Fourth-generation warfare minus five

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ABSTRACT
Whether discussing nation-state conflict or fourth-generation warfare, Clausewitzian principles are still valid. It is foolish to suggest that war has mutated beyond the nation-state and entered a fourth generation. A more realistic analysis is that war has again shifted to an older style as a practical response to overwhelming conventional military strength. While the actors may be different and the tactics unconventional, this shift to guerrilla warfare must not alter current war theory.

FULL TEXT
Whether discussing nation-state conflict or fourth-generation warfare, Clausewitzian principles are still valid. Some authors in the late 1980s and early 1990s offered a radical new theory that warfare was in the midst of change. They named it the fourth generation of warfare. This change was not based upon any revolution in military affairs or leaps in new computer-based technology but, rather, upon changes in the structure of the world. The thinking of these theorists is that globalism has made long-established political and international theories obsolete. War has been transformed from the domain of that of nation-states to transnational actors.

These conclusions were based on a survey of Western military theory beginning in the 16th century and concluding with an anti-Clausewitzian bias. In this theory the first generation of warfare dates back to Napoleon’s era of close order formations. The second generation of warfare was the Industrial Revolution-equipped mass armies of attrition, culminating with World War I. Then came the third generation of maneuver warfare during World War II. Now, we are supposedly in the fourth generation of warfare wherein wars are waged asymmetrically. Central to these arguments is that the modern nation-state no longer has a monopoly on war because of the new era of globalism. The strengths of such arguments rest in debunking Clausewitzian war that is based on defining nation-states while viewing transnational actors as unique. This is also the weakness of such arguments. The modern nation-state can be defined in two ways-first, through international law and, second, as a concept. International law recognizes nation-states through sovereignty. This is an artificial, legalistic, and subjective interpretation of what a nation-state is. Afghanistan under the Taliban was recognized by only three nations; thus, the current intervention in Afghanistan did not violate sovereignty nor did that intervention meet the legal definitions of war. However, it should be understood that international law is neither international nor law, but rather, it is how sovereign nations have chosen to conduct themselves with each other by agreement. This is a very Western concept.

Under the concept of the nation-state there is little question that the Taliban in Afghanistan believed they were a country. They maintained all of the government institutions associated with a nation-state, including sovereignty. This argument applies to the Palestinian National Authority, Chechens, and the Kurds in northern Iraq. The concept of nation extends further. Every guerrilla or civil war involves a national identity that is based on ethnic, religious, or ideological identification. The fact that these groups are not legally defined in international law does not detract from the reality of their national existence. Because most of these groups do not hold recognized territory and are frequently assisted by like-minded groups or by the process of diaspora, we call them transnational threats.
Terrorism/guerrilla warfare has been a factor in warfare since the beginning of war. Alexander the Great fought against guerrillas, as did the Roman Empire. Within the last two centuries most terrorism/guerrilla movements have been associated with revolutions, civil wars, or colonial struggles. The term guerrilla itself comes from the age of Napoleon. In 1874 at the Brussels Conference, during the height of colonial conquests, the Western world attempted to define guerrilla armies and moderate their conduct. This absurd attempt to codify legal combatants did nothing to change the reality of guerrilla war by non-Western transnational movements. By not adhering to international law, terrorists/guerrillas were unlawful combatants, or bandits, and not afforded protection under the laws of land warfare. This reflected a long-standing cultural bias of not recognizing non-European nations as nationstates. Recently, terrorists and guerrillas have been further defined to differentiate between attacks on military and civilian targets. This is as unworkable now as was the 1874 codification of guerrillas in international law.

Terrorism and guerrilla warfare are simply tactics, and neither is unique. What is unique is the modern environment. The difference between the current age of globalism and previous periods is global immigration and high-speed communications. Previously, books, magazines, newspapers, and letters required months to arrive. Ships were the only method of international travel and were considerably expensive. Now, global travel is cheap and quick, and ideas easily can be exchanged in a matter of seconds. This allows for greater coordination, but terrorism/guerrilla methods are largely the same-assassination, ambush, bombings, terrorism, and propaganda. The aims are the same as well-control of local populations to establish an alternative form of government.

In part, the United States inadvertently championed such movements in 1918 when President Woodrow T. Wilson announced the principle of self-determination. At the end of World War I, and the beginning of the second age of globalism, this concept spawned numerous “small wars.” It was President Wilson’s desire that self-determination would apply to colonies as well as in Eastern Europe and would be decided by peaceful plebiscite. Because rival mostly ethnic-groups claimed the same territory, self-determination proved to be a failure. In the colonial world there was a rise of national identity and anticolonial war. The legacy of self-determination with current policies of the modern world has given us a new round of small wars.

In 1928 a group known as the Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan al– Muslimin) was established in Egypt by Hasan al Banna. While religious in nature, it was really an anticolonial/nationalist movement. Its influence was felt from Morocco to the Horn of Africa, but its goals remained limited to the Islamic world. In Egypt the Muslim Brotherhood’s goal was governmental change that included ejecting the British influence that kept the current regime in power. The goals of the Muslim Brotherhood and other nationalist groups in Egypt found support in Nazi Germany. Al-Qaeda is little different today.

Following Operation DESERT STORM, al-Qaeda’s stated goals were a change in government in Saudi Arabia and the elimination of Western influence in the holy places. In order to accomplish these goals, al-Qaeda sponsored and coordinated with other Islamic groups whose local aims were regime change within their regions. Support for al-Qaeda came from like-minded groups and possibly nations whose local objectives might be assisted by al-Qaeda activities.

The attacks of 11 September 2001 are unique only in their scope of destruction and were made possible by modern transportation means. Other groups have attacked outside their regional objectives-Irish Republican Army attacks in London or the Chechen attacks in Moscow. In all cases the goals are to force changes in policy for more limited regional objectives.

Sovereignty has been the basis of international relations since the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. That treaty, like the 1874 Brussels Conference, helped define combatants and noncombatants. These are liberal Western concepts that managed European war and are artificial restraints as well. In practice, this did not give the state a monopoly on war, nor have these concepts been universally accepted. Similarly, the charter of the United Nations is fully accepted by most nation-states, but not all. What the nation-state largely has is a monopoly on industry that produces modern weapons.

It is true that the modern Western nation-states have declined in relative power, and this was by design. President Wilson’s League of Nations and President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s proposed United Nations were both aimed at maintaining the status quo; i.e., world peace. The United Nations’ charter specifically outlaws war except in self-defense. Thus, by mutual consent, war is no longer considered a legitimate instrument of national policy. By design, collective security for world peace became the mechanism that limits unilateral military action. With the end of the Cold War this became more of a fact than concept. With the greater integration of the global economy, most nations are willing to agree to these self-imposed restrictions out of self-interest. This hardly rules out wars between recognized nation-states, but rather, there are fewer reasons to go to war, and the reasons for war are far different. As an example, the war in Kosovo was justified by the
Serbs violation of the Human Rights Treaty of 1947. The Kosovo war was fought for this principle of human rights, not
for the traditional reason of national gain.

The nations that the United States currently is having the most difficulties with, and who are considered potential enemies,
are the nations that are the least integrated into the world economy and may seek gains by challenging the status quo.
These nations reject the notion that war is no longer an instrument of national policy. In the face of overwhelming military
power around the world, many nations have sponsored terrorist organizations. These nations are using terrorists as another
military tool to achieve their objectives.

This practice is not uncommon. It was the Imperial German Army that sponsored Lenin’s 1917 revolution in Russia. Later,
the Soviet Union would infiltrate agents worldwide, sponsoring civil unrest and revolution. In many cases these efforts
used local ethnic and religious differences or nationalistic movements to effect change. Later, in World War II, Nazi
Germany supported numerous groups in the Middle East and India to support their war efforts. External support for these
revolutionary/guerrilla/terrorist movements is vital but not confined to sovereign nations.

Al-Qaeda has obtained financial, intelligence, and logistics support through a variety of institutions in the same manner as
did the Irish Republican Army (IRA). Irish—American Catholics regularly contributed money and weapons to the IRA.
Like many Muslims, Irish—Americans maintained a national identity and thus were sympathetic to "the cause." This
scenario has been repeated many times, such as in the Armenian or Kurdish movements.

It is vital that we understand and acknowledge similarities and differences with past history within the context of the
current world situation. In developing new tactics or operational methods, generalizations of historical developments at
times are appropriate but should be used with extreme care. The so-called second generation of warfare, World War I,
holds examples of maneuver, particularly on the Eastern Front. Although many authors can find excellent examples of
maneuver warfare (the third generation) in World War II, that war was won by attrition.2

Technology and weapons are different today, but the nature of war is not. Calling the current rash of attacks evidence of a
fourth generation of warfare that is unique gives rise to misunderstandings and obfuscation. More importantly, it confuses
the debate regarding solutions and leads to lost opportunities, both domestically and abroad. For the military analysts it
creates the problem of understanding the enemy’s critical vulnerabilities.

The flawed Taliban regime had all of the traditional Clausewitzian elements. Their government and army were united in a
common policy. They had held out for years against the Northern Alliance, successfully fighting a long war of attrition.
Yet, the Northern Alliance, with minimal fire support provided by the United States, rapidly defeated the Taliban. This
can be explained easily because the Taliban lacked support by the Afghan people, a rather important element of
Clausewitz’s “trinity.” This event was predictable, and the late introduction of U.S. ground forces resulted in lost opportu-
nities.

Even if we accept the idea that we are now entering the fourth generation of warfare, it is important to remember that the
United States is a traditional nation-state. The Clausewitzian elements of trinity-government, people, and army—applies.
During the Vietnam conflict the U.S. government forgot this principle and attempted to pursue a cabinet war without
properly mobilizing the people. Ultimately, the United States lost that war. Attempting to redefine warfare into something
unique has allowed our senior policymakers to make the same mistakes as were made during the Vietnam conflict.3 This
is the greatest danger of the fourth-generation warfare theory.

Clausewitz was a philosopher whose fundamental understanding of war and work can be summarized in two ways. First
was the practical use of military power in the 19th century, and second was the application of political theory. On War has
few practical observations regarding guerrilla warfare. Even had he extensively written about irregular warfare, the
weapons and tactics of his day would be obsolete for 21st century use; however, the strength of his book rests with his
pure observations of war. Terrorists, guerrillas, revolutionaries, and irregulars present the same challenges today as they
did 50, 100, or 200 years ago. However, in order to be successful, they must still adhere to the basic political principles of
war recognized by Clausewitz.

There are very practical reasons for the rise of terrorism/guerrilla warfare, which were the same reasons for that type of
warfare during the previous two periods of globalization. We can hope that out of mutual interest there will be no more wars
between the great powers. Foolishly, statesmen in 1919 concluded that “the war to end all wars” was the definitive turning
point of nation-state conflicts. It is equally foolish to suggest today that war has mutated beyond the nation-state and
entered a fourth generation. A more realistic analysis is that war has again shifted to an older style as a practical response
to overwhelming conventional military strength. While the actors may be different and the tactics unconventional, this
shift to guerrilla warfare must not alter current war theory.
FOOTNOTE
Notes

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Gunfight at the Osicala Corral

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ABSTRACT
Small wars rarely grasp the attention of the mass media, and they are rarely studied these days. Armstrong shares his experiences during the 1988 counterinsurgency combat in Osicala, El Salvador.
Smaller wars rarely grasp the attention of the mass media, and they are rarely studied these days. But to those Marines and soldiers who participated, small wars, where the enemy is trying to kill you, quickly appear as high-intensity conflict. In this ninth installment of our 'Sting of Battle' series, LtCol Chuck Armstrong takes us back to the counterinsurgency in El Salvador in 1988.

I was pretty sure I was in for a boring day when I agreed to accompany a delegation of do-gooders to El Salvador's eastern war zone one morning in the fall of 1988. The delegation's reason for spending a day in the country's most conflictive department (think "state") was a photo session with El Salvador's famous poster girl—a child severely wounded by an insurgent mine a few years before. They wanted the world to see how she was growing up and to deliver a handful of presents to show she hadn't been forgotten. It was also a chance to visit an infantry battalion securing troubled terrain, a vital supply route, and hearts and minds of Salvadoran citizens. Little did I know this public relations gig would give me one of the tour's best insights into counterinsurgent warfare.

We loaded the dignitaries on a UH-1 helicopter in the capital of San Salvador about midmorning, then flew east to San Miguel to pick up the 3d Brigade's senior U.S. advisor, a savvy Army special forces major. From there we flew farther east to Osicala, a small town in the Department of Morazan, to link up with Col Roman Barrera, the Salvadoran Army colonel who commanded Military Detachment 4 (DM-4).

With Barrera as our host, we toured Osicala's main square, lunched on native fare at a makeshift restaurant, and spent a half-hour chatting with the now-teenaged poster girl.

Schmoozing complete, we headed toward the helicopter landing zone. During the goodbyes, I overheard a quiet conversation between Barrera and the battalion commander securing Osicala and the surrounding towns. Capt Jupiter told Barrera that intelligence predicted an attack on one of three towns in his area of responsibility that night—the primary target either Osicala or neighboring Delicias de Concepcion.

Barrera and I huddled briefly with the battalion officers at their streetside command post. I asked Roman if he had any objection to my staying with the rifle company securing Osicala. As always, he decided it was worth the slight risk of having America's naval attaché whacked on his watch to get one more objective report about the El Salvador Armed Forces' (ESAFs') warfighting abilities to his U.S. allies. I picked up my pack, slung my rifle, and made my way to the local company command post.

For the next few hours, activity in Osicala resembled any similar scene in many earlier wars. The company commander walked the town's perimeter with his officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs). They selected positions for M60 machineguns, planned local patrols, and agreed how to best employ their "supporting arms"—a lone M79 grenade launcher and two light antitank assault weapons. They laid routes from the reserve position (one squad) to the perimeter and distributed the password/countersign. Troops ate in shifts while cleaning weapons.

Chronically understrength at about 100 men, the company would be stretched thin that night. Two patrols would take 20 percent of the company's men. A fire team protected the mayor, a courageous lady who refused to sleep under DM-4's protection in Gotera, preferring to stay with her towns-people at night.

An hour after dark we woke to the sounds of a short, sharp firefight initiated by a friendly patrol. Moving to their night ambush position, the patrol had bumped into insurgents heading toward Osicala. The heavy "crack" of AK-47s answering the tight rattle of M16s told us the troops weren't shooting at shadows. Two "booms" from frag grenades later, firing tapered off. The patrol checked in by radio, reported no friendly casualties, and stated the insurgents had fled north. Lt MacArthur, the company commander, ordered the patrol to its alternate ambush site. Bandages and blood trails found the next day testified that the ESAF patrol had scored. Meanwhile, around the perimeter, everyone "stood to." The nearby firefight didn't mean Osicala was a main target, but it did signal the likelihood of at least a supporting attack. After an hour of nervous waiting, the company settled back to 20 percent alert.

Two hours later I stirred awake to a whispered message that buzzed the company commander's radio, "Movement to the front." The front, based on the call sign, was the open ground to the east of town center. In minutes the company was 100 percent alert. Seconds later, insurgent riflemen, hoping to spook the defenders into revealing their positions, opened fire from the east. Rounds cracked the air over the command post; insurgents were almost on top of the perimeter.

MacArthur quickly passed the word via radio to shoot only at confirmed targets; then-signaling to his radio operator and two nearby riflemen-he headed for the eastern perimeter. I joined his command group, figuring the best vantage point
would be with the company commander. With only starlight and a pale moon to light the way, we crossed the city center and took cover behind a tiny, outdoor restaurant on Osicala's eastern street. The dirt street smelled like livestock, and I recalled this was the place that served as the "corral" for cattle, pigs, goats, and other stock during local market days. As we crouched by the restaurant, AK-47 rounds from the eastern perimeter whacked into surrounding buildings and ricocheted off the stone wall protecting defenders. MacArthur whispered, "Es la hora," or "Time to go," and we raced across the open corral, around houses, and joined the fire team protecting a strongpoint on the perimeter's east side.

So far, only two defenders had returned fire. Despite several months in the bush with various ESAF units, I was still surprised at their fire discipline. As MacArthur conferred with his fire team leader, we could hear frustrated insurgents yelling to each other, then to the defenders as they tried to find their positions. Hidden from view and off the dim skyline, friendly troops yelled back, insulting the insurgents' marksmanship and mothers. This drew more fire but gave designated riflemen along the perimeter targets they could see and hit. Firing single shots, a few ESAF soldiers scored quick hits. Wounded insurgents screamed in pain, and the firing to our front stopped. After a few minutes of silence, MacArthur's command group made a stealthy trip the length of the eastern perimeter, stopping at each position with whispered words of encouragement to the troops.

For the next hour, insurgents probed the ESAF perimeter, trying to draw enough fire to find a route into the lines. ESAF troops fired only a few shots during that time, keeping automatic weapons silent and noise in defensive positions to a minimum. The insurgents were patient but working under a time constraint. Even if they did serious damage to the defenders during a full-scale attack, they needed to withdraw and disperse before dawn. MacArthur kept his command post near the eastern perimeter, which seemed the most likely place an attack would come. Only once did insurgents try to enter the town via another route—the northern draw covered by Plastico's M79. Responding to a listening post's report of movement, Plastico dropped a 40mm grenade round dead on target. One shot kept the northern perimeter secure.

Two hours after the first probing began, insurgents made the decision to withdraw. Under light covering fire and a final, heavy barrage of taunting insults, they slipped away toward the east. ESAF marksmen chased them with scattered rifle fire, but everybody knew the show was over. MacArthur walked the perimeter talking briefly to every soldier before returning to his command post in the center of town. Except for one rifleman scratched by chips of rock from a ricochet, no friendlies were hit. The gunfight at the Osicala corral was over.

The following morning, as the town stirred awake and local citizens thanked and congratulated soldiers for the night's defense, a nervous farmer hesitantly approached the command post. He said he had a message for "the American colonel" from insurgent commander Joaquin Villalobos (one of the five principal leaders of the insurgency). The message was simple: stay away from Osicala, or die. Since I was the only North American in town that morning, I assumed the message was for me. I thanked the farmer for passing the word and told him that if he saw Joaquin to respond for me, "Come any time; I'll be waiting." Troops around me laughed and hooted. In that culture, it was a perfect macho exchange.

Shortly after first light, the ESAF patrols came back to town. The patrol that had engaged insurgents brought several bloody bandages and a handful of ammunition recovered from the brief firefight. As troops cleaned weapons and rehashed the night's activities, MacArthur sent a patrol east of town. The patrol recovered bloody bandages, ammunition, explosives, and medical supplies. Flattened grass revealed the insurgents' attack positions. Conversations with local farmers indicated a force of 70 to 80 insurgents had massed against the town. There was no way to estimate casualties, and MacArthur didn't try. Since the insurgents never attacked in earnest, he officially reported a "harassment" against Osicala, rather than a thwarted night attack.

The Lessons

To veterans of raging tank battles, amphibious assaults, or heavy street fighting, the gunfight at the Osicala corral is barely a war story. Counterinsurgent warriors, however, will immediately recognize this fight as typical of many in small wars.

Counterinsurgent combat is the sum of many parts; most "shoot 'em ups" are small and quick. The same night Osicala was harassed, similar actions occurred in other towns in Morazan. In 2 years I would see or investigate the aftermath of scores of such "battles," most of which produced casualties and made local political statements without altering the course of the war.

Insurgencies are small unit leaders' wars. The senior officer in combat at Osicala was a lieutenant company commander whose battalion was led by a captain. Patrols were led by NCOs. The ESAF's senior officers were generally not shirkers, and field grade officers took to field frequently, but there weren't enough officers to man the line units to full strength. Unit dispersion—necessary to cover all of the ground and protect the infrastructure—ensured that the lion's share of the action would fall on junior soldiers.
Patton said, "There's only one kind of discipline-perfect discipline." In small wars, the only discipline is personal discipline. Only a dozen ESAF soldiers fired their weapons during the Osicala fight; fire discipline was excellent. No one on the perimeter left his position. The insurgent discipline, while not as good, was good enough. Unable to find an assailable hole in the defenses, the insurgents picked up their casualties and slipped away to fight another day. Widely dispersed troops have to count on each other to a greater degree than massed formations, so everybody has to perform.

The hearts and minds belong to the forces that stay for the long haul. ESAF soldiers in and around Osicala got good support from most of the townspeople. Despite its small size and remote location, Osicala was an important symbol to both the legitimate government and the insurgents. The government had to demonstrate its willingness and ability to protect the citizens; the insurgents needed to demonstrate their ability to keep that from happening. I was never near Osicala when it was not defended by at least a small unit of ESAF. The mayor never moved her office to a safer town. It was the ESAF's constant presence and good treatment of the citizens that kept their hearts and minds loyal.

Symbols are as strategically important as terrain. Osicala was attacked several times under different circumstances during my tour. Each time, insurgents tried to show their local superiority to government forces. Each time, they failed. Osicala was a pinprick on the map, but its location made it worth fighting over. However bloody the nights, when the sun came up over Osicala each morning, ESAF troops were visible and in full, confident control.

One often hears, "the night belongs to the guerrilla." That isn't true; the night is neutral. The ability to fight at night belongs to the soldier who trains for it and becomes comfortable at it. It was rare to find night vision gear in El Salvador, yet much of the combat occurred at night. Good soldiers in any army make the night their friend.

Courage, patience, firepower, and restraint are necessary components of counterinsurgency warfare. The object of the game isn't to kill every insurgent warrior, but to defeat the insurgent armed forces dramatically enough and often enough to let the political and cultural forces work through the root causes of the insurgency and get those fixed.

Epilogue

Joaquin Villalobos—for my money the best of the insurgent leaders—survived to join his country's political process. He took a respite after the war, moving with his family to England while he got a degree (in English literature, if memory serves me right) at Oxford. I hope to buy him a beer one of these days and get his views about the many gunfights at the Osicala corral.

LtCol Charles L. Armstrong, USMC(Ret)

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Progressive Reconstruction: Melding Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare With Nation Building and Stability Operations

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ABSTRACT
To increase the effectiveness of EMW in today's strategic landscape, the Marine Corps must increase the strategic agility and tactical flexibility of the concept. This calls for the ability to pacify as well as defeat the enemy. Keeping the enemy off balance throughout the theater by removing not just the immediate threat but also the roots of future threats is necessary.

ABSTRACT
The 21st century capstone concept of expeditionary maneuver warfare (EMW) calls on the Marine Corps to defeat America's enemies from the sea, utilizing the sea as a maneuver area with an enhanced ability to assail the asymmetrical enemy. Rohr discusses further the concept, which is built on the legs of operational maneuver from the sea, ship-to-objective maneuver, and seabasing.

FULL TEXT
2003 Chase Prize Essay Contest: First Place

'If when taking a native den one thinks chiefly of the market that he will establish there on the morrow, one does not take it in the ordinary way.'

-Marshall Lyautey

The 21st century capstone concept of expeditionary maneuver warfare (EMW) calls on the Marine Corps to defeat America's enemies from the sea, utilizing the sea as a maneuver area with an enhanced ability to assail the asymmetrical enemy. The concept is built on the legs of operational maneuver from the sea, ship-to-objective maneuver (STOM), and seabasing. This is a strong foundation and will carry the Marine Corps proudly and efficiently into the next century of conflicts. But, it could be made stronger still. The addition of yet one more leg, that of progressive reconstruction (PR), will fully round out the EMW concept to cover conflicts more indepth. PR will fully integrate the warfighting functions with the necessary rebuilding of the target nation, not after the war is complete, but right on the heels of the assault and capture of the objectives. By striking while the iron is hot—when U.S. influence is the strongest, immediately after the initial shock of the assault has been delivered—the Corps can gain a decisive advantage in peacemaking.

All our recent conquests . . . developed through two phases: that of the initial war, with the winning of apparently decisive victories, followed by that of insurrection, inevitable painful, and of which the issue was more administrative than military, the organization of the country.

-Gautier, 1910

PR is loosely based upon the French colonial concept of progressive occupation that assumed the initial conventional military victory and focused on immediate conservation and rehabilitation of the occupied territory.
In PR the transition phase begins immediately after the first rounds hit and the first objective is secured, and continues concurrently with combat operations. PR would limit the ability of terrorist or guerrilla forces by removing their power base utilizing a combination of applied force and politics—raid a town, build a school. The rear area forces would be organized to conduct area denial operations never allowing the insurgency to develop.

As we see today in Iraq such a policy of progressive occupation/reconstruction would have better served the pacification efforts by providing a military governmental structure to the newly liberated countryside in the wake of the assaulting forces. There would have been little to no power vacuum, and the coalition forces would have fully capitalized on the immense prestige created by the rapid destruction of the Iraqi armed forces.

In classical warfare (Clausewitz and Jomini) the goal is to crush an organization, a military machine. In a preemptive war on terrorism the goal of warfare is to create a stable democratic nation. To do so one must attack not only the armed forces of the enemy but also the roots of the psychology of terrorism—poverty, corruption, instability, etc. PR changes the focus of military intervention from a purely combat operation to a military-political action. In modern warfare the line between transition and decisive operations is becoming increasingly blurry. Stability operations need to be concurrent with decisive operations and not reserved for a separate transition phase. Interventionist forces must begin transforming the newly secured areas immediately and have a framework of reconstruction fully established while awaiting follow-on forces.

STOM and seabasing are designed to provide assured access and power projection. The question asked here is this, now that we have secured the objectives, what is next? In a raid, noncombatant evacuation operations, humanitarian assistance, or disaster relief, we withdraw. In a regime change we have to stay to replace the government. In regime support we have to stay to prop up the government. With PR in play the Marine Corps would be better prepared to deal with the latter two contingencies. PR focuses on democratic nation building and stability operations and can assist with humanitarian relief and infrastructure development. All would combine to reduce terrorist generation and insurrection.

Why PR?

PR brings the doctrine of the Corps in line with the preemptive threat removal theory currently in action. It would reduce emphasis on valid grievances, underemployment, and corruption; reduce terrorism by keeping or providing a governmental structure in areas no longer in the war zone; reduce the ability of the enemy remain behind and guerrilla forces from causing the coalition to lose the initiative in rear areas; reduce guerrilla potency by providing services—feeding, educating, rebuilding, and health care; reduce fear in areas that in regular military operations would often be left without protection; develop local self-defense forces or support local self-defense forces; and provide tangible evidence of a better future in rural and poor areas. In a regime change campaign, PR provides an immediate framework of government and a concentrated effort to win hearts and minds with orderly civic action all under one mission commander. Civic action would contribute to the betterment of the lives of the local population. It would gain the support, loyalty, and respect of the people for the government/military government and contribute, in some measure, to national development by building ties with the local population.

The enemy of America is that adapting, soft tactics are defeating our technological edge. The terrorists and guerrillas melt away when the heavy forces arrive, only to reemerge when they leave. T.E. Lawrence once stated that the advantage in an insurgency is in the hand of the insurgents through a common ideology: rationalized and focused discontent anchored in social organization. In this type of warfare, relationships with the people mean more than bullets and bombs. The firepower and technology advantage is important, but in counterinsurgency it is not decisive. Insurgents from rival states can obtain modern weapons and technologies. The recent disabling of an M1A1 main battle tank by a mystery round is an example. Artillery is marginalized, fixed-wing close air support (CAS) is limited, and rotary-wing CAS is vulnerable. Technology cannot replace sound strategic planning.

The goal of military intervention is to gain the collapse of the resistance as quickly as possible, thereby removing the imminent threat. PR provides a means to defeat an enemy who is not tied to a capital or other critical objective, and to fill the void created by the removal of the target nation government or the crushing of the insurgent main forces in the area of operation. The U.S. coalition zone should become a center of attraction vice repulsion. Military forces conducting PR must be capable of conducting a highly mobile defense with the capability to conduct saturation operations. Mobile infantry is necessary to protect resource centers—lines of communications/main supply routes, mercantile centers, ports, airfields, factories, power and water plants, and sanitation and medical facilities, and to protect national centers of influence—religious sites, universities, museums, and archeological sites, etc. The native population must profit in the U.S./United Nations/coalition presence. The protection should have a definite economic orientation. Encourage trade, attract investors, and bring not only a promise of security but also material prosperity.
PR Concepts

Within PR, the following concepts are applicable: advance militarily (hunt the insurgents and enemy armed forces); foster economic development on the heels of military action; control information by taking immediate control of television, radio, print, and Internet sources; ensure through embedded psychological operations that the population attributes improvements to U.S./government intervention. The military forces must conduct population and resource controls—overt and covert surveillance of population; conduct movement control and curfews and issuance of papers (manifests, identification); concentrate on visible benefits to the people who work with us and foster peaceful relations; isolate the troubled areas; operate on a wide front, rapidly creating secure rear areas; utilize surprise attacks and encirclement against insurgent strongholds; develop and utilize local auxiliary forces for intelligence and security. Our forces must be organized—regular forces for point defense and raids. Our forces must conduct operations designed to transform dissidents into associates. We can't neglect political warfare. Devising ways to undermine the power of the government being replaced, we can conduct a systematic disintegration of the old power base—removal of authority from the old regime's former supporters.

Unity of Command

Unity of command equals unity of effort. Why? Because military and civilian officials don't always view success in the same way and because political action is more important than military. Clear military and political goals must be established and developed from a common source before the invasion/intervention begins. Unity of command must reach beyond just military functions. "A colonial expedition should always be under the command of the chief appointed to be the first administrator of the country after its conquest (Marshal Hubert Lyautey)." The goal is to ensure that the commander views the invasion/intervention as a whole entity—not as two parts—further integrating the warfighting with the peacemaking efforts. Additional unified territorial commands will need to be established in the occupied territory. (I Marine Expeditionary Force in Iraq splitting the southern zone into regimental combat teams and battalion sectors is a good example.) This would create, not an occupied point but a zone, and not a military post but a center of influence and action. All of these zones must answer to a common leader—a leader who also commanded the initial invasion/intervention. This will further enhance the prestige of the occupying forces.

Force Structure: Warfighters-Peacemakers-Nation Builders

In this type of warfare it is necessary to alter the traditional Western designed force structure that is built for the European battlefields. Force structure must meet the unique requirements of the counterinsurgency. No force is more uniquely qualified for peacemaking than the Marine Corps. The Marine Corps' force structure—heavy on mounted infantry—is perfect for stability operations. The Marine air-ground task force is a complete package, not only for warfighting but also in engineering and service support. The same structures could be augmented to serve the role of nation builders. With the addition of joint, coalition, and governmental assets the Marine expeditionary brigade would be the perfect platform from which to launch the PR concept.

Marines could participate by supporting the active defense; building local auxiliary forces, police, and army; and guarding key infrastructure points (power, communications, transportation). They can assist with the rebuilding or building of key infrastructure points. If planned in advance, they could foster the rebuilding of the market, making the target nation economically feasible and self-sustaining, thereby providing jobs and making daily life safer.

To increase the effectiveness of EMW in today's strategic landscape, the Marine Corps must increase the strategic agility and tactical flexibility of the concept. This calls for the ability to pacify as well as defeat the enemy. Keeping the enemy off balance throughout the theater by removing not just the immediate threat but also the roots of future threats is necessary. It must be stressed that transition begins immediately after the first round impacts with the boots on the ground and the capture of the first objectives. Again, the goal of PR is to ensure that when combat operations are over there is already a unified government/military government in control of the target nation demonstrating the benefits of U.S. military intervention, adding a key piece of stability in order to reduce the breeding ground for terrorists and insurgents. Thus, by acknowledging that the only way to defeat swarms of mosquitoes is not by attacking each individual but by draining the swampland in which they breed, the Marine Corps can likewise benefit by adding PR to the EMW concept. By conducting PR behind combat operations, the Marine Corps will demonstrate the true benefits of democracy.

by Maj Karl C. Rohr

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Air Support in Counterinsurgencies

BYLINE: Melson, Charles D

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ABSTRACT


ABSTRACT


FULL TEXT

Most Marines are familiar with the literature of insurgency and counterinsurgency. Indeed, insurgencies have been more common than major conflicts in the history of mankind and deserve equal concern. Others have recently begun to do their homework into what may be the distinctive form of conflict of the 21st century. A new element since the dawn of the previous century has been aviation technology, though more useful on the side of the counterinsurgent than the insurgent, and even the rebel has had to adjust to this new element or suffer accordingly. But while aerospace theorists have expounded airpower from the beginning, they have paid little attention to the impact of this modern means of warfare on one of its most ancient and recurrent military problems—small wars.

Two recent books tackle the theory and practice of how to employ air weapons in the suppression of insurgency. The first is by two authors who have made a career of teaching both U.S. airmen and Marines. Professor Wray R. Johnson is currently at the Marine Corps University in Quantico, while coauthor Professor James S. Corum instructs at the U.S. Air Force School of Advanced Airpower Studies in Montgomery, AL. In addition to academic qualifications, Johnson is a career U.S. Air Force special operations officer, and Corum has a U.S. Army intelligence background as a Reserve officer. Their goal was to fill the gap in writing on this subject by examining a spectrum of small wars that had airpower as an
element. The result is a well-documented account of some 10 chapters that address the spectrum of fighting from early American and European colonial wars through modern British, French, and American experience up until Vietnam. Contemporary conflicts in Africa, the Middle East, and South America move history into current events. Both authors establish the background to the various conflicts, the forces involved, and the part played by airpower in resolving the issue. Sometimes this was decisive, and sometimes less so. For example, only the unconventional aspects of airpower in Vietnam were discussed rather than the conventional air campaign in North Vietnam and air support in the south.

While most Marines are familiar with the origins of close air support during the Banana Wars (and even with Philippine guerrillas in World War II), they will be less comfortable with parallel developments, including both the Soviet Union in Afghanistan and Israel in Palestine against Islamic extremists. The section on southern African conflicts through 1990 is unique, and one that I responded to, involving Portugal, Rhodesia, and South Africa. These wars took place while the United States was focused on Southeast Asia. Yet, along with the British experience during the same period, they provide a wealth of useful study on how to handle low-level conflict with limited resources. In each, air forces played a critical tactical role, although politics decided the final outcomes.

This leads to the second book under consideration, moving from theory into practice—in this case Rhodesia. Group Capt Peter Petter-Bowyer flew from 1957 until 1980. His career started with the jet fighters and bombers that had held pride of place in the Commonwealth order of battle. Petter-Bowyer moved on to helicopters and light aircraft used to kill insurgents in a real war lasting some 13 years. Illustrated were the need to integrate air support with ground maneuver, changes in air weapons and delivery (conventional bombs and rockets were traded for guns and napalm), and dependable low-tech aircraft. This transformation is documented in an autobiography that anyone who has flown will appreciate. For ground officers, it is the view from the cockpit by a professional who has much to offer.

One of the main lessons of both books is that air forces configured for conventional operations can shift to use in counterinsurgencies by emphasizing supporting roles rather than the holy grail of “victory through airpower.” Transport, communications, and helicopter tactical support are needed more than fighters and bombers in a strategic role. This is as much a mindset as training and equipment. Flexibility in transforming this view is one Marines should be familiar with and should be willing to share with their U.S. Air Force, Navy, and Army counterparts. Both books are recommended as means to that end.

SIDEBAR

While most Marines are familiar with the origins of close air support during the Banana Wars (and even with Philippine guerrillas in World War II), they will be less comfortable with parallel developments, including both the Soviet Union in Afghanistan and Israel in Palestine against Islamic extremists.

by Maj Charles D. Melson, USMC(Ret)

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The Next Decade

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ABSTRACT
Foreign powers have never done well in Afghanistan over time. For us to be successful in Afghanistan, we will have to continue building and working with the ANA. U.S. Army and Marine advisors have been working extremely hard to train and employ the ANA. One of the reasons the 22d MEU(SOC) was successful in Afghanistan was our ability to operate successfully with ANA and Afghan Militia Forces (AMF). AMF are largely subordinate to local military and political leaders appointed by the central government.

ABSTRACT
US Marines were the first conventional forces to enter Afghanistan after Sept 11, 2001. The Marines of Task Force 58, led by then-BGen James N. Mattis, spearheaded the American offensive that led to the fall of the Taliban regime. Here, Cavan and Bullard discuss the effort of the Marine Corps in supporting operations in Afghanistan.

FULL TEXT
The Marine Corps should anticipate supporting operations in Afghanistan for the foreseeable future. U.S. Marines are not strangers to security operations, counterinsurgency, nation building, and counternarcotic operations; they have engaged in each of these before. The war on terrorism requires that Marines hone these skills to aggressively eliminate the physical and financial bases of terrorist support. Accomplishing this mission in Afghanistan will require conducting offensive combat operations to take the fight to the enemy and building the Afghan National Army (ANA). Given the success that Marines have had since Task Force 58, 6th Marines and, most recently, 22d Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) (22d MEU(SOC)), we can anticipate that Marine forces will remain involved in Afghanistan for the next decade.

U.S. Marines were the first conventional forces to enter Afghanistan after 11 September 2001. The Marines of Task Force 58, led by then-BGen James N. Mattis, spearheaded the American offensive that led to the fall of the Taliban regime.

Deploying from amphibious shipping and using Pakistan as a springboard for offensive operations, the Marines worked closely with special operations forces and other government agencies to bring the Taliban to their knees. Since then, Marines have been continually involved in that remote country best known for its fierce terrain, fierce tribal loyalties, and fierce fighting spirit.

Surge and Security Operations

Until the Afghan military is able to provide security across the entire country, there remains the requirement to conduct continued offensive combat operations to maintain the initiative and keep transnational terrorism from reestablishing a foothold and support base in Afghanistan. Task Force 58, 6th Marines and, recently, the 22d MEU(SOC) have demonstrated that Marines are well-disposed to conducting offensive combat operations in this harsh environment.
The theater reserve in the U.S. Central Command (USCentCom) area of operations is most often a MEU operating as part of an expeditionary strike group. 22d MEU(SOC), as the USCentCom theater reserve, was committed as part of this year's spring offensive, Operation MOUNTAIN STORM. Marines, whether committed as part of a MEU or deployed as organic units, will continue to be called to service in Afghanistan to serve side by side with the ANA and other coalition forces.

The predominant reason that commanders prefer Marine airground task forces is because their expeditionary mindset facilitates offensive operations. These offensive operations allow the projection of power into previously inaccessible areas of the country through the establishment of remote forward operating bases (FOBs), such as the 22d MEU(SOC)'s establishment of FOB Ripley and several smaller bases that initially supported offensive operations, then, as they were turned over to U.S. Army forces, became bases from which to support further stability and development operations, such as the United Nations-sponsored voter registration and elections and the construction of a paved road from Kandahar to Tarin Kowt.

U.S. Marine units have also been tasked to provide additional forces to augment other operations in Afghanistan. A Marine infantry battalion (recently 2d Battalion, 8th Marines (2/8) and now 3/6) and a Marine CH-53 squadron have been operating in eastern Afghanistan since 2003, augmenting U.S. Army forces conducting security operations in this area. From February to June 2004, the 6th Marines regimental headquarters provided command and control (C^sup 2^) for the task force centered on the Marine infantry battalion, reinforced with a U.S. Army infantry battalion and other joint forces. Whether to surge or to augment, Marine units should expect to operate in Afghanistan to enhance either the combat power or C^sup 2^ of joint forces on the ground. On the aviation side, Marine CH-53s, and eventually MV-22s, will be essential to sustaining operations that place a heavy demand on logistics in the high altitudes and rough terrain of Afghanistan, and will likely be called upon to add to the capabilities of the fleet of CH-47s. In addition, U.S. Marine units also serve in Afghanistan as part of the force providing security at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul.

Building an Afghan Face

Foreign powers have never done well in Afghanistan over time. For us to be successful in Afghanistan, we will have to continue building and working with the ANA. U.S. Army and Marine advisors have been working extremely hard to train and employ the ANA. One of the reasons the 22d MEU(SOC) was successful in Afghanistan was our ability to operate successfully with ANA and Afghan Militia Forces (AMF). AMF are largely subordinate to local military and political leaders appointed by the central government. These militia forces have very little training and were designed as an interim force to provide security until the ANA was stood up. AMF, lacking in training and discipline, are more prone to corruption. Ultimately, each individual militia group continues to simply enforce the will of its respective commander, without effectively coordinating with other AMF units and developing a strategy that leads to a successful campaign nationwide against transnational terrorists. The enemy in Afghanistan understands and exploits the lack of coordination between AMF units. They move between different jurisdictions, targeting isolated forces and taking advantage of the disjointed nature of security in Afghanistan.

The solution to the woes of the factional AMF is the creation of a federal armed force-the ANA. U.S. Marines provide advisors to train and equip the new Afghan Army. Marines have long had a history of building indigenous security forces, from Nicaragua to Iraq. The enthusiasm, dedication, and professionalism of junior Marine officers and noncommissioned officers is contagious, and the exemplary leadership that Marines provide is rapidly emulated by any force they lead, whether in training or in combat. Alongside U.S. Army counterparts, the Marines have played a crucial role in developing the fledgling military force that is the ANA, and will continue to play an integral part in the rebuilding of a national Service capable of waging and winning a counterinsurgency. In fact, it is the maturing of this organization that will enable the eventual withdrawal of American military forces from Afghanistan. Until then, Marine units will inevitably operate next to ANA and AMF forces.

While the ANA and AMF fighters are aggressive and willing to fight, they require additional assistance to make them successful on the battlefield. In our experience, we had to provide sustainment, communications, and combat identification to the ANA and AMF units for them to be successful. We also used liaison officers who moved and fought with the ANA and AMF units to enhance C^sup 2^.

The current infantry-heavy ANA force lacks the ability to sustain itself logistically in the field and lacks the transportation assets necessary for effective ground and air mobility. The ANA currently relies exclusively on the coalition for its training, support, and mobility. This is not likely to change for years to come, until sufficient numbers of Afghan military professionals have been trained to standard in the warfighting functions of logistics and fire support to enable the ANA to be self-sufficient. While the initial focus of U.S. advisors will remain on building the infantry core of the ANA, as end strength continues to grow there will be an increasing need for training in supporting functional areas, such as admin-
istration, finance, and combat service support. An effective military support structure must overcome bureaucratic red tape and insipient government corruption to ensure that its soldiers receive their pay. All too commonly, ANA soldiers must wait months to receive their wages. Furthermore, the ANA must develop its own trained and experienced cadre capable of unilaterally sustaining recruiting and training programs. Here too, Marines, known for their ability to instruct and instill discipline, can assist the growing force. Additionally, as the proficiency and professionalism of the ANA increases, there will be a new effort required to take its leaders to the next level of mastery of tactics, techniques, and procedures. Enhancing the ANA's combat capabilities with proficiency in the use of combined arms and the integrated use of aviation assets will require advanced training, and who better to train them than experts in combined arms and integrated aviation—the U.S. Marines.

Fighting the war on terrorism requires the U.S. military to maintain a presence overseas where terrorists operate. Until indigenous forces are properly trained and offer the right level of security and stability, there will be a role for the U.S. military, and U.S. Marine Corps, in those areas. Afghanistan is one such area where Marines will continue to play a significant part supplementing coalition forces with additional military capability during offensive surge operations against the enemy and assisting in the building of a military force for national defense and internal security. Marines do well in these types of operations because we maintain an expeditionary mindset and are willing to take the fight to the enemy rather than have him bring the fight to our shores.

For more articles from BLT 1/6 operations in Afghanistan, go to the MCG web site at www.mcamarines.org/gazette.

SIDEBAR
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by 1stLt Joshua Cavan & Capt Bob Bullard

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* Capt Bullard is currently serving as the Intelligence Officer, BLT 1/6.

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GRAPHIC: Photographs
IMAGE PHOTOGRAPH, Capt Keith Buffa, 22d MEU(SOC), meets with village elders in Khas Qruzgan, Afghanistan. (Photo courtesy of Capt Eric Dent.)
IMAGE PHOTOGRAPH, CH-46ES from Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 266 (Reinforced) fly over a FOB during Operation THUNDER ROAD. (Photo courtesy of GySgt Keith A. Milks.), Marines from 22d MEU(SOC) conduct a civil affairs assessment in a village in south-central Afghanistan. (Photo courtesy of GySgt Keith A. Milks.)
Battle for An Najaf, August 2004

ABSTRACT
On 2 August, Battalion Landing Team 1st Battalion, 4th Marines (BLT 1/4), 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) (11th MEU(SOC)) was attacked by Muqtada Militia (MM) forces outside the exclusion zone in Najaf, Iraq. On 5 August, MM forces conducted a harassing attack against the Najaf main Iraqi police station and were repelled by Iraqi Security Forces (ISF).

ABSTRACT
Despite the cultural and historical significance of Najaf, the former regime of Saddam Hussein ignored the Shi'a region of Iraq. In August 2004, coalition forces crushed an insurgency in the city which dramatically improved living conditions for the city's residents. Here, an examination of the cultural and historical significance of the Imam Ali Shrine and mosque complex in the old city of Najaf and the conditions that caused Najaf to become a fertile recruiting ground for insurgents is presented.

FULL TEXT
Coalition crushing an insurgency without breaking the china.

On 2 August, Battalion Landing Team 1st Battalion, 4th Marines (BLT 1/4), 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) (11th MEU(SOC)) was attacked by Muqtada Militia (MM) forces outside the exclusion zone in Najaf, Iraq. On 5 August, MM forces conducted a harassing attack against the Najaf main Iraqi police station and were repelled by Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). When MM forces attacked the Iraqi police station for the second time later that day, the governor of Najaf requested military support from coalition forces (CF), I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) and the 11th MEU(SOC) answered the governor's "9-1-1" call and conducted successful military operations in Najaf. The success of this operation was due in large part to the effective joint/combined coordination of U.S. Army and Iraqi units.

This article examines the cultural and historical significance of the Imam Ali Shrine and mosque complex in the old city of Najaf. The article examines the conditions that caused Najaf to become a fertile recruiting ground for insurgents, provides an analysis of the friendly forces and their conduct, and includes a time-line of key events. The article concludes with several tactical lessons learned that are easily understood by the newest Marine or soldier.

Cultural and Historical Significance
Those who have conducted previous operations in Najaf will remember vividly that to the north and east of the town there are acres of graves and myriads of domes of various colors and in various stages of disrepair.2 Whoever goes to Najaf will follow a road that approaches the town by a winding course through a vast cemetery.3

The Mausoleum itself of Hazrat Ali at Najaf is breathtaking. There is one large central dome which stands out of a square-shaped ornate structure at the two sides of which are two minarets. The predominant color of the exterior is gold, bright shining gold and the entire exterior of the mausoleum is inlaid with a mosaic pattern of light powder blue, white marble, gold again with an occasional splash of Middle East rust.4

Countless numbers of people from all over the world flock to the tomb in the old city of Najaf day after day to pay their respects, to offer salutations, and to pray to Allah seeking his intercession.5

An Najaf Recruiting Ground

Despite the cultural and historical significance of Najaf, the former regime of Saddam Hussein ignored the Shi’a region of Iraq. Tourism and subsistence farming provided the bulk of local employment opportunities. From November 2003 to April 2004, a lack of project funding, limited commander’s emergency response program resources, and latent MM presence inhibited the ability of the CF to stabilize the area. The MM deterred local tourism and intimidated contractors. Consequently, impoverished communities provided fertile recruiting areas for the MM.

The current governor, Adnan Al Ziruffi, is a strong and farsighted leader. His power is based in the Council of Sheikhs whom he trusts as advisors and allies. Until 5 August, the 11th MEU(SOC) did not operate within the preexisting exclusion zones surrounding the old city of Najaf, the Najaf cemetery, and the town of Kufa. Following the second attack on the Najaf main Iraqi police station on the morning of 5 August, Governor Ziruffi requested coalition support and provided his approval for MEU forces to enter the cemetery in order to pursue the MM. The governor was determined to remove the MM for its criminal behavior and depressing effect on the economy of Najaf. He did not want, however, another partial solution as happened in the first battle that occurred from April to June 2004. The end result of the first battle was that the MM remained in the city, and CF were restricted from entering certain zones where the MM remained. Once he was convinced the Interim Iraqi Government and CF were decisively engaged, he wanted the job finished.

I MEF proposed to Multinational Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) a plan to assume operational control of the 11th MEU(SOC) and gain two Iraqi provinces—An Najaf and Ah Qadisiyah. On order from then-Commanding General, LtGen James T. Conway, I MEF (Forward (Fwd)) activated and deployed to the Najaf area of operations (AO). Commanded by BGen Dennis J. Hejlik, I MEF (Fwd) was established because of coalition diplomatic sensitivities and the increasing size and complexity of the urban military operations in Najaf and Kufa. MNC-I reinforced I MEF (Fwd) with the 11th MEU(SOC), commanded by Col Tony Haslam. 11th MEU(SOC) (Reinforced) was further task organized with 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry Regiment and 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment from 1st Cavalry Division (Army battalion task forces with M1A2 main battle tanks and M2 Bradley armored fighting vehicles), 1st/227th Aviation Battalion (Apaches), the 1st Brigade Iraqi Intervention Force (IIF), the 36th Commando Battalion (36th CDO), the Iraqi Counterterrorism Force (ICTF), and the 405th Iraqi National Guard (405th ING) Battalion and three ING companies from neighboring provinces in Iraq. (See Figure 1.)

Friendly National Iraqi Forces6

IIF. The IIF and 36th CDO are bright spots. Both units are part of the Ministry of Defense. The IIF performed their assigned duties well. The ICTF and the 36th CDO performed equally well. All of the Iraqi Armed Forces operated with embedded U.S. advisors. These advisors were essential in combat because of their close working relationships with their units, their added leadership, and their ability to fulfill technical military requirements.

ING. Unlike the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (renamed the ING in April), the ING units did not disintegrate as operations began. However, ING battalion strengths did fluctuate. ING units performed well at vehicle checkpoints (VCPs), tactical control points (TCPs) and in defensive roles, with some smaller formations performing well in offensive operations. Company A, 404th ING Battalion, based in Qadisiyah Province, participated in the Najaf operations from 7 to 16 August. All of the 405th participated in the fighting and maintained all of their TCPs. A company each from the 401st and 402d ING Battalions also participated in operations. A company from the 401st, 402d, and 404th ING Battalions were force fed to Najaf by the 50th Brigade commander. The three ING companies remained at a forward operating base (FOB) and received logistical support from the CF.7 These companies were called back to their original areas of operation due to security concerns resulting from the Najaf fighting and Muqtada al-Sadr’s "wounding.” Only the 405th ING Battalion

Of Insurgency, Arab History, and Militant Islam Marine Corps Gazette January 2005
from Najaf remained in place. The 405th ING Battalion received many accolades from IIF advisors during their participation in the Najaf clearing operations following combat operations.

Iraqi Police Service (IPS). The commander of the IPS, BG Ghaleib Al Jazaeri, exercised tight control over his officers. The IPS routinely stood and fought in defense of police stations. Indeed, effective IPS operations against MM criminal elements partly engendered the violent MM reaction that culminated on 5 August. On that day the MM mounted three attacks on a police station holding over 100 MM detainees. The third attack resulted in the decisive engagement with Marine forces and the beginning of the end of the MM operating in Najaf.

Najaf and Kufa Events/Timeline.

In early April, al-Sadr and his militia mounted a series of major attacks in key cities throughout southern Iraq. The fighting centered on Najaf. The intensity of the fighting quickly proved too great for the local ISV and Multinational Division-Central South (MND-CS) forces in the Najaf Province. MND-CS and local officials requested reinforcements. The 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment (2d ACR) assumed AO Spur (Najaf) for the period of 20 April to 7 June and began operations outside the exclusion zone, defined as the 1 kilometer buffer area surrounding the Kufa Mosque, old city Najaf, and the Najaf cemetery.

The 2d ACR concentrated on the security and restoration of lines of communications-Main Supply Route Tampa and local alternate supply routes. On 17 June a small battalion task force (TF), TF Dragon, from 1st Infantry Division, whose mission was to conduct limited stability and combat operations in order to facilitate the relief in place (RIP) and transfer of authority (TOA) with 11th MEU(SOC), replaced 2d ACR. In the course of the transition, very limited information on the April to June period was passed between units. Until the RIP/TOA with the 11th MEU(SOC), TF Dragon’s actions in the city consisted of joint VCP manning with ING and IPS patrolling, base security, and ISF training. 11th MEU(SOC) relieved TF Dragon on 31 July.9 (See sidebar.)

Tactical Lessons Learned in Four Categories: Equipment, Fires, Tactics, and Snipers10

Thermobaric rounds were used effectively to destroy enemy machinegun and squad/platoon positions during the heavy fighting in the old city of Najaf. However, a long-range precision thermobaric capability would complement the current capability resident in the rifle platoons’ organic weapons.

Typically, enemy forces would not show themselves during the period of AC-130 coverage because of the predictable AC-130 on-station time and its telltale audio signature. When employed in direct support of maneuver elements, the enemy would react to the maneuver force and expose themselves to the accurate fires of the AC-130. Probing attacks with tanks caused the enemy to expose his positions to the AC-130 and enabled their immediate destruction with fires, allowing the maneuver force to continue its attack. When the AC-130 is employed in conjunction with maneuver elements, the goal should be to induce the enemy to expose himself in order to maximize the AC-130's accurate direct fires.

Rules of engagement (ROE) and clearance of fires were issues of concern throughout the Najaf campaign. While the importance of minimizing collateral damage was clearly understood, many of the various buffer zones and exclusion zones were too restrictive, eliminating timely engagement of known targets. The old “react to indirect fire” battle drill of "9 o'clock, 400 meters" doesn't work in close terrain like the cemetery or the old city. In the future, various fire “zones” or engagement criteria should be carefully stated in a manner that leads to simple decisions regarding fire clearance. Furthermore, an approval authority for fires must always be immediately available.

CF snipers were employed in teams of four in general support of BLT 1/4 and in direct support while attached to the companies or other battalions (such as 2d Battalion. 7th Cavalry Regiment). Once the sniper teams gained a foothold, the snipers moved into and occupied key terrain to control rooftops, cover avenues of approach, and provide overwatch for the infantry during patrols and movement.

Marines or soldiers who are unfamiliar with the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) of the enemy snipers should not be utilized to locate them. They invariably become targets of opportunity for the enemy they are trying to locate. Snipers should not occupy rooftops unless concealed by trash, blankets, etc.

In addition, insurgent snipers employed many distinct TTP in Najaf. These included (1) establishing multiple firing positions on a second story using mouse holes or recessed windows in which the shooter is concealed by shadows and darkness; (2) operating primarily during the day, snipers constantly relocated their positions and limited the number of shots fired from each position; (3) using other snipers as decoys to draw enemy fire and deceive the enemy as to the actual sniper positions; (4) exclusively employing armor piercing rounds; (5) using 7- to 10-year-old children to spot friendly
sniper positions and report their locations; and (6) working in conjunction with light machinegun/rocket propelled grenade (RPG) teams to cover their fires.

Scout/sniper teams must be employed in general support of the maneuver battalion while ensuring that the teams train with the infantry companies during the workups. As infantry units continue to move in the city, so do the sniper teams. If the teams are attached to other units outside of the battalion, a small number of infantry should be provided to ensure they are focused on the mission of target location and target reduction, instead of providing their own local security.

Conclusion

The battle to liberate the old city of Najaf, that effectively integrated the Marine air-ground task force with Army mechanized battalions, ISF ground forces, and U.S. Navy and U.S. Air Force close air support (CAS), dramatically improved living conditions for the city’s residents. The Imam Ali Shrine and mosque complex opened for prayer in time for Ramadan. Muqtada al-Sadr was defeated and the MM severely attrited. ISF performed remarkably well-enhancing overall security during combat operations and spearheading search and seizure operations during consequence management. Elections in Najaf will be held in January 2005.

The citizens of Najaf appreciate the CF and still view them as liberators. In the recent crisis, the local government was in favor of the complete elimination of the MM and the arrest or death of al-Sadr. Today that sentiment still remains in Najaf. Civil-military operations are in high gear with nearly $9 million spent in restoration and reconstruction. Project implementation proceeded rapidly and thereby undercut insurgent reorganization and recruiting efforts. Moreover, CF pressure in the form of active security patrols and direct action missions has disrupted MM activities. Effective military pressure, civil reconstruction projects, and the professional development of the ISF have greatly improved the atmospheres within the city of Najaf and town of Kufa. This strategic change has also rendered the MM ineffective, thereby neutralizing a major destabilizing force in the Najaf Province.

Time will bear witness to the heroic efforts of Marines and soldiers who fought street by street to the Imam Ali Shrine with the Iraqi National Forces. Although battle damage and rubble filled the streets around the shrine after the battle, by design, the cultural icon of the Shi'ite remained intact and untouched. Through precision targeting, fire discipline, and time-tested small unit leadership, an urban insurgency was crushed without damage to the main objective. For this reason, the battle for Najaf will find a place of honor among the annals of hallowed Marine Corps history.

SIDEBAR

Highlights of combat operations in and around Najaf during August.

* 31 July to 2 August.
* MM armed forces operated outside of exclusion zones, manned checkpoints, kidnapped ISF, and conducted harassing attacks.

* 2 August.
* BLT 1/4 conducted local security patrol outside of the exclusion zone and was attacked by MM forces in the vicinity of the maternity hospital in Najaf. BLT 1/4 Combined Antiarmor Team A (CAAT A) returned fire and killed an estimated 10 MM. No friendly casualties.

* 5 August.
* MM conducted harassing attack from the Najaf cemetery on the main Iraqi police station.
* MM attacked Najaf main Iraqi police station again, and the governor requested CF assistance.
* Motorized quick reaction force (QRF), CAAT (reinforced), from FOB Hotel was deployed.

* 0830 the QRF was engaged vicinity of the main Iraqi police station by an estimated 300 MM located in and around the Najaf cemetery. QRF returned fire and requested mechanized QRF.

* A mechanized QRF (assault amphibious vehicles, light armored vehicles, and M1A1s) was dispatched to reinforce the forces engaged.
* Rotary-wing CAS was launched to provide on-call CAS.

* One UH-1N was shot down with two crewmembers sustaining injuries,
* Mechanized QRF rerouted to secure the site of the downed aircraft.
* Company A, 1/4 ordered to deploy from FOB Echo in Diwaniyah to reinforce battalion in Najaf.
* Najaf governor orders ING and IPS to seal Kufa and Najaf.
* Joint Coordinator Center coordinated the reinforcement of TCPs with additional ISF along avenues of approach leading into Najaf.
* One UH-IN recovered to FOB.
* Maritime special purpose force and BLT reconnaissance dispatched to reinforce TCP 1.
* 11th MEU commanding officer requested additional maneuver battalion to support combat operations in Najaf.
* Report from MNC-I via MND-CS indicated that "busloads of MM reinforcements" were moving toward Najaf from Baghdad and An Nasiriyah.
* MNC-I/MND-CS relayed plan to reinforce 11th MEU with a battalion TF from 1st Cavalry Division.
* Company A, 1/4 completed its movement and link up with BLT 1/4.
* Intelligence reported MM command element in charge of "cemetery defenses" was overrun and destroyed by Marine forces. Estimated 130 MM killed.

**SIDEBAR**

* TF 1-5 Cavalry advanced echelon arrived at FOB Duke.
* Upon approval from Commanding General (CG), MNC-I, BLT 1/4 (Minus)(Reinforced) attacked to clear MM forces within eastern sector of Najaf cemetery.
* 6 August.
* BLT 1/4 continued the attack in the Najaf cemetery.
* Linkup between the 11th MEU(SOC) and lead elements of TF 1-5 Cavalry.
* Numerous weapons caches uncovered yielding thousands of rounds of ammunition, hundreds of RPGs, AK-47s, and improvised explosive device making material.
* 7 August.
* ING raided an al-Sadr safehouse.
* TF 1-5 Cavalry main body arrived at FOB Duke.
* BLT 1/4 reached limit of advance (Route Hayes).
* 8 August.
* BLT 1/4 withdrew from Najaf cemetery to refit and rearm.
* I MEF (Fwd) assumed operational control.
* Exclusion zones for Najaf and Kufa reduced.
* 9 August.
* TF 1-5 attacked to clear western sector of Najaf cemetery.
* 11th MEU(SOC) CHOP (change of operational control) to Multinational Force-West (MNF-W).
* 10 August.
* TF 2-7 Cavalry arrives FOB Duke.
* 11 August.
* Company A, 404th ING returned to Diwaniyah.
* First cessation of offensive operations (24 hours) directed by MNC-I.
* 12 August.
* TF 2-7 Cavalry attacked in zone to clear MM forces. Lead element engaged at 0645.
* TF 2-7 occupied battle positions southwest of Najaf.
* All three maneuver battalions were in contact with the enemy and surrounded the Imam Ali Mosque complex.
* BLT 1/4 raided al-Sadr's house and maternity hospital.
* TF Commando raided the Salah Mosque in Kufa.
* 13 August.
* Second cessation of offensive operations directed by MNCT.
* Al-Sadr reportedly wounded.
* 14 August.
* First day of Iraqi National Assembly (through 16 August).
* 19 August.
* 2d Battalion IIF closed on FOB Duke.
* Iraqi police station Kufa attacked.
* BLT 1/4 conducted a destruction raid in Kufa (technical college).
* 20 August.
* Third cessation of offensive operations directed by MNC-I.
* 21 August.
* BLT 1/4 raided Kufa (technical college).
* TF 1-5 Cavalry conducted probing attack west of parking garage. Heavy resistance encountered.
* 22 August.
* Rehearsal of concept drill for deliberate attack on MEF Objective A (Obj A) conducted at FOB Duke. LTG Thomas F. Metz (CG, MNC-I and III Corps) and LtGen Conway (CG, MNF-W) in attendance.
* 24 August.
* LTG Metz arrived FOB Duke to receive mission update for immediate attack on MEF Obj A.
* 25 August.
* 4th Battalion IIF closed on FOB Echo.
* All three maneuver battalions conducted urban combat operations inside Ring Road.
* Fixed-wing airstrikes on multiple building occupied by MM forces.
* 26 August.
* Fourth cessation of offensive operations directed by MNC-I.
* Negotiations began between the Grand Ayatollah Sistani and Muqtada al-Sadr.
* 27 August.
* Grand Ayatollah Sistani received keys to the Imam Ali Mosque.

FOOTNOTE
Notes

1. In October 2003, 1 MEF left Najaf and retrograded to the continental United States. The responsibility for Najaf from November 2003 to April 2004 was delegated by Combined Joint Task Force 7 to the Spanish brigade from MND-CS. Due to restrictions in ROE, minimal military operations were conducted during this period, and it facilitated an undisturbed atmosphere to expand the MM. The MM grew to several thousand in strength, eventually occupying the major cultural and religious areas of Najaf. While the MM had a core of career criminals, thugs, and terrorists, it showed an ability to attract uneducated young males from the Shi’a regions of Iraq. By now the Iraqi police and ING training programs were making progress, but the low tempo of coalition and Iraqi operations allowed discontent to fester and insurgent forces to take root.


3. Ibid. According to the Islamic culture, "the Prophet Abraham had come to this place along with Isaac; there had been many earthquakes in the vicinity, but while Abraham remained there, there were no tremors. On the night, however, when Abraham and Isaac went to a different village, and sure enough Najaf was visited with another earthquake. When they returned, the people were most eager for them to make Najaf their permanent dwelling-place. Abraham agreed to do so on condition that they would sell him the valley behind the village for cultivation. Isaac protested and said that this land was neither fit for farming nor grazing, but Abraham insisted and assured him that the time would come when there would be a tomb there with a shrine, at which seventy thousand people would gain absolutely undisputed entrance to Paradise, and be able also to intercede for many others."

4. "History of the Shrines," http://www.al-islam.org/shrines/#F1 visited on 28 September 2004 at 10:00. So says D.F. Karaka after his visit to Najaf. He further adds, "I have sat and wondered at the marbled splendor of our Taj Mahal, the tomb which Shah Jahan built for his Empress Mumtaz Mahal, but despite its beauty, the Taj appears insipid in comparison with this splash of color at Najaf. The tomb surpassed anything I have seen in gorgeous splendor. All the great kings of the world put together could not have a tomb as magnificent as this, for this is the tribute which kings and peasants have built together to enshrine the mortal remains of the great Ali."

5. Ibid. "And those who cannot afford to go there personally, are constantly praying to Allah to help them to visit the shrine of their Maula Ali, and when somebody goes on a pilgrimage to Najaf, they request him to offer salutations on their behalf, and to pray to God-for some particular favor-and to seek Imam Ali's intercession."

6. These ING companies redeployed within days of their arrival based on unrest within their own provinces. In general, the Iraqi forces performed satisfactorily, especially when compared to the earlier fighting in April.

7. Difficulties were encountered, but overcome, in supplying Class I, III, and V to the Iraqi National Forces in Najaf.

8. 4 June through 4 August 2004.

9. Freedom of maneuver prior to 5 August. Upon assumption of its battlespace, 11th MEU(SOC) had restrictions on movement in the Najaf area; the governor requested 11th MEU(SOC) avoid Kufa, the old city of Najaf, and the Najaf cemetery. In patrols outside these exclusion zones, 11th MEU(SOC) units received small arms and RPG fire from the MM and routinely saw armed MM. The movements of 11th MEU(SOC) were not impaired as it focused on training the ING/IPS, manning joint TCPs, and routine patrolling.

10. Lessons learned are a representative portion of unit after-action reports from the field.

by The Staffs of I MEF (Forward) and 11th MEU(SOC)

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GRAPHIC: Photographs
IMAGE PHOTOGRAPH. Marines from 11th MEU(SOC) watch Najaf citizens as they demonstrate outside the Imam Ali Shrine against Muqtada al-Sadr, 3 September. (Photo courtesy of Cpl Dick Kotecki.)
Sustained Security Operations in the Combat Zone

SECTION: FOCUS ON OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM; Pg. 11 Vol. 89 No. 2 ISSN: 0025-3170

LENGTH: 2555 words

ABSTRACT

In the case of high-value asset security, Task Force (TF) Fleet Antiterrorism Security Team (FAST) was involved in defending the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) headquarters (formerly the Republican Presidential Palace) in Baghdad against insurgent and anticoalition attack from November 2003 to June 2004. Tasked with providing security for the CPA headquarters, the security concept required a headquarters element and 4 guard sections of 24 Marines. Here, an examination of the tactics, techniques, and procedures employed by FAST is presented.

FULL TEXT

'Security-1. Measures taken by a military unit, activity, or installation to protect itself against all acts designed to, or which may, impair its effectiveness. 2. A condition that results from the establishment and maintenance of protective measures that ensure a state of inviolability from hostile acts or influences.'1

In the case of high-value asset security, Task Force (TF) Fleet Antiterrorism Security Team (FAST) was involved in defending the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) headquarters (formerly the Republican Presidential Palace) in Baghdad against insurgent and anticoalition attack from November 2003 to June 2004. Tasked with providing security for the CPA headquarters, the security concept required a headquarters element and 4 guard sections of 24 Marines. At any given time, one section each was assigned to stand post, serve as a reactionary force, serve as a reserve force, and conduct
training/continuing actions. A separate rotation was established for the combat operations center (COC) consisting of two radio watches and a watch commander (captain/first lieutenant).

Many people made significant contributions to overall security as the mission evolved over time. An examination of the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) we employed will benefit others as they seek to provide security in Iraq and other areas of the world.

Guard Operations

Development and the importance of guard orders. Guard orders, at a minimum, had to cover the plan for rotation of forces, organization of the guard force on specific posts, post responsibilities, and individual sentry responsibilities. A baseline set of guard orders had been in use by our command for conducting camp guard duties in the rear at Camp Allen, Norfolk, VA. These known standards were set in place at the beginning of our mission and were refined over time to meet the specific situation we faced.

Using these known guard orders paid dividends in that each Marine knew and understood the basic responsibilities to which he was assigned from previous experience manning personnel and vehicle entry control points on duty back in Virginia. To address the changed dynamics of being in Baghdad, the guard orders were expanded to include, among other things, the plan for employment of reactionary forces, rules of engagement, CPA badge and identification procedures for personnel and vehicles, command and control, and administrative and logistical concerns. The guard orders also served as the reference document when the guard force was questioned concerning security procedures.

Watch rotation and rest plan considerations. Initially the watch rotation devised mandated 4-hour posts to accommodate a four-section/24-hour rotation. After a few days it became apparent to the TF leadership that this rotation would not be supportable for an extended period of time. The lack of appreciable time off to decompress from the 24-hour constant cycle of standing post, reaction force, reserve, and training was detrimental to long-term success.

The decision was made to move to three working sections, with one section in a training status. This modification afforded a longer period of time for rest and deliberate training but demanded a slightly longer time on duty. Each section stood 108 hours of time in a rotation of post, reaction force, or reserve, followed by 36 hours of training/rest time. With four sections, the cycle repeated itself every 18 days. Table 1 demonstrates a typical rotation over the course of 4 days.

The rotation we implemented increased the overall amount of time Marines spent on post in a day, provided more time for a training day, allowed for a period of 12 hours of continuous reserve, and reduced the amount of turnover that had to take place for all reactionary section-specific weapons, equipment, and ammunition. In the end, our Marines benefited from this schedule. We observed a significant reduction in complacency and fatigue despite the relatively extreme temperatures. For sustained four-section guard operations, we highly recommend the included rotation.

Utilization of Specialized Assets and Training

Role of the designated marksman (DM). A unique characteristic of a FAST platoon lies in the capabilities and equipment of the DM. The DM is, by definition, an individual highly trained in marksmanship, observation, and range estimation, and is employed in support of security operations. DMs are generally employed from elevated positions typical in urban terrain. A DM is equipped with a variety of optics and the DM rifle—an M14 with a Leupold scope that fires 7.62mm match grade ammunition.

During over 40 indirect fire attacks in our area, the DM often provided the most accurate reports on not only the location of the impacts but occasionally the point of origin of the attacks as well. The DM provides an excellent tool to the commander but is not without limitations. The junior Marines in these positions require substantial follow-on training after the school, and like all Marines, never get to shoot enough.

Explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) team interoperability and employment. The arrival of EOD Mobile Unit 5 Detachment 53 in early February provided the TF with greater capabilities for dealing with suspected improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and unexploded ordnance, and in doing crater analysis in the aftermath of indirect fire attacks against the palace.

TF FAST used EOD primarily for our IED contingency plans in our vehicle search pits. When convincing indicators from dogs or other detection devices for the presence of explosives were returned on a vehicle or one of the occupants, EOD would be immediately called to the scene to further investigate the situation. Their input assisted us in developing and refining our procedures for dealing with potential IEDs, and their services were used on many occasions.
Military working dog (MWD) team interoperability and employment. It is important to note that during security operations, FAST employs MWDs to assist, not replace, physical searches. Our standing operating procedures for vehicle searches rely first and foremost on a set of human eyes and hands to thoroughly search vehicles. Only when that is done does the MWD come out to enhance the search using his olfactory senses.

Most often trash trucks and other vehicles that hauled debris resulting from explosions returned positive results. Buses and trucks used to transport coalition forces often returned positive results due to the previous carriage of ammunition and explosives. A lesson for security forces employing MWD is that vehicles need to be thoroughly cleaned between each transport of equipment or materials that have been exposed to explosives.

Vehicles carrying other specific items would return positive results as well. EOD and MWD personnel provided good advice on what materials could be expected to yield false positives. Over time, drivers and maintainers of vehicles learned to thoroughly clean their vehicles after undergoing interrogation by intelligence personnel due to the presence of explosive traces or other items.

Communications

Communications during site security, as with any other mission, must consist of multiple redundancies. This is especially important in an urban environment and when the site at which you are conducting security encompasses a large area.

The most secure means of communications proved to be wire communications using TA-312 field phones. It also was the most reliable. Wire needs to be constantly checked and reran, especially in damp weather or at any place in the line that is subject to a great deal of vehicle or foot traffic. Wire communications served as our primary means of communications between all posts and the COC.

Hand-held radios are also a valuable asset and should be encrypted. Hand-held very high-frequency (VHF) Sabre radios served as the secondary means of communications between all posts and were used as the primary means for noistationary posts, such as rovers, sergeants of the guard, corporals of the guard, and the watch commander. The small weight and size of Sabre radios make them well-suited to use in security operations. It was still the responsibility of the sentry to pass on radio communications when range or buildings interfered with transmissions. The fourth general order allowed us to use VHF Sabres across the guard force with few problems.

A tertiary means of communications existed in our use of VHF SINCgars assets. Using OE-254 antennae on the roof, the COC was able to talk to all posts and any of our vehicles within the green zone. To conserve batteries, each post left their radios in standby mode. By placing these radio assets in each post's fighting position, which was used in the event of an indirect fire attack, we ensured that even if the sentries forgot or were unable to bring their field phone into the bunker, they at least had some means of reporting into the COC.

Adaptability in Overcoming Challenges

Many issues arose that challenged the successful accomplishment of the mission. The constant flow of distinguished visitors and dealing with the attendant political and protocol concerns using a guard force of 19- and 20-year-old Marines was challenging for both Marines and their leaders. Effective methods were found for overcoming each of those challenges.

Combating complacency. Many means were available for defeating complacency. Specifically, we used intelligence updates, innovative reactionary force drills, random antiterrorism measures (RAMs), and sustainment training to maintain a hard target and instill the proper mindset into sentries while defending the CPA. Consistent indirect fire attacks, sporadic direct fire attacks from across the Tigris River, and explosions in the area also served to keep everyone's mind on the reality of the situation and circumstances.

Every night the watch commanders executed a reactionary drill that tested the sentries on post and the section on react. Very early on it became apparent that our responses, whether to real threats or in the form of rehearsals, had a significant impact on the general perception of the many people at the CPA. Caution was utilized to prevent causing alarm amongst the 5,000-plus population of the CPA, and we ran drills only between the hours of 0000 and 0500. Nightly repetition of these drills resulted in significant gains in our handling of actual indirect fire attacks and other incidents when they occurred.

RAMs were used continually. Drawing upon Marines in the react section, the guard force would present constant random modifications to our scheme of maneuver varying from two-man roving patrols to use of a HMMWV mounted with an M2 .50 caliber machinegun to reinforce posts. RAMs served to disrupt anticoalition preoperational planning and present a
hardened appearance to discourage threats. Used properly, RAMs kept the react section in a heightened posture, improved the defense by changing our outward appearance, and reduced overall complacency.

Summary

A guard force is only as good as the individuals who put themselves, on the line every day. Anyone approaching the CPA could have been a threat. Constant vigilance by sentries kept the CPA safe during our mission. Our collective success was due to the combined efforts of the individual Marines, sailors, soldiers, and airmen of the TF.

The mission we conducted at the CPA was but one small part of the overall effort by all Americans, military and civilian, serving in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF). The above-mentioned areas allowed us to be successful in our mission. What we have done at the CPA can serve as a noteworthy model for how to conduct security operations for high-value assets heavily populated by numerous dignitaries and prominent officials.

While some of the assets and training discussed above are unique to FAST platoons, many of the capabilities and principles can be found elsewhere and employed in similar fashion. Snipers and/or scouts can easily substitute for DMs. Convoy operations can be conducted using any variety of vehicles. Any unit can serve as a camp guard force, face the same challenges, and use the same lessons we learned in conducting guard operations at the CPA. Communications, EOD, and MWD employment considerations are relatively the same for any unit as well.

As OIF and Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) continue, any unit could be called upon to conduct sustained security operations in the combat zone. Our training makes FAST well-suited to conducting security operations of this type, but the challenges are common for everyone. The situations encountered, lessons learned, and TTP discussed above should help in tackling those future missions by anyone as the global war on terrorism continues.

SIDEBAR

Guard orders, at a minimum, had to cover the plan for rotation of forces. . . .

SIDEBAR

We observed a significant reduction in complacency and fatigue despite the relatively extreme temperatures.

SIDEBAR

"The U.S. Marine FAST security teams were the most impressive security forces observed in the theater. They are superbly trained, well equipped, and well led. They provide a useful model for development of service training programs."

- Downing Report, Khobar Towers Investigation

SIDEBAR

Recent FAST Missions

* OEF.
  - Camp Lemonier security, Djibouti.
  - Military Sealift Command ship security, worldwide.
  - World Trade Organization conference security, Doha, Qatar.
  - Exercise BRIGHT STAR security, Egypt.
  - Security operations, Philippines.
  - Security operations, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
* U.S. Navy Seventh Fleet.
  - Security support aboard USS Blue Ridge (LCC 19).

OIF.
  - Iraqi oil platform security.
- Tactical recovery of aircraft and personnel security element, TF Dogwood.
- CPA security.
- Theater-wide security assessments.
* Joint TF-Librevia.
- American Embassy reinforcement/security.
* Haiti.
- American Embassy reinforcement/security.
- Convoy operations.

SIDEBAR
Every night the watch commanders executed a reactionary drill that tested the sentries on post . . . .

SIDEBAR
. . . any unit be called upon to conduct sustained security operations in the combat zone.

FOOTNOTE
Note
by the Officers and Staff Noncommissioned Officers of Task Force Fleet Antiterrorism Security Team

LOAD-DATE: June 12, 2007

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GRAPHIC: Photographs
IMAGE PHOTOGRAPH, Entry checkpoint operations at the CPA.
IMAGE TABLE, Table 1., 4 Day Example of Watch Rotation
IMAGE PHOTOGRAPH, The CPA from an observation tower within the green/international zone.
IMAGE PHOTOGRAPH, CPA entry point operations.
IMAGE PHOTOGRAPH, FAST members conducting convoy rehearsals in Baghdad.

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Introduction to 2/7 CAP Platoon Actions in Iraq

Byline: Skuta, Philip C

Section: Ideas & Issues (Operation Iraqi Freedom); Pg. 35 Vol. 89 No. 4 ISSN: 0025-3170

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Abstract

Looking back on the 2/7 CAP experience, it is clear that the Marines and sailors of "Golf 3" (2/7 CAP platoon call sign) performed many similar tasks as their Vietnam predecessors. In Vietnam, CAP platoons often lived in a village, surrounded by jungle, terrifying boobytraps, and thousands of supposedly hostile Vietnamese civilians. The Vietnam CAP platoons also trained local security forces.

Abstract

Part of the 1st Marine Division predeployment training for Operation Iraqi Freedom II (OIF II) included an orientation on the combined action program (CAP). The 2/7 CAP platoon mission was focused on preparing the nascent Iraqi National Guard to confront the insurgency following the transfer of sovereignty in June 2004.

Full Text

The CAP philosophy shows signs of success in Iraq.

Part of the 1st Marine Division (1st MarDiv) predeployment training for Operation Iraqi Freedom II (OIF II) included an orientation on the combined action program (CAP). The Corps' successful experience with the CAP in Vietnam covered some 6 years, from 1965-71. Some 33 years later, the contemporary CAP effort by the 1st MarDiv in Iraq is being adapted to Iraqi society and Arab culture.

As of this writing the CAP effort has been ongoing, in one form or another, within the I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) area of operations for 10 months. The U.S. Army has also experimented with a similar concept in Iraq. Since the 1st MarDiv returned to Iraq for OIF II in March 2004, platoon-sized units have been training and operating alongside Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) units. This effort must continue in order for the ISF to be capable of providing security independent of the Multinational Forces-Iraq.

Each infantry battalion deploying to OIF II was required to have a CAP platoon. The accompanying article about the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines (2/7) CAP experience discusses one relatively successful effort at applying the CAP model in Iraq. There certainly are other examples as well from throughout the 1st MarDiv. The 2/7 CAP platoon was able to conduct operations with the ISF-living, sleeping, eating, and fighting with them on a daily basis from May to September 2004.

Looking back on the 2/7 CAP experience, it is clear that the Marines and sailors of "Golf 3" (2/7 CAP platoon call sign) performed many similar tasks as their Vietnam predecessors. In Vietnam, CAP platoons often lived in a village, surrounded by jungle, terrifying boobytraps, and thousands of supposedly hostile Vietnamese civilians. The Vietnam CAP platoons also trained local security forces. In Iraq, the 2/7 CAP platoon lived close to the third largest city in Al Anbar Province, surrounded by both desert and thick palm groves lining the Euphrates River "green belt," and had to deal with insurgent improvised explosive devices as well. Iraqi CAP platoons also had to interact with thousands of supposedly hostile local Iraqis.

The 2/7 CAP platoon mission was focused on preparing the nascent Iraqi National Guard (ING) to confront the insurgency following the transfer of sovereignty in June 2004. The ING record across Iraq and against the insurgency remains mixed at best. Anyone on the ground for any length of time in Iraq quickly realizes that the complexities of post-Sadaam Iraq will not be easily overcome. Using the CAP to have the ING and other ISF gain advantage over the insurgency worked in some areas in 2004, but the effort must continue. It will most likely take years to achieve lasting stability and security using only Iraqi military forces.
A proud day that belonged to all of the Marines and sailors of Golf 3 and the staff of the Joint Coordination Center in Hit (pronounced heet), Iraq occurred when the unit was awarded a visit from LtGen James T. Conway, then-Commanding General, I MEF in August 2004.

by LtCol Philip C. Skuta

LtCol Skuta is the CO, 2/7.

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GRAPHIC: Photographs

IMAGE PHOTOGRAPH, LtGen Conway visiting 503d ING Battalion, August 2004. (Photo courtesy of 2/7.), LtGen Conway addressing 503d ING Battalion and local Iraqi police, August 2004. (Photo courtesy of 2/7.)

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16 of 199 DOCUMENTS

Marine Corps Gazette
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Genesis of an Ulcer

BYLINE: Smith, George W Jr

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ABSTRACT

Napoleon's "Spanish Ulcer," as he described the Spanish response to his occupation and focused primarily within the region known as the "Navarrese Diamond," provides a myriad of timeless lessons for strategic and operational planners.

ABSTRACT

Napoleon's "Spanish Ulcer," as he described the Spanish response to his occupation, provides a myriad of timeless lessons for strategic and operational planners. The aftermath of US-led decisive combat operations in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) has represented challenges to coalition forces similar to those experiences by the Napoleonic army in Spain almost two centuries ago. Smith comments on the errors in planning for OIF.

FULL TEXT
Have we focused on the wrong transformation?

Nearly two centuries ago, Napoleon preemptively occupied Portugal and Spain and ousted the Spanish royal family for being less than cooperative in their support toward his continental system. As Napoleon proclaimed, “Spaniards, your nation is perishing after a long agony; I have seen your ills, I am about to bring you the remedy for them.” Never did he imagine that conflict would continue in an altogether different form.1

Napoleon's "Spanish Ulcer," as he described the Spanish response to his occupation and focused primarily within the region known as the "Navarrese Diamond," provides a myriad of timeless lessons for strategic and operational planners. The strategic gap that developed between Napoleon's rapid conventional military victory, and the immediate requirement to positively influence the population as part of posthostilities stabilization operations, serves to highlight the limits of conventional military power in postconflict operations and the perils of forgetting "the people" in the initial and ongoing strategic calculus.

Heading the list of French challenges in the wake of Napoleon's military juggernaut was the economic aftershock. That shock was exacerbated by the scattering of Spanish soldiers who, no longer sustained by even their paltry income, were left to roam the countryside focusing simply on survival. In such a desperate environment, many young men were driven into the guerrilla fold out of sheer economic necessity, exacerbating a preexisting patriotic fervor that emanated from northern Spain and that was further fueled by French occupation.

Napoleon also greatly underestimated the strong influence of the Catholic Church on the Spanish people. Ecclesiastical leaders of guerrilla bands were expert at intertwining a host of ideological reasons to continue the struggle against the French. Sébastian Blaze, an officer in Napoleon's army, described the power of the church:

The monks skillfully employed the influence which they still enjoyed over Spanish credulity . . . to inflame the populace and exacerbate the implacable hatred with which they already regarded us. . . . As a result, just to be a Frenchman became a crime in the eyes of the country.3

Napoleon's cultural miscalculation resulted in a protracted struggle of occupation that lasted nearly 6 years and ultimately required approximately three-fifths of the empire's total armed strength, almost 4 times the force of 80,000 Napoleon originally had designated for this duty.4 A new type of warfare, one with which Napoleon was wholly unfamiliar, was rooted in the people and drove a wedge, the "decisive gap," between conventional military victory and the achievement of his strategic design.

A Preventable 'Iraqi Ulcer'?

The aftermath of U.S.-led decisive combat operations in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) has presented challenges to coalition forces similar to those experienced by the Napoleonic army in Spain almost two centuries ago. The shared failure to adequately understand the respective peoples and cultures stands in bold relief. The French experience in Spain, as well those of many other nations in the intervening 200 years, should drive us to examine why we are prone to making centuries-old mistakes in our campaign planning.

Gen Anthony C. Zinni, USMC(Ret), a former commander of U.S. Central Command, remarked on the formulation of a coherent campaign design:

We need to talk about not how you win the peace as a separate part of the war, but you have to look at this thing from start to finish. It is not a phased conflict; there is not a fighting part and then another part. It is a nine-inning game.5

In planning for OIF, the coalition was unable to focus its intelligence effort toward the challenges of posthostilities, arguably, until it was too late to be decisive in the strategically critical period between the end of large-scale combat and the wholesale transition to stability and support operations.

Planners did possess the macrolevel detail of the ethnic and religious divisions and the historical tensions between the various religious and ethnic groups, specifically the Sunnis, Shias, and Kurds. But that cultural understanding did not have the fidelity to highlight that, for example:

... more than 75 percent of Iraqis belong to one of 150 tribes, and that significant numbers of Iraqis subscribe to many of the medieval conventions of Islamic law, from unquestioning obedience to tribal elders to polygamy, revenge killings and blood money paid to the relatives of persons killed in feuds.6

Nor did the coalition understand the true depth of influence of the leading Shia cleric, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani or the young firebrand, Muqtada al-Sadr.
Furthermore, little analysis was conducted that highlighted what segment of the Iraqi population was likely to experience the highest degree of disenfranchisement. Specifically, what would be the impact of large segments of the Iraqi Republican Guard, Special Republican Guard, and remnants of the Ba'athist security apparatus scattered throughout the middle part of the country with no employment and a perceived less than bright future within an occupied Iraq?

The U.S.-led planning effort expended the better part of 16 months determining how best to "break humpty dumpty" with little timely thought that the coalition might be charged with "putting him back together again." The latter task, infinitely more difficult and foreign to the joint force than those associated with conventional combat operations and with the Iraqi people squarely at the center of such a planning challenge, was given short shrift in the intelligence preparation effort.

Succinctly, little professional analysis was conducted in order to answer the tough question: What is it about their society that's so remarkably different in their values, in the way they think, compared to my values and the way I think in my Western, white man mentality?7

That intelligence gap left far too much to wishful thinking and was the context for several broad assumptions that proved to be invalid. Whereas planners left no stone unturned in the intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB) as it related to the defeat of Iraqi forces and ultimate removal of the Hussein regime, there was little corresponding depth to the analysis of the next necessary target audience within the campaign design-the Iraqi people. Policymakers, commanders, and planners alike were content to lean on the frail assumption that Iraqis throughout the country would accept the coalition with open arms.

Bridging the Gap

The U.S. military must accept the fact that the posthostilities environment is central to campaign design if the political objectives are to be achieved. Properly estimating the magnitude of stability and support operations that will be necessary after the end of decisive combat operations is the only way to prevent the emergence of a strategic gap. Gen Zinni described just such a chaotic environment during an address to the Armed Forces Staff College fully a decade ago:

The situations you're going to be faced with go far beyond what you're trained for in a very narrow military sense. They become cultural issues; issues of traumatized populations' welfare, food, shelter; issues of government; issues of cultural, ethnic, religious problems; historical issues; economic issues that you have to deal with, that aren't part of the METT-T [mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available-time available] process, necessarily.8

While current joint intelligence doctrine that is specifically focused on the "people" is not completely barren, the anemic level of detail that is dedicated to intelligence requirements-focused on a people's history and culture-is a direct reflection of the imbalance of the current IPB process. As a picture is worth a thousand words, the glaring omission in Figure 1, taken from the lead joint doctrinal publication for intelligence, perhaps sums up best uSe current mindset of the joint community regarding where the people fit within the intelligence requirements for the development of a coherent campaign design.

If properly balanced, a corresponding red arrow entitled "People" would be in the center of this diagram opposite the existing red arrow entitled "Forces." This would draw attention to the reality that the civilian population will be the centerpiece of the posthostilities environment. As currently depicted, this view of the battlespace does little to reinforce the requirements within Joint Publication 5-00.1 (JP 5-00.1), Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning, that states that "campaign planners must plan for conflict termination from the outset of the planning process and update these plans as the campaign evolves."10

Striking a Balance

With the aforementioned imperative of "backward campaign planning," why then do we maintain such an imbalance in our IPB in the crafting of a holistic campaign design? Or to paraphrase Gen Zinni, why are we only planning for a three-inning ballgame? One part of the answer may be that:

Western military forces are not political forces, and professional warfighters like the US and British military tend to see peace making and nation building as a diversion from their main mission. Tactics and strategy, and military victory, have always had priority over grand strategy and winning the peace.12

Compounding this problem, the "gravitational pull" of ever-improving technology coupled with the drive toward "transformation" have resulted in the adoption of a mindset that more can be done with less to achieve the decisive effects in recent and future campaigns. In certain aspects of campaign planning, increased efficiency and effectiveness resulting
from technological breakthroughs lend credence to this line of thinking. However, policymakers, commanders, and planners alike must be ever mindful that "efficiency should not be held up as the overarching goal at the expense of better understanding." 13

Unfortunately, IPB, the driver of campaign planning, has been co-opted by the same fascination with efficiency. With a heavier focus on the employment of technologically more advanced collection systems, the delta between collection efforts focused on enemy forces and those intelligence efforts focused on the people—the last six innings of the ballgame if you will—has actually widened.

In the dozen years between Operation DESERT STORM and OIF, the U.S. military made tremendous technological strides in its efforts to increase all aspects of its joint warfighting capability, specifically the overall lethality of the force, joint information management, and situational awareness driven by enhanced collection capabilities. But it is clear that the joint force did not place the same premium on gaining an adequate understanding of the Iraqi people and their culture. In analyzing the current situation in Iraq, an astute citizen wrote in a letter to the The New York Times:

There is a crucial need for cultural anthropologists in Iraq even more than capable Arabic speakers. Linguistic knowledge is one thing, but understanding the conventions, subtleties and nuances of a language and culture is something different. 14

Three immediate steps should be taken to bridge future cultural intelligence gaps. The first step must be the acceptance that history is important, and while it may not repeat itself as some might argue, it surely holds the clues that will shed light on current and future cultural intelligence requirements. Robert Steele, in his monograph, The New Craft of Intelligence, reinforces the importance of historical analysis stating, "When entire volumes are written on anticipating ethnic conflict and history is not mentioned at all, America has indeed become ignorant." 15 Such ignorance would never be tolerated by commanders at any level in preparations for combat operations. That same intolerance must be maintained in planning for missions across the operational spectrum within a comprehensive campaign design.

Yet, solving the "puzzle of the people" cannot be the sole domain of military intelligence officials, the small group of foreign or regional area officers, or even the extremely competent but clearly undermanned and overtasked special forces, civil affairs, and translator units and detachments sprinkled throughout a large-scale campaign's area of operations. Rather, just as the U.S. defense establishment has increased overall efficiency and effectiveness by looking to all corners of the civilian business world within the military hardware acquisition process, so too must the joint force expand its horizons in the development of new intelligence doctrine.

Since doctrine is a guide, those who can provide the strongest beacon on historical and cultural issues must guide the force in its intelligence activities. In looking "toward motivational and value similarities, the military should be looking for a few good anthropologists" 16 as well as historians, economists, criminologists, and a host of other experts who can provide the depth of understanding that will lay the foundation for success in posthostilities.

The second step should be a culturally oriented addition to the intelligence series within joint doctrine. The scant references to postconflict intelligence focused on an indigenous population that are currently imbedded within several joint publications do not adequately address the myriad of unconventional intelligence challenges that are inevitable in the chaos of modern posthostilities environments.

An addition to the intelligence series could take a page or two from the Marine Corps Small Wars Manual. In its simplicity, the manual discusses at length the psychology of a country's population. Specifically, it states, "human reactions cannot be reduced to an exact science, but there are certain principles that should guide our conduct." 17 Furthermore, the manual warns that:

... psychological errors may be committed which antagonize the population of a country occupied and all the foreign sympathizers; mistakes may have the most far-reaching effect and it may require a long period to reestablish confidence, respect, and order. 18

The third step builds on the previous two and bridges the cultural gap through holistic backward planning that achieves intelligence leverage. Reinforcing the fact that the joint force will remain the lead agent for an unspecified period of time upon cessation of hostilities, a focus on the people further highlights the imperative for detailed intelligence planning focused on a posthostilities phase from the outset of campaign planning. It levies the requirement that intelligence analyses reach depths rarely explored within our current conventional intelligence mindset. Specifically that:

Ongoing human intelligence efforts identify potential cultural, religious, ethnic, racial, political, or economic attitudes that could jeopardize the post hostility [stability operation]. The intelligence capabilities begin to focus on the uncon-
ventional threat posed by total spoilers. . . . Human intelligence also focuses on the identity, motivation, and intentions of limited and greedy spoilers. 19

These different categories of spoilers will not be uncovered by conventional intelligence preparation and will remain undetected by our most technologically advanced collection assets. Such sophistication recognizes that the intelligence focus of the battlespace in posthostilities must shift from the physical to the cognitive domain, with the paramount concern being the "minds" of those who might oppose stability. 20

Conclusion and Future Implications

Proper IPB, focused on the people and the unique challenges of a post-combat operational environment, will continue to challenge the joint force in the 21st century just as it proved to be Napoleon's Achilles' heel two centuries ago. If we are to apply Napoleon's maxim that "the moral is to the physical as three to one" within a truly holistic campaign design, then perhaps such a ratio should be applied in balancing the collective intelligence effort, with a focus on the people assuming paramount importance. That will require addressing intelligence challenges that are unconventional and uncomfortable for planners and commanders at all levels. Comprehensive backward planning with a balanced intelligence effort throughout the width and depth of the envisioned campaign will ensure that:

. . . forces and assets arrive at the right times and places to support the campaign and that sufficient resources will be available when needed in the later stages of the campaign. 21

Just as it proved to be the beginning of the end for Napoleon's dominant influence in Europe, giving the importance of the people short shrift within the strategic calculus may be the prescription for failure within future military campaigns. Technology is not a panacea within our joint warfighting construct, and especially across the spectrum of intelligence requirements. As the world becomes even more complex, it is critical to understand root causes and effects of the histories and cultures of the peoples with whom the joint force will interact. Relying less on high-tech hardware, such a mental shift may be the most transformational step the military can take in preparing for the challenges of the 21st century. These requirements cannot be met with a narrowly focused approach toward IPB.

Sophisticated cultural IPB may not pinpoint exactly where opposition flashpoints may occur within a postcombat operational environment. However, by achieving appropriate IPB balance, beginning with a bolstered joint intelligence doctrine, the joint force will reduce the potential for strategic gaps by helping to prepare for the Sunni Triangles or Navarrese Diamonds of the future.

If the current modus operandi of insurgents in Iraq is an indicator of the total disregard that future adversaries will have toward global societal norms, the joint force will, in many respects, be operating with one hand tied behind its back. The U.S. military can ill afford to have the other hand bound through the development of comprehensive campaign plans not grounded in solid cultural understanding of countries and regions within which it will likely operate. To do so risks adding yet another footnote to history highlighting an intelligence gap between combat and stability and support operations.

SIDEBAR

The French experience in Spain . . . should drive us to examine why we are prone to making centuries-old mistakes in our campaign planning.

"Not a Frenchman then doubted that such rapid victories must have decided the fate of the Spaniards. We believed, and Europe believed it too, that we had only to march to Madrid to complete the subjection of Spain and to organize the country in the French manner . . . the wars we had hitherto carried on had accustomed us to see in a nation only its military forces and to count for nothing the spirit which animates its citizens."2

-Swiss soldier serving in Napoleon's army, 1808

SIDEBAR

"The U.S. armed forces must change with that world [a terribly changed and rapidly changing world] and must change in ways that are fundamental—a new human understanding of our environment would be of far more use than any number of brilliant machines. We have fallen in love with the wrong revolution."11

-Ralph Peters, 1999

SIDEBAR
... the joint force did not place the same premium on gaining an adequate understanding of the Iraqi people and their culture.

**SIDEBAR**

... the intelligence focus of the battlespace in posthostilities must shift from the physical to the cognitive domain. ...  

**SIDEBAR**

Technology is not a panacea within our joint warfighting construct. ...  

"What will win the global war on terrorism will be people that can cross the cultural divide. It's an idea often overlooked by people [who] want to build a new firebase or a new national training center for tanks."  

-GEN John Abizaid, Commander, U.S. Central Command

**FOOTNOTE**

Notes

8. Ibid.
18. Ibid., p. 32.
20. Ibid.
The other two cities, Rawah and Anah, were much smaller than Haditha. They were located approximately 50km west of Haditha along Highway 12. They were relatively stable retirement communities that in some respects seemed untouched by the insurgency. The population was made up of relatively affluent former Iraqi military leaders. Intelligence estimated that the two cities were probably a waypoint for the insurgents on their journey east to Baghdad.

**ABSTRACT**
The 3d Battalion, 4th Marine Regiment conducted a series of related military stability and support operations (SASO) during the period of Mar 10 through Jul 20 2004. Here, Norton examines the counterinsurgency campaign and Marine SASO in Haditha District, Al Anbar Province from March to July 2004. He also demonstrates the current doctrinal...
principles of military operations other than war combined with the lessons from the Small Wars Manual do work in SASO.

FULL TEXT

'Shoulder to shoulder with our comrades in the Army, Coalition Forces and maturing Iraqi security Forces, we are going to destroy the enemy with precise firepower while diminishing the conditions that create adversarial relationships between us and the Iraqi people.'

-MajGen James N. Mattis

The 3d Battalion, 4th Marine Regiment (3/4) conducted a series of related military stability and support operations (SASO) during the period of 10 March through 10 July 2004 that enabled the transfer of sovereignty to the Iraqi Interim Government. On 29 June transfer of sovereignty took place in Baghdad. 3/4 helped to achieve this major step toward the ultimate goal of establishing free representative government in Iraq. This article will examine the counterinsurgency campaign and Marine SASO in Haditha District, Al Anbar Province from March to July 2004 and demonstrate that the current doctrinal principles of military operations other than war (MOOTW) combined with the lessons from the Small Wars Manual do work in SASO.

The Setting

3/4 was one of nine infantry battalions that executed Operation IRAQI FREEDOM UA (OIF IIA). The battalion joined then-MajGen James N. Mattis' 1st Marine Division (1st MarDiv) that was part of LtGen James T. Conway's I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF). The Joint Force Commander was LTG Ricardo Sanchez, USA. He commanded Combined Joint Task Force 7 (CJTF-7). He was ultimately responsible for the prosecution of OIF IIA in Iraq.

3/4 had the same mission as CJTF-7, I MEF, and 1st MarDiv. Their mission was to conduct SASO in order to enable the transition of sovereignty in Iraq to shift from the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) to a sovereign Iraqi Interim Government.

During the summer months of 2003 the overall nature of operations in Iraq shifted from the decisive phase of a conventional military campaign to a transitional phase of stability and support. However, it soon became apparent that conditions were changing and SASO were being conducted in the context of a growing insurgency. This meant that the original joint campaign had insidiously shifted from the transition phase of a "big war" campaign-with its attendant planning-into an altogether different type of campaign-a counterinsurgency that had not been planned. The implication of this shift was that the principles of MC)OTW needed to be applied as the doctrinal principles associated with planning and execution.

The AOR

1st MarDiv was given the Al Anbar Province as its area of responsibility (AOR). Sunni Muslims make up 97 percent of the population in the Al Anbar Province. Under Saddam Hussein some tribes in this area had received preferential treatment. After the fall of Saddam's government, the situation on the ground in the Al Anbar Province had dramatically changed in two ways. First, the more powerful tribes took advantage of the lack of government control and consolidated their power and increased their wealth. They did this through a variety of criminal methods, such as smuggling, extortion, and theft. They also exerted pressure to secure rebuilding projects. second, these tribes passively and actively supported the genuinely anticoalition element forces as rnis perpetuated the status quo. The remainder of the population could do nothing about this tribal power.

1st MarDiv divided its forces into two regimental combat teams (RCTs) and an Army brigade combat team (BCT). They were to occupy and conduct SASO in this area better known as the Sunni Triangle. RCT-1 was assigned to the volatile, large population center of Fallujah. The 1st BCT was assigned to Ramadi, the capital of the province. In the west, RCT-7, to which 3/4 was assigned, was responsible for the small towns (population 100 to 1,000) to medium-sized cities (population 2,000 to 75,000) of northwest Iraq. 3/4 was responsible for the Haditha District. The city of Haditha was selected as the decisive point for several reasons. It sat on key avenues of approach that insurgents and foreign fighters used to funnel personnel, arms, and money into population centers farther south-like Baghdad, Fallujah, and Ramadi-but primarily it was selected because the district was home to a powerful hydroelectric dam. The dam perched over the city like a castle overlooking the city from the northwest. It was in the process of being repaired by civilian contractors and local Iraqis. The dam was seen as a prime target for the insurgents and had to be protected.
The situation in northwestern Iraq in March 2004 was precarious. The 82d Airborne Division had assigned the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment (3d ACR) to the northwest area of Iraq. In particular, the 3d Squadron of the 3d ACR was assigned the area that 3/4 was to take over in March 2004. The mission of 3/4 was the same as 3d Squadron’s when it was in charge of the area-to-conduct SASO in order to create a secure enough environment for the transfer of sovereignty from the CPA to the Iraqis. This event was significant because it served as the major step toward the ultimate goal of establishing a stable, secure, and democratic Iraq.

3/4 took over an area that was over 120 kilometers (km) in length and over 120km in width. More importantly, they brought with them a mindset that was rooted in the combined action program (CAP) operations of the Vietnam era. They conducted themselves in a manner that diminished the conditions that would create an adversarial relationship between the coalition forces and the local people of the Haditha area. Steeped in the fine points of cultural psychology addressed in the Small Wars Manual, the Marines had trained hard in the subtle nuances required to win the “hearts and minds” of the local population while going after the hardcore insurgents.

When the 3d Squadron transferred authority to LtCol B.P. McCoy, Commanding Officer (CO), 3/4, on 10 March, the Iraqis in 3/4’s AOR suddenly experienced more human-to-human contact than they had previously. There would be no armored tracked vehicles on patrol in their streets. 3/4 reached out to make common cause with the Iraqi people in order to bring about security and the conditions for an elected, civil administration to govern the people of the area. In terms of MOOTW doctrine and the Small Wars Manual, 3/4 went in with a clear objective. Security would be provided under a principle of the Hippocratic oath—“first, do no harm”—in order to enable a peaceful transfer of legitimate authority.

Execution and Analysis

3/4 brought with them over 1,100 Marines and sailors organized into 4 major groups: Company K (Co K), Co L, Battle Group Whiskey (BGW), and Headquarters and Service Company. These groups would be responsible for different areas of the 3/4 AOR. They would be facing a shadowy group of insurgents made up of former regime elements (FRE), foreign fighters, and local criminals who joined the insurgency. Included in the local criminal category was a large group of disenfranchised and unemployed young men as well as disgruntled former military men.

One of the battalion’s main objectives was to disrupt the shadowy and elusive FRE. The insurgent leaders developed a secret network that hired the local criminals and sponsored foreign fighters en route to Baghdad and the population centers to the east. This enemy was strikingly similar to a Mafia-style network. They were well funded and tied into several powerful Sunni Arab tribes. They were very capable of producing misinformation and intimidating the local Iraqis.

The operational objective for victory in Iraq was centered on the hearts and minds of the Iraqi people. It was apparent that in order for CJTF-7, I MEF, 1st MarDiv, RCT-7, and 3/4 to win the hearts and minds, they would have to win the battle of ideologies. The center of gravity was the hearts and minds of the local Iraqis. Once 3/4 won the locals’ hearts and minds they could then gain access to the human intelligence (HumInt) that would ultimately lead to the enemy defeat mechanism. Winning the locals’ hearts and minds required the synergistic and synchronized application of the MOOTW principles: dearly defined objectives, unity of effort, restraint, perseverance, legitimacy, and security. While easy to articulate, transferring these simple principles into action was not an easy task.

Like all of the units in Iraq, 3/4 had limited resources. Limited resources meant that the CO and his staff had to task organi/e, balancing economy of force in a way that was most effective to achieve unity of effort. He had to keep in mind that the overarching goal was to create the conditions for the transfer of authority to occur on 30 June. As he planned his operation, he knew it would be a complex, decentralized plan that would rely on the small unit leaders to conduct the SASO. (see Sidebar, Item 1.)

The following tasks became the intermediate objectives in the operational plan:

* Establish forces physically in the center of activity.
* Control routes throughout zone.
* Support civil administration with civil affairs projects and the establishment of security.
* Protect Iraqi infrastructure.
* Set the conditions for the transition of security and law enforcement to the Iraqi security forces (train and assist).
* Gain actionable intelligence-conduct limited offensive raids and cordon and search operations in order to disrupt the insurgency and restore the rule of law.
* Secure ammunition storage depot and prevent locals from smuggling.

* Conduct information operations in order to empower local Iraqi security forces and discredit criminals and insurgents.

There was no easy roadmap to success for 3/4. The MOOTW principles and the Small Wars Manual served as guides in the development and execution of the operational plan, but they provided no executable details. They served as critical checkpoints that operators could turn to when faced with a given situation.

The AOR was characterized by open desert with three main highways. The highways were ideal for enemy ambush. There were also the important population centers-Haditha, Rawah, and Anah. Haditha was the largest city and was the center of government for 3/4's AOR. The battalion headquarters, Co K, and one of the combined antiarmor teams (CAATs) established their base at the Haditha Dam.

The other two cities, Rawah and Anah, were much smaller than Haditha. They were located approximately 50km west of Haditha along Highway 12. They were relatively stable retirement communities that in some respects seemed untouched by the insurgency. The population was made up of relatively affluent former Iraqi military leaders. Intelligence estimated that the two cities were probably a waypoint for the insurgents on their journey east to Baghdad. These cities were suspected as being home to the shadowy coterie of financiers and organizers of the resistance. Moreover, the insurgent's elaborate early warning systems made it virtually impossible to catch insurgents in these cities. It was evident that the only way 3/4 could have an effect on Rawah and Anah was to station a force close enough to continually conduct surveillance.

The battle to disrupt the insurgency cells in this area required HumInt. However, the locals in Rawah did not trust the coalition in the past. Thus, the operation in Rawah first required gaining the locals' trust in accordance with MajGen Mattis' guidance-first, do no harm-before HumInt could be expected from the locals.

Maj Giles R. Boyce, the weapons company CO/BGW CO, was tasked with building Firm Base (FB) Whiskey. It would be a major engineering operation. Building FB Whiskey meant literally building an outpost from scratch. It sent a message to the local population that 3/4 was moving in and that the area was going to receive more attention than it had been used to in the past. In the early morning hours of 21 March, Maj Boyce led an engineer detachment with multiple bulldozers, Co I, and CAAT-1 to Rawah. They surprised the population by acting friendly toward the local populace. The word was out that 3/4 was going to help these communities get some of the reconstruction projects. Moreover, the building of FB Whiskey meant that things would be different in the remote cities of Rawah and Anah.

The Small Wars Manual states, "The campaign plan and strategy must be adapted to the character of the people encountered." For the Marines of 3/4 this meant that in order to gain HumInt in a tribal society, one had to put systems in place where rewards and punishments could be seen by the local people. Rawah and Anah had not received any of the new reconstruction money that was being pumped into the high population centers of Ramadi and Baghdad. 3/4 created the conditions for HumInt to begin to flow.

3/4 would exploit these opportunities with civil affairs projects and a close interaction with the civilian populace and local appointed leaders. The battalion civil affairs representative organized meetings to hear grievances of the mayors and sheiks in the area. These meetings were important because they empowered the local leaders by making them the spokesmen of the people. Civil affairs projects, such as building schools, repairing water treatment facilities, and new security jobs were routed through the local appointed tribal leaders. The battalion CO appointed Maj Andrew Petrucci, the battalion executive officer, as his representative for the Haditha area. BGW CO was responsible for being the battalion's direct representative in Anah and Rawah. This arrangement provided the battalion CO with the flexibility he needed to command and control the battalion. It also ensured that he did not get bogged down in daily politics of the local areas.

The main effort of the battalion was the 81mm mortar platoon whose mission shifted from providing indirect fires to becoming 3/4's CAP. They were specially trained by a cadre of cultural experts. They mimicked the CAP from the Vietnam era. They literally lived among the people in the city. The Haditha police station became their home. This decision to locate with the Iraqi security forces paid enormous dividends in gaining actionable HumInt and transitioning the enforcement of the rule of law to the Iraqi police and Iraqi civil defense corps. Additionally, the limited offensive operations would now have an Iraqi face on them. This action established legitimacy. These operations now became combined in nature. 3/4 and local Iraqi police worked side by side to maintain order and defeat anti-Iraqi forces.

Embedding the CAP in the police station proved the best way to conduct information operations. The locals' trust had to be won in order to gain HumInt. This decentralized approach, although dangerous, was a necessary strategy in order to disrupt the enemy networks and win the hearts and minds of the locals. The Iraqi police station came under continuous harassment assaults, but in the end, progress was made and an acceptable level of security and stability was restored.
It is important to note that in April, 3/4 was ordered to move south and reinforce RCT-I in the conduct of very aggressive security operations in the vicinity of Fallujah. While operations conducted by 3/4 near Fallujah are beyond the scope of this article, the short-notice movement placed a significant strain on battalion manpower. (See Sidebar, Item 2.)

During the Fallujah crisis period of 8 April to 13 May, 3/4 achieved economy of force by leaving a small cadre at Haditha Dam to conduct liaison with the local leaders and Iraqi security forces. Maj Andrew T. Roberto, the battalion's civil affairs officer, and Maj Bennett Walsh, the small craft company CO, led a small detachment of Marines in the conduct of reduced stability operations during this period.

3/4 returned to the Haditha District after supporting the Fallujah operations. The battalion established the CAP back in the police station and conducted SASO that enabled the transfer of sovereignty to the civil administration on 29 June 2004. This single event, the transfer of sovereignty, meant that 3/4 had accomplished its purpose in its AOR. In early July, 3/4 executed a relief in place with 1/8. 1/8 began what was called OIF IIB.

Conclusion

3/4 was successful in its mission through adherence to the principles of MOOTW and the Small Wars Manual. In order to ensure a relatively stable environment in their AOR, 3/4 had to conduct a twofold approach to the execution of their operations. One method employed a strategy to win the hearts and minds, establishing the foundation of trust between the two groups. The Iraqis working with the Marines in Haditha and the local leaders came to realize that 3/4 was truly there to improve their communities and their future. This also proved to be the best method to conduct information operations. The second method employed a strategy of information sharing between Army Special Forces Operational Detachment Alpha (ODA), other government agencies, and higher and adjacent units. Approval and coordination was necessary because any uncoordinated action within the battalion battlespace could have unintended results. A civilian casualty or a false arrest could undermine the creditability of the infantry battalion working in that area. If there is a conflict with outside agencies it should be reported immediately up to higher headquarters. This is an important lesson in ensuring that there is a unity of effort—not just through organization but through execution as well. (See Sidebar, Item 3.)

In a tribal culture like the one that exists in Iraq, U.S. forces cannot expect to fit into the culture and everyday life of the local populace. Nonetheless, this culture gap must be recognized and processes must be put into place to immediately disseminate information to the tribal leaders. The insurgent has many advantages, and his ability to develop an exceptional misinformation campaign that continually attacks the creditability and intentions of the coalition force must not be overlooked, regardless of his apparent level of sophistication. In the Arabic culture the deep-rooted mistrust of Western culture is played upon in the local mosques. Religious clerics often use their pulpits as avenues to spread misinformation that can eventually undermine the efforts of coalition forces.

Battalions responsible for areas of the country must continually stay engaged with the local authorities in order to monitor the messages coming out of the mosques. Whenever possible, commanders must attempt to use trusted Iraqi security forces and trusted Iraqi leaders to pressure anti-Western clerics into producing a message that will be favorable or neutral to the coalition forces and the new government.

Finding ways to stay continually engaged with the local population will be a challenging task. Commanders will be faced with multiple tasks and limited resources. The commander must continually make an effort to develop ordinary citizen relationships, local tribal leader relationships, and local security officer leadership. These relationships will be an important dynamic to maintain in order to effectively get to the truth and actionable intelligence. It is also important to note that an individual who may have helped the commander on one occasion may collude with the enemy on another occasion.

3/4 accomplished its mission and enabled the transfer of sovereignty to the Iraqi Interim Government. This transfer was made possible by focusing on the enemy center of gravity—the local Iraqi people—guided by principles of MOOTW and the Small Wars Manual. The decision to make the 81mm mortar platoon the main effort and physically locate them in the police station was a key turning point in the battle for information, the hearts and minds of the Iraqis, and legitimacy.

The battle against the insurgents will most likely continue for several years in Iraq. Ultimate victory will require perseverance. But in the end, victory can only result when Iraqis fight for a free and democratic Iraq. It is the perseverance of the Iraqi patriot, not the American that counts most. The small part of success that 3/4 can take credit for is that they empowered patriots who were willing to fight for freedom and democracy in their country.

SIDEBAR
Lessons Learned

(1) During SASO the commander will be faced with the problem of limited means versus a continual shift of objectives. HumInt and enemy activity will drive the operational train. Deciding on what operations to conduct, and where, becomes a dynamic process and must be continually analyzed by the commander and his staff. Decisions to conduct operations, such as direct action raids and what forces the commander will apply to these missions, will be a constant challenge for the commander and his staff. One lesson learned from these decisions is that it is beneficial to have a force task organized to conduct short notice raids. This force should be a minimum of a platoon-sized mounted element, reinforced by a CAAT section. In 3/4 the assault element of this task-organized raid force adopted many of the same tactics, techniques, and procedures that the Navy SEALs used in order to be most effective. These raids require detailed planning by the staff prior to execution. In an urban environment it is important to have pictures of the objective. During a raid or cordon and search mission, the commander should consider bringing Iraqi police on the scene. The timing of the Iraqi police must be coordinated and analyzed in order to achieve the proper effect on the local population near the objective. This continual decision-making process is driven by incoming HumInt combined with enemy activity on the ground.

In addition to developing a task-organized short-notice raid force, 3/4 divided the operations section into a current operations cell and a future operations cell in order to effectively manage the process.

(2) During SASO the commander at the battalion level through the division and JTF level, on occasion, will be faced with immediate threats to security that can lead to operational failure and destroy the legitimacy of the campaign. These immediate threats to security will require the immediate shifting of major forces within the theater of operations. An important lesson learned from 3/4’s reinforcement of RCT-1 in Fallujah is that commanders at all levels must be prepared to move from one area to another quickly. Plans for relief in place, movement, and logistics should be thought through in detail ahead of time. This will facilitate execution if needed.

In addition to the battalion staff developing a plan to move, the psychology of the Marines should also be considered. The nature of the fighting will often intensify when these immediate threats occur. Leaders at all levels must be able to transition the mindset of their Marines from a low-intensity enemy situation to a high-intensity situation when this type of event occurs. The psychological approach to execution of these operations cannot be underestimated. Additionally, if possible, leaders should endeavor to leave a liaison detachment behind in their original AOR. This detachment will help new incoming units understand the situation on the ground in that area and will also facilitate the return to that area after the reinforcement mission is completed.

(3) 3/4 did develop a great relationship with the ODA and the Navy SEAL detachment. This relationship was based on mutual understanding and continual communications and interaction. 3/4 held weekly targeting/future operations meetings that shared information in 3/4’s internal target folders with ODA’s target folders. These detailed intelligence sharing forums related to the situation within 3/4’s area of influence. It is important to note that personalities do matter in these relationships. The value of the CO, the operations officer, and the intelligence officer in the sharing of information with these outside agencies cannot be underestimated. The targeting/future operations meetings achieved a unity of effort within 3/4’s area of operations. Additionally, target lists became prioritized and 3/4 and ODA were able to plan coordinated future operations that would achieve a unity of effort and disrupt insurgent operations in Haditha. Those infantry battalions that did not recognize the value of these relationships were not able to utilize the support of outside agencies as much as those battalions that did continually engage the outside agencies.

FOOTNOTE

Notes

3. Personal interview with Capt Matthew Danner, CAP Platoon Commander, 3/4, 24 November 2004 and personal interview with LtCol B.P. McCoy during OIF IIA, 3 December 2004. The insurgents were made up of a variety of groups. It was not monolithic in nature. However, they were united in wanting to eject the infidel (U.S. coalition) from the Middle East.
4. Personal interview with LtCol McCoy, 3 December 2004. Haditha Dam had obvious strategic importance in that it was designed to produce 600 kilowatts of electricity. It served the eastern Al Anbar Province and parts of Baghdad with electricity.

6. Norton, Maj Kevin A., personal journal, 2004. In Camp Pendleton, prior to OIF UA deployment, 1st MarDiv conducted a detailed specialized training package that focused on understanding the culture, language skills, information operations, and the CAP philosophy. The battalion's 81mm mortar platoon became the CAP platoon. Additionally, each rifle platoon had small unit leaders attend this training.


11. Personal interview with Capt Danner, 24 November 2004. 3/4 used civil affairs contracts to strengthen the leaders they favored. This was a mixture of elected leaders and particular local sheiks who were cooperative toward the coalition.


14. Personal interview with LtCol McCoy, 3 December 2004. The CAP had a tangible effect on the population in Haditha. It was designed to win the trust of Iraqis by winning the trust of one family and one individual at a time. This could only be done by close interpersonal relationships with the local citizens of Haditha.


17. Personal interview with Capt Danner, 24 November 2004.

by Maj Kevin A. Norton

Maj Norton was the Operations Officer, 3/4. He is currently attending Command and Staff College, Quantico.

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GRAPHIC: Maps
IMAGE MAP, Map of the AOR.
IMAGE PHOTOGRAPH, LtCol B.P. McCoy interacting with local Iraqis while on "getting to know you" patrol in Haditha.
IMAGE PHOTOGRAPH, Haditha Hydroelectric Dam.
IMAGE PHOTOGRAPH, Capt Shannon Johnson, CO, Co I, 3/4, meets with local tribal leaders in Rawah.
IMAGE PHOTOGRAPH, Capt Matthew Danner and Haditha Police leaders.
IMAGE PHOTOGRAPH, CAP working with Haditha Police.
IMAGE PHOTOGRAPH, 1stLt Edward Slavis, Co K, 3/4, executing information operations in Haditha.

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An Organizational Model for Marines Fighting an Insurgency

BYLINE: Cooper, David E

SECTION: IDEAS & ISSUES (CHASE CONTEST); Pg. 48 Vol. 89 No. 6 ISSN: 0025-3170

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ABSTRACT
Marines are in a power struggle with an insurgency in Iraq. The stakes could not be greater, as the future of the Middle East hangs in the balance. There is no question that the Iraqi insurgency has grown in strength over the past year and a half despite the best efforts of our very talented and capable leaders. Former secretary of State Colin Powell said in an interview on 26 September 2004, "Yes, [the insurgency] is getting worse. And the reason it's getting worse is that they are determined to disrupt the election." With our current resources and combat ethos, how can the insurgency be expanding in our Marine area of operations (AO)?

The Problem Defined: The CivilMilitary Paradox

The organic assets of a Marine expeditionary force (MEF) were not designed to effectively fight a counterinsurgency. The Marine Corps is unequalled in the military application of power. In a counterinsurgency, though, military power is often used in a supporting role. The peace is actually won through a combination of economic, political, and cultural instruments of power. Military force is generally used to set the conditions for winning the peace.

Economic, political, and cultural instruments of power are primarily found in the interagency and nongovernmental organization (NGO) community. While the military has developed some of these capabilities over the years, these are not our core military fundamentals. We rely on the interagency community to provide these critical nonmilitary skill sets. Still, the concept of the military in a supporting role is fundamentally different from major combat operations and is often difficult for some military leaders to grasp.

Unfortunately, other governmental agencies and NGOs have some real limitations when it comes to tactical execution. There are a variety of political, logistical, and manpower reasons for this. The default has been to give nonmilitary missions to the military. In some respects this is understandable. The military is in a unique position with its logistics, communications, security, and manpower assets to make interagency synergy happen. The caution is that while the mil-
itary can indeed execute a plan, it does not have the unique skill sets these other agencies possess in nonmilitary matters. The military should support other agencies in doing their jobs but never attempt to replace them. We each have our role, and we each are dependent on the others' success.

The result of the civil-military paradox in Iraq has been that the current U.S. organizational structure is not bringing the full resources of our country to bear on the insurgency. The insurgency continues to grow. Time is not on our side. We need to do something different. The Marine Corps must understand how to leverage these other tools of power and multiagency assets at the tactical and operational levels within our assigned AO. Commanders at all levels must help facilitate a combined synergy of skill sets that will serve to undermine the insurgency. So how do we do it?

Recognize the limits of a bureaucratic structure. I think that the biggest impediment to an effective counterinsurgency is the inherent bureaucracy of our governmental structure (to include the military, other governmental agencies, and NGOs). Do we have the right organizational structure in Iraq? How was the structure created-deliberately or ad hoc?

Bureaucracies are able to handle routine and repetitive situations. They are not as adept at operating in dynamic environments. Our current structure is organized along the lines of a traditional hierarchy. A better organizational model in confronting the insurgency would be a small, task-organized, entrepreneurial organization. Dr. Eric Jansen of the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, cites Mintzberg and Quinn in describing the strengths of the entrepreneurial organization as being quick, responsive, dedicated, and directed.1

Military staffs themselves can be just as bureaucratic. The following excerpt from Lost Victory by William Colby describes one such pitfall:

At one point, as the American military role in South Vietnam grew and increasingly preoccupied the American policymakers, I spoke privately to McGeorge Bundy after one of the White House meetings. I asked that instead of fine-tuning the next increment of bombing North Vietnam, we should organize some major attention to the real problem we faced: how to meet the Communist challenge at the village level. He answered, ‘You may be right, Bill, but the structure of the American Government probably won't permit it.’ What he meant was that the Pentagon had to fight the only war it knew how to fight and that there was no other organization in the American structure that could fight any other.2

Fighting an insurgency will require some unorthodox solutions. The current bureaucratic structure may unwittingly hinder such creative development. We should ask ourselves, what changes could we make to the organizational structure to find creative and effective courses of action? One solution is to give the MEF commander organic control of interagency assets.

Give the MEF commander organic interagency assets with tasking authority. While major combat in Iraq has been declared over, all parts of Iraq are not “safe.” Without a safe environment, civilian agencies have a hard time operating. However, the work that these civilian agencies conduct is, in fact, one of the best counterinsurgency tools we have. When the basic human condition of safety is not met, the local military commander must still be in charge at the tactical level.

In a counterinsurgency, it is not enough for a Marine staff to coordinate interagency activities in a civilmilitary operations center. The MEF commander must have organic control and tasking authority of the resources provided by the inter-Service and interagency community at his disposal to succeed in a counterinsurgency environment. An organizational model without tasking authority and organic assets can lead to a duplication of effort, inefficiencies, efforts at cross purposes, and ultimately, it can challenge mission accomplishment. Despite expected opposition, the commander should push for organic authority of those forces operating in his AO.

Leaders during the Vietnam War had to struggle with similar structural problems. One effective arrangement came in 1967 when all pacification-related programs were organized under a single manager, Robert Komer. Known as the Deputy to the American Military Commander, he had tasking authority over interagency assets. To put him on equal footing with reluctant military commanders, his rank was equivalent to that of a four-star general. The civilian agencies, weary of military leadership, were comforted to have a civilian in the post. The military's interest in unity of command was also preserved. The result was a structure that meshed the political-civil-military relationships more effectively.3

Include detailed interagency input in operational planning annexes. Military staffs are not proficient in interagency operations. What little experience staffs do have is generally that of coordination. As a result, military staffs do not have a full appreciation for all of the assets in the greater interagency community. The military staff must understand multiagency and NGO operational and analytical capabilities, including their organizational structures. With that working knowledge, the staff can make informed support requests to help achieve mission accomplishment.
Operational planning should work backward—not from the military objective but, rather, from the economic, political, or cultural goal. In Iraq, the goal is security. Prior to a military operation, the end state should be defined with input from our experts in a multiagency environment. This concept applies both regionally and at the village level. Combined civil-military operation plans (OpPlans) can then be created. Having integrated OpPlans creates the synergy between military and civilian agencies. The best vehicle to reach this state is with the military commanders having organic interagency assets at their disposal.

Include the Iraqi cultural perspective as input during the normal staff process, to include operational planning and after-action review. In any counterinsurgency, gaining support of the people is the main effort. Without the support of the people, an insurgency will wither on the vine. In Iraq, the people must ultimately determine that they no longer want to support an insurgency in their country. We must reach a state where Iraqi citizens are willing to deny active support to the insurgents and turn in their neighbors who do. Connecting with the people in such a way will require true cultural understanding at the village level with respect to everything that the coalition does.

Marine staffs should produce local cultural assessments. Cultural understanding must be part of the planning and after-action processes for both military and civil activities. It must be embodied in all functional areas, much as force protection is integrated into everyday operations. The point is to look at things from the Iraqi point of view. This may be best accomplished by including local Iraqi input to the staffing process. The challenge then becomes the safety and vetting of those individuals. However, the gain will be well worth the cost.

In the book, In Retrospect, by Robert S. McNamara, secretary of Defense during most of the Vietnam War, Mr. McNamara lists several lessons learned from the Vietnam War. The following two excerpts seem prophetic.

We viewed the people and leaders of South Vietnam in terms of our own experience. We saw in them a thirst for and a determination to fight for freedom and democracy. We totally misjudged the political forces within the country.

Our misjudgments of friend and foe alike reflected our profound ignorance of the history, culture, and politics of the people in the area, and the personalities and habits of their leaders.4

Enhance tactical intelligence networks in order to exploit the insurgency. In Iraq there are multiple enemies. We might use the word "insurgency" to lump them all into one convenient basket, but that is an oversimplification. On the contrary, we can use the fact that there are multiple groups, with different grievances and alliances, to our advantage. It is critical to clearly define all subgroups accurately in an effort to devise our microstrategy.

The role of local intelligence is paramount in exploiting insurgency weaknesses. Just as in network-centric warfare, there are many points of information input that help build the intelligence picture. Input comes from the local population, other governmental agencies, and coalition assets. Again, having a central commander with organic control of these assets helps clarify the local intelligence picture. At the same time, tactical control does not preclude information from flowing up via multiple parallel channels.

Develop and deliver clear and customized messages. Poor communications leads to misunderstanding and conflict. We must connect with the Iraqi people. Currently, we try to do this with loudspeakers and pamphlets. We should be leveraging professional U.S. marketing firms and "Hollywood." Marine Corps Recruiting Command produces high-quality commercials that communicate our Marine Corps message. Why not apply these same techniques to getting out our local "message" in Iraq? Certainly we can sell stability and self-governance to a thirsty population.

There is not a "one message fits all" in Iraq. Our professionally produced messages should be targeted and customized, not generic. Applying generic messages could have the effect of trying to jam a square peg into a round hole. Again, having cultural representation and input to the message format, content, and delivery can make our communications much more effective.

Final Thought

My purpose is not to oversimplify the hard work required in Iraq, but rather to offer suggestions that may help with our fight. The ideas listed in this article in no way imply that commanders in the field are not doing their duty. Yet, the insurgency continues to grow. I am convinced that the path to victory lies in creating a structure that encourages independent thinking and creative solutions. If giving the MEF commander control of multiagency assets provides a new structure in Iraq that will set the conditions for an ultimate victory, then we should waste no time. We must win. We can win. But nothing in Iraq is a foregone conclusion.
SIDEBAR
The organic of a Marine expeditionary force (MEF) were not designed to effectively fight a counterinsurgency.

SIDEBAR
The MEF commander must organic control and tasking authority of the resources provided by the inter-Service and interagency community at his disposal to in a counterinsurgency environment.

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SIDEBAR
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FOOTNOTE
Notes
3. Ibid., pp. 207-208.

by Capt David E. Cooper
* Capt Cooper, an infantry officer, is currently attending the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS). Following graduation from NPS, he will be assigned to Marine Corps Systems Command. This article was his 2004 Chase Prize Essay Contest entry.

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20 of 199 DOCUMENTS
Counterinsurgency in Iraq Started With Fallujah

BYLINE: Hayden, H Thomas

SECTION: IDEAS & ISSUES (OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM); Pg. 28 Vol. 89 No. 7 ISSN: 0025-3170

LENGTH: 2068 words

ABSTRACT
If one cliché fits Iraq, it is "it's the economy, stupid." As many have reported in the news media, there was a plan for the "end game," but it was the wrong plan. The L. Paul Bremer plan for a laissez-faire economic policy, in which multinational corporations would rebuild Iraq, a "prosperous economy" would create jobs, and peace would nourish, was doomed to failure from the start.

ABSTRACT
Hayden comments on the early errors in countering the Iraqi insurgency. The only way to lose in Iraq is for the coalition and Iraqi armed forces to fail in the counterinsurgency campaign and the doom and gloom pundits in the US to weaken American resolve.

FULL TEXT
Early errors in countering the Iraqi insurgency.

Vacillation, indecision, and signs of weakness fuel an insurgency, The decision by the U.S. National Command Authorities to withdraw the Marines from Fallujah in April 2004 was a mistake. Fallujah stood as a symbol that the Americans could be made to quit. Before any realistic counterinsurgency campaign can begin, any pocket of insurgent dominance must be eliminated.

The problems that exist today stem from five failures: (1) failure to adequately provide enough coalition troops on the ground to assure security and stability at the end of organized hostilities, (2) failure to keep a major portion of the Iraqi Army and police forces intact, (3) failure to keep employed enough of the Iraqi Government bureaucracy to ensure some form of government services, (4) failure to work with the established Muslim religious and tribal leaders who were in place, and (5) failure to adequately plan for long-range internal security, stability, and reconstruction after major combat operations.

The original U.S. Central Command estimate for military forces for a war in Iraq called for 500,000 military personnel in the region. This figure was based on the former regional combatant commander's estimate (Gen Anthony C. Zinni, USMC(Ret)) to successfully complete an invasion and secure the country until a new form of government could take control and establish security and stability. GEN Tommy Franks balked at the Department of Defense "guidance" and successfully argued for 175,000 for the invasion and 220,000 in the region.

U.S. forces are now expected to successfully conclude the "occupation" and accomplish the following: (1) conduct a successful counterinsurgency campaign, (2) stop border infiltration by Islamic militants, (3) secure the lines of communications, (4) rebuild an Iraqi Army and police force, and (5) provide for security, transition, and reconstruction operations throughout Iraq.

There are currently four major types of insurgent forces in Iraq: (1) former Saddam Hussein regime loyalists, to include the Ba'athist, the fedayeen, and the remnants of the Republican Guards and Special Security forces; (2) the Abu Musab alZarqawi Tawhid and jihad groups, with links to al-Qaeda; (3) Islamic fundamentalists who operate independently; and (4) criminals who use kidnapping and robbery for profit.

If one cliché fits Iraq, it is "it's the economy, stupid." As many have reported in the news media, there was a plan for the "end game," but it was the wrong plan. The L. Paul Bremer plan for a laissez-faire economic policy, in which multina-
tional corporations would rebuild Iraq, a "prosperous economy" would create jobs, and peace would nourish, was doomed to failure from the start. The wartime destruction of the Iraqi infrastructure that put a lot of people out of work, not to mention alienated all of the people, together with the unemployed masses from the disbanded Iraqi Army and police forces, created a 75 percent unemployment rate that even today still hovers-from some press reports-at 65 percent.

The pre-Iraqi war establishment in Iraq had Islamic clerics and tribal leaders who had some relative power. Bremer ignored the recognized power of the clerics and the clan chieftains and picked and chose the clerics he would work with totally ignoring the tribal chiefs. At the end of his tour of duty, Bremer had started to talk to the chief clerics he had originally ignored.

The Pentagon has recognized that it underestimated the potential for an organized insurgency. The battles that have occurred in Fallujah, Ramadi, Mosul, and Najaf were fought not only by the remnants of holdout Iraqi forces isolated after the war, but many battles involve an indigenous uprising, commonly called an insurgency, that has the support, either forced or willingly provided, of the people. The foreign jihad "holy warriors" are much smaller than reported in the news media.

The battle fought against insurgents in Ramadi was a model for successful counterinsurgency. The U.S. forces worked hand in hand with Iraqi forces. Success in many other areas will only come with increased Iraqi military and police forces taking over the major activities against the insurgents. The first sign that the insurgency can be reversed will come when the people decide that they have had enough from living in fear of the insurgents and foreign fighters and stop supporting the insurgency.

Ultimate success in an insurgency comes from the local people, not U.S. or coalition troops. However, the coalition and Iraqi Government have to work closely in a combined civil-military counterinsurgency campaign plan.

There are 11 basic principles for a counterinsurgency campaign plan.

* The center of gravity is the people.
* Focus on security for the people and the establishment of public safety.
* Establish an effective intelligence collection system.
* Establish small, specialized counterinsurgency units to hunt down, destroy, or neutralize the insurgent leadership and the infrastructure that supports them.
* Establish well-disciplined, specially trained, and highly mobile counterguerrilla forces.
* Incorporate psychological operations and/or information operations in every action.
* Establish population and resource controls and a census grievance program.
* Reconstruction and/or development of the economic and public works infrastructure must have local popular support.
* Balance overmatching firepower with considerations for the population.
* Operate within established international law.
* Organize police, military, and civilian agencies under one civil-military campaign plan.

The first priority in counterinsurgency operations is creating an effective intelligence collection effort. Effective and trustworthy local police, paramilitary, and military forces, who have proven that they are in the fight against the insurgency, can be very effective in human intelligence. Intelligence in insurgency is more than learning order of battle and estimating intentions and capabilities. In an insurgency, intelligence teams have to reorient on the population, the leaders of the insurgency, the infrastructure that supports the insurgency, and the funding. Follow the money.

The next priority is to establish effective "population and resource control"; e.g., issue new identification cards to the friendly or neutral population and code suspected enemy agents/forces.

Establish or reestablish a "census grievance." All Arab and most Southeast Asia countries have a long tradition of the local tribal chief or governor meeting once a month with the people (anybody) to petition their leaders for a redress of grievances. This tradition has proven to be a valuable tool in collecting intelligence.

Combined action platoons were very successful in Vietnam with the Marine Corps combined action program (CAP). The first try at a CAP in Iraq got off to a bad start due to poor timing and poor implementation. It has recently been reported
that the senior military leadership in Iraq is now considering placing "advisors" with Iraqi units. It is time to reconsider a CAP-type organization for some Iraqi units.

Additionally, pseudo-operations, or black operations, can produce very favorable results. This is where you take returnees, Chieu Hoi in Vietnam, and turn them back into the enemy community to scout targets and collect intelligence. They should not be used as strike forces or they are quickly compromised. The so-called "El Salvador" option, or assassination teams, is not a good idea. As was learned with the Phoenix Program in Vietnam, this technique can be used to effectively eliminate legitimate political opposition.

Language proficiency cannot be overemphasized. Even rudimentary greetings can go a long way in making friends. All advisors of any kind must have a basic knowledge of the language, and every Marine, soldier, or civilian who comes in contact with the people must know simple greetings, customs, and local laws. Knowing who are the religious leaders and the tribal chieftains and who belongs to what group is important. Knowing the religious practices of the specific group is of paramount importance.

Interestingly, there is one item in the Iraqi insurgency that the U.S. political and military leadership has not recognized and exploited—Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and his followers are foreigners. A carefully planned and executed psychological warfare campaign to highlight the non-Iraqi interference in the Iraqi political life could drive a wedge between the foreign fighters and the Iraqis. This very important counterinsurgency tool seems to be sorely lacking. Separate the fish from the sea and the fish will die.

The civil-military campaign plan must unite all civil and military forces operating in the counterinsurgency campaign to identify a main focus of effort and execution of the commander’s intent. The counterinsurgency campaign may involve the concept, first enunciated by Gen Charles C. Krulak, USMC(Ret), of a three block war—peacekeeping on one block, counterguerrilla operations on another, and full-scale conventional battles on another.

Whether it is development or reconstruction of essential economic infrastructure, local indigenous participation must be assured. All civic action projects must be approved and supported by the people and their leadership.

Originally, the United States planned to do everything at once by trying to reestablish security and, at the same time, complete reconstruction projects and build new democratic institutions.

If approved by the U.S. Congress, the transfer of $2 billion of reprogrammed money to expand programs to train and equip Iraqi police and military forces will go a long way in fighting the insurgency.

The London Times, 15 September 2004, reported the same story that I heard time and again in Vietnam. The ordinary citizens of Iraq are more concerned with their welfare and their future than the battles in Fallujah and Najaf. The Times quoted an Iraqi:

It's all meaningless. What are we [London Times] talking about? Impose a siege, end a siege. Fight or retreat. This is not what we should be talking about. Let's talk about sewage, water, utilities, security, and the basic needs of life...We have two hours of electricity and ten hours off.

Until the Iraqis see a better life for themselves and their children, the insurgency may continue to have some form of support. Insurgents can be self-generating and can draw plenty of support from angry indigenous sources. The 30 January elections may have been a sign of what is to come.

There is an important element of an insurgency that cannot be overlooked—public opinion at home and abroad. Case studies of Vietnam, Algeria, Cyprus, Lebanon, Somalia, etc. are proof of how one can win all the battles but lose the war. There may be some positive signs developing in Iraq. There seems to be a quiet shift to more pragmatism.

As we saw in the early mistakes made in Fallujah, where political considerations were tied to tactical decisions, perceptions often become reality. The only way to lose in Iraq is for the coalition and Iraqi armed forces to fail in the counterinsurgency campaign and the doom and gloom pundits in the United States to weaken American resolve.

by Lt Col H. Thomas Hayden, USMC(Ret)

*LtCol Hayden spent 2 years as a counterinsurgency advisor in Vietnam and later in Central America. He has served as Branch Head, Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict Branch, HQMC; commanded Headquarters and Service Company, 1st FSSG during Operation DESERT STORM; and was the CO, Rear Area Security, I MEF, Aljubail, Saudi Arabia. LtCol Hayden currently writes columns for two web sites and national news media. He is writing a book on counternsurgency.
Operation AL FAJR: The Battle of Fallujah-Part II

BYLINE: Sattler, John F; Wilson, Daniel H

SECTION: FOCUS ON MEF BATTLE OF FALLUJAH; Pg. 12 Vol. 89 No. 7 ISSN: 0025-3170

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ABSTRACT
Other MEF units provided forces and supporting missions critical to the success of Operation AL FAJR. 11th MEU in the Najaf Province contributed a rifle company, sniper teams, an engineer platoon, explosive ordnance disposal teams, tanks, assault amphibious vehicles, air/naval gunfire liaison company teams, and additional linguists in direct support of combat forces involved in the fight.

ABSTRACT
Sattler and Wilson discuss the Operation Al Fajr in the Battle of Fallujah, which represents a major success for the Iraqi Government and coalition forces which have turned Fallujah from an insurgent base of operations into the cornerstone of progress in the Al Anbar Province. Among other things, they notes that the Fallujah Brigade experiment demonstrated that the insurgency was factionalized, and therein was its real weakness.

FULL TEXT
Dousing the bright ember of the insurgency.

Operation AL FAJR represented a major success for the Iraqi Government and coalition forces. The November 2004 assault and subsequent reconstruction efforts have turned Fallujah from an insurgent base of operations into the cornerstone of progress in the Al Anbar Province. Success in Operation AL FAJR resulted from prebattle shaping (information operations, feints, and precision airstrikes), the contribution of Iraqi and joint forces, and the indomitable fighting spirit of the coalition forces.
Background

The first battle of Fallujah (Operation VIGILANT RESOLVE) was fought from 5 to 30 April 2004, and ended with an agreement to cede the security responsibilities within the city to the hastily formed Fallujah Brigade. The agreement included provisions for the surrender of heavy weapons by insurgents and stipulated that the Fallujah Brigade would initiate investigations to identify the murderers and mutilators of the four American citizens (Blackwater employees) killed on 31 March. There was a feeble attempt by the Fallujah Brigade to collect and turn over weapons and ammunition to our forces that netted a few small pickup trucks' worth of rusty, inoperable rifles, mortar tubes, and mortar rounds. The insurgent and terrorist factions in Fallujah used their sanctuary to turn the "City of Mosques" (officially 72) into a way station for exporting their acts of terror to all parts of Iraq. Foreign fighters, weapons, ammunition, equipment, and money were all brought into the insurgent safe haven and facilitated their activities against coalition forces and the people of Iraq.

Our planners immediately resumed planning for combat operations in Fallujah. All felt it was not a matter of "if" but just a matter of "when" those operations would commence. The situation in Fallujah continued to deteriorate through the summer months (2004) and into the fall. A slow drain of the city's estimated 250,000 residents occurred as the insurgents and terrorists expanded their grip over the populace through intimidation, brutality, and murder. The effectiveness of the Fallujah Brigade quickly waned as various insurgent and terrorist groups vied for greater control in the city. While some viewed the Fallujah Brigade as a failed experiment, it actually provided an insight into the insurgency that was previously nonexistent. The Fallujah Brigade was an Iraqi solution to the Fallujah problem, and when it failed to maintain the peace, the blame could no longer be pinned on the coalition forces. In fact, the failure of the Fallujah Brigade provided the coalition forces with opportunities for the psychological operations (PsyOp) campaign that was effective in driving a wedge between competing factions and the residents of Fallujah. For example, it was pointed out in PsyOp products that the lack of stability in Fallujah, caused by factional infighting, denied the residents the benefit of $30 million waiting to be invested in community improvement projects. Equally significant, the Fallujah Brigade experiment demonstrated that the insurgency was factionalized, and therein was its real weakness. Without the presence of coalition forces to galvanize cooperation, the factions would fight each other for dominance.

The Threat

The threat in Iraq comes from a variety of insurgent, terrorist, tribal, extremist, and criminal networks-each with its own agenda. Foreign fighters are mixed in with these networks, with the primary foreign threat represented by Abu Musab alZarqawi and his al-Qaeda terrorist network. While there is no single unifying leader of the insurgency, these various groups cooperate with each other in a loose alliance when it is convenient to do so.

The predominant insurgent and terrorist leaders in Fallujah were Sheik Abdullah Janabi, Omar Hadid and, of course, al-Zarqawi. These three thugs were the real power brokers in the city and collaborated when it suited their purposes. In early August, when LtCol Suleiman, Commander, 506th Iraqi National Guard (ING) Battalion, confronted Hadid about the abduction of his intelligence officer, he himself was abducted and beaten to death. Residents understood that the real message behind this brutal murder was that Omar Hadid was a force to be reckoned with in Fallujah. Reporting suggested that he had as many as 1,500 fighters loyal to him. Inside sources also reported that Sheik Janabi was complicit in the murder of LtCol Suleiman and had even presided over a Sharia court that found the commander guilty of treason through his association with coalition forces. This incident was a red flag to the I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) and the Interim Iraqi Government (UG). It signaled the complete loss of any legitimate provision of security to the residents of Fallujah. Coupled with the theft of weapons, vehicles, and equipment from the compounds of the 505th and 506th ING Battalions, it became clear that Fallujah needed to be liberated from the thugs, intimidators. The IIG put out a decree disbanding the 505th and 506th ING Battalions. The ING battalions had become ineffective, and many of their members were themselves involved in insurgent activities. Fallujah had become the bright ember in the ash pit of the insurgency, and the HG knew it must be eliminated.

The threat assessment of Fallujah in September and October 2004 revealed that the insurgents were fully expecting an attack by coalition forces. Three hundred and six well-constructed defensive positions were identified, many of which were interlaced with improvised explosive devices (IEDs). The orientation of the bulk of their defenses indicated that they expected an attack into the southeast sector of the city, leading the planners to recommend an attack from north to south. Intelligence also identified 33 of 72 mosques in Fallujah being used by insurgents to conduct meetings, store weapons and ammunition, interrogate and torture kidnap victims, and conduct illegal Sharia court sessions. In our experience, the insurgents and terrorists justify their actions as jihad (holy war) when it is convenient, and in order to appeal to a broader Muslim audience, but their actual actions and motives are in stark contrast to the religious tenets of Islam.

Operations Planning

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Planning for combat operations in Fallujah continued during September and October. Intelligence improved as captured insurgents turned on their "brothers." The results of precision targeting of insurgent safe houses began to have their desired effect. Insurgent factions were turning on one another, as each suspected the other of providing us with intelligence. It seemed to them that our intelligence was too good for it not to have come from inside sources, and in some instances it did. Through various means that idea was perpetuated and encouraged, which increased the internecine strife among insurgent groups. We estimated that there were approximately 5,600 insurgent fighters operating in the Fallujah-Ramadi corridor at that time, with 4,500 in the city of Fallujah, including foreign fighters and terrorists. It is more probable that there were actually closer to 3,000 in Fallujah at the time, and this proved to be quite close to the number actually captured or killed during the major kinetic phase of operations.

The MEF plan called for five phases. Initially, it was named Operation PHANTOM FURY, but then was appropriately renamed by Prime Minister Ayad Allawi as Operation AL FAJR (New Dawn). We knew it would be important to include the Iraqi security Forces (ISF) in the battle and have the decision to conduct the operation made by none other than the Prime Minister himself. Previously, during the April battle of Fallujah, only the 36th Iraqi Commando Battalion had joined us for the fight, with the remainder of assigned Iraqi forces refusing to deploy. During August two Iraqi Intervention Force (IIF) battalions had fought side-by-side with the 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit (11th MEU) in Najaf, reinforced by two U.S. Army battalions, to crush Muqtada alSadr's Mahdi Militia around the Imam Ali and Kufa Mosques. These same two IIF battalions, along with six other ISF battalions, joined the I MEF for Operation AL FAJR. The ISF had come a long way by November in their training and willingness to fight.

Phase I of Operation AL FAJR was preparation and shaping. The primary activities during this phase were moving the forces into position, building the iron mountain (prestaged supplies, ammunition, and fuel), collecting intelligence, planning, and shaping the battlefield by various means, both kinetic and nonkinetic. This shaping was steady and precise for 2 months prior to Operation AL FAJR. Special operations forces (SOF) provided specific intelligence-based targeting information. These targets were struck with a variety of Marine Corps, coalition, and SOF assets. Marine battalions manning vehicle checkpoints (VCPs) or participating in feints were extremely successful in targeting fixed enemy defenses and degrading insurgent command and control (C^sup 2^) capabilities. A series of feints conducted by 1st Marine Division (1st MarDiv) deceived the insurgents as to the time and location of our main attack. They knew we were coming, but they didn't know when or from where. The feints also allowed us to develop actionable intelligence on their positions for targeting in Phase II. The Commanding Officer, 3d Battalion, 1st Marines, whose Marines manned the southern VCPs around Fallujah, described this period as a real-world fire support coordination exercise that provided a valuable opportunity for his fire support coordinator and company fire support teams to work tactics, techniques, and procedures and to practice coordinating surface and air-delivered fires.

Building the iron mountain was a concept derived from a lesson learned during April 2004 in the first battle of Fallujah. Our supply lines were heavily targeted at that time by the insurgents. A disruption of the supply lines was one of our worstcase planning assumptions, and building the iron mountain mitigated this risk. The just-in-time logistics concept was not practical in this situation. Quantity has a quality of its own, and the iron mountain was a textbook example of that maxim. Guidance for Operation AL FAJR was to have a 15-day excess amount of supplies, foodstuffs, ammunition, and fuel aboard each forward operating base prior to commencement of combat operations. The iron mountain also minimized the need for any routine resupply convoys to travel the dangerous routes. 1st Force Service Support Group (1st FSSG) was the main effort during this phase, and they literally moved mountains of supplies, equipment, and ammunition to build the iron mountain. Their exceptional around-the-clock efforts set the conditions for success during subsequent phases of the operation.

A monumental task of Phase I was the buildup of Camp Fallujah by the Marines and Sailors of the I MEF Headquarters Group (MHG) as the central hub for C2, logistics, and medical services. Camp Fallujah experienced an overnight surge as units poured in for Operation AL FAJR. Camp facilities felt the strain as they fought to accommodate nearly 2Vg times the camp's normal capacity. The Seabees of the MEF Engineering Group (MEG) rose above and beyond the call of duty to build the East Fallujah Iraqi Camp (EFIC) after the contractor failed to fulfill his contractual obligations. The MEG built the EFIC in mere days to accommodate the ISF battalions that were arriving. A temporary joint mortuary affairs (MA) facility at Camp Fallujah was opened to provide excess capacity for casualties. This detachment was later moved to the potato factory just outside Fallujah to provide MA support for the insurgent dead.

Information operations in close concert with combat operations during Phase I encouraged Fallujah’s residents to leave the city. A “whisper campaign,” PsyOp, and multiple feints convinced the overwhelming majority of the citizens to depart Fallujah, while disguising when and where the assault would occur. Estimates are that there were less than 500 civilians remaining in the city when Phase HI combat operations commenced. These efforts were instrumental in ensuring that few
civilians were injured in combat operations. The information campaign was very effective and as important to this operation as the actual combat offensive to liberate the city. We stole the strategic communications initiative from the enemy and never gave it back.

We were keenly aware of the strategic necessity to get ahead of the bow wave of publicity regularly associated with these types of combat actions. The influx of embeds from a variety of media outlets was welcomed with open arms. We were confident they would get the truth out if they were embedded with our forces. There were 91 embeds, representing 60 media outlets, at the peak of Operation AL FAJR. Their only restriction was not releasing operational information that would jeopardize lives. Anytime a significant target was struck, the public affairs section was ready with a straightforward, accurate, and timely press release. This guiding principle prevented us from being in the reactive mode of countering insurgent propaganda.

Joint and Combined Operations

Operation AL FAJR was joint and coalition warfare at its finest. (see Figure 1.) The best capability set was quickly assembled from throughout Iraq and massed for the battle. The flexibility of this force was later demonstrated shortly after offensive operations were underway, when the Stryker battalion (equipped with light armored wheeled vehicles—similar to the Marine light armored vehicle) was pulled in the midst of battle to return to its home area of Mosul in order to quell the insurgency there. The Army’s Black Jack Brigade (2d Brigade Combat Team (2d BCT), 1st Calvary Division) arrived from Baghdad just days before the fight. A look at the task organization of the Black Jack Brigade is a revelation of the joint integration that existed for this battle. An Army troop of tanks and Bradley’s was under the tactical control (TaCon) of 2d Marine Reconnaissance Battalion, which in turn was TaCon to the Black Jack Brigade, which in turn was TaCon to 1st MarDiv. Other Army battalions arrived that had participated in combat operations in Najaf during August. The heavy armor shock and firepower they brought to the fight was invaluable, and two of these task forces became the main penetration elements for our regimental combat teams (RCTs) in the attack. Joint special operations sniper teams (three teams of six) were integrated with the assault regiments. They performed superbly in the battle as a combat multiplier and were credited with numerous confirmed kills. All in all, the attack force included nine U.S. Army and Marine battalions, six Iraqi battalions, and attack aviation from all of the Military Services, to include naval air flying off an aircraft carrier. The full assault force included some 12,000 Marines, Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and ISF. The keys to successful integration of this joint and coalition force were complementary warfighting capabilities, a single chain of command, advances in technology, and the unifying vision of liberating a city from the oppressive grip of the insurgents and terrorists. Rehearsals of the concept and confirmation briefs solidified the plan in the minds of the combatants. You could feel the energy among the coalition forces—it was a contagious, confident enthusiasm.

Other MEF units provided forces and supporting missions critical to the success of Operation AL FAJR. 11th MEU in the Najaf Province contributed a rifle company, sniper teams, an engineer platoon, explosive ordnance disposal teams, tanks, assault amphibious vehicles, air/naval gunfire liaison company teams, and additional linguists in direct support of combat forces involved in the fight. They also ensured the peace and stability in the Najaf Province during Operation AL FAJR, allowing the MEF to concentrate additional combat power for the battle. 31st MEU, U.S. Central Command’s strategic reserve, was deployed to the Al Anbar Province just prior to Operation AL FAJR. They took command of the western area of the province from RCT-7. 31st MEU’s presence freed up RCT-7’s command post to participate in combat operations. The 31st MEU choppered their battalion landing team (Battalion Landing Team 1st Battalion, 3d Marines) TaCon to RCT-7 for the Fallujah fight. 31st MEU conducted supporting operations that prevented foreign fighters, weapons, and financing from crossing the borders and points of entry (POEs) into Iraq. They enforced the IIG’s complete closure of the Syrian POEs to military-aged males, preventing the insurgency from receiving foreign recruits for their cause. 24th MEU, operating in the northern portion of the Babil Province, kept a lid on the insurgency in their area. The British Black Watch Battalion deployed from southeastern Iraq in support of 24th MEU, and their combined force sealed off the escape routes of insurgents down through the Euphrates River corridor into Babil. 2d BCT, 2d Infantry Division (from Korea) conducted dozens of supporting operations in the Fallujah-Ramadi corridor throughout Operation AL FAJR that disrupted insurgent activity to the north and west of Fallujah proper. The addition of units to the regular I MEF structure expanded our numbers from a pre-AL FAJR 32,000 to 45,000 during the operation. The temporary augmentation was needed for full focus of combat power, without any loss of capability in the rest of the MEF’s area of operations. Everyone arrived ready for action, and the noteworthy performance by all of the organic and joined units guaranteed the success of Operation AL FAJR.

The final act of Phase I was the isolation of Fallujah through blocking positions established by the Black Jack Brigade. They were also responsible for security of the routes leading to Fallujah, coinciding with an IIG ban on vehicular traffic in and around the city. The IIG closed the border POEs from Syria into Iraq, which cut back significantly on the smuggling
of foreign fighters, weapons, and financial support to the insurgency. A portion of the insurgent and terrorist leadership, in spite of public proclamations to fight to the death, had cowardly slipped out of the city with the civilian exodus. The insurgents still in the city were isolated with few options remaining—escape, surrender, or die.

Phase II, enhanced shaping, began on 7 November at 1900 local time—D-day and H-hour respectively. This was an intense 12- to 24-hour period of electronic, aviation, and indirect fire attacks against the insurgents’ C2 nodes and defensive positions. All fires were delivered against precise targets. The fury of the 3d Marine Aircraft Wing (3d MAW) and all of the joint aircraft in support was unleashed. Artillery and mortar rounds added to the fires descending on enemy targets. The synchronization of fires into this confined urban area (5 kilometers by 5 kilometers) was facilitated by the establishment of a high-density airspace control zone (HIDACZ). The HIDACZ and fire support coordination measures, such as the coordinated fire line, allowed for the simultaneous employment of fixed- and rotary-wing fires in concert with ground direct and indirect fires, unmanned aerial vehicles, and AC-130 gunships. AC-130 aircraft in support of Operation AL FAJR were devastatingly effective in destroying targets with their accurate weapons systems. The Coalition Force Air Component Commander’s air support operations center and the MEF’s direct air support center synchronized and de-conflicted the intricate movements of aircraft and indirect fires in and around the HIDACZ.

A ground attack was conducted up the peninsula to the west of Fallujah during this phase by Task Force LAR (light armored reconnaissance battalion (TF LAR)) to set the final conditions for Phase III, which included Marines of 3d LAR; a company from 1st Battalion, 23d Marines; a company of Soldiers from the 1-503d Infantry Battalion, 2d BCT; and the Soldiers of the 36th Iraqi Commando Battalion. This attack was conducted as the final operation of Phase II to complete the isolation of Fallujah proper from the west, while the Black Jack Brigade isolated the city from the east and south. The hospital at the northern tip of the peninsula was also to be seized, as it had been used by the insurgents as a C^sup 2^ center and weapons storage facility.

The attack up the peninsula proceeded according to plan and accomplished its intended purpose. The 36th Iraqi Commando Battalion quickly seized the hospital from a small group of insurgents that included some foreign fighters. The bridges allowing access to western Fallujah were secured by TF LAR who encountered sporadic small arms fire and suffered some wounded from IEDs that were placed on the roads leading to the bridges. The insurgents mistook D-day for the actual attack, and cell leaders were on the speaker systems in Fallujah’s mosques calling their fighters to pick up weapons and report to designated locations. This tactical deception was a useful diversion for the real blow to come from the north 24 hours later. It also kept the insurgents in an alert status for a full day, sapping their physical and mental energies for the real fight to come. Phase II was a crucial part of properly setting the stage for the main attack. The precision attacks degraded the insurgents’ ability to C^sup 2^ their fighters and destroyed many of the hazards that would have impeded our forces’ attack into the city.

**Hammer Blows**

The twin hammers of Operation AL FAJR were RCT-1 and RCT-7. They rolled out of their various staging areas through the night of 7 November and during the day of 8 November (A-day for attack day). This was a sequenced movement of forces that first staged RCT-7 in position by daylight in the event that an early supporting attack was required to keep the insurgents off balance, or in the event that indirect fires made their attack positions untenable. The main effort, RCT-1, moved into position near simultaneously, but slightly behind RCT-7. RCT-1 completed its movement into its final attack positions just prior to the hour of attack (A-hour, 1900 local time). They literally moved into their attack positions and rolled onward into the attack. Each RCT had a penetration force consisting of an armor-heavy battalion TF from the Army. TF 2-7 (2d Cavalry Squadron, 7th Regiment, 1st Cavalry Division) led the way for RCT-1, with TF 2-2 (2d Battalion, 2d Infantry Regiment, 4th Infantry Division) advancing in zone for RCT-7. These penetrating forces were critical to quickly slicing through the insurgents’ defenses and disrupting their ability to conduct coordinated counterattacks. The firepower and armor protection these battalions brought to the fight added significantly to the capability set of the assault force. Marine and ISF battalions conducted supporting attacks and moved closely behind the penetration forces to conduct follow-on search and attack missions. The fighting was intense, close, and personal, the likes of which has been experienced on just a few occasions since the battle of Hue City in the Vietnam War. We attacked at night to take advantage of our superior night-fighting capability.

The assault force dominated the urban battle from the start. The Army penetration did what it was designed to do and fractured the enemy’s ability to execute a cohesive defense. The young Marines, Soldiers, and Iraqi Soldiers expanded and cleared the wedge of remaining insurgent groups. Wherever the insurgents stood to fight, they died. In spite of their prebattle braggadocio, they were no match for our combined and joint force. Many fought fiercely but were never able to overcome our troops’ advantage in leadership, training, and morale. The smart insurgents quickly went into survival.
mode. They scurried from building to building trying to avoid our forces until they had a window of opportunity to make a suicidal defense that would produce the greatest amount of casualties among our forces. In some cases they built spider holes in the floors of houses and buildings to use as ambush positions from which to attack our clearing forces as they entered the structures. In other instances, they built "panic rooms" in the interior of structures, complete with light discipline, where they waited for an opportune moment to attack. The insurgency rapidly dissolved into small groups that moved between houses using tunnels, ladders across rooftops, and holes that they had knocked out of exterior walls. Oftentimes they would double back into an area already "cleared" by our forces and wait for their chance to make a last-ditch suicidal stand.

In our prebattle planning we had anticipated reaching the center of town within 72 to 96 hours. In reality the battle progressed at a faster tempo than our best planning assumptions, with elements of RCT-7 crossing the road (Main Supply Route (MSR) Michigan/Phase Line (PL) Fran) that runs from east to west through the center of Fallujah in just 14 hours. The main effort (RCT-1) encountered some of the insurgents' toughest defensive positions in the Jolan District but still managed to fight to PL Fran within 43 hours of the commencement of the attack. The end of 10 November 2004-the Marine Corps' 229th Birthday-saw both RCT-1 and RCT-7 in control of MSR Michigan, having secured all initial 1st MarDiv objectives. Controlling MSR Michigan was a key tactical victory because it opened up a shorter resupply route from Camp Fallujah-3 miles to the southeast. The 1st MarDiv's original plan at this point of the battle was for RCT-7 to reorient, drive to the west, and become the main effort. However, RCT-1 was doing so well in driving from north to south, and resistance had been heavier in the northeastern quadrant of the city, that an audible was called to execute a branch plan instead. We deemed that the time delay to move and reorient the necessary forces to attack from east to west would give the enemy a chance to catch his breath when we had him back on his heels. The branch plan involved both RCTs continuing on their north-south attack in zone to the southern portion of the city. The division's execution of the branch plan maintained the momentum of the attack. The RCTs continued south on 11 November, and by the end of the day their forward units were at the southermmost edge of Fallujah. Full combat operations continued side by side with search and attack operations through the remainder of Phase III.

Phase III-B was the search and attack period of operations. There was no defining date that neatly separates the two subphases. Phase III-B activities featured small unit combat actions that were as equally intense and lethal as the Phase III-A combat operations. The city was divided into six sectors with the mission to go through each area in detail to eliminate remaining pockets of insurgents and to identify weapons caches. With the departure of TF 2-2 and TF 2-7 at the end of November, the city was reapportioned into four sectors, maintaining the same mission. Enough cannot be said about these competent professional Soldiers who brought a tremendous capability and warrior spirit to the fight. In turn, they will proudly wear the recently authorized Blue Diamond patch of the 1st MarDiv on their uniforms.

During Phase III we actually commenced Phase IV-type humanitarian and reconstruction activities simultaneously with the search and attack operations. We knew it was critical to get a headstart in restoring the city for the inevitable return of its residents. This is where the "three block" war literally became the "three building" war. On the same block, within steps of each other, combat operations were taking place in one building, while a few buildings away humanitarian aid was being rendered, and rubble was being cleared from the streets just down the block.

The search and attack operations of Phase III-B progressed steadily through the rest of November and into December. The city was divided into 86 sectors, and the status of operations was tracked with a colorcoded map. Green, for example, meant that the sector had been cleared in detail, with weapons caches and boobytraps removed. Slowly but surely our combined forces turned sector after sector into green. Prime Minister Allawi wanted the city reopened to its citizens as soon as possible, but we held firm that the city needed to be cleared of insurgents and weapons caches before opening the floodgates to the residents. Too much blood of courageous warriors was being spilled to not get the job done right. Furthermore, we wanted to make sure that Fallujah was safe and secure for returning residents. We established a civil-military operations center (CMOC) at the site of the former government center in the heart of the city. Our Seabees and civil affairs group (CAG) personnel worked around the clock to prepare the city for the return of residents. Many of the streets were filled with rubble and downed power lines that had to be cleared. Portions of Fallujah are below the water table, and the water pumps that kept river water out had ceased operating. Standing water was perhaps the biggest problem and was eventually solved by the Seabees of the MEG. Essential services across the board were nonexistent. The CAG established three humanitarian distribution sites at key junctures in the city to provide relief supplies to returning residents. These sites eventually supplied humanitarian relief to 87,620 residents. The removal of enemy dead bodies was another important job that was completed by our joint MA teams. These teams worked closely with the combat forces, often at great peril, to ensure that enemy bodies were handled morally and in accordance with Islamic customs. In several cases the insurgents had boobytrapped the bodies of their dead in a final attempt to inflict casualties among our forces. The
MA teams carefully recovered all located bodies and transported them to the potato factory for processing. Each body was meticulously checked and documented while being prepared for burial. Sunni Imams were flown in from Baghdad to perform their religious rites and ensure that the bodies were buried in compliance with religious traditions.

Open the City

The Prime Minister made the decision to open the city for returning residents on 23 December, and thus began Phase IV of Operation AL FAJR—the civil affairs phase. Reopening the city was accomplished through a sequenced phasing plan that repopulated Fallujah by opening up one district at a time (total of 18 districts) to returning residents. This control was necessary as there were still sectors of the city being cleared. Five entry control points (ECPs) were established at key roads leading into the city. Vehicles were searched by Marines and ISF Soldiers, and military-aged males were registered with the biometric automated tool set (BATS). The BATS was linked to a database that would alert us if a military-aged male had a previously recorded history of insurgent or criminal acts. Female military personnel played a critical role in this process by searching the women and children. Unfortunately, women and children needed to be searched to prevent insurgents from using them as smugglers. IIG workers and civilian contractors flooded the city to begin the process of reconstruction. We insisted that contractors hire Fallujan residents in their reconstruction projects. It was important that the rebuilding of Fallujah be an inclusive process, so the people of Fallujah would vehemently reject any attempts by insurgents to regain control. Thousands of Fallujans have been hired in the cleanup and reconstruction of their city. With unemployment running 60 percent in the Al Anbar Province, this was a win-win situation for all involved in rebuilding Fallujah. The CAG held weekly town hall meetings at the CMOC that were attended by national ministerial representatives, provincial government representatives, and local sheikhs. A $200 humanitarian payment was made to heads of household to help them get reestablished. It secured a temporary reservoir of good will with the returning residents. A total of $6,509,200 was paid to 32,546 heads of household.

The Payoff

One of the most memorable and gratifying moments of Phase IV occurred on election day—30 January 2005. Free from intimidation, the Sunni residents turned out in droves—proof positive that in an environment free of intimidation, the average citizen wants to exercise his or her right to freely determine his/her government. The 7,679 male and female residents who voted in Fallujah accounted for 40 percent of the entire vote cast in the Al Anbar Province. The elections were another strategic victory emanating from the decisive tactical victory of Operation AL FAJR.

The residents of Fallujah are eager about the opportunities that lie ahead. They are friendly and cooperative in our combined efforts to restore the city. One can hardly get out of a vehicle without being swarmed by children and residents. Residents have even identified weapons caches to our Marines and their ISF partners. A newfound sense of freedom and confidence prevails in the city, and the atmosphere is positive and electric.

The immediate impact of the first four phases of Operation AL FAJR has produced a turning of the tide in the fight against the insurgency in the Al Anbar Province. By the end of March we had recovered 629 weapons caches, just from the city itself. The amount of weapons, equipment, and ordnance is mind boggling—literally, enough to equip a good-sized army. The number of attacks throughout the MEF’s area of operations dropped 40 percent between October and December. The insurgents are on the run, and those who escaped have fled out west along the Euphrates River. The 1st MarDiv’s subsequent pursuits, Operations RIVER BLITZ and RIVER BRIDGE, further disrupted the intimidators’ ability to conduct organized attacks and uncovered even more weapons caches they will not be able to use. Raids conducted with actionable intelligence continue to roll up cell leaders. Calls to the tips line rose 630 percent between the beginning of January and the middle of March, as the citizens are becoming fed up with the insurgents, who are turning more and more to criminal activities to finance their operations. Another good measure of the effect of Operation AL FAJR has been the 90 percent, across the board, rise in the price of weapons and ammunition on the black market.

It was recognized by the planners that the compensation to homeowners and businessmen for damage to their homes and buildings would be key to sealing the strategic victory. Full compensation would demonstrate to the Sunni residents that the predominantly Shia-controlled government cared about their plight and wanted to include them in the new Iraq. It would open up multiple avenues for the inclusion of the Sunni population in the political process and turn Fallujah into a model for the entire Sunni heartland. The tactical military success of November 2004 was subsequently turned into a political strategic victory with the issuing of the first compensation checks at the CMOC to Iraqi homeowners on 14 March. The Iraqi Government made good on its promises, and the good will it has engendered will spawn a new era of political engagement with the previously disenfranchised Sunni population. This, in turn, will be the death knell of the insurgency. While the tactical military victory of Operation AL FAJR was a knockout blow, the strategic consequences that will flow from political engagement with the Sunni’s will be the knockout punch to the insurgency.
The Future

Operation AL FAJR continues on, as Phase V has yet to be implemented-transition to local control-at the time of this writing. However, great inroads have been made in the right direction. The bulk of the joint forces providing security for Fallujah have been phased out. In their place, the ISF have increasingly taken control of the day-to-day security for the city. The ISF are the right force for this role. They instinctively identify foreigners and undesirables and stop them at the ECPs. They interact well with the local population and, since they are from other provinces, can resist the normal family and tribal influences of "homegrown" forces. Traffic police have been on the streets of Fallujah since February directing the ever-increasing volume of traffic as the city springs back to life. A new Fallujah police force is being established, with tight screening of applicants to ensure there is no return of the corrupt old guard. The new police force will start to populate the city this summer. Specially designed and constructed police forts are being built to improve their force protection and to reduce their vulnerability to insurgent attacks. In fact, these structures will become a model for other troubled parts of Iraq.

Operation AL FAJR was a classic example of integrated staff planning, interaction, and collaboration between the MEF's major subordinate commands (1st MarDiv, 3d MAW, 1st FSSG, MHG, MEG, CAG, and 11th MEU), the MEF staff, and higher headquarters. Commanders at all levels were personally involved on a daily basis in both planning and execution. The Commanding General, 1st MarDiv and key staff were up front every day during the battle to maintain their situational awareness and rapidly adjust to changing circumstances. The commanders of Multinational Corps, Iraq and Multinational Force, Iraq provided the MEF with tremendous support-evident in the allocation of roughly six Iraqi battalions plus the Army's Blackjack Brigade to the operation. They went out of their way to fulfill every request for additional resources-such as the extension of the Black Jack Brigade-and provided the political top cover that allowed the MEF to focus on the mission at hand.

The heroics and tactical details of the battle of Fallujah will be the subject of many articles and books in the years to come. The real key to this tactical victory rested in the spirit of the warriors who courageously fought the battle. They deserve all of the credit for liberating Fallujah. Their spirit is epitomized by an encounter with a wounded Marine non-commissioned officer at our Bravo Surgical treatment facility on Camp Fallujah. When asked what we could do for him, he held up his right hand and extended his index finger, then replied, "Sir, send me back to my team. My trigger-finger is still good!"

This indomitable spirit was the consistent theme of all of the wounded fighters. They wanted to immediately return to the fight with their comrades. We were honored and privileged to have had the opportunity to serve with the Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Special Forces, Marines, and Iraqi Soldiers who selflessly gave their all to liberate Fallujah. "Remember Fallujah" is no longer the rallying cry of the insurgency. Our warriors took that from them and made it our rallying cry.

SIDEBAR

. . . the Fallujah Brigade experiment demonstrated that the insurgency was factionalized, and therein was its real weakness.

SIDEBAR

In our experience, the insurgents and terrorists justify their actions as jihad (holy war) when it is convenient, and in order to appeal to a broader Muslim audience. . . .

SIDEBAR

Enough cannot be said about these competent professional Soldiers who brought a tremendous capability and warrior spirit to the fight.

SIDEBAR

The real key to this tactical victory rested in the spirit of the warriors who courageously fought the battle.

by LtGen John F. Sattler & LtCol Daniel H. Wilson

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The Limits of Fourth-Generation Warfare

BYLINE: Dunlap, Charles J Jr

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ABSTRACT

Unfortunately, popular interpretations of 4GW have significant intellectual-and practical-gaps. For example, in today's incarnation 4GW is unabashedly hostile to technology. This is a deviation from its original construct and out of line with the view of its more thoughtful adherents today.
Dunlap discusses the concept of fourth-generation warfare (4GW) in connection with the current insurgency in Iraq. 4GW defies concise summarization; a linear, idea driven, and often involves nonstate actors who refuse to abide by the rules of conventional conflict.

**FULL TEXT**

Putting all of our military force capabilities into the fourth-generation warfare basket is not the answer for success on future battlefields.

Long a staple of Marine Corps thinking, the concept of fourth-generation warfare (4GW) is gaining a broader audience. An interesting Microsoft PowerPoint presentation discussing 4GW and the Iraqi insurgency recently surged to viewers beyond the beltway. This presentation complements the publication of Col Thomas X. Hammes' 4GW book, The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century (Zenith Press, St. Paul, MN, 2004).

Preparing for the Future

4GW defies concise summarization. It is nonlinear, idea driven, and often involves nonstate actors who refuse to abide by the rules of conventional conflict. Hammes describes this "anything goes" style of warfare as using:

. . . all available networks-political, economic, social and military-to convince the enemy's political decision makers that their strategic goals are either unachievable or too costly for the perceived benefit.

It is a favorite of insurgents, rebels, and other unconventional threats. It could even be the approach of the armies of developing countries.

4GW discussions are a timely reminder of what are actually ancient verities of war. Indeed, there is much to recommend about the theory of 4GW, especially in addressing the current insurgency in Iraq. 4GW proponents are especially "on target" in highlighting the criticality of the psychological dimension of war, that is, the vital importance of truly understanding the adversary's mindset and what it takes to overcome it.

Unfortunately, popular interpretations of 4GW have significant intellectual-and practical-gaps. For example, in today's incarnation 4GW is unabashedly hostile to technology. This is a deviation from its original construct and out of line with the view of its more thoughtful adherents today. Thus, some 4GW thinking has great potential to be misused and misunderstood as a rationale to redirect national defense resources away from technologies critical to maintaining military dominance in the 21st century. In many pitches about 4GW you will see lots of intriguing quotes critiquing what is portrayed as the United States' over-reliance upon technology. We need to consider these carefully, especially since Americans (airmen in particular, as the late military analyst and author Carl Builder was wont to note) can become overly enamored with technology for technology's sake. That said, one of the quotes you won't see in this or any 4GW presentation, and one to consider along with the critiques of technology, is that of historians Ronald Haycock and Keith Neilson. They ominously warn that military technology has the nasty habit of permitting "the division of mankind into ruler and ruled." Trivializing the role of technology in war can be catastrophic. Polish cavalymen learned that when facing German Panzers and Stukas at the outset of World War II.

Absent a disciplined approach, 4GW analysis becomes an exercise in planning to "fight the last war," which is, from a strategic perspective, the current insurgency in Iraq. As important as it is to succeed in Iraq, we ought to be very careful about allowing 4GW proponents to dramatically reorient our entire defense establishment to address today's threat at the expense of failing to prepare to meet tomorrow's most dangerous possible peril—a powerful peer competitor like China.

In truth, nothing Iraqi insurgents (or, frankly, even al-Qaeda terrorists) can do could threaten the continued survival of the United States as a free country. It is true that extremely grievous harm might be inflicted by them—and we must work to prevent that—but inflicting truly fatal harm is only a possibility for a peer competitor with a major, high-tech military capability (along with a significant inventory of nuclear weapons, not just one or a handful).

Examine Required Capabilities

As we look to the future, there will likely be situations where all we want or need to do to an adversary is to destroy his physical capability to project military power. 4GW advocates seem to think that we will always be in the "defeat and nation-build" mode. Actually, remaking/rebuilding societies may very often not be on our agenda in future conflicts. Frankly, the notion of occupying an opponent's territory and remaking his political/cultural system may not be feasible or even particularly desired under many circumstances. We will never wish, for example, to occupy any portion of any of the
nations that may become military peer competitors in the 21st century. Protecting ourselves from their force projection potential may completely satisfy our objectives.

To the untutored and shortsighted, exposure to 4GW aficionados could lead to an assumption that all security problems are solvable by some amalgam of the Marine Corps and special forces (a view I doubt is actually shared by those forces or, for that matter, the more thoughtful analysts of 4GW). Regardless, as important as those capabilities are, (or some combination of them) could not alone stop an authentic peer competitor bent on our destruction as a viable political entity.

The reality is that it takes decisive quantities of dominating weaponry along with well-trained warfighters from across all of the military Services to stop the kinds of forces that could really jeopardize the existence of the United States as anything we would recognize today. As terrific as the Marine Corps is and as talented as the special forces community is, I suspect that military planners of potentially hostile nations, like Soviet planners before them and Iraqi insurgents today, find them difficult but confrontable opponents.

Though it is an anathema to 4GW zealots, what actually inflicts despair and hopelessness upon the minds of adversaries these days is overwhelming dominating weapons. It is being attacked by systems against which the most hardened and dedicated warfighters are helpless. Yes, I am talking about things like the F/A-22 and the Joint Strike Fighter, that is, weapons that can dictate who lives and who dies on tomorrow's battlefields. Such capabilities can hold at risk every object they value in their society. And though it is faddish in the think tank circles to conclude otherwise, it is actually silly to suggest that the "ideas" and "culture" of a society-especially one with rapidly rising quality-of-life expectations-are unrelated to the objects it possesses and desires. Even seemingly ideologically driven opponents very often have valued touchstones in material objects.

It is the array of high-tech, uniquely American weaponry that causes our potential peer competitors to know that achieving their objectives by force is simply not obtainable within their lifetimes. In truth, it is the inability to control the air, not any number of ground forces, however skilled, that wakes them up at night in a cold sweat. And it is not just airpower; it is the insurmountable gap in the quantity and quality of U.S. ballistic missile and attack submarines. And before we start tossing out so-called "legacy" systems as "unchic," consider the reports about the dread that Iraqi insurgents have about the fearsome M1A1 tank. Think about what these platforms and other high-tech weapons can do to the minds of potential enemies. 4GW devotees too often completely miss the profound psychological impact on even the most combat-hardened fighters of technology against which they are completely helpless. Warfighters like to say that the enemy "always gets a vote" as to whether a combat operation succeeds. What American technology can do in many instances is to literally disenfranchise the adversary. The Taliban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan were just as tough and determined as the mujahideen who successfully fought the Russians. What proved to be decisive was the ability to hold at risk Soviet military aviation with the help of U.S. Stinger missiles. That circumstance did not exist in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM.

The emergence of extremely accurate joint direct attack munitions and other precision technology changed things radically. They enabled the application of precise combat power from beyond the range of any defensive weapon. This development did not just physically destroy enemy forces; it crushed their will to fight. There is nothing like a feeling of total vulnerability to undermine fighting spirit.

Force majeure-Napoleon's "big battalions" so to speak-sounds anti-quated, but thousands of years of military history prove otherwise. In 21st century conflicts, "mass" ought to be defined by deliverable combat power, not numbers per se. And it is ludicrous to suggest that high technology does not create deliverable combat power in distinctively effective ways.

In 21st century warfare, control of the air and sea mediums will, more than anything else, eliminate the force projection capabilities/possibilities/hopes of potential adversaries. The ability to exercise that control is essential-and irreplaceable-to safeguarding the U.S. homeland in the coming years.

by BGen Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., USAF

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A View From the Other Side

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ABSTRACT

ABSTRACT
Armstrong reviews GUERRILLA: Journeys in the Insurgent World by Jon Lee Anderson.

FULL TEXT

Jon Lee Anderson's Guerrillas is the product of a traveling research project conducted between December 1988 and January 1992, although the inspiration for his book began in late 1986. He spent that New Year's Day with Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) insurgents in El Salvador's Morazan Province. Although Anderson's book contains inevitable political and religious undercurrents, it is fundamentally a series of stories about people who "perceive themselves irrevocably disenfranchised by their government, or oppressed within their country." Anderson tells his tales from the insurgents' viewpoints, which means readers may cringe or cheer, depending on their own perceptions of the wars he addresses. He properly subtitles his work Journeys in the Insurgent World, as warriors in the conflicts he studied were not really waging "little wars."

In gathering material, the author went to Afghanistan to visit mujahideen, the Western Sahara with the Polisario Front, Burma for repeat visits to Karen insurgent bases, El Salvador for a return stay with the FMLN, and the Israeli-occupied Gaza strip. He organized his book to flow from mythological roots of insurgencies through chapters describing how insurgents created parallel realities with respect to shadow governments and earned a living while making war today and preparing future generations to carry on the fight. Each chapter is rich in anecdotes, told by characters-some colorful, some depressingly bland-who fought for the perceptions that led them to rebel.
Readers without counterinsurgency backgrounds may be surprised at the dedication of revolutionary gunfighters who, almost invariably outnumbered and outgunned, spent years living, running, hiding, and fighting under generally inhospitable and often harsh conditions. To get a sense of perspective, I considered my own experience in El Salvador. During a 2-year tour I was in the field about 500 days. When I was in the rear or capital city, I lived in relative luxury, though conditions were sometimes dangerous, and combat in the city was common and occasionally heavy. My counterparts in the Salvadoran Armed Forces were on a rotation schedule that kept them in the field or forward bases 22 days at a time, followed by a 5-day liberty. FMLN insurgents took liberty at their peril, and many were in the field for years at a time. When Polisario insurgents began releasing Moroccan prisoners of war in 2003, one of their captives had been a prisoner for 23 years. Some Palestinians have lived in refugee camps for generations. Anderson's characters put flesh on such bare, statistical bones in a way that makes one understand the insurgents' tenacity, even if one disagrees with their causes.

Throughout his work, the author reports with reasonable objectivity, if one remembers he is recounting the wars from purely insurgent viewpoints. He makes some judgments, if only by accepting certain stories and recollections at face value. This reporting style does not detract from the lessons in his book. Maintaining objectivity while reading the book may be impossible for those who have been there, depending on where one's experience occurred. The chilling, casual way a mujahideen leader accounts for the Soviet prisoners he's killed, for instance, contrasts with the more judicial view of an FMLN commander who killed government collaborators. Similar Palestinian accounts are more gruesome. When was it murder, and when was it justice? If it was justice, why wasn't it justice when government forces in any of these conflicts did similar killing? The answers may be clear in the cold light of a class on the law of warfare at The Basic School. Andersen's characters lend some fuzziness to the issue in the mountains of Afghanistan.

Anderson wraps his book with an afterward reviewing results of the insurgencies featured in his writing. Not surprisingly, his sympathies appear to be with guerrillas whom he knew personally, and he appears disappointed about some of the results. That underscores what counterinsurgent warriors in our own ranks know—this kind of warfare is extremely personal.

The book is a good read for the stories alone. It's an important read for Marines because it helps put a human face on the type of adversary we face today and will undoubtedly face elsewhere in the future.

by LtCol Charles L. Armstrong, USMC(Ret)

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July 2005

The Fall of Fallujah

BYLINE: West, F J "Bing".


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ABSTRACT

The Iraqi soldiers fought acceptably in Fallujah with the American advisers providing much of the combat leadership. That was a huge improvement over the mass desertions that occurred in the April 2004 fight in Fallujah. Still, it was only the first step. Inside the Sunni Triangle, over the past year, intimidation has been rife.

ABSTRACT

The battle of Fallujah deserves detailed, firsthand accounts of the tactics, techniques, and procedures used by the Marines who seized that wretched city. Here, West recounts the battle to clear Fallujah of insurgents during Nov 2004.

FULL TEXT

The author recounts the battle to clear Fallujah of insurgents during November 2004.

The battle of Fallujah deserves detailed, firsthand accounts of the tactics, techniques, and procedures used by the Marines who seized that wretched city. These will undoubtedly be forthcoming over the next several months. This overview is based on observing and interviewing 200 Marines from 9 companies in 4 infantry battalions and 2 American advisory detachments in Fallujah during November and December 2004.

The Setting

Fallujah is a hardscrabble Sunni city of 280,000, an hour’s drive west of Baghdad. It is laid out in a square grid, row after row of monochromatic ochre two- and three-story cement and brick buildings surrounded by 7-foot cement courtyard walls secured by padlocked iron gates. Bounded on the west and south by the Euphrates River and on the north and east by garbage heaps and flat expanses of dirt, the city has the architectural charm of Levittown circa 1950. Home of smugglers, industrial workers, and followers of the extreme Wahhabi fundamentalist sect, Fallujah has 47 mosques and no functioning civilian economy.

In April 2004, four battalions of the 1st Marine Division (1st MarDiv) were poised to take control of the city from a coalition of terrorists, jihadists, and local defenders. Instead, the Marines were ordered to halt, and the city was turned over to former Ba’athists and Iraqi Army generals who proved unable to wrest power from the hardcore insurgents. In the ensuing 6 months the city metastasized into an insurgent sanctuary controlled by a Taliban-style government that kowtowed to the archterrorist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.

Two local leaders emerged—Abdullah Janabi and Omar Hadid—both enjoying meteoric rises analogous to the psychopathic drug lord portrayed in the movie Scarface. Kidnappings, ransoms, beheadings, suicide bombings, and rocketing of Marine camps became commonplace. Jihadists seeped in across Syria’s deliberately porous border. Two to three thousand fighters swaggered around town. Analysts explained that many, perhaps most, were ignorant youths defending their city, which explained perhaps their motivation but did not diminish their capacity to kill Americans. On the insurgent side, Fallujah gained mythic proportions. It stood as the victory over the vaunted U.S. Marine Corps and was held out as the shining city on the hill—the future face of Iraq when the Sunni clique of Saddam followers reclaimed power.

In late spring and into the summer of 2004, American policymakers and Iraqi politicians believed that Fallujah should not distract attention from protecting Baghdad and restoring stability among the majority Shiites by first dealing with the rebel
cleric Muqtada al-Sadr. By September, though, it was obvious that Fallujah had morphed from a nuisance into a full-blown sanctuary where insurgents and terrorists could rest, plot, torture, intimidate, and manipulate the Arab press while stockpiling arms, munitions, communications, and foot soldiers. From Fallujah issued the orders and the resources to kill across Iraq. It was as if in 1968 Hanoi had been permitted to relocate 30 miles outside Saigon. By early fall, Washington and Baghdad agreed that Fallujah, now the command center of the insurgency, had to fall.

The Operation

Beginning in the summer, the I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) hit the al-Zarqawi network in Fallujah whenever the coalition hierarchy in Baghdad permitted. The technical means-agents, double agents, electronic bugs, refugees, tipoffs by watching the Arab media, electronic intercepts, the ubiquitous unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) with its relentless camera, satellites, and captured fighters-provided devastating evidence. Airstrikes against individual terrorist safe houses became a daily occurrence.

In April 2004 the insurgents had enlisted the sympathy of Iraqis countrywide to protest against the Marine investment of the city. By November, however, alZarqawi had drenched Fallujah in the blood of Iraqi civilians. As the Iraqi Prime Minister, Ayad Allawi, patiently listened to the lies of the city's insurgent council and implacably demanded al-Zarqawi's capture, a blind man could see the attack that was coming. While Fallujah's jihad council pleaded for reasoned dialogue, the population fled-the result intended by the coalition and the Iraqi Interim Government. In the April fight, some critical supplies were down to 2 days' on hand because the insurgents were attacking the main highways. For the November fight, then-BGen Richard S. Kramlich, Commanding General, 1st Force Service Support Group, did not rely upon "just-in-time" logistics; instead, the combat service support battalion built "iron mountains" of munitions, water, food, and fuel outside Fallujah. LtGen John F. Sattler, commanding the MEF, requested that the U.S. Army armored units that had fought alongside the 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit in Najaf during the summer be brought to the fight.

Based on the aborted April attack by the Marines, the insurgents expected the assault to come from the south and east, where they had erected earth barriers and rows of improvised explosive devices. The 1st MarDiv, commanded by MajGen Richard F. Natonski, launched several ruses from that direction to deceive the enemy. Then they struck from the north. The assault sprang forward with the same overwhelming intensity as the desert hurricane that had struck the Blue Diamond (1st MarDiv) in March 2003 during the march up to Baghdad. This time, the hurricane was manmade. Higher headquarters in Baghdad, with an eye on information operations, limited preparatory fires. The attack after dark on 7 November began with the seizure by the 3d Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion and the 36th Special Forces Iraqi Battalion of the hospital and the peninsula on the western side of the Euphrates, directly across from downtown Fallujah. The U.S. Army composite mounted brigade-called Blackjack-aggressively surrounded the city, backed by the 2d Marine Reconnaissance Battalion to the south. Recon kept a close eye on "Jackass Road," striking down fleeing fighters until the others learned that it was not an escape hatch.

On the evening of 8 November, the full attack kicked off, with seven battalions pouring through three breaches in the jihadist defenses. From west to east, within several hours, the following units attacked into the city: 3d Battalion, 5th Marines (3/5), 2/7 (Army armored battalion), 3/1, 1/8, 1/3, and 2/2 (Army armored battalion). The two Army armored battalions, 2/7 and 2/2, dashed 3 kilometers forward, seizing key locations along the main highway, called Phase Line Fran, that bisected the city.

The MEF calculated that the indigenous hard core would defend in the Jolan district to the northwest. That was the center of gravity of the resistance, although many of the diehard foreign fighters were consigned to the impoverished district called Queens, south of Fran. With the two Army armored battalions astride Fran, the suicidal foreign fighters in Queens were cut off from the Iraqi local leaders in the Jolan, shattering the command and control of the insurgent force, the bulk of whose fixed defenses pointed emptily to the south and southeast. Regimental Combat Team 1 (RCT-1) was the division's main effort. 2d Force Recon entered the city and engaged prior to the battalions. Then from the northwest, 3/5 advanced south, with three companies and tanks abreast, in a systematic, block-by-block clearing movement called "the squeegie," preceded by rolling mortar and artillery fires, with airstrikes employed whenever a hard point was encountered among the thousands of buildings. On 3/5's east flank, 3/1 moved more quickly south in trace of 2/7 for 2 kilometers, then wheeled to the west in front of 3/5 and attacked for a distance of 1 kilometer to the Euphrates, catching in the open the insurgents moving north in the alleys to attack 3/5. Within 3 days, 3/1 was astride Fran. To the east of 3/1, RCT-7, as the supporting effort, had launched 1/8 and 1/3, with the U.S. Army armored spearhead 2/2 in the lead. Again, progress was swift to Fran and 1/8 occupied the government complex. Fighting occurred in the day and night for the first 2 days.

The insurgents fell into three groups. The first were the crazies who, like moths to a flame, felt compelled to rush out and shoot at an Abrams tank or a Bradley in the armored spearheads (2/2 and 2/7), dying for the satisfaction of hearing the
ping of a rocket propelled grenade or 7.62mm round off the side of steel armor. The second were those in gangs with a command apparatus that conducted a mobile defense, especially fierce along Fran. The third were those who hunkered down in back rooms, often sustained by drugs, either to gun down an American at pointblank range or in the hopes that they would not be found.

The fighting was day and night for the first 3 days. After that, nights were mostly times to rest for Marines exhausted by searching hundreds of rooms. (Several times, 1/8 used the darkness to move forward.) As in Hue City in 1968, house-to-house fighting at night was rare. Insurgent mortar attacks diminished around midnight, apparently because the jihadists went to safe houses to sleep. American psychological operations trucks blared odd combinations of cries to surrender in Arabic with hard rock music. Some Marines got a kick out of it; others wanted to sleep and were annoyed.

MajGen Natonski did not pause the attack. With the insurgents confused, the battalions crossed Fran into the hard district called Queens, with 3/1 on the west and 1/8 on the east, together with 2/2, which recocked and made successive armored runs through the strongholds of the foreign fighters south of the industrial zone on the eastern side of the city. Four days after the attack began, the Iraqi politicians declared that the city had fallen, although for the Marine battalions, the fighting went on for more than 10 days. Regardless of the exact timing, the result was indisputable. The soldiers and Marines of Task Force Fallujah crushed the insurgents in a swift campaign of coordinated, unremitting battalion-sized movements.

Some Notable Aspects

History takes a while to sort out the dominant factors and crucial observations to be taken from any campaign. In the interim, below is a first cut of some aspects, based on multiple interviews.

AC-130 night street clearing. At the beginning there were instances of offensive insurgent night patrols. But for the most part the night belonged to the AC-130 and the UAV. Alternately called Slayer and Basher, the Air Force AC-130, with night vision featuring the forward-looking infrared, was fearsome. The informality of the talk-on procedures by the Air Force crews provided an ironic contrast to the devastating and consistent damage they inflicted. Paired with UAVs to scout in every nook and cranny, the AC-130s hunted down and killed, with 40mm or 105mm, those insurgents foolish enough to venture out.

An empty city. Less than 1,200 civilians had remained in a city of 280,000. In Hue in 1968, the civilians—trapped by the surprise North Vietnamese attack—had remained, huddled in cellars. In this case, the danger of collateral damage to civilians was removed, depriving the insurgents of a major propaganda card. The absence of most of the civilian population was due to the strategic information planning and actions of the MEF over the month prior to the attack.

Unpredictable, heavy close quarters combat. The enemy was a loose conglomeration of semi-independent cells of 4 to, say, 20 fighters. They would pop up at odd places and had to be hunted down and killed, small pack by small pack. Overall, on any given day, about 100 squads were searching among 39,000 buildings. In some sections, "irahibeen" (loose translation: criminals or terrorists) were lurking in 1 out of every 70 buildings searched; in other sections, they were lying in wait in 1 out of 15 houses. And they would sneak back to sectors already searched. So Marines engaged in firesights in courtyards already marked as cleared. Based on dozens of interviews, it seemed more than 2,000 insurgents died. For instance, 1st Platoon, Company L, 3/1 kept a log of daily contacts. It showed 70 buildings searched each day, with an average of 3 firesights per day over an 8-day period, resulting in 60 insurgents killed, most inside noises. These dry numbers portrayed the image of a platoon that advanced methodically, never sure where the enemy were lurking in a house, with no telltale outside signs, knowing that several times a day a ferocious firefight would break out, rage for 30 minutes, and be ended by small arms, grenades, shoulder-launched multipurpose assault weapons (SMAWs), bangalore explosives, tank rounds, and airstrikes.

Daytime artillery preparation and on-call fires. For the first 4 days the insurgents would gather and soon after daybreak surge forward in multiple groups of four to eight, relying on knowledge of the alleyways and black Addidas track suits and sneakers to dodge American direct firepower. Usually they tried to pop up several feet back in windows in cement buildings, generally keeping a distance of about 100 to 200 meters from the advancing Marines. As they fell back or scurried about, they became prey to 60mm mortars, 81mm mortars, and 155mm howitzer volleys. It was a combined arms fight beginning at dawn each day, with the company commanders and the fire support teams (FiSTs) climbing to vantage points on high roofs and plotting the fires as the platoons advanced.

The emergence of precise fixed-wing air. In the fight against the Taliban in Afghanistan, air was the critical variable at a distance of 1,000 meters or more. Time and again in Fallujah the forward air controllers (FACs) were dropping buildings 200 meters to the front. It became standing operating procedure in all four battalions, upon encountering a building oc-
tornado had roared down the streets with Force 10 winds occasionally stopping to hammer a building into a heap of bricks. You could imagine their last screams echoing out the windows as neighbors looked the other way. Fallujah looked like a town whose streets were paved with blood.

The presence of evil. Like Berlin in 1933, the residents of Fallujah had accepted evil in their midst. Many were complicit and others were intimidated. Arms caches and fall-back positions were ubiquitous. In the torture houses the stink of death clung to the walls, and bodies lay rotting in curdled black blood, the heads of the mutilated victims thrown back in agony. You could imagine their last screams echoing out the windows as neighbors looked the other way. Fallujah looked like a town whose streets were paved with blood.

Pillboxes were to be destroyed; they were not homes. The absence of civilians meant the Marines could employ blast weapons prior to entering houses that had become pillboxes, not homes. The economic cost of house replacement is not comparable to American lives. The numbers are still elusive, but squads were searching between 15 to 100 houses—depending on the neighborhood—before encountering the 1 house manned by 4 to 12 jihadists determined to fight to the death, generally from a single room with a firing lane toward the front entrance. Hence, all battalions adopted blast techniques appropriate to entering a bunker, assuming you did not know if the bunker was manned. It is imperative to develop a device that detects the presence of enemy bunkers before a Marine enters.

Tanks to the fore. The insurgents can threaten the helicopter or low-flying fixed-wing aircraft with surface-to-air missiles, but contrary to popular theories of a few years ago, the Abrams tank has emerged as invincible on the Iraqi battlefield. The insurgents did not have any weapon to stop it on a regular basis. The log for a section of two tanks working with Company I, 3/1, for instance, showed that over a 10-day period, each tank daily fired seventeen 120mm tank rounds, 700 .50 caliber machinegun rounds, and 2,000 7.62mm machinegun rounds. The tanks, knocking down walls and putting rounds through suspect buildings, were generally several meters in front of the infantry. The troops protected the flanks and rear of the tanks, shooting the insurgents who sneaked along the interior courtyards and lobbed grenades over the walls. The enemy in Fallujah stayed and fought. They kept their distance and dodged when they could, but as the Marines advanced across Fran and into the southern sector, the jihadists ran out of running room. Many hunkered down like badgers, defying the tanks to root them out. The tankers and D-9 bulldozers were happy to oblige.

Assault teams came into their own. In exercises, among the most frustrated Marines are the SMAW teams and those lugging AT4s (shoulder-fired antitank weapons). They're the ones who yell, "Bang!" and are promptly ignored. In Fallujah, no one ignored them. When possible, they were placed on a roof looking down, where the SMAWs could smash three or four houses in advance of the squads. The mix was about 35 percent thermobaric novel explosive (NE) and 65 percent standard high explosive. Because the large size of many windows mitigated the overpressure of the NEs, the SMAW gunners became expert at determining which wall to shoot to cause the roof to collapse and crush the insurgents fortified inside interior rooms. As was true of tank munitions consumption, the expenditure of explosives clearing houses was enormous. LCpl1 Derek Fetterolf, for instance, averaged 14 SMAW shots a day as he advanced with Company L, 3/1. His longest shot was 485 meters, and he estimated that inside 400 meters he was 90 percent accurate with his first shot. In addition to tank and SMAW rounds, sections of bangalore were avidly sought, along with handgrenades and 3-pound chunks of C4 (Composition 4) plastic explosive. Dynamic breaches through the sides of walls and top-down clearing were done where time and building structure permitted. But with thousands of houses to search, smashing and entering through the front door had to be done, despite the risk. Well over 30 percent of Marine fatalities occurred inside houses, whether because the insurgents were hiding and hoping to be bypassed or barricaded and waiting for a search party to enter. This occurrence stands in contrast to Hue City where, once the Marines gained a foothold on a block, the North Vietnamese would run from the houses to the next line of defenses on the next street.

Net assessment—combined arms are essential. All of the years of training in Combined Arms Exercises paid off. On any day, there were over a dozen FiSTs with individual frontages of 400 meters or less calling in mortars, artillery, and air, while the platoons were directing tank and M19 fires, supplemented by the assault teams. While the buildings did provide cover to restrict kinetic lethality distances, the lack of blue on blue and the care everyone gave to the geometry of fires while sustaining a prodigious volume of fire were impressive. It is not obvious that any other fighting force could have safely maintained such an operational tempo, day after day, with indirect fires being called constantly.

Conclusions

Writers will differ concerning what to emphasize about the Fallujah fight. Below are a few macro-observations.

The presence of evil. Like Berlin in 1933, the residents of Fallujah had accepted evil in their midst. Many were complicit and others were intimidated. Arms caches and fall-back positions were ubiquitous. In the torture houses the stink of death clung to the walls, and bodies lay rotting in curdled black blood, the heads of the mutilated victims thrown back in agony. You could imagine their last screams echoing out the windows as neighbors looked the other way. Fallujah looked like a tornado that had roared down the streets with Force 10 winds occasionally stopping to hammer a building into a heap of bricks.
before battering the rest of the block. Perhaps 2,000 buildings were demolished and 10,000 others smashed up. The Marines swept through like a hurricane, never pausing to let the insurgents get their feet under them. It was the only way to root out the jihadists. Whatever the confused motivations of the disparate groups of insurgents at Fallujah, they had coalesced since May into a force that supported al-Zarqawi and rampant terrorism.

Although it sounds paradoxical, only soldiers, because they have unlimited power, can impose the limits and rules upon human conduct that permit civilization to advance. In contrast, the insurgency in Iraq manifests no political goal and respects no rules of conduct. It may be that the Saddam loyalists privately believe they can manipulate the jihadists and, if the coalition leaves, resume a secular Sunni tyranny. Regardless of their ideologies, the insurgents, infused with a murderous nihilism, had succeeded in seizing control of the city. Conversely, American efforts since April 2003 to bring stability to Fallujah had been disjointed and at odds. In 1 year, five different U.S. battalions provided security. Each believed the situation was improving, while three mayors and three police chiefs were replaced. The other government agency, also known as the Central Intelligence Agency, correctly identified suspected insurgents, many of whom met with the American military but were not arrested for lack of proof. Although 40,000 military-age males in the city were unemployed, the American civilian authority in Baghdad limited to $100,000 per month the projects requested by the American military, or $2 per unemployed male.

The 18-month struggle for Fallujah pitted the democratic intentions of the Americans against Sunni desire to reemerge as the ruling power in Iraq. In the end the citizens of Fallujah supported the insurgents, due to a combination of conviction and intimidation. Fallujah, like Berlin in World War II, chose its own fate. Marines do not decide the politics of war. A British journalist, who reported from the insurgent side at Fallujah, wrote in the British newspaper, The Guardian, that "the United States Marine Corps is the world's most lethal military force." Fallujah is testament to that statement. No better friend, no worse enemy.

Resolute bravery. Together with personal armor, the speed of casualty evacuations greatly reduced the mortality rate, while communications on the close-in battlefield enabled the battalion commanders, sergeants major, company commanders, first sergeants, and gunnery sergeants to be on scene at the tough spots. The practical effect was a shared situational awareness, meaning that the troops in contact received immediate direct and indirect fire support. Despite applying fires, in every rifle company there were instances in which, when a Marine was struck down inside a house, the squads and platoons reacted by surging forward, fully conscious of the danger but resolved never to allow a single Marine to be left alone in peril. Depending on the sector searched, the individual squad engaged in 8 to 24 close quarters firefights over an 8-day period, and none flinched. Every battalion, as well as recon, engaged in memorable, intense fights that will be chronicled in future books and articles. The 2d Platoon, Company A, 1/8, for instance, engaged in shootouts outside houses 19 times. I asked numerous Iraqi soldiers if they-and the insurgents-noticed anything distinguishing about Marines. They laughed, as if the question answered itself. The most frequent answers used the words "powerful tribe," "duty," and "accuracy," meaning that Marines stuck together (tribe) and advanced any time they were fired upon, never backing away (duty). They shot what they aimed at and did not stop shooting until the enemy was dead. Senator Joseph R. Biden (D-DE) visited Fallujah in December and called the performance of the troops "incredible." Given this kind of combat, in addition to acknowledging their bravery, the Department of Defense should set aside large amounts of funds for the infantry. Potential and current adversaries understand that at the operational level of war they will be overwhelmed. They cannot be allowed to believe that by inflicting casualties at the tactical level they can force a U.S. withdrawal. Every pilot in the Armed Forces is meticulously trained and supported. Similarly, the intrepid performance of our squads should persuade the Pentagon to allocate the funds so that, for instance, every infantry squad in the Army and Marine Corps can go through close quarters battle training, as do the special operations forces.

Unfinished task. A breadth and depth of combat experience now extends throughout the Corps in three combat environments-urban warfare, counterinsurgency tactics (the three block war), and large-scale operational maneuver (the 2003 march to Baghdad). Marines have now embarked upon a fourth major combat task-training Iraqi security forces in the midst of an ongoing war. All wars end because the losing side tires of casualties, loses heart in its chances for success, and accepts terms. Civil wars, though, can drag on for decades, as in Colombia. But a satisfactory "tipping point" can be reached where reasonably normal commerce and daily life can proceed even while the government forces, without foreign troops, continue to prosecute counterinsurgent operations. Providing security for its citizens is the first duty of a government. This goal is a gigantic challenge in Iraq, where the determination of suicide bombers to murder civilians mocks the notion of civilian normalcy.

The Iraqi soldiers fought acceptably in Fallujah with the American advisers providing much of the combat leadership. That was a huge improvement over the mass desertions that occurred in the April 2004 fight in Fallujah. Still, it was only the first step. Inside the Sunni Triangle, over the past year, intimidation has been rife. Urged on by many Sunni clerics, the
insurgents have wrapped themselves in the religious cause of throwing out the infidel, while the Iraqi Government has provided no counterrallying cry. Too frequently Iraqi soldiers, confronted by those advocating jihad, behaved as if they had an inferiority complex in the face of a superior claim to moral legitimacy, rendering them incapable of deep anger and offensive action against fellow Muslim Iraqis bent on killing them. Iraqi soldiers have hidden their uniforms when taking local buses, a sure sign of which side controlled the streets. Iraq will remain in crisis as long as the government forces feel they must hide from the insurgents, rather than vice versa. The challenge, then, is how to improve the capabilities and confidence of Iraqi forces inside a sovereign system that chooses its officers too often by criteria (class or tribal connections, schooling, the right sponsors, etc.) that diverge from the military performance standards our advisers expect. Marines cannot affect Iraqi politics. Yet the inherent right of mankind to freedom-so vividly manifested by the January election in Iraq-is often not matched by the capacity of a nation to organize and to fight effectively to secure that freedom. So, what Marines can do is to extend the model shown at Fallujah-encouraging the Iraqi forces, showing them the way, backing them up, providing combined arms, and not letting them get in over their heads. This support requires patience and persuasion and is not an easy task. It is being done. Prior to the January elections, the police in Ramadi began walking off the job. In their stead, the MEF sent in Iraqi commandos who had been trained by the 1st MarDiv. The Sunnis, however, refused to take part in the elections. Too many of their leaders have not yet accepted the concept of a democratic Iraq in which they are not the dominant power. Hard fighting in the Sunni Triangle alongside the fledgling Iraqi units looms ahead. Ramadi, as the capital of Al Anbar Province, is a particular challenge. There will not, however, be another insurgent sanctuary on the scale of Fallujah. The November fight was definitive in excising that terrorist stronghold. The coalition led by the United States and the Iraqi Government learned from the events of April 2004 not to allow the hardcore opposition to metastasize a second time. Once was enough.

SIDEBAR

The soldiers and Marines of Task Force Fallujah crushed the insurgents in a swift campaign of coordinated, unremitting battalion-sized movements.

SIDEBAR

Four days after the attack began, the Iraqi politicians were declaring that the city had fallen, although for the Marine battalions, the fighting went on for more than 10 days.

SIDEBAR

The practical effect was shared situational awareness, meaning that the troops in contact received immediate direct and indirect fire support.

SIDEBAR

Iraq will remain in crisis as long as the government forces feel they must hide from the insurgents, rather than vice versa.

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GRAPHIC: Photographs
IMAGE PHOTOGRAPH, Approach to the Brooklyn Bridge where four contractors were mutilated and hung.
IMAGE PHOTOGRAPH, Elements of a platoon in Queens.
IMAGE PHOTOGRAPH, Marines and Iraqi security forces prepare to clear a building in Fallujah.
IMAGE PHOTOGRAPH, Marines and a tank operating in Queens.

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ABSTRACT
Our ability as Marines to see maneuver warfare in nonspatial terms is exactly what makes us different from others and in step with organizations such as the British Royal Marines. While other forces do many things exceptionally well, counterinsurgency and small wars in general are not amongst these, with the notable exception of certain British and French units.

ABSTRACT
Strickland talks about the concept development in the Marine Corps Combat Development Command that is consuming a considerable portion of limited resources, as countless personnel are tasked with ensuring that the force remains ready and able to face any global challenge. While this type of forward thinking is necessary ensure the finest fighting force, it tends to unnecessarily take the force further away from its foundation in small wars and warfighting - maneuver warfare that is the bedrock of the force's current operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.

FULL TEXT
Sometimes it's difficult to see the forest because of the trees.

As anyone serving with or under the Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC) umbrella can confirm, concept development consumes a considerable portion of our limited resources, as countless personnel are tasked with ensuring that our force remains ready and able to face any global challenge-present or future. To this end, commands, such as U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCom) and MCCDC, employ hundreds of contractors (most of whom are retired military)-in addition to active military personnel-to develop concepts addressing issues such as seabasing, effects-based planning, and distributed operations. While this type of forward thinking is necessary ensure that we remain the finest fighting force, it tends to unnecessarily take us further away from our foundation in small wars and warfighting-manuever warfare that is the bedrock of our current operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, and needlessly hemorrhage limited resources trying to reinvent ourselves. As the saying goes, "dance with the girl you brought," and for the Marine Corps, this means maneuver warfare.

Reinventing the Wheel
While the U.S. Army has just produced a 150-page manual on countercriisurgency and the brightest at USJFCom worked on a stability operations operating concept-both of which consumed thousands of man-hours and countless thousands of dollars-and were only able to produce such insightful recommendations as develop local intelligence, emphasize information operations, and concentrate on elimination of the insurgents and not terrain objectives, as Marines, all we need to know is found in Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1 (MCDP 1), Warfighting. The answer to "what ails us" is not
always as elusive as it may seem; however, it may simply be obscured by those unwilling to admit that technology, expensive toys, and new joint concepts cannot eliminate the nature of warfare and the validity of maneuver warfare in any environment, to include a nontrinitarian or fourth-generation warfare scenario.

From cover to cover MCDP 1 outlines operational considerations for conducting small wars, counterinsurgency operations, and information operations. When reviewed with the 1940 Small Wars Manual or 2003 Addendum, one finds critical information necessary for effective operations in environments such as Iraq, Afghanistan, Liberia, Haiti, the Philippines, Chad, and Niger and, thus, can accurately conclude that many of the current/ongoing projects on asymmetric warfare concepts simply try to reinvent the wheel and waste limited resources. We need "how-to guides," not more of the avalanche of concepts, equations, or theories in line with confrontation analysis or complexity theory. If one is familiar with the Small Wars Manual, MCDP 1, and military operations other than war principles, then one is equipped with the "know how" to conduct operations in Iraq and not in desperate need of further theory. This is not to say that continued professional military education (PME) is not valuable; it is essential. In fact, those who have a fundamental understanding of Mao Tse Tung, the civil operations revolutionary development support (CORDS) program in Southeast Asia, Operation PHOENIX, and the civil war in El Salvador in the 1980s tend to have a different understanding and perception of the merits and shortfalls of current U.S. operations. When discussing scenarios such as the asymmetric threat that presents itself in Iraq and Afghanistan, MCDP 1 states:

The Marine Corps concept for winning under these conditions is the warfighting doctrine based on rapid, flexible, and opportunistic maneuver. The essence of maneuver is taking action to generate and exploit some kind of advantage over the enemy as a means of accomplishing our objectives as effectively as possible. That advantage may be psychological, technological, or temporal as well as spatial. Especially important is maneuver in time–we generate a faster operating tempo than the enemy to gain a temporal advantage.

A "rapid, flexible, and opportunistic" (three block war) response is certainly consistent with Marine Corps policies in Iraq, as well as our attempts to exploit the insurgents’ inability to sustain a high operational tempo. Through superior technology and overwhelming advantage in resources available, Marines were quickly able to exploit gaps by conducting precision strikes in conjunction with psychological maneuvers pursued through speed, violence, humanitarian assistance (drinking water/subsistence items), and civil affairs, satisfying basic human needs, such as generating a feeling amongst the Iraqis of being safe in person and property, thus denying insurgents much needed popular support; supporting information operations (IO) goals; and satisfying a critical counterinsurgency principle of keeping as many indigenous personnel as neutrals or procoalition as possible. Unfortunately, this rapid response can and did lead to a "revolution of rising expectations" amongst the Iraqis, but that is the product of success and high expectations.

Our ability as Marines to see maneuver warfare in nonspatial terms is exactly what makes us different from others and in step with organizations such as the British Royal Marines. While other forces do many things exceptionally well, counterinsurgency and small wars in general are not amongst these, with the notable exception of certain British and French units. Many have unfortunately learned the hard way that vehicle assets provide mobility and spatial maneuver but don't always equal maneuver warfare. While motorized and mechanized assets provide increased mobility and firepower, their widespread utilization adversely impacts IO by sending the wrong message, influencing the population in a manner that is unwanted, and keeping troops who are desperately needed to interact with locals cocooned in vehicles. These vehicles have become the target of increased attacks and are further signs of an occupation–not a sign of cooperation when used for routine policing and patrolling–a lesson learned previously by the British in Northern Ireland and the Israelis in the West Bank. In Iraq, this rapid, flexible, and opportunistic maneuver allows Marines to influence and inform (IO basics) indigenous personnel, whether friendly, neutral, or hostile, and thus shape the battlespace in a manner consistent with our commander's intent. This type of maneuver by small units, led by capable company grade officers, staff noncommissioned officers, and noncommissioned officers, allows Marines to develop intelligence, develop census information necessary for properly understanding our battlespace, and influence the populace in a manner consistent with themes such as "no better friend, no worse enemy." In fact, MCDP 1 dedicates entire sections to shaping operations (IO) and the combined arms effects (IO). Thus, while IO has become the new "cure-all," it is certainly not a new process or idea.

Again, MCDP 1 warns us that we must influence and address human needs when combating asymmetric threats in order to successfully prosecute the campaign. Was capturing Fallujah tactically significant because of the terrain, or was it because of the message it sent other or potential insurgents throughout the area of operations (AO)? Destroying the insurgency in Fallujah is significant for many reasons, not the least of which is the impact it had on the "moral and mental" forces in Iraq. Other than through conventional operations, one does this through influencing the population through civil-military operations by achieving a unity of effort with other agencies, to include private volunteer organizations. Immediately after the regime change in Iraq, 150 nongovernmental and private volunteer organizations were operating...
within the country, thus the coalition had a wealth of resources to assist in achieving this end. Utilizing nonmilitary or nonstandard organizations requires our warfighters to remain flexible.

As Marines, MCDP 1 tells us that mental flexibility is essential. "We should not assume that every enemy thinks as we do, or has the same values or objectives." While some may disagree, this tends to be the one warning that most non-Marines and nonservicemembers ignore. MCDP 1 warns us that words that are clearly defined to us may not be accurately defined when utilized in other cultures, to include Middle Eastern environs. What may be considered lawful or legitimate to us may not be so to Sunni Albu Issa tribesmen operating in Ramadi and Fallujah. What we may perceive as a show of restraint may be perceived as a sign of weakness among indigenous peoples in Najaf. What some consider unacceptable collateral damage in the battles in Fallujah may be perceived by indigenous persons as the acceptable and natural reaction to an overt hostile act by insurgents. Our warfighters must be pseudopsychiatrists and understand the mindset of those affected.

As Col Christopher C. Conlin (former Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF)) writes in his article, "What Do You Do for an Encore?" (MCG, Sep04), "Marines must be prepared to influence the battlespace by serving as civil administrators, public affairs spokespersons, police forces, and humanitarian assistance workers." Since every Marine is a rifleman and expected to understand basic infantry fundamentals and the need for human interaction in postconflict environs, the Marine Corps is more capable of transforming personnel that normally serve as artillery or tank personnel into infantrymen, where others continue to find difficulty finding tactical success with noninfantry troops.

MCDP 1 tells us that "war is an extreme test of will," and Marines know, based on their PME and familiarity with the Southeast Asian conflict, that conflicts are more than conventional fights. We understand that you can win the battle and still lose the war. Marines understand Vo Nguyen Giap's assertion that "you will kill ten of mine for every one I kill of yours, but in the end, it will be you who tire of it." Because of this we understand that the most committed in a conflict wins. We train to operate at a marathon runner's pace through our warfighting fundamentals, not a sprinter's pace, and thus are able to gain a psychological and temporal maneuver advantage.

Because of these things, the Marine Corps, like the British in Northern Ireland, have been able to sustain casualties, yet separate the part from the whole and not punish all Iraqis for the acts of the insurgents. This is why we are able to walk down the same stretch of road day after day to clear improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and show the insurgents that we are patient, will outlast them, and impose our will—that will being a secure environment.

While technological resources and joint operating concepts/doctrine should be explored, it should be done in a manner that seeks to augment our current warfighting capabilities and not by reinventing the wheel. While casualties in OIF and Operation ENDURING FREEDOM have turned many into risk-averse champions of technology and a new way of thinking, in the end, the nature of warfare has not changed and so maneuver warfare remains the correct course of action. New technologies and publications have not been able to magically locate IEDs in Iraq, detect potential car bombs at Iraqi police stations, or help the Israelis locate suicide bombers; however, maneuver warfare can do all three.

A Sample of 'How To'

In an attempt to demonstrate what we need more of, I provide the following how-to list for counterinsurgency and foreign internal defense. These are but some of the many ways to operate that satisfy both the blue and green forces' need for security and further counterinsurgent activities.

Establish appropriate expectations. This is the essential first step to any successful counterinsurgency. Failing to establish appropriate or measurable expectations can create a situation in which no matter how well one's forces are doing, they appear to be failing due to unrealistic expectations. Should one have expected people who had been beaten, tortured, and intimidated for 34 years suddenly to be infused with a spirit of invention, initiative, and cooperation? If one has no realistic expectation that citizens of the United States living in "rougher" inner-city neighborhoods will cooperate with law enforcement officials by providing human intelligence, should we expect foreign nationals with no civil law enforcement protection to do so? When utilizing nonactive duty components of our Services, one must establish appropriate expectations for them. Should we expect the same outputs and utility from National Guard and Reserve units that train 24 to 36 days a year as we do from our active duty units? If these are appropriate expectations, why have a large active duty force?

Remember the basics. Too often our leaders do feel as though they have not been properly trained to succeed in an insurgency. What all need to recognize is that insurgencies are less about some "skill set" that can be taught and more about leadership and influence. Counterinsurgencies require that leaders utilize their leadership more than in any other type of
conflict. Counterinsurgencies demand professional leaders capable of outmaneuvering opponents in other than spatial terms. You must be able to outthink your opponent.

PME. As noted above, PME is essential and, for the most part, an integral part of training. Where we continue to fail is in the manner in which we absorb or modify our behavior based on lessons observed. Lessons observed or insights never become lessons learned until we achieve a change in behavior. In the counterinsurgency environs in which we operate today in Iraq and Afghanistan, there is much discussion about the need of interagency coordinating groups and civil affairs, and how these should affect our military operations. While we continue this debate, we neglect the example of past lessons and examples, such as CORDS in Southeast Asia. While most officers have digested works on Field Marshall Erwin Rommel and MG Thomas J. Jackson, few have read Mao or Ho Chi Minh, and thus are not in a position to recognize the phases of the insurgency they face. They continue to pursue operations in an attempt to force a decisive action, yet they fail to understand that in an insurgency, insurgents dictate decisive points and engagements. Ho and Mao would argue that insurgents only become engaged in decisive acts if it is on their terms. In addition, students of counterinsurgency utilize works by General Sir Frank Kitson, Roger Trinquier, and Sir Robert Thompson, which are all 20 to 40 years old, and further acknowledge that the British and French are much better at these operations than the United States. These students understand that patience is the key. They are fully aware that the Vietnamese and Chinese fought insurgencies that lasted over 30 years and thus do not have unrealistic expectations. Those who best understand counterinsurgency are those who also best understand certain social phenomena, and understand how best to influence behavior.

Determine security needs. This determination should be made by the unit leader on the ground, and no one else which might put it at odds with higher headquarters. The unit leader will determine both physical and psychological security needs for both host nationals and blue forces. We must answer the questions, do the people feel safe, and if not, what will make them feel safe? From this sense or perception of security all else grows. Determine how to influence peoples' sense of security. Metal detectors are a very good way when the threat is hidden weapons and bombs. Whether they work or not is not as important as making people think that you are out looking with an advanced technology. The key is to try to be in as many different places as possible from day to day and week to week, thus giving people the impression that you could always be right around the corner. Always maneuver in a dispersed fashion, which gives people the impression you are much larger than you truly are. Always remember that their security needs are no different than U.S. citizens living in the continental United States. Why won't those afflicted by threats of physical violence and intimidation in our urban settings come forward to tell police who has threatened them? The answer is that they don't feel safe. This perception or sense of security is the same in Detroit as it is in Najaf.

To what will the people respond? As a sign of good faith, unit leaders must decide what need is not being met that if met would greatly improve the level of cooperation between blue and green forces. In underdeveloped nations these needs could be abundant; however, subsistence needs usually are the first to be satisfied. By providing the basics, such as water, or basic cooking implements, such as flour or rice, one's security situation is greatly enhanced. The old saying is "don't bite the hand that feeds you." Violence associated with humanitarian assistance is also a good indicator of the level of resistance or character of the resistance in an area. When providing subsistence items, such as water bottles, have labels printed with a procoalition message or information that will be useful to the host nationals, such as how much money is being offered for information or weapons turned over. Families tend to respond to things like family pictures or clothes/shoes. Children obviously respond to items like soccer balls. People do not respond to armored HMMWVs in a manner consistent with their needs, but do respond to foot-mobile infantry. Remember that security and occupation are not congruent. In addition, remember the old saying, "ring the doorbell with your elbow," meaning always have something in your hands to give to the locals.

Establish metrics or measures of effectiveness. How do you know that you are winning or that the people are responding to you? These metrics need to be based on the individual unit and not absorbed from some higher headquarters list. Fewer casualties or enemy engagements are not sound metrics.

Establish a lawful/legitimate security presence. It is imperative that all actions taken are done in a lawful manner and as honest brokers. Clearly demonstrate that the ladder of law has no top or bottom and that all are to be treated equally and with the same respect that we would treat U.S. citizens. Establish rules that all host nationals know they will have to abide by-through whatever civil administration may be present. Avoid empowering individuals, such as tribal elders or sheiks, while remaining culturally sensitive. However, as noted earlier, what is legitimate may not be lawful, and what is lawful may not be legitimate. While Operation PHOENIX and the utilization of paramilitaries in El Salvador remain very controversial and misunderstood, both proved to be highly effective. While both were/were not entirely lawful when viewed through a Western liberal democracy prism, they were legitimate acts that achieved the desired effects. For young men
who have witnessed 34 years of violence, violence is seen as a legitimate way to achieve goals. This phenomenon is no
different in many U.S. urban settings.

Create local "yellow/white pages" or a census. A unit leader cannot effectively provide security if he does not understand
who he is securing. Set up nonevasive operations, such as vehicle checkpoints, where the main object is not searching
vehicles but rather collecting information. To keep a steady flow of traffic, limit interaction to two questions-what's your
name, and what do you do for a living? On another occasion ask, where do you live, and who is your sheik or leader? On
a third occasion ask, where do you attend religious services (mosque), and who is your Imam? One can quickly establish
a sound picture of the AO. During these stops provide water and take pictures. If possible, have a generator with a printer
hooked up to provide prints from past family photos to "regulars" whom you see daily. On advanced searches, have
interpreters speak with host nationals simply to "listen for inappropriate accents" denoting either foreign fighters or folks
not from that area.

Always remember the hierarchy of needs: security, subsistence, infrastructure, and interpersonal wants/needs. Be mindful
that all flows from security; therefore, one cannot try to meet the other needs first because they are easier. In addition,
providing infrastructure needs to people who cannot feed themselves is insensitive and adds fuel to the fire that, as
Westerners, we think money and material possessions are the answer to everything. School supplies are great influencers,
but you cannot eat them. These items quickly find themselves sold or traded for subsistence needs. Guard against a rev-
olution of rising expectations by not promising what you cannot accomplish. Always promise less and deliver more.

When engaged by enemy personnel, remain sensitive to the locals and do not treat all as hostiles. It is essential that you
remain respectful of persons and property at all times. Make appropriate compensation payments for damaged property or
harm done to local nationals. If engaged, it is essential that one maintain the ground. Never pull back once engaged, only
move forward. A unit leader must demonstrate that his will is the strongest.

Money does not solve every problem. We must understand that money is not a cure-all, and in fact, it tends to create more
problems. Host nationals working aboard U.S. installations and witnessing numerous sport utility vehicles,
air-conditioning, chow halls, and trailers with porcelain toilets are sure to wonder why they have no electricity, water, or
health care. U.S. efforts to continue to provide school supplies are well-received; however, people require basic necessities
like food. Remain sensitive to the fact that everything shapes the battlespace and insurgency.

MCDP 1 gives us all of the guidance we need and, therefore, makes many of the ongoing projects at places such as
USJFCom or MCCDC unnecessary, or at a minimum in need of a serious rudder change. It is imperative that we do not try
to reinvent ourselves in a manner that takes us further away from that which we do better than all others-warfighting. Our
positions in Iraq and Afghanistan are difficult; however, we are prevailing. Hopefully, our commanders will not decide
that the positions cannot be held.

SIDEBAR

'The sole justification for the United States Marine Corps is to secure or protect national policy objectives by military
force when peaceful means alone cannot. . . . This requires a concept of warfighting that will help us function effectively
in an uncertain, chaotic, and fluid environment-in fact, one with which we can exploit these conditions to our advantage.'
-MCDP 1

SIDEBAR

"[Defeating an asymmetric threat] requires a concept into account the moral the mental as well as the physical forces of
war. . . . It requires flexibility of mind to with and disorderly situations."
-MCDP 1

SIDEBAR

"It is not enough that the troops be skilled infantry men or artillery men of high morale: they must be skilled water men
and jungle men who know it can be done-Marines with Marine training."
-Earl H. Ellis, MCDP 1

SIDEBAR
"It is because of this dynamic of human interaction that fortitude, perseverance, boldness, spirit, and other traits not explainable by art or science are so essential in war."

-MCDP 1

SIDEBAR

"War is an extreme trial of moral and physical strength and stamina."

-MCDP 1

SIDEBAR

"We thus conclude that the conduct of war is fundamentally a dynamic process of human competition requiring both knowledge of science and the creativity of art but driven ultimately by the power of human will."

-MCDP 1

SIDEBAR

The key is to try to be in as many different places as possible day to day and to week, thus people the impression that you always be right around the corner.

SIDEBAR

"Positions are seldom lost because they have been destroyed, but almost invariably because the leader has decided in his own mind that the position cannot be held."

-Gen A.A. Vartdegrift, USMC(Ret), MCDP 1

by Maj Adam T. Strickland

Maj Strickland is assigned to the Wargaming Division, Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory, Quantico.
ABSTRACT

Security will be the greatest objection to a CAP in Iraq. This is ironic, given that the Marine rifle squad has far more combat power today than during the Vietnam era. Our Marines have communications, fire support, and mounted and airborne reinforcement assets unheard of in earlier times. Our Marines are led by noncommissioned officers who are smarter, better trained, and more schooled in leadership-more strategic-than ever before.

ABSTRACT

The Marine Corps has already developed an approach to counterinsurgency that is applicable to the complex situation in Iraq—the combined action program (CAP). This program, that in Vietnam combined Marine rifle squads with local Vietnamese militia platoons, was extremely successful in spite of the lack of integration into any coherent campaign plan and misunderstanding and disinterest in the highest echelons of command. A CAP for Iraq would pair Marine rifle squads with local forces, either local police or a "neighborhood watch."

FULL TEXT

'. . . you can't win a game of poker if your opponent insists on playing spades.'

-Small Wars, 2003

We must not let our performance in the heavy fighting in Fallujah lead us to believe that we have broken the back of the insurgency. The insurgency is not the forces that we destroyed in Fallujah. It is not a formation at all. It is a phenomenon, a disease that thrives in the chaotic matrix of Iraq. The center of gravity of the insurgency is not its massed combat power but its distributed forces that can attack us asymmetrically. The enemy's critical requirement is his ability to operate in the environment of Iraq-avoiding detection and choosing the time and place he will give battle. The enemy's critical vulnerability is the support he enjoys from the populace.1

We are at an important crux in the war. Twenty years ago Lebanon was just such a collection of numerous ragtag factions and associated militias. With outside guidance (that Syria and Iran may again be providing in Iraq), elements of this unprofessional and disorganized mob became the highly competent and extremely dangerous terrorist organization Hezbollah, arguably a far more formidable enemy than alQaeda. The sophistication of the insurgency in Iraq is increasing. We cannot afford to give it space.

The ultimate political question in this kind of complex conflict is this: what will be the power structure-who will be in control-when the United States leaves? While this is a question for policymakers, it must inform every operational decision the military makes. We tend to focus on the negative aspects of the primacy of political goals in complex conflicts. When we speak of the "strategic corporal" it is generally in terms of his decisions having a potentially negative implication, particularly with regard to the international media. Perhaps this is the case on the tactical level, although nowhere is the overlap between the strategic and tactical levels of war as great as in "small" wars. On the operational level, we must ask ourselves how every action advances the political objective.

Cognitive Dissonance

Why are we mistaking the nature of the fight? Part of the problem relates to our training. The Marine Corps is at the forefront of thinking on insurgency and, as the quotations above show, has been so for some time. We train our leaders and Marines in counterinsurgency and complex conflicts, but only as the exception; our classes on small wars come after our classes on conventional offense and defense. Our Marines train to fight large, organized enemy formations, with insurgency treated as a "lesser included case." As a result, we apply the mental models of large-scale conflict where it is not appropriate. For example, we failed to secure our supply lines of communications on the Fallujah peninsula and had our logistics convoys ambushed repeatedly because we conceptualized them as the "rear area." This strategy might have worked in the fight against Saddam's army where we could have been confident that we had not bypassed an enemy formation. It does not work in an insurgency where there is no rear area.
We equate tempo with speed. But insurgencies are defeated not by lightning, focused actions but instead by persistent, comprehensive actions. All of this is not to say that we should neglect our traditional mission essential tasks. On the contrary, a decision not to prematurely focus on stability and support operations at the expense of conventional training ensured that our battalion had the balanced skill set required in this conflict. But looking to the future, we need to do more than talk about the "three block war." We need to train for it in the same evolution. We need to integrate small wars as the rule rather than the exception.

A more fundamental problem is that complex situations are difficult to assess. On a psychological level, the mind shies away from a vague situation that cannot be developed in the traditional sense. We strive for a coup d'oeil-recognition-based comprehension of the enemy situation and critical vulnerability-on the battlefield. From the intelligence perspective, insurgencies defy easy, quantitative analysis. Our measures of effectiveness are only meaningful contextually and relative to the enemy's own situation. While physical geography remains important, it is the human geography that is the key to our analysis. Judgment is called for, both in intelligence products and the commander's estimate. Such judgment requires a lot more sophistication than the body count from Fallujah. It requires cultural sophistication that takes a serious investment of time and education to develop and retain.

Operational Dislocation

Destroying the insurgents in Iraq is not the same thing as defeating the insurgency. Our cordon and search operations (what would, in an earlier time, have been called "search and destroy") have had some success in the former area-when we have had good intelligence to drive them. They have accomplished little toward the latter goal. For all of our forward thinking on the nature of complex contingencies, we continue to treat the insurgency as an enemy to be defeated by force of arms, instead of a Hydra that is generated by the political and structural conditions in Iraq.

The center of gravity of the insurgency is the support it enjoys from the populace. The Iraqi people provide the insurgent his cover and concealment. They are, as Mao Tse Tung said, the sea the guerrilla swims in. They provide his intelligence network. They provide his logistics support, supply, and transportation. Most importantly, the people are his pool of recruits. The Iraqi people are the strength that enables the insurgency to fight.

There is a difference between this center of gravity that enables the insurgency and the conditions that give rise to the insurgency in the first place. The roots of the insurgency are deep and multifaceted. Some, such as economic conditions, may be ameliorated by U.S. initiatives. Others, such as the religious and tribal demographics, are less subject to our actions. While our unified campaign plan must address these factors, the critical vulnerability-the support of the populace-remains the key to undoing the insurgency. An insurgency deprived of support is incapable of effective action.

The populace provides support to the insurgency for a number of reasons, but all can be reduced to this fundamental political question-who is in control? The answer is that the insurgents are in control. Unless an American patrol happens to be in the area, the insurgents are the only real authority and are free to enjoy (or compel) the support they require.

Gaining and Maintaining Contact

The Marine Corps has already developed an approach to counterinsurgency that is applicable to the complex situation in Iraq-the combined action program (CAP). This program, that in Vietnam combined Marine rifle squads with local Vietnamese militia platoons, was extremely successful in spite of the lack of integration into any coherent campaign plan and misunderstanding and disinterest in the highest echelons of command. The Marines in CAP platoons lived among the people they were protecting, maintaining constant security, providing positive contact, and developing relationships that offered both a positive image and the opportunity for gathering the human intelligence that is the key to winning small wars-all while denying the insurgents their vital base of support.

A CAP for Iraq would pair Marine rifle squads with local forces, either local police or a "neighborhood watch." Our present efforts at training and conducting joint patrols with Iraqi security Forces (ISF), as important as they are, do not begin to qualify as a CAP. The key to these operations is getting Marines out of our bases and into the towns and villages, among the Iraqi people, who are, as LtGen Victor H. Krulak, USMC(Ret) observed of the Vietnamese people, "the battlefield on which the war must be fought." CAP squads should come from a single unit assigned a geographic zone (rather than the haphazard process of Vietnam), which will ensure unity of effort, mutual support, effective supervision, and access to higher assets, such as air support.

A constant Marine presence in Iraq's towns and villages (phased in by starting with daylight familiarization patrols and developing with Marines living among the populace) will answer the question of control for the local populace. Insurgents will be unable to conduct operations or enjoy support under the ever-present threat of a CAP platoon. Furthermore, it will
empower the local ISF, who can begin to take responsibility for its own security, as well as co-opt recalcitrant ISF into taking a firm stance against the insurgency.

One of the greatest benefits of an Iraqi CAP will be increased intelligence; the amount of information gathered by the Vietnam CAP was so great as to overwhelm the CAP platoons' abilities to process it. Human intelligence is hard to generate without opportunities for contact with locals. The CAP concept provides this contact, while giving the Marines a positive image that will encourage locals to volunteer information-information that enables their own operations (and their own security), as well as providing targets for raids and, often overlooked, intelligence in support of civil affairs efforts.

The ability for an Iraqi CAP to facilitate and leverage our information operations (IO) and psychological operations efforts is obvious, since the CAP presence represents an ongoing opportunity to spread our message while suppressing the insurgency's own IO efforts. (At present, the insurgents are able to propagandize freely with great effect in a society that does not have a welldeveloped discrimination between fact and conspiracy theory.) This ability will not only undermine their support, but will substantially undermine their recruiting effort. It should go without saying that IO must be integrated into and tailored for all aspects of the CAP, rather than the generic afterthought it often is today. The consistent security provided by CAP will also enable longer term civil affairs projects to improve the conditions that breed insurgency in the first place.

In Vietnam the CAP was so effective at denying the insurgents their base of support that the Viet Gong were forced to take offensive action in an attempt to win back their center of gravity. These actions had a noted effect on the perceptions of the local populace-the guerrillas were now the ones bringing violence to the village rather than the Marines. In this area, as in others, the CAP forestalled the insurgency on its own terms.

The insurgents have the initiative in this conflict; disturbingly, we have subconsciously conceded the initiative to them. We have become reactive. security has gradually become a greater concern than defeating the enemy; it is the first thing we think of when we venture out from our bases. This is not to say that we do not aggressively attack the enemy when we can locate him, but that we have subtly begun to despair of locating him in the first place. And, in truth, the enemy does control the battlespace and is thus able to choose the time and place he will give battle, and avoid our overwhelming combat power. Recent attacks on our bases confirm what we have known doctrinally all along—that there is no possibility of victory in the defense. We must gain contact with the enemy.

Security will be the greatest objection to a CAP in Iraq. This is ironic, given that the Marine rifle squad has far more combat power today than during the Vietnam era. Our Marines have communications, fire support, and mounted and airborne reinforcement assets unheard of in earlier times. Our Marines are led by noncommissioned officers who are smarter, better trained, and more schooled in leadership—more strategic—than ever before. Outside of a few pitched battles (that we initiated), we have not been faced with an insurgent force that is capable of withstanding the fire and maneuver of a single rifle squad. Interestingly, apropos the conflict in Iraq, the CAP platoons in Vietnam had negligible casualties from improvised explosive devices (IEDs), even though IEDs accounted for 30 percent of American casualties overall. Intelligence gathered from villagers by the CAP Marines gave them advance warning of attacks.7 An Iraqi CAP must be part of a larger, comprehensive program that includes civil affairs projects that target the underlying structural causes of discontent as well as direct action against identified enemy infrastructure. Neither a long-term campaign for the hearts and minds nor a search and destroy mentality focused solely on killing insurgent fighters can defeat the insurgency. As the centerpiece of this campaign, the CAP will allow civil operations to work toward permanent stability and growth and generate intelligence that will enable us to locate, close with, and destroy those who threaten that stability.

History Repeats Itself—Unless We Learn From It

The CAP might have turned Vietnam from defeat to victory. Modified and applied as the centerpiece of a unified campaign plan in Iraq, it offers the key to defeating the insurgency and accomplishing our Nation's political goals. It is not sufficient to do some joint patrols with ISF without daily contact with the Iraqi people and an ongoing, positive presence in their lives. If the only time the populace sees Marines is as they blow through town in an armored vehicle on the way to a cordon and search, we will fail to answer the ultimate political questions. The insurgency will be in control and free to keep the initiative. We will win the battles but lose the war-again.

**SIDEBAR**
"The application of purely military measures may not, by itself, restore peace and orderly government because the fundamental causes of the condition of unrest may be economic, political, or social. These conditions may have originated years ago and in many cases have been permitted to develop freely without any attempt to apply corrective measures."
-Small Wars Manual, 1940

**SIDEBAR**
CAP squads should come from a single unit assigned a geographic zone (rather than the haphazard process of Vietnam), which will ensure unity of effort, mutual support, effective supervision, and to assets, such as air support.

**SIDEBAR**
The insurgents have the initiative in this conflict; disturbingly, we subconsciously conceded the initiative to them.

**FOOTNOTE**
Notes
3. We also need to be aware that higher political media imperatives—such as the National security Advisor's subscription to neorealist theory, with its assumption of the primacy of state actors, or the overemphasis of the role of foreign fighters—may misdirect or color our thinking on the ground.
4. Here we are taking appropriately aggressive steps, such as offering indepth language training as a reenlistment incentive and developing a spectrum of cultural training. We should take care not to focus solely on Iraq. There is a vast "fracture zone" that may see complex conflict in the near future, and it would be unwise to train for the present war and not a future one. While expanding the ranks of true cultural experts, such as foreign area officers, we need to create a broader spectrum of cultural and linguistic competence, bridging the gap between the expert advisors and the "boots on the deck" through tiered training programs and a means of identifying and exploiting preexisting cultural and linguistic expertise.
6. Williamson suggests that this strategy would have alleviated many of the problems of the Vietnam CAP.

by Capt Zachary D. Martin
Capt Martin is serving with 3d Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion currently deployed to Iraq. This article was his 2004 Chase Prize Essay Contest entry.

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Practical Impacts and Effectiveness of Cultural Intelligence

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ABSTRACT

Expeditionary Strike Group 5 (ESG-5) and the 15th MEU were tasked with mitigating human suffering in both Indonesia and Sri Lanka. During OUA, 15th MEU provided HA and relief to displaced persons (DPs) in both Sri Lanka and Indonesia from 5 to 18 January 2005. The intelligence preparation of the battlespace was challenging due to the limited U.S. presence in both countries.

ABSTRACT

Overall cultural intelligence had a significant impact on the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit's success in Sri Lanka, Indonesia, and Iraq. Aspects of culture and behavior extend beyond the "meet and greet" mentality for which cultural intelligence is often used. Charkowske discusses how cultural intelligence facilitated mission accomplishment in support of Operations UNIFIED ASSISTANCE and IRAQI FREEDOM III.

FULL TEXT

How cultural intelligence facilitated mission accomplishment in support of Operations UNIFIED ASSISTANCE and IRAQI FREEDOM III.

Culture significantly impacted 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) (15th MEU(SOC)) participation in humanitarian assistance (HA) operations in Sri Lanka as part of Operation UNIFIED ASSISTANCE (OUA) and counterinsurgency operations in south Baghdad as part of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM III (OIF III). The actions and attitudes of the native peoples of Indonesia, Sri Lanka, and Iraq dynamically impacted the battlespace development process. These factors helped shape courses of action that determined friendly sector mission outcome.

OUA

On the morning of 26 December 2004, the largest earthquake in 40 years occurred off the western coast of Aceh Province on the island of Sumatra. The 9.1 magnitude earthquake created 50- to 100-foot tidal waves that battered coastal areas of 11 countries. The final death toll will likely never be absolutely determined but varies between the United Nations assessment of 165,493 and 230,000 estimated by affected governments. The 2 countries with the greatest damage were Sri Lanka, with an estimated 38,000 killed, and Indonesia, with 90,000 to 172,161 killed, predominantly in Aceh Province.
Expeditionary Strike Group 5 (ESG-5) and the 15th MEU were tasked with mitigating human suffering in both Indonesia and Sri Lanka. During OUA, 15th MEU provided HA and relief to displaced persons (DPs) in both Sri Lanka and Indonesia from 5 to 18 January 2005. The intelligence preparation of the battlespace was challenging due to the limited U.S. presence in both countries. Open source intelligence (OSInt) was used to acquire critical information about the most affected areas of each country, until MEU officers made liaison with U.S. Embassies and critical nodes of Combined Support Force 536. Both OSInt and MEU liaison officers were heavily influenced by the perceptions of the Sri Lankan and Indonesian Governments toward the DPs who were members of ethnic minorities with active resistance groups—the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka and the Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM) (an insurgent group also known as the Free Aceh Movement) in Indonesia. The central governments of both countries saw HA relief as a legitimate tool to isolate the populace from the influence of the disparate groups and to maintain local control. The attitudes and actions of all of the variously affected groups factored into HA operations and the threat to ESG-5/15th MEU HA operations.

Cultural bias made the Government of Indonesia (GOI) initially reluctant to allow foreign military personnel to operate ashore. Aceh was closed to Westerners after the Indonesian military (Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI)) commenced counterinsurgency operations in May 2003. In Medan, the capital of northern Sumatra, many Indonesians had a negative attitude toward a large landbased humanitarian effort due to paranoia about Westerners. As a result, a series of restrictions was placed on foreign military personnel. The GOI's reluctance to accept a large foreign footprint was due to the ongoing counterinsurgency operations in the interior of Aceh.

Initial operations ashore required TNI oversight and were limited by restrictions placed on U.S. personnel. U.S. personnel were not permitted to overtly carry weapons while ashore in Aceh. The GOI/TNI rescinded an initial request for Marines to assist with body recovery and removal when they realized that several hundred Marines would be required just for the effort in Banda Aceh. Farther south in Meulaboh, a small U.S. liaison element was permitted to stay overnight with a TNI presence. The limited infrastructure and TNI escort personnel made it more practical for the majority of Marines and sailors to return to the ships at nightfall.

Relations with the TNI were relatively distant at first, and somewhat difficult; however, the presence of the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) helped nurture relations between U.S. military elements and the TNI. Although the SAF appeared to have acquiesced to GOI/TNI concerns about U.S. and Western motives, our relationship with the SAF enabled ESG-5/15th MEU to develop credible ties with the TNI that proved indispensable in future operations.

Due to their historic relationship, Singaporean soldiers were allowed to carry weapons in Aceh. Furthermore, the TNI allowed the SAF to conduct repairs on the only C-130-capable airfield. This airfield, located on the west coast, was capable of directly supporting affected areas. The Singaporeans provided information to the ESG/MEU on both their own HA activities and TNI actions as well. When the ESG arrived on station, the SAF was conducting infrastructure repair and clearing debris. The TNI saw the U.S. offers of rubble clearing and infrastructure repair as redundant.

Within the TNI there was a varying degree of trust that developed over time with 15th MEU personnel. The Indonesian Marines (TNI-AL) had interacted with U.S. Marines in the past during landing force cooperation afloat readiness and training exercises. The TNI-AL personnel had a tremendous amount of friendly interaction with ESG-5/15th MEU personnel ashore. Over time, members of the TNI-AU (Para-Kommando) units warmed up to Marines on an individual level in Banda Aceh. Other elements of the TNI remained distant and were often strategically positioned to impede the distribution of supplies by U.S. elements for fear of reduced local confidence in the GOI.

The GOI initially observed helicopterborne relief efforts by providing observers to ride on the ESG-5 helicopters. Over time this observation became less of a factor, and ESG-5/15th MEU elements were able to distribute supplies to multiple groups in addition to the TNIsuch as nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)/private volunteer organizations (PVOs) and directly to DPs. In Galang, a single TNI truck running supplies to the interior broke down because of a local shortage of motor oil. Due to limited rotary-wing assets, the TNI delivered few supplies to isolated DPs. As a result, a large percentage of missions flown by U.S. helicopters focused on direct relief to DPs in remote areas.

In addition to cultural bias, the counterinsurgency with the GAM was largely responsible for the GOFs concern about controlling the relief effort. The TNI constantly warned U.S. elements that the GAM was dangerous and might engage U.S. aircraft or personnel. After encountering several GAM personnel, ESG-5/15th MEU flight crews reported that the GAM were friendly and helpful to the relief effort. In both isolated areas and those with a GAM presence, DPs asked for assistance by passing flight crews handwritten notes asking for aid. Many of these notes indicated a lack of faith in the GOFs ability to provide relief. Meanwhile, the TNI attempted to ensure that supplies did not enhance the GAM's local
standing and financial capabilities-GAM and criminal elements were infiltrating aid stations to steal supplies. Fighting continued between TNI and GAM elements in the interior despite a declared cease-fire.

ESG-5/15th MEU elements attempted to mitigate the impacts of TNI oversight and concern over GAM use of aid items. The rotarywing elements developed “trolling” techniques by flying over isolated areas where TNI presence was minimal or nonexistent. TNI who were encountered (likely Indonesian Army Reserve/National Guard personnel) in these areas often did not attempt to limit the distribution of supplies. U.S. personnel established relationships with TNI elements by providing them with oil and aviation fuel for vehicles. In Meulaboh, the daily presence of Marines ashore allowed for enduring relationships between Marines and TNI elements that led to direct distribution of aid to afflicted DPs in Meulaboh.

The cultural impact of operations in Indonesia primarily revolved around the TNFs attempts to control supplies and portray the GAM as terrorists. The GAM attempted to appeal to the local population by stealing supplies and establishing their own limited HA camps in competition with the GOI. The TNI distrust of Westerners, however, was never completely overcome. As ESG-5/15th MEU ceased OUA operations on 18 January, NGOs/PVOs were required to operate only out of approved areas.

While planning for HA operations in Sri Lanka, the longstanding conflict between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan Sinhalase Government was a concern. Perceptions of unequal aid were assessed as the catalyst that could lead to LTTE attacks on foreign aid workers. Political parties and the Karuna faction of the LTTE impacted planning. The latter was assessed as being severely degraded or destroyed, thereby reducing the likelihood of intra-LTTE fighting while the MEU was operating ashore. The Government of Sri Lanka was concerned with the attempts of the Communist Party to gain support in the south around the port town of Galle. Christians and Muslim minorities also factored into the HA dynamic, the Christians having been reported as providing past aid to the LTTE. As the 15th MEU began operating in the southern port of Galle, a number of cultural factors required MEU personnel to remain alert. MEU personnel were not affected when the Sri Lankan Government took over large LTTE relief camps in Jaffna, Batticaloa, and Trincomalee.

Cultural intelligence in support of OUA was derived or gathered from different sources and means. In Indonesia, the U.S. Embassy provided some basic cultural information. Cultural experts from supporting agencies provided more detail about Aceh and the GAM. On the ground, interaction with both the TNI and SAF highlighted cultural biases and sensitivities. The main goal of the DPs was access to food and water, and they exhibited a general distrust in the GOI.

Although the U.S. Embassy and cultural experts in Sri Lanka provided basic background knowledge, Marines on the advance party were able to send back more useful cultural planning considerations while in the capital of Colombo. Open source information was biased between Tamil and Sinhalase newspapers but provided valuable near-realtime reporting of afflicted areas. When analyzed and pieced together, the newspapers provided not only the attitudes of both peoples toward the LTTE and the HA, but their mindset as well.

**Operations in Southern Baghdad/Northern Babil**

In OIF III a different set of cultural impacts on operations occurred. These varied from the activities of local farmers, the interrelationships among the tribal elements in the 15th MEU’s area of operations (AO) of southern Baghdad/northern Babil, and the insurgent/criminal connection. The 15th MEU’s AO, set 5 kilometers (km) south of Baghdad in an agricultural area used by insurgents for sanctuary, had not been heavily traversed by coalition forces. The AO covered approximately 350 square km and was populated by an estimated 15,000 Iraqis. Rocket attacks against the international zone reportedly originated from the northern boundary of the AO. Rockets used in these attacks were reportedly stored in the area. improvised explosive device (IED) attacks occurred on Main Supply Route (MSR) Tampa and Auxiliary Supply Route (ASR) Jackson, particularly at the “mixing bowl” (the intersection of MSR Tampa/ASR Jackson).

While operating in the AO, the importance of tribal dispositions became apparent. Two tribes provided the leadership and a large portion of personnel in the AO. The largest was the al-Jabouri tribe, consisting of former regime supporters who were wealthy, affluent, and lived predominantly along the Tigris River in the eastern portion of the AO. Many Jabouri were hostile or unfriendly to 15th MEU elements. That said, the alObaydi tribe lived south of the mixing bowl and provided a larger number of personnel to the insurgent and criminal elements in the area.

The tribes in the AO were predominately Sunni and had various interrelationships with smaller tribes in the region. Due to the rural environment, tribal interaction varied in frequency. For example, the Jabouri and the Obaydi have fought in the past. These two tribes live in closely located villages but not in the same villages. Mixed tribal areas occurred, primarily at major road intersections and densely populated areas.
Criminal/insurgent activity typically followed tribal patterns. The regional umbrella organization was initially thought to be a large composite group called the secret Islamic Army (SIA). As interaction with the locals occurred, it became apparent that the local leader of the SIA was in fact an Obaydi tribal gang leader engaged in more criminal activity than insurgent attacks. The interaction between this group and a similar, but more capable, Jabouri criminal/insurgent organization was based more on consensual agreements than direct style control. The groups reflected more of a "Sopranos" or "Corleone" organization and outlook rather than the 1920th Revolutionary Brigade or Ansar al Sunna.

While the Obaydi tribal gang terrorized the countryside along Route Bug (the main east to west road in the AO), the Jabouris were better funded and tied to former regime elements who had a preponderance of recorded attacks on coalition forces and the Iraqi National Guard. This intelligence shifted direct action targeting away from Obaydi associated groups to Jabouri tribal members, thereby yielding better results from raids.

Culture altered operations as a result of tribal dispositions, local patterns of activity, and tribal ties to the insurgent activity. Due to limited cover and concealment in the AO, several of the reconnaissance elements were passively comprised of farmers and herdsmen. The Marines were greeted politely, and the farmers carried on with their activities. The local farmers typically began conducting business at 0500, which was when the majority of IEDs were emplaced in the AO both along Route Bug and MSR Tampa. One RA mission to a local school had a reduced impact as the school was closed on Thursdays and Fridays. The reason behind this closing was that the locals did not want to share a weekend day with the Jewish people, despite government direction of a Friday-Saturday weekend.

Farming activity altered mobility in the AO. Farmers used canals to irrigate their fields by flooding them. Poorer farmers cut through the roads parallel to canals to gain access to the water. The damaged roads affected at least one raid. One of these damaged roads was reported as trafficable just 3 days before the raid occurred. Inundating fields to irrigate crops impacted cross-country mobility, as fields were periodically muddy regardless of rain. The water level of canals varied as a complex series of pump stations controlled water levels, and farmers created their own access to water further restricting foot and vehicle mobility. The local populace also indicated that little or no fishing occurred in March and April, making boat activity on the Tigris suspicious.

Additional cultural factors were gained via direct contact with the local populace. Bricks were hung on power lines to prevent the wind from blowing uncoated wires and starting fires in their fuse boxes. The majority of the populace was neutral or friendly to Battalion Landing Team 1st Battalion, 1st Marines' (BLT 1/1’s) presence in the AO. The chief complaints of the local populace were the lack of electricity, water, and infrastructure repair. Farmers used plastic to hold condensation on their crops in the summer and stored the plastic in large holes in the ground in winter. The presence of a large number of holes capable of holding weapons caches increased the amount of searching required by BLT Marines.

Using accumulated cultural intelligence, the 15th MEU altered or adjusted operations. At varying times, patrols were dispatched to disrupt IED emplacement efforts along highincident areas of MSR Tampa. Insurgents adjusted their emplacement times; however, this adjustment did not occur during the 15th MEU’s tenure in Iraq, and the disruption efforts reduced attacks and discoveries. Knowing that local mosques were used by criminals and insurgents to provide indications and warnings, vehicular use of roads was limited. This limitation reduced criminal and insurgent visibility of 15th MEU operations and made IEDs less effective. Targeting of HA operations focused on areas that would provide a greater "bang for the buck" in poorer regions of the AO. The use of nonkinetic targeting likely reduced or mitigated hostility caused by overt use of force.

The cultural intelligence that affected operations in Iraq was provided by a number of sources. Intelligence Marines from the advance party received information from adjacent U.S. Army units and the Iraqi Intervention Forces on cultural impacts on threat activity. Civil affairs and psychological operations personnel who conducted operations in the AO provided their views as well. Local interpreters aided interaction between Marines and local Iraqis. Marine interaction with locals on the ground provided the most accurate and up-to-date intelligence, as many tribal dispositions appeared to have been assumed or based off of old information.

Conclusion

Overall cultural intelligence had a significant impact on 15th MEU's success in Sri Lanka, Indonesia, and Iraq. Aspects of culture and behavior extend beyond the "meet and greet" mentality for which cultural intelligence is often used. Details, such as government efforts to cripple already damaged resistance groups, the time farmers become active, and the identity of a group, directly led to focusing of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance and kinetic and nonkinetic operations. While the impact of certain elements of this type of intelligence will be of limited use (mixed tribal areas or multi-tribal membership in urban areas) the broad spectrum will always have applications.
There are a number of ways to improve cultural intelligence in realworld operations. All units gather and use intelligence; this is the most successful evidence that every Marine is a collector. What is often lost is transfer of the knowledge during relief in place operations and transfers of authority. The same intelligence has to be regathered, and time is lost relearning the cultural effects on the battlespace environment. During this time, unit operations are less effective and, in a worst-case scenario, aid the opposition or negatively influence populace.

For intelligence analysts, cultural intelligence allows for more detailed and useful analyses for conducting operations. These range from selection of targets for direct action missions/kinetic strikes, patterns of behavior, insurgent activity, and advising on the physical considerations of terrain. Cultural intelligence is the leading vehicle that allows an analyst to break the cultural paradigms that limit our understanding of a culture/group and provide a realistic, detailed analysis of the threat. What commander does not want to know that insurgents are emplacing IEDs after morning prayer or that the government of the country they are attempting to assist will limit his efforts? Cultural intelligence is, and will remain, one of the keys to operating in virtually any battlespace, and transfer of this knowledge must be improved upon.

**SIDEBAR**
The intelligence preparation of the battlespace was challenging due to the limited U.S. presence in both countries.

**SIDEBAR**
. . . Marines on the advance party were able to send back more useful cultural planning considerations while in the capital of Colombo.

**SIDEBAR**
Rocket attacks against the international zone reportedly originated from the northern boundary of the AO. Rockets used in these attacks were reportedly stored in the area.

**SIDEBAR**
For intelligence analysts, cultural intelligence allows for more detailed and useful analyses for conducting operations.

by Sgt Kevin M. Charkowske

Sgt Charkowske served as an intelligence analyst during two deployments with 15th MEU(SOC) between 2002-05. He was the senior intelligence analyst during OUA and OIF III. He is currently assigned to the National Joint Military Intelligence Center.

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Marine Corps Gazette
Protecting Infrastructure

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ABSTRACT
The conflict in Iraq is a focal point in the struggle over the future of international institutions and their structures. Failing to protect that nation's beleaguered oil infrastructure is certain to have severe consequences. New technological concepts and approaches should be brought to Iraq quickly for test, evaluation, and development. Lessons learned there could be applied globally before the threat widens. Insurgents, saboteurs, and terrorists learn fast and adapt quickly.

ABSTRACT
The military in Iraq plays a vital role in protecting the nation's vulnerable oil infrastructure; however, this mission results in a common problem for forces tasked to defend extended networks--too many competing requirements with too few resources. Here, Johnson proposes an approach for thinking through the elements required to make a nation's infrastructure less vulnerable to sabotage, with a special emphasis on oil systems.

FULL TEXT
A critical vulnerability to Iraq's economic stability is protecting oil production systems.

Iraq's recent elections have generated renewed hope in a long-suffering population. The United States and its coalition partners can be proud of their contributions to this historic accomplishment. President George W. Bush cited the elections as a harbinger of freedom to a region devoid of democracies. Yet, the country's future remains uncertain. If anything, the stakes now are higher than ever. Marines have much to contribute to Iraq's future, particularly if they apply their rich heritage of experience learned in numerous expeditionary "small wars."

Economic Recovery
One critical ingredient for success is economic recovery. Key to that recovery is the protection of Iraq's infrastructure, particularly its vital oil production systems. Terrorists recognize the vulnerabilities of the nation's petroleum network and continue to target it. The costs of their successful attacks will not only be measured in the millions of dollars of lost revenue urgently needed to rebuild that troubled country, but also in a loss of confidence in Iraq's future--a more serious consequence.

In the 2 years since major combat operations were declared at an end, Iraq has continued to suffer from oil export disruptions. These disruptions are partially due to the poor material condition of the nation's infrastructure, which decayed under the Ba'athists. Damaged or missing valves, gauges, motors, firefighting equipment, and other components need to be repaired or replaced. More serious are insurgent and terrorist attacks on isolated oil facilities. Local inhabitants, either expressing dissatisfaction with coalition or Iraqi Government policies or simply looting components to sell as scrap, also cause considerable damage.

The military in Iraq plays a vital role in protecting the nation's vulnerable oil infrastructure. This mission, however, results in a common problem for forces tasked to defend extended networks--too many competing requirements with too few resources. Troops assigned to defend fixed sites are troops no longer available to go on patrols, thus conceding to the enemy more opportunities to gain the initiative. This predicament is an important consideration for U.S. Marines who, being expeditionary by nature, are best employed on the offensive.

Technological Solutions
The successes of the attacks in Iraq highlight two concerns applicable to infrastructure defense in any war-torn region. First, how can military capabilities be multiplied or augmented both to increase the level of protection and to free forces...
for more urgent missions? Second, what are the best ways to protect facilities that cannot be constantly guarded? An immediate answer is to apply the advantages offered by technologies. The more difficult follow-on questions are: what technologies are best suited to the task, and how are they optimally employed?

Over the past months, coalition partners in Iraq have introduced several new technologies into the oil-fields. More effort is required to identify and develop even more innovative and reliable systems. To be truly effective, those technologies must be mobile and deployable. Expeditionary forces should develop the capability to quickly deliver and put in place the supporting technologies needed to protect infrastructure. Beleaguered inhabitants of a war-torn region expect results immediately. In the weeks following cessation of combat, good intentions are not as important as quick, effective action.

This article does not advocate a specific laundry list of protective devices. Rather, drawing lessons from Iraq, it proposes an approach for thinking through the elements required to make a nation's infrastructure less vulnerable to sabotage, with a special emphasis on oil systems.1 It recommends technology types and generic measures to be considered, and which merit additional research. To be effective, technologies applied must be merged into a coordinated defensive scheme linked by an agile command and control network.

The important first step in defending critical oil infrastructure is to determine which parts of the system absolutely must be protected. Because it is so obvious, this step is easily overlooked, but it corresponds to responsible intelligence preparation of the battlespace, a technique familiar to Marines. Infrastructure is key terrain and should be thought of that way. Rigorous evaluation of the infrastructure will yield an understanding of the situation. It is essential, for example, to avoid the temptation to add too many sites. Only those nodes whose loss would result in a costly shutdown should be included. For these sites, technology alone probably will not provide sufficient protection; well-equipped, well-trained, and well-led forces will be needed onsite.

Technologies, however, can be important force multipliers. Consider such devices as infrared cameras mounted on antennas or dirigibles, electro-optical systems, motion detectors, electronic trip wires, and low-cost air search systems. Remotely piloted submersibles vehicles with surveillance and deterrence capabilities could monitor and protect underwater pipes like those that serve the Iraqi oil platforms. Once infrastructure is recognized as key terrain, these become obvious elements of a reconnaissance and surveillance plan.

Defensive measures could include protective barriers like earthen berms (an inexpensive deterrent, even if ineffective against heavier weapons), wire obstacles, and specially designed shielding made of hardened composite materials, such as high molecular weight polyethylene. Composites could be used as body armor or plating on patrol vehicles, or molded to specifications to screen particularly vulnerable points along an oil network. For oil platforms at sea, defensive options include barriers (installed on the rigs themselves or floated around the platforms in a system of buoys and nets), diver detection devices, and seismic deterrent systems that could be activated either automatically or manually when an approaching intruder is detected. Stations and patrols need to be connected by a reliable, redundant communications system. The objective would be to construct a tiered network employing a variety of defenses to harden the infrastructure against attack.

Once critical sites are made more resistant to attack, terrorists undoubtedly will turn their attention to locations that cannot be guarded continuously. Adding system redundancies or placing them underground where possible would reduce their vulnerability. This tactic may seem costly or impractical, but many exposed infrastructure nodes could be readily hardened using the familiar techniques of field fortification. Installing wire or shielding made of harder synthetic materials would make them more difficult targets, albeit not invulnerable. Passive devices, such as remote electro-optical or infrared technologies and installed motion sensors, could be added. Of course, these could be susceptible to sabotage, but specially equipped unmanned aerial vehicles patrolling pipelines would reduce their vulnerability. Units on the ground can, and must, fully exploit all resources for reconnaissance and surveillance.

Oil production systems rely on a variety of external support elements like power stations and communications networks. Industries use supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems to control and monitor services and facility operations. These are built on common commercial off-the-shelf technologies, making them susceptible to vulnerabilities inherent to their basic operating systems. SCADA controls are highly networked and broadly accessible, leaving them open to attack via the Internet. Many oil companies share commercially sensitive information with third parties and outsource their information technology operations, thereby increasing the risk of hostile action.2 Cybersecurity is as important to the oil industry as it is to financial networks. In fact, it is among the most basic of security precautions. While predictions of a "cyber Armageddon" are exaggerated, information technology systems nonetheless are at risk from hackers and cyberspace saboteurs who know no international or physical barriers. The world's Information-Industrial Age...
nations and businesses must join to take immediate action to secure all commercial cybernetworks. Similar protection is needed for other, equally vulnerable supporting services. Although this isn't news to anyone, the vulnerabilities continue.

Repair Capability Requirements

Since no defensive system, no matter how cleverly designed, is impenetrable, equal thought must to be given to developing technologies to assist in response and systems restoration. Component failure and flow rate detectors along several key points could send signals up line to shut down valves either automatically or via remote control. A Scottish engineer has developed a polymer "platelet" capable of detecting sudden changes in pipe flow pressure. When this happens, the platelets form a temporary seal held in place by pressure inside the pipe and also transmit a radio signal notifying repair crews of the problem. Its proponents admit these would be of little value against the more extensive damage usually caused by explosive attacks. However, they also point out that the process could be useful against common occurrences like gunshot holes, gradual leaks, and theft. Pipeline "clotting" systems may not be quite ready yet, but with time and investment, they could quickly become an especially useful option.

Also needed are easily stored and maintained quick patches and repair kits, plus additional research into firefighting equipment. Environmental damage is a particularly serious consequence of breaks in an oil transfer system. Technologies for contamination containment and cleanup need improving. Response teams have to be trained, just as they would for other emergencies. This training can be done onsite with training technologies developed to give the scene greater realism. Practical hands-on experience could be provided by the imaginative use of simulators. Training is important as it pulls together all of the disparate parts of a protective network.

Options and Redundancy

There is no "silver bullet" to solve this problem. No single approach ever provides the certain key to success. Achieving oil infrastructure security requires a variety of applications linked into a networked protective system. These include the judicious use of armed manpower plus added system redundancy. Redundancy, in particular, will ensure no one site is an especially valuable, and therefore attractive, target. Both approaches add value, but each is too costly to put in place by itself to the extent necessary to be truly effective. In the shorter term, technologies—whether new systems developed specifically for the purpose or old ones adapted to the mission—must be applied to meet this rising challenge.

Given that Marine and Navy forces often are dispatched to provide security in the world's trouble spots, both should consider adding to their operational requirements the ability to quickly provide infrastructure protection. These tools could be deployed with the expeditionary strike group or made available through reachback. While this proposal may seem beyond the scope of normal military operations, having the ability to go beyond strictly combat operations to connect with the needs of local inhabitants has a long Marine Corps history. Support of this type has roots in the combined action program initiative championed in Vietnam by Marine Gens Victor "Brute" Krulak and Lewis Walt, and even beyond to the Central American small wars of the 1920s and 1930s.

The conflict in Iraq is a focal point in the struggle over the future of international institutions and their structures. Failing to protect that nation's beleaguered oil infrastructure is certain to have severe consequences. New technological concepts and approaches should be brought to Iraq quickly for test, evaluation, and development. Lessons learned there could be applied globally before the threat widens. Insurgents, saboteurs, and terrorists learn fast and adapt quickly. They will use what they have learned in Iraq to conduct similar operations against more vulnerable, and lucrative, oil sites in places like Saudi Arabia and west Africa (where several serious attacks already have occurred). The global community can't afford to lag the problem. The United States and industrialized nations must get out ahead of the emerging challenge, and expeditionary naval forces could make an important contribution to this effort. Given that Iraqi oil infrastructure security and reliability are international concerns, this is an effort on which all countries, even those with competing ideologies, could cooperate to achieve economies of scale for a common beneficial goal.

SIDEBAR

Once critical sites are made more resistant to attack, terrorists undoubtedly will turn their attention to locations that cannot be guarded continuously.

FOOTNOTE

Notes
1. Most points were developed by the author while thinking through the article. However, while researching background material, the author came across the Department of Energy's Rocky Mountain oilfield Testing Center web site at http://www.rmotic.com that had many of the same concepts but which also helped expand upon original thoughts. A debt is owed to that site for the information it offered.


by CAPT J. Lee Johnson, USN(Ret)

CAPT Johnson was a surface warfare officer and retired after 31 years of active service. During Operation IRAQI FREEDOM I he was the Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Central Command liaison to the Commander, Coalition Forces Land Component Commander. He is currently employed by Noesis, Inc.

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IMAGE PHOTOGRAPH, A coalition soldier at the Khawr al-Amaya oil terminal shore-to-sea blocking station on the Al Faw Peninsula. (Photo from author's collection.)

IMAGE PHOTOGRAPH, Khawr al-Amaya oil terminal. U.S. Marines and coalition soldiers surveying a section of oil pipeline. Notice the weathering on the piping. (Photo from author's collection.)

IMAGE PHOTOGRAPH, A Marine stands guard over an Iraqi oil platform in the northern Arabian Gulf. (Photo from author's collection.)

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Dealing With Uncertainty

BYLINE: Hammes, Thomas X

SECTION: MAJGEN RICHARD C SCHULZE MEMORIAL ESSAY; Pg. 36 Vol. 89 No. 11 ISSN: 0025-3170

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ABSTRACT
In addition to noting the prevalence of small wars, it is essential to recognize that these wars have changed dramatically over the last 50 years. While these wars maintain their two most prominent characteristics—political focus and protracted timelines—the organization and motivation of the insurgents themselves has changed significantly. Today's insurgents are not the monolithic Communist insurgencies of Mao Tse Tung and Ho Chi Minh; rather, they are coalitions of the willing.

ABSTRACT

Hammes stimulates a continuing discussion of what the future for the Marine Corps might look like. He claims that while dealing with the small wars of today, and preparing for their foreseeable evolution, we must structure our personnel, education, training, and organizational policies to provide the Marines the mental and organizational flexibility to deal with inevitable uncertainty.

FULL TEXT

The future requires flexibility.

Martin van Creveld entitled his look at future war, "Through a Glass, Darkly." 1 In this short title he captured the essential problem of looking into the future; it is never clear. Yet, looking is a requirement. Our Corps continues to exist through its demonstrated ability to meet the challenges of the day. From amphibious warfare to vertical assault to maritime prepositioning to mechanized warfare, the leaders of the Corps have consistently peered into the murky future well enough to ensure that our forces were ready when called. Despite Van Creveld's caution, we must continue to do so.

There are three major points to keep in mind when thinking about future war. First, war evolves from the political, economic, social, and technical structures of the time. It is not an evolution based purely on technology. In fact, despite America's great love for technology, it is not even driven primarily by technology. Rather, warfare reflects the society from which it springs. Whether it was Genghis Khan's incredibly mobile light cavalry or the exceptional advance of U.S. forces to Baghdad in 2003, the forces of a nation reflect the political, economic, social, and technical structure of the nation for which they are fighting.

Second, whatever your predictions about the future, they will probably be wrong. History is full of examples of military forces surprised and defeated by an enemy's adaptation to the changes in society. Only in retrospect does the innovation seem obvious. Whether the armored knight sitting in his castle trying to figure out the Swiss phalanx or today's Marine trying to sort out the conflicting information on future enemies, the practitioner peering into the future sees mostly murk.

Third, there are at least two sides, and often more, staring into that murk—you and potential enemies. They do not see things any more clearly than you do, but they are determined to find a way to beat you. Thus the future will not evolve based only on your actions but on the actions of all sides of the conflict.

This essay does not presume to predict the future. Rather, its purpose is to stimulate a continuing discussion of what that future might look like. Before we can look into the future, we have to have a common understanding of the present. Unfortunately, while there is widespread agreement that warfare is changing, there is no agreement as to what it is changing to. Prior to Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, the Pentagon had decided that the future lay with small, high-technology, rapid deploying forces. Now, at the end of the second year of combating insurgency in Iraq and with unrest increasing in Afghanistan, the Pentagon is considering additional threats to include irregular warfare and homeland defense. As a result, the Pentagon is sounding a bit schizophrenic about the future—purchasing for big wars but examining how we will deal with other possibilities. This is not a bad thing. Our Nation must be prepared to respond to a spectrum of threats.

Fortunately, the Corps is well positioned to deal with uncertainty. A hallmark of our Corps is flexibility. We have fought well alongside our Army during the 20-odd years our Nation has fought conventional wars, and we have excelled in small wars and presence missions during the other 210 years of our history.

Small Wars Predominate

The predominance of small wars in our past will continue into our future. In fact, over the last 50 years, small wars have become the dominant form of war. Since 1950 conventional wars have essentially ended with a return to the status quo. The Korean War, Arab-Israeli Wars, Falklands War, and Operation DESERT STORM each left the nations involved in essentially the same strategic positions in which they started. In contrast, small wars—the Indochina Wars, Aden, Soviet-Afghan War, Somalia, Lebanon, and Chechnya—resulted in significant changes to the political and social structure of the areas involved. Even those small wars where the government won—Malaya, Oman, El Salvador, and Pe-
ru-resulted in significant political and social changes. The Pentagon should heed this fact. Despite its continuing fasci-
nation with high-technology war, recent history indicates the way to force political change is via small wars. Our enemies
have noted and written about this fact.

In January 2002 Abut 'Ubeid Al-Qurashi, writing to encourage al-Qaeda members after the U.S. occupation of Afghani-
stan, stated:

Fourth Generation Wars have . . . proven the superiority of the weaker power. . . . This forecast did not arise in a vacuum . . . fourth-generation wars have already occurred and . . . the superiority of the theoretically weaker party has already been
proven; in many instances, nation-states have been defeated by stateless nations. . . . [America] is baffled by
fourth-generation warfare . . . .2

After being driven out of Fallujah in November 2004, Abu Musad al-Zarqawi wrote, "The war is very long, and always
think of this as the beginning. And always make the enemy think that yesterday was better than today." This is an ex-
ceptional example of an insurgent commander's intent.

The shift to small or fourth-generation wars reflects changes in society as a whole. Politically, the number of actors on the
world stage has grown dramatically—not just new nation-states, but new international organizations, transnational
movements, nongovernmental organizations, and causes all demand attention from political leaders. Economically,
networked companies band together in short-term alliances to create specific products-knowing full well that they will
compete in other fields. Socially, causes are replacing national loyalty for many. And of course, technically, the Infor-
mation Age is maturing, and we are moving into an age of biotechnology. All of these elements favor the lean, networked,
transnational insurgent organizations rather than stodgy, bureaucratic nation-states.

Changing Motivation

In addition to noting the prevalence of small wars, it is essential to recognize that these wars have changed dramatically
over the last 50 years. While these wars maintain their two most prominent characteristics-political focus and protracted
timelines-the organization and motivation of the insurgents themselves has changed significantly. Today's insurgents are
not the monolithic Communist insurgencies of Mao Tse Tung and Ho Chi Minh; rather, they are coalitions of the willing.
Various groups, with widely varying final goals, come together for the sole purpose of driving out a foreign power. To-
day's insurgents do not plan for the Phase III conventional campaign that was an integral part of Mao's three-phased
insurgency. They know they cannot militarily defeat the outside power. Instead, they seek to destroy the outside power's
political will so that it gives up and withdraws forces. They seek to do so by causing political, economic, social, and
military damage to the target nation. In Iraq the constant small-scale attacks are causing the President problems in
maintaining the will of the American people. Not only is there the constant, repetitive picture of U.S. casualties, but there
is also the increased cost of oil due to the inability to bring Iraqi oil production capacity fully on line. In addition, the war's
continuation imposes political and social costs on America's traditional alliances. The insurgents do not believe they can
defeat the coalition militarily, but they do believe they can prolong the conflict long enough that our political will breaks.
While classic counterinsurgency concepts still work against insurgents, they must be adjusted to these new realities.

How Do We Prepare?

As stated earlier, we know we cannot exactly predict the future. Further, our opponents are working hard to be sure we are
not ready for whatever that future holds. The question then becomes, what does our Corps do to prepare? The key attribute
our Corps must have is flexibility. If you cannot predict the future with real accuracy, you must be able to flex to whatever
comes along. This attribute requires both mental and organizational flexibility.

The first step in that process is to be sure our people are trained, educated, promoted, and retained with this flexibility in
mind. Despite the significant changes in war in the last 50 years, the Marine Corps continues to use a personnel system
that was devised in the 1890s. That is not a typo! Our current system came out of secretary of War Elihu Root's efforts to
update the U.S. personnel system that had been in place since the American Revolution. He applied Frederick Taylor's
1890s' organizational theories to the War Department in 1900. With only two significant changes —the up or out policy
following World War II and joint requirements for promotion following the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986—the personnel
system remains largely the one Root instituted. Even more problematic, those reforms were designed to facilitate and
control industry's conversion from small firms to big industrial organizations. To do so, the bureaucracy was specifically
designed to centralize decisionmaking and stifle change. After all, you could not have the builder of wagon frames in Ohio
suddenly decide he had a better way to build the frames if they had to be combined with beds and wheels from Penn-
sylvania. Over 100 years later bureaucracies remain very good at centralizing decisionmaking and preventing change.
With the shift to a “modern” bureaucracy in 1900 came career patterns intended to prepare each member for senior leadership positions. The method decided upon was a career path based on relatively short tours (2 to 3 years) in various parts of the organization so that the bureaucrat became familiar with all aspects of its operation. Unfortunately, the short tours also meant he never became truly expert at any area. Thus we have a system designed to centralize decisionmaking, stifle change, and produce amateurs rather than professionals.

Given the networked, agile enemies we face today, how do we adjust? Obviously, the Marine Corps is not going to change the organization or ethos of the Department of Defense or the other Services. However, we can lead the way by changing those things we can. We can do three things to make our personnel system produce leaders with the mental flexibility we require.

The first change is to adopt 360-degree fitness reports. The 360-degree system seeks input from peers and subordinates as well as seniors. We acknowledge we are fighting networks and that only networks succeed against networks. We know a network requires that each person trust and respect his peers, subordinates, and seniors. We know that the most effective networks seek input from all levels. Yet, our manpower system seeks only the senior’s inputs when considering who is best fitted for promotion. Peers and subordinates are never asked for their observations. In essence, our process for evaluation and selection is antithetical to the network we require to succeed.

Second, to ensure these Marines can function in a chaotic environment, we require frequent free-play exercises. While the Marine Corps preaches that leader development is our most important mission, we don't put our money where our mouth is. With Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System 2000, simunitions, and computer games we have the technology to expose our leaders to frequent, realistic free-play exercises. Only by training this way can we expose our leaders to the fog, friction, and chaos that are inherent parts of our profession. We can both build better leaders and improve our selection process since the 360-degree fitness report system means the leader will be evaluated by the network within which he fights. We have the assets to make wartime leader development a true priority. We lack the will.

The third major personnel problem-too little time in the Operating Forces—is a problem the Corps cannot solve by itself. The alarming proliferation of joint staffs means that there are literally more field grade billets for Marines outside the Operating Forces than within them. Field grade officers are doomed to spend more than half of their time out of the Operating Forces.

The U.S. Army has found a partial solution by creating tracks for officers. At about the time they become field grade officers, soldiers select a track. Some tracks will not return to the Operating Forces, allowing the combat, combat support, and combat service support tracks to spend a great deal more time in the Operating Forces. Thus, Army battalion commanders often have multiple tours as field grade officers in operational units before they take command. At the very least, our Corps needs to closely examine this option.

We should change the table of organization (T/O) so that combat arms company commanders are majors rather than captains. In Iraq and Afghanistan our companies are covering terrain and performing civil government functions normally assigned to battalions. It makes sense to increase the company T/O to have a major commander and a captain executive officer (XO). The much greater range and depth of responsibilities we place on today’s company commanders demand greater experience. This change will also improve the career path to battalion commander. An officer will be able to hold a critical leadership job at each rank from second lieutenant to major in preparation for battalion command. In addition, it will fix the problem of having staff officers who are senior to commanders inside an organization. At the division, brigade, and regimental levels the commander is either senior to or equivalent in rank to the XO and primary staff officers of the next senior headquarters. Only battalions violate this sensible rule of thumb. Making commander’s senior or equivalent to staffs at the next higher level will improve the flow of information between levels of command and emphasize that our Corps is command and not staff driven.

Our recent experience in Iraq and Afghanistan and historical experience in Vietnam, Haiti, and Nicaragua emphasize the importance of interagency operations. Yet we do little or nothing to prepare our officers and noncommissioned officers to operate in an interagency environment. While we cannot unilaterally change the joint personnel system, the Corps should support three major changes. First, we need to insist that interagency tours are as important as joint tours and assign officers accordingly. Second, we must also support efforts to drastically reduce the number of joint staffs. Third, we must support efforts to extend careers to ensure officers have time to meet the expanded requirements. Perhaps 35-year careers for colonels and 30-year careers for lieutenant colonels are workable.
Once we have strengthened our personnel system to deal with modern war, we have to update our training and education programs. Fortunately, the Marine Corps University has already made great strides in changing its curriculum to reflect what our Marines will actually face when they deploy. In addition, we are examining the possibility of assigning every Marine over the rank of sergeant an area of expertise. As part of his career progression, he will have to study that area’s language and culture. While such a program will not develop the expertise of a foreign area officer, it will do a great deal to expand the horizons of future Marines. Further, the prolonged nature of the conflicts we are in virtually assures that future instructors will be combat veterans. Thus, we should see a continual improvement in our training and education.

While we are making progress in our professional education, several areas still need immediate attention. We must reestablish the value of professional military education. Making nonresident courses the equivalent of resident courses certainly made the process more egalitarian. However, to consider nonresident the professional equivalent of resident courses requires accepting one of two ideas. You must either believe that a few hours each week squeezed out of an already overly busy schedule provides the same time for reflection, learning, and growth as 10 months in residence, or you must believe education is not a high priority in building effective officers.

Continuing professional reading and discussion in the Operating Forces must improve. We publish the Marine Corps Professional Reading Program list with great fanfare, but it is only used when commanders take a personal interest in guiding both the reading and the subsequent discussion. Commanders have to assist their Marines in prioritizing from the reading list and then ensure they are reading and discussing the applicable works. Constant emphasis on education and realistic free-play exercises will improve the mental flexibility of our Marines.

Restructuring

While working on personnel, education, and training, we also have to improve organizational flexibility. Given America's dominant conventional power, it takes a great leap of faith to think anyone will choose to fight us in a conventional way. Thus the small wars of our past and present are the most likely form of wars we will fight in the future. We need to structure accordingly. Starting with staffs, we can eliminate some of the duplication at the Marine expeditionary forces (MEFs) and Marine expeditionary brigades (MEBs). This structuring has been discussed before. The Corps is literally one corps reinforced, yet we try to maintain three corps-level headquarters. I say "try to" because by fielding three MEF staffs we fail to provide any of them enough troops to function properly. Then each time we go to war, we gut the other MEF staffs and supporting elements to provide the single MEF command organization we really need. We need to designate one of the MEFs as the primary warfighter and source it properly by reconfiguring the other two MEF headquarters. Each of the others should be staffed to fight a MEB and administer a MEF in peacetime.

In addition, we have to evaluate our mix of forces—particularly the high-demand, low-density forces, such as civil affairs, military police, intelligence assets, human intelligence collectors and analysts, liaison officers/advisors for allied forces, and military police—and reallocate structure accordingly. Our Marine air-ground task forces are inherently extremely flexible organizations and can serve as a model for the other Services. A MEF can fight across the spectrum from high-intensity conflict to the three block war. However, we are critically short of some key organizations for the three block war and must address those deficiencies. We have failed to take serious steps to correct our deficiencies in these critical areas.

Working along these lines we can prepare ourselves to fight the kind of wars that are prevalent in the world today—and that have been the dominant form of war for the last 50 years. Unfortunately, this reorganization does not fully prepare us for the future. The only way we can prepare for the future is by building a flexible, adaptable organization. While foreseeable enemies will continue to fight us using irregular war, future enemies will try entirely new approaches. The only thing certain about the future is uncertainty!

Change Is Inevitable

We know the underlying nature of war will not change. It will remain the province of chance, friction, and fog. But the character of war will change. In the same way war has evolved from industrial-based warfare to information-based warfare, it will evolve in the future. That’s why flexibility is the key.

As economic power has shifted from mass production to information, smaller and smaller teams create greater and greater wealth. At the same time, we are on the verge of huge breakthroughs in biological sciences. Socially, many people are attaching more importance to causes than to nations. These factors all point to the possibility of super empowered individuals or very small groups making use of knowledge and networks in the service of an obscure cause. In fact, the first of such attacks has already taken place with the anthrax and ricin attacks on Capitol Hill.
To truly prepare for the future, we need to study the new sciences that are changing our understanding of the world around us—in particular, network theory, complexity, and emergence. These sciences provide a much better understanding of the complex, networked enemies we face today and will face in the future.

Finally, in keeping with the history of our Corps, we have to make sure a career is fun. This is not a recruiting slogan or a flippant remark. Fun careers are central to combat effectiveness. Think back on all the classes and training you have had—from grade school to the latest military course. If you are honest, you know you retained a great deal more from an enjoyable course of instruction than you did from a boring one. Now think back to the most effective units you’ve been in. They were fun places to work. You got up in the morning looking forward to getting to work. Fun does not mean easy. Some of the most fun things we do in the Corps are the most challenging and even painful, but they were also fun—and we retain what we learn there.

The future is uncertain. While we must respect the trends we see developing, we cannot put all of our focus on one threat. While dealing with the small wars of today, and preparing for their foreseeable evolution, we must structure our personnel, education, training, and organizational policies to provide our Corps the mental and organizational flexibility to deal with inevitable uncertainty.

SIDEBAR
Now, at the end of the second year of combating insurgency in Iraq and with unrest increasing in Afghanistan, the Pentagon is considering additional threats to include irregular warfare and homeland defense.

SIDEBAR
Despite the significant changes in war in the last 50 years, the Marine Corps continues to use a personnel system that was devised in the 1890s.

MajGen Richard C. Schulze Memorial Essay

SIDEBAR
The MajGen Richard C. Schulze Memorial Essay honors the memory of the Marine Corps general officer for whom it is named. MajGen Schulze, a native of Oakland, CA, died in November 1983, 2 years after his retirement. An enlisted Marine at the time of his commissioning in 1951, he earned his B.A. in Far East history from Stanford University in 1954 and later earned an M.S. in public administration from George Washington University (1971).

He was a mortar section leader with the 1st Marines in Korea and commanded 3d Battalion, 3d Marines in Vietnam. MajGen Schulze served as director of three different divisions within the Manpower Department at Headquarters. He also served as inspector General of the Marine Corps and as Commanding General, Marine Corps Recruit Depot San Diego. He was a frequent contributor to the Gazette and wrote with philosophical insight on many of the intractable problems confronting the Armed Forces—thus the naming of this annual essay in his honor is singularly appropriate.

The Schulze Memorial Essays have been published each year since 1984. They are made possible by the earnings of an endowment fund established by friends of MajGen Schulze and administered by the Marine Corps Heritage Foundation. Authors of the essays are chosen by the Editorial Board of the Gazette.

SIDEBAR
Our recent experience in Iraq and Afghanistan and historical experience in Vietnam, Haiti, and Nicaragua emphasize the importance of interagency operations.

FOOTNOTE
Notes

by Col Thomas X. Hammes, USMC(Ret)
Col Hammes retired from the Marine Corps in 2005. He is the author of The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21 Century. Col Hammes is one of the MCG’s distinguished authors and is currently pursuing a doctorate in modern history at Lincoln College, Oxford University, England.

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GRAPHIC: Photographs
IMAGE PHOTOGRAPH, A Marine with 4th Platoon, Company B, 1st Battalion, 6th Marines (B/1/6) and an Iraqi soldier pause near a street corner in Fallujah during Operation ROLLING BAKRAHGE, July 2005. (Photo by Cpl Mike Escobar.)
IMAGE PHOTOGRAPH, LCpl Benjamin Pellum, 4th Platoon, B/1/6 provides security during operations in Fallujah, July 2005. (Photo by Cpl Mike Escobar.)

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Measuring Success in Counterinsurgency

BYLINE: Hayden, H Thomas

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ABSTRACT

In Vietnam there was a formal measuring stick called the hamlet evaluation system (HES). In 1966 Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara asked the Central Intelligence Agency to develop a technique to measure trends in "pacification" in the Republic of Vietnam.

ABSTRACT

Hayden discusses the need of a pacification campaign plan in Iraq. He claims that any accelerated pacification plan must stress the principles of community spirit, and every effort of the government must be based on that principle. Accounts detailing the hamlet evaluation system, which analyzes information on all aspects of pacification--security and political, social, and economic development, are also presented.

FULL TEXT
A pacification campaign plan is needed for Iraq.

The lack of institutional memory in the Department of Defense (DoD) and the Armed Services seems to create a continual need to “reinvent the wheel.” The Army is now writing a new field manual (FM) for counterinsurgency operations, FM 3-07.22. A copy of FM 31-73, Advisors Handbook for Counterinsurgency (Headquarters, Department of the Army, April 1965), would be a place to start. Additionally, the DoD is writing a joint operating concept, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations, that is to encompass all aspects of counterinsurgency in security, transition, and reconstruction. However, there is no section devoted to developing a system to measure success.

Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld asked his staff how they would know if they are winning in Iraq and Afghanistan. He asked the wrong question. The better question would have been have we ever had a matrix to measure success in an insurgency?

Clues From the Past

In what the British called the "Emergency in Malaya" from 1948 to 1960, the greatest advantage the British enjoyed was a sound administrative structure and a strong independent judiciary that made for some semblance of political stability. In Malaya, the British measured success by identifying if there was true local security, a local government freely elected, and local economic development. They did not have a formal reporting system, but the statistics in a given district clearly illustrated success was being achieved.

In Vietnam there was a formal measuring stick called the hamlet evaluation system (HES). In 1966 Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara asked the Central Intelligence Agency to develop a technique to measure trends in "pacification" in the Republic of Vietnam. The result was the HES that contained certain "objective" features, such as whether police or Popular Forces were in a hamlet, but it relied heavily on "subjective" features, principally to measure the quality of life of the people. The HES was to report whether a hamlet dweller lived in some tranquility or was subject to harassment, intimidation, and/or attacks from the Viet Cong (VC) or North Vietnamese Army.

A most important feature was that two separate reports were prepared independently. The American senior district advisor and his counterpart, the Vietnamese district commander, each had to prepare a report, independent of each other, for their respective chains of command. The independent preparation was to make sure that the two did not cooperate to write a rosy report.

Security Defined

The HES analyzed information on all aspects of pacification-security and political, social, and economic development. The computerized system then supplied a value to the information being reported. The security categories were defined as follows:

(A) Hamlet/city has an adequate security force; insurgent influence has been eliminated; public projects are underway; economic picture is improving.

(B) Insurgent threat exists, but security is organized and partially effective; insurgent infrastructure has been partially neutralized; new economic programs are underway.

(C) Hamlet/city is subject to infrequent insurgent or criminal harassment; insurgent and criminal leaders have been identified; the population participates in some development programs.

(D) Insurgent or criminal activities have been reduced, but an internal threat/some form of harassment still exists; the local population participates in limited government activities; the hamlet/city is still contested.

(E) The insurgents and/or criminals are effective although some government influence exists; government programs are nonexistent or just beginning.

(F) The hamlet/city is under insurgent or criminal gang control; no government officials or coalition troops may enter except on military operations; the population provides some support to the insurgents or criminal gangs.

In those areas rated as contested (D and E), efforts could be directed toward establishing security and limited community development. As for insurgent or criminal gang controlled areas, emphasis must be placed on military and police operations designed to disrupt unauthorized movement and destroy illegal materials.

The American and Vietnamese reports were then compared, first at province senior advisor level, then at Military Assistance Command, Vietnam/Civil Operations for Revolutionary Development Support (MACV/CORDS) headquarters.
in Saigon. Initially the Army of the Republic of Vietnam district commander had a much more glowing report while the MACV/CORDS advisor reported a much more realistic picture. The questions were given a mathematical compilation to provide a statistical average for each hamlet. These averages were then accumulated for each village or city, then each district and, finally, the province. A hamlet or village that was rated as secure or "under government influence" was rated A, B, or C. Hamlets that were under guerrilla influence were given a D or E.

The question always came up as to how anyone was able to tell what was fact and what was fiction. Most province senior advisors were able to carefully analyze each individual district advisor's report and determine where there might have been some "padding." They never called it false reporting, but they did look into the matter. If a village was reported as an A or B-under government influence-and it was known to be in contested territory, a call or radio transmission to the senior district advisor that the senior advisor wanted to spend the night in that village usually resulted in one of two replies, "Sir, we cannot do that," or "Sir, we can make that happen a little later." The latter always meant that the district chief had to get a platoon in the village immediately to provide security.

The most impressive effect of the HES was on the local officials. From province chiefs down to district chiefs, they soon became aware that President Nguyen Van Thieu was using the HES to measure the situation in each area. It became an efficiency report. It became a gauge on where to invest resources and where to send more security forces. Accordingly, the HES proved very valuable in stimulating action and was more effective than simple orders from higher headquarters. In January 1967, when the HES was first instituted, only 62 percent of 16 million people were under government control.

A Campaign Plan

Following the Tet offensive in 1968, the government initiated the Accelerated Pacification Campaign (APC) plan. This plan had as its major objective the consolidation of past achievements and the expansion of government control over necessary territory. The main effort was to be directed at maintaining security in those hamlets rated as under government influence and increasing efforts restoring security and quality of life where needed. By the end of 1971 about 97 percent of the 17.9 million South Vietnamese people were "relatively secure." It would seem to me that the current situation in Iraq's counterinsurgency campaign plan requires an APC plan.

Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., in his book, The Army and Vietnam (The John Hopkins University Press, 1986), stated that using data from the HES, as well as data on unit operations, showed how days of battalion maneuver operations in a given area contributed little to population security. He went on to say that on the other hand, VC activity in an area was closely associated with a decline in security. The lesson was that big unit sweeps did not promote pacification unless you stayed in the area. Both eyewitness accounts and mass data from numerous sources attested that the physical security provided for the bulk of the people in the rural areas expanded economic growth and improved the quality of life of the population.

The conventional military organizational structure in Vietnam, and now in Iraq and Afghanistan, has led naturally to military operations of a conventional type. Unless there is a strong overarching civil-military organization directing the war, a young, inexperienced military officer, appointed to a military division or an independent regiment, thinks immediately in terms of divisional and regimental operations. Time and again there will be reports of combat patrols and enemy contact. The conventional command structure will lead to a lack of initiative in junior officers.

Unfortunately, one cannot easily parade democracy, as it is understood in the West, as the ideological counterpart to dictatorial or radical Islamic rule. However, even if an authoritarian government can build an image based on the rule of law and the execution of constructive and progressive national policies, it is possible to establish in the people's mind that they are better off without Saddam Hussein. Two simple equations can illustrate a point:

* Legality + reconstruction and development + results = good government.
* Illegality + destruction and murder + promises = insurgency.

The Iraqi Government and the coalition partners need to implement an ACP with the following priorities:

* Reestablish regular army units with special counterguerrilla skills and improve local police.
* Improve the human intelligence collection efforts of Iraqi police and Iraqi intelligence agencies.
* Reform local government.
* Organize the people to become involved with community reconstruction projects and improve employment opportunities for all.
* Fund economic revival and improvement.
* Improve information and propaganda.
* Implement an "open arms" or amnesty program.
* Assist in the rehabilitation of destroyed and damaged homes and the return of refugees.

Many of these priorities are being accomplished, but for each task a specific target goal must be assigned. Any accelerated pacification plan must stress the principle of community spirit, and every effort of the government must be based on that principle. The idea of community spirit must work on a threefold basis-cooperation among the various civilian groups, cooperation between the people and the government, and cooperation among various government groups. The people must feel that they are involved and then they will cooperate with the government to identify and dispel the insurgents from their communities.

SIDEBAR

Unfortunately, one easily democracy, as it is understood in the West, as the ideological counterpart to dictatorial or Islamic rule.

by LtCol H.Thomas Hayden, USMC(Ret)

LtCol Hayden spent 2 years as a counterinsurgency advisor in Vietnam and later in Central America. He has served as Branch Head, Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict Branch, HQMC; commanded Headquarters and Service Company, 1st FSSG during Operation DESERT STORM; and was the CO, Rear Area Security, IMEF, Aljubail, Saudi Arabia. LtCol Hayden currently writes columns for two web sites and national news media.

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Marine Corps Gazette
December 2005

Marine Corps Intelligence
BYLINE: Higgins, James L; Trusso, Michelle L; Connable, Alfred B
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ABSTRACT
Due to its endeavors in the field of cultural intelligence support, MCIA has been tentatively designated the analytic lead for cultural intelligence for DoD. The activity has already developed some landmark products, to include an array of cultural "smart cards" for deploying forces, cultural field guides, indepth cultural intelligence studies, and detailed studies on foreign military cultures. Additionally, MCIA has continued to expand its ability to produce tailored intelligence products.

ABSTRACT
The Marine Corps developed a reputation for military cultural expertise during the early 20th century. Intensive counterinsurgency and stability operations from China to Nicaragua required Marines to gain familiarity with the cultural terrain of the battlefield. Higgins et al discuss cultural intelligence for Corps intelligence community and expeditionary units.

FULL TEXT
Charting a course across cultural terrain.

The Marine Corps developed a reputation for military cultural expertise during the early 20th century. Intensive counterinsurgency and stability operations from China to Nicaragua required Marines to gain familiarity with the "cultural terrain" of the battlefield. Men like MajGens Smedley Butler and Merritt "Red Mike" Edson and LtCol Earl H. "Pete" Ellis immersed themselves in foreign cultures and found ways to successfully exploit their hard-won knowledge. The sum of their skills and tactics was captured best in the Small Wars Manual, which perhaps remains the high watermark for military cultural acumen outside the special operations community.

Despite extensive operations in the Middle East, the Caribbean, Korea, and Southeast Asia, the Marine Corps slowly abandoned its cultural focus during the latter half of the 20th century. Cultural training became synonymous with sensitivity training. Classes on culture were treated with disdain by Operating Forces Marines who felt they were more of a distraction than a combat multiplier. Intelligence staffs were expected to give a perfunctory country study brief before deployment, but with few exceptions, the general cultural expertise of the Marines of the 1920s-30s was lost. That trend is being sharply reversed across the Marine Corps as a result of experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, and intelligence Marines are an integral part of the vanguard of cultural understanding.

The Working Group
The Marine Corps Intelligence Activity (MCIA) has been producing detailed cultural intelligence studies and products for the intelligence community and expeditionary units for more than 5 years. However, despite now-retired Marine Gen Anthony C. Zinni’s call for cultural education and study in the mid-1990s, the idea did not really take off until mid-2004. Hundreds of officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) returning from Iraq and Afghanistan sought to develop ad hoc classes, language training, and a network of contacts and advocates. This rising demand for knowledge gained notice at the Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC) Intelligence Department, which responded by forming a cultural awareness working group to explore ways to improve cultural expertise within the Corps and the intelligence community.

The Marines involved in the working group included not only intelligence officers, NCOs, and foreign area officers, but also a cross section of experienced combat arms and combat support Marines. The working group quickly discovered that similar cultural movements had begun across the Marine Corps, the Department of Defense (DoD), and within academia. Within a month of the working group’s creation, the Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC) started a parallel effort to reshape cultural training. Common ground was found quickly, and the intelligence and MCCDC efforts were effectively merged.

After significant debate, the working group and the MCCDC Training and Education Command (TECom) reached the following conclusions:

* Culture is simply another element of terrain. Cultural terrain parallels geographic terrain and can be subdivided into component parts, studied, and exploited to accomplish military missions. The study of cultural terrain is an integral part of the staff planning process and intelligence preparation of the battlefield.
* All Marines must have a basic understanding of culture, both American and foreign, so they can appreciate how culture can affect their mission. Training on specific cultures can only take place once this basic foundation is built, just as a Marine has to learn to use a compass and map before negotiating a specific piece of ground.

* Cultural intelligence is the process of adding more detailed cultural information to the all-source intelligence cycle and is, therefore, an intelligence-specific task. Cultural training and the study of cultural terrain are tasks that all Marines, not only intelligence Marines, must undertake and perform as part of their professional development.

* Cultural training is not sensitivity training. Instead of focusing on “how not to offend,” Marines will focus on how to use cultural information to accomplish the mission. The study of cultural terrain should not be a training burden; it should be a combat multiplier.

To support the new requirement for Corps-wide cultural training, MCCDC and TCCom created the Center for Advanced Operational Cultural Learning (CAOCL) at Quantico. The CAOCL opened its doors on 2 May and has become the focal point for all Marine Corps cultural training. The center has developed working relationships with all career development schools and major commands and is actively supporting deploying units.

Training Programs

Based on requirements laid out in the January Defense Language Transformation Roadmap, the CAOCL works closely with the HQMC Intelligence Department to develop intensive language training programs for career schools and at all major bases and stations. The CAOCL and MCIA have developed a symbiotic partnership to provide an array of cultural training and cultural intelligence requirements for the Marine Corps and DoD.

Due to its endeavors in the field of cultural intelligence support, MCIA has been tentatively designated the analytic lead for cultural intelligence for DoD. The activity has already developed some landmark products, to include an array of cultural "smart cards" for deploying forces, cultural field guides, indepth cultural intelligence studies, and detailed studies on foreign military cultures. Additionally, MCIA has continued to expand its ability to produce tailored intelligence products. Iraq analysts at MCIA have created a massive, detailed study of the tribes of selected Marine operating areas, providing deployed units with an innovative, graphic interface that allows them to see tribal relationships, tribal boundaries, and related intelligence reports at the click of a mouse.

With a renewed focus on culture, MCIA aggressively seeks to update its product line. Under a pilot program, teams of analysts and researchers are going in-country whenever possible to conduct culture interviews, survey the cultural terrain, and fact check research data. Future products will be based on first-person analytical research as well as interviews and data mining. Over the next few years the activity will greatly expand its cultural analytical pool to provide indepth research, cultural reachback support, and product lines. MCIA is also working to provide cultural intelligence products that lay the foundations for developing good relationships with coalition partners and allied nations. Developing baseline and tailored cultural intelligence to support ongoing and new engagement efforts to support organizations such as the foreign military training unit is also a priority.

The Marine Corps Intelligence Schools at the Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence Training Center, Dam Neck, VA developed the first set of cultural lesson plans for the Marine Corps and is in the process of incorporating cultural training into its curricula. Intelligence students now receive a baseline course on culture and its effect on operations, and then go on to learn specific techniques in cultural intelligence. Collections specialists learn the value of specific cultural factors (elements of cultural terrain) and techniques to elicit cultural information. Analysts will incorporate a broader range of cultural information into their processes and products.

Cultural intelligence should be the thread that weaves through all analytical efforts. The Marine Corps intelligence community and training commands are acutely aware of the cultural lessons lost over the past two centuries and are taking firm steps to ensure that the same mistakes are not made 50 years after operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have drawn to a close. The Marine Corps, as a whole, has taken the lead on studying culture for DoD and is developing strong partnerships with the other Services and academia. To the next generation of Marines, culture will be seen as nothing more and nothing less than another element of battlefield terrain.

**SIDEBAR**

Classes on culture were treated with disdain by Operating Forces Marines who felt they were more of a distraction than a combat multiplier.
SIDEBAR

Cultural intelligence should be the thread that weaves through all analytical efforts.

by LtCol James L. Higgins & Majs Michelle L. Trusso & Alfred B. Connable

LtCol Higgins has served as the S-2 for 15th MEU(SOC) during operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. During OIF II-1 he served as the Senior Analyst, Tactical Fusion Center, Ar Ramadi, Iraq. He is currently the Operations Officer, Marine Corps Intelligence Schools.

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Counterintelligence/Human Intelligence

BYLINE: Nieland, Matthew A; Dubrule, Michael A

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ABSTRACT

A HET brings a unique set of capabilities to an infantry battalion that enables the battalion to effectively target insurgent infrastructure and reduce insurgent effectiveness within a given geographical area. In OIF II, infantry units conducted countless combat patrols, raids, and cordon-and-knock operations that were initiated and driven by information provided by the HETs.
Nieland and Dubrule discuss Marine expeditionary force assets called HumInt exploitation teams (HET). HET provide valuable information to the infantry battalion—information obtained from the local populace through contact development, interviews, debriefing interrogation, liaison, and other activities.

**FULL TEXT**

Support to infantry battalions in OIF II.

Throughout Operation IRAQI FREEDOM II (OIF II) infantry battalions received counterintelligence/human intelligence (CI/HumInt) support from Marine expeditionary force (MEF) assets called HumInt exploitation teams (HETs). These teams combined CI and interrogator-translator (IT) capabilities in six- to eight-man units specifically manned, trained, and equipped to support any Marine Corps unit. Marine expeditionary units (MEUs) created the HET concept during the late 1980s, when CI and IT assets deployed in support of MEUs were routinely combined to maximize their capabilities. The concept proved highly successful and led to a formal merging of the two disciplines.

HETs provide valuable information to the infantry battalion—information obtained from the local populace through contact development, interviews, debriefings, interrogation, liaison, and other activities. With such specific information about the enemy, the maneuver element can disrupt and destroy enemy infrastructure and reduce the enemy's ability to carry out attacks within the battalion's area of operations (AO). In a counterinsurgency environment where the enemy uses the civilian populace for cover and concealment, HETs are especially effective in discerning the insurgents and terrorists from the general populace and in enhancing the commander's ability to prosecute subtle targets while minimizing collateral damage to innocent civilians.

**HET Employment**

Prior to deploying to Iraq, MEF planners had to decide how best to employ the HETs. The ideal method is usually through area coverage, because it keeps the CI/HumInt Marines in one location long enough to become intimately familiar with the economic situation, social conditions, geography, and people of that area. Consequently, they are able to establish enduring relationships with indigenous sources and provide tactical commanders more comprehensive information about the operating area. However, the environment in Iraq compelled MEF planners to employ most of the HETs in unit coverage (i.e., in direct support of infantry battalions) for two primary reasons. First, HETs had proven themselves highly capable—through years of MEU deployments—of going into new areas and developing good intelligence in a short period of time. Second, HETs were capable of maneuvering with infantry units and tailoring support based on each battalion's mission and methods of operation.

HETs assigned to support infantry battalions in Iraq actually operate under the operational control of the MEF through a command and control node called the CI/HumInt operations center (CIHOC) and under the tactical control of the infantry battalions. OIF II HETs were further separated into general support (GS) or direct support (DS) teams, with three GS teams complementing the nine infantry battalion HETs. Regardless of whether a HET is in DS of an infantry battalion or in GS of the MEF, the HET requires a security support element, logistical support, and permission to operate in a particular unit's AO.

In stark contrast, the Army placed most of its OIF II tactical HumInt teams (THTs) in GS, and many were never fully integrated into the operations of local units. Subsequently, THTs never gained full access to the pool of potential sources, leaving Army commanders with an unfilled need for quality HumInt. Whatever the employment means decided upon, when properly utilized and integrated, a HET can prove to be indispensable to an infantry battalion.

**HET Support to the Infantry**

A HET brings a unique set of capabilities to an infantry battalion that enables the battalion to effectively target insurgent infrastructure and reduce insurgent effectiveness within a given geographical area. In OIF II, infantry units conducted countless combat patrols, raids, and cordon-and-knock operations that were initiated and driven by information provided by the HETs. During combat operations HETs routinely provided realtime intelligence support to combat patrols, infantry companies in the attack, scout/sniper platoons, combined antiarmor teams, and quick reaction forces. During Operation VIGILANT RESOLVE in April 2004, HETs accompanied combat forces to Fallujah and were able to help accurately locate enemy forces through the interrogation of detainees. During Operation HURRICANE in September 2004, HETs provided critical targeting information and directly led raid forces against those targets in Ramadi. During Operation RODEO, HETs throughout Iraq provided detailed information on insurgent infrastructure, pinpointed enemy weapons caches, and identified locations of roadside bombs. During noncombat operations, HETs continued to provide commanders with valuable information, such as detailed feedback following Marine activity and local perceptions of current
events. This information helped unit leaders make informed decisions pertaining to asset allocation and empowerment of local governments. It also helped commanders avoid making mistakes that might feed enemy propaganda and adversely affect the friendly information operations effort. For instance, HETs in Najaf during and after the August 2004 campaign were able to assist the 11th MEU staff in coordinating support from local factions who helped undermine the persistent resistance of the Mahdi Militia, thereby helping set the conditions for a return to relative stability in that area of the country.

Operation PHANTOM FURY/AL FAJR

The battle for Fallujah in November 2004 underscores the critical importance of CI/HumInt support to OIF. HETs provided a tremendous amount of vital information between April and November 2004 that aided in the planning for this operation (originally named Operation PHANTOM FURY and later changed to Operation AL FAJR). Prior to the attack, HET information was used to shape the battlefield through precision airstrikes. When ground operations commenced, HETs went into the city with maneuver forces. During the battle, HETs made significant contributions by exploiting captured enemy documents and material, searching the bodies of dead insurgents, and screening detainees for information of both immediate and future intelligence value. HET screening of detainees provided lucrative targeting information to both supported and adjacent units, including information on weapons caches, sniper locations, and enemy egress routes. HET sensitive site exploitation became a key source of critical reporting, uncovering piles of insurgent documents, media, and equipment for exploitation. HETs also generated hundreds of pictures of insurgent torture sites, mosques used as fighting positions, improvised explosive device factories, and other potential violations of armed conflict. The MEF was able to declassify many of these pictures for release to public affairs, and a number of the photos became the main story on the evening news worldwide. The photos taken by the HETs helped justify the operation internationally, since it became difficult to criticize the armed intervention into Fallujah after viewing photographs of torture chambers and other tools of terror employed by the insurgents within the confines of the city. The actionable intelligence provided to Marine infantry battalions made the HETs such a highly coveted and sought after commodity that Army units began requesting Marine HET support.

HET Unique to Marine Corps

HETs provide a capability that is unique to the Marine Corps. The Army, while having tactical CI/HumInt capabilities, has not yet combined the two tactical intelligence functions of CI and HumInt into a single battlefield formation that can support not only infantry units but all other military command formations as well. The Navy and Air Force have nothing like the HET concept, and their limited CI-specific elements are not manned, trained, or equipped to adequately serve alongside ground combat or combat support units. Marine HETs bring their own vehicles, weapons, communications, and interpreter support, and unlike the other military Services, a large percentage of CI/HumInt Marines were recruited from combat arms specialties, so they can integrate seamlessly with maneuver elements. Due to the significant benefit HETs bring to the overall capability of ground combat forces, the Marine Corps should nurture this capability, ensuring it evolves and develops as an organic intelligence support asset.

Over the past 20 years HETs have served in a variety of operations, ranging from combat operations in the Middle East to contingency operations in the Balkans, Africa, and other locations where Marines are rapidly deployed around the world. HETs provide vital information and tailor it to the commander’s stated requirements. Regardless of the level or scope of the conflict, HETs bring the same unique and diverse capability to the situation—that is the capability to immediately develop and exploit valuable tactical information that is not available to Marine commanders from other sources. HETs bring to the fight the capability to detect and neutralize real and potential threats in advance, and contribute significantly to the collective success of any mission the Marine Corps will be directed to undertake in the future.

by Captains Matthew A. Nieland & Michael A. Dubrule

Capt Nieland is an intelligence officer currently serving at the Marine Corps Intelligence Activity (MCIA), Quantico. He spent a year in Iraq as an MCIA liaison officer and as the reports officer/collections manager for the CIHOC.

Capt Dubrule is currently the Department Head, CI/HumInt Training at the Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence Training Center, Dam Neck, VA. He spent OIF II-2 as the Officer in Charge, CIHOC and CI/HumInt Company Commander, 2d Intelligence Battalion.

LOAD-DATE: June 12, 2007

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Following in trace of the renewed CMC guidance, the Marine Corps Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning (CAOCL) was formed at the Training and Education Command at Quantico in May. The newly formed center has a formidable task as it becomes the spearhead for implementing the CMC guidance.

Glasgow discusses US Armed Forces' understanding of their enemy and culture. Through the constant flow of deployments of Marine units to and from Iraq over the past 2 years, the culture theme as a predictor of success has been constant. Their successes have come from the aggressive spirit, adaptability, and flexibility of their leaders and units of all levels.

Lessons learned have come pouring forth from our engagements in Afghanistan and Iraq. The one seemingly most often repeated lesson is that, as a Nation, we were woefully unprepared in the culture wars. Retired Gen Anthony C. Zinni often reminds us that our Armed Forces do very well at killing people and breaking things, but that once the killing and breaking are over, we don't do so well. If that is the case, then why is it so, and what are we doing about it? Operation IRAQI FREEDOM provides a perfect case study.

The "don't do so well" hits at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels and has led to incessant finger pointing by our friends in the 4th Estate. Discounting the rationale for entering the fray in the first place, it is abundantly clear that no one at the highest levels of the government foresaw the level of the insurgency that followed. At the beginning, culture and
understanding the "enemy" didn't seem to be all that important. Just topple Saddam and the Iraqis can govern themselves, and we will be seen as the liberators. Not so fast.

We weren't prepared for the quick victory or the rapid transition of authority. The vacuum created at the strategic level was immediately felt at the operational and tactical levels. Marines don't sit on their hands and do nothing. Hence I MEF and 1st MarDiv quickly moved to battalion-sized areas of responsibility making everyone on the scene brutally aware that understanding the local culture was mandatory for success. In the spring and summer of 2003 in southern Iraq, the Marines prevailed and were vigorously attempting to help the Iraqis take back their country.

Our Marines came home in September 2003 and were back in the Sunni Triangle in early 2004. The insurgency was in full swing, and our Marines went to fight again, clearing out Fallujah streets twice in the process, as ably described by Bing West in No True Glory (Bantam, 2005). As 2005 comes to a close, the Iraqi Constitution has been approved, a new government will be formed this month, and the Iraqi police and Army are becoming more and more able to keep the peace on their own despite a long and arduous insurgency in their midst.

Through the constant flow of deployments of Marine units to and from Iraq over the past 2 years, the culture theme as a predictor of success has been constant. In his updated CMC guidance (ALMAR 018/05) published on 18 April, Gen Hagee set the stage for the future when he stated, "Our successes have come from the aggressive spirit, adaptability, and flexibility of our leaders and units at all levels. We will continue to create Marines who thrive in chaotic and uncertain environments. To that end, we will place renewed emphasis on our greatest asset-the individual Marine-through improved training in education in foreign languages, cultural awareness, tactical intelligence, and urban operations."

Following in trace of the renewed CMC guidance, the Marine Corps Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning (CAOCL) was formed at the Training and Education Command at Quantico in May. The newly formed center has a formidable task as it becomes the spearhead for implementing the CMC guidance. Found on the web at http://www.tecom.usmc.mil/caocl, the homepage provides a vision and the mission, "As the Marine Corps' Culture and Language Center of Excellence, CAOCL ensures Marines are equipped with operationally relevant regional, culture, and language knowledge to allow them to plan and operate successfully in the joint and combined expeditionary environment." The CAOCL is operationally focused and works with deploying units as well as the education and training pipelines.

Though in its infancy, I expect that the center will grow in stature as time passes. The Marine Corps is headed in the right direction. As distributed operations become the norm and our small unit leaders carry much of the burden, our young Marines will have the tools to operate successfully in the new age of warfare. We wish them all success in this great venture as they become the culture shock absorbers.

Jack Glasgow
Air Combat Intelligence

BYLINE: Williams, Vernon J

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ABSTRACT
MAW G-2, in collaboration with the MAGs, built a manning structure comprised of Marines from the groups and squadrons and trained them, as outlined above, to examine and analyze events and trends beyond the scope of their formal training.

ABSTRACT
Aviation combat intelligence (ACI) is the Marine aircraft wing's (MAW's) intelligence organization designed as the focal point for intelligence activities within the aviation combat element. Moreover, the unique requirements placed on the MAW for countering the insurgent threat within Iraq resulted in additional intelligence requirements beyond being the central node for the Marine air-ground task force aviation-specific intelligence. Williams further details the implications of using ACI.

FULL TEXT
Tailoring wing intelligence for counter-insurgency operations.

Aviation combat intelligence (ACI) is the Marine aircraft wing's (MAW's) intelligence organization designed as "the focal point for intelligence activities within the aviation combat element (ACE) as well as the hub of aviation intelligence activity within the MAGTF." To support 2d MAW (Forward (Fwd)) in Iraq during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF), the Marines of the ACI had to accomplish many of the typical aviation tasks in addition to a variety of nontraditional tasks while adapting to a different environment and responsibilities not normally associated with MAW operations, such as convoy operations, base defense, and extensive human intelligence (HumInt) operations directed toward force protection. This differing approach required unique and focused training in addition to a complete restructuring of the MAW intelligence task organization that was initiated months prior to deploying to prepare the 2d MAW (Fwd) ACI for success on the battlefield.

Support the ACE
According to Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-25.4 (MCWP 3-25.4), Marine Tactical Air Command Center Handbook, the ACE G-2 (intelligence) is responsible for timely, accurate, and fused intelligence support to the ACE. Historically, the ACI has focused on the dissection of enemy integrated air defense systems (IADSs) and the development of targeting packages to be struck by MAW aircraft. To this end, the officers and Marines supporting aviation with intelligence dedicated themselves to understanding the enemy electronic order of battle and associating a variety of weapons and fighter responses based on electronic intelligence signatures and enemy aircraft activity. At present, the insurgent IADS is not a complex system of cueing radars and associated weapons systems, but rather an evasive small arms and man-portable air defense systems threat that generates much less of an identifiable signature. Moreover, the threat is easily hidden until such time and place the enemy chooses to strike against coalition assets. Meanwhile, the deliberate targeting phase of OIF and the air-to-air threat in Iraq have since been reduced to negligible levels.

The unique requirements placed on the MAW for countering the insurgent threat within Iraq resulted in additional intelligence requirements beyond being the central node for the Marine air-ground task force aviation-specific intelligence. ACI has been required to support MAW (Fwd) ground operations by tracking improvised explosive device trends and danger areas along MAW (Fwd) convoy routes, as well as ensuring that quality debriefs and reports are submitted for all
MAW (Fwd) ground actions. These actions have not traditionally been the purview of the ACI; however, in the counterinsurgency operations being conducted in OIF, these requirements exist and must be addressed by the ACI.

Lessons Learned Applied

2d MAW G-2 was able to prepare for OIF 04-06 by capitalizing on lessons learned from 3d MAW. These lessons proved to be of great benefit in organizing and training an AGI that would deploy as an organization tailored to support the commanders and aircrew flying combat operations, as well as the security battalion providing the base security, controlling the battlespace around the airfield, and conducting convoy security operations. The objective was to form an ACI that directly supported the MAW (Fwd) air and ground operating units from a consolidated intelligence clearinghouse at the MAW (Fwd) level. This concentrated effort allowed the best trained and most experienced intelligence professionals in the MAW (Fwd) to accomplish the majority of the analysis and product development for the operating units. Further, it allowed the squadron intelligence Marines who directly brief and debrief aircrew the ability to focus on their aircrew's specific intelligence requirements while also collecting and reporting on what the aircrew observes, then contributing those observations to the overall battlespace awareness throughout the area of operations.

ACI training was designed around the counterinsurgency mission based upon both after-action reports from returning units that had been operating in theater and comments and lessons learned from integrating 2d MAW AGI Marines with the 3d MAW AGI Marines at Exercise DESERT TALON at Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Yuma. From this, 2d MAW G-2 developed an intensive training package that began 6 months prior to 2d MAW OIF deployment and culminated in a concurrent training package presented both at 2d MAWs DESERT TALON, for squadron and battalion Marines, and at MCAS Cherry Point for those intelligence Marines working at the Marine aircraft group (MAG) level and above.

Leading the training effort, 2d MAW G-2 developed a 2-week "intelligence university" with a three-tiered training approach that initially focused on basic intelligence and military skills. This training was followed by training on more advanced intelligence skills integrated with operational issues coming from Iraq and, finally, culminated in practical exercises with real-world scenarios taken from current and past operations in Iraq. These scenarios were developed and taught by OIF counterinsurgency veterans and national-level intelligence agency instructors. Intelligence training at DESERT TALON was split between academics and scenario-driven exercises. DESERT TALON academics presented the intelligence university focusing on basic intelligence skills, such as intelligence briefings, debriefings, and writing mission reports. Then the exercise phase of DESERT TALON integrated battalion and squadron intelligence personnel with their aircrew and operators and allowed for practical application of those intelligence skills taught during the academic phase. This approach to training allowed the Marines of the deploying ACI to collaborate directly with the Marines they would replace in theater, and exercise a cohesive plan with a solid baseline of intelligence procedures and requirements based on real-world operations and lessons learned.

Planning for the composition of the 2d MAW (Fwd) resulted in the creation of an aviation unit comprised of a composite MAG (minus) (reinforced) and a significant ground footprint (Marine wing support group and Marine air control group). The differences in threat as compared to past conflicts, ACE composition, and atypical wing missions required that a unique approach be taken in the structure of intelligence support to the MAW (Fwd) for OIF 04-06.

2d MAW G-2, in collaboration with the MAGs, built a manning structure comprised of Marines from the groups and squadrons and trained them, as outlined above, to examine and analyze events and trends beyond the scope of their formal training. Not only did rotary-wing and fixed-wing intelligence support sections study every aircraft incident in which an insurgent had successfully targeted a multinational force (MNF) aircraft, but also a ground intelligence section studied routes and continued to refine the threat to convoys and base security wherever the MAW had units and equipment. These unique aspects of OIF were addressed within the intelligence structure by flattening the MAW intelligence organization. MAG commanders accepted a reduced, yet tailored, intelligence capability to allow for the squadrons and ACI to be manned to increased levels allowing for a more efficient and effective structure. By eliminating redundant activities that often take place at multiple levels, 2d MAW G-2 was able to streamline the intelligence flow to and from the tactical end user, quicken support to the decisionmaker, and make the unit combat reports available for integration to the overall intelligence picture in a greatly reduced timeline. Additionally, the ACI integrated within its structure both a counterintelligence (CI)/HumInt team, provided by the intelligence battalion, to conduct CI operations within the 2d MAW (Fwd) battlespace and a signals intelligence (SigInt) cell with access to the National security Agency, theater, and tactical SigInt units to coordinate directly with all levels of the SigInt community. ACI also procured access to the global broadcast system, a high-speed download capability, to download imagery rapidly, which enabled support to the squadrons for helicopter landing zone studies, snap vehicle checkpoints, raid packages, and other various requirements.
Conclusion

The success of this streamlined intelligence structure is reflected in the numbers. In the first 6 months of GIF 04-06, the 2d MAW (Fwd) AGI processed and answered over 450 requests for information (RFIs) while only submitting 14 RFIs to the Marine expeditionary force’s (MEF’s) tactical fusion center (TFC). Consolidating the intelligence effort at the wing level permitted greatly reduced response times to subordinate unit RFIs, while in turn decreasing the workload on the heavily tasked TFC. Due to the flexibility inherent in the tailormade intelligence organization that 2d MAW G-2 sent to Iraq, AGI has provided aviation-specific intelligence support to the TFC on numerous occasions and regularly collaborates on aviation as well as other allsource intelligence topics.

An ACI that is directly tied to subordinate squadrons and battalions and integrated with the MEF’s TFC and U.S. air forces, U.S. Central Command’s combined air operations center has become a model of aviation intelligence support in a counterinsurgency environment. The streamlining of the intelligence chain while still providing accurate, timely, and relevant intelligence to commanders at every level proved itself a viable option that should be considered for future deployments. The concept depends upon the confidence of commanders in their intelligence professionals coupled with solid intelligence training so that their confidence is well placed. The success achieved by 2d MAW (Fwd) ACI has reduced the risk to aircrew and ground Marines of the 2d MAW (Fwd) and will ultimately result in reducing the effectiveness of the insurgent's campaign against the MNF and the Iraqi people.

SIDEBAR

The unique requirements placed on the MAW for countering the insurgent threat within Iraq resulted in additional intelligence requirements beyond being the central node for the Marine air-ground task force aviation-specific intelligence.

SIDEBAR

Consolidating the intelligence effort at the wing level permitted greatly reduced response times to subordinate unit RFIs, while in turn decreasing the workload on the heavily tasked TFC.

FOOTNOTE

Note
1. MCWP 3-25.4, Chapter 2, p. 56.

by Maj Vernon J. Williams

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PME

BYLINE: Barr, Robert S

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ABSTRACT
In the 1950s the Philippine Government fought a local war against a rogue Hukbalahap insurgent guerrilla force simply called the Huk. Like the terrorists whom America fights today, the Hucks fed off of the support of the local populace who did not care for their own government or the U.S. military and American support effort. Even with U.S support, large-scale military operations proved ineffective against the Hucks.

ABSTRACT
Barr underscores the relevance of professional military education (PME) in preparing for operations in Iraq. PME is one aspect of training for war; however, it is too often the last consideration when the training plans are developed. Besides the importance of cultural understanding, PME has a very tangible application to current missions in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom.

FULL TEXT
A valuable tool in preparing for war.

It is a universal truth that every day the Marine Corps trains for war—and it is this constant requirement that forms a very large part of our profession of arms. In fact, the focus of effort for our Operating Forces is to prepare and train for combat as effectively and efficiently as possible given the resources and time available. This training includes fieldwork as well as resident and nonresident schooling. Professional military education (PME) is one aspect of our training for war; however, it is too often the last consideration when the training plans are developed. This article describes how one major command has attacked this issue and underscores the relevance of PME in preparing for operations in Iraq.

The Program Begins

The Spanish-born philosopher George Santayana espoused, "Those who fail to learn the lessons of history are destined to repeat them." Commanders and the Marines they lead cannot be expected to learn all that they must know by relying solely on training publications and on-the-job training. Leaving out the important lessons of history and vicarious experience can be very costly. Leaders must use education as a corollary tool to augment training in order to more effectively plan ahead, eliminate surprises, and posture themselves to react more quickly as the battlefield changes.

Beginning in 2003 the Commanding Officer, Marine Aircraft Group 29 (MAG-29) initiated a program of instruction to better prepare the field grade officers of the MAG to fight the global war on terrorism (GWOT) against a radical Islamic enemy. The PME syllabus (see Table 1) describes a building block approach incorporating a series of books, papers, and lectures on this subject. The MAG syllabus also dovetailed neatly into the program of instruction that the II Marine Expeditionary Force (II MEF) commanding general (CG) directed for Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) commanders, which focused on the Israeli Defense Force handling of the siege of the Church of the Nativity, followed a month later by a 2-day commanders' cultural awareness seminar. Moreover, the MAG syllabus mirrors in part that which thenMajGen James N. Mattis conducted while commanding the 1st Marine Division.

Historical References
Besides the importance of cultural understanding, PME has a very tangible application to current missions in support of OIF. To underscore this fact we shall draw out several lessons learned from the Hukbalahap insurrection that occurred in
the Philippines from 1946-55 where the Philippine Government, along with U.S. military and economic assistance, successfully countered the Hukbalahap insurgency.

To quote Dr. Norman Cigar from the Marine Corps University, “Fighting this insurgent enemy requires the employment of a sword and a shield.” In this example the military embodies the shield to provide security and the element of time. The social and jobs programs, the infrastructure rebuilding efforts, and the humanitarian assistance projects then embody the sword. Although the military is the critical component of these operations, the military alone cannot win this type of war.

In the 1950s the Philippine Government fought a local war against a rogue Hukbalahap insurgent guerrilla force simply called the Huk. Like the terrorists whom America fights today, the Huks fed off of the support of the local populace who did not care for their own government or the U.S. military and American support effort. Even with U.S support, large-scale military operations proved ineffective against the Huks. With that said, however, the U.S. involvement, although tenuous at times, proved invaluable to a successful outcome. The relative security provided by the U.S military enabled the Filipinos to enact the necessary political-social change in many areas. There are several key takeaways from this case study that should be addressed as they relate to current operations in Iraq.

**Keys to Success**

First, cultural awareness by the United States is absolutely key. We must know and understand the battlefield in which we are to operate. This issue lies at the very heart of the problem that America and other Western civilizations face. The unequivocal fact remains that we do not understand the inner workings of Middle East cultures. We don't understand their attitudes and motivations. We don't understand the complexities and the bonds of their tribes and clans. And most importantly, we fail to comprehend the Islamic religion writ large. The bottom line is that collectively we just don't get it! This problem must be addressed, because if the Iraqi people cannot see us as being a benevolent, helpful, and respectful people, we will be alienated and ostracized and our mission will fail.

Second, the will of the people is the center of gravity and is what the enemy relies upon for strength. Turn that will against the insurgents and the road will be paved for the social change that leads to mission success. The population may also be viewed as “key terrain” that is being contested by both the insurgents and the government. The enemy requires the support of the people for strength and legitimacy. Take that support away from them, deny them the key terrain, and the tide of the battle will turn. We must continue to avoid decisions that result in alienating the people and forcing them to run into the arms of the insurgents. The Abu Ghraib prisoner abuse incidents are a prime example of how poor decisions and criminal acts can damage mission accomplishment on both the operational as well as strategic levels. This statement is not meant to downplay in any way the fact that law of war violations are illegal and contrary to our national morals and ethos.

Third, the war will be won by the actions of the politicians and by the actions of the small unit leaders. Combining military operations with civic action projects formed the grand strategy in fighting the Huk rebellion. Providing a secure environment that enables the rebuilding of transportation systems, schools, medical facilities, electricity and other utilities, and religious centers, such as mosques, will be critical to our success in Iraq. When Iraq is a safer and better place to live, compared to the current status quo or than during the former Hussein regime, the Iraqi people will no longer desire to return to the old way of life under an oppressive dictator.

The actions of our small unit leaders, those strategic corporals and lieutenants, prove that our Marines truly make a difference. The daily interaction-providing security and solving problems on the local levels is extremely important. Marines who employ sound judgment, compassion, and common sense as the order of the day are successful. “No better friend, no worse enemy,” as LtGen Mattis has stated, captures a philosophy that is defined by cultural understanding developed through focused PME events, whereas sound decisions emerge from a unique understanding that is based upon cultural boundaries, which is especially true in this type of insurgency.

These three areas have been central issues to the recurring theme during the course of the MAG-29 PME. The seminar events listed in Table 1, coupled with readings, provide the cornerstone for the upcoming deployments and subsequent operations in Iraq and other countries as we fight the GWOT. Weave PME into your training plans early to reap the benefits of lessons of history. The result will be better prepared units to fight this conflict and our next battle in the war against terrorism.

**SIDEBAR**

The Abu Ghraib prisoner abuse incidents are a prime example of how poor decisions and criminal acts can damage mission accomplishment on both the operational as well as strategic levels.
CAP India

BYLINE: Iscol, Zachary J

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ABSTRACT
It is important to note that the enemy also targeted the Iraqi soldiers' will through threats, kidnapping, and even murder. A few weeks after Fallujah, two ING soldiers were brutally killed for fighting with us. Many of the Iraqi soldiers had family members kidnapped, and failed kidnapping attempts were common.

ABSTRACT
Iscol discusses the combined action program (CAP) used in India and its uses as a model for the training, development, and employment of indigenous forces at all levels of counterinsurgency warfare. The contributions made by CAP India went well beyond their performance in Fallujah, Iraq. By capitalizing on every opportunity, the battalion's commanding officer and operations officer aggressively employed these forces in all operations, building upon past success to increase the unit's confidence.

FULL TEXT
Patience and leadership result in successful CAP operations.
On 8 November 2004, Combined Action Platoon (CAP) India, a combined unit of 81mm mortar Marines from Weapons Company, 3d Battalion, 1st Marines (3/1) and Iraqi National Guard (ING) soldiers from India Company, 505th Battalion led the 1st Marine Division's attack into Fallujah during Operation AL FAJR and seized the railroad station on the city's northern edge. Over the next 2 weeks, CAP India continued to serve with distinction as the only ING unit to fight on the frontlines alongside adjacent Marine units. Furthermore, the ING platoons that didn't go into Fallujah conducted vital independent stability and support operations (SASO) to deny their city as a safe haven for fleeing insurgents. With little Marine support, this remain-behind unit detained over 50 insurgents.

The contributions made by CAP India went well beyond their performance in Fallujah. By capitalizing on every opportunity, the battalion's commanding officer and operations officer aggressively employed these forces in all operations, building upon past success to increase the unit's confidence. During the 5 months of SASO that preceded offensive operations, the ING soldiers were the eyes, ears, and voice of the battalion-ambassadors to the local community and a key mechanism for disrupting the enemy's lines of communications and ability to hide amongst the civilian population.

This article uses CAP India as a model for the training, development, and employment of indigenous forces at all levels of counterinsurgency warfare. It is organized into four sections. The first covers the organization of CAP India, the second covers development and training of India Company, the third section covers methods of employment, and the fourth and final section discusses the preparation of Marines for a CAP.

Organization

The Marines assigned to 3/1's CAP were responsible for two very different ING units-India Company and the Sa'don Platoon-with their differences indicative of their leadership. (See Figure 1.) India Company was a fully manned and operational company. Sa'don Platoon, the base unit for a future ING company, maintained a company headquarters and a single platoon. MAJ Achmed led India Company. He was a Shi'a who deserted Saddam's army as a sergeant and spent 6 years in prison. He was also a member of the Badr Corps and fought as an Iraqi dissident in the Iran-Iraq war. CPT Imad, a Sunni and former tank commander in the Special Republican Guard, led Sa'don Platoon. His soldiers were all members of the same tribe and hailed from a large Sunni area in the battalion's southern area of operations. His platoon was difficult to work with since most were Saddam loyalists who maintained close ties to the Sunni insurgents.

Training and Development

To make India Company successful, we had to work against the legacy of Saddam Hussein. During both the SASO and offensive phases of our deployment, we trained the ING in basic military skills and small unit tactics. Most important was developing the confidence and will of the Iraqi soldiers. This took a combined effort focused on engaging local leaders, tasking the ING with increasingly more difficult and independent missions, professional development, and Marine mentorship at all levels of the Iraqi chain of command. While some studies use cultural or religious inferiority to explain the ineffectiveness of Arab armies, I believe it is the sociological impact of any authoritarian regime and dictatorship that inhibits the growth of essential warrior traits. While democracies instill the education, initiative, and will essential to good soldiers, authoritarian regimes inhibit them. During German reunification in the early 1990s, East German officers were mediocre compared to their West German counterparts. Similarly, Saddam purged the talented officers he saw as threats from the ranks of his army, while decimating a generation of young men. In my experience working with Iraqis, this phenomenon explains the generation gap between old men and the younger generations. The former are capable, mature, and largely supportive of our endeavors. The latter lack the maturity, esteem, and work ethic that develop in a stable democratic society. The success of India Company depended on our ability to instill confidence and will, essential elements of capable soldiers.

Unit and Individual Development

We designed our operations to psychologically impact the ING soldiers. We used every opportunity to demonstrate the overwhelming firepower Marines brought to the fight in order to reinforce in the Iraqis' minds that they were well supported and fighting on the winning side. Even more importantly, we were careful to give them increasingly difficult missions within their capabilities. We concluded every operation with thorough debriefs and praise. During the September 2004 feints into Fallujah, CAP India provided rear area security and conducted improvised explosive device (IED) sweeps along the battalion's avenue of approach. During a raid south of Fallujah, the ING played a large role in searching and raiding homes while Cobras flew support overhead and tanks provided overwatch. On patrols we slowly began to limit our presence and role (from patrol leaders to patrol overwatch to an adjacent patrol with reaction capability to reaction only). During the attack to seize the train station, a tank platoon, a section of assault amphibious
vehicles, and two sections of combined antiarmor teams provided support, while a platoon from an adjacent Marine company stood ready to assist with actions on the objective if necessary. By January 2005, as we redeployed to the continental United States (CONUS), India Company deployed to Ramadi to provide security for the elections without Marine support.

It is important to note that the enemy also targeted the Iraqi soldiers' will through threats, kidnapping, and even murder. A few weeks after Fallujah, two ING soldiers were brutally killed for fighting with us. Many of the Iraqi soldiers had family members kidnapped, and failed kidnapping attempts were common. Because many of the Iraqi soldiers expected us to address the insurgent threats, we quickly established an immediate action (IA) drill to allay fears and deal with the insurgents’ disruption attempts. Initially we attempted to validate the legitimacy of the insurgents' attacks through questioning the soldier, witnesses, and the ING chain of command. The latter usually knew the soldier's intentions—whether he was really threatened or simply trying to get out of work without sacrificing pay. Next we would attempt to get a human exploitation team to further question the individual in order to gain intelligence to strike the insurgents. Then each threatened or attacked soldier was offered three courses of action: (1) send a fire team of Marines to his house to ambush the insurgents, (2) send a fire team of ING soldiers with the same mission, or (3) issue him an AK-47 and give him 1 week to guard his home and ambush the terrorists alone. The latter was the preferred choice, and we ordered them to report to India's base at designated times every few days. If the soldier's concern was deemed illegitimate, either one of the Iraqi officers or I would announce the reason during a company formation in order to prevent rumors from negatively influencing our relationships with other soldiers.

At our behest, MAJ Achmed implemented a policy of rewards and punishments. He created noncommissioned officer (NCO) and soldier of the month awards, and the award recipients received extra pay. Soldiers' unauthorized absences (UAs) were penalized by extra duties and pay cuts. MAJ Achmed allowed 3 UA days of work a month before firing a soldier. He was also very forgiving. When I asked him why he was so forgiving of good soldiers with UA days, he explained that fining soldiers meant that their children would go hungry a few days each month. MAJ Achmed taught that the loyalty inspired through such mercy was worth more than the penalty. As a Westerner I would never have known the true cost of a $50 penalty. MAJ Achmed represented the most important part of a successful CAP-its leadership.

Each morning following formation I held discussions with the Iraqi officers and gained incredible insights into the hearts and minds of the Iraqi people we had come to serve. We negotiated individual and unit standards, the training plan, awards, punishments, time off, and platoon missions. By including the ING leadership and the ING soldiers in these discussions we empowered the ING and gave them ownership of their unit. This also created a vital mechanism to hold the ING soldiers accountable for upholding their end of the bargain. Since soldiers and officers agreed upon disciplinary actions as fair, all fines and punishments were administered by MAJ Achmed in front of formation to serve as an example and prevent rumors. These meetings also served as an opportunity to impart Marine Corps leadership and ethos. Written on the white board in the room in Arabic and English was the essence of Marine Corps leadership—take care of your men, lead by example, and supervise and accomplish every mission. We also discussed tactical decision games, weapons employment, and potential missions. Eventually these meetings became facilitators for Iraqi initiatives.

One zealous Iraqi officer requested to patrol Nasr Wa Salam with his platoon in civilian cars and dress. We implemented control measures to prevent fratricide and coordinated with higher headquarters and adjacent units. Weapons would remain hidden in the vehicles unless absolutely necessary, and the patrols would radio to India's base before taking any action. Due to communications difficulties, we eventually had to place a Marine patrol closer to town in order to maintain communications and provide reaction support. We also confiscated the keys to ING vehicles and kept them in our combat operations center to ensure that the ING followed proper checkout procedures for patrols.

For combined patrols and IED sweeps, we designed a communications plan to address leadership development and a shortage of translators. (See Figure 2.) Each Marine was collocated with an Iraqi counterpart on patrols and IED sweeps. Both Marine and Iraqi small unit leaders had the ability to communicate with their leadership. I was collocated with the Iraqi platoon commander and a translator. If Marine NCOs had trouble communicating an order to their Iraqi counterparts, they sent it up their chain of command. I would then pass it through the translator to my counterpart and back down the Iraqi chain of command. If the situation required immediate action, Marines could forgo the Iraqi chain of command and respond quickly and effectively to all threats.

Local Leadership Engagement: The Sa'don Model

Additionally, we often had to engage local leaders to influence and sometimes create the ING soldiers' will to serve alongside coalition forces. Due principally to MAJ Achmed's example and standards, India Company was much less problematic than the Sa'don Platoon, which maintained support for the insurgency.
Initially the Sa'don Platoon refused to patrol alongside Marines, ride in our HMMWVs, or conduct operations in close proximity to Sa'don. We established a goal to conduct a joint HMMWV-mounted patrol in Sa'don by October 2004. After much negotiation, CPT Imad (who was stuck between Marines, insurgents, tribal and religious leaders, and his scared soldiers who reported not only to him but to the aforementioned groups as well) agreed to a timetable that would slowly incorporate the platoon into our operations.

In early August 2004 CPT Imad was relieved after his platoon failed to meet our mutual objectives according to the agreed timetable. When I interviewed each soldier in order to determine the reason they refused to patrol with us, it became apparent that they were under their sheiks’ orders. This revelation precipitated a meeting with the Sa'don tribal council. We agreed upon a new timetable and reinstating CPT Imad, who was powerless compared to his tribal leaders. It was also apparent that the sheiks did not want their tribesmen to ride in our vehicles because they knew insurgents who targeted HMMWVs. Nevertheless, with the sheiks’ support we influenced the will of the Sa'don soldiers and conducted countless IED sweeps, joint patrols, vehicle checkpoints (VCPs), and raids with the Sa'don Platoon. They even maintained a higher attendance rate than India Company. However, as October arrived, the Sa'don Platoon moved to Sa'don, and our battalion became focused on Fallujah, preventing us from achieving our initial goal of a combined HMMWV-mounted patrol in Sa'don.

Small Unit and Individual Development

Most of the Iraqi soldiers had little military experience prior to joining the ING, and their ING boot camp was a 6-day basic training course. We cannot teach a Marine recruit to shoot a rifle in 6 days, yet we expected to be able to develop combat capable Iraqi soldiers in 4 percent of the time it takes to train a school of infantry (SOI) graduate. However, the junior Marines of CAP India, conducting themselves as seasoned NCOs or SOI instructors, made up for the ING soldiers’ limited training and excelled as basic infantry skill instructors.

Initially our battalion’s SASO mission dictated that VCPs, IED sweeps, and urban patrols were the focus of our training. A four-man Marine training cadre was assigned to each platoon, and we designed a 5-day platoon rotation to balance the significant number of daily missions with essential training and maintenance of perishable infantry skills. (See Figure 3.) Day one was training, on day two they conducted joint missions with U.S. Marines, on day three they conducted independent missions and supported adjacent Marine units with indigenous capabilities, on day four they sourced the camp guard, and day five was a day off.

Since only one training cadre was responsible for training their platoon for upcoming missions each day, the other teams combined into 16-man squads to conduct joint missions. The cadres did everything with their platoons, to include standing in formation with them. Though a few Marines protested, most understood the importance in establishing unit cohesion and demonstrating our shared confidence to the ING soldiers.

Our initial training focused on three areas-IA drills, marksmanship, and fire and movement. We found that without continuous remedial training, most of the Iraqi soldiers lost acquired skills within a short period of time, and constant remediation was vital.

Once we were comfortable with the ING abilities to respond to worst-case scenarios, we shifted the focus of our training efforts to small unit SASO. Since we did not have much time to teach each soldier every mission essential skill, we trained each soldier in a specific mission essential task. For VGP operations, individual soldiers were trained as vehicle searchers, overwatch, barrier emplacements, or to search and question personnel. For IED sweeps, individuals were trained as kill team/overwatch members, metal detector operators, vehicle security, or visual searchers. Essentially, we tasked each patrol member through focused individual training that ensured that each soldier possessed the mission essential skills for his specific mission and task.

Offensive Operations

In late September 2004, anticipating Operation AL FAJR, we began training two combined platoons comprised of one Marine squad and two ING squads in military operations on urbanized terrain. Simultaneously, we continued to facilitate the remain-behind ING platoons’ capabilities to act as force multipliers and conduct SASO in our rear area.

During formation, MAJ Achmed asked for volunteers to fight in Fallujah, and most of the company volunteered. Marines then selected 50 of the volunteers based on maturity and aptitude. The selected soldiers were promised a large monetary reward from the battalion for fighting in the city and would become the NCO corps of India Company after the operation. Initially, two combined platoons were formed; however, after ING and Marine combat casualties and training attrition, the two platoons became two sections and then a single platoon.
We then implemented a 10-week live fire and physical training (PT)-intensive course to build the marksmanship, offensive skills capabilities, implicit communications, and unit cohesion of the combined platoons. The first week focused on developing unit cohesion through tough PT events. Training events during weeks two and three focused on individual skills-marksmanship, weapons handling, movement techniques, and hand and arm signals (vital to overcome the language barrier). Weeks four through eight were live fire intensive beginning at the buddy team and culminating with a company (minus)(reinforced) attack utilizing 81mm mortars and heavy machineguns. Balloons forced the ING soldiers to properly employ their weapons systems. Throughout this stage of the training, we continued to conduct combined PT each morning and constant remediation of previous training. For example, after a week of fire team live fire evolutions, we spent 2 days retraining the ING soldiers in buddy team fire and movement, and after working our way up to platoon live fires, we spent a few days on squad and individual marksmanship remediation.

During this training we forced the ING leadership to work. It was imperative that Marines force Iraqi leaders to correct ING soldiers. Slowly the ING leaders played a greater role in training and in debriefs. It was also important to praise individual soldiers through their leadership lest Iraqi leaders become jealous. Often, praise of a platoon sergeant or squad leader had an adverse effect because the platoon commander would feel threatened. Such is the legacy of Saddam.

Marines also provided a high example to the ING and strictly enforced proper weapons handling. The ING always kept their trigger hands on the pistol grips and adhered to the four weapons handling rules lest they face swift and severe corrections. Over time, Marines grew much more comfortable operating next to ING soldiers while conducting live fire and movement. In Fallujah we had zero negligent discharges by ING soldiers, and every shot fired was well aimed and from the shoulder.

With little time for training, one combined squad was tasked each night with a patrol to increase the ING comfort operating in darkness. By design, classes on tactics, ethics, and politics-including movies-were followed by professional military education discussions led by the Marines and that sufficed as rest periods. We watched Blackhawk Down, Band of Brothers, and We Were Soldiers. In early September 2004 CAP India was tasked with supporting a feint into Fallujah, and five ING soldiers and one officer went UA the day of the operation. After 2 months of intensive training, when we departed India's base for Fallujah, we only had one UA ING soldier. He was the younger brother of one of the platoon commanders. Their family did not want to risk both sons, and I blame myself for not identifying this situation.

Various Missions and Methods of Employment

The ING were also exceptional information operations (IO) platforms. Most Iraqis rely on gossip for news and entertainment. Few trust the formerly state run propaganda mill media, and many others do not watch much television. To access their information sources, a local voice is critical. One of the best means to access these vital networks is the relationship between soldiers and Marines. We used the ING to distribute pamphlets and supplied them with spray paint to create local responses to insurgent graffiti messages. An announcement responding to a local terrorist attack or an explanation of coalition activity made during formations quickly spread throughout the city. Eventually, the ING company set up its own computer and printer and started to print messages and IO pamphlets on its own.

The ING are also much better interrogators than U.S. personnel. On a routine logistics run to the battalion forward operating base, CAP India Marines detained two suspected triggermen after an IED attack. A week earlier, during VCP training, the ING leaders were trained to exploit their suspicions of people they were questioning with their local expertise and ability to hear accents. Armed with this training, the Iraqi platoon sergeant was able to ascertain in 10 minutes what would have taken a Marine and translator hours to figure out. Neither suspect's accent was from Nasr Wa Salam, where the suspects claimed to be from, nor did either one know anyone from the city. Both triggermen were detained and transferred to the regimental detention facility after Marines and ING gave statements.

While many informants, including ING soldiers, attempted to gain personally to settle a personal matter, obtain a reward, or even ambush Marine units, we operated under the auspice that all intelligence is actionable. Since few Iraqis could read a map, we always attempted to use informants as guides. If they refused, an alternate plan was to send a plainclothes ING soldier with the informant to then act as a guide. Also, Iraqi soldiers were informed that providing false information would result in blacklisting from the ING and ostracizing by tribal leaders and citizens in town.

Preparing Marines

Working with Iraqi forces was a test of resolve and patience for CAP India's Marines. Optimism, creativity, humor, and patience, coupled with realism and determination, are necessary to build an ING unit. While all of the Marines performed extraordinarily well, some possessed a higher degree of these intangible qualities. Almost exclusively all 81mm mortarmen, most of the NCOs were Operation IRAQI FREEDOM I veterans, while the junior Marines were mostly recent
SOI graduates. Other than language training, predeployment CAP training was limited. Most could write in Arabic, and the rudimentary framework of Arabic enabled them to quickly learn the language through immersion.

Once in Iraq, the NCOs taught the junior Marines the basic infantry skills outside of their mortarman military occupational specialty and how to use EDIP (explain, demonstrate, imitate, practice) for each class. Evenings were spent practicing the following day's subject matter, including the lesson plan, training objectives, drills, and details to supervise. For instance, the night before day one of marksmanship training, Marines reviewed proper employment, weapons handling, and shooting positions. Marines practiced giving their classes and were taught to ensure that each soldier kept one hand on the pistol grip at all times, conducted proper magazine changes, and properly presented their weapons during live fire drills. Marines then used every available opportunity during training and operations to ensure that Iraqis properly employed their weapons. As a result, our Iraqis had no negligent discharges in Fallujah. Every shot they fired was well aimed and from the shoulder.

Perhaps the greatest tribute to CAP India's junior Marines is that they managed to communicate with and lead their Iraqi counterparts after both of the platoon's translators were evacuated from Fallujah on the second day of fighting (one for wounds, the other for a serious medical condition). Capitalizing on implicit communication, hand and arm signals, limited Arabic, shared anecdotal experiences, and the trust that develops over 5 months of working together, the Marines managed to overcome this substantial language barrier. Emulating their more seasoned NCOs, CAP India's junior Marines applied the fundamentals of Marine Corps leadership across cultural and language divides with great success. These traits—learned—are universal in their application.

Conclusion

A few days before 3/1 redeployed to CONUS, Iraqi soldiers from India Company departed independently for Ramadi to provide security for the elections. We received reports from the U.S. Army unit to which they were assigned that they performed very well. For the CAP India Marines, the Iraqis' conduct of difficult operations independent of Marine support or leadership was the greatest measure of success.

Our success in Iraq and against future insurgencies depends upon our ability to train and employ indigenous forces. While India Company was a huge investment in time and resources by 3/1, it also played a significant role in our success across the spectrum of conflict from SASO to offensive operations. With the right leadership, earnest training, and a combined campaign to influence their will, indigenous forces are assets, not hindrances, to U.S. forces operating in an alien culture.

FOOTNOTE

Notes

by 1stLt Zachary J. Iscol

1stLt Iscol served with CAP India during the battle of Fallujah. He is currently assigned to the Foreign Military Training Unit at Camp Lejeune.

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GRAPHIC: Photographs
IMAGE CHART, Figure 1. CAP India was comprised of Marines from 3/1, an ING company, and a separate ING platoon.
IMAGE PHOTOGRAPH, On 8 November 2004, Marines and ING soldiers prepare for combat operations a few hours before seizing the train station north of Fallujah. (Photo courtesy of the author.)
IMAGE CHART, Figure 2. Communications plan for combined patrols.
IMAGE PHOTOGRAPH, While preparing for combat operations, Marines conducted extensive marksmanship and live fire training with INC soldiers at India base. (Photo courtesy of the author.)
A Tactical Staff Structure for an Ideological War

BYLINE: David, G John; Quinn, E Lawson

SECTION: IDEAS & ISSUES (FORCE STRUCTURE); Pg. 30 Vol. 90 No. 2 ISSN: 0025-3170

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ABSTRACT
To implement such a plan the Corps needs a primary staff structure to plan, command, and control IO, as well as a force structure to execute these operations. The components of this structure, with some exceptions, already exist; they need only to be organized into a coherent and effective form so that the Marine Corps can get into the fight for the message.

ABSTRACT
Waging war on terror means confronting adversarial ideas as much as, if not more than, it does confronting enemy forces. Terror's chief weapons are its messages sent through abhorrent acts that induce fear and garner news media attention. David and Quinn discuss the importance for US Marine Corps to establish an information operations staff section that includes the intelligence section, public affairs, and psychological operations in order to win the war on terror.

FULL TEXT
Establish an information operations staff section that includes the intelligence section, public affairs, and psychological operations.

The Marine Corps staff structure must adapt to fighting at the tactical level in the confrontation of ideologies that is the global war on terror by regrouping its elements into a form that more effectively conveys its message. Waging war on terror means confronting adversarial ideas as much as, if not more than, it does confronting enemy forces. Terror's chief weapons are its messages sent through abhorrent acts that induce fear and garner news media attention. The mes-
sage-weapon achieves success not by gaining ground, but by convincing a target population or populations to maintain or change attitudes and behaviors as a result of the activity on the ground. The ideology that produces and justifies the use of terrorism, however, is the driving force—the foe's center of gravity.

Influencing the Will

Terror targets representative government responding to the will of its people by attempting to induce horror or revulsion in those people. Changing a government's policy is a strategic target very different than that in the rifle sight of the tactical insurgent/terrorist. The Madrid bombings in early 2004 changed the course of Spain's presidential election through very limited tactical action. Likewise, most insurgent actions in Iraq seek to sow fear rather than to achieve physical success. In the November 2004 fighting in Fallujah, insurgents could not hope to physically succeed against I Marine Expeditionary Force; they sought, rather, to fight in order to show that they are viable, to inflict pain upon the American population through casualties, and to prevent the peaceful assimilation of the city into the Iraqi election process. The battleground with terrorist insurgents is information within a given population or set of populations, not only those physically fighting.

Joint and Marine Corps doctrine falls short of a working definition of information operations (IO) by reverting to command and control warfare (C^sup 2^W), focusing on a defined enemy decisionmaker and C^sup 2^W systems, and therefore, it is limited in terms of its objective and nature. C^sup 2^W affects an adversary combatant's information, primarily in terms of his C^sup 2^W, in order to affect his decision cycle in battle. But just as terrorism seeks to influence the will of an audience far broader than its physical foe on the battlefield, IO must influence more than just those actually bearing arms against U.S. forces at this moment (though they are certainly part of the issue) in order to be effective.

IO that deals with terror's supporting ideology must be a combined arms effort the object of which is to isolate the enemy from its justification and radical ideology, supplant its message with ours, and convince the various target populations to accept our message and change their behavior accordingly. All physical (also referred to as kinetic) actions taken on the battlefield generate a message to all of the populations in the area of operations (AO)—and some external to it—who witness them through information sources, whether that message is planned or not. Accordingly, just as fire supports maneuver and vice versa, physical and information battles must be viewed as combined arms achieving synergy only if intended and controlled. Although the Marine Corps will never have, nor would it seek, charge of all information producers in an AO, it can determine friendly message objectives that can preempt, counteract, or grow more powerful than terrorist weapons of fear by employing information to achieve its objectives. Moreover, it can and must target more than simply the enemy. Adversarial populations not actually engaging in fighting, potentially friendly populations not willing to act, neutral groups, voters in coalition or allied nations, all of these elements will be reached by messages our Corps sends when engaged, and we must have a plan for managing and directing what those populations receive.

Primary Staff Structure

To implement such a plan the Corps needs a primary staff structure to plan, command, and control IO, as well as a force structure to execute these operations. The components of this structure, with some exceptions, already exist; they need only to be organized into a coherent and effective form so that the Marine Corps can get into the fight for the message. Just as the operations section has charge of all of the physical forces on the battlespace and the logistics section controls all that which supports those forces, an IO section would contain all Marine information handlers (if not their pathways that are owned by communications). Command cognizance and responsibility demand that the IO section be a permanent, primary staff section rather than an ad hoc section assembled by contingency and given a vague moniker, such as "GX." This staff section must contain three major subordinate functional areas that produce information in today's battlespace—intelligence, psychological operations (PsyOp), and public affairs (PA). It must also contain robust support from the staff judge advocate and any activated civil affairs group liaison to review and coordinate activities. As the overwhelming majority of information handlers and related capabilities of IO in the Marine Corps already reside in the G-2 (intelligence), a reorganization of the G-2 into a "G-2/IO section," to include the integration of PsyOp, PA, and representatives from key related capabilities is logical. A separate IO section would siphon off too many resources from the G-2 to the point of making it and any intelligence support to IO impotent. Integrating IO into the G-2 achieves synergistic effects. (see Figure 1.)

The role of intelligence when faced with an IO campaign increases in scope and responsibility. Collections must be directed to perform traditional missions and form an impression of messages that work and resources available to convey them. Monitoring target populations, assessing their preferences, and coalescing their views into coherent, usable intelligence that supports establishing command message intent requires expanding traditional intelligence roles focused on enemy combatants. Moreover, as intelligence gathers information from various populations, it must encompass both
customary assessments of enemy courses of action and the sociological assessment of involved populations that one usually associates more with elections than warfare. What message resonates with them? What will make them change their behavior? How should they hear it?

PsyOp overlaps intelligence and PA in its current scope and has remained almost entirely independent of the tactical military. Joint Publication 3-35, Joint Deployment and Redeployment Operations, defines PsyOp as:

. . . operations planned to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals.

This broadly strategic definition resembles the intent of IO, making it inextricable from and inherently necessary in any IO effort. Moreover, this PsyOp role includes research to generate messages and methods to measure effectiveness, both areas that would benefit from integrating with intelligence and PA. Furthermore, tactical commanders cannot rely on the strategic or even the operational levels of command to establish intent and mission for those generating messages in their local areas of operations. Strategic application at the tactical level risks diffusion of intended response and, even worse, messages that may negatively affect a given locality despite positive effects across whole theaters. Obviously, tactical messages must fulfill the intent of and respond to message missions set by higher headquarters, but one would not expect combatant commanders to tell individual platoons what to do. Similarly, one should not expect combatant commanders to tell platoons what their message end state is in their AOs. Their tactical commanders should do that. Although the Marine Corps does not maintain any permanent PsyOp cadre, it should predicate its operations on its integration within the IO section (when attached from elsewhere) in the future as a force enabler because the missions are so similar.

PA presents the public face of IO and must be integrated into command message intent in order to maintain consistent messages across the spectrum of IO. Some have rebutted this argument with the claim that incorporating PA into an IO section would render it suspect to the news media, but as PA officers (PAOs) are already members of the Armed Forces and United States Marines beholden to their commanding officers, those inclined to be suspicious will be and will question PA objectivity. A recent Los Angeles Times article claims that a Marine lieutenant PAO deliberately misled the Times by describing preparation of the battlespace about Fallujah in October 2004, which the reporter mistook to be the same as attacking. This story demonstrates that regardless of where PAOs are in the staff structure, they still face intense scrutiny by civilian media. Furthermore, the messages of PA and IO both originate from the same commander. Therefore, it is more important to ensure that the commander's messages are coordinated, and it should be an IO responsibility to generate them in a form acceptable to the news media environment in order to engender effective results. Additionally, PA alone does not have the resources to confront multinational behemoths like Al Jazeera. Removing the Chinese wall and fully integrating with intelligence for research, background, and true up-to-the-moment situational awareness, and PsyOp to address those populations other than the observers through international media, PA becomes a more comprehensive, authoritative, and even more credible informer in the battlespace than it otherwise would be, even if it still is no match for the Cable News Network.

By utilizing a basic staff construct for how the section operates, IO in action may be illustrated as plans, operations, and effects. (see Figure 2.) These elements need to perform both the synergized activity of fulfilling the commander's message intent as well as the traditional forms of intelligence, PsyOp, and PA. In plans, the IO section would establish and coordinate the command message intent, collect the best messages and how best to convey them, assess available media through which to convey them, and predict the combined arms effects of physical and informational forces in operations. IO also needs to methodically approach an IO preparation of the battlespace, coupling traditional intelligence preparation of the battlefield with knowledge of the information environment. This preparation, in addition to taking into account the force laydown of combatants, insurgents, and terrorists, likewise needs to consider the mapping of populations in an AO and their likely inclinations with regard to our operations. Operations would perform the customary role expanded into overseeing execution of the message intent and distribution and tasks for forces from intelligence collectors to combat cameras.

Effects are more important than in solely intelligence-focused sections. In addition to battle damage assessments, effects would have to closely monitor the impact of efforts to convince listeners/readers through compelling messages and the informational results of physical action. Human intelligence, PA, and PsyOp all play important roles in measuring effectiveness. Moreover, these skills are sociological and, therefore, require skills akin to electioneering and polling, albeit in dangerous security environments.

An Expanded Vision
The spectrum of directed information used in support of a campaign stretches from PA, in which facts are to be given in as routine and unadorned fashion as possible, to PsyOp, which seeks to direct information to reinforce or change specific behavior in a foreign target audience. Nonetheless, across this information spectrum, the United States, by doctrine and regulation, releases only information that is factual to the best of our assessments, whether by PA or PsyOp. Without this grounding in fact, IO cannot ultimately be successful within our "free press" ideology. As a result, the two functions are force multipliers together, not mutually exclusive.

All of this will require training in an expanded vision of IO that incorporates PsyOp, commander's acceptance of the idea of the combined arms impact of physical and informational forces, and a commitment by the Marine Corps to extend into the PsyOp realm with the current level of personnel from both PA and intelligence. Sun Tzu wrote, "To fight and conquer in all your battles is not supreme excellence; supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy's resistance without fighting." And the only way to do so against the radical practitioners of today's extremist religious ideologies, prone to resorting to terrorism, is to have an effective means of conducting IO. Terrorism in and of itself is just a tactic. It is horrible and morally repugnant, but still just a tactic. Declaring war on a tactic is akin to declaring war on amphibious landings. The Marine Corps must do more than react to the enemy's tactic. It must attack insurgent or terrorist centers of gravity by comprehensively addressing intelligence collection, information projection, and information protection to shape the perceptions of all those in or observing the battlespace in order to influence them to make decisions in support of a defined objective. It must fight the battle for the message.

SIDEBAR
Terror's chief weapons are its messages sent through abhorrent acts that induce fear and garner news media attention.

SIDEBAR
Integrating IO into the G-2 achieves synergistic effects.

PA presents the public face of IO and must be integrated into command message intent in order to maintain consistent messages across the spectrum of IO.

SIDEBAR
Human intelligence, PA, and PsyOp all play important roles in measuring effectiveness.

by Maj G. John David & Capt E. Lawson Quinn
Maj David is the Senior Operations Officer, National Military Joint Intelligence Center, Directorate for Intelligence, J-2, the Joint Staff and Defense Intelligence Agency.
Capt Quinn is a recent graduate of Expeditionary Warfare School (EWS). Prior to EWS he served in the 1st Marine Division IO/civil affairs section in Al Ramadi, Iraq.

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IMAGE CHART, Figure 1. Staff section assets.
IMAGE CHART, Figure 2. Staff section functional organization.

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What We Owe to Those Who Died in Vietnam

BYLINE: Siegel, Pascale Combelles.

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SECTION: IDEALS & ISSUES (OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM); Pg. 29 Vol. 90 No. 2 ISSN: 0025-3170

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ABSTRACT

The insurgents have won big. They helped create the situation that our forces handled so poorly with "the ends justify the means" treatment of prisoners (suspects) documented in 21st century American "reality television" style. The hierarchy and the specific individuals involved in the prisoner abuse responded poorly to the crisis caused by increased insurgent attacks.

ABSTRACT

The hallmark of guerrilla warfare is to harass the conventional, bigger, more lethal force into overreacting, applying too much force, killing civilians and, thus, losing the support of those on whose behalf it claims to be working. In Iraq, just like in Vietnam 30 years ago, the use of guerrilla warfare seemed very effective against the US forces because it affected their nerves evidently shown on how they handle Iraqi insurgent suspects. Siegel comments on how the US forces in Abu Ghraib are reacting to daily insurgencies and threats, which are part of guerrilla warfare.

FULL TEXT

Does the current environment remind you of Vietnam?

Over 30 years ago we lost more U than 58,000 of our young men in Vietnam in a counterinsurgency war we could not manage to extinguish. Push forward to Iraq and consider this-like they did in Vietnam 30 years ago, guerrilla tactics work. The hallmark of guerrilla warfare is to harass the conventional, bigger, more lethal force into overreacting, applying too much force, killing civilians and, thus, losing the support of those on whose behalf it claims to be working.

Iraq, like Vietnam, is demonstrating how effective these tactics can be. The Abu Ghraib prison scandal has shown that widespread mistreatment began taking place as insurgents became more organized and more successful. In response we rounded up more people, especially young men-regardless of whether or not they had actually done something because they just might fit the profile of those who were doing something. We interned people simply on a neighbor's denunciation (with little ability to know the motive). Some were arrested because a raid's target wasn't there, and they were neighbors who came out of their houses at the wrong moment.

In little over a year 43,000 Iraqis have passed through our detention centers. Most have not been charged. The International Committee of the Red Cross estimates that the vast majority have been "innocents" caught up in a search for insurgents and their supporters by American units that have few Arabic speakers and regional experts amid the tactical patrols. While the percentage of innocents can be questioned, that many we've taken into custody were not engaged in or supporting insurgent ("terrorist"?) activity is clear. In fact, most of the 43,000 were eventually released-many after en-
during some form of mistreatment to entice cooperation. As a result, we have put back on the streets many who have witnessed abusive prisoner handling firsthand—abuse that has ranged from poor food to the "softening up of prisoners" documented in the pornographic-like images that we have all seen. Is it reasonable to expect these people to leave our facilities more favorably inclined toward the American occupiers, or have we been fostering ever-greater support for the insurgency?

Meanwhile, the reports that are on the web and the "tell all" interviews from unit members all suggest that morale was running low among the unit assigned to guard prisoners at Abu Ghraib because they were understaffed, undertrained, badly supervised, and facing daily attacks from insurgents—attacks designed to show them that they were not safe anywhere and that they could be next. Did that situation affect their nerves? Apparently, it did. That's exactly what the insurgents wanted.

And the insurgents have won big. They helped create the situation that our forces handled so poorly with "the ends justify the means" treatment of prisoners (suspects) documented in 21st century American "reality television" style. The hierarchy and the specific individuals involved in the prisoner abuse responded poorly to the crisis caused by increased insurgent attacks. In the tradition of "destroy the village to save it," an "anything goes" attitude dominated the incarceration of Iraqis. Rather than developing a sophisticated handling of prisoners and suspects, such that the inevitable innocents would leave with stories of how Americans live the ideal of "innocent until proven guilty" even amid a guerrilla campaign, our forces turned to an easier, get results as soon as possible, turn up the heat approach. When it came to real military discipline, the involved commands became more lenient. The despicable became acceptable. They badly overreacted, fueling the kind of sentiments that the guerrilla fighters sought.

Does this scenario sound familiar? It should. We made essentially the same mistake 30 years ago in Vietnam. With My Lai being the extreme, we increasingly misapplied and overapplied force and eroded the support of those whose very support we needed to achieve a sustainable political solution. That mistake cost us a political goal and, most importantly, a great treasure—the 57,000 lives that went down the drain of poor tactics and failed policy. Am I the only one to consider that we have a moral obligation to get it right this time, if for no other reason than that we actually learned something from the sacrifice of those who gave their all in Vietnam?

SIDEBAR

The hallmark of guerrilla warfare is to harass the conventional, bigger, more lethal force into overreacting, applying too much force, killing civilians and, thus, losing the support of those on whose behalf it claims to be working.

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The Naval Services: At Risk of Irrelevance

BYLINE: Berry, John C Jr

SECTION: Pg. 35 Vol. 90 No. 3 ISSN: 0025-3170

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ABSTRACT
The Marine Corps is developing a new family of operating concepts derived from the NDS, and the Navy appears to be embarking upon a similar endeavor. These efforts need to expand into a fully collaborative venture. Without a common, cogent, and concise view of the future, the Naval Services have struggled to organize their resources in a manner that coherently supports the NDS.

ABSTRACT
In recent years, the Navy and Marine Corps have been committed to a number of contingencies that exemplify the irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive challenges described in the National Defense Strategy (NDS). Naval forces are also well suited to address the strategic needs identified in the NDS, but the Navy and Marine Corps have been slow to explain and optimize their relevance to the new security era. Berry explains.

FULL TEXT
'America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones. We are menaced less by fleets and armies than by catastrophic technologies in the hands of the embittered few.'

-The Honorable George W. Bush, President of the United States

The National Defense Strategy (NDS) describes the current and future strategic environment as an uncertain one, with a variety of potential challenges posed by rising peer competitors, failing states that undermine regional stability and threaten our interests, and nonstate actors who seek to undermine legitimate governments. Nonstate actors include a variety of terrorists, insurgents, criminals, and paramilitary forces. Given our preeminence in traditional forms of warfare, our potential adversaries are driven toward irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive methods. The United States will counter those challenges by assuring allies and friends, dissuading potential adversaries, deterring aggression, countering coercion and, if necessary, defeating adversaries. The NDS calls for more widely dispersed forces that can provide increased forward presence, conduct security cooperation with an expanding set of international partners, act swiftly to preempt nontraditional threats, and globally respond to crises in spite of challenges to access.

In recent years the Navy and Marine Corps have been committed to a number of contingencies that exemplify the irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive challenges described in the NDS. These have included stability operations, counterinsurgency, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, nation building, peace operations, counterterrorism, counterproliferation, combating drug trafficking, and noncombatant evacuation operations. Naval forces are well suited to address the strategic needs identified in the NDS, but the Navy and Marine Corps have been slow to explain and optimize their relevance to the new security era.

Background
The Naval Services are in a situation not unlike that of 1945 when the end of World War II signaled the onset of a new security era. The United States had achieved command of the sea and established itself as the preeminent naval power, but its new opponent, the Soviet Union, was the preeminent land power. In 1954 historian Samuel P. Huntington published "National Policy and the Transoceanic Navy," an insightful essay that described what was required for the Naval Services to successfully adapt to the new era. He postulated that:

The fundamental element of a military service is its purpose or role in implementing national policy. The statement of this role may be called the strategic concept of the service. Basically, this concept is a description of how, when, and where the military service expects to protect the nation against some threat to its security.
A second element of a military service is the resources, human and material, which are required to implement its strategic concept. The resources which a service is able to obtain in a democratic society are a function of the public support of that service. If a service does not possess a well-defined strategic concept, the public and the political leaders will be confused as to the role of the service, uncertain as to the necessity of its existence, and apathetic or hostile to claims made by the service upon the resources of society.

Organizational structure is the third element of a military service. For, given these first two elements, it becomes necessary to group the resources allocated by society in such a manner as most effectively to implement the strategic concept. Thus the nature of the organization is dependent upon the nature of the strategic concept.

According to Huntington:

the redistribution of international power which occurred during World War II, the new threats to American national security which emerged after the War, and the consequent shifts in American foreign policy left the Navy without a strategic concept relevant to the postwar world.

Long-range bombers and atomic weapons appeared to offer the most economical counterweight to the Eurasian land power, and:

a 1949 Gallup poll revealed that 76% of the American people thought that the Air Force would play the most important role in winning any future war whereas only 4% assigned this role to the Navy.

The principal thesis of Huntington's article was that the naval writers and leaders of the day had already developed a strategic concept appropriate to national policy in the new security era. The task at hand was to better articulate that concept, gain public support in the form of resources, and organize those resources appropriately. Huntington described the strategic concept as the transoceanic navy that would exploit its command of the sea to "apply naval power to that decisive strip of littoral encircling the Eurasian continent.

The application of naval power against the land requires of course an entirely different sort of Navy from that which existed during the struggles for sea supremacy. The basic weapons of the new Navy are those which make it possible to project naval power far inland. These appear to take primarily three forms: Carrier aviation is sea based aviation; the Fleet Marine Force is a sea based ground force; the guns and guided missiles of the fleet are sea based artillery.

Over time, the Naval Services gained public support for their strategic concept and organized the forthcoming resources accordingly, reaching their Cold War zenith courtesy of the Reagan administration.

A New Security Era

With the end of the Cold War a new security environment began to emerge, eventually brought into better focus by the events of 11 September 2001. The U.S. Navy continues to command the seas without peer, but just like during the post-World War II era, the public is questioning its relevance in the new security environment. Some advocates, such as retired Navy CAPT John Byron, agree:

Is the Navy becoming irrelevant? Sadly, the answer is yes-unless it is reshaped for two essential missions ahead.

Mission One: Maintain a sufficient fleet-in-being as a hedge against potential threats to freedom of the seas, retaining enough industrial, technological, and training infrastructure to remain superior to any nation that might pose a blue-water threat. The Navy must drastically downsize its capital-ship inventory because its current cost cripples the second mission.

Mission Two: Support land warfare. This is now the Navy's primary mission, and the current fleet works hard at it. Making best use of a Cold War fleet, however, yields much less support than the Navy could provide with a force built purposely for its new role.

Huntington's advocacy of seabasing in support of power projection in the littorals of the world still has merit, but it must be refined to meet a different set of challenges. The three forms of naval power described by Huntington were focused on the application of lethal fires and maneuver against massed land forces, while the new era requires more diverse and discrete forms of power and influence appropriate to the NDS. Updating Huntington:

The application of naval power against irregular, disruptive and catastrophic challenges requires of course an entirely different sort of Navy from that which existed during the Cold War struggle versus a traditional land power.

The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) would appear to agree, stating:
Harnessing sea power in the 21st century will demand much more of us than simply putting ordnance on target ... it will demand that we bund for the future a new fleet of ships, aircraft and submarines to wield that power across the spectrum of conflict.8

Similarly, the Commandant of the Marine Corps is focusing on the demands of the new era, "We fight across the spectrum of conflict. However, we believe that our future will be characterized by irregular wars."9

Collectively, however, the Navy and Marine Corps have not clearly and succinctly articulated a strategic concept for this new era. Sea Power 21, Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare, the Naval Operating Concept for Joint Operations, and a host of other concept documents predate the NDS. These documents tend to generally advertise what the Naval Services can do, vice setting priorities for what they will do.

The Marine Corps is developing a new family of operating concepts derived from the NDS, and the Navy appears to be embarking upon a similar endeavor. These efforts need to expand into a fully collaborative venture. Without a common, cogent, and concise view of the future, the Naval Services have struggled to organize their resources in a manner that coherently supports the NDS. While the Navy and Marine Corps agree that the fleet needs to be rebalanced, they have not yet come to grips with what the correct balance is. The interim Annual Long-Range Plan for the Construction of Naval Vessels for Fiscal Year 200610 provides profiles for development of 260- or 325-ship fleets by fiscal year 2035. These profiles seem largely focused on Cold War priorities, such as strike missions. Both options propose minor cuts in aircraft carriers, submarines, and surface combatants, an approach that appears to be driven more by economic constraints than strategic necessity. The most significant changes reflected in those plans involve the development of littoral combat ships (LCSs) and maritime prepositioning force (future) (MPF(F)) ships, at the cost of cuts in amphibious ships. In 30 years the 325-ship option would cut amphibious ships from 35 to 24, while the 260-ship option would further reduce that number to 14. These changes may need to be reconsidered in light of the NDS.

The Program Executive Office Ships describes LCS as the key platform to:

... assure unimpeded access and maintain dominance in dangerous littoral or coastal regions where growing asymmetric or unconventional threats, such as mines, diesel submarines, and surface attack craft, can disrupt military operations. The Navy is developing the LCS as a specialized, reconfigurable platform to counter these anti-access littoral threats.11 An innovative design, some critics argue that it still does not adequately address the threat. CAPT James PeiVofski, USN, argues that we need:

... smaller, faster, more agile vessels to compete with maritime terrorists plotting to disrupt the global economy from the sea. The DD(X) and littoral combat ship programs fill only a partial requirement and are more suited toward operations against a future nation-state threat; for the war on terrorism, however, the numbers are insufficient and the costs per unit too high.12

On the other hand, it can be argued that we haven't explored the full potential of LCS. Very few Marines, for example, have begun to consider how Marine Corps capabilities might be configured aboard the LCS to conduct counterterrorism missions, such as surveillance, reconnaissance, raids, personnel recovery, and visit, board, search, and seizure operations.

Maritime prepositioning ships (MPSs) were originally conceived as an inexpensive means of overcoming a strategic lift shortfall. During Operation DESERT SHIELD they demonstrated a faster speed of response than amphibious forces, but unlike those forces, MPS required secure ports and airfields. Following Operation DESERT STORM the Marine Corps envisioned MPF(F) as a means of retaining that speed of response and increasing lift capacity while eliminating the requirement for secure infrastructure ashore. The improved capabilities of MPF(F) ships, however, will make them considerably more expensive than MPS. In operational terms, the Marine Corps espouses MPF(F) as complementary to amphibious ships, but in budgetary terms MPF(F) is increasingly viewed as a competitor with other fleet platforms, especially amphibious ships.

As envisioned, MPF(F) will support phased, at-sea, arrival, assembly, and reconstitution of expeditionary forces as well as the ability to rapidly deliver and selectively offload a large volume of materiel. MPF(F) will be interoperable with other seabased platforms and connectors via vertical and surface craft interfaces but will be built to a lower survivability threshold than amphibious ships. An attractive feature of MPF(F) over amphibious ships is that their civilian manning will allow the Navy to reduce manpower costs. From an operational perspective, however, that may be a false economy. Without the benefit of well-trained and disciplined Navy crews, survivability is even more questionable, and flight deck/well deck operations are problematic. Their ability to host embarked forces for extended periods is also unclear. These limitations will result in platforms with less operational flexibility than amphibious ships, especially with respect to
conducting security cooperation with an expanding set of international partners. Given the foregoing, it appears that MPF(F) ships will be optimized for major crisis response, provided they are accompanied by sufficient fleet resources to attain the requisite degree of air and maritime superiority.

Conversely, amphibious ships are optimized for more independent distributed forward presence, security cooperation, and operations in a higher threat environment. Often thought of strictly in terms of forcible entry, they actually perform five types of amphibious operations: "assaults, withdrawals, demonstrations, raids, and other operations in a permissive, uncertain, or hostile environment." The "other" heading recognizes that:

. . . the capabilities of amphibious forces may be especially suited to conduct other types of operations, such as non-combatant evacuation operations and foreign humanitarian assistance. 13

Over the last few decades the Navy-Marine Team has executed every doctrinal amphibious operation with steadily increasing frequency. Fifteen distinct commitments in the 1980s grew to 41 in the 1990s, a pace slightly exceeded thus far in the current decade.14 The key capabilities that give amphibious ships proven flexibility and adaptability for a wide range of functions are effective command and control; sustained, high-tempo well deck and flight deck operations; survivability in an antiaccess environment; and the ability to forward posture embarked forces for extended periods. Amphibious ships have a shortcoming, however, in that the tyranny of distance results in a slow speed of response from their current homeports to major crises overseas. This limitation can be offset by basing them forward, closer to likely employment areas, in accordance with the changes to the global defense posture advocated in the NDS.

The options provided in the Annual Long-Range Plan appear to be too heavily weighted toward concentrating major combat forces against traditional opponents. Rebalancing the fleet should be informed by the demand that the strategic concept places on the respective capabilities of each ship type. Given the characteristics of amphibious ships, we should be increasing both their number and forward posture in order to conduct numerous, widely dispersed, smaller scale operations against nontraditional challenges while retaining the ability to aggregate for larger operations against traditional opponents.

Recommendations

The Navy and Marine Corps need to mutually foster an intellectual renaissance that will produce a shared view of, and strategic concept for, the future. That strategic concept must be clearly articulated in order to obtain and effectively organize the resources necessary to implement it. This intellectual effort should include an examination of the capabilities and capacities required to address the nontraditional challenges described in the NDS, and how Navy and Marine Corps resources might be grouped together in creative ways to meet the strategic need. It should consider:

* Rebalancing the fleet to better meet the demands of the security environment.

* Creating new sizing options for Marine air-ground task forces or other Marine Corps forces, embarked aboard a variety of ship types, in order to meet expanding forward presence, security cooperation, and counterterrorism requirements.

* Making amphibious ships the main effort of future seabasing capability and repositioning them forward to enhance response time to likely crisis areas.

* Adapting other existing or envisioned ship types to incorporate Navy and Marine Corps capabilities suited to security cooperation, counterinsurgency, and counterterrorism. These might include health services; civil affairs; engineer; re-connaissance; visit, board, search, and seizure; and direct action.

* Collocating and more closely integrating naval force packages to reduce transit time, develop habitual relationships, and synchronize training, deployment, and maintenance cycles.

The prominent role played by Marine Corps forces in recent operations may tempt some Marines to view the lack of a strategic concept as a Navy, vice naval, problem. Succumbing to that temptation would be dangerously shortsighted. Without a relevant strategic concept there is no reason to have a Navy. Without a Navy there is no reason for a Marine Corps, especially after the conflict in Iraq subsides. Very few Marines have a full appreciation for the leadtime required to design, fund, and build a fleet; there is not a moment to lose. It is time to reenergize the Navy-Marine Corps partnership and strategic naval thinking.

SIDEBAR
Naval forces are well suited to address the strategic needs identified in the NDS, but the Navy and Marine Corps have been slow to explain and optimize their relevance to the new security era.

**SIDEBAR**

The Marine Corps is developing a new family of operating concepts derived from the NDS, and the Navy appears to be embarking upon a similar endeavor.

**SIDEBAR**

In operational terms, the Marine Corps MPF(F) as complementary to amphibious but in budgetary terms MPF(F) is increasingly viewed as a competitor with other fleet platforms, especially amphibious ships.

**FOOTNOTE**

Notes


4. Ibid., p. 485.

5. Ibid., pp. 400-491.

6. Ibid., p. 491.


by LtCol John C. Berry, Jr., USMC(Ret)

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Steps to Winning

BYLINE: Mann, Morgan G

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ABSTRACT
Know your enemy. First, I believe that the insurgency in Iraq is 95 percent about power and 5 percent about religion. The primary leaders and coordinators of the various insurgent factions use religion to attract foreigners to blow themselves up— and as a venue to give young men something to hate about the West. Recognize that the insurgents have a strategic goal they wish to accomplish. It is not to kill Americans but to regain lost power, wealth, and influence.

ABSTRACT
Mann discusses what worked for Company F, 2d Battalion, 24th Marines (2/24) while they fought a counterinsurgency for six months in the North Babil Province of Iraq. The area is south/southwest of Baghdad framed by the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers. The company's area of operations extended over 200 sq kms and was characterized by a large canal network and lush farmland, with many paved and unpaved roads.

FULL TEXT
One company commander's experience in Iraq.

This article is meant to be a quick and dirty synopsis of what worked for Company F, 2d Battalion, 24th Marines (2/24) while we fought a counterinsurgency for 6 months in the North Babil Province of Iraq. The area is south/southwest of Baghdad framed by the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers. My company's area of operations (AO) extended over 200 square kilometers and was characterized by a large canal network and lush farmland, with many paved and unpaved roads. The area was dotted with small villages and hamlets as well as several larger population centers anchored by the town of Al Yusufiyah. My western boundary was the Euphrates River. The area is primarily Sunni, though the town of Yusufiyah itself contains a Shi'ite majority.
Probably most rare during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM II is that we fought as a reinforced rifle company, operating out of our own firm base, separated from the battalion by 12 miles. We fought a different fight compared to our brothers in the Al Anbar Province where the rest of the 1st Marine Division was focused. We had relatively infrequent direct fire contests. The enemy took advantage of the open terrain—but restricted canal network—to establish long-range observation on routes and install hundreds of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) along main supply routes (MSRs) and alternate supply routes. In addition, the enemy employed numerous mortar and rocket attacks. Once the enemy engaged they would mix into the population and escape along the far side of a canal. The points below are a quick, short list of several of the main contributors to our success.

* Relentless pursuit of the enemy. Insurgents are hard to kill. They always are ready to throw down their weapons and hide in plain sight. As a result, it is imperative that leaders do everything possible to create a situation that allows Marines to kill insurgents. Capturing them is okay, but killing them is better. How do you do this? Always think ambush. Always dedicate a portion of your force to the maintaining of counter-IED and countermortar ambushes. Create area ambushes to ensure that if an enemy is not in one kill zone you can get him in another. Maintain excellent communications and mutual support between elements of an area ambush to track the location of the enemy—usually traveling at high speeds in civilian vehicles.

* Don't commute to work. Whenever possible operate directly in the area in which you are fighting the insurgents. This location allows you to acquire expert knowledge of the terrain, including the vast canal and farm road networks that exist along Iraq's two big rivers. It fosters a relationship between Marines and the populace, thus enhancing the ability to gather human intelligence. It denies the enemy safe harbor. Active patrolling of villages, MSRs, and town centers forces the enemy to operate with less support and at greater risk. Most importantly, if the populace knows you are committed to an area, they will be far more likely to help you. They will approach your checkpoints with information. They will even guide you to IEDs or enemy safe houses. We once received a compliment from a hostile Imam preaching at a mosque known for its anticoalition rhetoric. Through the Imam's bile came the comment, "The Americans know our countryside better than us..." We were able to achieve this local expertise by living where we worked, continuous patrolling, and not letting IEDs deter us from our mission.

* Human intelligence is the only way small units can collect the information they need to effectively target insurgents. Interviews and interrogations are worthless to the small unit with a large AO if the questioning takes place at a regimental detention facility. This questioning is not timely and is conducted by personnel who have no situational awareness. Keep human exploitation subteams at each firm base of company size or larger. Create a habitual relationship with the human exploitation subteam. They will be the primary collectors of human intelligence. Don't lose an opportunity to conduct a cordon and knock on a possible target house because the intelligence community believes the information isn't vetted or is sole source. Move aggressively with information collected from sources while staying mindful of avoiding patterns or falling into a trap. Leverage your Marines to catch even the smallest piece of intelligence.

* We had the opportunity to send our Marines to a 1-month long Arabic language course. Marines who excelled at this course were instrumental in our intelligence collection efforts. With interpreters at a premium, we relied upon Marines to conduct many of our field interviews to determine whether to detain someone for further questioning. Ensure that platoon commanders and squad leaders are conducting thorough debriefs of all units. Make patrols write detailed patrol reports. Collect this information and assimilate it into your intelligence collection process.

* If a rifle company is to have its own sector or AO for a long period of time, create a company intelligence cell. I had the executive officer run this cell. Assisting him was one of our clerks who was also a database designer in the civilian world. The clerk built a simple Microsoft Access database. I would regularly task platoons to conduct "census" operations during which Marines would collect the full names, photos, and 10-digit grids of as many males within a given area as possible. We would then insert this information into the database. We ended up collecting over 14,000 names. As intelligence reports from higher headquarters came in we would check names with our database. On more than 15 occasions our database matched names from an intelligence report, thus giving us a picture and 10-digit grid target. The longer we stayed in the AO the more effective this technique became.

* Know your enemy. First, I believe that the insurgency in Iraq is 95 percent about power and 5 percent about religion. The primary leaders and coordinators of the various insurgent factions use religion to attract foreigners to blow themselves up—and as a venue to give young men something to hate about the West. Recognize that the insurgents have a strategic goal they wish to accomplish. It is not to kill Americans but to regain lost power, wealth, and influence. We have upset long-time power relationships between tribes, politicians, and the military and have eliminated flow of money and employment from Baghdad to the outlying countryside. You don't need to place a value judgment on this; you need to
accept it as an assumption that must be part of your planning process. Once you understand why your enemy is fighting you need to create the conditions that make him stop fighting. Marines need to keep killing, but battalions must take a longer term picture of the situation and understand how to stop the enemy from fighting. One way is through tribal accountability. Make tribal sheiks responsible for reducing violence in their areas. Tie reductions to specific carrots, such as civil affairs projects or release of certain types of detainees. You must show tribal leaders that you can enhance their power and prestige as well as take it away. If sheiks don't comply, then detain them or eliminate their access to patronage. The sheiks may state that it's the "tribe next door" conducting attacks or allowing insurgents into the area. You can use this as an opportunity to host "intertribal security meetings" where you can establish power, deliver patronage, and attempt to move the war in the direction you want it to go-albeit in small steps. Does this strategy require Marines to stop being aggressive? Absolutely not. If anything, ensure that they are more forceful. You want the tribes to feel the weight of your military power and know that you can turn it off and on based on what you want from them.

* Countermobility operations only immobilize friendly forces. Insurgents and civilians will always find a way around our obstacles and checkpoints. Obstacles will only end up hurting a friendly unit's ability to navigate or close with an enemy.

Some of the items I've listed may be obvious; other points might be less conventional and not traditionally within the combined arms set of a company commander. However, this is not a traditional war. We must not look at this insurgency through the lens of our existing doctrine. We must recognize that, like our 19th century forbears, officers must be warriors with a keen understanding of political power and how to apply political power as another combined arm. We are fighting an enemy more like crime families or mafias than organized remnants of a motorized rifle regiment.

USMC

SIDEBAR

The area was dotted with small villages and hamlets as well as several larger population centers anchored by the town of Al Yusufiyah.

SIDEBAR

You must show tribal leaders that you can enhance their power and prestige as well as take it away.

by Maj Morgan G. Mann, USMCR

Maj Mann is the CO, Company F, 2/24.

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IMAGE PHOTOGRAPH, Shiek meeting. (Photo courtesy of the author.), Checkpoint Operations. (Photo courtesy of the author.), Patrolling along the canal. (Photo courtesy of the author.), Terrain along the canal. (Photo courtesy of the author.)

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47 of 199 DOCUMENTS
Embracing Foreign Internal Defense

BYLINE: Nussberger, Clint J; Douglas, Thomas A

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ABSTRACT

During its Operation IRAQI FREEDOM II (GIF II) deployment from July 2004 to February 2005, the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) (24th MEU(SOC)) learned that trust and mutual respect between the Marines and their Iraqi counterparts was critical to achieving successful counterinsurgency operations.

ABSTRACT

While the infantry battalions focused on training and equipping the Iraqi National Guard and Iraqi police, the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) command element assumed responsibility for training and equipping the Hillah Special Weapons and Tactics force. Nussberger and Douglas detail how the 24th MEU operated during Operation Iraqi Freedom II.

FULL TEXT

24th MEU operations during OIF II.

During its Operation IRAQI FREEDOM II (GIF II) deployment from July 2004 to February 2005, the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) (24th MEU(SOC)) learned that trust and mutual respect between the Marines and their Iraqi counterparts was critical to achieving successful counterinsurgency operations. While the infantry battalions focused on training and equipping the Iraqi National Guard and Iraqi police, the 24th MEU command element assumed responsibility for training and equipping the Hillah Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) force. The Hillah SWAT is subordinate to the Babil Province police chief and maintains jurisdiction for counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations throughout this south-central Iraqi province. Through several months of training and combined operations, 24th MEU was able to expand the Iraqi security Forces (ISF) in Babil Province and enable the Iraqi Government to hold successful national elections in this key area on 30 January 2005.

Initial Meeting

The 24th MEU began deploying to Iraq in June 2004. In late July the MEU assumed responsibility for an area of operations (AO) (see Figure 1) comprising the southernmost portion of Baghdad Province (Mahmoudiyah District), the northern portion of Babil Province (Iskandariyah District), and a small sliver of the southeastern portion of Al Anbar Province. Col Ron Johnson, Commanding Officer (CO), 24th MEU, met with the Babil police chief, BG Qais Hamza, for the first time in early July. BG Qais explained that his police force had established a secure environment in the city of Hillah, the provincial capital, as well as throughout much of southern and central Babil Province. North Babil, however, presented the principal security concern for the police chief. BG Qais briefed Col Johnson that he was building a direct action force known as the Hillah SWAT team, a unit that had already established a solid reputation for loyalty and aggressiveness. Numbering approximately 50 police officers, BG Qais explained that this force needed additional training, equipment, and personnel to continue to be successful.

Initial Training at Forward Operating Base Kalsu

The CO decided that the optimum unit to train Hillah SWAT would be the 24th MEU’s Maritime Special Purpose Force (MSPF), composed of 2d Platoon, Force Reconnaissance Company and 3d Platoon, Company C, 2d Reconnaissance Battalion. Although the MSPF had not received foreign internal defense training, it completed an extensive MEU pre-deployment training program in June 2004, built primarily around precision raids and urban reconnaissance. These were
the very skills BG Qais sought to develop in Hillah SWAT. The maturity, flexibility, and experience base of the MSPF also made it the ideal force to adapt to the challenges presented by this unique mission.

The MSPF conducted three 2-week training evolutions during August and September 2004 at Forward Operating Base (FOB) Kalsu, a former Iraqi Republican Guard communications facility approximately 40 kilometers south of Baghdad. FOB Kalsu served as the command post for the 24th MEU command element and MEU Service Support Group 24. During each training cycle, approximately 30 Hillah SWAT members received training in marksmanship, unarmed combat, and small unit raid tactics. Each 30-man group remained aboard FOB Kalsu for the entire 2-week evolution, billeting in the MSPF compound and taking meals with the Marines in the FOB messing facility. In addition to training, the combined MSPF-Hillah SWAT force conducted raids throughout this time, with the level of integration increasing as the SWAT team members' skill levels progressed.

Upon completion of each training cycle, the Hillah SWAT members returned to their headquarters in Hillah. Throughout August and September 2004, the MSPF and Hillah SWAT conducted a handful of combined direct action missions to capture or kill high-profile targets in Babil Province. The results of these operations indicated that only modest progress had been made in improving the unit's proficiency. In fact, because several of the combined raid targets turned out to be "dry holes," concerns for operational security arose. These operations were planned by the combined leadership of the MSPF and Hillah SWAT at FOB Kalsu but were briefed to the raid forces and staged in separate locations (FOB Kalsu for the MSPF and Babil Police Headquarters for Hillah SWAT). These concerns regarding the overall level of effectiveness led to a change in training and operations.

Hillah SWAT Permanently Deploys to FOB Kalsu

By late September 2004, Hillah SWAT had grown to nearly 250 men, drawn from the Babil Police Force ranks and vetted by BG Qais and the Hillah SWAT commander. As September came to a close, Col Johnson sought BG Qais' approval to billet a SWAT company, approximately half the force, at FOB Kalsu on a permanent basis. In doing so the 24th MEU command element could offer more sustained training opportunities and, more importantly, enhance cohesion between the elements of the combined MSPF-Hillah SWAT force. This arrangement could also provide a forward deployed precision raid force that could react to time-sensitive targets in North Babil. BG Qais agreed to the deployment, and the SWAT company began to arrive on 27 September 2004.

Over the next 4 ½ months the MSPF and Hillah SWAT conducted 67 combined precision raids and security operations. Concomitantly, the MSPF continued training Hillah SWAT between operations, developing habitual relationships at the small unit leadership and individual levels. During this period, Hillah SWAT acquired greater skill by emulating the Marines' performance during combined operations. The Hillah SWAT members came to understand that the Marines would expose themselves to the same level of danger and adversity that they faced. By treating Hillah SWAT as an equal partner, the 24th MEU created an environment in which trust and mutual respect developed in earnest.

Over the course of the deployment, the MSPF would take on more of a command and control role as Hillah SWAT took the lead in raid execution. These missions were accomplished by a 1:4 ratio of Marines to Iraqi SWAT members. Three Marines would be assigned to lead and coordinate roughly 12 to 30 SWAT team members, depending on the operational scenario. This ratio allowed for 2^4 of the combined "stack" but with the added benefit of quadrupling the size of the force that the MSPF could deploy against a target set. Also during this time frame, the MSPF and Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 263 (the 24th MEU's aviation combat element) conducted helicopter ingress and egress training with Hillah SWAT, providing the combined MSPF-SWAT force with the ability to conduct helicopterborne raids.

A substantial improvement in operational security (OpSec) was also evident during these later months, as each raid resulted in the detention of a greater percentage of targets of interest. All combined missions were planned, briefed, rehearsed, and staged from FOB Kalsu, limiting knowledge of targets and concepts of operations to only those with a true "need to know." Enhanced OpSec was also due, in part, to the combined intelligence efforts of the 24th MEU S-2 (intelligence) and Hillah SWAT's intelligence directorate.

Intelligence and Targeting

The Hillah SWAT commander embedded a robust intelligence directorate within his force, working in concert with Iraqi police and investigators in Hillah. This subunit performed a variety of tasks, from conducting close target reconnaissance of objectives and developing source networks, to screening detainees during the course of operations. Obviously, Marines could not duplicate many of these tasks.
The area of intelligence reflected yet another aspect of trust and mutual respect that was developed among the MEU command element, the MSPF, and Hillah SWAT. The ISF as a whole, and Hillah SWAT in particular, had great respect for the Marines' C^sup 2^, fires, and maneuver capabilities. However, Hillah SWAT firmly believed that they could provide the majority of the intelligence required by the combined force. While 24th MEU maintained multiple sources of intelligence, Hillah SWAT was, indeed, a major source of actionable intelligence. Additionally, their intelligence officers provided valuable knowledge of the local terrain, secondary and tertiary road networks, and detailed demographic intelligence. Some units may be reluctant to engage in this level of intelligence exchange due to foreign disclosure concerns. However, in this case, foreign disclosure requirements were minimal, since Hillah SWAT provided a great deal of intelligence yet asked for only unclassified imagery and map graphics in return.

The core targeting cell for the 24th MEU included the MEU S-3 operations officer, S-2 intelligence officer, and the MSPF commander. This targeting cell was convened to brief the S-3 only after extensive briefs and planning discussions had taken place among the MSPF commander, MEU S-2, and the Hillah SWAT commander and his principal intelligence officers. These preliminary operations intelligence meetings ensured that intelligence gaps were identified and that all key players maintained situational awareness throughout the planning process. The results of these meetings and discussions were briefed to the MEU S-3, who drafted concepts of operations (ConOps) to incorporate MSPF-Hillah SWAT precision raids into ongoing security operations conducted by the infantry battalions. The target folders and draft ConOps were then presented to the CO for approval.

Conclusion

The relationship between the MSPF and SWAT had far-reaching implications for the people of Babil Province. A prime example of this relationship was the role the two units played during the national elections on 30 January 2005. During the weeks leading up to the elections, the MSPF and Hillah SWAT conducted raids and information operations missions to shape the area for the election. On election day, their tasks were to provide a regional quick reaction force while the polls were open and, upon closure of the polls, to retrieve the ballots and deliver them to the provisional capital. These tasks were accomplished with little fanfare and almost no violence—a true sign of the progress made in the 24th MEU AO.

The level of trust and mutual respect that developed between the MEU command element and Hillah SWAT over the course of 24th MEU's 7-month deployment exceeded all expectations. By living, eating, sleeping, training, and fighting the insurgency together, the MSPF and Hillah SWAT developed habitual working relationships and cohesion. By engaging Hillah SWAT as an equal partner in a combined effort to combat terrorists, criminals, and insurgents, the 24th MEU made significant progress in preparing the ISF for independent operations.

SIDEBAR

A substantial improvement in operational security (OpSec) was also evident during these later months, as each raid resulted in the detention of a greater percentage of targets of interest.

SIDEBAR

... the MSPF and Hillah SWAT conducted raids and information operations missions to shape the area for the election.

by Maj Clint J. Nussberger & Capt Thomas A. Douglas

Maj Nussberger served with 24th MEU from November 2001 to May 2005 as the S-2A for Operation ENDURING FREEDOM and OIF I and as the S-2 for OIF II. He is currently assigned as a faculty advisor, Expeditionary Warfare School, Quantico.

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Winning in Iraq

BYLINE: Alford, Julian D; Rueda, Edwin O

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ABSTRACT
Alford and Rueda suggest that immediately following kinetic operations, it is necessary to have a strong, visible, and numerous military force that can take care of all of the security and civil administration tasks needed to start the reconstruction process. The change of paradigm must occur, not just in the manner that the military fights the counterinsurgency fight, but in the way that the Marine Corps selects and awards those who serve in the role as military advisors.

FULL TEXT
It's time to change our operational paradigm.

The debate over the number of forces required to win the Iraq war and what constitutes an exit strategy is at the crux of the discussion over the future of the military mission in support of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF). It is a debate that must focus on fourth-generation warfare and should not assume that we are fighting a homogenous enemy in a static conventional fight.

Initial Steps
Immediately following kinetic operations it is necessary to have a strong, visible, and numerous military force that can take care of all of the security and civil administration tasks needed to start the reconstruction process. Arguably, a major operational mistake of the Iraq war was not surging the force in March/April 2003 when U.S. forces quickly transitioned to reconstruction and stabilization activities. The problem of force availability was compounded by the dreaded decision to dismantle the Iraqi Army (IA), rather than quickly reorganizing and reshaping this indigenous force to support manpower intensive security and stability operations. In the early days of postconflict operations in Iraq there was just not enough manpower available to provide security, control the population, and execute civil administration.
Three years later the war morphed. What is true in Al Kut is not necessarily the case in Al Qaim or Mosul. Even within regions the situation changes from town to town. The fight is now driven by local conditions and local politics. The tactical commander is directly behind the wheel of the counterinsurgency fight.

The Al Anbar Province in Iraq is a vast desert with semipopulated cities that primarily stretch across the length of the Euphrates River valley. Arguably it is in this province, and in these cities, that Iraq will be won or lost. In the Al Qaim region, coalition forces and the IA recently executed decisive offensive operations to kill insurgents and destroy their base of operations. Following kinetics, U.S. Marines and their Iraqi counterparts immediately established battle positions inside the cities of Husaybah, Karabilah, Sadah, Ubaydi, and Ramana in the Al Qaim region. The force was sizeable, strong, and visible. Security was provided immediately, and the actions of the forces were overt and clearly evident to the population. The technique facilitated the immediate execution of a reconstruction plan that became the focus of effort for the military in the area. At the point in time immediately following kinetic operations, a surge of forces was required, and the forces needed to be active and visible to the population.

The Changing Scene

Fast forward in time, or look at what is currently happening in Al Anbar in the cities of Fallujah (where coalition forces executed Operation AL FAJR in November 2004) and Ramadi. In time (and figuring when that time is becomes the art of command) visible and numerous forces become counterproductive against an insurgency. The tasks that military forces have to execute for security—both active and passive antiterrorism and force protection activities—start to have a negative affect on the population. People slowly start to resent the visible presence of foreign troops, and they begin to show antipathy toward some of the tactics that are militarily necessary—checkpoints, roadblocks, detention of suspects, patrols, etc. In time people begin to support (passively or actively) the insurgency.

At the tactical level the commander on the ground must make the assessment on when the posture of forces must change and when having more overt forces becomes a liability rather than an asset. It is at this point in time that a gray area exists and that the counterinsurgency fight is won or lost. In this gray area, there needs to be a shift in force posture and tactics, where forces become less visible and provide less restriction to the population. It is in this gray area that host-nation military and police forces must provide the primary elements of security.

In this gray area—and for the remainder of the counterinsurgency fight—a small cadre of capable, professional, and experienced military advisors can make the difference. In the 1960s and 1970s such teams advised South Vietnamese units and were composed of men such as then-Maj Walter E. Boomer, then-Capt John R. Ripley, then-Maj William G. Leftwich, then-Capt Ray L. Smith, and then-1stLt Anthony C. Zinni. As the transition is made from conventional warfighting to counterinsurgency methods, quantity must be replaced with quality. Advisors must be career Marine officers and staff noncommissioned officers (SNCOs) with combat knowledge and experience and regional and cultural smarts who can immerse themselves within the ranks of the host-nation army and provide key advice to commanders at the brigade, battalion, and company levels.

The Advisor Group

In Al Anbar a Marine infantry battalion (by table of organization nearly 1,000 Marines and sailors) now operates in a 450-square-kilometer area near the Syrian border with responsibility for the security and reconstruction of a region comprised of 5 towns with a population of over 150,000 Iraqis. This Marine force also supports one brigade from the newly established IA.

Soon a paradigm change must occur. A force of 1,000 Marines must be transformed, and in its wake, a unit of IA personnel, advised by a capable core of Marine professionals, must be born. In this portion of Al Anbar, with some of the fiercest fighting and most active levels of insurgency, the Iraq Marine advisor group (IMAG) at the IA brigade level would be composed of 76 officers and SNCOs—the best from a Marine infantry battalion. The battalion’s commanding officer, along with his sergeant major, would serve as the senior advisors to the IA brigade commander. Line company commanders and their first sergeants become senior advisors to the IA battalions, while the junior officers and SNCOs work closely with the IA companies and platoons in their advisor duties. Battalion staff officers and SNCOs, ideally with extensive combat and planning experience, would be strung across the staff sections of the IA brigade and battalions to advise and assist the units on all of the warfighting functions—maneuver, intelligence, logistics, command and control, force protection, and fires. These men would live, eat, and work with their Iraqi counterparts, donning Iraqi uniforms and continuously working to become immersed in the life of an Iraqi infantry unit. These Marines would work with the same units for extended periods of time (12-month tours of duty) to ensure continuity, increased familiarization, and the de-
The IMAG would provide the IA with a cadre of Marines who could provide continuous education and guidance on the principles of war, small unit tactics, force integration, counterinsurgency activities, and leadership development. More importantly, the IMAG would bring to the fight the tangible aspect of massive firepower. Equipped with the best command, control, and communications (C^sup 3^) equipment available to the military, these Marines would have the ability to immediately call upon ground forces and airpower tucked away in remote locations in the Iraqi desert. The C^sup 3^ capability of the IMAG must be robust. This capability is the lifeline between the advisor contingency and the U.S. intelligence community. It also provides the capability to bring overwhelming joint fires, medevac, and logistics when required to support the IA forces. All of the IMAG personnel must have the capability for mobile and tactical satellite communications (SatCom) access. Tactical SatCom must be augmented with secure, mobile, antijam, reliable, tactical terminal capability to access real-world feed from intelligence platforms and provide the ability for teams to communicate via chat technology, such as multiuser Internet relay chat. C^sup 3^ suites become the force multipliers that connect the IMAG to the rest of the in-theater military capability.

The size and capability of the quick reaction force (QRF) for a region like Al Anbar would vary based on the size and capability of the threat. With the current threat levels, a U.S. Marine infantry battalion would suffice as a QRF provided the IMAG capability and manning is adequate. The QRF could deploy to the Iraqi theater of operations (ITO) for 7-month tours. Aside from the primary responsibility as the regional QRF, the infantry battalion would assume the base security mission for air support and logistics units supporting the IA through the IMAG, further reducing the number of troops in the ITO since these security tasks are currently assigned to noncombat arms forces.

The combination of an advisor capability, suitable reaction forces, logistical support and massive airpower accomplishes two primary objectives—the major drawdown of military forces in the theater and the decrease of the conventional military force posture in the region. Achieving these primary objectives leads to two significant results: (1) posture the military for an effective and prolonged counterinsurgency mission, and (2) decrease the end strength requirement for forces in support of the mission in Iraq, allowing all units to continue training and planning efforts in support of other war plans. (Even commands deploying advisors to Iraq can have robust remain-behind elements using a small number of officers and SNCOs—that continue to achieve unit and individual training and readiness goals.)

Shifting Focus

The change of paradigm needs to be complete—not just in the manner that the military fights the counterinsurgency fight but in the way that the Marine Corps selects and awards those who serve in the role as military advisors. Infantry commanders serving in these IMAG billets must be rewarded in the same manner as commanders following successful combat tours with their units. All things begin equally. The Marine serving as a military advisor must be seen as performing an equally demanding billet as that of command. The paradigm change guarantees that the officers and SNCOs serving in these billets are uniquely qualified to perform in this demanding, independent, and geostrategically important mission.

Counterinsurgency operations are complex. These operations demand the military's ability to learn, adapt, and quickly change to overcome the enemy's constant modification of tactics and techniques. Conventional forces are not suited to fight this unconventional fight. There needs to be a significant drawdown of forces from the ITO—not as a withdrawal from the fight but as a major paradigm change in the manner in which the fight is executed.

SIDEBAR

In time . . . visible and numerous forces become counterproductive against an insurgency.

by LtCol Julian D. Alford & Maj Edwin O. Rueda

LtCol Alford is currently the CO, 3d Battalion, 6th Mannes. He has executed counterinsurgency operations with his battalion in support of both OIF and Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF).

Maj Rueda has served as the regional affairs officer for Regimental Combat Team 2. He has deployed twice for OIF operations and once in support of OEF. He is currently assigned as the S-5 (Plans/Future Operations), Marine Air Control Group 28, Cherry Point.

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Shoot, Move, and Communicate

BYLINE: Holt, Tyler J

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ABSTRACT
My platoon’s set of vehicles included four or five HMMWVs that had turrets with Mk19s, M2s, M240Gs, or M249s, along with two highback HMMWVs and two 7-ton military tactical vehicle replacements (MTVRs). All vehicles were up armored. We only conducted motorized patrols. We varied the vehicle set, sometimes only using gun trucks and highbacks, and sometimes including MTVRs. Commanders task organized to every mission. The HMMWVs provided firepower, survivability, and powerful communications.

ABSTRACT
First Battalion, 5th Marines was deployed to Ramadi, Iraq, the capital of the Al Anbar Province, from March to Sep 2005. Ramadi is a city of 400,000. Company A’s area of operations, in downtown Ramadi, was an example of particularly dense urban terrain in Iraq. Part of Company A’s mission was patrolling the downtown area to include the market and several dense residential neighborhoods. Holt shares some of the lessons he learned during the Company A’s time in Iraq—to shoot, move, and communicate.

FULL TEXT
A rifle company operating in an urban environment.

1st Battalion, 5th Marines (1/5) was deployed to Ramadi, Iraq, the capital of the Al Anbar Province, from March to September 2005. Ramadi is a city of 400,000. Company A’s area of operations (AO), in downtown Ramadi, was an example of particularly dense urban terrain in Iraq. Part of Company A’s mission was patrolling the downtown area to include the market and several dense residential neighborhoods. There are no two cities exactly alike and no two groups of insurgents who operate the same way. These are some of the lessons we learned during our time in Iraq.
Shoot
We never conducted missions with less than a platoon, including four HMMWVs with mounted machineguns. Each vehicle set had two heavy machineguns and two medium machineguns. These weapons systems provided the bulk of our firepower and went a long way toward discouraging the enemy from initiating contact. However, gunners on the Mk19 40mm machineguns had to be careful not to bounce grenades off of the city's numerous power lines.

The vast majority of buildings in Ramadi are constructed with walls that will withstand 7.62mm ammunition. The insurgents knew this fact and would only minimally expose themselves to shoot and then duck back behind the walls. The only way we could touch these insurgents was with precision fire from M203 grenade launchers, M2 heavy barrel machineguns, and Mk19s. All three of these weapons systems served us well. Grenadiers must practice with the M203. The standard should be to put a round in a window from 150 meters away.

Rockets, both AT-4 self-contained, shoulder-fired antiarmor weapons and Mk 153 shoulder-launched multipurpose assault weapons, did not prove a viable option to kill the insurgents. Patrol formations in the city made clearing a back blast area very difficult. Even if we could clear a back blast area, the only hot positions would lead to unacceptable exposure of assaultmen in the middle of the street. This was a far worse option than relying on heavy machineguns and M203s. Soft-launch rockets might prove effective.

The insurgents we faced were never suicidal. They would not initiate an engagement unless they believed they could escape unscathed. We fought an enemy who would expose himself as little as possible and then break contact before Marines had time to maneuver against him.

Our engagement ranges were typically 100 to 400 meters. The only weapons system that approached its maximum effective range was the M203. Otherwise, maximum effective range was never an issue. The greater issue was geometry of fires.

Our AO was 1 kilometer (km) at its widest and barely 2 km from north to south. In such a tight AO, preventing fraternal fires was always one of our first concerns. A .50 caliber round could easily reach any of seven firm bases and outposts. To complicate matters, our AO was bordered by the Army to the east. When we went on patrol it was possible to keep track of 1/5 patrols but very difficult to know the location of Army patrols, forcing us to assume that there were always friendly forces to our east. Every Marine had to understand the location of friendly outposts, snipers, and patrols.

The choice of optics for the rifles was determined by the enemy. They chose to have engagements with standoff, almost never Fighting at close range. This positioning made the advanced combat optical gun-sight (ACOG) a much better choice than the Aimpoint reflexive sight. We also used machinegun optics (MGOs) on every one of our squad automatic weapons. The ACOGs and MGOs were very good for target identification and marksmanship. The only time we used shotguns was for breaching shielded padlocks, which was very rare.

Move
My platoon's set of vehicles included four or five HMMWVs that had turrets with Mk19s, M2s, M240Gs, or M249s, along with two highback HMMWVs and two 7-ton military tactical vehicle replacements (MTVRs). All vehicles were up armored. We only conducted motorized patrols. We varied the vehicle set, sometimes only using gun trucks and highbacks, and sometimes including MTVRs. Commanders task organized to every mission. The HMMWVs provided firepower, survivability, and powerful communications. These vehicles saved lives during small arms engagements and when improvised explosive devices (IEDs) were encountered. They also allowed us to accomplish missions that required the mobility and firepower of motorized infantry. However, it took us time to learn how to use the vehicles most effectively.

At first we used a combination of dismounted patrolling, moving next to the vehicles, and mounted patrolling. The dismounted patrolling had the advantage of slightly greater situational awareness, but this awareness came at the cost of greater exposure to snipers and IEDs. As the sniper threat increased, the Commanding Officer (CO), Company A, decided we were to remain mounted unless we were doing something that required being out of the vehicles. We only dismounted to search cars, search houses, put up posters, and hand out flyers. This change in our patrolling technique felt unusual at first but saved lives without any compromise of mission effectiveness.

We used a variation of satellite patrolling to mitigate the sniper threat. When we stopped and dismounted for an extended period of time, we sent out a gun truck detachment to act as a mobile screen. By reducing an enemy's chance of safely getting away, we prevented sniper or hit-and-run attacks on our dismounted troops.
Anytime we stopped for more than 5 minutes we established an overwatch position. One squad would take the building, or buildings, with the best observation. The Marines did not use the rooftops because that would make them easy targets for snipers. Instead they used the top floor and positioned themselves behind windows, sometimes deep inside a room, to reduce their vulnerability. Overwatch gave us better observation and more instantly available firepower than if we had only used the HMMWVs with machineguns for security.

Individual actions, especially individual "hard targeting," were essential to minimizing sniper casualties. Marines were never allowed to remain stationary on the street. They had to keep moving or get into a courtyard. One hard targeting technique was to move quickly from the moment you exposed yourself coming out of a courtyard or vehicle. We stressed knowing where you were going before you exposed yourself.

HMMWV gunners stayed down in the turrets. There was no reason for gunners to stand in the turrets. Full defilade was the default position. We never found a reason to deviate from this procedure unless we were actually engaged.

Part of our AO was a mixture of paved and unpaved roads. The unpaved roads made burying IEDs much easier. We learned only to travel on paved roads. This practice almost eliminated the threat of running directly over an IED.

Communicate

Locating targets is particularly difficult in a dense urban environment. The echoes from walls make it challenging even to get a direction based on the sound of gunfire. If someone saw a muzzle flash or a shooter, it was often only one Marine who saw it. That made ADDRAC (alert, direction, description, range, assignment, control) extremely important.

We had enough personal intrasquad radios (PIRs) for drivers and fire team leaders to each have their own. Having strong radio assets reduced the need to yell and made communications much easier.

The HMMWVs made communications with the company combat operations center (COC) much easier. The platoon commander and platoon sergeant both had an AN/VRC-90 in their vehicles. We were each able to report our location to the company COC, which then relayed it to the battalion COC. This relay was an essential part of preventing fraternal fires. The company CO regularly went on patrols. His vehicle had an AN/MRC-145 which allowed him to monitor both the company and battalion tactical nets and provide the patrol leader with updates on where friendly patrols were located and on any new IED reports.

While having AN/VRC-90s in each vehicle would have been ideal, we had few problems with our radio suite. By using amplified radios in the lead and rear vehicles and placing PIRs in each vehicle, we had good communications inside the patrol and between the patrol leader, assistant patrol leader, and higher headquarters.

Conclusion

The tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) that I have discussed worked well as Company A operated as a motorized rifle company in a dense urban environment. The enemy and the environment changed regularly. We developed TTP specific to our AO and assets, but we also learned to be flexible and continuously reevaluate the enemy and ourselves.

by 2dLt Tyler J. Holt

2dLt Holt was a platoon commander with Company A, 1/5 when this article was written. He is now the company executive officer.
Operation IRAQI FREEDOM 05-07

BYLINE: Butler, Glen G

SECTION: IDEAS & ISSUES (CHASE ESSAYS); Pg. 21 Vol. 90 No. 7 ISSN: 0025-3170

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ABSTRACT
Still, all Marines must remain vigilant against adopting a strategy of hope. Every American wants Iraq to succeed on its own; however, as ISF stand up. Marines should guard against premature “base realignment and closure” for Iraq; i.e., pulling back to firm bases before desired results have been met.

ABSTRACT
The National Security Council's National Strategy for Victory in Iraq identifies three reinforcing, synergetic tracks for success in the Iraq campaign--political, security, and economic. A working knowledge of all three tracks is beneficial as they reflect a near-universal realization that military action alone will not defeat their determined enemy. Butler offers a few recommendations to prevent Iraqi Security Forces from being lucrative targets for the enemy and keep US forces away from returning to the bloodshed.

FULL TEXT
'Clear, hold, and build' requires active Marine participation, not hiding in the shadows.

The National Security Council's National Strategy for Victory in Iraq (November 2005) identifies three reinforcing, synergetic tracks for success in the Iraq campaign-political, security, and economic. A working knowledge of all three tracks is beneficial as they reflect a near-universal realization that military action alone will not defeat our determined enemy. But most important to Marines is obviously the security track that involves carrying out a campaign to defeat and neutralize the insurgency, developing Iraqi security Forces (ISF), and helping the Iraqi Government, via a "clear, hold, and build" approach-clear areas of enemy control by remaining on the offensive, hold areas freed from enemy, and build ISF and the capacity of local institutions.

With I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) embarking on its third Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) tour, I MEF's Commander, LtGen John F. Sattler, has stated repeatedly that his unit's focus in 2006 will be on training and mentoring the ISF, not on defeating the insurgency. While these two priorities go hand in hand, the guidance perhaps stems from a belief inside the beltway that we've passed the "golden hour" opportunity to convince Iraqis we are the good guys, not oil mongering occupiers, and that a strong coalition presence simply increases opposition by angering the locals. I MEF will thus attempt to reduce its participation in clear operations whenever possible and mostly leave the hold missions to the ISF. However, I believe the insurgency is not fueled so much by high visibility of American forces but by our inability to connect with average Iraqis and convince them of our true mission.

Witness the lack of sufficient manpower along die Euphrates River corridor in mid-2004 through early 2005 that created conditions that allowed insurgents to take over towns, such as Haditha, Haqlaniyah, and Rawah, and led to a repeated cycle of "clear, clear, clear" (with no forces to hold or build). Ultimately, this situation resulted in a bitter and frustrated local populace. Recent strategy has moved to a more productive path, but ISF manning towns remain lucrative targets for
the enemy, and a premature reduction or consolidation of U.S. forces creates potential for a return to the bloodshed. In that light, here are a few recommendations.

Refocus on Information Operations

The 1940's Marine Corps Small Wan Manual reminds us that small wars are "information wars." Winning the hearts and minds of Iraqis remains a challenge at best, particularly this late in the conflict. Part of the dilemma stems not only from a lack of infrastructure and security, but also from inaccurate information and beliefs about U.S. intentions. Our Achilles' heel has been our inability to properly and effectively get our message out, to convince Iraqis of our sincerity.

We must also do more than positively influence Iraqi civilians and maintain the sustained support of the American people. We must convince potential enemy fighters that every Marine is truly "no better friend, no worse enemy." Targeting the opinion of the enemy—"addressing the ideological part of the war that deals with how terrorists recruit and indoctrinate new terrorists"—was identified by the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, Douglas J. Feith, as the "key to ultimately winning the war."1 The opinion of potential opponents will not be made favorable simply by decreasing forces on patrol or remaining on our fortified bases in a reserve status behind the developing ISF.

It is not too late to improve and redouble our civil affairs efforts and information operations. Despite the criticality of these operations in this war, we continue to rely on a few hundred reservists to be the gurus. The recent designation of artillery Marines as secondary civil affairs specialists is a great step, but all Marines should think of themselves and be trained as civil affairs experts, just as all Marines are riflemen.

Increase MTT Efforts and Overall Marine Manpower in Iraq

Part of I MEF's strategy includes embedding approximately 30 military training teams (MTTs) of roughly 15 to 20 Marines each into Iraqi units to provide focused training and liaison, similar to Vietnam's combined action program (CAP) and a variation on Andrew F. Krepinevich's "oil spot" strategy. The intention is to maintain the Marine Corps' potent fighting capability, while simultaneously reducing our visible footprint so as to decrease the impression of occupation and increase the autonomy of the ISF. The MIT plan represents a marked improvement (in terms of scale) over 2004's single CAP (in Haditha that ended in July 2004), but I believe the concept of a hastened exit strategy via reduced visibility is flawed.

First, we must collectively conquer our fear that our mere presence inflames the insurgency. Senior Iraq war strategists GENs John Abizaid and George W. casey recently said that they did not want a large increase in U.S. forces, mainly because they believed that an increase would "fuel the insurgency by reinforcing the perception among Iraqis of the Americans as occupiers."2 However, the problem lies not in numbers but in tactics and strategy. A minimized presence that relies on the developing ISF and a redeveloping police force—both of which remain hampered by infiltration, inexpensive, and lack of logistics support—has much less chance for tactical and strategic success than does a focused, robust group of Marines who make their intentions clear and earn the trust and confidence of Iraqis on a daily basis in the small towns. Hearts and minds are won in the towns, not in green zone conference rooms.

Second, as improving ISF is the first priority, the MTT mission should be more of an all-hands effort rather than relegated to less than 500 out of 20,000 Marines. Similarly, the construction of the new Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning in Quantico is a good longterm step in the broader context, but it does little to put the essential expertise into the hands of lance corporals and first lieutenants on the streets of Ramadi or Husaybah in 2006. More cultural focus is necessary before and during OIF deployments.

Third, more translators in the ranks and an improved intelligence capability are also necessities. Central Intelligence Agency or Defense Intelligence Agency liaisons in battalions/air groups/squadrons would add greatly to a neglected area, while improving morale of the undersupported Marines by proving that our intelligence agencies truly want to best and first support the warfighter at the tip of the spear, as they often claim.

Fourth, the MTT plan must also be redeveloped to fit the modern challenges presented by the transitional Iraq situation, and not remain completely ground-centric. Even though aviation has proven vital to the American mission (official sources say U.S. and coalition aircraft fly approximately 50 close air support and armed reconnaissance missions each day), there has been virtually zero integration or training between Marine aviation and ISF. As LtGen Sattler's embedded liaison teams take root this year, what role will U.S. aviation play in their support? Senior Marine leaders have stated that they fear an overreliance by ISF on U.S. firepower and logistics support, but what if that support remains critical to their success? For example, how does rotary-wing aviation reduce its presence (to minimize the occupation perception) other
than by simply not flying? And is that even an option when so many Marines on patrol and in convoys have declared that the sounds and appearance of Cobras and Hueys overhead remain undeniable deterrents to potential attackers?

Finally, Marine liaisons should be integrated not only into ISF units but must participate vigorously in the operations of the Iraqi police (IP) units as well. Ultimately, after the ISF take control of the cities and reestablish stability with our help, they too will withdraw, leaving the IP behind to maintain order. The IP will play a vital role in the establishment of a working democracy, and the Marine Corps must not discount their importance.

Improved Recruiting and Information Operations at Home

Crippling propaganda perception paranoia by the public has resulted in a lackluster information campaign on the home-front. From lance corporal heroes on "war bond" style tours to short television public service announcements, we must do better at getting our message out. Relying on mainstream media to tell our story has not worked sufficiently, and many of our Navy and Air Force brethren are perhaps more focused on countering China in 2025 than on winning in Iraq in the near term. Where political leaders have neither sufficiently convinced the public to offer sacrifices nor remain focused on mission success in Iraq, the Marine Corps must strive to make up the difference, even as we guard against prematurely eyeing an African front in the war on terror. We complain that we are at war while our Nation is not, yet we have let this happen. It is imperative to reawaken the post-11 September 2001 patriotic fervor and national sense of altruism that once energized our great country, as U.S. public support is paramount to victory.

Stop fretting over the political connotations of the current war, and highlight the real threat to our Nation to help rekindle that flame of service. The "diamond" recruiting commercial should be augmented by another effort that includes footage of the World Trade Center collapsing and Marine heroics in combat, with the simple message that "your Nation needs you to fight, now more than ever." Put simply, stop tiptoeing around the Iraq issue with the moms of America and address the reality head on. Plenty of Americans want to serve, to be part of something special, to do great things; let's be more pragmatic in our approach to give them that opportunity.

Restructured OIF Deployed Headquarters and Increased Manpower

Our current system of swapping complete MEFs and wings, with numerous individual augment quotas to fill the gaps, must be improved. As the Marine Corps mentally shifts from believing Iraq will be a short operation to accepting and planning for extended engagement, consideration should be given to restructuring Marine command organization in Iraq. A special purpose Marine air-ground task force (read Horn of Africa) semipermanently stationed in Al Anbar would provide needed continuity as the MEFs continue to rotate, and still allow flexibility for commanders, staff, and units to transition in and out of the Operating Forces effectively under a standing headquarters structure.

On a related note, the Marines are poised to lose much of their Iraq war expertise as thousands of veterans who've been on multiple combat tours are rotating out of the deployment cycle (and often out of the Corps) for the first time since OIF began. Various methods exist to sustain or increase troop levels effectively-and the first step is to ask for more money and people, keys to executing an effective CAP/MTT/oil spot strategy. Even though the President has stated repeatedly that he will send more troops if military leaders ask for them, making this request is no simple task, and it is understandably difficult for A Message to Garcia fans to ask for more (particularly when one of the Corps' mantras is "doing more with less"). Nevertheless, winning in Iraq sooner vice later requires additional forces, as unpleasant as that prospect is.

On Christmas Day 2005, the Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman, den Peter Pace, acknowledged on Fox News Sunday that if enemy action warrants, troop levels in Iraq could increase. In this vein, we must plan for the enemy's most dangerous course of action rather than the easiest or most desired. For example, we should be prepared to execute Operation AL F.AJR-type (Fallujah II) operations in Ramadi and Baghdad if necessary. These types of operations will not be possible without sufficient troop strength in-theater well ahead of time. In this "long war," the focus must be on victory, not just on our departure.

Contrary to popular political opinion, the Iraqi people are not counting heads. They want results. The "rejectionists," "Saddamists," and terrorists in Iraq will not become magically friendly as we reduce our deployed numbers, nor will the insurgent recruiting pool be necessarily reduced if Marines remain inside the cozy confines of Al Asad ("Camp Chocolate Cake"). Indeed, bolstering our numbers and remaining actively engaged throughout Al Anhar are hard sells to the war-wean' American public and the (Congress, but defeat is a much uglier prospect.

Conclusion
I MEF Marines recognize that they remain warfighters first, but they understand that nontraditional methods might be required to achieve victory. As in other recent conflicts, the actions of just one Marine can have significant impact—better or for worse—on the outcome of this war. Gen Charles C. Krulak's "strategic corporal" proves himself on a daily basis in the three block battlespace of Iraq.

Still, all Marines must remain vigilant against adopting a strategy of hope. Every American wants Iraq to succeed on its own; however, as ISF stand up. Marines should guard against premature "base realignment and closure" for Iraq; i.e., pulling back to firm bases before desired results have been met. It is unclear why many war planners seem convinced that the ISF and IP, with minimal armor and a hodgepodge of donated, secondhand equipment, will so easily defeat the improvised explosive device threat where U.S. forces have not. Prematurely pushing the ISF to the war on terror front could lead to an operational victory for al-Qaeda, loss of national prestige, and instability in the region. As the President made clear via the National Strategy, "Victory in Iraq is a vital U.S. interest," and "failure is not an option." Thus, it is not prudent to now bet our own country's security and future on the questionable abilities of freshmen Iraqi soldiers. Without proactive action by our own Marines, we stand poised to remain in the reactive mode and once again win all of our battles yet lose the war.

Military scholars often warn against fighting the last war, and though it is true that our military must be prepared to meet and defeat any threat across the globe, it is critical to remember that Iraq is not the last war, it is the current war—a conflict without a foregone conclusion. The Commander in Chief provided succinct guidance at North Island Naval Air Station on 30 August 2005:

If Zarqawi and bin Laden gain control of Iraq, they would create a new training ground for future terrorist attacks; they'd seize oil fields to fund their ambitions; they could recruit more terrorists by claiming an historic victory over the United States and our Coalition. Our goal is clear, as well. We will defeat the terrorists. We'll build a free Iraq that will fight terrorists instead of giving them aid and sanctuary. ... A free Iraq will show that when America gives its word, America keeps its word. ... We will stay on the offensive. We will stand with the people of Iraq, and we will prevail. ... In this war, some of our best citizens have made the ultimate sacrifice ... we will honor their sacrifice by completing the mission and laying the foundation for peace.

Whether one believes that America should have entered Iraq in the first place is largely irrelevant now. We are there, the enemy is there, and we must win. Today, there can be no doubt. This war is not a mistake. This war is our calling. This war will be won by America, and United States Marines will continue to lead the way.

SIDEBAR

We must also do more than positively influence Iraqi civilians and maintain the sustained support of the American people.

SIDEBAR

Crippling propaganda perception paranoia by the public has resulted in a lackluster information campaign on the home-front.

SIDEBAR

... we must plan for the enemy's most dangerous course of action rather than the easiest or most desired.

FOOTNOTE

Notes

by LtCol Glen G. Butler

LtCol Huiler, formerly assigned to HMLA-169, was recently transferred to Marine Corps Air Facility Kaneohe Bay, HI. This article was his submission to the 2005 Chase Prize Essay Contest.

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Irregular Warfare in Africa

BYLINE: Boré, Henri

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ABSTRACT

The course addressed some key questions we had as young, inexperienced platoon leaders. How were we to be both riflemen and vital intelligence collectors? In other words, how do we translate otherwise imperceptible signs of changes among the population habits or individual behaviors into vital intelligence data that can alert the chain of command to anticipate the enemy's next move? How do we track guerrilla infrastructure and simultaneously run pacification programs in our areas of responsibility?

ABSTRACT

Bore discusses irregular warfare in Africa with experiences from French Marines. In light of the current focus of the US Marine Corps on Africa, it is of some interest to observe what her brothers-in-arms experienced over 40 years of irregular warfare on this continent. Teaching the US Marine's young leaders early in their careers about Africa's cultures and irregular warfare is key to mission success.

FULL TEXT

A French Marine experience.

For more than 40 years French Marines have learned the hard way the various challenges of counterinsurgency (Coin) and stability and support operations (SASO) in Africa. During this time, while training African troops and territorial militia, they were confronted with profound cultural gaps. Since the 1960s French Marines have been navigating what LtGen James N. Mattis recently termed a four block war in a hybrid war environment when their units were called upon to frequently transition from various forms of conventional operations to less usual pacification, psychological, and infor-
mation operations among African populations. In light of the current focus of the U.S. Marine Corps on Africa, it is of some interest to observe what her brothers-in-arms experienced over 40 years of irregular warfare on this continent. What kind of operational challenges did they encounter, and how did they address them?

They learned two primary lessons. First, irregular warfare harvests leadership paradigms where "civil affairs," "psychological operations," and "intelligence" are no longer military occupational specialties but individual Marine basic combat skills, second, any type of mission can be accomplished in Africa as long as units and individuals possess an advanced operational knowledge of the local cultures, specifically knowledge of their more obscure elements. Thus, teaching their young leaders early in their careers about Africa's cultures and irregular warfare was key to mission success.

A Growing Operational Focus on Africa

It may not seem that Africa ranks with Iraq or Afghanistan as the main effort in the war on terrorism. In the post-11 September 2001 era, however, it looms on America's strategic horizon. A persistent lack of security on this continent will allow terrorist groups to use African states as operational bases. The United States and France share a common approach to address this security challenge. Through a growing cooperation with regional and pan-African organizations, both nations have built a similar policy that rests on two dominant pillars-training African forces and providing logistical support to African peacekeeping operations. In each area, a partnership with the African Union (AU) has already improved the African military capabilities through numerous assistance programs. To provide African forces with the necessary skills and resources to carry out difficult missions, Pentagon officials have secured agreements with up to 10 southern and western African nations that would allow the U.S. military to temporarily use facilities there to launch missions, train armed forces, and preposition support platforms, equipment, and supplies. Seeking a similar proactive strategy to help Africans help themselves, France has already announced it will regroup its thousands of African-based troops into three African bases that conform with three AU subregions-Senegal for western Africa, Gabon for central Africa, and Djibouti for eastern Africa.

Adjusting to new realities in the war on terrorism and facing the uncertainty of tomorrow's peace and security in Africa, the cooperation between Western and African nations will continue and grow. "Africa is everybody's problem and everybody's responsibility," warned Marine Gen James L. Jones, the commander of U.S. European Command, who also suggested that given the importance of Africa, the command may have to amend its name in the future. Marines from the Foreign Military Training Unit based at Camp Lejeune already play a significant role in training sub-Saharan military forces. More Marines will be called tomorrow either to train African forces or to achieve hybrid wars as they did in Somalia, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Congo, and Djibouti.

Learning Africa: Sooner Is Better

French Marines have repeatedly experienced irregular warfare combined with the effects of operating among the myriad cultures of Africa. It takes time to truly learn and understand a foreign culture and then determine how to apply this knowledge to all types of military operations. The sooner young French Marine leaders learned about Africa, the more confident and, ultimately, more successful they were when deployed.

Before planning for any deployment begins, platoon leaders attend an overseas operations training program. Their favorite class is about fighting irregular warfare in Africa. The course was designed to teach them how to fight an insurgency. First, they learn about the diverse African cultures, traditions, and warfighting approaches and then they are taught how to apply this knowledge to train national forces and territorial militia, as well as to win the hearts and minds of local villagers in areas of rebellions. In regard to the African forces training, they learn how to make progress with people who are not as deadline conscious as we are, who don't work in a linear fashion of schedules and planning, and who don't value controlling processes as we do. They are also taught how to maintain the fighting spirit of African units by favoring their traditional approach to warfighting, as well as keeping people from one ethnic group within the same unit in order to invest in their core lineage.

When I attended the course with the other platoon leaders of our regiment, the two initial required readings were The Seven Pillars of Wisdom by T.E. Lawrence (Doubleday, Doran, 1936) and Modern Warfare by Roger Trinquier (Praeger, 1964). The core curriculum was designed to teach us about African cultures, local intelligence collection, African approaches to warfighting, local forces' combat readiness, and African unit training. Basically, we learned to identify the various ethnic and religious forces in western Africa and the Horn of Africa and the way they influence political and social life. We were taught how to apply this knowledge to keep the initiative in Coin and SASO as well as to train African forces.
The course addressed some key questions we had as young, inexperienced platoon leaders. How were we to be both riflemen and vital intelligence collectors? In other words, how do we translate otherwise imperceptible signs of changes among the population habits or individual behaviors into vital intelligence data that can alert the chain of command to anticipate the enemy’s next move? How do we track guerrilla infrastructure and simultaneously run pacification programs in our areas of responsibility? How do we train African units and militia? How do we achieve counterinsurgency, stabilization, and peacekeeping operations in desert, tropical zones, and urban areas? How do we conduct specific tactics, techniques, and procedures, such as urban assault, checkpoint control, cordon and search, convoy protection, border control, etc? Our instructor was a colonel, a veteran from Algeria’s wars who had spent half of his career in Africa. He borrowed from T.E. Lawrence, “Messieurs, just don’t eat soup with a knife.” He showed us how cultural adjustments can reap great effectiveness—how irregular warfare harvests new leadership paradigms where civil affairs, psychological operations, and intelligence are no longer military occupational specialties but individual Marine combat skills. In retrospect, learning Africa from him gave us self-confidence and also infused us with a critical aspect of the Marine culture—agility and innovative thinking. At all levels of responsibility throughout our careers, we immeasurably benefited from these early operational teachings about African culture and irregular warfare.

Irregular Warfare and Foreign Unit Training Challenges in Africa

This colonel also nourished us with quintessential principles of irregular warfare. He reminded us to never underestimate the enemy. He was absolutely right. We applied this principle when we were confronted with an insurgency in Chad, a mutiny in the Central African Republic, a secession of warlords in Somalia, and a rebellion in Rwanda. African fighters are usually very effective on the ground. They take advantage of terrain they know by heart, and they master ancestral guerrilla and raid techniques enhanced by lethal weapons systems. Although often technologically inferior, African tribal fighters possess huge resources of creativity and remain tactically sophisticated enough to inflict heavy casualties. They deftly use the population’s support, time usually works to their advantage, and their leaders are highly motivated. So, to cut an insurgency at its roots, we searched out and destroyed supply caches and command cells, but only while simultaneously mining information and hearts and minds campaigns among the population. What we nowadays term civil affairs operations, psychological operations, and pacification were then listed as tactical tasks in our operation orders. As any Marine would do, prosecuting a four block war was integral to operations. In that respect, even Marine became a collector of crucial local intelligence. It is a combat skill as effective as innovative tactics, audacious maneuver, and marksmanship. In order to pave the way for better intelligence feedback and to prevent the creation of breeding grounds for insurgency, we worked (sometimes with interpreters) with tribal chiefs, local mayors, imams, and marabouts, providing the inhabitants with what they needed to improve their living conditions. We built schools, drilled wells, repaired bridges, and provided medical support.

Facing a Cultural Iceberg

Our overseas operations education also taught us the value of cultural adjustments while training African forces or territorial militia in west Africa and the Horn of Africa. We learned about the hidden elements of local cultures and became familiar with the iceberg metaphor, which served to remind us that knowledge of the expanse of culture that exists below the surface is key to mission success. It was an invaluable education for young Marine leaders.

African national forces usually train and fight according to Western doctrine, tactics, and staff procedures. They are disciplined troops, dedicated to protect their nation. Like Western militaries, they are proud to serve their country. This philosophy shapes the tip of the cultural iceberg. Many Africans, however, are also torn between this modernity and their cultural heritage, and therein lies much of the expanse beneath the surface. Loyalty to lineage, family, religion, and ethnic group often far outweighs allegiance to the state or national institutions. Ethnic and religious obedience, as well as caste identity, remains strong, shaping mentalities and conditioning behaviors. In that respect, Western military trainers or allied forces must keep in mind that the loyalty of some Africans to their government or to a multinational coalition is often subject to challenge that can be as sudden as it is subtle.

Many cultural gaps find their niche beneath the surface of the iceberg. Some are difficult to fathom—a company commander in Chad shooting one of his lieutenants in the head for lack of respect in front of the unit; a captain, a native of the southern part of Mauritania, paying obedience to his second lieutenant who was a member of a dominant northern Maure’s tribe; regular soldiers killing women and children execution style in Rwanda. Despite these disturbing occurrences, our training allowed us to continue to walk down these less traveled roads and find mission success by strengthening relationships with the local military and the population. We were deeply aware that cultural adjustments were vital to mission accomplishment.
Knowledge of traditions and religious beliefs, as well as hidden superstitions, is of great significance when fighting guerrillas or training African forces and territorial militia. The French Marines integrate such operational culture learning throughout their warfighting education, predeployment training, and professional military education continuum. Teaching leaders early in their careers to navigate culture, traditions, and diverse African approaches to warfare is the key to operational success on the ground. Marines, regardless of their nationality, stand ready to deploy anywhere on short notice. In irregular warfare even the least experienced is expected to react quickly and properly to turn initial suspicious or hostile populations into more cooperative assets in order to gain vital intelligence and organize chaos. Therefore, civil affairs, psychological operations, and intelligence become individual Marine basic combat skills. In Africa, as well as Iraq, Afghanistan, and many other areas of interest, the effectiveness of Marine leaders—from squad to battalion level and above—depends upon their abilities to understand and take operational advantage of the diversity of traditions, local cultures, and the way they profoundly shape wills and behaviors. Integrating irregular warfare and operational culture learning throughout the warfighting education continuum has been one of the pillars of the French Marine expeditionary culture.

FOOTNOTE

Notes
2. These assistance programs include the U.S. African Contingency Operations and Training Assistance (ACOTA) program and the French Reinforcement of African Peacekeeping Capabilities.
4. The French plan was unveiled in December 2005 at the Franco-African summit in Bamako, Mali.

by Col Henri Boré, French Marines (Ret)

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IMAGE PHOTOGRAPH, Senegalese battalion staff training before going to Darfur, Sudan.
IMAGE PHOTOGRAPH, African military going through crowd control training before deployment.
IMAGE PHOTOGRAPH, Maj Ryan Gutzweiter (right). Commanding Officer, West Africa Training Cruise 2005, meeting his counterpart before a training exercise. (Photo courtesy of the Center for Emerging Threats and Opportunities.)

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ABSTRACT
Article 22. Local forces should mirror the enemy, not ourselves. By this stage you will be working closely with local forces, training or supporting them, and building indigenous capability. The natural tendency is to build forces in our own image with the aim of eventually handing our role over to them. This is a mistake. Instead, local indigenous forces need to mirror the enemy's capabilities and seek to supplant the insurgent's role.

ABSTRACT
In the battlefield, insurgents are among the most adaptive opponents soldiers will ever face. Countering them will demand every ounce of one's intellect. Here, Kilcullen discusses the tactical fundamentals of company-level counterinsurgency which soldiers can apply to link the theory with the techniques and procedures they already know.

FULL TEXT
Fundamentals of company-level counterinsurgency.

Your company has just been warned for deployment on counterinsurgency operations in Iraq or Afghanistan. You have read David Galula, T.E. Lawrence, and Sir Robert Thompson. You have studied Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency, and now understand the history, philosophy, and theory of counterinsurgency. You watched Black Hawk Down and The Battle of Algiers, and you know this will be the most difficult challenge of your life. But what does all of the theory mean at the company level? How do the principles translate into action-at night, with the global positioning system down, the media criticizing you, the locals complaining in a language you don't understand, and an unseen enemy killing your people by ones and twos? How does counterinsurgency actually happen?

There are no universal answers, and insurgents are among the most adaptive opponents you will ever face. Countering them will demand every ounce of your intellect. But be comforted; you are not the first to feel this way. There are tactical fundamentals you can apply to link the theory with the techniques and procedures you already know.

What Is Counterinsurgency?

If you have not studied counterinsurgency theory, here it is in a nutshell. It is a competition with the insurgent for the right and the ability to win the hearts, minds, and acquiescence of the population. You are being sent in because the insurgents, at their strongest, can defeat anything weaker than you. But you have more combat power than you can or should use in most situations. Injudicious use of firepower creates blood feuds, homeless people, and societal disruption that fuels and perpetuates the insurgency. The most beneficial actions are often local politics, civic action, and beat-cop behaviors. For your side to win, the people do not have to like you, but they must respect you, accept that your actions benefit them, and trust your integrity and ability to deliver on promises, particularly regarding their security. In this battlefield, popular perceptions and rumor are more influential than the facts and more powerful than 100 tanks.
Within this context, what follows are observations from collective experience—the distilled essence of what those who went before you learned. They are expressed as commandments, for clarity, but are really more like folklore. Apply them judiciously and skeptically.

Preparation

Time is short during predeployment, but you will never have more time to think than you have now. Now is your chance to prepare yourself and your command.

Article 1. Know your turf. Know the people, topography, economy, history, religion, and culture. Know every village, road, field, population group, tribal leader, and ancient grievance. Your task is to become the world expert on your district. If you don’t know precisely where you will be operating, study the general area. Read the map like a book; study it every night before sleep, and redraw it from memory every morning until you understand its patterns intuitively. Develop a mental model of your area—a framework in which to fit every new piece of knowledge you acquire. Study handover notes from predecessors; better still, get in touch with the unit in-theater and pick their brains. In an ideal world, intelligence officers and area experts would brief you. This rarely happens. Even if it does, there is no substitute for personal mastery. Understand the broader “area of influence.” This can be a wide area, particularly when insurgents draw on “global” grievances. Share aspects of the operational area among platoon leaders and noncommissioned officers; have each individual develop a personal specialization and brief the others. Neglect this knowledge and it will kill you.

Article 2. Diagnose the problem. Once you know your area and its people, you can begin to diagnose the problem. Who are the insurgents? What drives them? What makes local leaders tick? Counterinsurgency is fundamentally a competition between many groups, each seeking to mobilize the population in support of their agenda. Counterinsurgency is always more than two sided, so you must understand what motivates the people and how to mobilize them. You need to know why and how the insurgents are getting followers. This means you need to know your real enemy, not a cardboard cutout. The enemy is adaptive, resourceful, and probably grew up in the region where you will operate. The locals have known him since he was a boy. How long have they known you? Your worst opponent is not the psychopathic terrorist of Hollywood; it is the charismatic “follow me” warrior who would make your best platoon leader. His followers are not misled or naïve. Much of his success is due to bad government policies or security forces that alienate the population. Work this problem collectively with your platoon and squad leaders. Discuss ideas, explore the problem, understand what you are lacing, and seek a consensus. If this sounds “unmilitary,” get over it. Once you are in-theater, situations will arise too quickly for orders or even commander’s intent. Corporals and privates will have to make snap judgments with strategic impact. The only way to help them is to give them a shared understanding, then trust them to think for themselves on the day.

Article 3. Organize for intelligence. In counterinsurgency, killing the enemy is easy. Finding him is often nearly impossible. Intelligence and operations are complementary. Your operations will he intelligence driven, but intelligence will come mostly from your own operations, not as a “product” prepared and sen-ed up by higher headquarters. So you must organize for intelligence. You will need a company S-2 intelligence section—including analysts. You may need platoon S-2s and S-3s (operations), and you will need a reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) element. You will not have enough linguists—you never do—but consider carefully where best to employ them. Linguists are battle-winning assets, but like any other scarce resource, you must have a prioritized “hump plan” in case you lose them. Often during predeployment preparations the best use of linguists is to train your command in basic language skills. You will probably not get augmentation for all of this, but you must still do it. Put the smartest Marines in the S-2 section and the R&S squad. You will have one less rifle squad, but the intelligence section will pay for itself in lives and effort saved.

Article 4. Organize for interagency operations. Almost everything in counterinsurgency is interagency. And even-thing important—from policing to intelligence to civil—military operations to trash collection—will involve your company working with civilian actors and local indigenous partners you cannot control but whose success is essential for yours. Train the company in interagency operations. Get briefings from the State Department, aid agencies, and the local police or fire-brigade. Train point men in each squad to deal with the interagency. Realize that civilians find rifles, helmets, and body armor intimidating. Learn how not to scare them. Ask others who come from that country or culture about your ideas. See it through the eyes of a civilian who knows nothing about the military. How would you react if foreigners came to your neighborhood and conducted the operations you planned? What if somebody came to your mother’s house and did that? Most importantly, know that your operations will create temporary breathing space, but long-term development and stabilization by civilian agencies will ultimately win the war.

Article 5. Travel light and harden four combat service support (CSS). You will be weighed down with body armor, rations, extra ammunition, communications gear, and 1,000 other things. The enemy will carry a rifle or rocket propelled
grenade, a shemagh (a traditional Arab head scarf worn as protection from bright sunlight, sun glare, and blowing sand in the desert), and a water bottle if he is lucky. Unless you ruthlessly lighten your load and enforce a culture of speed and mobility, the insurgents will consistently outrun and outmaneuver you. But in lightening your load, make sure you can always "reach back" to call for firepower or heavy support if needed. Also, remember to harden your CSS. The enemy will attack your weakest points. Most attacks on coalition forces in Iraq in 2004 and 2005, outside of preplanned combat actions like the two battles of Fallujah or Operation IRON HORSK, were against CSS installations and convoys. You do the math. Ensure that your CSS assets are hardened, have communications, and are trained in combat operations. They may do more fighting than your rifle squads.

Article 6. Find a political/cultural adviser. In a force optimized for counterinsurgency, you might receive a political/cultural adviser at company level—a diplomat or military foreign area officer who is able to speak the language and navigate the intricacies of local politics. Back on planet Karth, the division commander will get a political/cultural adviser. You will not, so you must improvise. Find a political/cultural adviser from among your people, perhaps an officer, perhaps not. (see Article 8.) Someone with people skills and a "feel" for the environment will do better than a political science graduate. Don't try to be your own cultural adviser. You must be fully aware of the political and cultural dimension, but this is a different task. Also, don't give one of your intelligence people this role. They can help, but their task is to understand the environment. The political adviser's job is to help shape it.

Article 7. I ruin the squad leaders and then trust them. Counterinsurgency is a squad and platoon leader's war, and often a private Marine's war. Battles are won or lost in moments. Whoever can bring combat power to bear in seconds on a street corner will win. The commander on the spot controls the fight. You must train the squad leaders to act intelligently and independently without orders. If your squad leaders are competent, you can get away with average company or platoon staffs. The reverse is not the case. Training should focus on basic skills—marksmanship, patrolling, security on the move and at the halt, and basic drills. When in doubt, spend less time on company and platoon training and more time on squad training. Ruthlessly replace leaders who do not make the grade. But once people are trained, and you have a shared operational "diagnosis," you must trust them. We talk about this, but few company or platoon leaders really trust their people. In counterinsurgency, you have no choice.

Article 8. Rank is nothing; talent is everything. Not everyone is good at counterinsurgency. Many people don't understand the concept, and some who do can't execute it. It is difficult, and in a conventional force only a few people will master it. Anyone can learn the basics, but a few "naturals" do exist. Learn how to spot these people and put them in positions where they can make a difference. Rank matters far less than talent; a few good men under a smart junior noncommissioned officer can succeed in counterinsurgency where hundreds of well-armed Marines under a mediocre senior officer will fail.

Article 9. Have a game plan. The final preparation task is to develop a game plan—a mental picture of how you see the operation developing. You will be tempted to try to do this too early. But wait. As your knowledge improves, you will get a better idea of what needs to be done and of your own limitations. Like any plan, this plan will change once you hit the ground and may need to be scrapped if there is a major shift in the environment. But you still need a plan, and the process of planning will give you a simple, robust idea of what to achieve, even if the methods change. This is sometimes called "operational design." One approach is to identify basic stages in your operation. For example, establish dominance, build local networks, and marginalize the enemy. Make sure you can easily transition between phases, both forward and backward in case of setbacks. Just as the insurgent can adapt his activity to your operational "diagnosis," you must trust them. We talk about this, but few company or platoon leaders really trust their people. In counterinsurgency, you have no choice.

The Golden Hour

You have deployed, completed reception and staging, and (if you are lucky) attended the in-country counterinsurgency school. Now it is time to enter your sector and start your tour. This is the golden hour. Mistakes made now will haunt you for the rest of the tour, while early successes will set the tone for victory. You will look back on your early actions and cringe at your clumsiness. So be it, but you must act.

Article 10. Be there. The first rule of deployment in counterinsurgency is to be there. You can almost never outrun the enemy. If you are not present when an incident happens, there is usually little you can do about it. So your first order of business is to establish presence. If you cannot do this throughout your sector, then do it wherever you can. Establishing presence demands a residential approach—living in your sector, in close proximity to the population, rather than raiding into the area from remote, secure bases. Movement on foot, sleeping in local villages, night patrolling, all of these seem more dangerous than they are. These actions establish links with the locals who see you as real people they can trust and
do business with, not as aliens who descend from an armored box. Driving around in an armored convoy—day-tripping like a tourist in hell-degrades situational awareness, makes you a target, and is ultimately more dangerous.

Article 11. Avoid knee-jerk responses to first impressions. Don't act rashly; get the facts first. The violence you see may be part of the insurgent strategy, it may be various interest groups fighting it out, or it may be people settling personal vendettas. Or, it may just be daily life. "Normality" in Kandahar is not the same as in Kansas. So you need time to learn what normality looks like. The insurgent commander also wants to goad you into lashing out at the population or making a mistake. Unless you happen to be on the spot when an incident occurs, you will have only secondhand reports and may misunderstand the local context or interpretation. This fragmentation and "disaggregation" of the battlefield—particularly in urban areas—means that first impressions are often highly misleading. Of course, you cannot avoid making judgments. But if possible, check them with an older hand or a trusted local. If you can, keep one or two officers from your predecessor unit for the first part of the tour. Try to avoid a rush to judgment.

Article 12. Prepare for handover from day one. Believe it or not, you will not resolve the insurgency on your watch. Your tour will end, and your successors will need your corporate knowledge. Start handover folders, in every platoon and specialist squad, from day one. Ideally, you would have inherited these from your predecessors, but if not, you must start them. The folders should include lessons learned, details about the population, village and patrol reports, updated maps, photographs—anything that will help newcomers master the environment. Computerized databases are fine, but keep good backups and ensure that you have a hard copy of key artifacts and documents. This is boring, tedious, and essential. Over time you will create a corporate memory that keeps your people alive.

Article 13. Build trusted networks. Once you have settled into your sector, your next task is to build trusted networks. This is the true meaning of the phrase "hearts and minds," which comprises two separate components. "Hearts" means persuading people that their best interests are served by your success; "minds" means convincing them that you can protect them and that resisting you is pointless. Note that neither concept has to do with whether people like you. Calculated self-interest, not emotion, is what counts. Over time, if you successfully build networks of trust, these will grow like roots into the population, displacing the enemy's networks, bringing him out into the open to fight you, and seizing the initiative. These networks include local allies, community leaders, local security forces, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and other friendly or neutral nonstate actors in your area, and the media. Conduct village and neighborhood surveys to identify needs in the community and then follow through to meet them, build common interests, and mobilize popular support. This is your true main effort; everything else is secondary. Actions that help build trusted networks serve your cause. Actions—even killing high-profile targets—that undermine trust or disrupt your networks help the enemy.

Article 14. Start easy. If you were trained in maneuver warfare you know about surfaces and gaps. This theory applies to counterinsurgency as much as any other form of maneuver. Don't try to crack the hardest nut first. Don't go straight for the main insurgent stronghold, try to provoke a decisive showdown, or focus efforts on villages that support the insurgents. Instead, start from secure areas and work gradually outward. Do this by extending your influence through the locals' own networks. Go with, not against, the grain of local society. First win the confidence of a few villages and then see with whom they trade, intermarry, or do business. Now win these people over. Soon enough the showdown with the insurgents will come. But now you have local allies, a mobilized population, and a trusted network at your back. Do it the other way around and no one will mourn your failure.

Article 15. Seek early victories. In this early phase your aim is to stamp your dominance in your sector. Do this by seeking an early victory. This will probably not translate into a combat victory over the enemy. Looking for such a victory can be overly aggressive and create collateral damage, especially since you really do not yet understand your sector. Also, such a combat victory depends on the enemy being stupid enough to present you with a clear-cut target, a rare windfall in counterinsurgency. Instead, you may achieve a victory by resolving longstanding issues your predecessors have failed to address or co-opting a key local leader who has resisted cooperation with your forces. Like any other form of armed propaganda, achieving even a small victory early in the tour sets the tone for what comes later and helps seize the initiative, which you have probably lost due to the inevitable hiatus entailed by the handover/takeover with your predecessor.

Article 16. Practice deterrent patrolling. Establish patrolling methods that deter the enemy from attacking you. Often our patrolling approach seems designed to provoke, then defeat, enemy attacks. This strategy is counterproductive; it leads to a raiding, day-tripping mindset or, worse, a bunker mentality. Instead, practice deterrent patrolling. There are many methods for deterrent patrolling, including "multiple" patrolling where you flood an area with numerous small patrols working together. Each is too small to be a worthwhile target, and the insurgents never know where all of the patrols are, making an attack on any one patrol extremely risky. Other methods include so-called "blue-green" patrolling where you mount daylight overt humanitarian patrols that go covert at night and hunt specific targets. Again, the aim is to keep the
enemy off balance and the population reassured through constant and unpredictable activity that, over time, deters attacks and creates a more permissive environment. A reasonable rule of thumb is that one- to two-thirds of your force should be on patrol at any time, day or night.

Article 17. Be prepared for setbacks. Setbacks are normal in counterinsurgency, as in every other form of war. You will make mistakes, lose people, or occasionally kill or detain the wrong person. You may fail in building or expanding networks. If this happens, don't lose heart. Simply drop back to the previous phase of your game plan and recover your balance. It is normal in company counterinsurgency operations for some platoons to be doing well, while others do badly. This is not necessarily evidence of failure. Give local commanders the freedom to adjust their posture to local conditions. This freedom creates elasticity that helps you survive setbacks.

Article 18. Remember the global audience. One of the biggest differences between the counterinsurgencies our fathers fought and those we face today is the omnipresence of globalized media. Most houses in Iraq have one or more satellite dishes. Web bloggers; print, radio, and television reporters; and others are monitoring and commenting on your every move. When the insurgents ambush your patrols or set off a car bomb, they do so not to destroy one more track, but because they want graphic images of a burning vehicle and dead bodies for the evening news. Beware of the "scripted enemy" who plays to a global audience and seeks to defeat you in the court of global public opinion. You counter this tactic by training people to always bear in mind the global audience, assume that everything they say or do will be publicized, and befriend the media. Document everything you do. Have a video or photographic record, or an independent witness, wherever possible. This documentation makes it harder for the enemy to put negative "spin" on your actions with disinformation. Get the press on your side, help them get their story, and trade information with them. Good relationships with nonembedded media—especially indigenous media—dramatically increase your situational awareness and help get your message across to the global and local audience.

Article 19. Engage the women; beware of the children. Most insurgent fighters are men. But in traditional societies, women are hugely influential in forming the social networks that insurgents use for support. Co-opting neutral or friendly women through targeted social and economic programs builds networks of enlightened self-interest that eventually undermine the insurgents. You need your own female counterinsurgents, including interagency people, to do this effectively. Win the women and you own the family unit. Own the family and you take a big step forward in mobilizing the population. Conversely, though, stop your people from fraternizing with local children. Your troops are homesick; they want to drop their guard with the kids. But children are sharp-eyed, lacking in empathy, and willing to commit atrocities that their elders would shrink from. The insurgents are watching. They will notice a growing friendship between one of your people and a local child and either harm the child as punishment or use him against you. Similarly, stop throwing candies or presents to children. It attracts them to your vehicles, creates crowds the enemy can exploit, and leads to children being run over. Harden your heart and keep the children at arm's length.

Article 20. Take stock regularly. You probably already know that a "body count" tells you little, because you usually cannot know how many insurgents there were to start with, how many moved into the area, how many transferred from ant status, or how many new fighters the conflict has created. But you still need to develop metrics early in the tour and refine them as the operation progresses. They should cover a range of social, informational, military, and economic issues. Use metrics intelligently to form an overall impression of progress—not in a mechanical "traffic light" fashion. Typical metrics include percentage of engagements initiated by our forces versus those initiated by insurgents, longevity of friendly local leaders in positions of authority, number and quality of tipoffs on insurgent activity that originate spontaneously from the population, and economic activity at markets and shops. These mean virtually nothing as a snapshot. Trends over time are the true indicators of progress in your sector.

Groundhog Day

Now you are in "steady state." You are established in your sector, and people are settling into that "groundhog day" mentality that hits every unit at some stage during every tour. It will probably take people at least the first third of the tour to become effective in the environment, if not longer. Then in the last period you will struggle against the short-timer mentality. So this middle part of the tour is the most productive. But keeping the flame alive and bringing the local population along with you takes immense leadership.

Article 21. Exploit a "single narrative." Since counterinsurgency is a competition to mobilize popular support, it pays to know how people are mobilized. In most societies there are opinion-makers—local leaders, pillars of the community, religious figures, media personalities, and others who set trends and influence public perceptions. This influence—including the pernicious influence of the insurgents—often takes the form of a single narrative—a simple, unifying, easily expressed story or explanation that organizes people's experience and provides a framework for understanding events. Nationalist
and ethnic historical myths, or sectarian creeds, provide such a narrative. The Iraqi insurgents have one, as do al-Qaeda and the Taliban. To undercut their influence you must exploit an alternative narrative, or better yet, tap into an existing narrative that excludes the insurgents. This narrative is often worked out for you by higher headquarters, but only you have the detailed knowledge to tailor the narrative to local conditions and generate leverage from it. For example, you might use a nationalist narrative to marginalize foreign fighters in your area, or a narrative of national redemption to undermine former regime elements that have been terrorizing the population. At the company level you do this in baby steps by getting to know local opinion makers, winning their trust, learning what motivates them, and building on this trust to find a single narrative that emphasizes the inevitability and rightness of your ultimate success. This is art, not science.

Article 22. Local forces should mirror the enemy, not ourselves. By this stage you will be working closely with local forces, training or supporting them, and building indigenous capability. The natural tendency is to build forces in our own image with the aim of eventually handing our role over to them. This is a mistake. Instead, local indigenous forces need to mirror the enemy’s capabilities and seek to supplant the insurgent’s role. This does not mean they should be “irregular” in the sense of being brutal or outside proper control. Rather, they should move, equip, and organize like the insurgents but have access to your support and be under the firm control of their parent societies. Combined with a mobilized population and trusted networks, this allows local forces to “hardware” the enemy out of the environment, under top cover from you. At the company level, this means that raising, training, and employing local indigenous auxiliary forces (police and military) are valid tasks. These tasks require high-level clearance, of course, but if support is given, you should establish a company training cell. Platoons should aim to train one local squad and then use that squad as a nucleus for a partner platoon. Company headquarters should train an indigenous leadership team. This mirrors the “growth” process of other trusted networks and tends to emerge naturally as you win local allies who want to take up arms in their own defense.

Article 23. Practice armed civil affairs. Counterinsurgency is armed social work, an attempt to redress basic social and political problems while being shot at. This situation makes civil affairs a central counterinsurgency activity, not an afterthought. It is how you restructure the environment to displace the enemy from it. In your company sector, civil affairs must focus on meeting basic needs first and then progress up Abraham Maslow’s hierarchy of needs as each successive need is met. A series of village or neighborhood surveys, regularly updated, is an invaluable tool to help understand the population’s needs and track progress in meeting them over time. You need intimate cooperation with interagency partners here-national, international, and local. You will not be able to control these partners. Many NGOs, for example, do not want to be too closely associated with you because they need to preserve their perceived neutrality. Instead, you need to work on a shared diagnosis of the problem, building a consensus that helps you self-synchronize. Your role is to provide protection, identify needs, facilitate civil affairs, and use improvements in social conditions as leverage to build networks and mobilize the population. Thus, there is no such thing as impartial humanitarian assistance or civil affairs in counterinsurgency. Every time you help someone, you hurt someone else—not the least the insurgents. So civil and humanitarian assistance personnel will be targeted. Protecting them is a matter not only of close-in defense, but also of creating a permissive operating environment by co-opting the beneficiaries of aid-local communities and leaders-to help you help them.

Article 24. Small is beautiful. Another natural tendency is to go for large-scale, mass programs. In particular, we have a tendency to template ideas that succeed in one area and transplant them into another, and we tend to take small programs that work and try to replicate them on a larger scale. Again, this strategy is usually a mistake. Often programs succeed because of specific local conditions of which we are unaware, or because their very smallness kept them below the enemy’s radar and helped them flourish unmolested. At the company level, programs that succeed in one district often also succeed in another (because the overall company sector is small), but small scale projects rarely proceed smoothly into large programs. Keep programs small. Small scale makes them cheap, sustainable, low key, and (importantly) recoverable if they fail. You can add new programs-also small-cheap, and tailored to local conditions as the situation allows.

Article 25. Fight the enemy’s strategy, not his forces. At this stage, if things are proceeding well, the insurgents will go over to the offensive. Yes, the offensive because you have created a situation so dangerous to the insurgents, by threatening to displace them from the environment, that they have to attack you and the population to get back into the game. Thus it is normal, even in the most successful operations, to have spikes of offensive insurgent activity late in the campaign. This activity does not necessarily mean you have done something wrong (though it may-it depends on whether you have successfully mobilized the population). At this point the tendency is to go for the jugular and seek to destroy the enemy’s forces in open battle. This strategy is rarely the best choice at the company level, because provoking major combat usually plays into the enemy’s hands by undermining the population’s confidence. Instead, attack the enemy’s strategy. If he is seeking to recapture the allegiance of a segment of the local population, then co-opt them against him. If
he is trying to provoke a sectarian conflict, go over to "peace enforcement mode." The permutations are endless, but the principle is the same-fight the enemy's strategy, not his forces.

Article 26. Build your own solution-only attack the enemy when he gets in the way. Try not to be distracted or forced into a series of reactive moves by a desire to kill or capture the insurgents. Your aim should be to implement your own solution-the game plan you developed early in the campaign and then refined through interaction with local partners. Your approach must be environment-centric (based on dominating the whole district and implementing a solution to its systemic problems) rather than enemy-centric. This means that, particularly late in the campaign, you may need to learn to negotiate with the enemy. Members of the population that support you also know the enemy's leaders (they may have grown up together in the small district that is now your company sector), and valid negotiating partners sometimes emerge as the campaign progresses. Again, you need close interagency relationships to exploit opportunities to co-opt segments of the enemy. This helps you wind down the insurgency without alienating potential local allies who have relatives or friends in the insurgent movement. At this stage, a defection is better than a surrender, a surrender is better than a capture, and a capture is better than a kill.

Getting Short

Time is short, and the tour is drawing to a close. The key problem now is keeping your people focused, preventing them from dropping their guard, and maintaining the rage on all of the multifarious programs, projects, and operations that you have started. In this final phase, the previous articles still stand, but there is an important new one.

Article 27. Keep your extraction plan secret. The temptation to talk about home becomes almost unbearable toward the end of a tour. The locals know you are leaving and probably have a better idea than you of the generic extraction plan. Remember, they have seen units come and go. But you must protect the specific details of the extraction plan, or the enemy will use this time as an opportunity to score a high-profile hit, recapture the population's allegiance by scare tactics that convince them they will not be protected once you leave, or persuade them that your successor unit will be oppressive or incompetent. Keep the details secret, within a tightly controlled compartment in your headquarters. And resist the temptation to say goodbye to local allies. You can always send a postcard from home.

Four 'What Ifs'

The articles above describe what should happen, but we all know that things go wrong. Here are some "what ifs" to consider.

What if you get moved to a different area? You prepared for Ramadi and studied Dulaim tribal structures and Sunni beliefs. Now you are going to Najaf and will be surrounded by al-Hassan and Unizzah tribes and Shi'a communities. But that work was not wasted. In mastering your first area, you learned techniques you can apply-how to "case" an operational area or how to decide what matters in the local societal structure. Do the same again. This time the process is easier and faster. You have an existing mental structure and can focus on what is different. The same applies if you get moved frequently within a battalion or brigade area.

What if higher headquarters doesn't "get" counterinsurgency? Higher headquarters is telling you that the mission is to "kill terrorists" or is pushing for high-speed armored patrols and a base camp mentality. They just do not seem to understand counterinsurgency. This is not uncommon since company grade officers today often have more combat experience than senior officers. In this case, just do what you can. Try not to create expectations that higher headquarters will not let you meet. Apply the adage "first do no harm." Over time you will find ways to do what you have to do. But never lie to higher headquarters about your locations or activities. They own the indirect fires.

What if you have no resources? Yours is a low-priority sector. You have no linguists, the aid agencies have no money for projects in your area, and you have a low priority for funding. You can still get things done, but you need to focus on self-reliance, keeping things small and sustainable, and ruthlessly prioritize effort. Local community leaders are your allies. They know what matters to them more than you do. Be honest with them, discuss possible projects and options with community leaders, and get them to choose what their priorities are. Often they will find the translators, building supplies, or expertise that you need and will only expect your support and protection in making their projects work. And the process of negotiation and consultation will help mobilize their support and strengthen their social cohesion. If you set your sights on what is achievable, the situation can still work.

What if the theater situation shifts under your feet? It is your worst nightmare. Everything has gone well in your sector, but the whole theater situation has changed and invalidates your efforts. Think of the first battle of Fallujah, the al-Askariya shrine bombing, or the Sadr uprising. What do you do? Here is where having a flexible, adaptive game plan...
comes in. Just as the insurgents drop down to a lower posture when things go wrong, now is the time to drop back a stage, consolidate, regain your balance, and prepare to expand again when the situation allows. But, see Article 28. If you cede the initiative, you must regain it as soon as the situation allows, or you will eventually lose.

Conclusion

This then is the tribal wisdom, the folklore that those who went before you have learned. Like any folklore it needs interpretation and contains seemingly contradictory advice. Over time, as you apply unremitting intellectual effort to study your sector, you will learn to apply these ideas in your own way and will add to this store of wisdom from your own observations and experience. So only one article remains. If you remember nothing else, remember this one.

Article 28. Whatever else you do, keep the initiative. In counterinsurgency, the initiative is everything. If the enemy is reacting to you, you control the environment. Provided you mobilize the population, you will win. If you are reacting to the enemy—even if you are killing or capturing him in large numbers—then he is controlling the environment, and you will eventually lose. In counterinsurgency, the enemy initiates most attacks, targets you unexpectedly, and withdraws too fast for you to react. Do not be drawn into purely reactive operations. Focus on the population, build your own solution, further your game plan, and fight the enemy only when he gets in the way. This strategy gains and keeps the initiative.

* Author's Note: This article reflects the author's personal judgments and does not represent the views of any department or agency of the U.S. Government or any other government. This article was written from field notes compiled in Baghdad, Taji, and Kuwait City in 2006.

** Editor's Note: A similar version of this article has recently been published by the Military Review.

SIDEBAR

In this battlefield, popular perceptions and rumor are more influential than the facts and more powerful than 100 tanks.

SIDEBAR

Unless you ruthlessly lighten your load and enforce a culture of speed and mobility, the insurgents will consistently outrun and outmaneuver you.

SIDEBAR

Good relationships with nonembedded media—especially indigenous media—dramatically increase your situational awareness and help get your message across to the global and local audience.

SIDEBAR

. . . local indigenous forces need to mirror the enemy's capabilities and seek to supplant the insurgent's role.

SIDEBAR

Be honest with them, discuss possible projects and options with community leaders, and get them to choose what their priorities are.

by LTC David Kilcullen, Australian Army

*TC Kilrullen sen'd 21 years in the Australian Army; commanded an infantry company on counterinsurgency operations in East Timor; taught tactics on the Platoon Commanders’ Battle Course, British School of Infantry; served in peace operations in Cyprus and Bougainville; was a military advisor to Indonesian Special Forces; and trained and led Timorese irregulars. He was a special adviser for irregular warfare to the 2005 U.S. Quadrennial Defense Review. He is currently seconded to the U.S. Stale Department as Chief Strategist, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism and remains a Reserve lieutenant colonel in the Australian Army.

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The articles on Marine Corps combat engineers in the June Gazette were of particular interest to me since, when enlisted, I served in Headquarters and Service Co, 2d Engineer Bn, 2d MarDiv (as a sergeant), and 4 years later, after being recalled to active duty and commissioned as second lieutenant (5th Special Basic Class), I served as a platoon leader in Korea (1951-52) in Co C, 1st Engineer Bn, 1st MarDiv. In addition to mine clearing (mostly by "probing" with bayonets since both antipersonnel and antitank mines were made of wood and plastic and could not be detected otherwise), road construction, bridge building (Co C built a 240-foot Bailey bridge over the Soyang-gang), and preparation/fortification of outposts, we also worked closely with the 1st Tank Battalion by winching tanks up Hills 812 and 884 with our bulldozers.

Twenty-Eight Articles

LTC David Kilcullen, Australian Army, has done an outstanding job in providing a blueprint for company-level counterinsurgency operations in "Twenty-Eight Articles" (MCG, Jul06). Hopefully, it will be studied carefully up and down the chain of command. His definition of counterinsurgency, "armed social work," is right on point. Marines are being asked to operate like "cops on the beat" in hostile circumstances. That's quite a bit different than being a disciplined assault force.

The need for 28 articles to guide company-level activity says a lot about the complexities involved. And doing it right is a dicey proposition at best, particularly since being an "occupying force" has never been a core capability of the Marine Corps-and rightfully so. That makes Kilcullen's work all the more important as we enter the "end game" phase of the second Iraq conflict.

Lewis J. Kleinrock

Every Marine Is a Rifleman
"Every Marine is a rifleman" is a saying that Marines hear starting from basic training throughout their careers, whether enlisted or commissioned. This statement is as true today as it was during previous years. Recently I attended the Sergeant's Course where we learned everything from administration to writing and executing patrol orders. The thing that stuck with me the most after graduating was that other sergeants with whom I attended the course did not know basic infantry skills. Many of them didn't know or want to know these skills. The common response among the students when learning different infantry skills was, "I’m not a grunt. Why should I know this?"

A large majority of these skills are perishable and need refresher training. The time to pick up a rifle and use it isn't when it's time to requalify. Immediate action drills should apply to every MOS, not just the 0300 field. If units do have standing operating procedures established, then the training schedule should be tailored to include time for classes and practical application.

My questions are these when did MOS-specific training phase out common skills training, and why are there sergeants and corporals who don't want to learn these combat skills or teach them to their junior Marines?

Sgt Mark R. Smith

Historical Hoax

Regarding "A Historical Hoax" by Col F. Brooke Nihart, USMC(Ret) (MCG, Jul06), I'm glad to read that there were other "hoaxers" in the Corps. Col Jake Shriver and I were lieutenants in Peking, China in 1945. One of our favorite sports was to start a rumor at breakfast and then see if we could recognize it at suppertime. There were some lulus, some hardly recognizable. It is nice to know that Col Heinl enjoyed the same sport.

MGySgt J.R. Todd, USMC(Ret)

SNCOs

Here is a surprising occurrence. The July Gazette had articles by a first sergeant and a gunnery sergeant, plus letters to the editor from four master gunnery sergeants, one first sergeant, one Army master sergeant, and two former enlisted Marines. What other Service professional journal can expect those kinds of submissions from its vitally important SNCOs? Just the Corps.

Col J. Angus MacDonald, USMC(Ret)

Respect for the Flag

In his letter, "Foreign Advisors" (MCG, Jul06), J.B. Hollingsworth calls attention to a photograph of Marines displaying a flag that has been written upon. Regrettably, defacing the U.S. flag has become popular.

Although proscribed under section 4 (Disrespect to the Flag) of Public Law 94-344, U.S. Flag Code, flags superimposed with various images and slogans, and items such as pillows, blankets, clothing, stationary, etc. made in the image of the flag, are marketed under the protection of the First Amendment. Some veterans' organizations sell these novelties and allow the flag to be used in advertisements in their magazines. They print photographs of members wearing or displaying the flag inappropriately and yet claim to support a flag amendment.

The President, who could change the U.S. Flag Code by proclamation, simply ignores it when he autographs U.S. flags. Members of a Marine coordinating council recently signed their names to flags to be sent to mothers of fallen Marines. A Marine general even wore a flag shirt to a public ceremony recently. Lack of proper respect for our national ensign has become so common that many of us have habituated to the myriad improprieties. Knowledge and adherence to traditional flag protocols is no longer an institutional value embraced by Marines.

Mr. Hollingsworth states, "...Marines set the example for all Americans." Shouldn't we be setting a better example of restoring respect for our flag?

LtCol John Moisuk, USMC(Ret)

Cohesion

In the July 2006 editorial Col John P. Glasgow Jr. writes about how difficult it is to obtain unit cohesion. In the same issue 1stSgt Douglas E. Berry Jr.'s "Battle Drills" addresses the importance of battle drills to enhance your skills in order to function as a cohesive unit in combat.
When the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade deployed to Korea in July 1950, much was said about how understrength the 5th Marines was since it deployed with two rifle companies, a weapons company, and a headquarters and service company in each infantry battalion. What has hardly ever been mentioned is the fact that the brigade was formed in 9 days with troops from other division units and from posts and stations from west of the Mississippi River. Therefore, we did not have the luxury of having at least one field exercise before we sailed out of San Diego. The thinking then was that we were going to Japan to train and await the arrival of our third rifle company before we deployed to Korea. Sadly, that never came to be because of the deteriorating situation at the Pusan Perimeter in South Korea. Our third rifle company never joined up with us until the Inchon landing.

Since we were constantly assigned to working parties while the brigade was forming in Camp Pendleton, we got acquainted with each other aboard ship while underway to Korea, and the first time that we operated together as a unit was in a combat situation. Due to the superb leadership of our officers and SNCOs (most of them World War II veterans), we attained our unit cohesion and battle skills while actually engaged against a very formidable and battle-tested North Korean People's Army. History records that we did quite well despite the fact that we virtually had one hand tied behind our backs because of the absence of our third rifle company in each battalion. Hopefully future troop deployments will never have to live through that experience again.

1stSgt V.U. Yreugas, USMC(Ret)

Your unit cohesion editorial took me back to my first tour after finishing The Basic School (TBS), in the old transplacement battalion system. The outgoing tour was wonderful-stable, progressive, training priorities. It was great. The stateside tour was not so great-schools, fleet assistance program, understrength, training aids for higher headquarters. At the right time in the cycle we had been potent, until we started to take casualties. When taking casualties the cohesion is built on shared interest in survival. World War II units had turnovers that would defect any manpower scheme, and that was when they were there for the duration. In Vietnam we didn't have the casualty turnovers, so we came up with a 6-month rotation inside a 12-month rotation with time off for Purple Hearts.

I think Marine cohesion comes from boot camp, TBS, and our heritage. Companies find cohesion through the eagle, globe, and anchor-Marine values, Marine standards, Marine commitment, and standard units.

Col Gordon D. Batcheller, USMC(Ret)

LtCol David Ottignon's article, "Engineers at the Crossroads" (MCG, Jun06), is spot on. There is a relatively straightforward way to help solve one of the problems, however.

The current shortage of division combat engineer platoons could be partially relieved by realigning the five line platoons and headquarters of Combat Engineer Company (CEC), Combat Assault Battalion, 3d MarDiv in Okinawa. Two of the line platoons, the support platoon, and the company headquarters should be reassigned to 3d Marines in order to collocate platoons with the infantry battalions they support (as opposed to the one platoon currently in Hawaii). The other three platoons should be moved to 1st Combat Engineer Battalion's line companies in order to provide four line platoons to support the four battalions in each 1st MarDiv infantry regiment. Any resumption of infantry battalion unit deployments could include attached engineer platoons, just like a MEU battalion landing team.

Since 2001 only two platoons from CEC have deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan (once each). This number is a considerably lower combat deployment rate than nearly any unit in the Operating Forces. While CEC has provided a number of individual augment, there is a better way to employ these combat engineer assets.

Capt William V. Osborne

Kudos to Maj Brian Gard ("Mine Countermeasures," MCG, Jun06) for sharing the good news regarding improvements in countering mines, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and unexploded ordnance. There are great success stories on new mine countermeasure (MCM) capabilities Operating Forces are being provided, and there are great "fix MCM" visions. Are there illusions too?

To be sure, plans to improve countering the asymmetric threats of IEDs are well funded, and U.S. forces are gaining capabilities to find, avoid, destroy, or temporarily neutralize IEDs. Individual and vehicle protection enhancements have also improved greatly in 4 years. However, major questions that readers should ask are: (1) what are the greatest challenges to fixing MAGTF MCM, (2) is master plan guidance being fulfilled on what to do, and (3) are programmatic in
place for the Program Objective Memorandum 06-08 (POM 06-08) to ensure that MCM becomes a truly functional component of all elements of expeditionary maneuver warfare (EMW) by 2015—or even by 2020?

The greatest challenges are operationally effective, suitable (and survivable), organic standoff and close-in detection and neutralization of all explosives, including hazards and obstacles. Focus on IEDs helps—especially in urban operations—but major challenges exist to find and neutralize mined or likely mined areas in high-speed, movement, and maneuver environments. The long pole in the tent is sufficient investments in the right technologies—technologies not now ready for development and fielding. Are we investing in the right technologies? MCM science and technology (S&T) and development history is littered with carcasses of exceptionally costly, unfielded projects invested in very wrong technologies. I can think of at least five big ones. Doing the wrong things again, however rightly done, is not what we need.

With the exception of the largely congressionally funded advanced mine detector and the coastal battlefield reconnaissance and analysis (stand-off detection) programs, there was no Marine Corps MCM S&T program of record between 1999 and 2006! The master plan recommends investments of about $25 million per year in MCM S&T from fiscal year 2006 through 2011 (FY06-11) to fix MCM by 2015. The naval S&T budget is in excess of $2 billion per year. The 2006 naval S&T POM devotes less than $10 million to MAGTF MCM Master Plan recommended investments. It appears that a similar amount is programmed for 2007. Is there a major Naval Services commitment to fix MAGTF MCM?

MCM S&T programmatics clearly do not match up to the recommendations outlined by the MCM Master Plan to fix MCM by 2015—except for countering IEDs. And no effort is being made to make up for the lost time/missed program opportunities of FY00-FY05. Clearly, there is no affirmative action to fix MCM beyond IEDs. Why not? It seems-like the Navy-Marine Corps MCM S&T should certify to the Secretary of the Navy and to the Secretary of Defense what and when program objectives will be achieved.

We see some successes and great visions for 21st century MAGTF MCM, but unless translated to programmatic reality, visions to solve the most persistent countermine capability deficiencies are illusions. Marine forces and all elements of future naval EMW deserve more than illusions.

Col J.A. Marapoti, USMC(Ret)

The articles on Marine Corps combat engineers in the June Gazette were of particular interest to me since, when enlisted, I served in Headquarters and Service Co, 2d Engineer Bn, 2d MarDiv (as a sergeant), and 4 years later, after being recalled to active duty and commissioned as second lieutenant (5th Special Basic Class), I served as a platoon leader in Korea (1951-52) in Co C, 1st Engineer Bn, 1st MarDiv.

Another article in the same issue, "Fighting at Luke's Castle" by Kenneth R. Steele, was also of interest to me since Co C was supporting the Marine regiments on line in 1951 and early 1952. In addition to mine clearing (mostly by "probing" with bayonets since both antipersonnel and antitank mines were made of wood and plastic and could not be detected otherwise), road construction, bridge building (Co C built a 240-foot Bailey bridge over the Soyang-gang), and preparation/fortification of outposts, we also worked closely with the 1st Tank Battalion by winching tanks up Hills 812 and 884 with our bulldozers. Additionally, we dug "slots" in which the tanks could locate to protect their tracks and so they could fire direct fire across the valley. Sometime in late 1951 we winched an 8-inch self-propelled gun up Hill 812 specifically to fire on "Luke's Castle."

Col Theodore G. Jenkins, USMCR(Ret)

SIDEBAR

Letters of professional interest on any topic are welcomed by the Gazette. E-mail submissions to gazette@mca-marines.org are preferred. They should not exceed 200 words and should be DOUBLE SPACED. Letters concerning a specific article are generally published 3 months after the article appeared.

SIDEBAR

E-mail letters (200 words) to gazette@mca-marines.org

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Millennials Merging: Leading a New Generation in War

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ABSTRACT

So are Millennials inherently better suited for methodical battle than maneuver warfare? With Generation Xers most known for self-reliance, pragmatism, and go-for-broke risk taking-tailormade characteristics for the maneuverist mindset-one may conclude that the basic concepts of maneuver warfare have a distinct generational bias. Furthermore, Millennials inherent qualities appear to have special contemporary value.

ABSTRACT

Understandably, when older Americans consider the complexities of counterinsurgency operations and the delicate nature of cross-cultural communications in the global war on terrorism, many privately wonder how such a seemingly naïve and insulated population is faring so well. Since the dawn of civilization, people have identified generational cycles as a force of history and the master regulators for social change. A generation is composed of a society-wide peer group shaped by older generations, historical events, and shared experiences. Within a common culture, pivotal historical events (e.g., the Pearl Harbor attack, the Cuban missile crisis, the Challenger explosion, the 11 September 2001 attacks, etc.) affect and shape different age groups' outward and inward perceptions differently and inspire collective behaviors toward common goals.

FULL TEXT

The human heart is the starting point in all matters pertaining to war.’

-Frederick the Great

If war is truly a young man's occupation, then the tactical struggle to bring order and stability to Afghanistan and Iraq certainly depends on an admired but little understood generation of Americans. In a war that transforms totalitarian societies and rebuilds failed states, great discernment, adaptability, and virtue are especially essential in its junior participants. Understandably, when older Americans consider the complexities of counterinsurgency operations and the delicate nature of cross-cultural communications in the global war on terrorism, many privately wonder how such a seemingly
naïve and insulated population is faring so well. Research on the character of America's youngest generation offers some reassuring answers. America's youth may actually be better prepared to prevail in the irregular conflicts of the early 21st century than any previous generation. The challenge for the two previous, and decidedly different, generations still in uniform lies in recognizing and realizing this tremendous potential. This recognition and realization takes more than sound leadership; it requires an appreciation of generational differences and the skill to turn this perspective into inspiration. America's generation gap is further widened by a military culture that commends pragmatism and independent decisionmaking while promoting the doctrinal precepts of maneuver warfare—all conceptually inconsistent with the strengths, vulnerabilities, and leadership needs of a generation rapidly making its presence felt.

In spite of America's fondness for quick, technology-driven results in warfare, blood and sweat—rather than machines and microchips—are proving the greater value. Yet as technology gives mankind ever greater powers, it gives men ever less significance. New operational concepts and promising material solutions attract far more high-level attention than studies on how people change or generations interact. Given the asymmetric character of the long war against terrorism, the American public's deep-rooted faith in its uniformed citizenry is vital and must never be taken for granted. Although segments of the U.S. military have explored generational shifts for recruiting and marketing needs, the ability to connect with a new generation of young Americans may be completely overlooked.1

Generations

They are known as "Millennials"—the first generation to reach adulthood in the new millennium. This American cohort—born between 1981 and 2002—has other names and like-aged counterparts around the world: the Net Generation, Generation Y, the Google Generation, and Echo-Boomers. Since the dawn of civilization, people have identified generational cycles as a force of history and the master regulators for social change.2 A generation is composed of a society-wide peer group shaped by older generations, historical events, and shared experiences. It is considered as the average period between the birth of parents and the birth of their offspring—about 21 years. Within a common culture, pivotal historical events (e.g., the Pearl Harbor attack, the Cuban missile crisis, the Challenger explosion, the 11 September 2001 attacks, etc.) affect and shape different age groups' outward and inward perceptions differently and inspire collective behaviors toward common goals.

Generational identities are also formed by the preceding generations based on what phase of life they are in, their own unique characteristics, and their intergenerational relationships. Since the exact birth dates of American generations are subjective and there is no formal naming convention per se, it is best to think of these timespans as eras. That said, the common names and approximate birth years of the six living generations of Americans are listed below:

* The GI (Government Issue) or Veterans Generation (1901-24).
* The Silent Generation or Traditionalists (1925-42).
* The Baby Boomers (1943-60).
* Generation X or the 13th Generation (1961-81).
* The Homeland Generation (2002-?).

Since generations are made up of people, they have many of the same characteristics. Collectively, generations have prevailing moods, temperaments, personalities and, most importantly, a distinct sense of direction and purpose. For Millennials, a brief look at their origins and traits reveals some potential strengths and weaknesses in modern war. First, however, the stage must be set by an overview of maneuver warfare doctrine and why it appeals to every serving generation except the Millennials.

Maneuver Warfare and the Human Dimension

Maneuver warfare has served as the philosophical basis for the Marine Corps' approach to warfighting for nearly 20 years and is the cornerstone of the Marine Corps' future concept, expeditionary maneuver warfare.3 As crafted in Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1, Warfighting (the watershed booklet first published in 1989), maneuver warfare begins with a thought process that stresses how, not what, to think. Accordingly, it is intended to exist not so much in prescriptive formulas or methodologies but in the minds of all Marines, where it guides their actions across the spectrum of conflict at all levels of war.4
Beginning in the mid-1970s, post-Vietnam hand wringing over the condition of the U.S. Armed Forces fueled intense debate about the American way of war. Military reformers in and out of uniform placed much of the blame on America's "fire-power and attrition" style of warfare. Faced with the monolithic Soviet threat, and inspired by the stunning Israeli victories fighting out-numbered against Egypt and Syria in the 1973 Yom Kippur War, they sought less direct approaches to battle that promised quicker victories at lower costs using psychology as a principal defeat mechanism.5 Both linear and methodical battle reflected the prevailing military culture of order. In contrast, the principal goal of maneuver warfare is speed-at the expense of order and control if necessary-in order to make faster decisions, gain positional advantage, and leverage chaos* on the battlefield.6 In execution, this becomes what is known as tempo.  

A great deal of this all-important tempo is generated by decentralized decisionmaking. Through "mission-type" orders and adept handling of "surfaces and gaps," maneuver warfare draws its power mainly from opportunism-the calculated risk-and the exploitation of both chance and circumstances.7 Flexibility, creativity, and initiative are not just desirable in junior leaders; they are indispensable. Today, all branches of the U.S. Armed Forces embrace the precepts of maneuver warfare, and it remains the doctrinal cornerstone of the Marine Corps' professional military education system.  

* Indicative of the maneuverist mindset, "Chaos" was the radio call sign of MajGen James N. Mattis, Commanding General, 1st Marine Division during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM I.  

Enter the Millennials  

As a whole, the general direction of Millennials is surprising many members of the typically cynical Generation X and materialistic Baby Boomers. Millennials appear to be a more civic minded, morally grounded, and selfless generation than any in the past 40 years-maybe even longer.8 They are reversing a vast array of negative youth trends from criminal activity to drug use, from teen pregnancies and abortion to test scores and future goals.  

What accounts for this change? Research suggests that a primary factor in the development of generational cycles is the oscillation between the overprotection and underprotection of children.9 While dual-career or single parents raised the "latchkey" kids of Generation X, Millennials began arriving when childbearing and rearing became a national priority once again. Childfriendly minivans with "baby on board" signs became the fashion, abortion and divorce rates ebbed, the socioeconomic tide rose, birth rates soared (at about 76 million, they are twice the size of Generation X), child abuse prevention and safety were hot topics, and several books that taught virtues and values to children became bestsellers.10  

For many parents, educators, and lawyers, the goal became not to prepare children for life's risks, but to remove as many risks as possible. By design and with the best intentions, Millennials became the most protected generation in history.11  

Public education was a major influence on Millennial development and serves as the dividing line between Generation X and the Millennials.12 The reason was national school reform. After almost two decades of decline in their children's elementary and high schools, Americans had had enough. Parent and teacher frustration with poor student performance, a lack of classroom order, and substandard public education resources led to massive school reforms during the second half of the 1980s. Changes were everywhere as parents became passionate about their kids' education. Higher academic standards, "zero tolerance" policies, school uniforms, and formalized teacher accountability were widely instituted. By the mid-1990s, U.S. public education had moved from an "age of lament" to an "age of accountability."13  

With Millennial parents so highly invested in their children's goals and outcomes, any sign of mediocrity in their children is met with professional "coaching" (not counseling-even the best have coaches) or expert advice. In contrast to Generation Xers, parental relationships and opinion are considered crucial to young people's well-being and decisionmaking calculus. Accustomed to center stage, they are more than willing to work hard to meet the high expectations of the audience. For many, life revolves around organized activities. As the most over-scheduled generation in history, Millennials thrive in a multitask environment.14 To help cope with demanding schedules, technology is an enabler on a scale never before imagined. They expect light speed and interactive communications tools and are comfortable conveying and receiving information in sound bytes and cryptic keystrokes. When one considers that Millennials have never known life without cell phones, instant messaging, and fingertip access to ideas and information from around the world through the Internet, their conceptions of time, communications, and space are easier to understand.  

Millennials and Maneuver Warfare  

As Millennials mature, distinct traits, core values, and groupthink characteristics solidify and can be linked to positive military virtues. There is a flip side however; these much-admired assets imply expectations and propensities that can have troubling implications for many tenets of maneuver warfare. They are contrasted in Figure 1.
So are Millennials inherently better suited for methodical battle than maneuver warfare? With Generation Xers most known for self-reliance, pragmatism, and go-for-broke risk taking-tailormade characteristics for the maneuverist mindset—one may conclude that the basic concepts of maneuver warfare have a distinct generational bias. Furthermore, Millennials inherent qualities appear to have special contemporary value. Generation X decisionmakers who “just want the facts”—preferably the “bottom line up front”—to find the right “decisive” action or high-value target to accomplish the mission or destroy an enemy’s will to resist would do well to take advantage of the more introspective nature of their young warriors. Their generational propensity to impose order, seek the greater good, take the role of protector vice conqueror, build structure, and seek clarity of direction or consensus in their actions are not necessarily liabilities in the irregular three block wars and nation-building predicaments in which Marines will find themselves for decades to come. Still, one must understand their capacity for creativity and self-regulation. In contrast to their more independently minded Generation X predecessors, the Millennial small unit leaders need and expect tailored solutions (e.g., tactics, techniques, and procedures), structure, oversight, teamwork, methodology, and a cause that gives them the opportunity to make a difference for something greater than themselves. Given these ingredients, they will show a willingness to fight and, if necessary, a readiness to die that will shatter even the most negative stereotypes assigned to young Americans.

Bridging the Gap: Leading and Mentoring Millennials

Millennials look to their leaders to create an environment that respects individuals yet promotes collaborative problem solving. Hence, organizational climate is as important as organizational culture. Whereas military culture represents the sum of ingrained values and pursuits, a command’s climate develops the members’ attitudes and perceptions with respect to human interaction in several key areas: leader engagement, group cohesion, trust and respect for individuals, ethical behavior, and fair recognition for good performance.15 Millennials are not enamored by position or title. They count on experienced hands-on leaders who earn their respect by recognizing their potential and teaching them by showing them how to increase their performance. They yearn for open communications and the mentor imposed “reality check” through unembellished but entertaining “war stories” of real life challenges that focus not on a leader’s skill or stamina but on what was accomplished and learned.

In doing so, leaders must recognize that for many Millennials, sheltered affluence, communications technology, and a lifelong conditioning to virtual reality have dulled their responsiveness to the “sit and listen” lecture style of teaching. Not surprisingly, Millennials prize practical experience and the chance to “take the wheel” and learn by trial and error. Since Millennials are accustomed to structure, direction, explanations, protection, and engagement, the importance of mentoring cannot be overstressed. To this end, mentoring in a coach/partner role should seek to:

* Explain why and how things must be done—at least initially.
* Establish boundaries of conduct and behavior explicitly.
* Clarify the value of their roles in any venture. (Perceived “busy work” is despised.)
* Enforce accountability to standards through peer mentoring.
* Show how opportunism and risk taking can be balanced.
* Teach self-assessment techniques (answers truthfully, “How am I doing?”).
* Teach project and time management to include sequencing of implicit tasks.
* Provide frequent and accurate feedback in a small, interactive group.

This style serves to offset their “blindspots” and develops their decisionmaking skills before entering the chaotic environment of combat.

Finally, Millennials are exceptionally attuned to sincerity in their leaders. Leaders perceived to promote an image to intimidate, gain acceptance, or to compromise their moral authority will be suspected of fraud regardless of their levels of competence.16 Millennials may forgive many shortcomings in their leaders, but hypocrisy is the unpardonable sin.

Conclusion

As in the past, careful investments in the Marine Corps’ human capital will continue to pay the highest dividends in war. While human nature remains much the same, human behavior changes with values. In order to leverage the many qualities of the Millennial Generation, military leaders must successfully merge the best of the past with the requirements of the future.17 With three generations of Americans in uniform today, the United States is engaged in a war-predicted to last a
generation—that will continue to place extraordinary demands on the character and capabilities of its servicemen and women. In a few years, virtually every company grade officer and noncommissioned officer will be a mature Millennial who entered service after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. These will be America's "strategic" corporals and captains. They will fight and win the long and arduous campaigns of this war. The mandate for leaders at all levels is clear. For the Nation to be assured that its rising generation will be the country's greatest source of military strength in its hour of need, they need only leaders prepared to show them the way.

**FOOTNOTE**

Notes

1. The Marine Corps Recruiting Command began to focus on understanding Millennials for marketing purposes in 1999. Other U.S. recruiting services have since followed suit. Apart from recruiting and a presentation given to newly selected Marine Corps general officers, I can find no evidence that the newest American generation has been officially recognized by the military. Regarding how they should be trained or led (compared to past generations), numerous requests to military training organizations went unanswered, or in two cases, they replied that they were not informed on the matter. Requests for official positions or informal opinions on this topic were sent electronically to members of the Marine Corps Training and Education Command, the U.S. Military Academy, the U.S. Naval Academy, the Citadel, and the Virginia Military Institute.


9. Strauss and Howe, The Fourth Turning, p. 82.

10. William Bennett's Children's Book of Virtues published in 1995 is one such example.


by LtCol Wayne A. Sinclair

LtCol Sinclair is the CO, 1st Combat Engineer Battalion, 1st MarDiv, Camp Pendleton. His interest in the Millennial Generation and its unique value to the Marine Corps began while he was on recruiting duty from 1999-2000. LtCol Sinclair is a member of the Marine Corps Gazette editorial board.

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Lessons From an Ancient Campaign

BYLINE: Hammes, Thomas X

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ABSTRACT

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The Afghan Campaign is yet another gripping historical novel told from the grunt's point of view. Unused to failure, Alexander pauses, studies his enemy, and then starts major sweep operations. Each time during these later efforts, the conventional army starts with a conventional campaign, progresses to sweeps, and frequently progresses to the brutal scorched earth phase before finally understanding that it is really about winning over the population.

FULL TEXT

Steven Pressfield has done it again. The Afghan Campaign is yet another gripping historical novel told from the grunt's point of view. This time his narrator is a young Macedonian, Matthias, who longs to join Alexander the Great in glorious wars of conquest.
As he matures from recruit to combat-tested noncommissioned officer, Matthias provides a remarkable historical narrative of Alexander's 3-year Afghan campaign. Pressfield brings alive the enormous difficulties the Macedonian Army faced in subduing the Afghans. Stunningly, Alexander, who had easily swept every previous enemy before him, finds himself severely tested and ultimately turned back by Afghan guerrillas. His is neither the first nor the last empire the Afghans defeat.

In his efforts to win against this unconventional enemy, Alexander sets a pattern that Western armies unwittingly repeat for the next 2,300 years. He enters Afghanistan expecting a brief, conventional campaign. Rather than accepting their defeat when Alexander's armies crush every Afghan force, they fall back into their mountains and continue the fight. Alexander reacts as generations of commanders who follow him will. He marches his army hard trying to force the enemy into a decisive battle. Like generations to come, he fails. Unused to failure, Alexander pauses, studies his enemy, and then starts major sweep operations. These tactics appear to be successful. Yet once again the enemy has simply melted away and reappeared in his rear area. Frustrated, Alexander modifies his sweeps by adopting a scorched earth policy, destroying everything in his path. He tries sealing the borders, establishing outposts, and bringing in rival tribesmen from the south to garrison major cities. The tribesmen, at first, are happy to do so, but then they too begin to resist. Even those tribesmen whom Alexander hires directly for his army are suspected of assisting the guerrillas.

Continually denied success, Alexander once again sets the pattern for Western armies when he fixates on the insurgents' strongest leader—Spitamenes. Alexander becomes convinced that if he can run Spitamenes to earth it will decapitate the resistance. He does so; the resistance continues. Finally, Alexander recognizes reality. The Afghans cannot be defeated militarily. The best he can do is select one tribal leader to set up as governor, declare victory, and leave. Even this strategy can only be accomplished by showing utmost respect for the man he selects. He does so by marrying his daughter. Thus Alexander runs the gamut of military operations before learning that only a political solution can bring the insurgency to an end.

The Afghan Campaign will offend many with it descriptions of the brutal approaches Alexander used in his attempts to subdue the Afghans. However, the reader must recognize that Pressfield is not writing about a modern democracy's approach to counterinsurgency but rather that of a dictator who seeks immediate solutions to his problems. Of note is the fact that brutality did not work for Alexander—or for the Soviets in Afghanistan, the French in Algeria, or the Belgians in the Congo. His work puts into true perspective the argument that we could win if we just use naked force.

More importantly, Matthias' narration highlights the psychological toll such an approach takes on Alexander's Macedonians. They have to struggle to reconcile the brutality they are inflicting on the Afghans with the Macedonian view of an honorable warrior. Given that the Western concept of the honorable soldier grew out of Greek traditions, these passages will ring true for today's Marines. While Matthias never experiences the "glory" of a set piece battle, he gains the true prestige and honor of soldiering on in nearly impossible conditions.

Although set in ancient times, Pressfield's narration of the Macedonians' efforts reveals remarkable parallels to later efforts by the Romans, British, Soviets, and Americans. Each time during these later efforts, the conventional army starts with a conventional campaign, progresses to sweeps, and frequently progresses to the brutal scorched earth phase before finally understanding that it is really about winning over the population. The key variable between success and failure is how well each country makes the adjustments to gain the political loyalty of the people. Like the best of the books on our professional reading list, The Afghan Campaign is an intense, fun, and thought-provoking read. From private first class to general, it belongs on your bookshelf.

reviewed by Col Thomas X. Hammes, USMC(Ret)

* Col Hammes is the author of The Sling and the Stone (Zenith Press, 2004). He has been recognized as a MCG Distinguished Author.

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Tribalism in the Al Anbar Province

BYLINE: Rueda, Edwin O.

Mr. Rueda, a former Marine, wrote this article while serving with 3d Battalion, 6th Marines in support of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. He currently resides in Fairfax, VA.

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ABSTRACT

In 1991 [Saddam Hussein] saw the power of the central government nearly collapse. Following defeat by coalition forces in Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, the Ba'ath regime was threatened by foiled coup attempts and open rebellions throughout the country—with the most notable being the revolts by the [Shi]a in the south and the Kurd population in the north.

ABSTRACT

Following kinetic operations that liberated the region of Al Qaim from insurgents, the coalition forces and Iraqi Army were in a particular position of power and authority in the region. This position of control allowed the commanders on the ground to attempt a different approach to tribal relationships. The party in power was not taking sides and drove a dear point to the tribal leadership—either the tribal leaders learned to work together toward rebuilding the city and providing a better place and environment for their children and families or the U.S. military would step aside and reconstruction of the city would stop. With an appreciation of the history, customs, and dynamics of the region the primary question posed by the military commanders following kinetic operations in the area was "how do we deal with the tribal situation and ensure tribal acceptance?" Complicating the matter further was the fact that the answer to the question had to consider the important ongoing political process in Iraq and the grander scope of achieving national unity in this nascent democracy.

FULL TEXT

Tribalism is a dynamic that must be understood when dealing with the Iraqi people.

The ethnic and religious differences found in Iraq are so profound that talk of civil war, federalism, autonomous provinces, or the outright division of the country is often pronounced. In reality, the ethnoreligious distinctions in the country are small compared to the intricacies, divisions, and dynamics evident in the tribal framework.1 Nowhere is that tribal composition as evident or influential as in the western Iraqi province of Al Anbar.

Today many parts of the Al Anbar Province resemble feudalist Europe in the 16th century. When one speaks to tribal leaders there is no perception or understanding of a system where tribes and families are subordinate to the needs of the
nation-state. There is no real discourse about national elections, the Iraqi Army, or any other subject that deals with the bureaucracy of the provincial and national governments. The real (and only) measuring stick for the tribal leader is simple—what can you do for my family, my tribe, and me now? That measuring stick drives people's decisions, actions, and associations.

The current tribal dynamics in Iraq are a result of several factors that have influenced the tribal situation throughout history. In recent centuries the Ottomans, the British, and the Ba'ath Party have understood the importance of the tribal dynamics in the area. Each regime attempted to co-opt the tribal leaders to ensure stability in the farflung areas of their respective empires. In early 2006 the situation was not any different as the coalition forces and the Iraqi Government endeavored to satisfy the demands of the differing tribes and attempted to bring the tribal elements into the process of building the new Iraq.

The example of the Al Qaim region is presented here to show the intricacies of tribal dynamics in the Al Anbar Province. Al Qaim represents an area with particularly complex tribal compositions and distinct and independent tribal entities. The region is arguably the most intricate tribal area in Al Anbar, where the tribal elements maintain a significant amount of influence and power. Following kinetic operations that liberated the region of Al Qaim from insurgents, the coalition forces and Iraqi Army were in a particular position of power and authority in the region.2 This position of control allowed the commanders on the ground to attempt a different approach to tribal relationships. The approach was different from the strategies used by the Ottomans, the British, and Saddam Hussein. The strategy demanded inclusiveness in all talks for city reconstruction and any plans for local governance and development. The party in power was not taking sides and drove a dear point to the tribal leadership—either the tribal leaders learned to work together toward rebuilding the city and providing a better place and environment for their children and families or the U.S. military would step aside and reconstruction of the city would stop.

Historical Perspective

Empires and regimes have dealt with the tribal complexities in Iraq differently. Governments have, through the centuries, attempted to rule:

. . . largely nomadic and autonomous entities, whose territories crossed state boundaries and whose members recognized only their own leader's authority. Iraq's Ottoman and British rulers attempted over many generations to bring the tribes under administrative control, for the purposes of pacification and tax collection, with varying degrees of success.3

Under the Ottoman Empire, Iraq began the process toward the creation of a nation-state, using the influence of the tribes to achieve stability.

The Ottoman Empire

Beginning in the 16th century and lasting until the end of World War I, the Al Anbar Province was under the control of the Ottoman Turks. During this period the region was deeply affected and plagued by conflicts between the Sunni-dominated Ottomans and the Shi'a Safavid Empire. The fighting between the two empires created a vacuum in regions of the Ottoman Empire as the central governments were weakened. This weakening ultimately allowed the tribal authorities to dominate, and:

. . . the history of . . . nineteenth-century Iraq is a chronicle of tribal migrations and of conflict. The nomadic population swelled with the influx of Bedouins from Najd, in the Arabian Peninsula.4

In an effort to settle the tribes and modernize the Iraqi territory, the Ottoman central government in Iraq (based in the city of Baghdad), under the leadership of Midhat Pasha, implemented reforms called tanzimat. These reforms were focused on reshaping the government into a more effective, secular, and representative Western model that would have more direct control over the decentralized groups outside of the Baghdad area. The changes in Baghdad had deep impacts on the tribal dynamics of the region.

By establishing government agencies in the cities and by attempting to settle the tribes, Midhat altered the tribal-urban balance of power, which since the thirteenth century had been largely in favor of the tribes. The most important element of Midhat's plan to extend Ottoman authority into the countryside was the 1858 TAPU land law (named after the initials of the government office issuing it). The new land reform replaced the feudal system of land holdings and tax farms with legally sanctioned property rights. It was designed both to induce tribal shaykhs to settle and to give them a stake in the existing political order. In practice, the TAPU laws enabled the tribal shaykhs to become large landowners. As a result,
tribal shaykhs gradually were transformed into profit-seeking landlords while their tribesmen were relegated to the role of impoverished sharecroppers.5

These changes by the Ottomans focused on modernization and resulted in breaking down the traditional autonomous groupings of the tribes. As the Ottoman Empire came to an end, the power of the government was slowly centralized, and the influence of the tribes waned as large landowners and urban intelligentsia gained power in the region.

The British Empire

Following the demise of the Ottoman Empire after World War I, the British came to power in Iraq as protectors of the League of Nations mandate in Iraq. Starting in 1920 the British were menaced by insurrections in the region that in Iraq led to the backing of Faysal of the Hashimite family as king. The British strategy that lasted over a decade focused on collaboration with King Faysal and actively sought the coop eration of the tribal sheikhs to speed Iraqi independence.6

The British, therefore, sought to strengthen the power of the tribal leaders-power that had slowly been taken away by the Ottoman reforms of the late 19th century. For centuries the power of the tribal sheikhs was limited by the tribe’s Shura council, or council of elders, who appointed the leaders within a tribe and provided oversight over their leadership. The British tribal strategy in Iraq attempted to annul these tribal checks and balances by actively empowering the tribal sheikhs and turning these men "into the sole source of law and authority in the wide stretches of Iraq's countryside."

The Ba'ath Regime

The approach of the Ba'ath Party in dealing with tribal leadership changed over time. The Ba'ath regime came to power under the pan-Arab umbrella of socialism, modernization, and secularization. Starting in 1968, therefore, there was a significant change in the social and political structure of the tribes in Iraq. In time, the cohesion of the tribal leadership collapsed as rural populations migrated to larger villages and cities. In addition, the Ba'ath Party originally saw tribal force as a threat to the strength of the central leadership, and "tribal identity was outlawed in the early 1970s due to the government's fear of a weakened Party structure in the face of strong tribal bonds."8

In 1991 Saddam Hussein saw the power of the central government nearly collapse. Following defeat by coalition forces in Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, the Ba'ath regime was threatened by foiled coup attempts and open rebellions throughout the country—with the most notable being the revolts by the Shi'a in the south and the Kurd population in the north. In the 1990s, therefore, Saddam Hussein's dictatorship saw in the tribes the solution to Ba'ath Party weakness, and he emphasized the reemergence of tribal identity as the primary force in the country. Saddam Hussein ensured tribal compliance with a clear strategy of "divide and conquer" and "many of Iraq's Sunni tribes enjoyed considerable perqu-

ites and privileges that ensured at least some degree of loyalty to the regime.9 The Ba'ath regime was able to co-opt the tribal elements by distribution of patronage to the sheikhs, pitting tribe against tribe, and the use of repressive measures when required. In essence, it was at the height of tribal strength and strong links with the central government and Ba'ath security apparatus that the coalition forces entered Iraq in the spring of 2003.

The Case of Al Qaim

As mentioned before, the region of Al Qaim arguably contains the most complex tribal dynamics in the Al Anbar Province and, by extension, the country of Iraq. 10 There are four tribes of significant influence in the region—the Al-Bumahal, Al-Salmani, Karbali, and Ubaidi tribes. Other tribes that are present in the region include the Al-Jesham, Al-Jarmil, Al-Faraj, Al-Jurghafe, Al-Dughaima, Al Ku Basat, Al-ANI, Al Hardan, and Al-Rawi tribes. In time, the influence of each tribe has ebbed and flowed depending on local conditions and the nature of the power brokers in the area.

In the 1990s, as Saddam Hussein sought compliance from local sheikhs and used privileges to gain the cooperation of tribal elements, the Al-Salmani tribe gained influence in the region at the expense of the other tribes. In a region of Iraq that thrives on the smuggling routes naturally created by the flow of the Euphrates River, the regime of Saddam Hussein ensured that the profits of smuggling and the ties to the border security elements were primarily provided to tribes that were faithful to the regime. Although larger than other tribes in the area, die Al-Bumahal (or Mahalowi tribe as they are usually called) were less represented, were provided with lesser privileges, and were generally worse off than the Al-Salmani counterparts. The Al-Bumahal tribe was also tied, to some degree, to the Al-Nimr tribe located in the Haditha and Ramadi areas of Al Anbar that compromised the larger Dulaymi Confederation (of note because in the mid-1990s the AlNimr tribe and other elements of the Dulaymi Confederation were suppressed with a heavy hand following attempts by members of the confederation to unseat Saddam Hussein from power11).
Similar to what occurred in other locations across Iraq, when the Ba’ath regime was toppled all of the privileges, accommodations, and cooption methods used by Saddam Hussein to keep his own supporters in power came falling down. In the Al Qaim region, the larger AlBumahal tribe began to actively challenge the influence of those elements that had been supported by the former Iraqi regime.

In 2005 the situation in the Al Qaim region in general, and the town of Husaybah in particular, amounted to open tribal warfare. Most of the AlSalmani and Karbuli leaders and tribal members decided to actively support the foreign fighters and Islamic extremist insurgents connected to the al-Qaeda organization in Iraq. Following the kidnapping and assassination of the acting provincial governor (who had familial ties to the AlBumahal sheikh), the Mahalowi tribe began an armed fight against the foreign fighters, insurgents, and those tribal elements that supported them in Husaybah and surrounding towns. Unfortunately, the insurgency and the foreign fighter elements managed to defeat the offensive by the Al-Bumahal tribesmen, and most of the Mahalowi leadership and members were forced out of the Al Qaim region into refugee camps and into other locations in Al Anbar Province.

In September 2005 the coalition forces and Iraqi Army initiated offensive operations in the Al Qaim region. By mid-November conditions drastically changed. The insurgency was defeated, the population of the region was liberated, and those who had been thrown out of their cities returned to their homes. With these conditions, and the coalition forces and Iraqi Army in control of the situation and the region, the process of reconstruction and governance began.

With an appreciation of the history, customs, and dynamics of the region the primary question posed by the military commanders following kinetic operations in the area was “how do we deal with the tribal situation and ensure tribal acceptance?” Complicating the matter further was the fact that the answer to the question had to consider the important ongoing political process in Iraq and the grander scope of achieving national unity in this nascent democracy. The commanders settled on the strategy of full tribal inclusion.

In reality, the decision to favor an inclusiveness strategy was easy to make. The British model of handing absolute power to the tribal leaders in return for cooperation would only endanger the new democracy and oppose the need to strengthen the national and provincial governments. The Saddam Hussein model of “divide and conquer” would only ensure continuing tribal infighting and the persisting deterioration of the rule of law. Choosing a strategy of inclusiveness provided the following benefits:

* Supported the operational strategy of increasing the power of the central and provincial governments to enhance the transition to democracy.
* Ended the continuing intratribal fighting and blood feuds caused by the strategy of supporting one tribe over another.
* Forced the tribes to think in terms of benefit to the community rather than benefit to the tribe.
* Created the right environment that focused on the establishment of a strong civic leadership and the eventual decrease of tribal influence.

Conclusion

It is too early to decipher whether the strategy of inclusiveness will lead to tribal cooperation and the eventual enhancement of the local government. The approach chosen by the coalition and Iraqi forces is unique in dealing with tribal relations. It is an approach that demands inclusion of the strong and the weak. It is an approach that demands change. It is an approach that seeks to break an old paradigm. But the uniqueness of Al Qaim and the particular circumstances that placed the coalition forces in a position of power might be exactly what is needed to bring true change to this region—and ultimately to Al Anbar Province as a whole. Maybe the time has come for this old feudalist and tribal approach to cease and for a society to begin to learn what it means to be a nation-state.

SIDEBAR

The current tribal dynamics in Iraq are a result of several factors that have influenced the tribal situation throughout history.

FOOTNOTE

Notes
1. It is outside the scope of this article to provide a full definition of a "tribe." Nevertheless, Dr. Faleh Jabar, fellow at the U.S. Institute for Peace, provides a good and concise explanation of tribal dynamics: "For centuries, the political and social organization of many Iraqi Arabs has centered on the tribe. Socially, tribes were broken into related sub-tribes, which further divided into clans, and then into extended families. Each tribe served as a minisate with its own patriarchal hierarchy, common law, council of consultation, and leader the sheikh. The sheikh was at once a political leader, military general, chief educator, and manager of foreign affairs. The tribes did not follow a sophisticated religious code. They relied on traditional myths and beliefs to explain life and death," Rethinking Iraq: Tribal Identities, Middle East Institute, April 2004.

2. In October and November 2005, Regimental Combat Team 2 executed two major offensives in the western Euphrates River valley. Operation IRON FIST and the larger Operation STEEL CURTAIN liberated the Al Qaim towns of Husayfaah, Karabilah, Sadah, and Ubaydi. Although the insurgency in Sunni areas is hard to identify, it is mostly defined by three identity-based categories—former regime elements, Islamic fundamentalists, and/or tribal interests. In Al Qaim, foreign fighters managed to co-opt some local tribal elements and created an Islamic entity that suppressed and incarcerated the population of the region.


7. Ibid.


9. Ibid.

10. Al Qaim can be defined as the area that encompasses the western Euphrates River valley from the Syrian border to the town of Ubaydi. In this area the main villages are Husaybah, Karabilah, Sadah, Jurayjib, Fayadee, Qumatra, and Ubaydi. Although not denoted as the Al Qaim region, the area north of the Euphrates River (Ramana area) also contains tribal elements that are tied to the tribal dynamics of Al Qaim.

11. The tribal descriptions provided here are general. Because of the nature of tribes, there are different elements within a tribe that will not prescribe to the generalization. Even among the different subtribes or clans, families or individuals might in reality be different than the general descriptions provided here.

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GRAPHIC: Photographs
IMAGE PHOTOGRAPH, Iraqi police forces, like military units, are made up of Iraqis from several local tribes.
IMAGE PHOTOGRAPH, Col Larry D. Nicholson, Commanding Officer, Regimental Combat Team 5, engages in conversation with a local Iraqi leader at a civil-military operations center. Understanding tribal relations is critical.
IMAGE PHOTOGRAPH, Meeting between the governor (center) and local tribal sheikhs. (Photo by Cpl Antonio Roses.)

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Where's Pete Ellis?

BYLINE: Armstrong, Charles L

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ABSTRACT
Risk aversion, like the elephant in every organization's parlor, is a topic people avoid discussing, hoping it won't be noticed. No officer believes he is risk averse; it's the other guy who won't take risks. I have no idea what drives current promotion policies, but the Corps I left could be ruthlessly unforgiving of errors or those who swim outside the mainstream.

ABSTRACT
The retired ranks contain the same talent, but as the former I Marine Expeditionary Force Commander, Gen Walter E. Boomer, told a cohort of retiring officers shortly after Operation DESERT STORM, "The Marine Corps will go right on without you, just as it will survive the passing of all the lance corporals."

FULL TEXT
Have we stifled independent thinking in the Marine Corps?

Maj Gregory T. Poland, Head, Ground Combat Team, Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron 1, asked me, "Where's Pete Ellis?" as he paid my standard fee (two beers) for coaching Marine warfighters in counterinsurgency. Discussing Pete's long absence, I realized I had been away from the mainstream long enough to be ignorant about whether the Marine Corps still needed or could produce another maverick visionary.

The original-LtCol Earl H. Elliswas by most accounts a brilliant, drunken troublemaker who badgered the Commandant into granting him a sabbatical to the Far East for a mission that ended in personal disaster and mysterious death. The products of that mission are generally considered to be modern amphibious warfare and a concept for defeating the Japanese Empire in World War II. All Marines know at least part of the story, and the Ellis legend contributed to the Corps' reputation as fertile ground for independent thinkers and innovators. He remains the platinum standard for out-of-the-box eccentrics whose contributions span generations of Leathernecks.

Since Pete's untimely demise, only two officers could claim to be likeminded successors to this freethinking pioneer. The late Col John Boyd, USAF(Ret) is credited with laying the foundation for maneuver warfare-the basis of Marine warfighting doctrine. Boyd's critics (indeed, his friends and admirers) found him bullying, obnoxious, and so far off the reservation that his ideas didn't take hold until after he retired. His reach was considerable and he achieved legendary status among Marine disciples. Even modern business executives discuss "getting inside the other guy's OODA (observe, orient, decide, act) loop."
The second candidate is Phillip G. Wasielewski who, as a Marine second lieutenant, won the Marine Corps Gazelle's 1984 Chase Prize Essay Contest for boldness and daring. His article, "The Soviet Myopia," persuasively argued against continued focus on fighting the Russians in favor of a fresh look at "a sound application of counterinsurgency doctrine." Today, with counterinsurgency interest booming, Wasielewski is all but forgotten. He was years ahead, however, with his unconventional thinking.

No other individual has introduced the next big idea to guide institutional development over the horizon. The Marine Corps, currently a general-purpose expeditionary force, is differentiated from the Army by its amphibious capability and capacity to deploy with its own organic air arm. The ability to rapidly employ robust, amphibious, task-oriented air-ground teams is a significant differentiator for the occasional forced entry mission, but that's the only contemporary claim to fame. We have no monopoly on maneuver warfare, nor do we have a unique strength for unconventional warfare. On the contrary, maneuver warfare is now widely accepted. Furthermore, except for relatively short forays into the world of post-Vietnam-era counterinsurgency, the Marine Corps' once famous reputation for small wars leadership has been eclipsed by the special operations community.

Our institutional ability to move quickly has atrophied, at least when compared with the speed of innovation or pragmatic necessity of generations past. Consider then-Commandant Louis H. Wilson's expeditious discharge program that accelerated the removal of substandard Marines following Vietnam. His successor, Gen Robert H. Barrow, shamed Congress into increasing the budget by stating his intention to lower end strength to buy ammunition and replace rolling stock and he did it with one speech! (Barrow, incidentally, was also the Commandant whose edict to institutionalize audacity inspired the inaugural Chase Contest's winning article, "Institutionalizing Audacity" by then-Capt R. S. Moore (MCG, May 83), a quarter century ago.)

Contrast those events with today's velocity. According to recent Gazette commentary, 7 years after the Commandant directed "fix recon," reconnaissance units remain "unfixed." Other news reports that the first Osprey combat deployment will occur in 2007-after how many decades of false starts? During the summer of 1969, officer candidates at Quantico watched a demonstration of the AV-8 Harrier, a controversial aircraft pioneered by Thomas Miller, a Marine aviator who eventually retired with three stars. Subject to intense criticism by pilots because of its short legs and limited ordnance capacity, the Harrier has nevertheless stayed in the inventory for almost 40 years and has made numerous combat deployments. These are not apple-to-apple comparisons, but they do illustrate that our previous institutional capacity for speedy innovation has changed.

Institutional sluggishness, by the way, does not mean the individual Marine and his small unit leader are less innovative or imaginative in combat. On the contrary, long after it was declared, "There will be no more [characters] in the Marine Corps," characters and their innovative ways flourish on the battlefield. Without citing examples that many Marines would recognize, this comes with the tacit understanding that some innovations will be cheered and decorated while others may be career ending. Nonetheless, one sees a significant gap between what is happily permitted in wartime yet otherwise discouraged.

Assuming that the Marine Corps does need Pete Ellis' periodic influence, where are we likely to find such a character? I don't know exactly, but I do know where he won't surface, and why.

He won't be a general officer. General officers are either too busy wrestling the day-to-day job requirements (active duty generals) or they become irrelevant (shortly after retirement). The Corps' pool of serving general officers contains hugely talented and experienced individuals who are bright enough to produce institution-changing revelations. They just don't have the cycles.

The retired ranks contain the same talent, but as the former I Marine Expeditionary Force Commander, Gen Walter E. Boomer, told a cohort of retiring officers shortly after Operation DESERT STORM, "The Marine Corps will go right on without you, just as it will survive the passing of all the lance corporals." Retired generals do good work, make good money, and are often revered by active duty brethren, but their influence is, at best, limited.

He won't be in the Operating Forces. Warfightiiig is a full-time job. While lessons learned from the field are prolific, they address whatever current war we've got. That's exactly as it should be. Marines in combat don't need to be distracted with anything else. They are often concentrating on a battlespace that is 3-feet wide and dead ahead. Looking further into the future than the next city block or the next deployment could be detrimental to the tactical mission and fatal to hoot.

He won't be in the formal schools. Our schools are led and staffed by some of the finest Marines in uniform. Tasked to teach doctrine, producing a standard product at each educational level, they are unlikely to have time or inclination to steer the ship of stale around the school solution. There is no implied criticism here: doctrine is pan of the glue that holds an
organization together and sets the broad tone and direction for generally uniform performance. It can, though, limit creative thinking, a crucial element for institutional evolution.

He won't be agreeing with consensus. Since the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, counterinsurgent warriors have seen a rebirth of interest in unconventional warfare. Old articles have been dusted off, new books have hit the presses, and special operations units are the undisputed darlings of the day. Former practitioners are in demand as contractors and truest speakers. As much as I support the trend to devote more resources to counterinsurgency, and as much as I agree that we're likely to see more unconventional warfare in the near term, the contrarian in me says we are getting close to groupthink.

The most dangerous words in financial investment are "it's different this time." The most dangerous words in warfighting are "it's just like__________" (fill in the blank with Vietnam, Lebanon, El Salvador, Bosnia, DESERT STORM, etc.). I don't know if the United States would actually go to war to prevent Iran from enhancing its nuclear power programs, to stop North Korea from developing a long-range missile, to prohibit China from assimilating Taiwan, to halt genocide in resource-poor African countries, or to secure our southern border from a growing stream of illegal immigrants. Any of these scenarios would require intervention beyond the scope of special operations troops. Some could require violent forced entry from the sea. None would necessarily resemble the last wars we've fought, the wars that the Armed Forces almost inevitably prepare to fight anew. When we all agree with something, we're about to be surprised.

He won't be on any committee. Pete Ellis-like Napoleon, Horatio Nelson, Mozart, Michelangelo, Bill Gates, and Warren Buffett was not a committee. In a society where governments, school systems, mutual funds, and Oscar awards are ruled by committee, it's easy to forget what Texas entrepreneur Ross Perot said about real talent, "Eagles don't flock: you have to find 'em one at a time."

The Marine Corps committees I remember were railed "boards" but operated much like committees in the civilian world. Officer selection boards provide an effective and efficient way to manage promotions in a bureaucratic organization approaching 200,000 active duty members, Boards of directors in publicly held companies function because they parcel work over numerous committees. The same is true for Congress and state legislatures. They convene, prepare, discuss, vote, and decide on behalf of their constituents, producing predictable work spanning the spectrum of success and failure. Committee-led bureaucracies rarely produce a sea change in their organizations. When it does happen, the catalyst for major change is often public outcry (think "Ribbon Creek incident" at Parris Island) or huge political/shareholder dissatisfaction (think Watergate or Enron).

Anecdotal examples are infinite, but the punch line is clear. Farreaching institutional change, like the creation of an artistic masterpiece, entirely new technology, or sustainable growth stock portfolio, is the work of talented (often eccentric and contrarian) individuals. They work alone, often viewed with suspicion by their organizations, and are frequently underrewarded for their contributions. The civilian exception is the entrepreneur who creates a product or service that returns huge personal wealth. The public servant is someone like Pete Ellis.

Since Greg Poland asked me the question, I've become convinced that no one can "find" Pete Ellis. That's not surprising, after all no one was looking for the original. He simply had an idea, got the OK to develop it, and sailed into history. The real question should be, "Why hasn't the next Pete surfaced on his own?" I suspect the reasons include operational tempo, risk aversion, and parochialism about roles, missions, and traditions.

Operational tempo needs no discussion. Marines know better than anyone else the pressures of repeated combat deployments.

Risk aversion, like the elephant in every organization's parlor, is a topic people avoid discussing, hoping it won't be noticed. No officer believes he is risk averse; it's the other guy who won't take risks. I have no idea what drives current promotion policies, but the Corps I left could be ruthlessly unforgiving of errors or those who swim outside the mainstream. I recall a discussion among colonels and Navy captains about a brilliant and talented contemporary who was passed over for general-reportedly because of his fanatical personal viewpoints on religion. One sage colonel stated, "You can't be fanatical about anything and make general in today's Marine Corps." Twenty years later civilian colleagues called me in amazement after the current Commandant reprimanded a popular general officer for publicly stating that shooting guys who need to be shot is OK. (One colleague asked, "Isn't killing the enemy what Marines are hired to do?") Pete Ellis affinity for the bottle might have ended his career had he been so overindulgent in the 1990s rather than the 1920s. The point is that innovative thinkers come with warts. If they aren't nurtured in the Corps, they won't stop thinking outside the box; they'll just take their talent elsewhere.
I'm not sure to what extent parochialism or traditions discourage over-the-horizon thinking. Based on what I read in the Gazette I suspect the answer is "somewhat." The recent article about unfixed recon, for example, indicates that one problem remains a selection process apparently designed to deny entry to an in-house elite community. On the other hand, the recent creation of a Marine component for joint special operations forces overrides (at least temporarily) longstanding prejudice against anything more elite than a garden variety Marine.

We still proclaim every Marine a rifleman, which we often interpret to mean everyone else supports the infantry. Many of us have been in fights that featured airpower as the arm of decision. Most would prefer to "shoot the guys who need it" with the relative ease of an airstrike, rather than send a lire team up a darkened staircase for close quarters battle. We are so protective of our air arm that some officers engaged in planning the Operation DESERT STORM air offensive went ballistic at the idea of having Marine air managed by a joint air component commander. One officer told me he feared the precedent could destroy the Marine air-ground team and possibly cost us the air wings in postwar realignments. These examples show that we aren't immune to in-house parochialism, even as we jealously guard from outsiders our private air force.

The root cause of Pete's long absence may be much simpler; maybe slow evolution is good enough. Or maybe the Marine Corps' differentiating capabilities are enough to ensure an appropriate contribution to the country's defense without tweaking. If, however, the Corps recognizes a need for Pete's occasional intervention—for super-charged thought leadership, for intellectual swimming against the institutional tide—then the environment must encourage and reward the offbeat rebel. Whether that is the current environment, only active duty Marines can say.

SIDEBAR
Since Pete's untimely demise, only two officers could claim to be like-minded successors to this freethinking pioneer.
by LtCol Charles L. Armstrong, USMC(Ret)

LtCol Armstrong, an infantry officer, has written articles for the MCXI since 1980. Since retiring in 1991, he has taught counterinsurgency strategy, tactics, and techniques to Marines. He resides in Texas.

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GRAPHIC: Photographs
IMAGE PHOTOGRAPH, Regardless of personal flaws, Ellis epitomized the phrase, "thinking outside the box about the future of war." (Photo courtesy of the Marine Corps League Museum web site.)
IMAGE ILLUSTRATION, Terrorist Trail is the latest in a series of tactics manual supplements from Last Hundred Yards author HJ. Poole. It talks about the Muslim militants' African roots and has a chapter on urban tracking. Maj.Gen. Ray Smith USMC (Ret.) again writes the Foreword. Send $14.95 plus $5.00 s&h to Posterity Press, P.O. Box 5360, Emerald Isle, NC, 28594; or charge it at www.posteritypress.org and 800-505-4334.

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Twenty-Seven Articles of Lawrence of Arabia

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ABSTRACT
Assigned to a 1-year military transition team (MiTT) tour to Iraq in support of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM 5.7 (OIF 5.7), I diligently prepared myself. It's a daunting mission-embed within an Iraqi Army (IA) unit and transition it from "starter-kit" status to one that is prepared to assume "independent battlespace," all within an austere counterinsurgency (COIN) environment.

ABSTRACT
Assigned to a 1-year military transition team (MiTT) tour to Iraq in support of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM 5.7 (OIF 5.7), I diligently prepared myself. In an effort to prepare future MiTTs for this rewarding assignment, I have attempted to translate World War I-era British vernacular (italicized text) into 21st century Marine-speak. Initially, your priority of work is to build relationships; once those bonds of trust and confidence are built, sustaining quality relationships with quality leaders is an enduring task. Take the time to determine who your quality leaders are-the men who will influence your IA unit to conduct independent COIN operations in independent battlespace-and then invest in them.

FULL TEXT
A perspective on training Iraqis during OIF

Assigned to a 1-year military transition team (MiTT) tour to Iraq in support of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM 5.7 (OIF 5.7), I diligently prepared myself. It's a daunting mission-embed within an Iraqi Army (IA) unit and transition it from "starter-kit" status to one that is prepared to assume "independent battlespace," all within an austere counterinsurgency (COIN) environment. As part of that preparation, and with the hopes of better understanding how to assimilate into Iraqi culture, it was suggested that I read The Arab Bulletin, dated 20 August 1917, that outlines the 27 articles of TE. Lawrence. It wasn't until about the ninth month of my deployment that I truly understood the articles.

In an effort to prepare future MiTTs for this rewarding assignment, I have attempted to translate World War I-era British vernacular (italicized text) into 21st century Marine-speak. The bold text is my summation of Lawrence's articles.

T.E.'s Truths

Go easy for a few weeks. A bad start is difficult to atone for. Your priority of work for the first week to 10 days as a MiTT is not to train to standard or to conduct COIN operations. Initially, your priority of work is to build relationships; once those bonds of trust and confidence are built, sustaining quality relationships with quality leaders is an enduring task. Capitalize on your one opportunity to make a good first impression. Take the time to determine who your quality leaders are-the men who will influence your IA unit to conduct independent COIN operations in independent battlespace-and then invest in them.

Learn all you can about the leaders, families, clans and tribes, friends and enemies, hills and roads. Marines have utilized the acronym METT-T to analyze mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available-time available. Never has the application of METT-T been so important. Constant communications and a proactive turnover with the preceding MiTT will facilitate a new MiTT's acclimation into this unfamiliar environment.

In a matter of business, deal only with the commander of the army. All Iraqi decisions, critical or not, are centralized to the commander. Although MiTT members must closely embed with key Iraqi leadership in an effort to decentralize decision-making and enhance the efficiency of the IA unit, it will be the MiTT chief who ultimately engages the Iraqi commander to solve many problems.

Always approve your counterpart's ideas. Praise them, modify them, and then convince your counterpart that it was his idea. Gain his approval and hold him to those ideas. Use an Iraqi solution for an Iraqi problem. Whether it's purely an IA
initiative or has been shaped by the MiTT and then adopted by the IA leadership, an Iraqi solution always works best. We desire IA leaders to actively participate. MiTTs have to limit their inclination to micromanage.

Formal visits to give advice are not so good as the constant dropping of ideas in casual talk. Formal meetings are confirmation briefs. Prior to a formal meeting, MiTT rehearsals (MiTT-only meetings to discuss all pertinent issues and develop general themes) are paramount. Once the MiTT speaks with one voice, the IA commander and his staff can be shaped, influenced, and coached. The result is a formal meeting (confirmation brief) that is succinct, purposeful, and unified.

Be shy of too close relations with the subordinates. Development of the junior officers is the key to the development of an IA unit. Don't shy away from them; embrace them. Iraqis will not embrace their enlisted ranks in the same manner that Marine officers embrace their noncommissioned officers. Do not attempt to break a social paradigm. Make your "new Army" company grade officers competent and confident. Invest in them; they are the key to the future IA. They can be molded into aggressive, proactive, concerned, positive leaders.

Treat the subchiefs quite easily and lightly. Hold yourself above their level. Treat your Iraqi peers and seniors with the respect due their rank and their humanity, but you are a United States Marine. We are aiding the nation of Iraq in the reconstruction of its army. You are the duty expert; act as such graciously.

Your ideal position is when you are present and not noticed. For those who have served on inspector-instructor duty, this same tenet applies. The MiTT may be the energy behind a decision or action, but make it an Iraqi success. Iraqi success hastens acceptance of new ideas and creates further confidence in the unit's leadership abilities.

Magnify and develop the growing conception of the sheriffs as the natural aristocracy of the Arabs. As we strive to assume IA lead battlespace, it is essential that our competent IA leaders be pushed to lead from the front. Within your capabilities, screen IA leaders and advocate for the quality performers. The IA is not focused on a merit-based system; it's all based on whom you know.

Call the sheriff "sidi" (sir). Call others by their ordinary names without title. In intimate conversation, call by an informal nickname. Just like at home, start formal and as you develop relationships, the formalities will disappear.

The foreigner/Christian is not a popular person in Arabia. Remember always that your foundations are very sandy ones. Americans will never be Iraqis, and those in your Iraqi unit will never become Americans. We are different from one another-and always will be. Understand and respect those cultural differences and MiTT-Iraqi relationships succeed. Don't make it more than it is. The IA recognizes that we, as Americans, have a culture of our own.

Cling tight to your sense of humor. There are some things that happen on this duty that only other MiTTs will understand. You have to laugh at least once a day on this job or you will lose your overall perspective and sense of mission.

The less you lose your temper the greater your advantage-also, then you will not go mad yourself. The Iraqis have been around Americans long enough to have seen American displays of anger. If this is your modus operandi, you will soon be tuned out. An infrequent, timely display of anger served as a "silver bullet" to emphasize a critical point can be effective; it will disrupt the unit's harmony for half of a day, but it will be enough to leverage a critical issue that is paramount for the unit's development or success. Good cop/bad cop works well.

While very difficult to drive, the Bedu are easy to lead if you have the patience to bear with them. This statement is painfully true. You are driving a battleship. It takes time to turn an IA unit in the direction you want it to go. The small unit leaders and "jenud" (soldiers) are not any different. With established trust and strengthened relationships, you will elevate Iraqi productivity, but there is a limit. Energize an incentive that will then make them look upon you only as a cow to milk. A MiTT implied task is to sustain the force. Just to
feed and outfit our IA unit requires countless MiTT and adjacent supporting coalition agencies' resources. Just don't let the "I needs" evolve into "I wants."

Wear an Arab headcloth when with a tribe. Except in special areas, let it be clearly known that you are a British officer and a Christian. If you wear Arab things, wear the best. Leave your English friends and customs on the coast, and fall back on Arab habits entirely. The IA respects its own army-and ours. Iraqis equate the uniform of a Marine with that of the highest of qualities. Wear your uniform with pride. The best investment you can make, both in the direct performance of your job and as an intangible gain in trust and confidence from your Iraqi unit, is to learn some of the language, share meals with them, and suffer in some of their pain. Many of your soldiers’ families are suffering from the reality of this COIN. Share that with them.

Religious discussions will be frequent. With the Bedu (Arabs), Islam is so all-pervading an element that there is little religiosity, little fervor, and no regard for the externals. In the practice of their religion, Iraqis are not any different than Americans. Some are very devout, some do not practice, but most fall in the middle. Whether Iraqis practice Islam or not, it does permeate their culture. It is not black voodoo. Ask about it. Religion will be used as a crutch or excuse.

Do not try to trade on what you know of fighting; learn the Bedu principles of war as thoroughly and quickly as you can. In familiar conditions they fight well, but strange events cause panic. Don't attempt unusual things. Make proper use of the knowledge of the country. Keep it simple stupid-KISS. It works well in America and even better in Iraq. The IA is not laden with idiots—far from it. Iraqis are bright individuals. Detailed, military-specific terms and detailed coordinating instructions are lost in translation and generally not regarded by the Iraqi officers.

The open reason that Bedu give you for action or inaction maybe true, but always there will be better reasons left for you to divine. The majority of your Iraqis aren't telling you the truth-only a variation thereof. Don't take this personally. It's a MiTT's job to determine to what degree and why the truth is being enhanced. Do not publicly embarrass the IA officer; always give your Iraqi an out.

Do not mix Bedu and Syrians, or trained men and tribesmen. You will get work out of neither, for they hate each other.

Today's parallel in Iraq is do you mix the army and police? The answer ultimately depends on the leadership of your unit's commander and the strength of his relationship with the local police chief. This interaction is not natural and must be cultivated. If both are favorable, combined Iraqi police/IA operations work very well.

In spite of ordinary Arab example, avoid too freely talking about women. An Iraqi will rarely offer any information about his wife or daughters—or women in general.

It defies centuries of cultural imprint. They will not take offense to your inquiring as to the well-being of their families. Don't delve any deeper; it simply doesn't "translate." That being said, don't confuse the common Iraqi for the pure and pious.

Be careful of your servants as of yourself. Out of genuine respect for our interpreters ("terps"), I would never refer to them as servants; these critical individuals who serve the MiTT are critical enablers. Find a good terp and take care of him. He is your cultural advisor and will translate the meanings behind stated words if you forge a positive relationship with him.

Keep always on your guard; never say an unnecessary thing. Watch yourself and your companions all the time. Se

Making Sense of It All

The last article by Sir Lawrence is 100 percent true. A successful MiTT requires patient, flexible, creative Marines who possess a relentless work ethic. While no single task in itself is difficult, the web of clashing command structures, individual motives, and misunderstood cultures weights every endeavor with friction. The basics become complex. You are pushing a boulder up a hill. It's hard work and worth stopping to occasionally catch your breath and enjoy the view, but don't let go of the rock or it is going back down to the bottom. Every Iraqi success or failure has MiTT fingerprints on it.

Here is my advice for all current and future MiTTs. Spend the time to learn your Iraqi unit and its culture, but even more so, simply embrace those intangibles that embody Marines. Demonstrate to the IA how we earn our base pay. This tour has been and continues to be a rewarding and exciting one. Count on yours being an equally positive, memorable experience.
SIDEBAR

Make your “new Army” company grade officers competent and confident. Invest in them; they are the key to the future IA.

SIDEBAR

T.E. Lawrence's 27 articles are available online at www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/biblio/27articles.asp.

by Maj Jonathan P. Dunne

Maj Dunne, from 3d Bn, 11th Mar, Twentynine Palms, is forward deployed as a MiTT member embedded with an IA brigade in the northern Al Anbar Province, Iraq.

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IMAGE PHOTOGRAPH, 1stLt Alden Hingle III, a member of a MiTT, goes over squad leader responsibilities with two IA soldiers. Building relationships is critical. (Photo by SSgt Brenda L. Varnadore.)

IMAGE PHOTOGRAPH, Marines from MiTT 7 and IA soldiers patrol the streets of Fallujah, Iraq. Shared experiences build trust. (Photo by Rueben D. Maestre.)

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The Combat Tracking Team

BYLINE: Day, Matthew A

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ABSTRACT

The CTT should consist of a tracking dog, a dog handler, and a team of four Marines trained in visual tracking skills. It is important to note that the tracking dog is not a weapon. The tracking dog is a sensor chat allows the handler and tracker...
to increase their radius of perception. As such, the handler and tracking team must be capable of scouting and tracking in order to make the CTT concept viable. The CTT would fulfill its missions by identifying and acquiring a track from sign or scent.

ABSTRACT

Quantum leaps in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) technology have armed American strategic, operational, and tactical commanders with a wide range of tools to execute their missions. Currently, the military tracking program uses visual trackers without augmentation by tracking dogs. More often than not, special operations forces and reconnaissance elements of the Army and Marine Corps practice visual tracking. Efforts are underway to refine the joint surveillance target attack radar system (JSTARS) capability; however, when adversaries enter urban areas where there is a great deal of clutter and masking, they challenge JSTARS ability to locate them.

FULL TEXT

Finding an elusive enemy among the populace

Today's high-tech battlefield often resembles, what was once in the not so distant past, science fiction. Quantum leaps in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) technology have armed American strategic, operational, and tactical commanders with a wide range of tools to execute their missions. These technologies enhance the commander's ability to find, fix, and destroy an adversary in mid- to high-intensity conflicts. Consider Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. American technology enabled coalition forces to seize operational and tactical momentum, quickly exceeding the capability of the Iraqis to react. Ironically, and despite American technological superiority, the former Iraqi Ba'athist regime members are now using guerrilla tactics to challenge coalition forces in Iraq—sometimes exceeding American capability to react.

American technology allowed the United States to prevail easily in DESERT SHIELD/STORM. The United States demonstrated that if it can find an adversary on the ground and identify him, the ability to destroy him is above 80 percent. Locating (or finding), the first step in the sensor-shooter relationship, is an easy task when the targets are tanks and static defensive positions in the desert. Future adversaries will seek to adapt and to avoid the overwhelming capability that the United States brings to the fight. Future adversaries will not mass until moments before they act, thus avoiding being "targets." Additionally, adversaries will take advantage of places where America's technology does not work—in the cellars of buildings or in caves, where technology cannot find or identify them. In Iraq we see insurgents employing many of these techniques-techniques that the United States last saw in Vietnam.

In Iraq the United States faces an insurgency that uses guerrilla tactics and acts of terror. Guerrilla tactics have long frustrated counterinsurgent forces. Chief among these tactics is the ability of the adversary to strike and then disappear into the indigenous population. C.E. Callwell posited in his work, Small Wars, "In small wars the field intelligence department is often greatly hampered by this difficulty in eliciting correct information from the people of the country." Previously, forces that lacked human intelligence capabilities developed organic scouting and tracking capabilities to locate and destroy guerrilla forces. The U.S. Army maintained combat tracking teams (CTTs), units designed to track enemies on the battlefield, until 1975. The CTT consisted of soldiers trained in visual tracking coupled with a tracking dog.

Currently, the military tracking program uses visual trackers without augmentation by tracking dogs. More often than not, special operations forces and reconnaissance elements of the Army and Marine Corps practice visual tracking. It is a skill not taught in basic military schools. Unit commanders frequently develop tracking training on their own, seeking assistance from contractors, in contrast to Vietnam where CTTs served alongside regular infantry formations and military schools taught tracking.

This article proposes that the Marine Corps develop and retain a CTT capability in support of ground combat element (GCE) operations. Such a capability permits the counterinsurgent to gain intelligence on insurgents quickly without having to rely on indigenous sources or technical means. The article will also review the current requirements that the CTT could fulfill along with rival tactical and technological solutions.

Signs and Tracking Defined

A sign is any physical indication that is left on or in the environment by an adversary. A sign could be a mark left on the ground by the passage of a person or object. Examination of signs reveals information about the enemy. Tracking is the
effort to close with and apprehend or destroy a fleeing adversary. Inherent in tracking is the ability to locate, identify, and pursue by interpreting a series of signs. Simply put, tracking is following and interpreting signs.

The Requirement: The Security Environment-the 'Long War'

Since 2001 the United States has been at war. This war is different from previous American conflicts. It is characterized by operations in which the adversary is not the regular military force of a nation-state. In many cases, actions occur simultaneously on many continents in countries with which the United States is not formally at war. The adversaries are not nation-states but dispersed nonstate networks—a global insurgency. The United States has been engaged in many countries, fighting terrorists and helping partners to police and govern their nations. To succeed in such operations, the United States must often take an indirect approach, building up and working with others. It is a struggle that may last for many years to come.

The March 2005 National Defense Strategy acknowledges that the United States maintains considerable advantages in traditional forms of warfare. However, the strategy also states that traditional warfare is not the only, or even the most likely, manner in which adversaries will challenge the United States. Some, such as nonstate actors, will choose irregular warfare, including terrorism, insurgency, or guerrilla warfare, in an attempt to break our will through protracted conflict. Many states will seek capabilities designed to disrupt or negate traditional U.S. advantages. Consider the insurgents in Iraq.

As the United States attempts to locate insurgents at the tactical level in Iraq it is challenged in three respects. First, the vastness of the country inhibits the ability of coalition forces to observe everything at once. Second, particularly in the densely populated cities and towns, insurgents can move from house to house through back alleys and underground passages. Insurgents are constantly on the move and are particularly careful about using mobile phones and other means of electronic communications. Insurgents skillfully manage to evade detection eluding even the most sophisticated coalition electronic surveillance. Third, as Werner Heisenberg and Col John Boyd, USAF(Ret) observed, the process of observation changes what is being observed. Insurgents study coalition forces' tactics, techniques, and procedures in order to evade detection.

The United States faces a protracted conflict and an adaptive enemy in Iraq. The Department of Defense (DoD) has recognized this fact in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review. The report specifically highlights the need for persistent surveillance to find and precisely target enemy capabilities in denied areas as well as capabilities to locate, tag, and track terrorists in all "domains." There is no single technology that will render a comprehensive solution to locating insurgents. The United States must develop capabilities that allow it to locate insurgents by methods other than technological surveillance. It will require the pooling of intelligence and surveillance assets with improved capabilities on the ground that will yield success against insurgents. To that end, Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 2 (MCDP 2), Intelligence, states:

Sources of information must be appropriate to the nature of the particular intelligence requirement; that is, the collection method or capability used must be appropriate to the aspect of the enemy or the environment about which information is needed. For example, electronic intelligence will likely be of little use against a technologically unsophisticated enemy; human intelligence sources will generally be more valuable. We must tailor the sources to the requirement, ensuring that we exploit both the observations of units in direct contact with the enemy and our more sophisticated sensors.

The challenge then is to develop the capability to locate, tag, and track a technologically "unsophisticated enemy." The CTT is one such capability.

A Solution: CTTs

Latency is the largest problem in locating a fleeing enemy. The delay in reporting and communicating through various levels of command contributes to latency. The way to negate latency in an organization is to have a "like" capability at every level. This capability speeds the process by which the observer is able to orient and act to destroy his target. The joint surveillance and target attack radar system provides the joint force commander the ability to conduct airborne surveillance and target acquisition. The Marine airground task force commander possesses organic unmanned aircraft systems (UASs) and reconnaissance units with which to conduct surveillance and target acquisition. However, at the regiment and below, this capability becomes limited. Introduction of CTTs into the battalion or below would give the commander a tracking capability he currently does not possess. The CTT concept is efficient and proven. Of course, there are disadvantages to the CTT, but due to the lack of alternatives, the CTT should be implemented within the Marine Corps.

CTTs: Concept
The Marine Corps should develop and retain a CTT capability in support of GCE operations. The primary missions of a CTT would consist of gaining information about die enemy in order to provide useful intelligence to commanders. In addition, if required, the second mission would be to locate the enemy in order to destroy him."

The CTT should consist of a tracking dog, a dog handler, and a team of four Marines trained in visual tracking skills. It is important to note that the tracking dog is not a weapon. The tracking dog is a sensor that allows the handler and tracker to increase their radius of perception. As such, the handler and tracking teams must be capable of scouting and tracking in order to make the CTT concept viable. The CTT would fulfill its missions by identifying and acquiring a track from scent or sign. Tracking dogs are trained to follow only one scent on the ground. Dogs acquire a scent, usually by sniffing an enemy footprint or blood trail identified at an incident site. The dog then follows this scent picture amid hundreds of other odors on the trail. This scent is as unique as a person's fingerprint or written signature.

The use of a tracking dog coupled with a visual tracker is the preferred construct of a CTT. Employment as a team enables both the dog and visual tracker to work to their fullest potential; their skills complement one another. A dog can follow a specific scent on the ground or in the air but cannot read visual signs left behind by those it is tracking. The dog often follows a circuitous route when tracking via scent. However, it can maintain a track over many surfaces that a visual tracker cannot, particularly in urban or rocky terrain, where there is less chance of visual signs. In that regard, a tracking dog can continue to track while a visual tracker may not locate any sign to track. Conversely, a visual tracker is trained to read signs through deduction, obtaining valuable information from signs. By deductive reasoning, the visual tracker can aid the dog in using visual clues from signs. The tracking team can then work ahead and take shortcuts to shorten the gap between the team and the enemy it is pursuing. The team concept is not limited solely to the CTT.

Attached and employed in support of a combined arms team within the GCE, a CTT can speed the supported commander's efforts in tracking the enemy. Once given the primary direction of travel by the CTT, the supported commander can employ his organic ISR assets in order to close the gap in pursuit of the enemy. For example, once the CTT gives the commander the enemy direction of egress from an ambush site, he can then employ a UAS along the projected enemy route. Conversely, if a UAS is tracking an enemy vehicle in which the occupants stop, go to ground, and elude surveillance, the CTT can pick up the track from the vehicle location and continue the pursuit.

The Israeli Defense Force (IDF) employs tracking dogs and teams in support of its operations. The CTTs are critical link in the sensor-shooter cycle against infiltration operations along the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The Israeli Security Authority provides real-time intelligence through its channels that is then verified through Israeli Air Force UASs and other aerial platforms. Sometimes an infiltrator's track will be lost by electronic surveillance, particularly if the infiltrator enters an urban environment. Field commanders then employ CTTs to regain the pursuit. The IDF centrally manages its military working dog (MWD) program by maintaining a battalion consisting of MWDs, the Oketz Battalion.

CTTs: Disadvantages

There are disadvantages to creating and maintaining a CTT with an MWD. Disadvantages are well known, thus militaries can reduce them. The use of MWDs does involve a significant investment in training time and veterinarian support. Most militaries, such as the IDF, centrally manage large MWD programs to mitigate disadvantages and gain efficiencies.

The complexity and challenges associated with training dogs and handlers cannot be overstated. The time required to train a combat tracking dog may vary from 180 to 260 days for a dog that is capable of backtracking. Training methods must be tailored to the individual MWD and its handler. Each MWD is unique and possesses its own personality. Some are quick to learn and others are slow-witted. Some cooperate and others are stubborn. Trainers often do not know what to expect until the MWD and handler start working together. Additionally, it is the consensus of most MWD trainers that it is best to keep the same MWD and handler together throughout the initial training and employment.

The Marine Corps does not possess organic veterinary support and relies on the Army for such support. Veterinary support includes physical examinations, vaccinations, and weekly weight monitoring to ensure a proper diet. At its major U.S. installations, Army veterinarians support the Marine Corps. However, once deployed it becomes a challenge for Marine MWD teams to receive proper veterinary support. This challenge affects MWD employment if a deployed Army veterinarian does not directly support them. Potentially, MWDs may spend less time performing their missions if they require care and need to be transported to a veterinarian. However, a well-thought-out employment plan—that is, one that creates a rotation plan that allows MWDs to train, work, and refit—can mitigate this disadvantage. There is an investment in resources required in order to establish a CTT with an MWD. The investment appears less significant upon the realization that there are few alternatives.

CTTs: Alternatives-the 'Four-Footed Radar'
Technology cannot, for now, replicate the unique sensory capabilities of an MWD. The olfactory capability in particular is the subject of many industry studies. Most studies indicate that industry is at least 20 years away from creating a similar technological capability. For a human, the olfactory center in the brain is about 1/2 square inch in size, compared to 20 square inches of tissue for an average dog. Researchers know very little other than that. They do not know how or why a dog uniquely processes scent the way it does.15

There are attempts by industry to develop other technological methods of tracking. Efforts are underway to refine the joint surveillance target attack radar system (JSTARS) capability; however, when adversaries enter urban areas where there is a great deal of clutter and masking, they challenge JSTARS' ability to locate them. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) is providing support for several projects that do show promise. Change detection using imagery is one such project. DARPA is also seeking to develop a system that would recognize chemical vapor signatures from a moving vehicle.16 All of these capabilities, while promising, are still many years away from fielding.

Conclusion

At present, the United States finds itself in a new security environment, facing a protracted and adaptive global insurgency. As highlighted in the DoD 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, this new security environment will require persistent surveillance to find and precisely target enemy capabilities in denied areas, as well as capabilities to locate, tag, and track terrorists in all domains. The vastness of the requirement inhibits the ability of American forces to observe everything at once. Insurgents skillfully manage to evade detection, eluding even the most sophisticated American electronic surveillance. Human intelligence will become a premium in such an environment. However, the United States is handicapped in this regard as it has primarily focused on technological means for gathering intelligence.

Previously, when nations found themselves similarly challenged in facing guerrillas, they developed tracking teams in order to obtain much needed intelligence. The United States developed and maintained such a capability from the Indian Wars through the Vietnam War. Many of our allies have developed and continue to maintain a combat tracking capability using tracking dogs. All have enjoyed success, particularly when employed in conjunction with other ISR assets. The CTT that includes a tracking dog can provide a vital link in an integrated sensor-shooter loop that is otherwise thwarted when an enemy evades existing electronic detection and tracking means.

The Marine Corps should develop and retain a CTT capability in support of GCE operations. The CTT concept is efficient and proven. Centrally managed in support of the GCE, the CTT can provide an improved capability to the commander at a modest cost to the Service.

SIDEBAR

This war will not be like the war against Iraq a decade ago, with a decisive liberation of territory and a swift conclusion. . . Americans should not expect one battle, but a lengthy campaign, unlike any other we have ever seen. . . We will starve terrorists of funding, turn them against one another, drive them from place to place, until there is not refuge and no rest.”

-President George W. Bush, 20 September 2001

SIDEBAR

"Dogs on Reconnaissance: Dogs may sometimes be profitably employed with outguards and security detachments on the march to detect the presence of hostile forces."

- Small Wars Manual, 1940

SIDEBAR

"Unless they [MWDs] are carefully and specifically trained, their usefulness for this purpose is doubtful."

- Small Wars Manual, 1940

The CTT that includes a tracking dog can provide a vital link in an integrated sensor-shooter loop that is otherwise thwarted when an enemy evades existing electronic detection and tracking means.

FOOTNOTE

Notes
1. These capabilities require the fielding of an extensive intelligence network, integrating all types of ISR operations including persistent sensors (operating continuously), satellite imagery, aerial reconnaissance, elevated standoff aerial observation by long-range telescopes, and close-in views by UASs, mast mounted or aerostat tethered imagers, radars, and forward-looking infrared, etc. Other sources include unattended ground sensors designed to monitor suspected enemy locations and report on enemy activity and movements before an operation. Other means used to collect information include signals intelligence; surveillance systems, such as tracking radars; and infrared scanners and acoustic sensors, which can determine the location and concentration of suspected enemy.

2. The six-stage target cycle of find, fix, track, target, engage, and assess, also known as F^sup 2^T^sup 2^EA, sensor-to-shooter or, more simply, the "kill chain."


4. Today the United States makes use of a variety of MWDs, but none are tracking dogs. The Marine Corps is currently experimenting with a prototype tracking dog initiative that is funded by the technical support working group. The current U.S. MWD inventory consists of patrol/explosive dogs, patrol/drug detector dogs, explosive detector dogs, drug detector dogs, and specialized search dogs that search for explosives "off leash" at some distance from the handler.

5. A common source of contractors is the Tactical Tracking Operations School run by David Scott-Donelan, a former Selous Scout. This school is one of the only schools in the United States that teaches tracking skills. In late July 2005 the U.S. Army Intelligence Center conducted a 1-week pilot tracking course that was developed in large part by David Scott-Donelan. The Army has since created a formal combat tracking school at Fort Huachuca, AZ.

6. Werner Heisenberg is perhaps best known for the "Uncertainty Principle," advanced in 1927, that states that determining the position and momentum of a particle necessarily contains errors. Robert Coram, in his biography of Col John Boyd, USAF(Ret), Boyd: the Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of War (Little, Brown and Company, 2002), offers a simplified example of the observer-observed relationship based on Heisenberg's theories. People in a crowd, knowing a television cameraman is observing them, might wave, shout, or begin spontaneous demonstrations. The same crowd, knowing security officers are observing, might become subdued and decorous, or it might become confrontational. If we are aware that these changes take place we assess and recalculate our relationship with whatever it is we are observing. In other words, the process not only shapes what is being observed, but feedback reshapes the observers outlook. The television cameraman searches out people who are not waving. Security officers become more vigilant because they know people in the crowd are disguising their behavior. Thus a cycle begins that repeats again and again.

7. Hammes, Col Thomas X., The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century, Zenith Publishing, St. Paul, MN, 2004. "Combat Darwinism" also contributes to this phenomenon. As Hammes noted, coalition counterinsurgency operations kill the stupid and unlucky insurgents and, in doing so, improve the quality of those still fighting. Those who survive are smarter, more careful, and more effective. They have learned from the mistakes of others. As the elements of the insurgent network observe the action-reaction-counteraction cycle, they are learning what works and what doesn't when it comes to fighting the U.S.-led coalition.


9. The mission essential task list includes tracking enemy personnel who survive friendly ambushes; enemy ambush parties after ambush of friendly units; enemy mortar or rocket crews after attack on friendly units and improvised explosive device or mine laying parties; small enemy elements that have been observed by ground forces or air observers; lost or missing friendly patrols/personnel; intelligence information, such as age of track, direction of travel, and composition of party; and identification of a specific individual out of a group.

10. The reason for the inclusion of four Marines is twofold. First, using four men enables the team to operate in a "diamond" formation. This formation allows the team to move more quickly and efficiently. Instead of stopping and reorienting point men, flankers, and trailers, the formation can simply rotate in a new direction of travel with either one of the flankers assuming the role of point. Second, four Marines provide additional protection. Historically, and more often than not, CTTs move more quickly than supporting infantry formations. Thus, they find themselves in contact with the enemy until the supporting unit can assist them.

11. Currently MWD handlers are military policemen (military occupational specialty (MOS) 58XX). This is due to the military law enforcement community assuming DoD Executive Agency responsibilities for MWD post-Vietnam. (Law enforcement was primarily interested in the MWD drug and explosive detection capability.) In Vietnam, U.S. Army CTTs consisted of infantrymen (MOS 11B and UF). Interviews by the author indicate that the DoD MWD program manager and
respective Service program managers are not resistant to infantrymen being trained to be MWD handlers. In fact, they all strongly encourage it.

12. Many countries maintain a CTT capability that includes tracking dogs, including (but not limited to) Great Britain, Israel, Malaysia, and the Philippines.


14. The Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory and Auburn University are currently conducting a feasibility study that would ascertain whether it is possible to train an MWD in the continental United States with one handler and then ship the dog overseas. Once overseas, the MWD would be assigned a new handler and then would undergo a 10-day orientation period where the MWD and handler would familiarize themselves with one another. This program would allow the MWD to remain overseas while units would continue to rotate into and out of the theater. It is the consensus of most DoD MWD program managers that this concept is flawed due to the unique relationship and bonding between an MWD and handler gained through initial training. An MWD may respond during initial training and learn to track with one handler but then, when assigned a new handler, would not respond to tracking tasks. Toward the end of Vietnam a similar rotation concept was initiated within Army CITs. The concept reduced the capability of the teams and proved inefficient as a significant amount of training time had to be rededicated to the MWD and its new handler.

15. Lemish, p. 218.


by LtCol Matthew A. Day

LtCol Day is an infantry officer currently assigned to 1st Marine Division.
Image Is Everything

BYLINE: Andrious, Antony J

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ABSTRACT

Operation GENERAL HOSPITAL was conducted by the Army's 1st Armored Division in Ramadi to deny insurgents access to the Ramadi General Hospital, which according to credible intelligence reports was being used as an insurgent safe haven to conduct and plan attacks on Multinational Force-West (MNF-W), used as a weapons cache site, used to murder and terrorize patients and local nationals, and used as an elevated position for enemy snipers to attack MNF-W.

ABSTRACT

Hurricane Katrina, the initial stages of the war in Iraq, and operations in Afghanistan were all accompanied by images. Operation GENERAL HOSPITAL was conducted by the Army's 1st Armored Division in Ramadi to deny insurgents access to the Ramadi General Hospital, which according to credible intelligence reports was being used as an insurgent safe haven to conduct and plan attacks on Multinational Force-West (MNF-W), used as a weapons cache site, used to murder and terrorize patients and local nationals, and used as an elevated position for enemy snipers to attack MNF-W. Department of Defense (DoD) public affairs doctrine states that the mission of public affairs is to "provide and expedite the flow of timely and accurate information to the internal and external audiences."

FULL TEXT

What kind of first impression do you want to make

Do you remember the Canon camera advertisement with Andre Agassi claiming "image is everything"? Think about it for a moment. We have all heard of the profound saying, "a picture speaks a thousand words." Images and pictures make a first impression last for a very long time. In the world of media, images and pictures tell the news. They mold public opinion and set the stage for future decisions to be made. Public opinion affects decisions made across the spectrum of the levels of war-strategic, operational, and tactical. We were able to do it during previous wars. What about now? Back to the future is where we need to revisit.

Part of building the warfighting machine, along with our reputation, has been telling our story. Public affairs facilitates storytelling. We tell our story through different mediums, such as the media embed program, but this article does not address our success there. This article addresses what I like to call "the sublevel of warfare"—the information level—a level of warfare the enemy is very good at and we are not.

The media thrive on images because the viewer thrives on images. Some would argue that images are what make the news so influential. Imagine the British Broadcasting Corporation, FOX, or Cable News Network with a news anchor sitting in front of the camera reading the news from a teleprompter. Imagine no footage or images to assist in telling the story. Boring? Yes!

For example, for those of you who followed the 2006 World Cup in Germany, we know Italy won the cup, but what World Cup fans will remember is not the familiar image of players holding the gold statue but rather the French player headbutting an Italian player in the chest and knocking him to the ground. Hurricane Katrina, the initial stages of the war in Iraq, and operations in Afghanistan were all accompanied by images. Images tell the story and depict the emotions in realtime.

The demanding nature of the 24-hour news cycle creates a necessity of information around events. Some prominent news agencies will sacrifice accuracy for timeliness. Such business practices, however unorthodox, work against the U.S. military's efforts, specifically the Marine Corps'. I experienced this firsthand in Iraq.

Wire services are relied upon heavily by local, national, and international media outlets that must provide timely news all over the world. Some wire services have measures in place to authenticate information before releasing it. To collect such "timely information" wire services depend on "stringers." A stringer is an independent freelance reporter who writes for
Local nationals witness much of the military's actions, creating an obvious scrutiny. When a public affairs office receives a query from the media they research the query and provide a response within the boundaries of operational security—usually seeking approval from the chain of command. Depending on the nature of the query, sometimes they can answer the query right away, or sometimes it takes a few days, depending on the information requested.

Operation GENERAL HOSPITAL was conducted by the Army's 1st Armored Division in Ramadi to deny insurgents access to the Ramadi General Hospital, which according to credible intelligence reports was being used as an insurgent safe haven to conduct and plan attacks on Multinational Force-West (MNF-W), used as a weapons cache site, used to murder and terrorize patients and local nationals, and used as an elevated position for enemy snipers to attack MNF-W. Once the operation started, the public affairs office sent a press release to international and Arab media. The press release did not receive any play throughout the media. What we did see were queries from specific wire services attempting to confirm that the Marines and soldiers involved in the operation harassed hospital staff and beat some of the patients. These queries were received at the Marine expeditionary force (MEF) or MNF-W level. To confirm or deny such accusations takes an enormous amount of coordination. The time it takes to properly respond is too long for reporters to wait for an accurate response. So the wire service runs with what the stringer supposedly witnessed. Even if the information is completely wrong, the reader in smalltown Kenya, an Eskimo in Alaska, or maybe a local national who lives in Ramadi reads, "U.S. Marines attack and beat hospital patients during an operation in Ramadi." The reader does not find out until the end of the article that the information is from a stringer or as the media like to call them "special correspondents." The public affairs office sees the misinformation and corrects it for the record. Now, I ask you, how many times do you read corrections in an article or newspaper? Probably never. Most people don't. This is how misinformation and disinformation undermine the efforts of the coalition forces, specifically in Iraq. Reacting to the enemy's information campaign is clearly not working. Al-Qaeda does very well getting inside our information observation, orientation, decision, action loop.

My proposal is to have an onsite public affairs team or a mobile public affairs detachment (MPAD). These detachments would provide direct public affairs support to units deployed in support of combined or joint operations and provide augmentation to a public affairs operations center. A digital video imagery data system (DVIOS) would be part of the MPAD's equipment. Marine Corps public affairs already has DVIDS that are immobile. The DVIDS capability allows users to send video and images via satellite to an information hub located in Atlanta, GA. It is essentially a high-speed e-mail setup. The DVIDS hub also coordinates with television news networks to arrange live interviews. Picture smaller type operations taking place after "major combat operations" are declared over. The onsite commander, platoon commander, or platoon sergeant could be interviewed simultaneously, providing firsthand information to include accountability for the actions of his troops. This is the type of "offensive action" ground commanders need to conduct to set the record straight.

Due to the nature of crises, public affairs, more often than not, operates in a reactive posture. Having an on-scene public affairs team for combat operations sets the record straight and prevents misinformation and disinformation from enemy sympathizers, enemy news reporters, and legitimate news reporters by providing die on-scene commander with the public support needed to win wars. We had it during World Wars I and II. What happened?

At the commander's discretion, the public affairs team can set up interviews with cable news networks in the United States providing facts and actions taken at the scene of the operation. Commanders taking an active public affairs posture will provide credible, firsthand information to the American public and, to a larger extent, the international community.

An MPAD would provide the following capabilities to the ground commander. The MPAD would be staffed, trained, and equipped to rapidly deploy in support of platoon, company, regimental, and Marine expeditionary unit (special operations capable)/MEF-sized task force operations, with personnel and equipment to:

* Conduct public affairs planning and analysis for the Marine forces of a joint task force (JTF) commander.
* Develop information strategies and campaigns in support of operations.
* Support higher echelon public affairs requirements for information, media facilitation, planning, and training.
* Be technologically capable of serving as the base force to support Army forces media operations.
* Provide services and facilities for media representatives in support of national, multinational, unified, or joint operations.
* Coordinate the assignment of news media representatives to a unit.
* Monitor the global and military information environments; provide analysis and review of external media messages.
* Evaluate and conduct public affairs training programs for the JTF.
* Tactically communicate to the public affairs units at echelons above brigade and all supported combat units in the operational area.
* Establish a branch public affairs section at subordinate units.
* Support the hometown news release program.
* Acquire digital photographs, view images, and make audio recordings into information products.
* Distribute digital photographs, view images, and provide audio recordings to a variety of mediums.
* Protect digital images, information products, and information systems from compromise and intrusion.
* Provide public affairs support to the civil affairs programs.
* Produce and distribute text, photo, video, and audio information products to internal and external audiences.
* Manage a news and information product distribution system.
* Provide higher echelon public affairs elements with information products produced by the detachment.
* Provide ground transportation to move personnel, equipment, and media to separate locations in and around the area of operations with organic vehicles.

MPADs provide on the scene coverage of an operation allowing for realtime imagery and information to make the news before unsubstantiated reports saturate the media landscape. Having on-scene public affairs coverage ensures that the Marine Corps' side of the story is told before someone else tells it. This does not imply that the Marine Corps sensationalizes or dramatically reports on current military events. Nor does it mean that we manipulate information. We state the facts. Department of Defense (DoD) public affairs doctrine states that the mission of public affairs is to "provide and expedite the flow of timely and accurate information to the internal and external audiences." Marine Corps public affairs has the best reputation throughout the U.S. military for fulfilling that mission.

The media have a job to do and that is to report and inform their respective publics. We can use the media to tell our side of the story, or they will tell it for us. Arguably, uparmor for military vehicles was fielded faster because the media brought the issue to the American publics attention. Under extreme public scrutiny the DoD acted in a steadfast manor to make sure that the men and women of the U.S. military are as safe as technology allows them to be.

Today's media are much more in touch with the U.S. military. After talking to reporters from major U.S. and international networks, I have come to the conclusion that the ones who frequent Iraq have had more combat experience than the majority of Marines. These guys are combat veterans and deserve respect for what they do. We have all seen this type of reporting from embedded media and witnessed the resounding success the U.S. military, specifically the Marine Corps, has made with the media embed program. When our Commander in Chief told the world 2 years ago that major combat operations were over in Iraq, that was the day we should have placed MPADs to cover these "smaller" type operations. Most Marines on the ground in Iraq know the United States is capable of winning the war-and that is exactly what we are doing-but like Vietnam, we are losing the information war.

During World Wars I and II the Allies' success was due, in part, to information from the frontlines making its way back to the radios and newspapers of the millions of listeners and readers around the world. In today's world the television is our source of information. Satellite television and cable are what we use to view images and gather information. If we do not put forth the images of our successes and attribute veracious information to the efforts and actions of our fellow Marines and sailors, we will continue to be reactive to public opinion, always chasing the enemy and playing catchup with the enemy's successful information campaign.

SIDEBAR

"The Marine Corps is the Navy's police force and as long as I am President that is what it will remain. They have a propaganda machine that is almost equal to Stalin's."
SIDEBAR
... public affairs, more often than not, operates in a reactive posture.

SIDEBAR
Most Marines on the ground in Iraq know the United States is capable of winning the war... but like Vietnam, we are losing the information war.

by 1 StLt Antony J. Andrious

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IMAGE PHOTOGRAPH, Having an off-scene public affairs team is critical to setting the record straight. (Photo courtesy of the author.)

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In Search of the Single Battle

BYLINE: Sinclair, Wayne A

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ABSTRACT
After 2 ½ years of COIN operations in Iraq, the single battle remains elusive. Some senior commanders with a great deal of Iraq experience have even dismissed the notion of a "MEF deep fight." In the past, the MEF headquarters group, the Marine aircraft wing, and the Marine logistics group were each assigned an AO that amounted to the respective com-
mand's primary base of operations and an adjacent security belt. The division (and currently the regimental combat teams and the U.S.

**ABSTRACT**

The irregular character of the war in Iraq and the lack of recent institutional experience in this kind of warfare at its onset have made application of the "single battle" concept especially challenging for the MAGTF command element (CE). Since planning for Operation IRAQI FREEDOM II (OIF II) began in the fall of 2003, a heated debate has ensued in the Marine Corps over the proper role of the Marine expeditionary force (MEF) CE in counter-insurgency (COIN) operations.* While some advocated a central and even enhanced role for the MEF CE in the planning and execution of complex, synchronized operations, others viewed the MEF CE as a "force provider" whose primary task was to deliver resources to its major subordinate commands (MSCs) and ensure that higher headquarters (in this case, Multinational Corps-Iraq (MNC-I)) did not interfere or meddle in what was essentially a ground combat element (GCE) "decentralized fight."

**FULL TEXT**

The MAGTF command element's role in irregular warfare

The dominance of decentralized planning across western Iraq for more than 2 years suggests that key tenets of the Marine Corps Planning Process (MCPP) are being neglected. This bottom-up approach to irregular warfare has often allowed such variances in goals and methods that the relevance of our warfighting doctrine may be called into question. If many of our operational concepts go unpracticed outside of our learning institutions-particularly in the midst of a war-then we risk encouraging indifference toward professional military education and inadvertently breeding a climate of anti-intellectualism in our officer corps. If doctrine codifies institutional memory and provides a common understanding of how the Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) operates, we have an obligation to apply it-or consciously revise or discard that which does not work. Such may be the challenge today. The irregular character of the war in Iraq and the lack of recent institutional experience in this kind of warfare at its onset have made application of the "single battle" concept especially challenging for the MAGTF command element (CE).

The greatest challenges and most far-reaching opportunities for the MAGTF commander lie in his ability to orchestrate and synchronize the efforts of numerous, diverse entities along a single critical path toward an overarching campaign objective. Irregular warfare demands clear decisionmaking at every level to establish consistent priorities and achieve desired effects across a broad and dynamic battlespace. Failure to maintain a campaign-wide unity of effort frustrates the small unit leaders in the field and further alienates the indigenous population they seek to influence most.

Since planning for Operation IRAQI FREEDOM II (OIF II) began in the fall of 2003, a heated debate has ensued in the Marine Corps over the proper role of the Marine expeditionary force (MEF) CE in counter-insurgency (COIN) operations.* While some advocated a central and even enhanced role for the MEF CE in the planning and execution of complex, synchronized operations, others viewed the MEF CE as a "force provider" whose primary task was to deliver resources to its major subordinate commands (MSCs) and ensure that higher headquarters (in this case, Multinational Corps-Iraq (MNC-I)) did not interfere or meddle in what was essentially a ground combat element (GCE) "decentralized fight."

These discussions and accompanying decisions have had profound implications for the future of the MAGTF in irregular warfare. This article argues that the single battle concept is essential for lasting success in COIN operations and that the MAGTF CE has a critical and far-reaching role in seeking and achieving it. In irregular warfare, the CE remains not only essential to planning, executing, and synchronizing all MAGTF operations but ensures that those operations are "nested" with higher headquarters' campaign objectives.

Defining the Single Battle

The single battle is not, as its name suggests, about one particular tactical action or series of engagements. It is about shared objectives, total force utilization, and a type of singular integration in time, space, and purpose that ensures the MAGTF "whole" is, in fact, greater than the sum of its parts. The single battle is essentially about how to most effectively and simultaneously harness the power of all elements of the MAGTF and integrate their activities across the MAGTF's area of operations. Arguably, it is the MEF CE and only the MEF CE that has the resources to truly fight the single battle. Naturally, this level of MAGTF synergy requires the vision of the commander and an experienced staff with more than a conceptual appreciation of the single battle. Not surprisingly, the single battle concept is one of three tenets of the MCPP and is rooted in a principle of war-unity of command. (See Figure 1.) It is built upon the other two tenets of top-down and integrated planning. Top-down planning is essential for directing and coordinating subordinate efforts while allowing sufficient flexibility to meet unexpected challenges. Though tempo is the primary goal of maneuver warfare, a more
relevant contributor to the MAGTF single battle in irregular warfare is the vertical nesting of concepts. Nested concepts drive tempo more widely and purposefully through concentration and initiative. GEN William DuPuy, USA, captured this crucial aspect of integration particularly well:

Cascading concepts carry the top commanders intentions to the lowest levels, and the nesting of those concepts traces the critical path of concentration and priorities. This is a phenomenon the Germans called schwerpunkt. The concepts are nested like mixing bowls in a kitchen. Each must fit within the confines of the larger and accommodate the next smaller and so on down to the squad, the tank, and the brave soldier himself. It is the only method by which the talent and initiative of commanders and troops at every level can be engaged and exploited.2

The complexities of irregular warfare, however, create a paradox that makes achievement of the single battle especially challenging for the MEF, particularly with the maneuver warfare philosophy of the Marine Corps. On the one hand, the inherently political nature of COIN operations requires clear priorities and agonizing intellectual rigor from the top down to ensure that MEF operations are nested to support theater campaign objectives. On the other hand, the vast spaces covered and the rapidly changing conditions in the battlespace (note: not simply the area of operations (AO)) inherently drive execution to the lowest levels.

After 2 ½ years of COIN operations in Iraq, the single battle remains elusive. Some senior commanders with a great deal of Iraq experience have even dismissed the notion of a "MEF deep fight." In the past, the MEF headquarters group, the Marine aircraft wing, and the Marine logistics group were each assigned an AO that amounted to the respective command's primary base of operations and an adjacent security belt. The division (and currently the regimental combat teams and the U.S. Army brigade combat team) was assigned a vast and contiguous AO that included the remainder of Multinational Force-West's AO. This arrangement contributed immensely to the prevailing GCE's perspective that the MEF CE's primary role was that of a resource provider whose attention should be directed "up" toward corps headquarters (MNC-I) rather than "down" on its own subordinates. Reinforcing this viewpoint, many officers believed that the MEF was an operational-level command vice the tactical-level command our doctrine clearly and purposefully states. Consistent with these views, and in an effort to increase responsiveness during two successive deployments, both I and II MEF's order of battle reflected a task organization that had the majority of its MEF force structure-to include the intelligence and radio battalions and the force reconnaissance company-attached to the GCE. This trend of "pushing" virtually all resources to the lowest possible level (in most cases, the infantry battalions that were referred to as task forces), coupled with the primacy of independent, small unit actions, only heightened the sense of detachment at the MEF level. For the MEF CE, the cyclical, seemingly unconnected, day-to-day activities by multiple MSCs and other supporting elements (e.g., the civil affairs group, the naval construction regiment, a U.S. Army engineer battalion conducting route clearance missions, etc.) made bottom-up planning the norm for COIN operations. With few exceptions, there did not appear to be a "next mission" to prepare for. This situation was quite possibly exacerbated by the number of MEF staff officers-many of whom were individual augmentees and/or reservists with no staff experience above the battalion level-who lacked confidence in their knowledge of warfighting doctrine or the planning process. With so much to learn in a fast-paced environment, such officers were more comfortable pulling and forwarding information and reports from subordinates than planning and orchestrating the single battle.

Top-down planning is not out of place on the irregular battlefield. While many anti-insurgent activities are decentralized in execution, the need for centralized planning is a surprisingly consistent theme in COIN studies. French Army officer COL Roger Trinquier, who spent more than 30 years leading guerrilla and counterguerrilla operations in Asia and Africa, addressed the paradox that bedevils the MEF CE in his 1963 study, Modern Warfare (Praeger, 2006):

The struggle against the guerilla is not, as one might suppose, a war of lieutenants and captains. The number of troops that must be put into action, the vast areas over which they will be led to do battle, the necessity of coordinating diverse actions over these vast areas, the politico-military measures to be taken regarding the populace, the necessarily close cooperation with various branches of civil administration-all this requires that operations against the guerilla be conducted according to a plan, established at a very high command level, capable at any moment of making quick, direct intercession effectively felt in the wide areas affected by modern warfare.

In essence, Trinquier describes the single battle. But despite many references to the oft-quoted but less read Marine Corps' Small War Manual of 1940, COIN operations are not intuitive to most Marines, and the single battle will not just happen without carefully crafted purpose. Like all challenging yet worthwhile endeavors, it requires hard work by all. The search for the single battle must include both top-down and integrated planning that emanates from a clear understanding of the three components of the battlespace and how it is organized through the intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB) process.
Battlespace's Building Blocks

Considering its pivotal role in military operations, battlespace is a surprisingly misunderstood term. Marines routinely, but erroneously, use the term to refer to an AO—a tangible piece of land or water that is assigned to a commander who in turn is responsible for all activities therein. While an AO is a subset of battlespace, they are not interchangeable terms. The widespread misuse of the term reflects more than a terminology mixup. It is an overall poor understanding of a foundational concept. Without a basic appreciation of battlespace as a concept, its scope is more likely to be underestimated and its essential elements overlooked. Joint Publication 2-01.3 (JP 2-01.3), Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace, attempts to point this out:

More importantly, the failure to identify all the relevant characteristics (of battlespace) may lead to the joint force being surprised and unprepared when some overlooked aspect of the battlespace exerts an influence on the accomplishment of the joint force's mission.

So what is it? Battlespace is defined in JP 3-0, Joint Operations, as "the environment, factors, and conditions that must be understood to successfully apply combat power, protect the force, or complete the mission." Since battlespace is conceptual it is not assigned but is identified by the commander as a nonlinear, mental construct of relevant factors with respect to a mission over a given period of time.3 In a COIN setting, and in addition to terrain and weather, battlespace would include such factors as population groups, key leaders' decisionmaking patterns, languages, social customs, cultural, tribal, and religious beliefs, relationship barriers and bridges, environmental and political conditions, rules of engagement, historical trends, nongovernmental organizations, nonstate actors, and contractors, as well as cyberspace and American and coalition countries' public perceptions. To cover this wide variety of relevant factors, Marine Corps doctrine subdivides battlespace into three categories: area of interest, area of influence, and AO.

The area of interest may be the most important and least appreciated component of battlespace in a COIN campaign. JP1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, currently defines it as the "geographical area wherein a commander is directly capable of influencing operations by maneuver or fire support systems normally under the commander's control" (emphasis added). The trend has been to equate the size of the area of influence to the ranges of weapons systems or delivery platforms available to the commander-fixed-wing aviation in most cases. The trouble lies in the fact that the geographic focus reflects an entirely conventional battlespace perspective. This perspective creates unintended blind spots and suggests, by extension, a purely kinetic approach without due consideration for nongeographic and intangible factors a MAGTF may seek to influence. These may include such diverse matters as local job opportunities linked to critical infrastructure or the morale of an indigenous army we intend to train and employ.

Since the nonphysical dimensions of a commander's battlespace extend well beyond his AO, identifying multiple, noncontiguous areas of influence within an AO will serve to focus and unify efforts on those people, places, or things that fall within the commander's functional reach. This implies that directed activities aimed at identified areas of influence across a MAGTF's AO will likely be performed by various elements and resources of the MAGTF—some of which will not have assigned AOs of their own. The identification of these tasks and their orchestration, coordination, and assessment during and after execution is one of the most important functions the MEF CE must embrace to realize and sustain the single battle.

The irregular character of the present conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan suggest that influence is not determined as much by weapons and topography as by enablers to our authority and our ability to peacefully coexist and effectively communicate between cultures on a variety of levels. Curiously, the area of influence is only delineated as a distinct subset of battlespace in Marine Corps doctrine, and its definition fails to appear in the U.S. Army's Field Manual 34-130 (FM 34-120), Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield.

The area of interest is the broadest dimension of battlespace as it includes anything that can affect current or future operations. As such, the area of interest contains friendly and enemy forces, fire support coordination measures, host-nation capabilities, infrastructure, supporting ports and airfields, and any weather and terrain that are of concern to the commander. Removing those things within the realm of a commander's influence, the area of interest must be serviced by intelligence and information collection plans. Areas of interest are thus noncontiguous and may stretch far beyond the AO.

The terrain-oriented depictions of these battlespace components found in many reference publications usually include the AO and the areas of influence within a larger contiguous area of interest. This again reflects a distinctly conventional perspective that can easily overlook the cultural, linguistic, tribal, spiritual, economic, criminal, and other nongeographic factors that have proven more relevant to virtually every U.S. military intervention since Operation DESERT STORM in 1991. How and where these concerns fall into battlespace delineation is important to better align resources with main and
supporting efforts within the single battle. This lends itself to an important concept known as battlefield framework. The battlefield framework should be sketched out early in the planning process to help the commander "organize his battlespace" into a consistent vision of deep, close, and rear operations. Deep, close, and rear operations are not constrained or limited by spatial proximities. As an alternative to the deep, close, and rear approach, and in accordance with sound counterinsurgency practices, battlespace activities are often grouped by their primary purposes or functions of shaping, decisive, or sustaining actions. In either construct, this form of battlespace organization and integration by a single commander is the key to the single battle.

The counterinsurgent's "deep fight" then is more likely to have an extended horizon in time rather than space and consist of shaping actions to create or preserve conditions that allow the success of decisive actions in the "close fight." As such, deep operations at the MEF level in irregular warfare may include border security actions to limit enemy freedom of movement, population and resource control measures, tribal and key leader engagement, indigenous force generation and support, and infrastructure development. The close fight-traditionally characterized as a fire and maneuver affair-may in fact be more progressive and population oriented (e.g., tactical task of "protect") than decisive and enemy focused (e.g., tactical task of "destroy"). Thus the close fight may include civil-military activities performed by the Marine logistics group or the civil affairs group, such as the establishment of facilities for vocational training, improved services for the local population, or introduction of new economic and employment opportunities. Finally, "rear" actions enable and sustain shaping and decisive operations by the MAGTF through such diverse means as combat service support, forward operating base security, movement control, and detention operations.

IPBs Paintbrush Meets Canvas

Since battlespace could theoretically include almost anything outside the MAGTF, IPB offers a process to help narrow the commander's focus to those aspects of the battlespace most essential for mission analysis and command decisionmaking. Surprising for its importance and value to military planning and decisionmaking, the four steps of the IPB process are not widely known, which contributes directly to the lack of understanding of battlespace. The problem stems in part because 12 years ago the IPB process changed drastically with the publication of the revised FM 34-130/Marine Corps Reference Publication 2-12A, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield, (followed 6 years later by JP 2-01.3). IPB's shift from the physical battlefield to the conceptual battlespace went largely unnoticed while the differences between the old and new four-step processes had profound implications. (See Figure 2.)

Before IPB doctrine was revised in 1994, it was designed to support U.S. Army AirLand Battle doctrine and was primarily focused on offensive, conventional operations on a linear battlefield. In effect, early IPB became associated with a checklist of product-intensive procedures that served to graphically display terrain and weather effects and enemy templates. The physical focus of IPB continues to dominate long after the process was revised. Even the contemporary and widely known term "commander's battlespace area evaluation" was named for the first step of the pre-1994 IPB process-battlefield area evaluation. The joint doctrine published in 2000 took a far more expansive and interactive view of the environment. Most importantly, it offered a straightforward and comprehensive approach to align analyses of the most essential environmental/circumstantial conditions with the planning and decisionmaking process. The implications of the shift appear to have been overlooked in many intelligence and operational planning circles. While the revised IPB process continues to support and interact with the intelligence, planning, and decisionmaking cycles in four continuous phases, the inclusion of nongeographic, intangible characteristics is apparent. Steps one and two focus outside the organization to identify, categorize, and define everything that matters to the commander, as well as address their effects (outcomes) as the friendly force and the adversary interact with the environment and vice versa. Steps three and four focus on the adversary within the context established by the previous step. Here we seek to understand the adversary's structures, functions, capabilities, limitations, vulnerabilities and, ultimately, their intentions based on what the environment affords. As stated, however, what should have been a watershed doctrinal event for intelligence and operations planners-and by extension commanders-went largely unnoticed. Even long after this "new" process was introduced, most IPB efforts gloss over step one (define the battlespace), overlook step two (describe battlespace effects), and jump prematurely into the enemy-focused step three (evaluate the adversary).

Conclusion

In his handwritten memoirs, British Field Marshall Sir Bernard Montgomery described his "critical and intolerant" state of mind as a young officer in 1918 having emerged from 4 years of active field service in the Great War with "no theoretical study as a background to that experience." He had learned to fight and function against modern, industrialized European opponents but recognized his limited ability to place his rich and varied experiences in context to build "trained common sense" for a future war. Conversely today, many Marine officers are experiencing intense difficulty aligning their op-
erational experiences with their doctrinal upbringing within a larger MAGTF context appropriate to a COIN. As a result, many young officers with service in Iraq see practical experience as the only worthwhile teacher. The successful counterinsurgent depends on many tools, but consistency and steadfastness in their purpose and use vertically and horizontally are the fuels of synergy. The single battle begins with a holistic view of the three components of battlespace and depends heavily on a MAGTF staffs deeper understanding of the IPB process. From the planning process through execution, the single battle must be vigorously preserved by the commander. At the MEF level, top-down planning by a disciplined staff will harness the tremendous planning capacity of the MEF (with a future operations section under the Cr-3 (current operations) and the G-5 (plans), the MEF's planning horizon is unrivaled by any MSC) in order to constantly identify, present, and plan future MSC missions and anticipate the next likely MEF mission. For its part, the MEF G-3 has a vital role in achieving the single battle by identifying complex battlespace relationships in order to understand how events and actions in one AO can affect others. Furthermore, current operations must not only follow, coordinate, and/or direct daily tactical operations but be predisposed to frame its analysis across an AO-wide stage for what comes next and focus all MEF subordinate commands accordingly.

Finally, at each command level, the orders development process must include "crosswalks" to ensure every task and purpose is nested with higher and linked to adjacent commands. Enduring success in irregular warfare will not allow as many different battles as we have battalions on the ground. The single battle concept can and should be better and more widely understood, but it can never be appreciated by all until it is practiced by all commanders and their staffs.

SIDEBAR
"...remember also that the worth of the ideal must be largely determined by the success with which it can in practice be realized."
- Theohodore Roosevelt, Paris, 1910

* The MEF headquarters for OIF 04-06 and OIF 05-07 was designated as the forward command element with the MEF headquarters proper remaining in Camp Lejeune and Camp Pendleton, respectively.

SIDEBAR
Top-down planning is essential for directing and coordinating subordinate efforts while allowing sufficient flexibility to meet unexpected challenges.

FOOTNOTE
Notes

by LtCol Wayne A. Sinclair

LtCol Sinclair is the CO, 1st Combat Engineer Battalion, Camp Pendleton. Prior to assuming his current billet, he served as the Deputy, Future Operations, G-3, I MEF from 2004-06.

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Lessons From Vietnam

John Arquilla, codirector of the Center on Terrorism and Irregular Warfare at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA was quoted as saying that the general lack of American cultural preparation for the Iraqi campaign, including an insufficient number of people with language skills to understand even the basic information, is one of the causes of failure to effectively combat this insurgency. To better prepare the troops and combat commanders for the Iraqi insurgency, what is needed is a formal school that teaches the principles of counterinsurgency through a dynamic curriculum delivered as small group instruction, hands-on learning, and online web-based training (distance learning). The Army and the Marine Corps should agree on a single unified approach to the advisory effort that would also serve to integrate the efforts of the Army's military training teams program, the efforts of the Army special forces, the Army advisory program, the Phoenix School in Iraq, and the Marine advisory unit and CAP.

Essential training of Marine advisors and combined action platoon personnel

Two of the most effective legacies of the Vietnam experience that are directly applicable to the Marine Corps efforts in Iraq are the combined action program (CAP) and the Marine advisory effort. These efforts had their roots in earlier Marine operations in Haiti (1915-34), Santo Domingo (1916-22), and Nicaragua (1926-33) where Marines were combined with host-nation forces to defeat insurgency. Then, as now, there was a realization by the Marine Corps-and to a lesser extent the Army-that military might, no matter how skillfully or how massively applied, cannot solve the underlying political
cause of a conflict. I had the rare opportunity to gain a unique perspective on the Vietnam conflict while participating in combat operations against the Viet Cong insurgency as a member of the first Marine combat units in Vietnam. I served as part of the first CAP unit during 1965 and 1966 in Phu Bai, as an advisor (Co-Van) to Vietnamese Marines during 1967, and as battery commander on Hill 65 (Dai Loc) prior to, during, and after Tet in 1968. I observed that there were substantial variations in the depth, quality, and applicability of the training and preparation of the Marines for their roles as CAP members and as Marine advisors. We can learn from the lessons of Vietnam and apply modern training design methodology, training technology, experience, and the lessons learned to prepare Marine noncommissioned officers (NCOs) and officers for CAP and advisor duty in Iraq.

Substitute "Iraq" for "Vietnam" in Gen Westmorland's quote at right and you have a picture of the situation in the Middle East today.

Training CAP in Vietnam

As part of the first CAP in Phu Bai during 1965, I observed that while the CAP personnel were handpicked and interviewed for the job, they were given very little cultural or language training. Much of what they learned was on-the-job training. For the first CAP units in Phu Bai, we started a 1-week-long combined action school that included a crash course in Vietnamese political structure and culture. Notably absent from the syllabus was any sort of language training, a weakness of the program that would continue throughout its existence. Later, a formal school was set up in Da Nang, and the candidate CAP members went through a 2-week curriculum that included basic language instruction and cultural awareness. Most CAP members never achieved language proficiency other than what they were able to pick up working in the villages. The challenge in Iraq and other spots, as it was in Vietnam, is to overcome the lack of language skills and cultural understanding. CAP enjoyed considerable support from the senior Marine leadership, notably LtGen Victor H. Krulak, then-Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific. This support was despite resistance from GEN Westmorland, the Commander, Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV), who was more interested in engaging the Viet Cong in conventional set piece battles. While achieving a level of success beyond their numbers and expectations, because of the lack of a coherent and integrated strategy for training, deploying, and supporting the CAP units, they were not able to realize their full potential as an effective counterinsurgent force.

Preparing Advisors for Vietnam

In preparation for duties as an advisor to the Vietnamese Marines, I attended the 6-week Military Assistance Training Agency (MATA) course at the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare School at Fort Bragg, NC. Out of the entire syllabus, the Vietnamese language and cultural training proved invaluable to me and to other Marine and Army advisors when we arrived in Vietnam and started to work with our counterparts. The language training consisted of Vietnamese language classes held 4 hours per day, 6 days per week, and taught by a Vietnamese national. The MATA program employed some innovative technologies and training methodology. Each student was given a tape recorder with two-track audiotapes. On one track a Vietnamese national spoke a phrase. The student was expected to repeat that phrase using his best Vietnamese pronunciation and then play the tape back to listen to the linguist, listen to himself, and then compare the two. This technique was a very effective way to develop the proper pronunciation and to develop an "ear" for spoken Vietnamese. This was one of the high-technology learning techniques of 1966. Later, an advisory training program was set up in Quantico, but the language training was conducted by Americans, not Vietnamese, and consequently the advisors did not develop the same language proficiency as the MATA graduates.

Create a Formal Marine Advisor Training School

John Arquilla, codirector of the Center on Terrorism and Irregular Warfare at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA was quoted as saying that the general lack of American cultural preparation for the Iraqi campaign, including an insufficient number of people with language skills to understand even the basic information, is one of the causes of failure to effectively combat this insurgency.

The Security Cooperation Education and Training Command (SCETC) at Quantico, as well as I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) and II MEF and the Marine Special Operations Command's Foreign Military Training Unit, has undertaken the effort to train Marines to serve as advisors in Iraq, Afghanistan, Georgia, and other hotspots. By adopting and adapting some of the training lessons from Vietnam, and by starting to address the advisory requirement in Iraq, Marine officers and enlisted NCOs currently undergo a course of instruction to prepare them for their roles as advisors. The original 3-week curriculum stressed some language and cultural training combined with a reinforcement of basic infantry skills to prepare the advisors to teach these skills to the Iraqis.
To better prepare the troops and combat commanders for the Iraqi insurgency, what is needed is a formal school that teaches the principles of counterinsurgency through a dynamic curriculum delivered as small group instruction, hands-on learning, and online web-based training (distance learning). This multimedia curriculum should be supported by constantly updated learning materials and continuously infused with lessons learned from the current conflicts. The program should move past the pure didactic lectures, which characterize the training in many Service schools, by providing the students with experience-based lessons learned from other counterinsurgencies and presented as a blended learning curriculum. This hands-on approach draws upon instructors with past and current advisory experience, supplemented with online simulations, interaction with foreign nationals in real-world scenarios, extensive foreign weapons familiarization and firing, case studies, and small group interactions to more thoroughly expand the advisors' existing knowledge of combat arms and tactics.

Until June 2006 there were no formal instructors assigned to the SCETC program; rather, instructors were drawn from The Basic School, other Marine Corps schools, local colleges, and guest instructors on a catch-as-catch-can basis. As might be expected, the presentations varied in quality, relevancy, completeness, and uniformity. This deficiency is changing with the funding of SCETC to hire its own instructors. Further, the current advisory program has no centralized, easily accessible internal repository of training materials that has been developed and updated. In addition, there has been little formal effort to collect and organize the lessons learned and after-action reports from troops returning from Iraq and Afghanistan into instructionally sound learning materials that are updated regularly to reflect the current state of knowledge. This is an essential activity for continuously refreshing, improving, and ensuring currency of the training materials that must be funded and supported.

To more effectively address the language, cultural, political, secular, religious, economic, and military issues facing all of our advisors in Iraq, as well as Afghanistan, Georgia, and other hotspots, several Marines from SCETC and the Schools of Infantry and I prepared recommendations on how to transition the current advisor school to a formal Marine Corps school. The proposed first steps in year one should be to:

* Identify and evaluate efficiency of hostnation forces (standards, evaluation plan/mission essential training standards (METS)).

* Conduct an onsite front-end analysis of the current advisory units in Iraq and Afghanistan to identify the key training needs and requirements as articulated by current advisors.

* Design a training and evaluation model (gap analysis program).

* Develop materials of instruction that ensure incremental growth and progress while incorporating lessons learned from the various advisory efforts around the world, coordinating with the U.S. Army advisory training effort at locations such as the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare School.

* Implement training delivery through synchronous/asynchronous classroom, virtual classroom, and online (distance) training delivery systems methods and an evaluation plan to validate progress.

* Evaluate proficiency levels and validate measures of effectiveness (METS, curricula).

* Determine success and adjust for overall mission accomplishment.

Recommended Program of Instruction

What is recommended is a three-phase program of instruction to ensure that the Marines heading to Iraq or Afghanistan as advisors and as CAP leaders have the best possible preparation to accomplish their mission.

Phase one will require Marines who are selected for the advisory training program to review and demonstrate a proficiency in the basic infantry combat skills prior to attending the advisory program. These include basic infantry tactics; basic infantry weapons; communications; field sanitation; survival, evasion, resistance to interrogation, and escape (SERE); first aid; and fire support.

Phase two is a remediation and refresher program delivered as online learning (also called distance learning) utilizing web-based training courses delivered and the results tracked by the Marine Corps learning management system. This phase is especially critical for those individuals who are called up from nonoperational billets, such as recruiting, and need to brush up on their basic combat skills. An example of shared courseware object reference model-compliant online training may include web-based training courses that are structured as tutorial, example, practice, simulation, and helps (publications stored as PDF (portable document format) files); real time collaboration around critical discussion topics; re-
fresher material linked to the mission essential task list for advisors; language basis; simulations; and more. Relevant examples may include:

* Simulations.
* Radio.
* Dashboard familiarization using graphics.
* Operating procedures (on, off, tune) using animation and digital audio sound effects.
* Radio procedures using digital audio and voice recognition.
* Situation report.
* Fire support.
* Casualty evacuation.
* Reporting.
* Maintenance and troubleshooting using problem statements supported with interactive animations and drag-and-drop exercises.
* Foreign weapons familiarization.
* Overview of primary Iraqi Army weapons using learner-controlled 360-degree rotation graphics.
* Identification of weapons components using rollover graphics and text.
* Disassembly of the weapons using hotspots and drag-and-drop graphics.
* Recall questions to assess the learner's knowledge of the functional characteristics of the weapons.
* Training foreign troops on weapons characteristics, disassembly, assembly, malfunctions, and employment using country-specific training techniques practiced in small groups.
* Advisor-counterpart interactions.
* Introduction to your counterpart using photographs and digital audio in on-screen dialogs.
* Basic military terminology and Iraqi force structure familiarization.
* Basic body language communications using photographs and audio.
* Host-nation customs familiarization using photographs, graphics, and audio.
* Case studies, scenarios, and situational simulations using text, audio, graphics, videoclips, and interactions.
* Language familiarization.
* Host-nation alphabet using text, graphics, and digital audio.
* Basic grammar using interactions such as drag-and-drop, hotspots.
* Pronunciation using audio and voice recognition software.
* Procurement and employment of commercial packages, such as Rosetta Stone Language software, similar to what the Army has done.

* Practice using common military terms by drag-and-drop of Iraqi language terms to photographs and illustrations of items. Phase three training would occur at the formal schoolhouse in Quantico or wherever the formal school will be based. The curriculum covered during the 3- or 4-week course would focus on:

* Goals of the advisory effort.
* Structure of the Iraq/Afghanistan Army.
* Language/Interpreter interaction.
* Customs and cultural aspect of hostnation life.
* Interpersonal communications and listening skills.
* Lesson plan development and presentation skills (using the systems approach to training).
* How to teach to foreign nationals.
* Team building.
* Problem solving.
* Role-playing for leadership development.
* Intelligence collection and analysis.
* Hands-on radio procedures and communications.
* Foreign weapons familiarization and familiarization firing.
* Combat lifesaver.
* Close air support/casualty evacuation.
* SERE.

An important part of the proposed curriculum should include the advisor-counterpart lessons taken from Vietnam and adapted to the current insurgencies.

Conclusion

There is evidence that the Marine advisory program has started to yield results and that the CAP started by some of the Marine battalions is showing some success. From a more strategic perspective, the Marine Corps should consider integrating the advisory and CAP forces with the conventional force structure under a single command to fight "one war" that integrates the military, political, social, psychological, and economic components.

The Army and the Marine Corps should agree on a single unified approach to the advisory effort that would also serve to integrate the efforts of the Army's military training teams program, the efforts of the Army special forces, the Army advisory program, the Phoenix School in Iraq, and the Marine advisory unit and CAP. This was done successfully in 1968 in Vietnam under GEN Creighton Abrams and could result in something along the lines of a Military Assistance Command-Iraq to coordinate the efforts of Marine and Army conventional units, CAP units, and the advisory personnel and have them work and communicate with nongovernmental organizations and civilian reconstruction operations. This would allow us to find, fix, and destroy the insurgency in an ever-spreading "oil spot" while we provide the security, reestablish the daily basic services, and allow the Iraqi infrastructure to survive and grow.

SIDEBAR

"A knowledge of the character of the people and a command of their language are great assets. Political methods and motives which govern the actions of foreign people and their political parties, incomprehensible at best to the average North American, are practically beyond the understanding of persons who do not speak their language."

- Small Wars Manual1

SIDEBAR

"Vietnam is involved in two simultaneous and very difficult tasks, nation building and fighting a vicious and well-organized enemy. If it could do either one alone, the task would be vastly simplified, but it's got to do both at once. . . . Helping Vietnam . . . may very well be the most complex problem ever faced by men in uniform anywhere on earth."

- GEN William C. Westmorland3

SIDEBAR

There is evidence that the Marine advisory program . . . started by some of the Marine battalions is showing some success.

FOOTNOTE
Notes

LOAD-DATE: June 12, 2007
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GRAPHIC: Photographs
IMAGE PHOTOGRAPH, Marines worked closely with the Popular Forces during CAP. (USMC photo by GySgt Dan Grady.)
IMAGE PHOTOGRAPH, Interacting with villagers is as essential in Iraq as it was in Vietnam. (USMC photo by Sgt J. A. Mullins.)

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The Battalion Judge Advocate
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ABSTRACT
Infantry battalion commanders operating in Iraq since the beginning of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) have faced a challenging tactical environment in which operational issues, such as targeting, rules of engagement (ROE), and the handling of civilians, are extremely complex. Through his role as an advisor to the battalion commander on operational challenges, such as detainee handling, investigations, and ROE, the battalion JA plays a key role in coalition efforts to "win the hearts and minds" of the Iraqi people and establish the rule of law in Iraq.
A counterinsurgency force multiplier

Infantry battalion commanders operating in Iraq since the beginning of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) have faced a challenging tactical environment in which operational issues, such as targeting, rules of engagement (ROE), and the handling of civilians, are extremely complex. In addition, the potential for small unit leader decisions and actions to have a strategic impact is far greater than in earlier conflicts due to advances in information technology. Since the end of major combat operations, Marine commanders have faced an insurgency that continues to present a threat to both coalition forces and the democratically elected Government of Iraq. The innovative practice of assigning a judge advocate (JA) to Marine infantry battalions during OIF has proven to be a counterinsurgency (COIN) force multiplier.

Benefits of the Rule of Law

The importance of close adherence to the rule of law during COIN operations was demonstrated during the U.S. involvement in defeating an insurgency during the Philippine insurrection (1899-1902). Described by one author as "perhaps the most successful counterinsurgency campaign waged by a Western army in the past 200 years," one factor in the success of the Philippine campaign was adherence to General Order 100—the set of legal principles enacted by President Abraham Lincoln in 1863 to guide the conduct of Union forces in the field—and to the fact that captured rebels "were by and large well treated."1

The Department of Defense (DoD) dictionary defines insurgency as "an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict."2 The insurgency in Iraq is comprised primarily of Sunni Ba'athists from Saddam Hussein's former regime and foreign religious extremists and occurs against a background of widespread criminal activity and infighting between Sunni and Shi'a factions. As Andrew Krepinevich has pointed out:

[T]he insurgents are fighting to perpetuate disorder and to prevent the establishment of a legitimate, democratic Iraqi government. . . . The insurgency's success, accordingly, depends on continued disorder to forestall the creation of a stable, democratic Iraq and erode the coalition's willingness to persist and prevail. . . . The current fight has three centers of gravity: the Iraqi people, the American people, and the American soldier. The insurgents have recognized this, making them their primary targets. . . . The insurgents have a clear advantage when it comes to this fight: they only need to win one of the centers of gravity to succeed, whereas the United States must secure all three.3

Krepinevich goes on to recommend that the coalition pursue a strategy that focuses on protecting the civilian population, rather than an attrition strategy that is focused on pursuing and killing insurgent forces.4

Establishing the Rule of Law

Under Saddam the Iraqi people were governed by one man's whim, and they obeyed regime rules primarily out of fear. With the arrival of democracy in Iraq, the rule of fear has been replaced by the rule of law. Stability and support operations (SASO) and COIN operations place coalition forces in close contact with the Iraqi people, and the treatment Iraqis receive from coalition personnel is an opportunity to demonstrate the benefits of the rule of law. Through his role as an advisor to the battalion commander on operational challenges, such as detainee handling, investigations, and ROE, the battalion JA plays a key role in coalition efforts to "win the hearts and minds" of the Iraqi people and establish the rule of law in Iraq.

By training and experience, who is both better qualified and better positioned to assist coalition efforts to establish the rule of law in Iraq than the battalion JA? This is especially true in detainee handling, as each encounter that deviates from established rules has the potential to harm coalition efforts and gain support for the insurgency. In Iraq this is of particular importance because infantry battalions are located great distances from higher headquarters, with widely dispersed companies, and are responsible for areas of operation normally assigned to regiments, a situation not foreseen by the existing Cold War-era legal doctrine that places all JAs at higher headquarters.

As Col Nicholas F. Marano observed while in command of 1st Battalion, 7th Marines (1/7) during 2006 in Iraq:

A commander needs instantaneous legal advice, but the tyranny of distance in Iraq prevents getting help from outside the unit, especially judge advocate help, when the help is needed. My battalion JA was crucial to the success of the battalion's detainee processing, which continues to get more complex and requires careful oversight to ensure the packages are complete and the detainee stays incarcerated. In dealing with locals, especially sheiks, my lawyer was particularly helpful. In Iraq culture sheiks consider the CO [commanding officer] a very important man if he has his own lawyer. Perceived
status is everything. Furthermore, in a culture like Iraq's where personal relationships are essential and everything is subject to negotiation and deal making, a lawyer's education, training, and insights are invaluable. I always took my lawyer with me when talking to locals. An infantry battalion simply cannot fight a COIN operation without a judge advocate on the battalion staff.5

In addition to the rule of law and the handling of detainees, the battalion JA makes a difference in the ability of an infantry battalion to adhere to targeting and ROE requirements in the SASO environment. When asked if a battalion JA was really necessary to accomplish the battalion mission, LtCol Willard A. Buhl commented on his experience with his battalion JA during the November 2004 battle for Fallujah:

It just would have been a question of how efficiently or how effectively we accomplished our mission. . . . It's just the potential, especially in a combat environment for mistakes to be made, some of which potentially could have a strategic level impact. I had [the corporal] . . . who shot the man in the mosque that the journalist Kevin Sites had filmed and he released the footage to the world [Note: the corporal was subsequently cleared of any wrongdoing] . . . so I just give you an example like that. How many situations were averted because of the 'hands on' training, guidance, advice, et cetera that was really daily from an assigned embedded Judge Advocate? We'll never know. 6

It is vital that the JA assigned to an infantry battalion be experienced in operational law and be assigned during the workup phase prior to deployment. As with all staff relationships, the best results will be derived from those situations where the battalion commander has time to work with his JA before deployment and gain confidence in the JA's ability to contribute to the battalion's mission. The battalion JA will in turn provide input and advice that will provide the battalion commander with the confidence to exercise the tactical patience necessary for COIN success. A long-term relationship with the battalion will also provide the battalion JA time to get to know and train the Marines in the battalion and, in the best case, build relationships directly with those Marines. One battalion-level JA, Capt Julio W. Valdivieso, estimated that he personally briefed over 1,200 Marines during the first 4 months of his tour.

I tried to reach every Marine with a class because these are such sensitive issues that we felt they needed to hear it directly from me. . . . I felt it was very important that they be able to ask me questions directly that I made sure I explained it in a simple form because if you've got Marines that are making these decisions in split seconds, you don't want to confuse them. . . . I go over with them . . . how everything they do here impacts and how the insurgents are fighting the war, trying to get them to step out of line and do things they shouldn't. . . . I instill in them a sense of responsibility in what they do so that they understand that when they punch that insurgent or if they were to punch that insurgent that they've caught . . . that they're really hurting the greater mission .... I always tell them, 'Don't put me in a bad spot. I'm going to do the investigation on you.' There's a sense of . . . I guess when you're out there they don't want to let you down.7

A well-known Shakespeare quotation, "The first thing we do, let's kill all the lawyers,"8 is often used to denigrate lawyers and the legal profession. However, the context in which the quote was originally used suggests a very different idea. The quote is actually part of a dialogue between plotters seeking to overthrow the government during a chaotic and lawless period of English history known as the Wars of the Roses (1453-85). The members of the rebellion were referring to measures necessary for the rebellion to succeed. They recognized that their chances of success would be better if they could eliminate those who knew and enforced the rule of law. Future COIN/SASO operations will have the best chance for success to the extent that they can establish and maintain the rule of law, and the battalion JA is a true force multiplier in the rule of law process.

FOOTNOTE

Nota
4. Ibid.
5. Marano, LtCol Nicholas E, CO, 1/7, e-mail October 2006.
Fresh Counterinsurgency Doctrine

BYLINE: Armstrong, Charles L

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ABSTRACT
The new Counterinsurgency (COIN) Manual, cosigned by the U.S. Army and Marine Corps, was already heavily critiqued while still in draft form. Since troops don’t get to choose their wars, however, and since there will never be enough special forces soldiers to win alone, the need for fresh doctrine to bring more general-purpose troops closer to COIN competence is obvious.

FULL TEXT
Field Manual 3-24/Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.5 represents a new era for small wars

The new Counterinsurgency (COIN) Manual, cosigned by the U.S. Army and Marine Corps, was already heavily critiqued while still in draft form. Since publication the finished product has drawn a mix of praise and criticism by early reviewers. It may be difficult to get a truly objective viewpoint of the lengthy document (282 pages including notes, references, index, and authentication) because those most likely to write about it are bound by personal mental maps.

Current warriors fighting stubborn insurgencies may feel there's too much reference to historical "models." Old hands may key on techniques that worked in the past but appear inapplicable to present fights. Marines might object to the inference that they are lumped with soldiers as general-purpose forces. It's too "touchy-feely" or academic for some. The special forces will doubt they need it. Everybody will think it's too long. I think the manual represents a good single source document that can get all Department of Defense players (the Air Force and Navy will have a few enlightened folks who read it) on the same page with respect to applying sound COIN doctrine to current and future wars.

The key word is "doctrine." When I attended the Infantry Officer Advanced Course at Fort Benning, GA in the late 1970s, my Army counterparts adopted a quip as the unofficial class motto: "Never confuse doctrine with logic." Doctrine is a double-edged sword. It is the glue that permits building templates for warfighting success, but it can lull the unimaginative into believing the same template will fit neatly over any war. If one accepts the need for flexible templates that can be adjusted to fit the insurgency and avoids the temptation to force fit the insurgency to any standard template, the new COIN Manual will do what it should. The introduction to the manual, incidentally, nicely paraphrases that idea right up front.

The manual is "directed primarily at leaders and planners at the battalion level and up." In every insurgency I attended, the tip of the spear was the battalion and down. If there was ever a guidebook needed by the strategic corporal in his three block war, a COIN guide is it. The battalion commander's challenge will be to condense the manuals core lessons so the fire team leader can learn them during predeployment education. The young Marines I meet are smart enough to get it, but they are really busy and won't be able to grind through the reading before their first time out. Unless they become career Marines, they'll probably never read the whole manual. It's the platoon, squad, and fire team leaders who need not only the basics but also the ability to extrapolate new techniques on the fly in combat. It doesn't matter if the generals understand COIN doctrine if the lieutenants can't translate it. This is a common reality to any doctrinal shift or enhancement. Absorbing and adapting the manual's lessons will simply take time and innovation.

Anyone who thinks the manual only addresses "Maoist-type insurgent models" is mistaken. When American patriots hosted the Boston Tea Party, Chairman Mao was not yet conceived. T.E. Lawrence (of Arabia) had no guidance from Mao about swimming in the sea of the people; he didn't need it. Everyone with insurgency field experience knows a leaders influence is ineffective unless he lives, eats, sleeps, and fights side by side with the people to be influenced. Recruiting and training potential fighters by day and retreating to isolated, relatively safe compounds by night wins no hearts and minds and leaves trainers/advisors ignorant about what trainees actually do. If troops interface with an unfriendly or neutral population only to coerce or kill its members, they will create a hostile population. The manual makes these points well enough.

Shared hardships will not necessarily cause different cultures to meld; they will, however, make cross-cultural exchange and mutual tolerance almost inevitable. The manual emphasizes the necessity to avoid judging other cultures by American standards. Unless our COIN troops are literally immersed in those cultures and stay immersed long enough to develop tolerance (better yet, respect) for those cultures-they wiV/ be judgmental. The manual doesn't provide an adequate blueprint for how general-purpose troops (as opposed to more highly trained special forces) manage the hurdle. This is a shortcoming.

The manual acknowledges that all hearts and minds aren't susceptible to being won. "Extremists" must be killed or captured. History shows that unless insurgent leaders are killed, they will at least share power and may take over completely. George Washington, Sam Houston, Nelson Mandela, Fidel Castro, and Jomo Kenyatta are good examples. What the manual brushes over is the large number of extremists who may appear on the insurgent roster and how to deal with them en masse.

In practical terms, to use an example from an earlier war, every Japanese defender of Iwo Jima in 1945 was an extremist, not only willing to fight to the death but also tasked with killing 10 Marines before dying. No one balked at the necessity to kill 'em all in that conventional fight. Muqtada al-Sadr can probably put three times the number of extremists on the streets of Baghdad as defended Iwo Jima, all equally willing to fight and die. If their hearts and minds aren't up for grabs, do counterinsurgent planners consider them all legitimate targets? If they agree to quit and join the process we are trying to help Iraq develop, can we live with the result, that is, a government heavily influenced by a sect whose battle cry
is our country's destruction? Al-Sadr's support is reportedly vital to the current Iraqi Government. Does that make him a good guy, or is he an extremist? These are sticky questions many will say must be answered by U.S. political (civilian) leadership. Such questions won't arise in every insurgency we face. Military leaders and planners should be asked by political leaders what is militarily possible to achieve in a given insurgency, and what forces and actions it will take. The manual does not sufficiently address the peculiar situation we face in a current war and how we come to grips with similar situations in wars to come.

The manual doesn't adequately address the need for more troops to speak a foreign language. Properly vetting translators (described in detail) is no substitute for communicating directly with trainees and low-level foreign leaders. At a minimum, everyone assigned as a trainer or advisor should have working fluency in the local language. It isn't required on a conventional battlefield where killing the enemy is good enough, but you can't influence live people unless you communicate with them.

The manual states that not everybody can succeed as a COIN warrior. The Army Special Forces (Green Berets) will undoubtedly agree, and probably add that most conventional troops are woefully unqualified. Since troops don't get to choose their wars, however, and since there will never be enough special forces soldiers to win alone, the need for fresh doctrine to bring more general-purpose troops closer to COIN competence is obvious. The manual can clearly help close the gap.

The appendices are all useful, but one that will resonate especially well with company grade officers and noncommissioned officers is Appendix A. This appendix reads amazingly like the excellent article, "Twenty-Eight Articles" by LTC David Kilcullen, Australian Army, published in the July 2006 Marine Corps Gazette. Any critic of the manual, as well as troops preparing for deployment, should start by reading it. It is a superb reality check for anyone who doesn't understand why the COIN business is so hard.

Anyone who hopes to become well educated in COIN will have to dig deeply into the source material referenced in the manual. That overstates the obvious, while reinforcing how complicated, frustrating, and messy insurgencies are. This new joint effort at fresh doctrine is a fine start to broader institutional expertise, competence, and comfort with a type of warfare in which American troops have participated for centuries. If its relatively few shortcomings can be addressed and shored up by knowledgeable COIN veterans, the document-bolstered by an ever-expanding reading list based on newest "lessons learned"—should serve well for generations.

SIDEBAR
At a minimum, everyone assigned as a trainer or advisor should have working fluency in the local language.

LtCol Charles L. Armstrong, USMC(Ret)

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Preparing for Hybrid Wars

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ABSTRACT
But there are others, including the author of Savage Wars of Peace, Max Boot, who think we should return to our small wars legacy.1 Reembracing that role is an urgent task because the future of warfare is looking more and more like the Marines' past. Hybrid wars blend the lethality of state conflict with the fanatical and protracted fervor of irregular warfare. 5 In such conflicts, future adversaries can be nonstate groups that exploit access to encrypted command systems, man-portable air-to-surface missiles, and other modern lethal systems, as well as promote protracted insurgencies that employ ambushes, improvised explosive devices, and coercive assassinations.

FULL TEXT
What will be the future Marine Corps capability

The ongoing conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan reinforce Gen Charles C. Krulak's famous forecast about future conflicts. He predicted that the character of the next war would be unlike Operation DESERT STORM and more like the "stepchild of Chechnya." Now the Pentagon's renewed interest in irregular wars could renew a debate about the future of the Marine Corps. Several analysts suggest that the Marines revert to pre-World War II roots and focus solely on small wars.

One author has argued that the Marine Corps and Navy should serve as the system administrators to globalization and export security and free market economics to the undeveloped world-"the nonintegrating gap." The suggestion that the Marine Corps should devolve into a Third World Peace Corps is a bit much. But there are others, including the author of Savage Wars of Peace, Max Boot, who think we should return to our small wars legacy.1 Reembracing that role is an urgent task because the future of warfare is looking more and more like the Marines' past. Small wars-encompassing counterinsurgency, nation-building, and peacekeeping-seem likely to be the major challenge for the United States as it fights the war on terror. The Marines are well placed to play a leading role in this kind of irregular conflict, but to do so they will have to leave their glorious World War II heritage even further behind.2

This school of thought has its proponents inside the Corps. Since the Small Wars and Tentative Landing Parry Manuals were in codevelopment at Quantico in the 1930s there has been tension inside the Marine Corps between its amphibious and continental fighting roles. This line of reasoning argues that state-based conventional warfare is an increasingly unlikely contingency and that the continued rise of irregular challengers requires a response. This school points to the rise of fourth-generation warfare, as well as the need to govern the dangerous cesspools where jihadists prey on fragile states.

Certainly, this school has its points and can look to the Pentagon's 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). The report recognized the shift, concluding, "In the post-September 11 world, irregular warfare has emerged as the dominant form of warfare confronting the United States. "3 The QDR noted that fighting the "long war" against terrorism and meeting rotational requirements would be the basis for sizing and shaping the military. This viewpoint suggests we sharpen our focus on this increasingly likely form of warfare, but it does not mean we can just dust off the Small Wars Manual or argue for jettisoning our amphibious legacy.
But the QDR miscast the real future challenge. Tomorrow's conflicts will not be easily categorized into simple classifications of conventional or irregular warfare. In fact, some of today's best thinking acknowledges the blurring of lines between modes of war. Our greatest challenge will not come from a state that selects one approach but from states or groups that select from the whole menu of tactics and technologies to meet their own strategic culture and geography. Many analysts have captured these trends, with Russian, Australian, and American authors talking about multimodal and multivariant forms of war. A pair of Chinese colonels is notorious for their conception of unrestricted warfare—or war without limits. Rather than the "quad chart" found in the new National Defense Strategy, future scenarios will more likely present unique combinations that are specifically designed to target U.S. vulnerabilities. Conventional, irregular, and catastrophic terrorist challenges will not be distinct styles; they will all be present in some form. The combination could include states blending high-tech capabilities like antisatellite weapons with terrorism and cyberwarfare directed against financial targets.

The Pentagon has yet to catch up to the front pages of the newspaper. Its multichallenger quad chart properly shifts the Department of Defenses portfolio from an overemphasis on conventional threats. However, instead of a single option, our adversaries could choose to explore unknown combinations—something LtGen James N. Mattis once called "hybrid wars." Hybrid wars blend the lethality of state conflict with the fanatical and protracted fervor of irregular warfare. In such conflicts, future adversaries can be nonstate groups that exploit access to encrypted command systems, man-portable air-to-surface missiles, and other modern lethal systems, as well as promote protracted insurgencies that employ ambushes, improvised explosive devices, and coercive assassinations. The term hybrid captures both their organization and their means. States will employ terrorism as an operational method, and nonstate actors will gain and use state-like conventional capabilities. States will shift their conventional to irregular formations and adopt new tactics, as Iran appears to be doing. We will face major states capable of supporting coven and indirect means of attack, as well as groups with state-like capability sets, or Thomas Friedman's "superempowered" fanatics capable of highly lethal attacks undercutting the sinews of global order. Cunning savagery, continuous improvisation, and rampant organizational adaptation will mark this form of warfare.

Clearly future opponents will avoid fighting the American way of war, where we optimize our Industrial Age mass or Information Age prominence and our preferred rule sets of war. The likeliest opponents on future battlefields accept no rules. Their principal approach will be to avoid predictability and seek advantage in unexpected ways and ruthless modes of attack. We can expect to see a lot of tactical plagiarism, with our opponent learning from us, coupled with wild cards or hybrid adaptation where our adversary has learned how to use high technology in unique and unanticipated ways. We will also face primitive forms of warfare and criminal activity that long ago was proscribed by Western society.

Future enemies will seek their own degree of "shock and awe" with crude barbarity (with video) rather than precision weaponry. What we ironically call irregular warfare will become increasingly familiar but with greater velocity and greater lethality than in the past. Arguably, the Marine Corps could extend its well-founded legacy of warfighting excellence, its expeditionary ethos, and its institutional agility for this new era.

Complicating the problem, the battlespace in tomorrow's hybrid wars will take place in complex terrain, most likely the burgeoning cities of the developing world. The hybrid challenger realizes that complex terrain affords defenders a number of advantages that offset our conventional superiority. Recent combat operations suggest a shift toward what can be called the contested zones. These zones include the dense urban jungles and the congested littorals where the majority of the world's population and economic activity is centered. As seen in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq, irregular adversaries are adopting tactics and modes of operations to offset our firepower and advantages in intelligence collection, surveillance, and reconnaissance. Today, dense urban terrain provides similar safe havens to the urban guerrilla or terrorist where the density of population, transportation networks, public services and infrastructure, and structures gives him multiple avenues of escape and the ability to hide while planning and rehearsing operations. The density of the urban complex provides sufficient cover and noise to mask the adversary's preparation and attack position. Engaging American forces in the contested zone with a range of crude but effective asymmetric approaches is intended to draw out conflicts, protract their duration and costs, and sap American will. This strategy will come as no news to the veterans of Operation AL FAJIR in Fallujah.

Hezbollah and Hybrid Wars

We may have just seen the birth of the first hybrid challenger in Lebanon. Hezbollah, led by Hassan Nasrallah, demonstrated a number of state-like military capabilities, including thousands of short- and intermediate-range rockets and missiles. This case demonstrates the ability of nonstate actors to study and deconstruct the vulnerabilities of Western-style militaries, and devise appropriate countermeasures.
The amorphous Hezbollah is representative of the rising hybrid threat. This past summer's battle in southern Lebanon reveals significant weaknesses in the posture of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF), but it has implications for American defense planners too. Mixing an organized political movement with decentralized cells employing adaptive tactics in ungoverned zones, Hezbollah showed that it could inflict as well as take punishment. Its highly disciplined, well-trained, distributed cells contested ground and wills against a modern conventional force using an admixture of guerrilla tactics and technology in densely packed urban centers. Hezbollah's use of C-802 antiship cruise missiles and volleys of rockets represents a sample of what hybrid warfare might look like.

Hezbollah's antitank weapons include the Russian made RPG29, a powerful variation on a standard rocket propelled grenade; the Russian Metis, which has a range of 1 mile; and the Russian built Kornet, which has a range of 3 miles and thermal sights for tracking the heat signatures of tanks. Hezbollah even managed to launch a few armed unmanned aircraft systems that the IDF had little problem knocking down. There is evidence that Hezbollah has invested in signals intelligence and monitored IDF cell phone calls for some time, as well as unconfirmed reports that they managed to deencrypt frequency-hopping radio traffic against IDF communications using an algorithm-based system similar to SINCGARS.

Claims about a victory for Nasrallah are a bit dubious in strictly military terms. But one thing is certain, the IDF's credibility has been weakened, and Hezbollah has come out of the conflict with a stronger ideological appeal. However, Israel failed to route out the Iranian-backed force and may have lost the strategic battle of perceptions. Hezbollah was able to exploit the political effects of their limited tactical successes, as magnified by the media. Their intelligence was clearly faulty, as was their conventional fighting readiness and logistics.

Hezbollah's real advantage lay not in technology but in having the luxury of being able to prepare the terrain and their tactics for a single recognized enemy. They operated as decentralized cells, and their training and tenacity paid off. They proved willing to engage the IDF in prepared close encounters and were willing to absorb great punishment to inflict a cost. Their Katushayas and Kornet missiles extracted a price for Israel's intervention. Retired Army officer Ralph Peters, who visited Lebanon during the fighting, observed that Hezbollah:

. . . displayed impressive flexibility, relying on the ability of cellular units to combine rapidly for specific operations, or when cut off to operate independently after falling in on pre-positioned stockpiles of weapons and ammunition. Hezbollah combat cells were a hybrid of guerrillas and regular troops—a form of opponent that U.S. forces are apt to encounter with increasing frequency.8 (Emphasis added.)

Peters is on the money, as usual. Organizations like Hamas are already emulating Hezbollah. According to Jane's Defence Weekly, Hamas has just taken delivery of a supply of AT-5 antiarmor missile systems as well as some SA-7s.9 Postings on Hamas web sites suggest that they are an active learning organization, working off of Hezbollah's perceived success. We would do well to study this prototype of an effective 21st century hybrid army.

Implications

Hybrid wars do not allow us the luxury of building single-mission forces; we don't have the luxury of working one block in a three block war world. What we need is a modern-day synthesis of our extraordinary expeditionary tools and attitudes. This requires a balance between our potent conventional combat capability and our small wars tool kit. This new balance should retain the Corps' historical role as the Nation's shock troops but also prepare the Marines for more protracted and subtle missions instead of short "first in/first out" missions or "operational raids" from the sea. Robust and integrated combined arms teams, capable of adapting their mode of operations and tailoring their forces against potent adversaries, are needed. These combined arms teams will require military forces that are not merely "general purpose" but are professional multipurpose units. Because of its institutional capacity for excellence, continuous evolution, and tactical improvisation, the Marine Corps is well suited for this coming age. We have historically worked at transition operations, transitioning from peace to crisis response, from ship to shore, and between the blocks of the three block war. We have the doctrinal basis and organizational flexibility to excel in hybrid conflict.10

A force prepared for this environment would have to possess a unique set of expeditionary characteristics. The force's preparedness for close quarters battle would be high, as would its readiness for protecting and controlling a large number of noncombatants in densely populated cities. (Think of Najaf and Fallujah in April 2004.) This force would have to be prepared for protean opponents or known adversaries employing unpredicted tactics or asymmetric technologies. We will need to improve our long-range anticipatory intelligence, as well as our research base into future threats and adversary reasoning. We could also improve our red teaming and experimentation with irregular and disruptive approaches.

Such a force would be equally prepared to thwart very adaptive enemies by posing irregular, catastrophic, or disruptive operations of its own. A force prepared to address hybrid threats would have to be built upon a solid professional military
foundation, but it would also place a premium on the cognitive skills to recognize or quickly adapt to the unknown. Success in hybrid wars requires small unit leaders with decisionmaking skills and tactical cunning to respond to the unknown-and the equipment sets to react or adapt faster than tomorrow's foe. Organizational learning and adaptation would be at a premium.

At the individual level, we need to determine the "sweet spot" to which all Marines must be educated, trained, and equipped for them to operate successfully and seamlessly in a hybrid battlespace. We don't have the luxury of focusing on a single opponent, and we don't have the luxury of deciding to focus on a single quadrant in the Pentagon's threat matrix either. In short, we need to develop a hybrid warrior-who is capable of seamlessly operating and winning on any type of battlespace and who has the proper mix of education and training to enable that Marine to recognize, adapt to, and defeat threats not yet known. This should shift the perception of the Marine Corps from a general purpose force useful for enabling others to a very professional multipurpose force of choice, with a commensurate claim for resources. The special operations forces (SOF) community has this degree of flexibility but not the staying power required to seize and occupy contested zones against hybrid threats. But this battlespace will have many uses for the ultimate "shadow warriors" from the SOF.

Ending

So what exactly is the future for today's Leathernecks? A simplistic choice of big versus small wars is flawed. The United States can't imagine all future threats as state based and completely conventional or assume that state-based conflict has passed into history's dustbin. There are many who have made that assumption before and have been consistently proven mistaken. State-based conflict is less likely, but it is certainly not extinct. We should not assume that all state-centric warfare is completely conventional. Any cursory reading of Chinese strategic culture suggests otherwise.

The Pentagon's strategy and QDR expand the U.S. military's mission set outside of its comfort zone and beyond its preference for fighting conventional forces. We can no longer focus just on battles against preferred enemies, vice campaigns versus thinking opponents. Nor can we assume that the option set is a nice contrast of large-scale conventional conflicts versus messy but limited terrorists. Hezbollah clearly demonstrates the ability of nonstate actors to study and deconstruct the vulnerabilities of Western-style militaries and devise appropriate countermeasures. The price for complacency—for not preparing for complex or hybrid threats—is sharply rising.

SIDEBAR

Future enemies will seek their own degree of "shock and awe" with crude barbarity (with video) rather than precision weaponry.

SIDEBAR

Our greatest challenge will not come from a state that selects one approach but from states or groups that select from the whole menu of tactics and technologies to meet their own strategic culture and geography.

SIDEBAR

At the individual level, we need to determine the "sweet spot" to which all Marines must be educated, trained, and equipped for them to operate successfully and seamlessly in a hybrid battlespace.

SIDEBAR

Do you want to comment on this article? Go to www.mcamarines.org/forum.

FOOTNOTE

Notes


LtCol Huffman, a frequent contributor to MCG, is a Research Fellow, Center for Emerging Threats and Opportunities, Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory, Quantico.

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GRAPHIC: Photographs

IMAGE PHOTOGRAPH, Photo: In hybrid warfare, what will be the role of our conventional forces like tanks? (Photo by GySgt Mark Oliva.)

IMAGE PHOTOGRAPH, A mixture of guerrilla tactics and high technology can contest conventional forces. (Photo by GSgt Rob Blakenship.)

IMAGE PHOTOGRAPH, Hybrid warfare does not allow us the luxury of working one block in a three block war. (Photo by Sgt Ree F. Seigle.)

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Editorial: Views From the Deckplate

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ABSTRACT
At the tactical level, several articles decried what Bing West, a former Marine, former Assistant Secretary of Defense, and prolific author, has called the "catch and release policy" when it comes to captured insurgents. Given that counterinsurgency operations are focused on the populace, several authors felt that our current policy of rotating command elements after 1 year and units after 7 months hampered our ability to operate effectively in a culture that puts personal relations above all else.

FULL TEXT
This month we announce the Boldness and Daring award winners of the Chase Prize Essay Contest. One of the interesting benefits of the contest, for those of us who sit on the selection committee, is the view we get of some of the issues that are resonating on the deckplate throughout the Marine Corps. There were some interesting themes that brought in multiple entries on the same topic from different authors.

At the tactical level, several articles decried what Bing West, a former Marine, former Assistant Secretary of Defense, and prolific author, has called the "catch and release policy" when it comes to captured insurgents. The authors strongly believed that through technology and information sharing, as well as policy changes, we have to take a different approach and hold insurgents as prisoners. A second theme was the current personnel policies we are using to fight the war. Given that counterinsurgency operations are focused on the populace, several authors felt that our current policy of rotating command elements after 1 year and units after 7 months hampered our ability to operate effectively in a culture that puts personal relations above all else. Several articles fell under the rubric of personnel policies in general. Multiple papers addressed the challenges of recruiting and suggested changes to current practices. Two articles, including the winning article, addressed issues affecting rotary-wing aviation. The winning articles all proposed a sea change in current procurement, practice, or policy. Over the next several months we will publish many of the entries, and I believe that you will agree that Marines have not lost the ability to propose a better way.

Another window on the deckplate is a section that we have added to this month's issue, titled "From the Discussion Board." To fit this section in we have truncated the "Letters" section. Additional letters to the editor may be found on our web site at www.mca-marines.org/gazette. I have published, with slight editing for length, two of the threads that have appeared recently on the discussion board. One is a posting that details a conversation with a lieutenant recently returned from Iraq. Clearly this lieutenant "gets it" when it comes to the current fight and what it will take to be successful. Equally clearly, he rode a learning curve that might not have been necessary with more effective training and transfer of tactical lessons learned. The entire post and others may be found at www.mca-marines.org/gazette. Just click on the link for the discussion board. As a final observation, the growth of the discussion board has been slow. We will not disclose the identities of posters. In fact we only have a valid e-mail address for participants and not an actual identity. We will only remove posts that violate the rules of the board. The purpose of the discussion board is to provide a forum to air and debate issues. Hopefully, it will prove a useful tool in fulfilling an important function within the Marine Corps.

John Keenan

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On the Conduct of War

BYLINE: Mujica, Mauro III

SECTION: IDEAS & ISSUES: (DOCTRINE); Pg. 33 Vol. 91 No. 4 ISSN: 0025-3170

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ABSTRACT
The numbers themselves highlight the effectiveness of the enemy's principal weapon against coalition forces. While we train our Marines in the classroom to find gaps to maneuver on the enemy, the continuing course of action in Iraq has been to bolt more armor onto our vehicles and develop more sophisticated electronic countermeasures. The Marine Corps takes great pride in its ability to give subordinates the commander's intent allowing for decentralized execution. While the insurgency can be likened to organized crime, the Marine Corps is certainly not the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

FULL TEXT
Applying theoretical doctrine into practical application

Maneuver warfare is defined as a:

... warfighting philosophy that seeks to shatter the enemy's cohesion through a variety of rapid, focused, and unexpected actions which create a turbulent and rapidly deteriorating situation with which the enemy cannot cope.1

The theory is simple in its idea yet complex in its application. It is possibly the first thing that every second lieutenant is taught—and is certainly the most valuable. It has proven over the years that the Marine Corps as a military force is in a league of its own. The idea itself is not new. Sun Tzu, in The Art of War, described similar principles. They are as true today as they were 2,000 years ago. In order to be successful in Iraq and in future operations, maneuver warfare must not only be emphasized in theoretical discussions and the classroom, but it must be ingrained into the way we conduct our operations.

In March 2003 coalition forces barreled across the Iraqi border to liberate a nation under a tyrannical government and advance our national security. We again demonstrated that U.S. military forces engaged in conventional operations are unmatched. It should be no shock then that the enemy forces that remained would begin utilizing unconventional methods to inflict maximum casualties.

The improvised explosive device (IED), a rather simple concoction, has become the ideal weapon to employ against occupying forces with predictable main supply routes. One can immediately see the "surface" that has caused such devastating casualties, yet we have done little to find the "gap." The numbers themselves highlight the effectiveness of the enemy's principal weapon against coalition forces. While we train our Marines in the classroom to find gaps to maneuver on the enemy, the continuing course of action in Iraq has been to bolt more armor onto our vehicles and develop more sophisticated electronic countermeasures. These actions contribute to a cycle in which we develop new ways to protect ourselves from IEDs while the enemy evolves more sophisticated IEDs, as witnessed by die implementation of the pressure or motion switches that are being seen today.

We have in fact been practicing the opposite of maneuver warfare. We have found the enemy's surface and have pushed even harder into it. We allow our enemy to completely control the tempo of the fight by controlling the who, when, and
where of contact. During 4 months in Ramadi our battalion didn't catch one confirmed triggerman in the aftermath of an IED attack. With all of the capabilities that the Marine Corps has, we are long overdue to reorient and act.

The use of IEDs has created a central problem that is compounded when given the nature of this war; it grants the enemy anonymity. Coalition forces can't orient on an insurgent force that can't be identified. Given the amount of emphasis our doctrine places on orienting on the enemy, it should be obvious that drastic action is required if we are to succeed in defeating this very stealthy foe.

We should try to understand the unique characteristics that make the enemy function so that we can penetrate the system, tear it apart, and, if necessary, destroy the isolated components. We should seek to identify and attack critical vulnerabilities and those centers of gravity without which the enemy cannot function effectively.

A clear line needs to be drawn distinguishing an informant from a source, which would clarify which people would necessitate HETs. The potential for turf wars to begin within the Marine Corps is certain, which is prohibiting them from developing informants, which in turn is hampering our intelligence efforts. Again, we are not Central Intelligence Agency case officers and do not need to run sources. But, with strict guidelines, allowing commanders to field interrogate within a very specific set of guidelines is prohibiting them from developing informants, which in turn is hampering our intelligence efforts. A clear line needs to be drawn distinguishing an informant from a source, which would clarify which people would necessitate HETs. The potential for turf wars to begin within the Marine Corps is certain, which is prohibiting them from developing informants, which in turn is hampering our intelligence efforts. A clear line needs to be drawn distinguishing an informant from a source, which would clarify which people would necessitate HETs. The potential for turf wars to begin within the Marine Corps is certain, which is prohibiting them from developing informants, which in turn is hampering our intelligence efforts. A clear line needs to be drawn distinguishing an informant from a source, which would clarify which people would necessitate HETs. The potential for turf wars to begin within the Marine Corps is certain, which is prohibiting them from developing informants, which in turn is hampering our intelligence efforts.

Human intelligence is vital for successful operations in Iraq. With the HET's current manning level, platoon commanders and above should be authorized to field interrogate and handle low-level informants.

The Marine Corps derives its historical combat supremacy from our ability to strike from the land, air, or sea. Every second lieutenant can remember the lectures at The Basic School and learning about the Corps' history. In Iraq today we must utilize all of the assets that the Marine Corps has to offer in order to create an unpredictable atmosphere in which enemy forces can no longer dictate the pace of contact. If insurgent forces are laying IEDs along our main supply routes, then why not fly over them? If Iraq is the land of two rivers, why don't we use them to float around the IEDs? The argument of a high risk to benefit ratio is already moot. It goes without saying that helicopter or boat operations require more planning than normal vehicle operations, but the benefit of these operations far outweighs the burden of the planning. It is already clear that the majority of insurgents spend far more time planning their extract than their ambush. At this stage, we have made ourselves predictable and have continually invited ambushes. By using helicopters and small riverine
craft, we invalidate the enemy’s principal weapon. Vehicles are extremely useful and powerful assets that should continue to be utilized in Iraq. The ability to provide a powerful communications platform, their substantial firepower, and their protection against small arms makes them an invaluable combat power multiplier. Yet, to rely on them as we do in Ramadi, and I suspect across Iraq, is much like giving the star football player the ball on every down. Very quickly the opponent will adapt and begin to double- or tripleteam his efforts. When using vehicles, we must do so deliberately.

Imagine inserting a raid force with small boats while having a few support gun trucks moving parallel along a cleared supply route that has been under observation for 24 hours. IEDs would prove useless against the primary raid force, and therefore, the enemy would be forced to use small arms to inflict damage. Now the enemy is forced into a dilemma. Does he choose to attack with small arms knowing that vehicles could vector in on his position within moments? By examining this scenario we see that it is indeed risky but far less threatening than continually driving on unpaved roads where we can be certain to continue being hit by IEDs. Taking the scenario further, let us assume the enemy engages our force. The mobile units could cordon the house or block and fire upon the enemy. Dismounts can move in and begin interrogating those present as well as the surrounding neighbors. The IO component is utilized with the neighbors by informing them that they have been disrupted because anticoalition forces have been operating in their neighborhood. Another mobile section could launch, allowing the commander to continue with the raid. A combined arms effect has been created that sets up a favorable atmosphere in which to gather intelligence, conduct successful operations, and force the enemy to divulge his location.

Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1 (MCDP 1), Warfighting, is our doctrine. It is the Marine Corps’ warfighting philosophy. Its principles must be fully utilized if the Marine Corps is going to be successful in Iraq. Maneuver warfare is an ongoing process, and we must continue to assess the enemy’s center of gravity and critical vulnerabilities. But the act is meaningless if we do not reorient and execute on our new conclusions. We must train and use our sea and air capabilities to create an unpredictable environment to decrease the effectiveness of the IED. Furthermore, decentralize execution and allow the commanders to create their own IO and field interrogate low-level informants. To maintain our status as the elite of the world's military forces we must continue our scholastic analysis of the theoretical principles of warfighting but also begin to apply them practically.

FOOTNOTE
Notes
2. To date there have been 2,444 U.S. deaths as a result of hostile fire. IEDs are responsible for 1,105 of those killed in action, accounting for 45.2 percent of all hostile fire fatalities. Information is available at http://www.icasualties.org/oif, accessed on 19 January 2007.
3. MCDP 1, p. 76.

by 1stLt Mauro Mujica III
1stLt Mujica is assigned to Co L, 3d Bn, 7th Mar, Twentynine Palms. This article was his entry in the Chase Prize Essay Contest.

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GRAPHIC: Photographs
IMAGE PHOTOGRAPH, Discerning insurgents from the general population is not always as simple as black and white.
IMAGE PHOTOGRAPH, Air capabilities must create an unpredictable environment for the enemy. (Photo by Cpl C. Alex Herron.)
IMAGE PHOTOGRAPH, Aviation movements can avoid roads plagued with IED ambushes. (Photo by CW02 Tim Dryden.)

DOCUMENT-TYPE: Commentary
Planning Large Convoys in a Hostile Area

BYLINE: Pallotta, Maria J.

by Maj Maria J. Pallotta

Maj Pallotta is currently the Regimental Operations Officer, Combat Logistics Regiment 2 (CLR-2). She has deployed twice to Iraq, once as the Operations Officer, CLR-25, and once as the Commander, Transportation Support Company, CLR-15.

SECTION: IDEAS & ISSUES (LOGISTICS); Pg. 38 Vol. 91 No. 5 ISSN: 0025-3170

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ABSTRACT

Motor transport, combat engineer, communications, landing support, maintenance, and supply Marines now find themselves at forward operating bases surrounded by hostile forces, and for those who regularly leave the wire, it is imperative that their combat skills match the threat they regularly face. (For example, in Iraq, think of a route that goes from Camp Fallujah west to Trebil on the Jordanian border.) A unit may not be able to afford to give up a maneuver element to ride in one of the passenger trucks, and even if it did, it might not be able to respond to enemy action in a reasonable amount of time, given the sizable length of the convoy.

FULL TEXT

Attention to detail pays worthwhile dividends

Ever since Operation IRAQI FREEDOM II in early 2004 and he rise of the Iraqi insurgency, logistics units have found themselves on the nebulous frontlines of the fight. Of course, there is no traditional or linear frontline anymore, but instead there is a cloud of enemy activity throughout the Corps’ battlespace. Motor transport, combat engineer, communications, landing support, maintenance, and supply Marines now find themselves at forward operating bases surrounded by hostile forces, and for those who regularly leave the wire, it is imperative that their combat skills match the threat they regularly face. Solid, detailed convoy planning is essential to moving successfully through a hostile area and delivering all classes of supply to supported units. Traditional convoy planning instructions are not always sufficient for the dynamic combat environment of an insurgent war.

The Marine Corps has put together some outstanding training for logistics Marines who will find themselves traveling through Iraq or other hostile areas in large convoys (or what are commonly referred to as combat logistics patrols). MOJAVE VIPER in Twentynine Palms runs a convoy operations course that is geared toward smaller, direct support movements with an attached maneuver element that will close with and destroy the enemy. The reality at the Marine logistics group level (and other support units from the wing and the Marine expeditionary force headquarters group) is that
most, if not all, large convoy movements will not fit into the neat, standard package of what is normally taught during predeployment training. Most convoys, especially the general support ones, will have as attachments several or many civilian 40-foot tractor-trailers, some driven by Americans, and perhaps all of them driven by third country nationals (TCNs). These vehicles usually have neither armor nor weapons, and the walkie-talkies they use for communications are rendered useless with many of the newer improvised explosive device (IED) countermeasures devices. In the case of TCNs, there is usually a language barrier as well. Therefore, a unit may have integrated with it civilian vehicles that have no armor, no weapons, and no easy way of communicating with the rest of the convoy. These general support convoys may be anywhere from 20 to 60 vehicles long, spanning many kilometers. Even when a unit has the personnel to mount a mobile quick reaction force (QRF), this QRF may be several thousand meters away from where enemy contact is actually occurring in another part of the convoy. For example, a 50-vehicle convoy with 100-meter dispersion between trucks will span a length of 5 clicks (5,000 meters).

There are various aspects to consider when assembling a long convoy (20 or more vehicles) for transit through a hostile area. It is important to remember that such logistics movements have as their main goal the delivery of critical supplies (including food, water, ammunition, repair parts, and mail, among others) and not closing with and destroying the enemy. Locating the enemy and suppressing or even killing him is certainly desired, but vectoring in air support or a local QRF is the more likely method of dealing with the threat while ensuring that the cargo arrives at its destination so that it can get into the hands of the warfighter. In any case, serving in any of the logistics fields previously mentioned means that, more than ever before, convoy commanders and their assistants need to be well versed in every aspect of the Marine air-ground task force.

Begin Planning

After completing a thorough METT-T (mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available) analysis, it is usually apparent that, other than possible air support, a convoy may very well be on its own for protecting itself. The route may traverse through wide-open, nonurban areas, and the nearest QRF may be many miles away. (For example, in Iraq, think of a route that goes from Camp Fallujah west to Trebil on the Jordanian border.) A unit may not be able to afford to give up a maneuver element to ride in one of the passenger trucks, and even if it did, it might not be able to respond to enemy action in a reasonable amount of time, given the sizable length of the convoy. What is more likely is the use of a highly maneuverable security element that rides in front of and behind the convoy’s main body. With machineguns mounted in HMMWVs, this element will be responsible for protecting the other vehicles, both military and civilian.

Additionally, before a convoy can transit through a hostile area, a significant amount of time must be spent gathering and applying relevant intelligence. The battalion S-2 section (or any intelligence shop collocated with the unit) should have this information, along with enemy trends and imagery for all areas where the convoy will travel. Once the mission is clarified, ensure that the S-3 (operations) shop arranges for all necessary frequencies, coordination information, and how to call for the QRF in each battlespace. Before each convoy movement, a thorough intelligence brief should be given to the commander. This brief should occur as close to the departure time as possible so as to ensure that the most recent information is passed. Likewise, at the destination the convoy commander should receive an updated intelligence brief from the appropriate unit at that location. Once the mission is complete, the S-2 needs to debrief the commander thoroughly in order to compose an after-action report. This report will be useful in detecting trends and recommending changes to the unit’s tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP).

The Basics

There are four main decisions a convoy planner needs to make upfront. These are the types of decisions that will become part of a unit’s standing operating procedures (SOP), and they include the following: size limit of the convoy (maximum number of vehicles that will operate outside the wire), guntruck ratio, dispersion between vehicles, and size of the security element. Each of these will be discussed in detail.

The size of the convoy is ultimately limited by the number of vehicles and drivers the unit possesses, plus all attachments. More likely, however, is that the convoy size will be limited to the maximum number of vehicles that the convoy commander is reasonably able to control. The other basics must be taken into account when figuring this number: military versus civilian vehicle numbers (TCNs will often bunch up and not follow proper dispersion distances, plus they do not all speak English and can essentially drive away from the convoy on their own if they feel like it) and the dispersion distance. Some commanders are comfortable with controlling 50 or more vehicles; some will make the number smaller depending on the situation. Generally, the more open and flat the terrain, the larger the convoy can be.
In determining dispersion distance between vehicles, consider percent illumination of the moon, morrise and moonset, use of night vision goggles (NVG), and the nature of the terrain (is it hilly or flat, etc.). Each machinegunner must be able to provide interlocking fields of fire with the gun truck in front of or behind him; this means he must be able to see that far. Weather will be the biggest factor during the daytime, and weather and the moon will be the biggest factors at night. NVG are highly useful assets at night, but when escorting civilian tractortrailers, chances are those drivers will not have NVG and the entire convoy will have to move with their lights on. In this case a shorter dispersion distance may be required.

If the vehicles are also using any of the various electronic jamming devices for use against IEDs, then dispersion will also be determined by the protective "bubble" around each vehicle. If each vehicle carries one of these systems, then it is ideal for their bubbles to overlap so that a command-detonated IED cannot detonate and damage the convoy. Again, some or all of the civilian vehicles in the convoy may have none of these devices, rendering the bubble factor a moot point. Experience and common sense show that the ideal way to employ these systems is to spread them out evenly in the convoy so that all major segments have at least one device. Obviously, this technique will change rapidly as technology and the enemy threat change at an ever-increasing pace.

The final basic decision to make is that of convoy security. Whether a convoy provides its own or has a security element attached, this handful of vehicle operators needs to be set apart from the main body's drivers and given a slightly different focus. They will not be transporting cargo and should not be given any cargo or delivery-related tasks. They should be in HMMWVs for maximum mobility, preferably the top-of-the-line infantry variant (currently the M1114) designed for maximum protection and possessing capable communications assets and a turret. This may, however, be wishful thinking, so scraping together whatever HMMWVs a unit does have, or perhaps even using an MTVR gun truck or two, will suffice. The most important trait for this mission is mobility, with heavy firepower a close second. Along with deciding the number of security vehicles (usually somewhere between three and six), the convoy commander must decide how many Marines will be in each of these vehicles. Filling each HMMWV with four or five personnel is ideal, but using three will also work. It goes without saying that, ideally, each member of this team should be able to perform all required tasks—driving, machinegunning, talking on the radio, etc., along with all fire and maneuver basic rifleman skills.

The Order

Generally, a good, thorough five-paragraph order should take at least 1/2 hour to give; some may take longer. Using vague and all-encompassing statements, such as "per the SOP" or "as we normally do," should not be used in the order, even if the unit travels the same routes regularly. Not only does the order need to reemphasize key points and TTP each time, but oftentimes there will also be extra personnel attached to the convoy. Take nothing for granted and err on the side of reciting copious amounts of detail. If the commander fears that he or she might lose the audience's attention because of the amount of detail, then have the Marines participate by calling on them to fill in the blanks of the order verbally or answering pointed questions regarding the order and TTP; this participation will keep them alert.

A unit may choose to have the convoy commander give the entire order; some units allow the security team leader to give the immediate actions portion of the order. This decision should be determined by the comfort level of the commander and the speaking abilities of the security team leader. Issuing an order is pointless if the audience cannot hear a loud, motivated, and knowledgeable speaker.

Along with the normal required parts of a five-paragraph order, it is important to include the specific location of each key billet holder in the convoy (convoy commander, assistant convoy commander, security team leader, corpsman, combat lifesavers, radio operators, mechanics, etc.), as well as the location of key vehicles and equipment (wrecker or other maintenance vehicle, tow bars, medical bags, etc.). Reviewing rules of engagement and escalation of force procedures is advisable (and is often required), as well as discussing a lost vehicle/lost personnel plan and catchup speed—that is, if the unit uses a catchup speed. Some units choose to disallow this technique and instead have the entire convoy simply slow down or go into a short security halt and wait for the vehicle(s) to catch up. This procedure allows the security element to proceed at their normal or slower pace so that they may continue their deliberate search for IEDs and other suspicious activity. Recent history has shown that convoys that move more slowly and deliberately with a "bring it on" mindset and posture are more effective against the enemy threat.

Also in the order be sure to discuss the bivouac plan if the mission is going to take longer than a day. If the unit is able to remain overnight at a base, then the planning is fairly simple and straightforward. If they have to bivouac outside in an unprotected area, then the commander will need to address a solid security plan and a watch rotation. Obviously, planning adequate sleep for all drivers is critical, since accidents are often more deadly than enemy attacks.
If the convoy includes vehicles driven by TCNs, there will be a language barrier in most cases, and these drivers will usually not be allowed to hear the normal brief, as it contains classified portions. Therefore, it is best to create a bilingual handout (in Arabic and English, for example, when in Iraq) to give to each driver. This handout should discuss rudimentary immediate actions for what they need to do in a given situation; e.g., vehicle breakdowns, IED attacks, security halts, accidents, etc. Keep the information basic and refrain from including anything classified or otherwise helpful to the enemy. A marking system should be used for all escorted civilian vehicles (TCN or otherwise) so that all members of the convoy know which trucks belong in the convoy. Numbered signs or reflective tape in various shapes have worked well in the past.

TTP Reviews

TTP reviews should be conducted as necessary (at least every few months) to brainstorm what can be done better and what should be changed in the unit SOP. Against a clever and everchanging enemy, these reviews will keep the unit from becoming too comfortable or setting too many patterns. The convoy SOP should be considered a living document—one that changes with the enemy and is updated as often as is required. The unit may find itself in a situation that they may not have specifically prepared for or previously discussed. Once the fog of war strikes, it is often up to the junior Marines to find a solution. During these reviews, encourage the Marines to devise the most convoluted scenarios and then have them come up with creative solutions. The more the small unit leader stretches the Marines' brains in training, the better they will be able to think during a crisis. This must be done continuously.

Safety and Maintenance

Finally, it is worth mentioning the importance of maintaining all vehicles in a roadworthy status so that the unit can accomplish its mission from day to day. Being a motor transport officer in charge of convoys is not simply about TTP and weaponry. If the operators are not aggressive about preventive maintenance and prompt induction of vehicles into the maintenance cycle, then the unit will not be able to run any convoys in the first place. Those in leadership positions need a solid foundation in maintenance management procedures and a practical understanding of how they work while deployed. What is taught in logistics school is often not enough. If the unit has its own organic mechanics, then this task becomes easier. If not, then they need to work out a system with the nearest maintenance unit to have line mechanics attached or in direct support of the operators. Having line mechanics go over each vehicle as soon as it comes off the road pays immense dividends. If some of the Marine operators learn what to look for through on-the-job training with mechanics, then these dividends will increase. In a harsh environment, annual preventive maintenance checks and services should be conducted more often, even four times a year if possible. These checks will dramatically increase readiness; that is, if higher headquarters is able to support them. When planning how many vehicles and drivers are needed for a deployment, a factor between 1.2 and 1.5 drivers per truck will normally suffice; this number allows for a normal deadline of vehicles that are inducted into the maintenance cycle.

Safety will always be emphasized in the motor transport community, and justifiably so. The biggest threat outside of enemy action is motor vehicle accidents and mishaps. From the highest leaders on down, seat belts need to be worn consistently, along with all proper personal protective equipment. Using chock blocks is a daily necessity every time the vehicle stops to unload or park. Adequate sleep for the operators is essential, and establishing an appropriate battle rhythm for extended operations is key. It is bad practice to try to sprint through a marathon. Along with staying awake and alert is the importance of driver experience. Overcorrecting a vehicle, especially a loaded LVS, is the usual cause of vehicle rollovers, which can be deadly. Ensure that the Marines know how to drive around and over deep ruts and canals, know the fording limits of each vehicle, and know how to grab the gunner’s legs during a rollover. Above all, do whatever it takes to fight complacency. Most convoys are peaceful and occur safely without incident. Because of this, Marines of all ranks begin to think that they are invincible and that nothing bad will happen to them. However, each time they leave die wire, they are starting from zero, and anything can happen regardless of past experience. Every day is day one. And this may very well be the most burdensome challenge and planning consideration for a convoy commander when conducting large convoy operations in a hostile area.

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GRAPHIC: Equations
Tempo, Technology, and Hubris

BYLINE: Martin, Zachary D.

by Capt Zachary D. Martin

Capt Martin is an infantry officer serving in Iraq. This article was his entry in the Chase Prize Essay Contest.

SECTION: IDEAS & ISSUES (C2); Pg. 50 Vol. 91 No. 5 ISSN: 0025-3170

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ABSTRACT

During OIF I we discarded obsolete tactical control measures and techniques that could not maintain support for our rapid advance. In the counterinsurgency fight we need to revise our operational terms and graphics publications, because we are still briefing operations that feature "big blue arrows" of axes of advance and other concepts that make no sense in fighting an insurgency. Yet oddly, in the slow pace of operations in Iraq, the planning process is so drawn out that the "one-third/two-thirds" concept-the rule of thumb that we should ideally use only one-third of available planning time ourselves and leave two-thirds of available time to our subordinates to do their own planning, preparation, and rehearsals-has been almost completely forsaken.

FULL TEXT

The garrison mentality in Iraq

The pace of counter-insurgency operations in Iraq is indeed misleading us. We demonstrated during lighting-paced Operation IRAQI FREEDOM I (OIF I) against the uniformed Iraqi Army that we are capable of following our own maneuver warfare doctrine and achieving overwhelming tempo. We have demonstrated during the subsequent counterinsurgency fight against a hodgepodge of guerrilla and terrorist organizations that once the pressure is off we often fall victim to our own "garrison" mentality that is completely contrary to all of our forward thinking on warfighting. During OIF I we discarded obsolete tactical control measures and techniques that could not maintain support for our rapid advance. In the counterinsurgency fight we need to revise our operational terms and graphics publications, because we are still briefing...
operations that feature "big blue arrows" of axes of advance and other concepts that make no sense in fighting an insurgency.

Prior to deploying to Iraq recently, I was adjoined to read The Small Wars Manual. In fact, my battalion distributed copies of the book and held professional military education sessions in which it was discussed. During my tour in Iraq, however, I discovered that this book, like S.L.A. Marshall's The Soldier's Load and the Mobility da Nation, is one that everybody has on their shelves and nobody has read. I had the opportunity to work with several battalions conducting the counterinsurgency fight in several different areas of Iraq and found diat, for the most part, we have allowed our own hubris, aided and abetted by our command and control (C^sup 2^) technology, to undermine our efforts to win.

Tempo

In training we naturally seek to minimize risk to our Marines using operational risk management and other planning techniques to ensure that the hazards imposed in training are worth the payoff. Even in training we often err too far on the side of caution. Realistic training may be worth some risk to life or limb if it better prepares our Marines for the greater risks of combat. While we also strive to avoid unnecessary danger in combat, we recognize that winning against a thinking enemy requires taking calculated risks. However, the slow pace of counterinsurgency in Iraq, and the difficulty of measuring our success, has lulled us into a sense that we are back in the garrison. Because the payoff is so hard to assess, we have concluded that almost no risk is acceptable. Force protection has become the mission.

The rapid pace of operations during OIF I forced us to follow our own doctrine of decentralized C^sup 2^, Commands were required to use the speed of advance to use recognition-based decision making and mission-style orders. In some cases the briefing consisted of pulling subordinates around a map, giving a quick estimate of the situation, and directing, "You fix them from here; you flank them on the left; you provide security to the northeast. Any questions? Roger, we cross the line of departure in 10 minutes!"

Logically, we should plan better with more time in which to do so. Yet oddly, in the slow pace of operations in Iraq, the planning process is so drawn out that the "one-third/two-thirds" concept-the rule of thumb that we should ideally use only one-third of available planning time ourselves and leave two-thirds of available time to our subordinates to do their own planning, preparation, and rehearsals-has been almost completely forsaken. Worse, the confirmation brief, because of the primacy ofoffere protection, has come to consume more time than planning the mission and writing the order itself. What should be a tool to ensure that plans are coherent and that all elements are in place has assumed a greater prominence than the actual plan. There is a term for this. It is called "cover your ass," and it is so prevalent a mentality that it has been bestowed the ultimate badge of military acceptance, an acronym-CYA.

As a result, we have truly turned Iraq into a garrison. We have become reactive. With our fortified bases and our few secured major supply routes linking them, we have immobilized ourselves and cut ourselves off from the battlefield-the populace of Iraq. From the Roman occupation of Iberia more than 2,000 years ago, history has shown time and again that an occupying force that immobilizes itself this way, and owns only "the ground beneath their feet," is already defeated.

Technology

We once feared that someday soon every Marine would have a global positioning system transponder on his helmet, allowing leaders ensconced in front of computer screens at the Pentagon to reach down and maneuver our squads. In Iraq this scenario has come to pass, enabled not by futuristic systems but by e-mail, satellite chat channels, and Microsoft PowerPoint presentations. Even in the field, away from base, some commands require a detailed and laboriously prepared confirmation brief to be sent in over satellite prior to any action, including rapid raids based on timely intelligence. This is no way to generate tactical tempo. One wonders how we functioned when the only way to communicate was by voice over radio and a quick brief of the scheme of maneuver had to suffice.

One of the most destructive technologies the Marine Corps has adopted -destructive to our own thought processes and planning capabilities-is PowerPoint presentation software. The use of PowerPoint as a panacea for our C^sup 2^ problems is a major step backward. PowerPoint does not have the resolution, and thus the information density, to convey more than extremely simple ideas. Moreover, the structure of PowerPoint conceals this limitation by forcing all of our thoughts onto its own Procrustean bed. Edward R. Tufte, the data presentation scholar, asked, "How is it that each elaborate architecture of thought always fits exactly on one slide?" In fact, it doesn't. "Many true statements are too long to fit on a PP [PowerPoint] slide," Tufte further argues. "But this does not mean we should abbreviate the truth to make the words fit."4 The result of this process is the "bullet list," a style of communications that denies the complex, logical structure of human language and chops our ideas into a vague outline. The bullet list format has infected even our non-PowerPoint communications; for example, the dissemination of a guide for Marine conduct, a so-called "ethos." By reducing a commander's
guidance to a bullet list, this ethos failed to actually explain what the commander really wanted. One item, for example, was simply stated as "geometry of fires." The interpretation of this item varied so widely in Iraq that while one unit took it to mean simply that a target's background must be taken into account to reduce the risk of fratricide and injury to civilians, another interpreted it to mean that a weapon could never be oriented in such a way that friendlies or civilians would fall within its surface danger zone (SDZ), thus a scoped rifle could not be used to engage insurgents emplacing a rocket to attack a Marine base because a highway 3 kilometers beyond the target was theoretically within the SDZ. A simple sentence could have conveyed the commander's actual guidance. The bullet, geometry of fires, tells us nothing. Contrast this to our written order format that provides a clear commanders intent in natural language; conveys a generic, narrative scheme of maneuver to ensure that all elements are operating in unison; and takes subordinates "from big to small" in order to eliminate uncertainty. This clarity is not possible with PowerPoint.

PowerPoint is even worse with visual information. The resolution of PowerPoint is insufficient to display the amount of information on the average map. While a leader looking at a map can either step back to get the "big picture" or look closely to see details, PowerPoint offers no such granularity. There will never be a coup d'oeil while looking at a PowerPoint slide. All that can be seen are vague generalities.

One popular use of PowerPoint is as a vehicle to e-mail briefings to higher headquarters. It should be obvious from the above that PowerPoint is inadequate to inform higher headquarters of anything; its use in this manner contradicts our own C^sup 2^ doctrine, which emphasizes the value of high information content communications, such as face-to-face interaction. Given that PowerPoint has a lower information density than a telephone conversation or a verbal briefing, it is an extremely poor channel for C^sup 2^.5

Which brings us to what these technologies are really offering—the illusion of control. Proponents of network-centric warfare and other technology-oriented paradigms have argued that technology offers us the opportunity for a greatly flattened command structure. This statement assumes that communications is the primary limitation on span of control, the number of subordinates one commander can control at a time. In fact, the real limitation on span of control is the limitation of the human mind. Chess grandmasters can play multiple games of chess simultaneously but only because they rely on positional rules—"recognition-based" decisionmaking—and not because they are able to hold multiple games in their heads simultaneously. No colonel can simultaneously maneuver 150 squads or even 50 platoons. Why then are regimental Marine expeditionary unit-level staffs demanding 10-digit grids and weapons orientation for fire teams? They are demanding them because of CYA—the illusion of absolute control on the battlefield. (I am not referring to position reports for the purpose of clearing fires and other deconfliction but to briefings in the planning phase.)

The proper way to leverage our technology is to use it to facilitate radical decentralization—the use of a common operational picture to enable fluid operations while minimizing (although not eliminating) the risk of fratricide. The endless computer-disseminated briefings should be going down the chain of command as leaders refine and granularize a unifying intent and campaign plan.6

Hubris

The truth is that many commands in Iraq are no longer focused on winning and are instead focused on CYA (or, charitably, force protection) and no small amount of self-glorification. Part of this loss of focus is a lack of clear guidance on what exactly winning means and how we are to achieve it. From the highest levels, there is nothing to relate our efforts to the vague goals of "democracy in Iraq" and "the defeat of terrorism." What are the relative roles of the civil affairs efforts to rebuild Iraq's infrastructure and the effort to seek out and destroy insurgents through direct action? What is the ultimate purpose of the effort to develop Iraq's security forces? Only when local commanders have filled the void and issued their own guidance are there any answers to these questions, and these commanders rotate every 6 months, leaving no continuity of effort.

Thus, commanders in Iraq cannot win, although they can certainly lose. An aggressive commander who, in the absence of unifying guidance and in spite of inadequate cultural preparation, assesses the situation, formulates a campaign plan, and takes calculated risks in implementing it will most likely have little concrete evidence of success to show when he rotates 6 months later. The time scale of counterinsurgency is simply too long. On the other hand, a commander who takes no risks and thus keeps his casualties low can be reasonably assured of a Bronze Star with combat "V." an article in the Gazette relating how well his battalion performed under his firm and dynamic leadership and, with combat command ticket punched, a decent shot at promotion. The "templating" of awards has institutionalized this message: awards that were once given to recognize valor have now come to recognize only discretion.
The end result of all of this is that in some commands we are no longer concerned with victory. The only motivating force has become a sort of dramatic, epic leadership myth. The commander's vision has become divorced from the battlefield and has acquired a life of its own. Participating in several battlespace turnovers in Iraq, I was surprised at how little interest incoming commanders showed in the outgoing commander's campaign plan. The new commander wanted only facts. He had invariably formulated his own campaign plan while still at home.

Part of this problem stems from the grandiose cosmic terms in which the war has been framed in the media-as the ultimate battle of good versus evil. Much of it stems from the less forgivable human weakness of self-aggrandizement. We would do well to distinguish between the need for heroism and the need for leadership; we do not, after all, celebrate Chesty Puller for his tactical genius (such as it may have been) but for his reputation as a hard man. Fighting a successful counterinsurgency takes a less egoistic character—a cool head, compassion, empathy, and calculation.

In Iraq we have the spectacle of battalion commanders, accompanied like celebrities by the entourage of a personal security detachment, who have participated in more raids than any element of their battalion; company commanders replacing gunners behind machineguns in order to personally engage the enemy (and gain the coveted Combat Action Ribbon); and field grade staff officers jumping through windows to clear buildings-alone. "Heroic" leaders thus preoccupied are an obstacle because of the seductive illusion of absolute, infallible control that seems to be a corollary to the persona. A commander's staff and subordinate commanders should be a resource, a set of brains that serves to inform and validate his decisions. This is not planning by committee, and it is certainly not detrimental to the commander's authority. On the contrary, it is a commander's duty to use all available perspectives to arrive at the best possible decision. But it does imply that the main effort is not a personality. One battalion-sized task force planned for operations in Fallujah as follows. The operations officer and executive officer sequestered themselves for the night and then briefed a surprised staff on the single course of action (COA) they had come up with, which was then wargamed over the next several days. (A previous attempt to plan by sitting the staff around a blank PowerPoint briefing slide and "filling in the blanks" had failed to produce even a single coherent COA.) This type of planning obviously turns the Marine Corps Planning Process (MCP) on its head. In a proper MCPP sequence, subordinate commanders and staff would have had a forum in which to voice their insights, raise questions, and find and eliminate weaknesses before the commander made a decision as to which COA was most appropriate. In this case subordinates were not consulted until a decision had already been made, and thus any objections were a threat to authority. "This is the plan," they were told. A serious flaw—an unsecured supply line—was glossed over in spite of being pointed out by a company commander and a primary staff officer. A number of Marines and sailors were subsequently wounded or killed on resupply operations, and at one point the battalion was cut off and could only be resupplied by air. Only after a serious ambush were assets finally shifted to secure the supply line. Some higher level staffs are even more dysfunctional, with such a range of personalities and a lack of management that staff officers will sometimes work at cross-purposes to their commander, and certainly to each other.

We have thus become cynical. Morale is low because Marines cannot see how their operations contribute to victory, and few believe that victory is even possible. As leaders we should be aware that our subordinates tend to tell us what we want to hear. This is not just obsequiousness but often a real desire to be positive. It takes a special environment to encourage subordinates to speak up when the emperor has no clothes. Unfortunately, the ending to this fable is often forgotten. The emperor realizes that the little boy is right but is unwilling to lose face and so continues to parade dramatically in his imaginary suit. Our Marines' frustration can be seen in the circulation of an apocryphal story about GEN John A. Pershing, who supposedly committed atrocities in the Philippines in 1911 and thus successfully suppressed the Muslim insurgency there.7

Conclusion

None of this is to suggest that these problems are found in every command (although the cognitive dissonance engendered by PowerPoint is probably pandemic). There are many commands doing things right. There are many commanders who are in Iraq to win the complex war we are fighting, who recognize that they must still generate tempo in spite of the extended nature of counterinsurgency and that to do this they must streamline and decentralize C² using the tools that they have learned since The Basic School-commander's intent and clear articulation of the campaign plan-and they must use their human resources to assist them in making decisions. There are many commanders who are not in Iraq to throw grenades or take prisoners but to lead Marines.

However, we must be brutally honest with ourselves. The examples above are only a sample, and they are probably not a surprise to most of us. Why, then, are we deceiving ourselves? We are well aware of the consequences of self-deception and dereliction of duty in Vietnam. In one battalion in Iraq, afteraction reports and "lessons learned" documents were written by two staff officers without conducting any kind of debriefing or critique or otherwise soliciting input from
company commanders or even other staff officers. Such practices elevate ego over victory. That is hubris. To use Sun Tzu's formulation, if we know neither our enemy nor ourselves, we face certain defeat.

**SIDEBAR**

"It has been said that low tempo appears to be a characteristic of many counterinsurgency campaigns. This is to misunderstand the term tempo, which is judged not by the 'pace' of operations but the speed of action and reaction relative to the insurgent. It is true that slow pace is a direct result of the protracted nature of some, though not all, forms of insurgent strategy. . . . Certainly the accomplished insurgent commander will rely on an ability to exploit tempo, moving the classic revolutionary phases of an insurgency up where possible, and down when necessary, at such a speed as to make the security force's responses inappropriate and counterproductive." 2

-Gavin Bulloch

**SIDEBAR**

". . . not by others' hands are we now smitten."

-Aeschylus, Epigraph of Once an Eagle by Anton Myrer

**SIDEBAR**

No colonel can simultaneously maneuver 150 squads or even 50 platoons.

**FOOTNOTE**

Notes
1. Among other things, discarding close air support (CAS) coordination techniques that have long ceased to keep pace with technology; see Maj James W. Frey, "Keyhole CAS for Modern Warriors," Marine Corps Gazette, May 2004, p. 39.
3. see Robert B. Asprey, War in the Shadows the Guerilla in History, (revised edition), Morrow, New York, 1994. For applicable early historical examples, see Chapters 2 and 7. Some of the passages on the Roman occupation of Spain could have been written about the war in Iraq today; e.g., p. 16 concerning recruiting.
4. see Edward R. Tufte, TAE Cognitive Style of PowerPoint, Graphics Press, Cheshire, CT, 2003. This short paper should be required reading for all commanders and staff officers.
5. see Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 66, Command and Control, particularly p. 144, note 13.
7. The story is, of course, untrue. see http://urbanlegends.about.com/library/bl_black_jack_pershing.htm. As to Marines who think this technique is viable, one only has to ask how they themselves would react if someone committed such atrocities on their family and friends, and then ask why they would expect others to react differently.

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IMAGE PHOTOGRAPH, The author argues that a garrison mentality has cut us off from the Iraqi populace and their future. (Photo by Cpl Paul Bobbins, Jr.)

**DOCUMENT-TYPE:** Commentary
Three Tasks in 30 Days

BYLINE: Cuomo, Scott A

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ABSTRACT

[...] it's not accessible by the average Marine who either doesn't have a computer at his workstation or doesn't have a common access card reader to use when not at work—this means almost every NCO and many SNCOs and officers as well. Second, MCCLL doesn't normally produce information that's specific to an area of operation (AO) or that speaks directly to the lessons learned by a squad leader or platoon commander in a specific town—not ideal in a COIN fight where the nature of the insurgency from town to town, and even from block to block, is often very different. The following recommendations are provided as a means to recognize Marines who excel as both "no worse enemy" and "no better friend":

* Ensure that eligibility for combat promotions is for anyone in a combat zone, not just to those who are in firefights.
* Either create an entirely new strategic Marine awards system or, at the very least, expand the use of noncombat awards at the level of our familiar combat decorations (e.g., Meritorious Service Medal for Bronze Star, Legion of Merit for Silver Star, Distinguished Service Medal for Navy Cross, etc.).
* Explicitly allow the award of senior noncombat medals to junior Marines; if a private first class can win the Navy Cross he should also be eligible for the Distinguished Service Medal.

FULL TEXT

Mandatory actions for Marine leaders leaving Iraq

Since 2003 the Marine Corps has made significant changes in the training that prepares units for deployment to Iraq. While much has been written about improving this process, there has been much less institutional attention paid to learning from and taking care of the Marines who return from these deployments. This deficiency has led to three major shortfalls in the Corps’ post-Iraq priorities. There are improvements that can be made to remedy these problems. First, we need to refocus our after-action report (AAR) process; second, every leader must understand that combat stress is legitimate and also that it’s his responsibility to help deal with it after deployment; and third, in order to truly commit ourselves to counterinsurgency (COIN) operations we must adjust our awards process away from a largely kinetic operation bias. What follows is a “three tasks in 30 days” post-Iraq policy for Marine leaders.

Task One

Implement an AAR process that involves every noncommissioned officer (NCO), staffNCO (SNCO), and officer sharing lessons learned and posting on an Internet site accessible to all Marines. In the process of seeking out AARs, conducting
interviews with Marines recently back from Iraq, and forwarding AARs to other Marines, it's become apparent that we don't have an effective process to ensure that one unit's lessons learned are made available for all to learn from. Below are a few responses that I've received recently after forwarding AARs to other Marines:

* "I just wanted to say thank you for typing this [an interview with a lieutenant recently back from Iraq] up for us. Everything in your e-mail is gold in my opinion . . . exactly the type of stuff I have been searching for since I began BOC [Basic Officers Course] back in July."

* "This stuff is $$$ . If you ever get more, it would be much appreciated if you forwarded it along. I'm passing on the Ramadi AAR to my CO [commanding officer]-at the moment, that's where _ is supposed to be going."

* "Thanks for the info. It came to me very indirectly. Would you mind putting me on your short email list? This is great stuff. . . . Thanks again."

* "I shook my head as I read the AAR because we made the same mistakes as those described for our first three months in-country. I wish I would have seen something like this AAR before going to Iraq."

Similar responses have come from squad leaders, platoon sergeants, platoon commanders, company commanders, and even a battalion commander. I respond in kind when AARs are sent to me. While better than not sharing lessons learned at all, is this the best we can do?

The Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) has done well in collecting information and publishing reports on a variety of topics. But there are two major problems with the MCCLL. First, it's not accessible by the average Marine who either doesn't have a computer at his workstation or doesn't have a common access card reader to use when not at work-this means almost every NCO and many SNCOs and officers as well. second, MCCLL doesn't normally produce information that's specific to an area of operation (AO) or that speaks directly to the lessons learned by a squad leader or platoon commander in a specific town-not ideal in a COIN fight where the nature of the insurgency from town to town, and even from block to block, is often very different. As a result of these shortfalls, either one of two things happen as Marines prepare for deployment. They either don't have access to the information passed from those who have gone before them or they can't find information that speaks directly to their specific billet or mission. There is a simple fix to this problem. Within 30 days of departing Iraq every NCO, SNCO, and officer must be required to answer the following questions:

* What was your billet?
* In what AO did you operate and what was it like?
* What was your relationship with the Iraqi people? What were the best ways you found to provide security for them? What ways did you find productive in relating to them? Were you able to obtain any information from them?
* Who was your enemy? His table of organization and table of equipment? If more than one entity, explain. Did you notice any trends in his actions?
* What three to four items should your successor focus on during the relief in place (RIP)?
* What was your opinion of the mandatory predeployment training?
* If you could go back in time would you have trained differently, and if yes, how so?
* What were your main lessons learned?
* What was your biggest mistake?
* What was the most important leadership lesson learned?

The answers to these questions should then be posted on one Internet site where Marines could easily access them. An optimal feature in this AAR process would be to have a program that groups lessons learned by AO, such as that depicted in Figure 1 for Ramadi.

Although this recommended AAR process doesn't provide as timely a solution as would be ideal (i.e., the successor unit will already be on deck before the redeploying unit's AARs are posted), it's significantly better than what currently exists. Also, when operational requirements permit, units should start their AAR process before redeployment and can then turn them over during the RIE Plus, if I'm a Marine in the unit relieving 1st Battalion, 6th Marines (1/6), I'd definitely like to
read die AARs from all five battalions that have served in Ramadi over the last 3 years so that I can better understand how the AO has remained the same or changed.

Approaching the AAR process in this manner does bring operational security concerns. And we should strive to create a Marine-friendly site that requires a login procedure certifying the user’s identity. That said, we can’t continue failing our Marines by not providing the information they need in order to "know their turf” just because the enemy might see it as well. The only one who benefits from denying information to our Marines is the enemy.

In writing about our Nation’s failures in Vietnam, COL David Hackworth, USA(Ret) stated:

In Vietnam, America spent more than $141 billion, had more than 300,000 men wounded, and lost some 58,000 men killed. Almost fifteen years since the tragic, inevitable fall of Saigon, there has been no major, honest postmortem of the war. There have been critiques dealing with the big picture, examining inarguably profound mistakes like not mobilizing the Reserves and not having an objective. But none has addressed the lessons learned the hard way, at the fighting level, where people died and the war was, in fact, lost.2

We've taken positive strides in the lessons learned process through MCCLL. But we still have a very long way to go. We're facing an enemy who doesn't take a break every 7 months and, consequently, one who frequently learns and adapts faster than we do, leading to our repeatedly making mistakes made by previous units-often at great cost. We must immediately get better at recording, disseminating, and incorporating lessons learned from unit to unit if we are to have a chance in this fight.

Task Two

In addition to the warrior transition process already in place, implement ways to keep the lines of communication open for Marines on a permanent basis. Remember when you were a platoon or company commander and your higher command tasked you to "give up" five Marines for guard duty, for a working party, or to send to another unit? Or when higher headquarters wanted to charge your Marine for an offense that you felt unjust? If you're like most Marine leaders, deep down you were probably thinking, "There's got to be a way that I can keep my Marines," or "There's no way I can let higher charge my Marine for this." At what point is your Marine no longer your Marine?

Combat in Iraq has caused thousands of Marines to have experiences for which neither the comforts of American society nor the Marine Corps' training system have adequately prepared them. There isn't necessarily a "right" answer on how to come to grips with killing or losing your best friend to an enemy sniper or improvised explosive device (IED). The graphic images that are involved in these incidents are often imprinted in a Marine's mind forever. While it's difficult to quantify the number of Marines suffering from postcombat mental health problems, the consensus from multiple medical experts suggests that it's at least 20 percent of those who have served in Operations ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) and IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF).3 With respect to posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) alone, the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) has identified approximately 34,000 out of 205,000 OEF/OIF veterans who have since left the military and sought medical care for this problem.

Of the 130-plus Marines whom I led in Iraq, at least 3 suffer from PTSD. I say at least because VA statistics suggest that 12 to 20 percent of Iraq veterans suffer from PTSD. This means that there might be as many as 25 Marines from my platoons now suffering from PTSD. I recently ate dinner with one of those Marines. Prior to this dinner I had spoken to him often over the past 2 years but hadn’t seen him since April 2005. Fortunately, he’s doing really well. He just finished the police academy, has had a steady girlfriend for the past 8 months, and is doing much better dealing with trauma brought on by being in a fighting hole with his best friend when he was shot by a sniper. I think the way the platoon leadership cared for him has much to do with his mental state today. By caring I mean spending hours listening to him talk about problems, ensuring that he received appropriate medical attention, and keeping him with his initial platoon commander and platoon sergeant until processed out of the Marine Corps.

The case of my platoon guide during OIF I is the exact opposite. He's had an extremely difficult time adjusting to civilian life-lots of excessive drinking, violent outbreaks, and difficulty in holding jobs. In fact, the one job that he's had the most success staying committed to is playing a leading role in the Iraq Veterans Against the War movement. When speaking against the war his justification is mostly focused on the "evils" of war and how they've resulted in his having PTSD.

Looking back on my experiences with this sergeant now, I know I could have done a better job taking care of him before, during, and after bringing him to combat. I should have recognized early signs that he wasn't 100 percent mentally prepared for war. I should have also realized that his mother's decision to make public not only her opposition to the war, but also to march with a sign stating "Marine Mom Against the War" would have a major influence on his psyche.
There are ways, beyond warrior transition, for leaders to continue taking care of their Marines within 30 days after departing Iraq and for much longer. Initially this means sitting down with every one of your Marines-on an individual basis-and asking if they are having a difficult time coping with any of the experiences from Iraq. If yes, then what’s the plan to address these problems when on postdeployment leave when none of their brother Marines are around? What about after you or they leave the unit? How will you take care of your Marines whom you led in combat after you’ve gone separate ways?

While understanding that we’re not medical professionals, the best way that I think we can continue caring for our Marines is to establish permanent, open lines of communication (including for family members of Marines killed in combat as well). Open lines of communication means more than simply giving Marines your phone number, which might change after you move. It means gathering individual phone numbers, phone numbers of family members, home addresses and, probably most helpful, a platoon e-mail roster. Make it your mission to contact the entire platoon at least once a month, particularly on the anniversary of the most trying events that you all experienced. Your Marines must know that the brothers for whom they fought in combat are available if they need them. Additionally, should you have specific Marines who are suffering from any type of combat stress, make it your mission to contact them in person or by phone at least once a month. Encourage your subordinate unit leaders to do the same.

Task Three

Ensure you recognize your Marines for both killing those who need to die and for sparing those who deserve to live. The responsibility that leaders have to recognize the accomplishments of their Marines might seem like an obvious subject. In many ways, it is. But there’s more to it-especially in a COIN fight. Right now the measure of a Marine leader who has been to Iraq is often based on the heroic acts he accomplished. What awards does he have? Are the awards for valorous acts? Our promotion boards are heavily influenced by such awards.

While we can always do better in recognizing the heroic acts of our Marines, where we’re most lacking is in recognizing Marines who don’t have war stories to tell about gunfights and surviving IED attacks. The reason why some don’t have such stories to tell may very well be because they’ve embraced the idea that there are sometimes better options in a COIN fight than going kinetic. Let’s consider, for example, how we might recognize the following two Marines for their actions during and after cordon and search operations.

Upon receiving information of a suspected IED cell at a house, SSgt Robert orders his Marines to go in hard. They blow the front door, kick it down, clear the house, and detain three military-age males. However, they find no evidence to indicate they were part of an IED cell. Five days later, when patrolling past the same house, the platoon is ambushed by family members avenging their detained kin. The staff sergeant’s platoon kills four of them and two civilians caught in the crossfire. This part of town becomes increasingly hostile to the platoon throughout the deployment.

SSgt Rick has a similar mission to conduct a cordon and search operation looking for an IED cell. Instead of using forcible entry techniques, this staff sergeant knocks on the door and politely asks to enter. Once inside, he begins speaking Arabic (which he learned through self-study) to the father, asking if he can conduct a routine search. The father says yes as long as he can accompany the search team. The staff sergeant agrees. The Marines find nothing. They then share multiple cups of chai with the family. Five days later, when patrolling through this same area, the staff sergeant stops at the house to check on the family. The children are happy to see the Marines, and the father expresses his appreciation for their helping to provide security to the area, while also asking about the limited hours of electricity in the area. Over the course of the deployment the staff sergeant has no problems in this part of the town.

Who gets an award? Are both acts valorous? Who's currently more competitive for a combat promotion? Who's done more in accomplishing the intent behind the term "strategic corporal"? The current balance in our awards process is heavily in favor of recognizing Marines for kinetic actions and rarely for actions that aren't kinetic but may end up better serving our long-term strategic mission. All one has to do to realize this fact is go to www.usmc.mil and click on the icon, "Combat Awards." Where's the icon for the "strategic corporal, sergeant, lieutenant, lieutenant colonel" who achieved success in his AO by limiting or altogether eliminating kinetic actions?

The following recommendations are provided as a means to recognize Marines who excel as both "no worse enemy" and "no better friend":

* Ensure that eligibility for combat promotions is for anyone in a combat zone, not just to those who are in firefights.
* Either create an entirely new strategic Marine awards system or, at the very least, expand the use of noncombat awards at the level of our familiar combat decorations (e.g., Meritorious Service Medal for Bronze Star, Legion of Merit for Silver Star, Distinguished Service Medal for Navy Cross, etc.).

* Explicitly allow the award of senior noncombat medals to junior Marines; if a private first class can win the Navy Cross he should also be eligible for the Distinguished Service Medal.

Until such changes are made, leaders must find maneuver space within the current awards system to further recognize Marines for their actions while in contact with the enemy and for their actions that help drain the swamp where insurgents hide. This recognition process must take place within 30 days of departing Iraq in order to prevent your Marines' accomplishments from being forgotten or lost in the shuffle when Marines rotate in and out of the unit.

Conclusion
For the new COIN strategy to work in Iraq, American forces will need to remain on the ground for the next 2 years, if not much longer. But time on the ground alone will not bring success. Whether we succeed will depend largely on whether we are able to constantly learn and adapt based on our enemy's actions and the needs of the Iraqi people. Adopting the "3 in 30" plan will ensure that we get better learning from each other while also taking care of our Marines who are suffering from combat stress and awarding our Marines for both killing those who need to die and for sparing those who deserve to live.

SIDEBAR
"The British are leaving, the Iraqis are failing and the Americans are staying—and we're going to be there a lot longer than anyone in Washington is acknowledging right now."

-Michael Hirsh, "In for the Long Haul"

FOOTNOTE
Notes


by Capt Scott A. Cuomo
Capt Cuomo is currently assigned to the Infantry Officer Course.

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IMAGE ILLUSTRATION, Figure 1.
Intelligence Support to Counterinsurgency Operations

BYLINE: Dinsmore, Jeffrey S

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ABSTRACT
All-source analysts at the multinational force (MNF) headquarters build extensive target packages, compiling information that may trigger special operations forces raids to kill or capture these key individuals. [...] unmanned aircraft system (UAS) assets are dedicated around the clock to recording live video footage of these raids, providing immediate feedback to commanders at the next operations briefing, not to mention grist for the next press release.

FULL TEXT
The search for fused, coherent intelligence to support the commander

Intelligence support to counterinsurgency (COIN) operations in Operations IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) II, III, and IV has focused primarily on the pursuit of high-value individuals (HVIs) as the centerpiece of the targeting process. This targeting approach has been reinforced because it provides commanders with tangible, immediate measures of effectiveness. It does not, however, reflect a coherent all-source approach to combating the insurgency. An aggressive and decentralized tactical intelligence focus, combined with systematic targeting methodologies that provide intelligence on all aspects of insurgent operations, will improve immediate coalition forces success and provide the critical intelligence required to debilitate the insurgency in the long term.

The HVI Focus in OIF

Since the transition from conventional operations during OIF I to the COIN fight of subsequent OIF iterations, the HVI has grown to become a centerpiece of the targeting process at every level of command above the battalion in OIF. Human intelligence (HumInt) efforts key their collections to developing sources that report on HVIs. Signals intelligence (SigInt) organizations build their operations around determining the whereabouts of HVIs. All-source analysts at the multinational force (MNF) headquarters build extensive target packages, compiling information that may trigger special operations forces raids to kill or capture these key individuals. Finally, unmanned aircraft system (UAS) assets are dedicated around
the clock to recording live video footage of these raids, providing immediate feedback to commanders at the next operations briefing, not to mention grist for the next press release. The root problem with this overwhelming focus on HVIs is twofold. It neither reflects a deliberate planning methodology nor is it effective in quelling the continuing Iraqi insurgency.

HVI Targeting-Neither Doctrinal Nor Effective

The first litmus test to determine an effective targeting strategy is to compare it to its root doctrine. Marine Corps doctrinal publications define a high-value target (HVT) as a target that "is necessary to the enemy commander for the success of his operational course of action." As part and parcel of the Marine Corps Planning Process, HVTs are derived from a detailed mission and intelligence analysis of the battlespace and are the natural outgrowth of determining named areas of interest and target areas of interest. These HVTs translate to high-payoff targets (HPTs), the "destruction of which will ensure the success of friendly operational courses of action." A doctrinal planning process in OIF would recognize that HVIs are necessary for the success of the insurgency, and defeat of those HVIs would eliminate its ability to flourish.1

Once the planning process is complete and the operation is underway, the second test of a targeting strategy should be through continuing analysis of its results on the enemy; i.e., its "measures of effectiveness." The longterm effectiveness of targeting HVIs has been a failure. Since the beginning of OIF in August 2003, coalition forces casualties due to insurgent activity have been on the steady increase. As Iraqi Security Forces have become, in coalition forces' judgment, "operational," they have suffered increasingly catastrophic attacks by insurgent forces. The elimination or detention of most targeted HVIs results in little long-term impact on insurgent operations and often in resurgence of retribution attacks on coalition forces. By any analysis, current targeting methodologies have remained ineffective at quelling a continuing and growing insurgency.

Why Focus on HVIs?

The fact that an HVI-centric targeting methodology is neither doctrinal nor effective begs a central question. Why does MNF continue to dedicate overwhelming collection and analysis assets to its prosecution? Three fundamental issues lie at the center of this problem. First, separate intelligence disciplines, driven by their own desire to impact operational success, develop stovepiped targeting information at the expense of fused intelligence. Second, the amount of information available overwhelms the ability of headquarters intelligence analysts to collect, collate, and analyze in support of coherent, fused intelligence. Their separation from tactical operations exacerbates this problem and drives them to an increasingly internal focus on HVI targeting operations. Finally, the commander's desire for immediate, quantifiable results drives staff officers to provide those results, at the expense of patient planning and all-source intelligence collection.

Natural human and organizational tendencies lie at the heart of the first problem. In the current OIF operating environment, policymakers have placed a premium on the ability of any single intelligence discipline to provide tangible success. HumInt and SigInt are provided by separate intelligence structures within MNF commands and are often briefed to commanders separately, with a view to providing the next "trigger" that will initiate special operations raids against HVIs. Imagery assets, specifically UASs, are dedicated to two predominant missions-possible improvised explosive device identification and raid overwatch. Despite the proven ineffectiveness of the former and intelligence collections uselessness of the latter, these aerial reconnaissance assets continue to seek to provide a panacea for defeating the insurgency. All of these examples demonstrate intelligence disciplines operating in a stovepipe, believing that the success or failure of coalition forces operations relies solely on the tangible, immediately actionable results of their respective efforts.

The second issue contributing to continued HVI focus in OIF is the inability of intelligence organizations to analyze and collate information into coherent, fused intelligence. Two factors contribute to this failure-analysts that are out of touch with the ground truth at the tactical level and their inability to manage the volume of information provided by intelligence collectors throughout the battlespace.

Although it is an oft-stated complaint of tactical units that "higher headquarters provides little support," the MNF-level intelligence effort truly provides little value added to the tactical COIN effort. The tactical fusion center (TFC) was organized in the waning days of OIF I to provide direct support to the tactical units (battalions) on the frontlines of the COIN effort. In its earliest days, the TFC provided personnel to those battalions to streamline information collection and dissemination and to stay in touch with the ground truth as it was being experienced and reported by tactical units. Since that time the fusion center has grown in structure and personnel strength, but it has also become detached from the tactical COIN effort. Its analysts no longer conduct onsite assistance to the battalions and are increasingly focused on providing target packages, briefing products, and analysis to MNF commanders seeking immediate results. The center's change in focus has resulted in an organizational detachment from the ground truth in the battalion operating areas. Analysts who
The volume of information provided by OIF intelligence collectors also presents a daunting challenge to intelligence analysts at the MNF headquarters level. Intelligence analysts are faced with sifting through hundreds of reports per day from battalion intelligence sections, HumInt teams, and SigInt detachments throughout the MNF battlespace. Not only are MNF analysts hamstrung by their own unfamiliarity with the nuances of the battlespace, but they also currently have no way of collating and analyzing the information in support of fused targeting. Consequently, analysts are forced to skim reports for mention of their own predesignated HVIs. In an effort to deal with the sheer volume of information, analysts discard valuable information regarding atmospherics, cell structure, and insurgent operations in order to search for the trigger that will add to a targeting package in support of an HVI raid.

The final factor can simply be described as "operations-driven intelligence." It derives from and contributes to the continuing HVI hunt and is demonstrated in the staff's desire for immediate targeting gratification in support of the commander. Staff intelligence officers are under pressure from commanders to demonstrate immediate results in support of OIF operational and strategic objectives. In their eyes, the most immediate way to provide this support is threefold. First, instead of incorporating intelligence collectors into the fusion effort, intelligence staff officers foster competition between disciplines that transfers command pressure to those disciplines for source reliability, information credibility, and targeting results. Second, instead of being dedicated to intelligence requirement-driven collections, imagery and UAS assets are predominantly used to conduct continuous raid coverage, providing live video for the commander and satisfying his desire for dynamic information. Finally, staff intelligence officers focused on the HVI targeting priorities build large, centralized intelligence infrastructures in order to maintain the capability to compile polished targeting packages at a moment's notice.

These three fundamental problems lie at the heart of the nondoctrinal use of the HVI as a centerpiece of OIF operations. Intelligence disciplines fighting for money, recognition, and credibility in a demanding results-based environment; centralized organizational structures characterized by out-of-touch analysts and information overload; and staff officers who cannot maintain a downward focus in support of tactical COIN operations are the immediate challenges to a growing insurgency as coalition forces attempt to pave the way for operational Iraqi Security Forces. Three solutions, however, provide the way ahead for intelligence support to defeat of the Iraqi insurgency.

The Solutions: Command Relationships, Staying in Touch, and Information Management

The foundation of any improvement in current intelligence support to COIN must be the recognition that battalion COIN is the most successful approach to defeating the Iraqi insurgency. No amount of precision personality targeting has been as effective against the insurgency as the ability of ground forces to interdict insurgent logistics and planning, deny insurgent operating areas, and secure the support of the local populace. With this as the basis of future COIN planning, a comprehensive restructuring of intelligence thought can be undertaken.

The first of three initiatives to be undertaken centers upon the intelligence disciplines and how those disciplines are apportioned throughout the battlespace. Currently, HumInt and SigInt efforts are separately and centrally managed, with assets husbanded at the MNF level for apportionment among the battalions. Command relationships, however, differ greatly between the two disciplines. SigInt assets are centrally managed, and their use in support of battalion operations is strictly controlled. HumInt assets, however, are loosely managed at the MNF level and given maximum latitude in their direct support roles to the battalions. These subtle differences in command relationships result in widely different tactical applications. HumInt reporting is directly routed to, and often immediately applied by, battalion commanders. SigInt information, however, is more often focused on MNF information requirements, and by the time it is fed to the battalion commander it is of little use to tactical operations. In essence, SigInt information is stovepiped in support of MNF commanders’ HVI targeting requirements vice tactical COIN operations. HumInt structure should be the model for future organization. Instead of a structure wherein tactical collection teams are primarily tasked with strategic collection requirements (with tactical requirements as a byproduct), they should be impressed with their tactical collection responsibility, and strategic information requirements will be satisfied by default.

The second initiative should be a comprehensive reorganization of the TFC. The current TFC organization consists of hundreds of analysts working in thousands of square feet of workspace. In essence, MNF headquarters has built a megaintelligence center in support of one battlespace commander. Those hundreds of analysts should be immediately dispatched to work within the battalion S-2 (intelligence) sections in the MNF battlespace. This measure should not be read
to mean beefing up the battalion S-2 sections. To the contrary, the TFC analysts operating at the battalions would directly report to the TFC, operating as trusted agents within the battalion battlespace. They would learn their operating area, provide required reports to the TFC, and internalize the ground truth among the disparate and Spartan environments of the battalion firm bases. Not only would this provide the TFC with a crucial link to tactical reporting, but it would also "outsource" their reporting and analysis requirements. These analysts would provide "forward eyes" for reporting requirements and, if properly tasked, would incorporate battalion analysis into TFC production.

The third initiative derives directly from the two previous solutions. The TFC should build a master insurgent tracking database and actively maintain a central repository of all intelligence databases across battalion areas of operation. As of early 2006, no comprehensive database of insurgent cell structure existed at the TFC. Although webbased "Google-style" search engines have been developed for message search functions, the thorough sifting and cataloguing of detailed cell structure and insurgent personalities has been impossible with these rudimentary tools. This lack of focused intelligence scrutiny has resulted in a de facto culling of only HVI information, which naturally feeds the current HVI targeting methodology. Most battalions have developed detailed databases with already available tools (Microsoft Access, Excel) and have used these tools in direct support of all tactical targeting applications. The TFC is well suited to incorporate and manage these databases to build an MNF-wide fused intelligence picture that it currently lacks.

Conclusion

The current HVI targeting methodology, while providing feedback to commanders for strategic and operational immediate gratification, reflects little deliberate planning and is ineffective at defeating the Iraqi insurgency in the long term. It is driven by intelligence disciplines that seek to protect their own credibility, is exacerbated by inattention to detail and lackluster information management, and is perpetuated by empires of analysts and intelligence sections built in support of higher headquarters information requirements. It ignores the overwhelming success of detailed tactical targeting methodologies that focus on insurgent cell destruction, logistics interdiction, and local populace support. The way ahead for successful intelligence support to COIN operations is to reestablish the analytical and communications link to tactical operations, eliminate competition between intelligence disciplines, and establish deliberate analysis, thoughtful targeting methodologies, and intelligence-driven operations. An aggressive and decentralized tactical intelligence focus, combined with systematic targeting methodologies that provide intelligence on all aspects of insurgent operations, will improve immediate coalition force success and provide the critical intelligence required to debilitate the insurgency in the long term.

SIDEBAR

The long-term effectiveness of targeting HVIs has been a failure.

SIDEBAR

The TFC is well suited to incorporate and manage these databases to build an MNF-wide fused intelligence picture that it currently lacks.

FOOTNOTE

Note

1. Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Staff Training Program (MSTP) Center, MAGTF Planner's Reference Manual (MSTP Pamphlet 5-03.3), Quantico, 2001, p. 86. Although numerous Marine Corps and joint doctrinal publications outline HVTs and HPTs in planning and targeting processes, this paragraph is derived from the MSTP Pamphlet 5-03.3 that states: "A function of the decide phase is target value analysis (TVA). TVA provides a relative ranking of target sets or categories using the following enemy characteristics: doctrine, tactics, equipment, organizations, and expected behavior. It also identifies high value targets (HVTs)—those assets the enemy commander requires to successfully complete his mission. In addition, fire planners identify high payoff targets (HPTs), a subset of HVTs, whose loss to the enemy will contribute to the success of the friendly COA [course of action]."

by Capt Jeffrey S. Dinsmore

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Problems of Culture

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ABSTRACT

While it is certainly helpful to know that it is inappropriate to ask local men about female relatives or show the soles of your feet, Marines in advisory billets need to have an awareness of the problematic aspects of local cultures, such as tribal-based corruption and favoritism, which will conspire against success in institution building. There also needs to be a coordinated effort from U.S. and coalition advisors to demand minimum standards of accountability from ANA commanders at every level, from international diplomacy to the company level, otherwise corrupt officers will continue to simply wait out advisors who attempt to hold them accountable for substandard performance or else appeal any punishment up their chain of command until they reach an influential relative who will tolerate their incompetence or corruption.

FULL TEXT

Leadership in the Afghan National Army

The creation of a new national army in Afghanistan is a vital part of our strategy to integrate that country into the international community and prevent it from becoming a terrorist safe haven again. The task would be a straightforward one if
it were only a matter of recruiting a certain number of men and teaching them a basic set of tangible military skills. However, experience in Afghanistan shows that classes and training exercises may improve basic combat skills of individual soldiers, but they do not necessarily make a newly formed army into an effective fighting force.

"We made them as good as they can be. You'll see what I mean when you get there," one returning advisor remarked when asked what Marine embedded training teams (ETTs) could expect in Afghanistan. It was a simple and direct way of saying that without cultural, economic, and political changes within Afghanistan as a whole, the army would continue to be dependent on outside help to be even marginally effective.

Much attention has been devoted in recent years to understanding the cultural conditions in which insurgencies develop as a means of developing successful counterinsurgency strategies. Oftentimes the development of viable host-nation forces capable of conducting counterinsurgency operations without significant outside support is named as a vital part of any such strategy. But relatively little attention has been devoted to the role culture often plays in the persistent institutional weaknesses in these host-nation forces that prevent their rapid development into effective military organizations. The effort to construct the Afghan National Army (ANA) is essentially an effort to graft a foreign value set onto a nascent national institution that reflects the very different culture and history of the nation to which it belongs. As such, the main obstacles preventing the development of the ANA into an effective fighting force are the intangible cultural sensibilities and practices that all of this army’s soldiers share to some degree. Many of the visible problems of organization, command, training, and logistics I observed were rooted in culture. Ingrained cultural patterns, ideas, and values frequently manifested themselves in ways that tended to prevent the sustained, progressive development of military power.

Tribalism, with the endemic corruption it fosters, served to undermine the foundation of the new army almost as fast as it could be built. Other more subtle but deeply seated values and beliefs frequently made it difficult to get ANA leaders to take responsibility for their commands. These problems existed at every level I was able to observe, from the corps level to the company in which I was embedded.

The Marine Corps has devoted a great deal of effort to cultural training, but in my experience this effort has focused almost exclusively on teaching Marines how to avoid inadvertently offending the local populace in those countries where they are being deployed. While it is certainly helpful to know that it is inappropriate to ask local men about female relatives or show the soles of your feet, Marines in advisory billets need to have an awareness of the problematic aspects of local cultures, such as tribal-based corruption and favoritism, which will conspire against success in institution building. There also needs to be a coordinated effort from U.S. and coalition advisors to demand minimum standards of accountability from ANA commanders at every level, from international diplomacy to the company level, otherwise corrupt officers will continue to simply wait out advisors who attempt to hold them accountable for substandard performance or else appeal any punishment up their chain of command until they reach an influential relative who will tolerate their incompetence or corruption.

In my company the first sergeant was a military academy graduate, while the commander had no higher education to speak of. However, the company commander was from a tribe that had a well-placed member in the Afghan Ministry of Defense (MoD), so he was the company commander, and the first sergeant was not. This might have been tolerable had the company commander demonstrated good leadership, but he did not. He was not only incompetent and ill educated but corrupt and unjust as well. The border control post that was his company’s primary mission developed a local reputation as a cesspool of corruption. Good soldiers were punished when they tried to check the misconduct of the commander’s favorites, who had free reign to do as they pleased without fear of consequence.

I eventually succeeded in getting him removed from his post with the help of my chain of command, although he retained his commission. The ANA corps commander visited our firebase a week later to try to reinstate the company commander and have me fired. His forceful defense of the company commander was understandable, given the top-down pressure he was getting from certain quarters of the Afghan MoD. The corps commander finally relented but only under heavy pressure from the American side. The issue continued to fester for several months, while senior ANA officers plotted to find a way to reinstate the company commander once we left.

In this and other cases I observed, the ANA proved unable to take decisive action against weak or corrupt leaders. This paralysis extended even to disciplinary problems involving low-ranking soldiers in those cases where the responsible officer was from the same tribe. Many, if not most, of these leaders owed their positions to tribal connections and influence in the first place, so it should hardly have been surprising that considerations of tribal politics took precedence over any established standard of professional performance and conduct. It remained the job of outsiders who were not subject to tribal retribution to do what they could to pressure the ANA to hold its leaders to a standard of accountability. Without
a major cultural change in Afghan society, this situation will not change, and the ANA will continue to be plagued with poor leadership.

Another more subtle but significant obstacle was the tendency of ANA leaders to view their military problems in strictly material, tangible terms. Most ANA leaders valued us to the extent that we were able to address materiel shortfalls with U.S. taxpayer funds and give them access to our supporting arms assets. The intangible value of our experience, knowledge, and advice was, in most cases, something they acknowledged only to the degree necessary to gain access to the tangible assets we brought to the fight, and to compensate for their deficiencies in combat leadership. In their eyes we were merely members of a powerful tribe with a red, white, and blue flag that, for its own reasons, had decided to provide support against a common enemy. (While Americans tend to view the war in Afghanistan as a fight against international terrorists, Afghans tend to see it in the context of an ongoing territorial and political dispute with Pakistan.)

During one particularly frustrating counseling session with the company executive officer, I asked him what he thought would happen to his army after the Americans left if the ANA leaders failed to find solutions to their own problems. "You should be the one to answer that question," he said, without hesitation. "This army is your creation." In other words, in his eyes we were only the latest group of tribal warlords—albeit exceptionally stingy ones—to appear in Afghanistan and recruit a local army. That being the case, we were responsible for addressing its problems, not the nominal leaders who were merely filling positions of privilege they were entitled to by virtue of social status. The fact that we were trying to build leaders, who could in turn build an army that belonged to a sovereign national government, was completely lost on him and many others as well.

While there were notable exceptions, most Afghans I advised missed the point that our tangible military power was rooted in intangible ideas of accountability, initiative, loyalty to Corps and country, fairness, honest dealing, duty, and work ethic, among others. These ideas were all known in some form to the Afghans I knew. But they existed within a traditional cultural framework of family and tribal codes that did not readily support the development of an impersonal national institution such as the ANA. As a result the ANA remained a weak institution dependent on outside assistance. Rates of desertion and unauthorized absence in most units were high. These spiked during religious holidays and immediately after each payday when soldiers left to visit their families and give them money, as Afghanistan has no banking system. Given that government and law enforcement institutions existed in the same social context as the army, there was no functioning mechanism to round up and punish soldiers who left without authorization. In my experience, regulations pertaining to unauthorized absence that did exist in the ANA were rarely, if ever, enforced for the same reasons other disciplinary infractions were allowed to go unpunished.

A code of military justice was still in the process of being implemented toward the end of 2005, 4 years after the initial American intervention in Afghanistan. Although I had no direct experience with the process of its formulation, my sense was that the ANA leadership did not particularly want a uniform code, because it would give their American advisors another tool to hold them accountable to an established standard rather than allowing them to make up rules to suit their whims. Even something as straightforward as a leave policy was never finalized. The officers preferred to give themselves and their favorites leave as desired and make up justifications as they went along. It was up to the ETTs to cajole and persuade officers to consider the impact of their decisions on mission readiness.

Training soldiers in basic marksmanship and squad-level tactics was relatively easy, although the widespread lack of basic education among the majority of the soldiers often made it much more challenging than teaching American high school graduates at Marine boot camp. Most soldiers were illiterate; lacked basic mathematical skills, such as counting the number of rounds to be fired at a target; and had difficulty with military tasks requiring basic knowledge of geometry and spatial perception, such as estimating range and adjusting indirect fires. Nonetheless, soldiers were usually able to operate at an acceptable level of tactical and technical proficiency at the squad level. But operations above the squad level that required major planning, coordination, and logistics support almost always relied on American initiative and guidance. Efforts to get the ANA to take over these functions consistently ran up against the cultural obstacles described above.

At one point the ETTs were abruptly informed that responsibility for supplying food to the ANA was being turned over to the Afghan MoD. I learned about it when the battalion S-4 (logistics) rolled up in a 2.5-ton truck filled with potatoes and informed me that my soldiers would cook for themselves from that day forward. It was clear that much of the money allocated to buy the food had already been skimmed at several levels of command. There was no plan in place for supplying cooks and cooking facilities. My soldiers initially refused to do the extra work that it would require to feed themselves, while the acting company commander refused to accept the MoD supplied food without my assurance that I would work with him to find a way to feed the soldiers. For the most part the ETTs had to beg, borrow, and steal to cobble together a plan on the fly that would keep their units from being starved into nonexistence.
By contrast the indigenous forces recruited and trained by the U.S. Army special forces and civilian agencies experienced few of these problems. However, the fundamental issues of support, organization, and leadership belonged entirely to the Americans who hired them. Their essential supplies and equipment were purchased on U.S.-sponsored contracts or with U.S.-controlled operating funds. They were, as mentioned above, hired (and in many cases fired) at will by their American employers without regard to tribal issues and paid at least twice as much as the average ANA soldier. "While this allowed U.S. forces to train and field relatively competent indigenous militias quickly, these units were never intended to operate independently as a force commanded and supported by a sovereign Afghan Government.

Essentially, the local special forces commanders operated as exceptionally well-trained and funded warlords who paid for their own militias as needed. It was a command relationship our officers understood well and frequently pointed to when complaining about their many problems. Our response, that we were there as their advisors trying to teach them how to operate independently rather than being their employers or commanders, did little to placate them. If the U.S.-sponsored militias are ever integrated into the existing Afghan command structure, they will very likely face the same problems the ANA is currently dealing with.

Any improvement in the current situation will be directly proportional to our ability to get the Afghan Government and army to buy into a notion of accountability divorced from traditional cultural strictures. A combination of pressure and persuasion may accomplish positive results over time. In my company there was certainly noticeable improvement in organization, discipline, and morale after the company commander was relieved. However, much of the improvement turned out to be temporary, as the ANA's leadership issues run much deeper than the misconduct of a single company grade officer. There were simply not enough good, uncorrupted leaders to go around. There were exceptional leaders, but they had to struggle against an ingrained culture of corruption to have any impact at all. For permanent progress to be made, it will require sustained outside pressure to be exerted across the board, at every level of command, so that good leaders have the opportunity to lead, and bad leaders are weeded out.

Although the ANA falls under the command of a sovereign foreign government, there are significant areas where U.S. and coalition advisors can pressure and influence its members, so that they might one day be able to operate independently. Ironically, these are all related to dependencies. As noted above, we pay, feed, and in many cases, supply the ANA. Perhaps more significantly, we serve as a bulwark against Pakistani strategic ambitions in eastern Afghanistan, which was the primary military concern of every ANA officer I knew. While U.S. cooperation with Pakistan was frequently a sore point in our relations, they also realized that they would have little ability to counter Pakistan's pressure on their eastern border without our assistance. Particularly at higher levels of command, this dynamic might be used to instill a sense of urgency in the ANA's military and civilian leadership in moving beyond petty issues of tribal politics and enforcing standards of accountability in an unbiased way.

Afghanistan's deeply conservative tribal culture maintains the status quo of dependency in the military. For meaningful change to take place to any degree, this culture will need to make a place for ideas and practices that are the underpinnings of every effective military in the world. To the extent that we can help the Afghans accomplish this level of effectiveness, we will be successful.

SIDEBAR

Good soldiers were punished when they tried to check the misconduct of the commander's favorites, who had free reign to do as they pleased without fear of consequence.

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GRAPHIC: Photographs

IMAGE PHOTOGRAPH, The Marine advisor's role will be difficult, but preparing the advisor for the cultural conditions that he Will face is imperative. (Photo courtesy of Marine Corps Logistics Base, Albany, GA.)

IMAGE PHOTOGRAPH, It is imperative to get the ANA to divorce accountability from traditional culture structure. (Photo courtesy of Combined Task Force 76.)

DOCUMENT-TYPE: Feature
Iraq, Amundsen, and the Zouaves

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ABSTRACT

Acknowledging that there are voices in the United States today that recognize the applicability of Amundsen's wisdom, they are nevertheless fighting an American cultural mentality that is not so different from the Victorian one of yesteryear. In The popular movie, The Battle of Algiers, and Alistair Home's A Savage War of Peace (New York Review Books Classics, 2006) have focused U.S. military attention on French strategic failures in spite of tactical successes during the Algerian "rebellion" against 132 years of French rule. Big footprints, counterinsurgency specialists agree, need to give way to small, discreet, and intelligently discriminating footprints; that is, fewer huge, easy-to-target base camps and more small groups of military personnel living among the people in the precincts where the local population lives-without air conditioning, National Football League games, or Starbucks.

FULL TEXT

Marines need to be smarter and more culturally in tune with their environment

Roald Amundsen offered Americans some food for thought on 23 January. Unfortunately, it was delivered only an hour before President George W. Bush's State of the Union address and to a location few would have visited anyway to seek wisdom about Iraq. At first blush, defeating our enemies in Iraq (and elsewhere) may seem to have little to do with the Norwegian explorer's successful navigation through the Northwest Passage in 1903. The Public Broadcasting Service program, Nova, ran a story about why he succeeded when so many others before him had failed. America is now stuck in the equivalent of an ice field pressing on all sides. There are few perfect analogies in life, but one can try to combine lessons from different life or death experiences. Amundsen's seems too obvious to ignore, especially given the timing of the show's release. What then are the elements that could possibly connect Amundsen with Iraq and the Zouaves?

The answers are his insight that smaller was better for getting through the ice and his appreciation, unusual at the time, of the value of native knowledge to survive in the Arctic. Seventy years earlier, French officers, struggling with the pacification of North Africa after liberating it from the terrible Turk, had discovered the importance of employing native troops for the same reason Amundsen studied at the feet of the Inuit people-their local knowledge and adaptability to the physical
environment. The Zouaves were one of the French's most successful experiments in doing what the U.S. military needs to explore to succeed in Iraq and in the so-called "long war" against Islamic insurgencies around the world.

The argument that follows is this. A much smaller, regionally "earmarked" military force capable of navigating the cultural and political shoals of Iraq would allow for a more refined, adaptive approach against a protean enemy, some of whom are al-Qaeda terrorists, some criminals, some Ba'athist deadenders, but most of whom are angry and unemployed Iraqis whose lives have been made more miserable by the American presence. These elements of opposition to the United States are embedded now in a sectarian conflict (as a tactic to make the country ungovernable) unleashed indirectly by the U.S. invasion, creating a degree of complexity that only an unflinching American arrogance could believe is solvable without "native" knowledge, sensibilities, and wisdom.

First, let's have a word about the famous explorer. Amundsen's father died while he was an infant, and if his mother had had her way, Amundsen would have become a medical doctor, not an explorer-a calling she saw as offering little security. But all of those years that his mother thought he was diligently studying medical books, Amundsen had in fact been reading about past expeditions, especially those of an intrepid Englishman named Sir John Franklin, who died on his third Arctic expedition in 1845.

While he was in medical school Amundsen's mother died. Released from his sense of filial duty, the young student pursued the dream he had had since he was a small boy-to be the first to navigate the elusive Northwest Passage. Amundsen accomplished his dream by the ripe old age of 31.

His years of clandestinely assessing the mistakes of others had led Amundsen to a revolutionary Zen-like conclusion. Less would be more. To navigate the unpredictable, ever-changing ice flows, previous expeditions had always assumed the need for brute force to break through the ice. This meant big, heavy ships and large crews-as many as 65 men per boat. But large crews required enormous amounts of supplies. In the end Amundsen succeeded because of intensive study and preparation, drawing correct conclusions from past experience, and using a 70-foot fishing vessel with a crew of six.

No ship, then or today, including those with 75,000 horsepower engines, can defeat a hard icepack. A small, sturdy, and relatively light fishing boat with a highly skilled crew could do two things that larger boats could not. His boat could slip through narrow openings in the ice and, with a shallow draft, could go closer to shore where warmer water could mean less ice.

When Amundsen put in to winter on Prince William Island, he met curious Inuit "savages," as non-Europeans were known in the Victorian era. He soon came to another revolutionary conclusion-the natives had indispensable survival knowledge for men unfamiliar with such a hostile environment as arctic Canada. It was not the mentality of the Victorian era to think of native people as possessing useful knowledge. Explorers didn't win praise for bringing home anthropological insights about primitive people whom they were ultimately supposed to uplift. Instead, it was the Victorian way to lug their way of life with them, which meant thousands of pounds of supplies and, with a few exceptions (like Sir Richard Burton), a distinct lack of curiosity about native culture. Realizing very soon the valuable survival knowledge possessed by the Inuits, Amundsen decided to spend a second winter to master the various skills his team would need. It was not a popular decision with his crew. But it saved their lives.

They learned how to catch seal, hunt caribou, and recognize other sources of food in the icy desert that surrounded them. They learned how to construct igloos, appreciate the superior insulating properties of caribou fur over their own Victorian woolens, use dogsleds, and treat the sled skins with moss and saliva so that they would sail easily over any kind of snow. Amundsen kept his crew alive because he went native and didn't carry the Victorian baggage of the "white man's burden"-believing he was so superior to the indigenous population that he couldn't learn from them. He learned how to adapt to the hostile environment in which he found himself.

Acknowledging that there are voices in the United States today that recognize the applicability of Amundsen's wisdom, they are nevertheless fighting an American cultural mentality that is not so different from the Victorian one of yesteryear. The notion of seeking the wisdom of the natives in dealing with their own environment is foreign to a country whose leaders have unquestioning faith in the universal validity of "the American way," creating prefabricated views of the world that don't correspond to "ground truth." Admittedly, there is no single Iraqi voice of wisdom as to how America should extricate itself (which is not the same as "cutting and running") from the ice field of its own making. The United States has effectively created an Iraqi Government that is a dependency, vulnerable to being considered quislings by a hostile successor government, yet even the Iraqi Government leadership urges a lower U.S. profile and withdrawal to the periphery.
If small, light, and agile could be the better path to success, is creating huge, supply-intensive mini-Americas a wise approach? True, they provide as many of the morale boosting comforts of home as possible (like the Victorian generals who brought all of their china, silverware, and fine wines with them on campaigns), but they also insulate the soldiers from knowledge of the people and country they are trying to pacify, entail huge support costs, and require a constant stream of aggressively driven convoys that anger and endanger innocent Iraqis trying to go about their lives. Hence, "less is more" might apply to the conundrum in Iraq, especially as it is also the advice of President Nouri al-Maliki and, over the longer term, would make the war more sustainable at home and abroad.

Enter the French colonial experience with native troops in Algeria, coupled with the "small boat" thinking a la Amundsen. The toughest infantry the French had during their 15-year struggle to subdue Algeria (after their initial liberation of the Arabs in 1830) were the native Zouaves. Zouaves were, drawn from the Zouaoua Berbers in Kabyle. They were professional mercenaries who had formerly served the Turks. They knew the country and the languages, were used to "living rough," and had a warrior culture. They could march faster and longer than the Europeans in the French Army of North Africa. They were led initially by French officers and, over time, became an elite unit that Europeans wanted to join-and eventually had even Christian, Muslim, and Jewish regiments. In large measure, the French owed their success in North Africa in the 19th century to skillful use of native troops who were integrated into their chain of command.

To change metaphors, America has sent a bull (in big boats) to fight wasps (in kayaks). In a fight where it is difficult, if not impossible, for American soldiers to distinguish good wasps from bad wasps, the only way to fight in a manner that isn't constantly creating more angry wasps is to gain cultural and situational knowledge that only local Iraqis possess. This is hardly a new insight.

During the Vietnam War, the acknowledged success of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) Ranger, parachute, and selected ARVN units, as well as the Vietnamese Marines, trained by Army and Marine personnel, demonstrated American ability to effectively use native troops. Unfortunately, there were not enough of such soldiers. But how do we implement Amundsen's insight about small and agile with his use of local knowledge that could be both militarily and politically effective today? Perhaps by doing something that sounds colonial and un-American, but isn't.

* Create an Army of the Middle East, consisting of career officers and men who are dedicated to working in Arab speaking countries and committed to learning Arabic and acquiring cultural knowledge-of going native like Amundsen, if only to survive and succeed.

* Create from scratch a certain number of mixed battalions (or brigades) selectively recruited from the Iraqi Army and police who, like the Zouaves, know the language and have local knowledge and tolerance for living rough but are stationed among the people. These become our combined action units of the past, only now our wasps are interbred to gain the best traits of both species, and are adapted for Iraqi conditions. Like the Marine combined action platoons (CAPs) in Vietnam, they would have medical, intelligence gathering functions, and social work as part of their mission. The Vietnam-era CAPs deployed squad-sized units that were light and agile. They went native, built trust, and worked and lived with local village militias for months at a time outside fixed bases. They were very effective. We need to take it one step further in Iraq.

The native recruits would be offered (with the concurrence of the Iraqi Government) a 5-year contract to serve in specialized counterinsurgency units of the U.S. Marine Corps or Army. If their 5 years of service ends with an honorable discharge, they receive the same benefits as their American counterparts and will automatically acquire U.S. citizenship (or at least guaranteed U.S. residence) without losing their Iraqi citizenship. Dual citizenship would give Iraqi soldiers the security of not ending up like the Harkis in Algeria who served the French so well and were later disowned by GEN Charles de Gaulle and brutally murdered as collaborators by the newly independent Algerian Government.

This military miscegenation will have a two-way educational benefit as well as structurally build into the U.S. military the skills and knowledge it will need for a long time, thus establishing what is now missing in U.S.-Iraqi relations-a sense of mutual respect, trust, and true comradeship. The "ragheads" attitude toward Arabs held by many U.S. Marines and soldiers has to disappear, unless we are going to wage total war and reduce the whole population into abject, gelatinous submission as we did to Japan, with the help of an atomic bomb.

* Rethink the rotational policies of the military. Current policies, which are centered around the movements of large units, are constantly disrupting the learning curve and the hard-won relationships with the locals that are vital to success. A small corps of men and women is needed, married with monk-like dedication to their Services and committed to "stabilizing" Iraq (or other regions) while working respectfully with Iraqis. The ablest officers in the French Army who finally subdued Algeria in 1848 had served for 15 years in that theater.
The popular movie, The Battle of Algiers, and Alistair Home's A Savage War of Peace (New York Review Books Classics, 2006) have focused U.S. military attention on French strategic failures in spite of tactical successes during the Algerian "rebellion" against 132 years of French rule. In many ways the French experience of liberating Algeria and using native troops in the 1830s and 1840s is more directly relevant to the United States in Iraq, for France was as much of a neophyte to Arab culture then as the United States is today. Yet the French did some things right, and one of them was their use of local knowledge and listening to it. For a time the Zouaves were considered by many military observers to be the best infantry in the world. (The future general, George B. McClellan, as a military observer during the Crimean War of 1854-56, was deeply impressed by the fighting spirit and aggressive tactics of the Zouaves.)

It might be useful to remember that the English have struggled with the Irish Republican Army since 1916, despite knowing something about the land, the language, and the culture. If the United States is truly in a long war in parts of the world about which it knows nothing, the military needs to acquire the cultural, linguistic, and situational knowledge required to fight long-term, low-intensity conflicts in ways that will not produce more recruits for the enemy than it eliminates. Such thinking is now accepted wisdom in counterinsurgency circles. However, the military also needs to find ways to preserve this knowledge so it doesn't have to be constantly reacquired at great cost in blood and money. Selective recruitment and integration of local cultural and warfighting expertise into a flexible and fleet-footed regional counter-insurgency force could provide a long-term strategy to address this need. Such "local" resources should not feel the same pressing need to "go home" as American troops. They are already at home. That would be their value to American efforts.

A smaller, more culturally knowledgeable force committed to building long-term, sustainable relationships would likely please most Iraqis, as well as President Maliki, who wants U.S. troops to withdraw to the periphery and be a more discreet presence. Big footprints, counterinsurgency specialists agree, need to give way to small, discreet, and intelligently discriminating footprints; that is, fewer huge, easy-to-target base camps and more small groups of military personnel living among the people in the precincts where the local population lives-without air conditioning, National Football League games, or Starbucks.

A leaner, smarter, regionally dedicated force would please an American public that wants fewer troops in Iraq, and it would still be consistent with the victory-only attitude that Americans normally prefer, assuming we can define victory and are intelligently led. Fighting from a smaller, maneuverable, Amundsen-like boat could be politically and economically sustainable over the long term, and America could uphold its moral obligation to rebuild Iraq in partnership with Iraqis.

SIDEBAR

Editor's Note: The Gazette staff wishes to thank Ms. Patricia S. Lane, Research Librarian, Gen Alfred M. Gray Research Center for her assistance in finding the photograph/illustration of Amundsen and the Zouaves.

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GRAPHIC: Photographs
IMAGE PHOTOGRAPH, Capt Roald Amundsen in the cabin of his boat, the Gjoa. (Photo from the National Geographic, "Honors for Admunsen," January 1918, p. 56.)
IMAGE PHOTOGRAPH, If they are thought of as "ragheads" by the troops, we will never succeed. (Photo by Cpl Michael S. Cifuentes.)
IMAGE PHOTOGRAPH, Will the young Iraqi have good memories of the Marines who patrolled his hometown? (Photo by Cpl Luke Blom.)

DOCUMENT-TYPE: Commentary

PUBLICATION-TYPE: Magazine
The Strategic Corporal Versus the Strategic Cameraman

BYLINE: Manchester, Joshua

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ABSTRACT

When the Marines are comfortable with their weapons, seemingly unafraid to interact with the locals, understanding of native customs and mores, and treat the populace with dignity and respect, then the sum of all of these attitudes conveys a certain perception to both the people and the terrorists who watch them. In brief, public affairs is usually handled like the old-fashioned public relations machines of large companies, featuring photo opportunities, interviews, press releases, and the like.

FULL TEXT

That dramatic photograph becomes 'global' within minutes after being taken

Consider for a moment the differences in the informational warfare responsibilities of junior leaders in the Marine Corps-corporals-and the propagandists in insurgent and terror cells-cameramen. Infantry squad leaders-often-corporals-know (or should know) that the behavior of their Marines sends signals to those always watching them in an insurgency - the people and the insurgents. When the Marines are comfortable with their weapons, seemingly unafraid to interact with the locals, understanding of native customs and mores, and treat the populace with dignity and respect, then the sum of all of these attitudes conveys a certain perception to both the people and the terrorists who watch them. This perception hastens cooperation from the populace and hard targets them from insurgent attacks. This is the basic informational component of a strategic corporal in Iraq.

Consider now a strategic cameraman. Numerous attacks in Iraq and elsewhere are filmed for propaganda purposes. The classic case is that of the improvised explosive device (IED) or vehicleborne IED. Numerous IED videos circulate throughout Cyberspace for recruiting or fundraising purposes. From an informational standpoint, the area immediately affected by a corporal with a squad of Marines is local and physically located. The area immediately affected by a cameraman posting attack videos online is global and virtual. If our enemies can manage to squeeze virtual and global effects out of tactical and local actions, why can't we?

The Origins of the Strategic Corporal

In 1999, then-Commandant of the Marine Corps, Gen Charles C. Krulak, coined the term "strategic corporal" to reflect the devolution of greater responsibility onto the small unit levels of military leadership.

In many cases, the individual Marine will be the most conspicuous symbol of American foreign policy and will potentially influence not only the immediate tactical situation but the operational and strategic levels as well. His actions, therefore,
will directly impact the outcome of the larger operation, and he will become, as the title of this article suggests-the
Strategic Corporal.1

In this very first definition, Gen Krulak alluded to the informational component of the strategic corporal, noting that
individual Marines are conspicuous symbols of American foreign policy. But how eagerly does the Marine Corps insti-
tutionally embrace this informational aspect of a strategic corporal?

When first conceived, the strategic corporal conjured notions of noncommissioned officers capable of doing far more than
their predecessors had been capable of doing, allowing them to influence conflicts at the operational and even strategic
levels. This is certainly the case today with the training of an infantry squad leader. Some even go so far as to argue that
the corporals of today have the same skill sets as the captains of 1980.

But what of the term strategic corporal itself? As an institution, it seems the Marine Corps only invokes this term when
admonishing leaders to watch out for the press. For example, if a Marine screws up and Cable News Network is present,
then he'll become a strategic corporal. The soldiers at Abu Ghraib became inadvertent strategic corporals. Pay attention
the next time someone uses this term and note two things-the context usually involves the media, and the connotation is
almost always negative.

This is not the way it's supposed to be. Taken in this way, being a strategic corporal becomes a condition to be avoided.
Who wants his Marines screwing up on national television? Moreover, it reduces the concept to something akin to being
on one's best behavior all of the time. This is certainly a good way to think of one's conduct, but it results in ceding the
virtual informational battlespace to any enemy who is not afraid of the media. In fact, the strategic corporal can mean a
whole lot more for U.S. operations-specifically with regard to the media-and can even help us win conflicts.

The Current Information Environment

Two trends vex information operations. The first is the globalization of electronic media. The military has traditionally
divided perception management into two areas and skill sets-public affairs and psychological operations. In brief, public
affairs is usually handled like the old-fashioned public relations machines of large companies, featuring photo opportu-
nities, interviews, press releases, and the like. The target audience is generally the U.S. public, and public affairs is usually
imbued with the notion of telling things as they are or getting stories out. Psychological operations are targeted toward an
enemy or a given neutral populace and are meant to make them think a certain way. These two communities have tradi-
tionally been taught to never associate with one another due to the differing needs governing their roles. The problem lies
at the intersection of the warfighter's need for deception and the public's need for transparency.

Today though, the globalization of all forms of media means that it is more and more difficult to segregate media products
for a given audience. With regard to Iraq, this means that any given story, video, interview, or announcement that is
accessible via the Internet can potentially have four audiences-Iraqis, Muslims elsewhere, Americans, and the rest of the
world-all of whom will have a tendency to view it differently. There is much further segmentation within these groups as
well. The point is that electronic media can no longer be carefully segregated as to who will view, read, or listen to it.
Segregation may still be possible for types of information that is not digitized, such as announcements via a loudspeaker
system or handbills and leaflets. For anything that can be sent by e-mail though, the walls have come down.

The second trend is a growing distrust in traditionally manufactured information. Corporate press releases, press con-
ferences, advertising, and the like are more and more seen as possessing suspect and murky agendas. Sometimes, though
not always, new media, such as blogs, podcasts, and YouTube videos, overcome these suspicions, as they possess a less
polished feel to them. Ultimately, many consumers of information mitigate their suspicions by developing something like
a personal relationship and trust with the source, whether it is an institution or an individual.

These trends make for a bewildering environment in which to operate. Consider two recent phenomena. In March, Mul-
tinational Force-Iraq (MNF-I) created its own YouTube channel.2 On the homepage for the channel, MNF-I states that:

Multi-National Force-Iraq established this YouTube channel to give viewers around the world a 'boots on the ground'
perspective of Operation Iraqi Freedom from those who are fighting it.

Video clips document action as it appeared to personnel on the ground and in the air as it was shot. We will only edit video
clips for time, security reasons, and/or overly disturbing or offensive images.

What you will see on this channel in the coming months:

* Combat action.
* Interesting, eye-catching footage.
* Interaction between Coalition troops and the Iraqi populace.
* Teamwork between Coalition and Iraqi troops in the fight against terror.

In other words the MNF-I has decentralized its public affairs to some extent by allowing videos submitted by troops to reach a very wide audience.

At the same time, a controversy recently erupted about the Army's new guidance for posting on message boards, blogging, e-mailing, sending letters home, or creating resumes.3 The controversy was due to the fact that the going perception of the new policy was that it was intended to shut down personal blogs by Army members. Apparently this was not the case. Nevertheless, the fact is that within 2 months of each other, one military agency-MNF-I-sought to decentralize its informational goals, while another-the Army-sought to put added restrictions or layers of oversight on the informational capabilities of its soldiers.

What Is To Be Done?

In such a confusing media environment, how might the Marine Corps enable its small unit leaders to become as effective in the informational domain as the strategic cameraman described above? Here are three possible solutions.

A media intent. Marines are used to operating within a commander's intent. Why not have an intent for electronic media at even the lowest levels? Such guidance would serve to lay down some clear expectations and end states for the production and distribution of electronic media in a war zone. Rather than simple censorship, a media intent statement might allow Marines to focus their own electronic efforts toward the commander's end state. Such a statement might sound like this:

Reporting indicates that insurgent leaders in the area are attempting to spread the rumor that the coalition is fabricating evidence that it finds when conducting home searches in our area of operation. I want to produce footage showing that every arrest we make after searching a home is tied to concrete evidence found at the site.

An intent could be a very valuable guide. The same Marine squad might be in a firefight in the morning and eat lunch at a community leader's home in the afternoon. They might have footage of both. But an intent could guide which video is put on a blog and which is put on a hard drive for reminiscing after returning home. Instead of "this is me getting hit by an IED," videos like "this is me rebuilding a school" or "this is me meeting a sheik" might come to dominate.

Selective magnification. Alternately, a commander might designate that everything his unit does be recorded by Marines within it. He could then designate an information cell to cull through the footage to find what he needs for the effects he desires. Such footage might also serve a training and adaptation role by helping Marines see their own behaviors and tweaking them accordingly.

Information sped a lists. Maj Daniel Q. Greenwood recently authored an article entitled, "Combined Action Counterinsurgency Concepts: A Proposed Framework for Future Counterinsurgency Operations."4 Among many other ideas he argues that:

Future 'information specialists' should be recruited and selected for employment at the Company/Platoon level to undermine local insurgent propaganda efforts.

Maj Greenwood goes on to elaborate in a footnote:

The Marine Corps Recruiting Command employs E-5 Sergeant Marketing/Public Affairs (MPA) specialists at all 48 recruiting stations throughout the nation. Arguably one of the most valuable members of the command, these junior Marines combine their initial public affairs training with imagination, initiative and hard work to interact with the local population, schools and the media, telling the Marine Corps story. This same approach should be employed at the tactical level within the COIN [counterinsurgency] environment.

Conclusion

There's no reason for the term strategic corporal to refer only to some sort of "gotcha" moment. In his article, "Counterinsurgency Redux,"5 David Kilcullen argued that one feature of COIN today is the importance of energizing one's base:

In modern Counterinsurgency, the side may win which best mobilizes and energizes its global, regional, and local support base-and prevents its adversaries doing likewise.

The goal of information operations should be to help energize the counterinsurgent's bases of support.
The current generation of Americans in their teens and 20s loves to make media. Those who join the Marine Corps are no exception. Harnessing their technical skills and imaginations can help build trust with the populace in a COIN environment and fortify the will of the public at home, allowing positive strategic effects from junior Marines.

FOOTNOTE

Notes


3. For background on this story, see the Small Wars Journal post, "Everything You Always Wanted to Know About Losing the Information War," available online at http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2007/05/everything-youalways-wanted-t/.


Author's Note: The author appreciates the assistance provided by Cape Scott A. Cuomo for his help in developing this anecdote.

*Editor's Note: A version of this anecdote first appeared on the Small Wars Journal online at www.smallwarsjournal.com.

Capt Manchester is a platoon commander with 3d Battalion, 23d Marines. He participated in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM I with 7th Engineer Support Battalion.

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IMAGE PHOTOGRAPH, Set piece news is live; however, it has little, if any, strategic or tactical impact (Photo by LCpl James B. Hoke.)

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The MSTP Mission Rehearsal Exercise

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ABSTRACT
After the foundation is laid during the planning phase, the focus of effort is the five major training events (or parts), comprised of a command, control, communications and computers mobile training team (C^sup 4^ MTT); warfighting seminar; operational planning team (OPT) planning practical application (PPA); and after-action review (AAR).

FULL TEXT
Full-spectrum training for the MAGTF
by the Staff, MAGTF Staff Training Program
- Associated Press, 13 October 2006

The discussion for a brighter future in one of Iraq's most embattled regions went on as gunfire echoed outside. Senior staff of Multinational Force-West, or MNF-W as it is known here, today hosted an economic conference at the governor's compound in the volatile city of Ramadi, capital of the violent Al Anbar Province and an active insurgent stronghold. Since early 2004 U.S. Marines here have been attempting to improve the quality of life for this majority Sunni region as part of their ongoing effort to defeat al-Qaeda and create an environment where the Iraqi Security Forces could take up the fight. Even after defeating insurgents in the well-publicized battle of Fallujah, "winning the hearts and minds" of the region's civilian population has been especially challenging. Economic conditions in the province remain highly depressed, with little industry, poor infrastructure, and few opportunities for the local citizens, a situation that has aided the insurgents.

The objective of the conference was for Camp Lejeune-based II Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward) (II MEF(Fwd)) Marines and coalition officials to reach consensus with their Iraqi counterparts on the Al Anbar Economic Consolidation Plan and engender a sense of cooperation and shared purpose on the way ahead. According to MNF-W officials, the underlying intent was to demonstrate the legitimacy of Iraq's provincial government and to win the confidence of the citizens of Al Anbar in their government. The high-profile meeting included a host of Iraqi officials, including the governor of Al Anbar Province, Baghdad's Chief of Police, and representatives from Iraq's national Economic and Interior Ministries. The conference packed a full agenda reflecting the many challenges that the attendees faced. Security was tight as the discussions worked through issues, such as ongoing threats from insurgents to chronic unemployment due to the recent shutdown of a factory and concerns over an unruly crowd upset over contaminated water from a local treatment plant near the governor's compound.

Communicating predominantly through an interpreter, MajGen Walter Gaskin, commander of the Marines in Al Anbar, engaged Governor Mahmoun and other Iraqi officials at length on ways the economic situation in the province could be improved. Increased cooperation with Marines by local sheiks and the awarding of contracts were primary topics. The governor, in turn, pressed the U.S. Marine general to pledge support in the form of money, troops, and construction projects. "The Generals were very resistant to giving any financial commitment," said Mr. George Michael, an Iraqi-American who served as the governor's interpreter during the economic conference. However, Iraqi officials were able to persuade MajGen Gaskins to commit to improving the security situation in Al Anbar Province and meet with them again in the future. Though contentious at points, during a briefing with reporters from the international press at the conclusion of the event, the Marines and Iraqi participants felt progress had been made during the conference and were generally positive about the possibilities for future cooperation.

The fictional vignette at left could have happened in Al Anbar Province but instead occurred at Camp Lejeune during the II MEF(Fwd) mission rehearsal exercise (MRX) in October 2006. The Al Anbar Economic Conference event highlighted some of the significant changes in MRXs and MEF exercises (MEFExs) since the start of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF). While still training Marine air-ground task forces (MAGTFs) in the Marine Corps Planning Process (MCP)}
other "blocking and tackling" fundamentals of warfighting, these exercises also provide a venue for training in other essential tasks as requested by the MAGTF commander. Both MEFExs and MRXs are planned using the same core four-phase, five-part (see Figure 1) MAGTF Staff Training Program (MSTP) exercise design process. The process is flexible, scalable, and focused to develop a realistic scenario to accomplish the MAGTF commanders training goals and objectives. After the foundation is laid during the planning phase, the focus of effort is the five major training events (or parts), comprised of a command, control, communications and computers mobile training team (C^sup 4^ MTT); warfighting seminar; operational planning team (OPT) planning practical application (PPA); and after-action review (AAR). The MSTP exercise design model is depicted in Figure 1.

This article will provide a brief overview of the MSTP MRX design process and major training events in order that the reader may gain an appreciation for the value of the MRX or MEFEx as the capstone event for the MAGTF Predeployment Training Program (PTP).

In accordance with Marine Corps Order 1500.53A, MAGTF Staff Training Program (MSTP), the primary mission of MSTP is to:

. . . provide training in MAGTF warfighting skills, within the context of a joint and combined environment, in order to improve the warfighting skills of senior commanders and their staffs and to provide feedback into the Expeditionary Force Development System (EFDS).

The designated main effort for MSTP is support to the Operating Forces through a MEFEx or MRX for each of the three numbered MEFs approximately every 24 months. In addition, MSTP supports several formal schools and requested joint training events and serves as a proponent for designated doctrinal publications and pamphlets. To accomplish its mission, MSTP has a small but diverse team made up of active duty and Reserve personnel, as well as highly qualified civilian contractors organized into different functional sections. This team includes five retired lieutenant generals who serve as senior mentors offering critical advice and insight based on their considerable experience. In order to provide the most realistic exercises possible, MSTP also leverages joint, combined, and interagency participation in the MRX program as a certified organization under the Joint National Training Capability.

As combat operations in U.S. Central Command have turned from largely conventional and symmetric in nature to asymmetric counterinsurgency (COIN)/stability and support operations (SASO) in a mature theater, the MRX has grown in scope and complexity in order to provide a realistic training venue that reflects the current operating environment. A general understanding of the differences between MEFExs and MRXs is necessary to fully appreciate this evolution. MEFExs are Title 10, Service-only events exercising hypothetical scenarios, frequently executed in conjunction with other major joint/combined exercises. These exercises are typically "free play" in nature, pitting the MAGTF against an independent, free-thinking opposing force in an unconstrained environment. Starting with pre-OIF workups in 2002, the character of the MEFEx began to evolve into what has since become known as the MRX, a term coined from U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCom). The concept of the MRX is to provide an immersive learning environment where the training audience experiences situations and likely events they will encounter in current real-world scenarios while performing mission oriented predeployment training. While still free play in nature, the MRX has an increased amount of "scripted" activity over a conventional MEFEx. In addition to scripting, a greater number of joint, interagency, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and coalition stakeholders in the MEFs operating area typically increase MRX complexity. In October 2004, II MEF executed an MRX in preparation for operations in Al Anbar Province during OIF 04-06. This was a USJFCom-led, MSTP-supported event executed in conjunction with Exercise UNIFIED ENDEAVOR. Based on lessons learned from that event, MSTP has been the lead agent for the planning and conduct of the past two MRXs in preparation for OIF 05-07 and OIF 06-08, with USJFCom in support. In addition, MSTP executed a "traditional" MEFEx in support of IH MEF in May 2006 involving a hypothetical Soudieast Asia COIN scenario.

Phase I: Planning

Planning for the MRX is driven from the outset by the MAGTF commander's exercise objectives, training goals, and desired key events. These form the foundation for the entire exercise. They are articulated and refined throughout in a series of formal and informal planning events that culminate in command post exercise (CPX) execution. During the conduct of the formal planning conferences, the MAGTF will identify the desired scenario and key events that provide the backdrop for event execution. The scenario creates a plausible and credible context for the exercise, comprising the total exercise environment including the strategic setting, road to crisis, and all applicable background information. Reflecting the wide-ranging number of military and nonmilitary issues, recent MRX scenarios have included operational-level lines of operation (LOOs) in their design. LOOs are broad themes, such as security or economic development, that provide a conceptual framework for a variety of tactical actions that are interwoven to produce effects that drive toward a
well-defined strategic end state. Specific scenario key events are identified by the training audience as actions they wish to emphasize and practice during the CPX. Key events are linked to the MAGTF training goals and normally involve coordinated actions by a majority of the training audience vice only a few specific sections or units. Recent examples include the targeting of a high-value individual by conventional and special operations forces, recovery of a downed aircraft, or execution of a high-level conference with local community leaders, such as noted in the vignette above.

Concurrent with the MAGTF finalizing its goals and objectives during planning, MSTP will develop the foundation for the CPX through the development of dedicated story lines, master scenario events lists (MSELs), and background information that supports the desired scenario. A story line is a series of related events (or MSELs) under a single theme, with a specified purpose that is designed to cause major training audience reactions. They are developed to emphasize critical learning points across the warfighting functions, with expected actions and a defined end state in mind. Story lines utilize a series of enabling and supporting actions through implementers, such as messages, phone calls, or media events, that build toward a key event in a plausible and credible manner. The key event then provides the catalyst for the audience to react, while supporting events help bring the story line to a plausible conclusion. The MAGTF's specified key events are addressed with dedicated story lines, while other story lines may be created to exercise general "steady-state" type actions (typical "day in the life" of Al Anbar Province) that the MAGTF will be executing while deployed. MSTP creates and refines story lines through a series of internal planning conferences, assisted by Service, joint, interagency, and other subject matter experts (SMEs) as required. Multiple story lines are usually developed along the major themes or LOOs. A typical MRX will have from 15 to 25 story lines. The story line development process is shown in Figure 2. As story lines are developed, MSTP will ensure that they are synchronized and critical background material is reflected in an exercise planning book. The planning book is the stage setter that provides the immersive environment for the MEF to execute within. Drawn from current events in theater, the planning book provides a "ground truth" picture for the training audience.

Phase II: Preparation

The preparation phase of MSTP exercise design includes the first three major training events that ready the MAGTF for event execution. While elements of internal MRX planning continue, the main effort for the preparation phase is focused on providing key MAGTF personnel learning opportunities via academics and planning practical application. The first of the five-part training package is the C^sup 4^ MTT. Led by the MSTP Command and Control (C^sup 2^) Support Branch, the C^sup 4^ MTTs provide instruction to MAGTF information management and technology personnel to the level of competency for the C^sup 4^ architecture to function during the exercise. Instruction may be separate from or complement that already resident at the MEF MAGTF Integrated Systems Technology Center facilities and provides training on systems that the MAGTF can expect to utilize while deployed. Normally lasting 2 weeks, the C^sup 4^ MTTs are divided into separate technical and functional events. These are shown in Figure 3.

The functional C^sup 4^ MTT facilitates use of collaborative planning and automated information exchange between echelons. This MTT provides commanders and other end users with a C^sup 4^ systems overview, information management, common operational picture management, and hands-on training with the C^sup 4^ systems that they will use in Iraq. These MTTs range from training the audience on standard C^sub 4^ systems of record to training on new technologies, such as command post of the future, which MSTP will facilitate with Marine Corps Systems Command and joint agencies if required. The technical C^sup 4^ MTT provides refresher training to data specialists on planning, installing, operating, and maintaining the MAGTFs C^sup 4^ architecture and systems. Training typically includes information necessary to gain an in-depth understanding of the units information flow requirements, as well as training on systems like routers, switches, cryptographic devices, and software, such as Microsoft NT.

The second major training event during the MRX is the warfighting seminar (WFS). The WFS is an opportunity to present the basic body of planning information contained in Marine Corps doctrine and to offer tailored academic instruction on subjects supporting accomplishment of the MAGTF's specified training goals. The WFS program of instruction is developed with a foundation in MCPP fundamentals, but the majority of instruction is typically on topics oriented to the MAGTF's future area of operations. An example WFS is shown in Figure 4.

All classes are "operationalized" with maps, vignettes, and other information from the area of responsibility in order to provide relevant examples for each topic of instruction. Classes normally take place over 5 training days and range from plenary sessions with several hundred members in attendance to specialized breakout sessions for select members of the MEF's major subordinate commands (MSCs) or attached units. In addition to organic instructors, including senior mentors, MSTP heavily leverages SMEs from across the Marine Corps, joint arena, and interagencies for the WFS. If desired, SMEs may be utilized for seminars or other instruction outside the WFS venue during any of the exercise design phases.
MSTP will also prepare follow-on training or conferences after the conclusion of the MRX to address any shortfalls the MAGTF may identify that can't be covered during the exercise. For example, MSTP has prepared and executed offsite economic development conferences for the past two MRXs, each of which gathered SMEs from across the country in order to familiarize senior MAGTF staff members with issues specific to Al Anbar Province along the economic LOO. (See Figure 5.)

The third major training event of the MRX is the OPT PPA. The OPT PPA provides the MAGTF command element and its MSCs an opportunity to develop an exercise order to be utilized during MRX execution. The orders process is highlighted in Figure 6.

The MAGTF will apply instruction from the WFS, along with information in the planning book and relevant tactics, techniques, and procedures, to the problem posed by the exercise scenario. The steps of the MCPP provide the foundation for the OPT battle rhythm, with opportunities taken by MSTP to provide MAGTF MSCs with additional instruction in their specific warfighting functions as opportunities allow. Staff coordination is facilitated through an automated request for information system and opportunities for staff-to-staff interaction utilizing video teleconferencing (VTC), Internet, or telephone conferences. The MSTP External Elements Branch and a senior mentor will provide information, guidance, and coordination with the training audience, while simulating higher and adjacent headquarters (HOcAHQ) functions. The HOcAHQ staff is primarily composed of Reserve Marines from the MSTP HOcAHQ Detachment (formerly the Individual Mobilized Augment Detachment). In conjunction with external augmentation from a variety of Department of Defense and other agencies, the HOeAHQ Detachment simulates the battle rhythm of Multinational Corps-Iraq and other commands to provide plausible and credible interactions for the MEF.

The OPT process will be attended by selected MSTP MAGTF branch observers/trainers/collectors (OTCs) and other senior mentors, who will unobtrusively observe the OPT and provide feedback to the MSTP staff on potential concerns during execution that may be reflected in the order. Once the MAGTF and MSC exercise orders are complete, they will be sent to MSTP for a detailed orders crosswalk. MSTP will then conduct a detailed scrub of the orders to gain an appreciation for the MAGTF's intended operations and formulate collection plans to be used during the CPX. During the crosswalk, MSTP will also determine where any inconsistencies with the orders may be present, as well as areas in which the MAGTF excelled. At the conclusion of the orders crosswalk, MSTP will prepare a formal orders crosswalk back brief to the MAGTF chief of staff that will address all potential concerns with the operations orders.

Phase III: Event Execution

CPX execution is the culminating event of the entire five-part MSTP exercise process. The CPX is normally 50 to 60 hours of a simulation-supported exercise spread over 5 to 6 days as desired by the MAGTF. The CPX will incorporate modeling and simulation technology, typically MAGTF tactical warfare simulation or joint conflict and tactical simulation, along with human interaction across the story line construct to provide the MAGTF an opportunity to accomplish its established training goals. During the CPX, MSTP will attempt to provide the most realistic exercise environment for the training audience as possible, closely replicating what they will encounter while deployed. The MAGTF will execute a series of progressive workup events to validate that all C^sup 4^ systems are set up, linked, and operating properly, with all necessary personnel competent in their use prior to the commencement of the CPX itself. Upon successful completion of all C^sup 4^ workup events, the MAGTF will participate in a formal 1-day rehearsal. The rehearsal is designed to provide the MAGTF an opportunity to orient the staff to the concept of operations and positions of all units and to work out any last minute communications systems problems. During rehearsal the simulation will be turned on, and the MAGTF will utilize all C^sup 4^ systems to execute a series of predesignated exercise events. They will also typically conduct VTCs and other coordination with the MSTP H&AHQ staff to familiarize the MAGTF staff with their counterparts at HHQ and to discuss issues necessary to the conduct of the CPX itself.

The CPX will commence following the conclusion of a successful rehearsal. After a short warm start, MSTP will begin MSEL injects utilizing the story line construct previously discussed. The tempo of each training day will be modulated to ensure that the training audience is challenged in meeting its training objectives without being overwhelmed. The exercise coordinator (ExCon), with the assistance of the exercise design staff, monitors and coordinates all exercise activity during the CPX. He modulates the level of intensity based on how he, the OTCs, and other elements of MSTP judge the MAGTF to be meeting its training goals. This is accomplished by timing the injection of MSELs, providing direction on what activity is conducted in the model, and coordination of the response cells or other elements of the simulation. The effort includes the direction of role-players and SME interaction with the training audience, media "Cable News Network moments," and multiparty events, such as provincial counsel meetings. Thus, while scripted, the MRX story line methodology is not prescriptive. The MAGTF response to exercise stimuli is observed and actions analyzed based on the
scenario material presented, kinetic and nonkinetic. When the MAGTF takes actions to appropriately address the situation at hand, a story line may be brought to a successful conclusion, even if such actions were not previously anticipated by MSTP. If a story line is not addressed properly, a series of branches or sequels may be developed dynamically during CPX execution to reinforce the desired learning points. Should significant problems develop where the MAGTF may operate in a manner detrimental to its training goals, ExCon will call a meeting of the white cell. The white cell will determine how to address the situation and direct appropriate adjustments to the simulation or story lines as necessary. The MSTP team will also meet each day to review observations, ensure situational awareness, and provide a venue for the collection of information for the formal AAR.

Phase IV: Critique and Analysis

The final part of the MSTP exercise design process begins with the AAR. It provides a venue for comparing what the MAGTF planned with what it actually executed during the MRX process. Immediately following the end of the exercise, the MSTP OTCs will provide informal debriefs with elements of the training audience that they observed. This informal AAR will include the OTCs personal observations during the CPX, noting trends and potential areas for improvement as well as areas where the MAGTF excelled. The MSTP staff will then gather to review input into the OTC system and all feedback gained from the team including attached SMEs. From these inputs they will develop the formal AAR presentation and associated graphics, to be facilitated by the exercise director within 3 days of CPX completion. The formal AAR is designed to provide immediate, positive, overarching feedback to the training audience in an open forum regarding its performance during the CPX. It is attended by the Commandant of the Marine Corps and the MAGTF commanding general, along with key personnel from the MSCs and battle staff. All MSTP senior mentors and OTCs will also be in attendance to answer questions from the training audience and support the Director, MSTP’s presentation. The formal AAR utilizes leading questions and a facilitated discussion to objectively bring out relevant learning points and provide positive feedback. Observations used in the AAR correlate directly to the MAGTF’s training goals, focusing on major themes vice every finding. The MAGTF commander participates by facilitating the AAR discussion and making any comments on each topic as he deems appropriate. Within 30 days following the AAR, the MAGTF commander will be sent a detailed final exercise report (FER). The FER is a text-heavy narrative that provides a detailed assessment of all AAR observations, including those not presented during the formal AAR. Unlike the AAR, the FER may contain MSTP perspective on each topic in order to facilitate realization of the MAGTF training goals and will be provided only to the MAGTF commander.

Conclusion

The value of the MRX to improve the warfighting skills of the MAGTF has been proven. In either the MEFEx or MRX format, MSTP can develop an exercise through its four-phase, five-part model that provides training in the fundamentals, as well as tailored, relevant training based on the MAGTF’s specific requirements. Though recent MRXs have been designed to prepare MEF commanders and their MSCs for ongoing OIF contingency operations with a COIN/SASO focus, the MSTP can provide exercises that cut across the spectrum of conflict. While evolving, the MSTP exercise design model allows MSTP to develop and execute a highly comprehensive, realistic MAGTF-level exercise that utilizes current story lines while leveraging the expertise of the Marine Corps and joint, interagency, and NGO communities. MSTP MRX training thus represents more than a "check in the box" for MAGTF PTP.

Official and unofficial feedback regarding recent MRXs from members of various training audiences has been overwhelmingly positive. Many Marines have commented that if they had known how valuable the MRX experience was going to be, they would have encouraged an even greater level of participation. While future initiatives and conflicts may necessitate further evolution of exercise design, the MSTP model will remain a viable method for MAGTFs to receive the most relevant training.

SIDEBAR

The concept of the MRX is to provide an immersive learning environment where the training audience experiences situations and likely events they will encounter in current real-world scenarios while performing mission oriented pre-deployment training.

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Three experts disclose some of the essential differences between conventional warfare and counterinsurgency and tell why it is important for Marines to recognize them

MajGen Victor H. Krulak is Special Assistant to the Director for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities, Joint Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff. He is the first "active duty military voice" to be heard on the Lejeune Forum. As a major in 1942 he volunteered for parachute training and later became Commanding Officer, 2d Parachute Battalion, the unit selected to raid Choiseul Island to divert enemy attention from the Bougainville invasion. During the ensuing weeklong action he earned the Navy Cross. He has twice been awarded the Legion of Merit (Okinawa and Korea) and while Assistant Chief of Staff (C/S) C-3 (Operations), Fleet Marine Force Pacific (FMFPac), received the air medal for reconnaissance flights in Korea.
between August 1950 and July 1951. He later was C/S, 1st Marine Division (1st MarDiv) in Korea. In 1955 he rejoined FMFPac, serving as C/S until his promotion to brigadier general when he became Assistant Division Commander, 3d MarDiv. From July 1957 until January 1960 he was Director, Marine Corps Education Center, Marine Corps Schools, Quantico. At the time of his present assignment in February 1962 he was the Commanding General, Marine Corps Recruit Depot, San Diego. He was commissioned in 1934 after graduating from the Naval Academy.

Col David Galula is also a welcome newcomer to the Lejeune Forum. Raised in Morocco, he was educated at St. Cyr, commissioned in the French Marine Corps, and fought World War II (WWII) in North Africa, France, and Germany. Postwar duty included 9 years in China and Hong Kong, a tour as United Nations observer in Greece during that country's civil war, 2 years in Algeria as troop and area commander, and special tours with French Army Intelligence and the General Staff. Recently retired after 23 years of service, he is now a research associate at Harvard's Center for International Affairs. His most recent project at the center includes as a major part the laws of counterinsurgency and their application. This part, he says, evolves around the golden rule that in any circumstances the people are divided pro and con (both are in the minority) and neutral (the majority). Principle: identify the "pro" group, train it, organize it, and set it to work in order to rally the neutrals and eliminate the "cons."

Dr. G.K. Tanham makes his second appearance on the Lejeune Forum. As a member of Forum V (September 1962), he listed what he considered to be the five most important strategic decisions made during this century. One of these was "the Chinese Communist decision to make the Long March in 1934," an experience, he explained, that helped Mao Tse Tung develop and codify a theory of warfare that today is having important applications all over the world. Here, as before, he writes from the viewpoint of a soldier and a scholar (A.B., Princeton; M.A. and Ph.D., Stanford). During WWII he spent 3 years in Europe with the 7th Armored Division and was awarded the Silver Star with Oak Leaf Cluster, Air Medal, and Croix de Guerre. In 1947 he began teaching military history at Cal Tech in Pasadena and in 1954 was appointed Associate Professor of History. He is now Assistant to the President, RAND Corporation.

Editor's Note: This series of essays first appeared in the January 1963 issue of the Marine Corps Gazette. They have been reproduced here with minimal editing and reformating.

by MajGen Victor H. Krulak

Before discussing essential differences between conventional warfare and the military aspect of counterinsurgency, we must realize that in conducting counterinsurgency operations around the globe we are fighting a war. Strange as this war may seem, its stakes are just as high as any in history, and the strategy of the enemy is as thoroughly refined and carefully prepared as was German strategy under the Schlieffen Plan. While its character may not be entirely recognizable, its purpose certainly is. In an address on 6 January 1961, Premier [Nikita] Khrushchev proposed that the Communist world would support the uprisings of people around the world who are, as he put it, fighting "just wars . . . against rotten reactionary regimes." In other words he laid down the insurgency challenge.

If we admit this fact of war we illuminate the first and most essential variation from conventional combat: the character of the area of operations. In the last century America has fought her wars principally on the high seas, on the territory of an enemy, or in the land of an invaded ally. Never before, however, have we been dedicated to winning a global war where the battleground is not some identifiable geographic area but is found in the hearts of thousands of small and simple people. Never before, moreover, has the capture or liberation of territory been completely subordinated, as a national goal, to winning the convictions of men, whose loyalty and good will are themselves the full measure of victory.

Nor have we ever been obliged to fight under such a blanket of stultifying restraints. For the first time in our history we find ourselves in a position in which our beleaguered allies do most of the fighting and in which our own operational contribution is largely in the form of material and advice—which may or may not be accepted.

This situation can scarcely avoid breeding frustration, nor is it a frustration confined to ourselves. The matter of sanctuary, for example, has probably never played a more dramatic and more annoying part, as witness Algeria and Vietnam. South Vietnamese officers speak of the Viet Cong bases in Laos, of the columns of warlike material and people entering their country via the Ho Chi Minh trail, and of the unassailable propaganda radios in North Vietnam and Cambodia. The charges may or may not be exaggerated, but the basic fact is still there: the Communists do have a privileged training and marshaling ground north of the 17th parallel if they choose to use it. We saw this first in Korea, and it has become no less repugnant or difficult to deal with since then.

Restricted warfare—war by degree—leads to the matter of escalation and its relationship with national policy. In the classic war of the 1941 style, everyone involved did his level best; the wars were top speed efforts, and all of the antagonists knew
it. Italian women surrendered their wedding rings; American wives forewent their nylons. We actually derived a measure of comfort in realizing that everyone was operating at full bore.

War against insurgency is quite a different affair. Its scale or intensity is measured not by what we can afford, not by what we will sacrifice, not by what our economy can stand, not even by what our allies want or what they will accept, but by a complicated synthesis of all these factors and it is not likely to be the same synthesis on any 2 successive days.

Likewise we are not confronted with a simple matter of calculating the magnitude of the enemy's strength and then gearing to defeat it. In the battle against subversive insurgency our question is not one of estimating how strong the enemy is, but how much of his strength he chooses to employ against us. This is a far more difficult problem for, by an unannounced shift in emphasis, the enemy can force our entire mechanism into another gear ratio.

Further, we find a wholly different impact in the word "totality." In the atom-conscious years following WWII we placed a very clear interpretation on the term "total war." Now, in combating insurgency around the world, we are brought face to face with still another kind of a total war. This is not total war in the sense of multimegaton exchanges or in masses of marching bayonets as in the great wars of the past. But it is total in that it draws upon all the sources of national strength of those who foment the struggle and those who oppose it, too.

Put another way, our past wars have been largely matters of violence. Equipped with grenades and tanks, ships and planes-all of the mechanisms of destruction-our military people, as practitioners of violence, occupied the key position without challenge. But counterinsurgency is a different matter. The winning of this battle involves not just the efforts of the soldier as he destroys the guerrilla, but the resources of the politician, of the propagandist, the economist, and the educator. In past wars where violence was king, these other forces sat in the economy seats while the military occupied the dress circle. Now they all are involved-and on a coordinate, give-and-take basis. Here is a profound difference (and one that raises immense problems).

Related to this give-and-take effort is another dramatic variation: the almost indistinguishable area between war and peace. Unlike August 1914, this war is not a matter of demands, ultimatums, declarations, and then formal war. Rather, an insurgency crisis usually grows slowly-in some areas it has developed over a decade or more-and the criteria by which it comes to deserve the name "war" are extremely hard to discern. This factor also tends to create operational problems; for example, whether the task at any one moment is primarily political, economic, or military, and just what the balance of responsibility and authority among the participants should be. This is a novel problem for which the United States is only now becoming organized.

Finally, we must consider the difference in motivation. "Avenging the Alamo," "Remembering the Maine," "Making the World Safe for Democracy," "Remembering Pearl Harbor"-these were more than rallying cries in the past, more than standards. In reality they represented a national purpose in terms readily understood by those called upon to sacrifice. In our fight against insurgency we as yet lack an electrifying phrase to chart the road from where we are to where we want to go. In the minds of many of our citizens this leaves the war a political, spiritual, and geographic abstraction. Democracies are not renowned for fighting abstract wars.

Taken altogether these variations from conventional warfare characterize the counterinsurgency war as a very hard one to fight-a war that is quite foreign to many of our basic conceptions. Yet one characteristic of counterinsurgency is wholly favorable and, in its significance, far outweighs all of the unfavorable factors discussed to this point. In facing up to the Communists directly, in challenging their "national liberation struggle" philosophy, in striving on our own to win the hearts of the underdeveloped nations around the world, we have actually set a dynamic strategy in motion. Although this strategy is new, although it may involve accepting temporary setback along with incremental triumph, it is geared in the final analysis to win while still avoiding the cataclysm of nuclear conflict-where neither victor nor vanquished is the winner.

by Col David Galula

I want to concentrate on two of the essential differences between conventional warfare and the military side of counterinsurgency operations. One is the difference in the outbreak of the two wars; the other is the difference in conducting them once they have started.

No matter how unpleasant a conventional war may later prove, a war that begins with a good smart bang has the singular merit of clarifying a vast number of problems. The issues, whatever they were, become now a singular matter of defeating the enemy. The military takes over, politics move to the back seat. We have a clear issue that leaves no room for opposition.
In conventional warfare, our objective automatically becomes the destruction of the enemy's armed forces and the occupation of his territory. By its very nature this objective also provides clear-cut criteria to assess whether we are winning, stagnating, or losing.

In conventional warfare, the method to defeat the enemy is essentially military action supported by diplomacy, propaganda, and economic blockade. A war economy, grand strategy, tactics—all are familiar to us, all are governed by well-known, established rules. In conventional warfare, organization is also greatly simplified into a neat division of task and responsibility between civil and military authorities, between the government that directs and the armed forces that execute, between the nation that provides the tools and the soldiers who utilize them. This is only too clearly seen in the theater of operations where civilian authority is completely subordinated to the military.

No positive bang salutes the birth of an insurgency. One of its annoying characteristics, in fact, is how to determine when it really starts. Does it begin when guerrilla gangs first appear? (1 gang, 2 gangs, 10 gangs?) Or when terrorism attracts the first headlines in the press? Or when police report one meeting of an obscure group of possible plotters out of many other meetings of many other groups of possible plotters? These all are danger signs but scarcely a bang. By the time a bang is heard (and it may not be very loud), the insurgents are well underway in their bid for power.

This initial ambiguity results in serious troubles for the counterinsurgent. Before the feeble bang is heard, while the situation is not yet recognized as an insurgency, the counterinsurgent has no issue that can be known to and approved by the population at large. At this stage only police and other government specialists realize what is looming. On the basis of available, objective facts, how can they possibly convince the nation of a potential crisis, a danger that requires sacrifice?

After the bang, the counterinsurgent has an issue, but unfortunately it is rarely dynamic. The insurgent is capitalizing on such promising causes as independence, freedom, land reform, anticorruption, antifeudalism—the list is as various as the weaknesses of mankind. He has chosen these causes precisely for their attractiveness, for their strong appeal to passion. In doing so he leaves the counterinsurgent a narrow choice of counter issues that appeal generally to reason; for example, stability, unity, order, evolution, reforms. The power of ideology seldom works for the counterinsurgent. Burdened with this handicap, confronted next with opposition and fence sitting even among his own ranks, the counterinsurgent now starts his long, uphill campaign.

Usually at this stage, after the bang is heard, the armed forces are ordered to step in because the normal peacetime means of the government no longer prove adequate to the task. The armed forces now find themselves involved in a political war, because a war whose only valid objective is to gain the active support of the population or at least to control it can only be a political war. "20 percent military, 80 percent politics" as Chiang Kaishek often stated, and others after him.

"Where then is the difficulty?" one asks. "Let the military do its 20 percent and the civil power its 80 percent." But now we come to another very real difference. In counterinsurgency, military action cannot be separated from political action. We can see this more plainly if we translate the broad objective-control and support of the population-into such specific field tasks as ensuring a reasonable degree of security, taking a thorough census, enforcing new regulations on the transport of persons and goods, informing the population, conducting person-to-person and village-to-village propaganda, gathering intelligence, identifying and arresting insurgent cell members, finding new leaders from within the population, opening schools for children and adults, giving medical care, finding work for the unemployed, building new roads and rural engineering works, organizing self-defense units, and fighting organized guerrilla units.

These tasks, and the list is by no means complete, are essentially political-military tasks. Rather than taking a back seat, as in conventional warfare, politics remain of paramount importance in counterinsurgency warfare. Every military operation must be weighed with regard to its effect on the political picture, every political move for its effect on the military situation.

I am the civilian official in charge of a district. I have identified insurgent cell members in a village and my police officer is ready to arrest them. The military commander of the area, however, informs me that he is unable to establish a garrison in the village to protect the inhabitants against insurgent raids.

Shall I proceed to the arrest? I gain obvious advantages if I do so. But I also know that unless the village is garrisoned, guerrilla pressure will subsequently force the inhabitants to organize another cell. Then I must begin the painful, time-consuming process of identification, arrest, interrogation, and punishment all over again with the probability of causing more bitterness.

Shall I wait? Shall I press the military commander to find soldiers to protect the village? The problem of assigning responsibility is further complicated by a lack of trained civilian personnel. No civilian branch of the government has the
reservoir of manpower needed for counterinsurgency. Take the tasks listed above and multiply them by the given number of districts and villages in just a small country. It comes to a staggering personnel requirement. We do not have time to train the people. We need them now. Only the army can provide them. Yet who is to direct them? Military or civilian authority?

The temptation is often great to let the military run the entire show, at least in some specific geographical areas. Such a decision, however, is politically self-defeating, and by taking it the government acknowledges a signal defeat. Unable to cope with the insurgency, it abdicates its powers; in turn, most if not all of the counterissues scraped together to answer the insurgent become dead issues. Primarily for these reasons, overall responsibility must be given at every level to the civilian who represents the political authority in a political war. If there is a shortage of trusted officials, nothing prevents filling the gap with army officers serving in a civilian capacity.

But such are the close interrelations between political and military action in a counterinsurgency that the civilian in charge must forge most of his decisions by committee procedure. Unfortunately the best committee is only as good as its members. Even with the best conceivable organization, personality conflicts are more than likely to be the order of the day. Although the wrong member can sometimes be fired and replaced, this will not solve the problem for all committees. The question, then, is how to make "war by committee" work at its maximum effectiveness in a counterinsurgency, regardless of the personality factors.

I have said that in fighting conventional warfare we rely on time-tested methods of military action familiar to professional soldiers and acceptable to civil officials who have in any event taken a back seat. But when the war is a counterinsurgency, even the professionals - the experts - are unsure of themselves. In sad truth, we have no established rules for this kind of warfare. We know by experience that rules for conventional warfare do not apply. This leaves rules only for the insurgent, based principally on Chinese Communist theory and experience enriched by a substantial number of other successful cases. When the counterinsurgent attempts to copy them-and some have-he falls into a disastrous trap which we must briefly examine.

The chief feature of a counterinsurgency is the total lack of symmetry between the opponents. Although it is the same war as to time and place, the insurgent's and the counterinsurgent's types of warfare are radically different. Each side has its own restrictions, not because it so chooses, but by necessity, because of the very nature of the war, because of the enormous disproportion of strength between the camps at the outset, because of the difference in essence between assets and liabilities.

The insurgent grows from small to large. At the start he has "plenty of nothin'". He has no territory, no administration, no police, no army, no bank, and no tax collectors. He has only an intangible asset, a cause that lends itself to revolutionary developments. His task is to transform this asset into something tangible.

The counterinsurgent goes from large to small. He has territory, administration, and all that. He has also an intangible liability-the responsibility for maintaining order. His task is to prevent this liability from nullifying his tangible assets.

To give a concrete application of this asymmetry: terrorism, a source of disorder, is a valid action for the insurgent (ignoring morals). Can the counterinsurgent use counterterrorism? No, precisely because it too promotes disorder; besides, if it is possible to murder an insurgent, it is also possible to arrest him and punish him legally. Another example: the insurgent fights a cheap war. When he spends one cent, his opponent has to spend $2; the insurgent can accept a protracted war, the counterinsurgent must not.

Why we lack a set of rules for counterinsurgency warfare after the last 15 years of fighting it, I do not know. I can only observe the fact. That such a hiatus is potentially disastrous to war by committee is obvious. A committee specially set up to conduct counterinsurgency, and whose members do not know exactly what to do and in what order, is bound to produce confusion, dispute, and perhaps defeat. Indeed, by the time it gets off the ground its raison d'etre may have fallen to the enemy, and this has happened a good many times in the past.

But let's assume that our committee works, if only more or less. The results of its field operations will merely reflect the overall personality of the committee, its individual approach to the task, its success or failure. The same will be true for neighboring committees. What happens? Inevitably the national counterinsurgency effort will appear as a mosaic, a patchwork with no general pattern. One piece of the mosaic may be well controlled by the counterinsurgent. Simultaneously, bordering pieces may be less well controlled or even yielded to effective insurgent control. So, how easy it is for the insurgent to maneuver at will among these pieces, concentrating on some, disappearing temporarily from others. Against an opponent as elusive as the insurgent, uniformity in action is a must for the counterinsurgent, more so than in any other kind of warfare.
Another paradox in this type of war is the necessity for extreme centralization of its direction at the top and extreme decentralization of its execution at the bottom. A rigid general line is vital, but so is a broad margin of initiative. At the bottom, this is very small-scale warfare, and this means small-scale and fugitive opportunities, which must be seized upon instantly. This holds true for both sides, insurgents and counterinsurgents.

How, then, is our committee to avoid these pitfalls? How do we allow it to work at its best? We give it something we don't yet have. We give it a doctrine—a sound doctrine whose elements have been proven by past success. This is how the insurgent solves his problem and how the counterinsurgent must solve his.

Let me illustrate this. During the Sino-Japanese War, Communist maquis appeared in Hainan Island in the Gulf of Tongking. Communications between the island and the Communist headquarters at Yenan, some 1,300 miles away, did not exist, even by radio. After V-J Day, when the final round was fought in the long Nationalist Communist struggle, the Communists took from 1 to 2 months to send a courier to Hainan. Yet, according to all Nationalist reports, the local Communists were operating exactly as their comrades in North China, with few deviations, few errors—and with the same amount of success. All they had in common was a doctrine for action.

Complex as is the counterinsurgency problem, it can be relatively simple when armed forces are called to act directly for their own government, in their own country, or in a territory ruled by their own country. But I shudder to think of the difficulty when armed forces are simply serving as advisers in a foreign country, as the U.S. forces are today serving in South Vietnam. Here they can succeed only if they convince. They can convince only if they can rely on a coherent, proven doctrine.

by Dr. G.K. Tanham

In my view each level of counterinsurgency activity, each sphere of operations, military or nonmilitary, presents its own peculiar challenge. In the past we and other nations have erred at all levels; we sometimes continue to err in the present. But we also have made gains, and not the least of these lies in the tactical end of specific military operations.

We know that early insurgency actions are usually committed first by small groups of individuals and then by small-sized units, such as platoons and companies. Lighdy armed, these enemy groups find security in mobility and in “blending” with the people. Most of their actions are ambushes, sabotage, and hit-and-run attacks on villages and outposts. To counter diem we don’t require divisions or corps, we don’t need to mass tanks or artillery, we don’t have to worry too much about divisional boundaries or large-scale operational planning, and we don’t need a high headquarters to direct the actual fighting. Instead, the requirement is for a small supreme headquarters to direct the general strategy and to coordinate the planning of the war while delegating almost, if not all, audiority for operations to the smaller units—say battalions. If the enemy develops divisions and attempts to hold territory, then there would be a more conventional war and higher headquarters would have a greater role in the fighting.

The local unit knows its area much more intimately than does higher headquarters, and it also is working very close to the people in the area. This is not the kind of war where you can plan campaigns on a map and direct subordinate units to specific objectives. Local units depend on the people for intelligence, and they must work very closely with all local officials. Many military operations may have to be modified or even canceled because of local political situations. One could say that this is warfare by local committee headed by a civilian—not a very appealing notion to the average military man.

The communications lag also makes it difficult if not impossible for higher headquarters to direct in detail operations against a Communist revolutionary force. Insurgent ambushes last only a minute or two, attacks on outposts are of short duration, and assassinations take only a few seconds. While we can speed up reaction times, we can never totally overcome the handicaps imposed by such actions. We may hamper the enemy and reduce his effectiveness if he knows that reserves can be brought against him in a matter of minutes, but this will not stop his operations. Defensively, higher headquarters cannot react quickly enough to play a major role.

Local small units also make the most effective contribution in the offensive. French experience with large offensive sweeps was very disappointing, and I would guess we are encountering similar frustrations now in Vietnam. To hide preparations for such operations, which involve large numbers of troops and items of equipment, is most difficult. Even helicopters broadcast sufficient warning for the enemy to melt away. Troops strange to an area find it difficult to determine who the enemy is and whether the killed and wounded are friend, foe, or neutral.

In decided contrast to a fanfare sweep launched from higher headquarters stands the small offensive. Based on careful, local intelligence and mounted not just for a few days but for weeks, a small offensive directed by the local commander is
much more likely to run the enemy ragged and eventually to track him down. Again, higher headquarters should have the
role of general direction, but local units should plan and execute their own fights.

A related difference is that in conventional warfare we deal with specific (usually terrain) objectives. In WWII a corps
would order a division to take such and such a physical objective. To regiments, battalions, and companies down the line
went orders to take a hill or crossroad or maybe a city block or a clump of trees. Attacks were planned, partially at least,
from maps and photos, and the various levels of command could follow the progress of the attacking troops.

In guerrilla warfare we have no such neat delineation of objectives. The enemy isn't much interested in holding a village,
or a crossroad, or a hill. To him these are indescribably useless. If there and if attacked by superior forces he will withdraw
or disappear. In 1953 the Viet Minh surveyed all of their installations and asked themselves if there was any single one
they would defend to the end. The answer was none. Instead of anchoring himself to a specific piece of land, the enemy
retains his mobility and quite often remains indistinguishable from the local people. Rather than the high ground or a
commanding position, our military objective, when actually fighting the enemy, is the enemy himself, often very hard to
identify.

Faced with this objective our local commander must have good intelligence if he is to stand a fair chance of making
contact with his real enemy and not with passive peasants who wear the same kind of clothes. Accomplishing his task
means long, grueling marches for his troops many times without success-or, on other occasions, fleeting skirmishes with
a frustrating enemy who refuses to stand and fight. However, only through constant patrolling and continuously pushing
the physical enemy can he ever expect to root out the hardcore guerrilla bands and provide the security necessary to
counter the insurgency's higher mission-winning over the population.

This kind of war is likely to be fought mostly in unfriendly terrain and in underdeveloped areas. Che Guevara has said, as
Mao did, that the basis for revolution is in the rural areas where the people are good fighters and the enemy has the greatest
difficulty in bringing his power to bear. Recent insurgencies bear this out; we can expect future revolutionary wars to
break out in remote and difficult areas where governmental control is weak, communications are poor, and where local
grievances can be exploited quietly-at first.

This means that at least some of our equipment cannot be used. Tanks and artillery may not be able to go into jungles or
swamps or any place where they will be so road bound as to represent sitting pigeons. The deeds of this war thus become
more largely the deeds of men. A battle of human wits is the order of the day, not an overwhelming mass of equipment and
supporting arms. This is not to say that helicopters, radios, and new equipment, such as surveillance radar, cannot help in
this kind of war. It is to emphasize the danger of becoming too dependent on modern equipment and comforts. In fighting
the insurgent we must not only cast away extraneous equipment, but must also rid ourselves of preconceived beliefs and
habits and somehow free our minds to Conjure up solutions that aren't traditional.

A convention of regular warfare is the clear and legal distinction between combatant and noncombatant. Most nations
accept codes that govern the conduct and reciprocal treatment of the soldier and the civilian; for example, soldiers must
wear uniforms if upon capture they want to be treated as soldiers. This tradition and legal distinction is difficult for us to
eschew, if only because it is convenient and coincides with our more orderly environment.

The insurgent, although differentiating the roles of his men and women, makes no distinction between combatant and noncombatant. For example, a peasant, through desire or pressure, begins informing for the Viet Cong. Next he provides labor or other help, then joins a unit or is blackmailed or cajoled into joining the local Communist guerrilla band. Finally he begins training for future military activity. During the day he tends his rice paddy. At what point exactly is he a combatant or soldier? Even in the later stages of an insurgency, when the revolutionaries have developed formal units and have adopted uniforms, the largest number of adherents will remain outside the regular army. However, they still actively contribute to the war by providing intelligence, logistics support, propaganda support, and money, and by forming a great manpower reserve. These functions are usually performed by regular soldiers in Western-type armies. Who then is who in this type of warfare? How can we identify the guilty without harming the innocent? What do we do with the guilty if we capture them? All these and more are pressing questions of the moment.

Again, in violation of generally accepted rules of warfare, the revolutionaries do not hesitate to use terror against the
people. This is not limited to unpopular officials or to those favoring the legitimate government. It is used against anyone,
from successful government officials, who may be improving the people's health or welfare, to a remote tribal headman,
who exercises an inconvenient cohesiveness among his people. Che says that terror cannot be used indiscriminately.
But it can be and is being used effectively, and we can counter it only by our physical presence in an area, and then only
sometimes.
In discussing these few differences—the list is very long, of course—I wanted only to point out how the countering of revolutionary warfare has shifted the emphasis away from warfare as we generally have practiced it in the last two decades. We already have made and we are making certain fundamental changes in our approach to the new challenge. Fortunately, as Americans, we pride ourselves on ingenuity and invention, on living by our wits—and the type of warfare we are now fighting is a unique challenge to that pride.
Targeted at the battalion level and above, it is intended to promote discussion and debate on how to counter complex and dynamic insurgent threats by influencing the environment through the coordinated pursuit of six logical lines of operation-information/intelligence, humanitarian aid, economic advice, defense and security, governance, and combat operations.

FULL TEXT

New concepts for consideration

Thus far in the 21st century, the United States has increasingly faced state and nonstate adversaries who employ irregular warfare to counter our vast conventional military power. That trend is expected to continue with the implication that U.S. forces must become as adept at waging irregular warfare—both defensively and offensively—as we are at waging conventional warfare. We must become expert in irregular methods—unconventional, guerrilla, economic, cultural, technological, and other assorted means—in order to defend the Nation in the protracted regional or global irregular warfare campaigns ahead.

Our rich and varied national experience in irregular warfare—from 1776 to Iraq-shows that we must approach it in a fundamentally different manner from our approach to conventional warfare. While many of our current Department of Defense capabilities have applicability in irregular warfare, many others need to be developed and incorporated into doctrine and training. The Concepts and Plans Division, Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory (MCWL), Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC), is developing a set of concepts and doctrine to help shape the capability development. These recently published or forthcoming publications include:

* The MultiService Concept for Irregular Warfare was produced in cooperation with U.S. Special Operations Command's (USSOCom's) Center for Knowledge and Futures and approved by the Commanding General (CG), MCCDC and the Deputy Commander, USSOCom in early August 2006. It describes how U.S. military forces will conduct irregular warfare in support of unified action on a regional or global scale against both state and nonstate adversaries. It is meant as a guide for enhancing and improving U.S. military capabilities and capacities, and to point toward closer integration of U.S. military and civilian agencies in meeting the irregular warfare challenge. It describes a comprehensive approach for applying all elements of U.S. national power-economic, diplomatic, cultural, and technological, as well as military—to achieve U.S. objectives. This publication may be viewed on the MCWL website at http://www.mcwl.usmc.mil.

* A Tentative Manual for Countering Irregular Threats: An Updated Approach to Counterinsurgency was issued in limited numbers by MCCDC during July 2006 for comment and refinement. Targeted at the battalion level and above, it is intended to promote discussion and debate on how to counter complex and dynamic insurgent threats by influencing the environment through the coordinated pursuit of six logical lines of operation-information/intelligence, humanitarian aid, economic advice, defense and security, governance, and combat operations. These six operational lines, all applied by a combined military/civilian team, are not prescriptive but representative, and the Tentative Manual shows how, in a given campaign design, their number can be expanded or shrunk to meet the requirements of a particular intervention. This publication is available to registered users on the MCWL website at http://www.mcwl.usmc.mil.

* Small Unit Leader's Guide to Counterinsurgency, signed by the CG, MCCDC on 20 July 2006, provides a collection of tactics, techniques, and procedures that represent the current counterinsurgency "best practices" from the U.S., British, and Australian experience. This publication is aimed at small unit leaders at the squad, platoon, and company levels. It is available to registered users on the MCWL website at http://www.mcwl.usmc.mil.

* Field Manual 3-24/Marine Corps yCrflighgPublication 3.33-5, Counterinsurgency Manual, is currently under development in cooperation with the U.S. Army. It aims to fill a doctrinal gap by describing how offensive, defensive, and stability operations, conducted along multiple lines of operation, are necessary to defeat insurgency. It requires that soldiers and Marines balance a mix of familiar combat skills with skills more often associated with civilian agencies, such as reconstruction and stability, to defeat an insurgency.

Although the future is highly uncertain, what does appear likely is that our Nation's enemies will not seek to attack our strengths but, rather, will strive to negate these strengths through various means, including hiding amongst the indigenous populations of fragile or failed states. The publications noted above reflect the complex environmental challenges that war amongst the people can create. A common theme that emerges from these publications is that the capabilities required to wage irregular warfare are largely intellectual rather than material or technical. The general premise is that mental agility and organizational adaptability will enable and support the Marine Corps' successful participation in intervention campaigns—even if that intervention is in the complex environment posed by irregular warfare.
Significance in Semantics

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Abstract

From this context we should seize the opportunity to define war in Iraq to further build upon gained success and apply the lessons learned to the global war on terrorism. Preventing Random Acts of COIN Violence can be defined as lethal acts produced by military action (regardless of the style or method of warfare), nonstate or even organized gang aggression, and ordinary criminal brutality. In understanding the Marine Corps' exceptional in-country tactical experience, combined with a truly remarkable institutional predeployment training program, room still exists to apply intellectual rigor and professional candor in defining the war in Iraq.

Full Text

The utility in defining the war in Iraq
The Marine Corps' tacit, singular belief defining the Iraq war as a pure insurgency inhibits efficient management of the conflict. From this singular dogmatic perspective, indiscriminate application of counterinsurgency (COIN) operations for nonrelated situations merely produces the "PAD" effect (placate, appease, and delay the inevitable) among the influence audience. Key observations of the Malayan Emergency (pure insurgency) and the Vietnam War (complex civil war) provide a relative present-day indicator of Iraq. As with any tactical problem, the foundation of good decisionmaking finds its basis on an accurate estimate of the situation. Gaining an accurate estimate of the situation is impossible if everything is viewed as an insurgency. The ability to adapt as the circumstances exist has long been a vital component of the Marine Corps' proud fighting legacy. From this context we should seize the opportunity to define war in Iraq to further build upon gained success and apply the lessons learned to the global war on terrorism.

A Tidy Insurgency

The Malayan Emergency's success created an unrealistic expectation of universal COIN applicability for irregular wars. While viable lessons can be derived from the Malayan insurgency, they should be illuminated in the context of the exceptionally unique conflict. First, the Communist Chinese insurgents were an identifiable minority ethnic group amongst a generally progovernment population. Second, the geography of the Malayan peninsula physically isolated insurgents from support, supply, and sanctuary. Furthermore, the government's anti-insurgent forces benefited from a remarkable 1 to 2 ratio against the entire estimated sympathetic population at large. Finally, the concurrent end of British colonial rule during the course of the emergency legitimized the Malayan Government and negated the prime informational weapon of the insurgency. Clearly, the Malayan Emergency serves as a very unique case of irregular war creating the possible subsequent false application of COIN theory.

Vietnam: Murky Civil War

While Malaya serves as the idealized model for the successful application of COIN, the totality of the Vietnam experience is commonly perceived as a COIN failure. However, Vietnam exists as an example of an irregular war that involved various competing state and nonstate actors in an internal struggle versus a pure insurgency. Despite the existence of a highly capable guerrilla force, the North Vietnamese and the associated Viet Cong cadre never considered themselves as a pure insurgency. Instead, the North Vietnamese viewed themselves as the legitimate sovereign in their nationalistic struggle against both oppressive colonial (read American/Western) and foreign (read Chinese/Soviet) rule. The application of guerrilla tactics and revolutionary warfare served as viable shaping efforts for the conventional main effort, but they were never decisive as a singular arm. Regardless of the Marine Corps' enormous COIN success in Vietnam, a conventional fight was still brewing. The eventual fall of Saigon did not occur from a massive insurgent uprising but from a conventional corps-sized campaign nearly 4 years after the majority of U.S. combat forces exited the country. In retrospect, the greater military failure in Vietnam resulted from addressing only limited aspects of the irregular war.

Iraq: Somewhere in Between

In the fall of 2006, Shi'ite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr made his second official trip abroad to meet with leaders of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, and Iran. While no explicit answers resonate from al-Sadr's foreign travel, an uneasy feeling surfaces when an Iraqi factional leader conducts foreign diplomacy. If one characterized al-Sadr's political, religious, military, and social activity he could be described as anything from an insurgent leader to a possible nation builder. From this dichotomy, al-Sadr represents one of the many dynamic, evolving, and complex spheres of power competing in Iraq instead of an isolated insurgency.

Preventing Random Acts of COIN

Violence can be defined as lethal acts produced by military action (regardless of the style or method of warfare), nonstate or even organized gang aggression, and ordinary criminal brutality. Instability categorizes the diplomatic, economic, and informational forces that cause unrest. Together violence and instability (VI) describe the outputs of irregular war. Even more specific, common cause VI describes byproducts of a given society that are nearly always present and in full effect. The reduction of common cause VI proves costly in time, resources, and will. On the other hand, special cause VI can be minimized because their sources are attributable to a specific cause. Every nation possesses common cause VI, ranging from dissatisfaction to crime. Consider the case of the United States; one could easily attribute high murder rates, gang activity, and poverty to an active insurgency. Startlingly, in 2005 there were nearly twice as many prisoners in America than active duty servicemembers.5 While an admirable goal, beating common cause VI is far too great an expectation domestically, let alone in a country with a history like Iraq.

Many of the perceived acts of an insurgency are merely extensions of Iraq's high common cause VI previous to the 2003 liberation. The Ba'ath Party's known tactics of intimidation promulgated against all elements of its population, including
perceived threats within the party loyalty base, produced a tinderbox soaked in oil. Saddam Hussein's guilty verdict from his illegal reaction to an attack on his Presidential convoy demonstrates the high levels of existing common cause VI. Operation DESERT STORM and subsequent United Nations sanctions further intensified common cause VI. Manifested VI is not always logical, and it should be no surprise that Iraq, particularly Al Anbar Province, would be chock filled with it. Ultimately, the overwhelming success of the Operation IRAQI FREEDOM I liberation erased most of the special causes of VI, namely the brutality of the Saddam Hussein regime, but uncorked common cause VI resulting from the long existing history of unrest.

Biting off more than we can chew in the realm of broad scale COIN produces more dysfunction than satisfaction. The incalculable positive nature of COIN has to be concurrently viewed as a liability of equal magnitude if the intended action results in failure. Applying the COIN hammer to fix an assumed insurgency may produce long-term problems. First, attempting to treat many of the common cause VI as elements of an insurgency has produced unachievable expectations among the influence population. Second, attempting to conduct COIN in support of a legitimate Iraqi Government while spheres of power are still bubbling yields unintended consequences at best. Whether Iraq is engulfed in a national civil war or just severe sectarian violence, the decision to act could be perceived as biased action. By the same account, any action taken possibly influences the outcome of the internal struggle. While obtaining a favorable outcome by supporting a particular faction is a viable strategy, the unintentional or, more accurately, unknowing support of a faction to yield such a result is risky. Thus, if Iraq is somewhere between a tidy insurgency and murky civil war, COIN could significantly backfire in its original intended effect. Next, treating entire regions as unified insurgencies depletes and fixes limited combat power. The conventional COIN wisdom to control the villages possibly invites manifestation of common cause VI against coalition forces. If one wants to find a fight in Iraq, he does not have to look too far. By the same account, the mere American presence serves as a fundamental informational message to fuel anticoalition sentiment both inside Iraq and globally. If no massive insurgency exists, no need exists to massively control the villages. When feasible and acceptable, minimizing enduring tasks that oddly exist for the very sake of supporting more enduring tasks gains flexibility. Particularly, low-density, high-demand units serving as COIN multipliers suffer in their ability to be truly effective because they are spread far too thin in order to perform more COIN in the first place! Finally, the greatest detriment in employing COIN for nonapplicable situations involves inability to collect accurate measures of effectiveness (MOE) due to the nonpermissive atmosphere. Far too many times a seemingly positive surface response by the influence audience (the stated PAD effect) sends inaccurate signals regarding actual progress. Concurrently, inaccurate figures of merit in statistical proof of COIN progress mask true results on the ground. It has been said that in Vietnam we counted rounds expended per kill while in Iraq today we could count "gigs" of data per kill or projects enacted. Effective COIN requires unique conditions from a combined friendly, host-nation, and threat perspective. When coalition forces find the right conditions for COIN employment, they must make it an absolute bid for success. Like the maneuver warfare concept of "reconnaissance pull," we need to better reinforce validated success through "MOE pull." In COIN, quality vice quantity reigns supreme. The skill, professionalism, and sacrifice of American and Iraqi forces attempting COIN have been systemically marginalized by universal application of a single doctrine to remedy diverse problems.

For Action

If we must strip our ideological blinders to understand the complexity of American success in the Philippines over 100 years after the conclusion of the insurrection, what ideological obstacles block our understanding of Iraq today? Prescriptive, singular doctrine does not serve as the very remedy for complex situations. By the same token, preconceived interpretations of VI could eventually cause mission failure. With that being said, mindsets utilized in COIN find utility regardless of the conflict's VI scope and intensity. Effective intelligence, precise uses of force, benevolence toward the influence audience, and civic action are always viable if utilized when applicable. However, it is not to enough throw some "COIN" in the fountain and make a wish. In understanding the Marine Corps' exceptional in-country tactical experience, combined with a truly remarkable institutional predeployment training program, room still exists to apply intellectual rigor and professional candor in defining the war in Iraq. Well-conceived analysis of the nature of Iraq would at worst strengthen existing understanding and at best provide an opportunity to optimize existing tactics and doctrine.

**SIDEBAR**

"The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and the commander have to make is to establish by that the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature."1

-Carl von Clausewitz
SIDEBAR
"Sometimes questions are more important than answers."3
-Nancy Williard

"The process is not rigidly sequential; it is a dynamic process that requires great intellectual ability and strong character from tacticians who desire to make successful changes."4
-Timothy Lupfer

SIDEBAR
"When stripped of ideological blinders, the study of the Philippine War can offer great insight into the complexities of localized guerrilla warfare and indigenous resistance to foreign control."6
-Brian Linn McAllister

FOOTNOTE
Notes
5. As of 30 June 2005 there were 2,186,230 prisoners held in Federal or State prisons or in local jails (retrieved from http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/prisons.htm) and 1,112,684 active duty military personnel (retrieved from http://siadapp.dior.whs.mil/personnel/MILITARY/history/hst0605.pdf).

by Maj Christopher S. Ieva

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GRAPHIC: Photographs
IMAGE PHOTOGRAPH, Then-Capt Doug Zembiec, Commanding Officer, Company E, 2d Battalion, 1st Marines, directs his company during combat operations in Fallujah, April 2004. The current struggle in Iraq has morphed into the reality of the three block war. Maj Zembiec was subsequently killed during combat operations in 2007. (Photo by Sgt Jose E. Guillion.)

IMAGE PHOTOGRAPH, It's time to change our vocabulary and view the Iraqi conflict as something more than simply an insurgency. (Photo by LCpl Ryan C. Heiser.)

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Best Practices in Countering Insurgencies

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ABSTRACT

The Centro de Coordinación de Acción Integral (Coordination Center for Integrated Action) was created and physically located at the Presidential palace to maximize its influence and opportunity for strategic direction. The old Small Wars Manual noted the rapidity by which a revolution could develop due to modern communications technologies. Today's continuous "24/7" news cycles and graphic imagery produce even faster and higher response cycles from audiences around the globe and offer powerful new "weapons" to those who can master them. Today, under the rubric of counter-insurgency, irregular warfare, or hybrid conflicts, the Marine Corps faces a wide range of potential missions and interventions. The Marine Corps' rich legacy in this form of warfare provides a solid foundation to build upon, but it cannot assume easy victories or complacent enemies.

FULL TEXT

Compressing the learning curve

Mr. Weinberger made that observation in 1986, but the reader might be excused for thinking it applied to today's ongoing global insurgency and U.S. operations in Iraq. This article describes a research effort undertaken in the hopes of identifying key best practices that would enable Marines in their analysis of and planning for conducting future counterinsurgencies. The study synthesizes and builds upon other research efforts. This project was designed to support ongoing efforts within the Marine Corps to help explore new concepts and update doctrine for irregular warfare. Because of Iraq and the long war, the nature of irregular conflicts is of particular importance to today's national security planners.

The project examines nine insurgencies conducted by a variety of countries. These cases range across a half-century timespan and cover a variety of different political and demographic circumstances. These studies were undertaken with a focus on potential "best practices" selected from a variety of counterinsurgency experts. Subsequently, the cases were researched and analyzed to ascertain the importance of these identified practices to the success or failure of the counterinsurgency effort. Of course, all insurgencies are different in some way, and each must be analyzed within its own cultural context. Thus, this framework is offered only as a foundation for critical study and adaptation.

The Case Studies

A total of eight case studies were examined in detail. The cases were picked to afford a wide range of political, security, demographic, and geographic elements. The cases include:
* Malaya. British-directed program to counter the Communist minority Chinese from gaining control over Malaya during the period from 1950 to 1957.
* Kenya. The British-led counterinsurgency against the Mau Maus that ran from 1952 to 1960.
* Algeria. The French efforts against the native Algerian insurgency to achieve independence, which ran from 1954 to 1962.
* Vietnam. The subsequent American intervention in Southeast Asia, which ended in 1972.
* Peru. This South American country's efforts to dampen the Sendero Luminoso or Shining Path from 1980 to 1992.
* Colombia. Colombia's efforts to counter the narco-sponsored and Marxist insurgency led by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) from 1964 to the present.

Best Practices or Campaign Components

Instead of examining the campaign through sets of principles or fundamentals, this study expressly uses practices or "campaign components" as the basis for analysis. Some of these represent specific techniques or procedures. Others reflect a much broader approach or what might be a major element or component in the overall counterinsurgency campaign. These elements are described as follows:

* Integrate civil-military mechanisms. How all government agencies were coordinated by command, by a single individual, or by coordination committees.
* Governance/Political reforms. The degree to which government or political reforms were instituted to counter weaknesses or enhance the credibility of the state.
* Socioeconomic programs. The degree to which social development and economic projects were employed to better support the local civilian population.
* Integrated intelligence. The degree to which special intelligence organs were constructed or existing agencies integrated to deal with the insurgency.
* Special units for foreign internal defense (FID). The degree to which special units or local indigenous units were created as counters to the insurgents.
* Unique military training. The degree to which the counterinsurgent forces are uniquely trained to deal with an incipient or full-blown insurgency.
* Information operations. How the counterinsurgency employed psychological operations to isolate the insurgents or promote the government's themes.
* Population control. How the civilian population was isolated from the insurgents through security, identification cards, barriers, or forced relocation.
* Resource control. This factor accounts for efforts to limit or isolate the insurgents from food, weapons, or other forms of support.
* Discriminate force. The degree to which counterinsurgent forces limit the use of military power to the minimal degree necessary to avoid antagonizing the local population or to preclude collateral damage. (See Figure 1.)

In general we found a high correlation between all of the best practices and operational success. When governments and their supporting allies and partners used these elements as key components of their overall campaigns, they were generally successful. In almost all cases, some sort of learning curve was evident, and eventually policymakers and military leaders reassessed themselves and made numerous strategic or operational changes. Some adapted faster than others. Those who ignored history or underestimated the opponent fared much worse.
The best techniques identified in this research effort offer a framework for officer education and for planners studying and preparing Marines for a potential contingency. Most importantly, they are not a prescriptive list or a set of inviolable principles to be rigidly applied. In any case, "the devil will be in the details" of design and implementation.

Insights

Integrated civil-military mechanisms. This practice has a high correlation to successful strategies since comprehensive applications of all elements of national power are usually the sine qua non for success against an insurgency that seeks to depose an existing regime or create a counterstate. The evidence for this is most manifest in the Malayan case with the series of committees as integrating measures by GEN Sir Gerald Templer. Templer was vested with the authority and had the foresight to understand that all civil and military operations needed to be coordinated. It is also relevant to the belated American pacification effort in the early 1970s in Vietnam, as well as the Kenyan, Peruvian, and Colombian case studies. Colombia hosts one of the most persistent insurgencies and longest enduring narcocriminal enterprises, especially the FARC, which has conducted a four-decade-long insurgency. Under President Alvaro Uribe, Colombia established unique coordination mechanisms at the strategic and theater levels. The Centro de Coordinación de Acción Integral (Coordinación Center for Integrated Action) was created and physically located at the Presidential palace to maximize its influence and opportunity for strategic direction.

Conversely, the French failed to integrate their civil-military components but did usually vest authority in a single military commander. Whether integration is achieved by unity of command under an El Supremo or by tightly knit integrating mechanisms, the need for the holistic and integrated applications of both civilian and military tools is paramount. This lesson appears to be critical at the operational level for planning and assessment.

Governance reforms. This area attempts to capture how national or local political and government reforms were instituted to counter perceived weaknesses or to enhance legitimacy or credibility of the state. This is another area with high cause and effect relationships, particularly as evidenced in the Kenyan, Malayan, Omani, and Peruvian case studies. Frequently, in the case of colonial conflicts, this was accomplished by agreeing to eventually grant independence or providing for political freedoms. In other cases, it means negotiating with the enemy and granting concessions of some sort. Both the Algerian and the Vietnamese failures underscore the lesson for political or governmental reform. The American case history includes significant tactical success at the hamlet and village levels but was never translated into significant reforms at the national government or strategic levels. Vietnam may not have been "the wrong war at the wrong time," but in the words of one analyst, it was a war with the wrong allies.3 The Americans could not induce the host government to make a better case for a free and democratic state.

Socioeconomic programs. Social development and economic projects are often employed to enhance support to the local civilian population and to undercut the ideological message of the insurgent. This correlates well with success, as seen in the Malayan, Kenyan, Omani, and Colombian case summaries. Economic reforms were critical in quelling resistance in Kenya. The Swynnerton Plan allowed the Kenyan Government to seize land from Mau Mau supporters and consolidate plots for award to loyalists or reformed insurgents. The plan replaced communal land ownership with a land tenure system and undercut the Mau Mau's principal political message.

The rapid implementation of economic aid to Dhofar substantially undermined the resistance in Oman and may be the best case on record of negating an insurgency early. Social and economic programs were at the core of the famous but belated and underresourced American-led civil operations revolutionary development support effort in Vietnam as well. In Vietnam, to address pacification needs, the French established mobile operational administrative units or GAMOs (groupes administratifs mobiles operationnels) to enhance local administration and to help provide food, medicine, and shelter. The GAMOs never had sufficient local militias to hold the cleared areas they were to pacify. In Algeria, the French innovated with the establishment of special administrative sections (SASs). These were designed to address social and political matters and worked to enhance Algerian infrastructure and institutions, including civil administration, local schools, medical services, and constabulary forces. The Marine Corps Combined Action Program in Vietnam drew upon these examples.

Integrated intelligence. This element examines how intelligence was emphasized and exploited. We looked for evidence of where special intelligence cells or means were constructed to deal with the insurgency and/or where efforts to fuse intelligence from various sources (law enforcement, military, etc.) were made to good effect. While unique and special intelligence organs were frequent, they were not the only evidence we found. Overall, the adaptation of existing intelligence to the unique cultural context of the situation and its timely exploitation were correlated with successful counter-insurgency. We found more than sufficient evidence in the Malayan, Kenyan, Peruvian, Colombian, and Vietnamese cases to underscore the conclusion that effective intelligence is the driver of operations in this mode of war. In Algeria we
found extensive evidence of intensive intelligence collection (too intense in fact) and effective integration and rapid
exploitation. The French assigned their best officers, and intelligence staff positions became, in effect, the key operational
staff positions in battalion-level organizations and higher. Second, the French ensured that intelligence was tied tightly to
the elite mobile forces. However, the interrogation process undercut French authority and energized the National Liber-
ation Front’s resistance in Algeria.

Spedai units for FID. This element examines the degree to which special units or local indigenous units were created as
counters to the insurgents. The employment of indigenous personnel to either serve as home guards/local militia or special
units serving as elite counterinsurgent hunter/killer groups was found to be significant to operational success. In almost all
successful counterinsurgencies, trained indigenous personnel have been crucial to effective counterguerrilla operations.

French organizational initiatives include the Groupement de Commandos Mixtes Aéroportés, mixing French commandos
with former Viet Minh fighters who were inserted in contested areas to work with tribes allied to the French. In Malaya the
British created a home guard popular militia as well as the Special Operations Volunteer Force of repatriated rebels, while
in Kenya a number of units were created from reeducated Mau Maus who easily infiltrated rebel held areas. Reformed
insurgents under British leaders accounted for the capture of the vast majority of Mau Mau leaders.

The French understood the utility of trained indigenous forces in Algeria, forming local paramilitary elements for local
security. As these Harki units gained proficiency they were given missions to prove themselves and then were assigned to
replace French forces. The British did the same in Oman with firqats, tribal militia recruited with amnesty offers and cash
and land grants.

Unique military training. The training foundation for counterinsurgent forces has also been identified as a potential core
element to address an incipient or full-blown insurgency. Almost every case study highlights the unique and particularly
stressing aspects of counterinsurgency operations. It is almost axiomatic that conventional forces need special training to
become agile enough to deal with the complexities of combating a guerrilla force that is contesting for the support of a
civilian population for its government and its legitimacy. Each situation, but especially the French and American Indo-
china, Algeria, Peru, Colombia, and Intifada cases, reveal the initial weakness of using conventional forces that are doc-
trinally and educationally unprepared for unconventional forms of combat. In several cases, special forces and unique
units were created to deal with particular demands. In particular, the British used special advisor units in all three exam-
pies they were involved with, as did the Americans and French in Vietnam.

Information operations. Inasmuch as insurgencies are generally won in the minds of the civilian population and its atti-
itudes toward its government, information operations were expected to play a significant role in effective counterinsur-
gencies. We were not disappointed. The degree to which the counterinsurgent force employed psychological operations to
isolate the insurgents correlated fairly well with success. British examples once again showed a sophisticated under-
standing of the use of various techniques, both simple and culturally astute. Great Britain tapped into the knowledge and
expertise of a Chinese-trained expert to orchestrate their psychological operations campaign, as well as input from cap-
tured and reformed insurgents, which brought additional acute cultural knowledge to their efforts.

American psychological operations efforts in Vietnam were also extensive, but their overall effectiveness was never equal
to the expended resources due to other factors, including inadequate numbers of cultural experts. As seen in recent con-
licts, information operations by themselves may never be effective. Actions, in the forms of security patrols, humani-
tarian projects, and civil action programs, may also be sending messages as well. In fact, actions may speak louder than
the leaflets and broadcasts.

Population control. Isolating and securing the civilian population from contact with the insurgents through security
measures, physical barriers, or relocation is another practice that appears with great frequency. This practice can also
include checkpoints, national identification cards and censuses, ward or village captains, and mass relocations. Every case
history in this study employed more than one form of population control. In some cases, like Kenya and Algeria, a mas-
sive scale of detainees and special camps was used. However, it proved difficult for the government to properly control
and adequately meet the needs of the internees. These turned out to be counterproductive. Control measures that do not
require massive dislocation appear more viable than creating temporary camps. Forced relocation has long-term costs that
can be avoided with other forms of control. At the same time, population control features, vital for controlling the in-
troduction of weapons and contraband, may also antagonize the local population and contribute to increased resistance. In
some cases this hostility has been negated by using locally recruited units.
In Malaya, the British built up the Home Guards, local forces for local security of their model villages. More recently in Colombia, local Soldatos de mi Pueblo (Home Guards) have been established as an element of state presence and credibility in areas previously abandoned to the insurgency.

Resource control. Aside from isolating the population, this factor accounts for efforts to limit or isolate the insurgents from food, weapons, or other forms of support. Resource control is usually achieved by various forms of border security and population control. However, in some cases, measures to ration or control foodstuffs were used to limit the ability of the general population to support a standing guerrilla force. This was especially true in the Kenyan, Omani, and Vietnamese examples. Extensive efforts were made in Kenya and in Vietnam to limit the ability of the insurgents to draw food or other resources from the population. Like Templer in Malaya, GEN Emmanuel A. Erskine enforced food denial programs in Kenya to limit resources for his opponent and to incentivize cooperation. Other campaigns created extensive border security systems, as in Algeria, to block the introduction of weapons and materials. This practice may have greater relevance in rural insurgencies and may not apply or may be extremely difficult to achieve in 21st century urban counterinsurgencies.

Discriminate force. History and past experience strongly suggest that the best weapon in counterinsurgency is invariably not a weapon. Success is not achieved by attrition of the insurgent force; in fact, success may be in reverse proportion to the amount of force used. The degree to which counterinsurgent forces limit the use of military power to the minimal degree necessary to avoid antagonizing the local population is cited in both extant British and U.S. doctrine. This is also identified in the Small Wars Manual. It is possible to conduct a brilliant series of tactical actions with overwhelming force and firepower and lose the larger strategic goal. "In small wars caution must be exercised and instead of striving to generate the maximum power with forces available," advises the Small Wars Manual, "the goal is to gain decisive results with the least application of force and the consequent minimum loss of life."4

Firepower-intensive operations may antagonize both external and internal parties that are neutral, swinging support and additional resources to the opponent. Excessive collateral damage will undermine the credibility of external efforts to assist a host-nation and could make the counterintervention longer and more costly. The French experience in Algeria is one example of this concern, as were aspects of the U.S. involvement in Vietnam. In Algeria, the French employed raids, reprisals, and interrogations that produced a series of tactical successes but at the cost of the support of the Algerian populace at the same time. The case histories in Malaya and Oman underscore the general lesson that kinetic force application must be measured and discriminate. Certainly, events in Iraq are reproofing this fundamental principle.

Perspectives

A number of key perspectives have emerged from this analysis. The first is the importance of intelligence, especially an acute degree of cultural awareness. This perspective reinforces a point made in the Small Wars Manual. Solid intelligence was a precious commodity in past small wars, largely due to the remote nature of the host-country, the inadequacy of infrastructure, and the lack of familiarity with the native population.

Cultural awareness and understanding are critical to success. But understanding how foreign cultures view us and how they may perceive our actions is critical. It is impossible for U.S. forces to succeed in working within another society without an intimate appreciation of the local culture. This is true for all wars since wars are conflicts between and within societies and cultures. In general, but especially in irregular and counterinsurgent conflicts, "the roots of victory or defeat often have to be sought far from the battlefield, in political, social, or economic factors."5 Counterinsurgencies and other forms of small wars often involve a contest for the popular support of a nation's citizenry, and as numerous conflicts have demonstrated, it is impossible to win the cooperation, let alone the hearts and minds, of the people without a thorough appreciation of their culture.

The second broad conclusion is the importance of history-in context. The study of history remains the best laboratory for thinking about future military conflict. A comprehensive study of past experience is the best defense against future challenges. But, once again, context matters, and commanders and their planners must consciously look for both similarities and distinctions in applying historical precedents. Templates are not useful and may even be dangerous. As one strategist recently exclaimed:

Many try to borrow from past wars or historical examples as if a few simple lessons from one conflict could be transferred easily to another. Far too often, they trot out all the same old case histories without really examining how valid they are.6

Too often, inappropriate lessons from one insurgency are carried over and unconsciously laminated over an entirely different political conflict or socioeconomic context. The danger of oversimplification and shallow historical analogy is to be avoided. As stated in our own Small Wars Manual, “. . . to a greater degree is each small war somewhat different from
The third most significant action involves the criticality of isolating the insurgent. Despite the wide range of case studies explored herein, the physical and psychological isolation of the insurgent was a key contributor to all successful examples. Isolation cuts off resources and other sources of support, from within the host-nation or from contiguous territories used as sanctuary. Physical isolation maximizes freedom of action within other domains, such as economic development and governance, by limiting the insurgent's opportunity to coerce indigenous personnel. From Hadrian's Wall in Britain to Israel's latest effort, physical defense barriers have been a regular feature in this mode of war. However, isolation in the ideological or political sense is also critical to neutralize both die insurgent's message and appeal. It also helps reduce intelligence gathering, recruiting, or funding. The classic experts, including T.E. Lawrence, Mao Tse Tung, and Col David Galula, have all underscored the use of information as a weapon. However, its mastery has proven to be elusive even to modern powers. Galula went on to add, "If there was a field in which we were definitely and infinitely more stupid than our opponents, it was propaganda."8 The Secretary of Defense has admitted that the United States has struggled with this component of national power in Iraq.

This aspect of modern counterinsurgency could rise in salience as future irregular combatants continue to exploit modern Information Age tools to broaden their appeal and resource base. Winning hearts and minds may have a more global orientation thanks to the ubiquitous nature of modern communications techniques. The old Small Wars Manual noted the rapidity by which a revolution could develop due to modern communications technologies.9 Today's continuous "24/7" news cycles and graphic imagery produce even faster and higher response cycles from audiences around the globe and offer powerful new "weapons" to those who can master them.

The final and most critical major conclusion involves operational adaptation. This historical analysis suggests that many countries were slow to recognize the potential of a growing insurgent movement, and that both civilian and military organizations went through a slow learning curve to come to grips with the necessary strategic, operational, and tactical adaptations required to win. In most cases, military and police forces were unprepared for the unique and often counter-intuitive aspects of counterinsurgency. Few were willing to try different approaches and alter their actions as necessary. Oman was a noted exception, thanks to the experience of the SAS. They proved to be a true learning organization.10

Such operational learning or adaptation appears to be a useful characteristic in the past, and one even more valuable in the future in a world of protean or adaptive enemies. Some counterinsurgency experts have characterized insurgencies as "competitions in learning," a form of conflict requiring continuous evolution in procedures, structure, and strategy.11 Today's adaptive enemies suggest that this will be an attribute of even greater value in the future. Increasing the velocity of organizational learning and adaptation may be a key element in future insurgencies.

Conclusion

The purpose of this effort was to identify best practices and key insights about counterinsurgency. As noted by T.E. Lawrence, there really is no excuse for not understanding this mode of warfare, given nearly 2,000 years of recorded experience. The critical study of history, the identification of common threads, and creating an ability to discover discontinuities are critical to gaining and exploiting this understanding.

As the Small Wars Manual of 1940 suggests, a study of the past is essential to an understanding of war and the complex nature of the contingencies the Marine Corps came to know as small wars. Today, under the rubric of counterinsurgency, irregular warfare, or hybrid conflicts, the Marine Corps faces a wide range of potential missions and interventions. 12 The Marine Corps' rich legacy in this form of warfare provides a solid foundation to build upon, but it cannot assume easy victories or complacent enemies. Today's threat is more dangerous and more lethal than the past, and the character of modern insurgency is different than the colonial wars or Maoist rural insurgencies of the past. But a detailed knowledge of the existing history of such interventions remains vital. History remains the best means for advancing our understanding of the problem and for developing the critical thinking skills that are the basis for comprehension and professional competence across the full range of human conflict.13 With this greater level of comprehension, we'll continue to ensure that we both understand and effectively apply the fundamentals of counterinsurgency, no matter how unique the circumstances.

SIDEBAR

"Much has been written about low intensity warfare, but it remains an open question how much is understood. Of greater certainty is the fact that very little of what is understood has been applied effectively."
-Caspar Weinberger

FOOTNOTE

Notes


11. Comment attributed to Dr. Steven Metz of the Strategic Studies Institute, Army Strategy Conference, Army War College, Carlisle, PA, 13 April 2005.


A Counterinsurgency Dilemma in Al Anbar

BYLINE: Cancian, Mark F.

by Col Mark F. Cancian, USMCR(Ret)

Col Cancian served 34 years on active duty and in the Reserves as an infantry and artillery officer. In March 2007 he returned from Iraq where he had been the G-7, Assistant Chief of Staff for Assessment, MNF-W.

ABSTRACT

Polling shows a consistent 85 percent disapproval of U.S. forces and a high level of acceptance for the use of force against them, despite the recent improvement of conditions on the ground. A central criticism of the U.S. occupation of Iraq has been that military operations are too "kinetic"—that is, operations rely too much on violent warfighting techniques and not enough on "soft power." There was a default to 'meet violence with violence' by some US forces, which led to civilian casualties and hardened the attitudes of many Iraqis against Americans. The recently rediscovered writings of David Galula capture the alternative perspective, emphasizing the importance of population control and the futility of chasing insurgents in the wilderness.

FULL TEXT

What is the mission; what is the goal? The senior officer was clearly uncomfortable. The early part of the briefing had gone well. The operation targeted a large public space that was a known insurgent activity center. The unit's operation plan called for the rapid takedown of the objective and a thorough search of the extensive premises. Surveillance would produce high situational awareness; a double cordon would effectively isolate the objective; rapid action throughout the objective area would ensure that coalition forces maintained the initiative. All that seemed excellent. The plan also included screening of all of the civilians who would be caught in the cordon—an evolution that would take up to 12 hours. As a precautionary measure, all of the male detainees would be flex-cuffed until cleared by the screening. This is where the senior officer had hesitated. Hundreds of men, most of whom would turn out to be entirely innocent, would be flex-cuffed by coalition forces for an extended period. For many this humiliation would happen in front of their families. In addition, hundreds of women and children would be held against their will, an uncomfortable action in a traditional society.

The senior officer asked, "Could the unit offer something to the detainees while they awaited processing, tea maybe?" Eyes rolled. Hundreds of warfighters were being prepared, thousands of planning details were being coordinated, and the senior officer was worried about tea! Some discussion then ensued about whether people who had been flex-cuffed could even drink tea. The senior officer thought they could. More eyes rolled.

But the senior officer had put his finger on two key points. In a counterinsurgency operation like this, was the price potentially alienating the population worth the gain in capturing suspected insurgents and disrupting a center of insurgent activity? Beyond that, what price should be imposed on the civilian population in order to protect friendly forces?

Disrupting the Insurgents or Alienating the Population?

Judged as a warfighting operation, the operation was well planned and, in actual execution, a success. Units understood their mission and executed as intended. The public space was isolated without incident, facilities were searched, derained personnel were screened, and several dozen civilians on "bad lists" were identified and sent for further interrogation and processing. No one, military or civilian, was injured. The entire action was completed in less than a day, ahead of schedule. Coalition forces returned to their bases without incident.
Judged by its effects on the population, the operation's success was less certain. The "optics" (to use a currendy fashioned military term) had been terrible. Although some Iraqi police had participated, the operation consisted mostly of U.S. forces conducting a mass detendon of civilians. No "high-value targets" were captured. Because of a weak legal system, most detainees were soon released. No obvious insurgent facilities were discovered. Intelligence sources reported continued insurgent use of the facility after coalition forces had left. However, without polling or systematic "atmospheres" it was hard to say what the population thought of all of this.

The difference in perspective matters. No civilian population likes being occupied. Therefore, every operation has a price because, inevitably, the occupiers will annoy, inconvenience, or actually humiliate the population. Whether the occupying power can justify the operation to itself or under the laws of war is irrelevant; the local population makes its own judgments. In Al Anbar Province these judgments are clear. Polling shows a consistent 85 percent disapproval of U.S. forces and a high level of acceptance for the use of force against them, despite the recent improvement of conditions on the ground.3

A central criticism of the U.S. occupation of Iraq has been that military operations are too "kinetic"—that is, operations rely too much on violent warfighting techniques and not enough on "soft power." This criticism arose most publicly in 2005 when British Brigadier Nigel Aylwin-Foster published an article4 that politely but forcefully made this argument based on his experiences at the senior U.S. headquarters in Iraq. The U.S. Army Chief of Staff sent the article to his general officers. If the criticism were limited to one foreign observer, or to liberal critics of the war who also criticize U.S. military methods, men it would not be very interesting. However, many observers, military and civilian, have made the same criticism, particularly during the early days of the occupation but continuing to the present. For example, Tom Ricks in Fiasco cites many internal military commentaries about the excessive use of force.5 Similarly then-BGen (now MajGen) John F. Kelly observed that as the occupation began:

There was a default to 'meet violence with violence' by some US forces, which led to civilian casualties and hardened the attitudes of many Iraqis against Americans.6

The recently rediscovered writings of David Galula7 capture the alternative perspective, emphasizing the importance of population control and the futility of chasing insurgents in the wilderness. In response, the new U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine8 focuses on the population as the battlefield.

This debate is an old one. After the Vietnam War, for example, Andrew Krepinevich made a similar observation in his widely read book, The Army in Vietnam.9 In it he argued that a military force built to fight the conventional forces of other nation-states was poorly prepared to conduct a counterinsurgency campaign. U.S. military culture focused on locating, closing with, and destroying enemy forces. It regarded the civilian population as an impediment, not as the battleground.

On the other hand, commentators like Ralph Peters forcefully point out that the United States must not shrink from violent action.

Only by killing [terrorists] . . . may we deter their weaker supporters. The humanitarianism we cherish is regarded as a sign of impotence by such opponents.10

Peters has argued for a decade that some opponents are irreconcilable and must be killed. Therefore, there is a limit to what soft power can accomplish. This tension was reflected in the drafting of the new counterinsurgency manual. Early drafts were viewed as too soft. Later drafts acknowledged more clearly the need for the use of force.

Many Marines and outside experts point to the Small Wars Manual as evidence of Marine Corps expertise in counterinsurgency, applying both hard and soft power. The manual is, indeed, a magnificent document. Containing insights distilled from the many Marine Corps interventions of the 1920s and 1930s, it covers all elements of counterinsurgency— from combat patrols and guarding infrastructure to organizing elections and dealing with the State Department. Although some sections are dated, much of the manual has enduring value, and Marines in Al Anbar continue to benefit from it. However, the manual was published in 1940, just as the Marine Corps was reorienting itself from small wars to amphibious operations. The experience of World War II and then Korea, Vietnam, and the Cold War focused the Marine Corps as an institution on large-scale amphibious operations against conventional forces. Although the interest in small wars/operations other than war never entirely disappeared (Marine expeditionary units (special operations capable) leaned heavily in this direction) the institutional focus was at the other end of the spectrum—major combat operations.

Two generations of focus on major combat operations have created a culture that shapes expectations about what objectives combat operations will target, how forces will operate, what tasks are appropriate, and what risks are acceptable.

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This makes fighting the "three block war" difficult; the right outlook for one block is inappropriate for another. For example, since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. military (not just the Marine Corps) has argued that well-trained, well-disciplined infantry can be effective peacekeepers as well as warfighters. But there is a key difference in mindset. Police look at the civilian population as basically law abiding against whom violence is not authorized. Violence must be targeted only against the few criminal elements. Warfighters look at the civilian population as all potentially hostile. As a result they are much more willing to use force.

This dilemma was the core of the senior officer's concern. He regarded the civilians as mostly innocent and worried about the psychological effect that the operation might have on them. The warfighters viewed the civilians as all potentially dangerous until proven otherwise.

What Price Force Protection?

Marines understand that a landing on a hostile shore will get a lot of people hurt. Although regrettable, casualties are intrinsic to the nature of the operation. But what risks are acceptable in a counterinsurgency operation? In this particular operation, the risk that male detainees might become violent, even when confined to holding areas, was considered great enough that all were flex-cuffed. For commanders concerned about force protection that just seemed prudent. But the action could be looked at another way; to reduce a small risk to the force, hundreds of Iraqi men were humiliated by the occupier. Was this tradeoff worthwhile?

For the U.S. public, casualties are the principal metric by which they measure success or failure in Iraq. The United States, as a democratic country that values the lives of its citizens, is naturally sensitive to casualties. But the public also cannot avoid focusing on casualties because every day the press headlines casualty-producing incidents. Then, at the end of each month, the press tabulates the cost and compares the results with previous months, often in a construct such as, "The most casualties since . . . ." The military as an institution rejects using casualties as metric of progress. Casualties are regarded as a regrettable, but inevitable, consequence of military operations; security, governance, and economics are the key metrics. But the senior leadership cannot ignore the sensitivity to casualties.

Military culture also plays a role. Leaders take care of their people, so a good leader implements every force protection measure possible. On the other hand, counterinsurgency doctrine calls for many actions—moving among the people, establishing vehicle checkpoints, setting up local observation posts—that expose friendly forces to enemy action in order to further the abstract goal of securing the population. A conscientious commander instinctively tries to mitigate these dangers, and mitigating often means minimizing; that is, reducing to the lowest possible level. But minimizing the risk of friendly casualties imposes costs on the civilian population.

The attitude was not limited to flexcuffing, to a particular operation, or to a particular unit but broadly affected coalition actions. Escalation of force (EOF) incidents are an example. In order to protect the force from suicide bombers, Marines and soldiers in Al Anbar end up killing, on average, a dozen Iraqis every month at checkpoints or encounters with convoys.11 These are not wanton killings caused by an overly aggressive or poorly trained force. Virtually all occur after U.S. forces follow proper warning procedures - flags, pyrotechnics, warning shots, vehicle-disabling shots. But the end is still the same-dead Iraqi civilians whose only crime was that they froze up, got confused, or were not paying attention.

The issue is not judicial. Marines in these EOF incidents are following the rules of engagement and are authorized the use of deadly force. They are not criminally culpable. Instead, the issue is strategic. Can we protect the force like this and still win the allegiance of the population? In the case of EOF casualties, every dead civilian is a family or clan alienated from the coalition and perhaps incited to a blood feud, despite mitigating actions, such as condolence payments.

Surveys of the Anbar population show that civilians are much more afraid of coalition forces than of the insurgents. In an April 2007 poll 80 percent of Anbaris said that the American military was "always" or "usually threatening," whereas only 28 percent said the same about "the armed resistance."12 U.S. commanders find this statement hard to believe. They have rigid rules of engagement, and insurgents routinely commit terrible atrocities. U.S. firepower is also much more tightly controlled than in the early days of the war, but to Anbari civilians, insurgent violence looks targeted while coalition violence looks random and unnecessary. Further, civilians have seen the measures that U.S. forces will take to protect themselves. One Army civil affairs officer (working elsewhere in Iraq) summed up this dilemma. On the one hand, he spent every day trying to improve the daily lives of Iraqis. On the other hand, he saw the military's aggressive response to perceived threats:

I think of the children who burst into tears when we point our weapons into their cars (just in case), and the countless vehicles we sideswipe [to avoid potential improvised explosive devices]. ... I also think of the reality of being attacked and
it all makes sense - the need to smash their cars and point our weapons at them and detain them. . . . But how would I feel in their shoes?13

Taken to an extreme, this attitude—that the force must be protected by any means necessary—induces Marines to shoot 40 civilians in an attempt to evade a perceived car bomb threat, as allegedly happened in Afghanistan.14

Culture and Strategy

The senior officer in this story faced a dilemma. On the one hand he did not want to tell subordinates how to fight the war in their area of operations. These subordinates had been given the forces and authority to operate independently on the well-established theory that commanders at the lowest level possible should take the lead. They understood local conditions best, and counterinsurgency is a local struggle. On the other hand, the senior officer was concerned about the indirect effects that coalition operations might have on the population, which was, according to counterinsurgency theory, the main battlefield. Did the operation meet the test of not creating more enemies than it eliminated, as GEN David H. Petraeus once asked?15 The senior officer's solution—providing amenities like tea—was an attempt to mitigate adverse effects without interfering with his subordinates' prerogatives.

If these different perspectives had arisen only in one operation by one unit, then the divergence in outlook would be of little interest. But these different perspectives arose repeatedly because they got at the central question of counterinsurgency warfare—what are military forces supposed to accomplish? The answer to this question drives operations and, ultimately, strategy. If the purpose is to attack insurgents while minimizing friendly casualties, then the operation was structured appropriately. If the purpose is to control and win the allegiance of the population, then the structure of this operation was problematic. Because of deep cultural attitudes, military organizations may not even be aware that they are making a choice. They are doing what, over the course of decades, the institution expected to do.

Not only is this question culturally difficult to address, it is also institutionally difficult to address because the answers appear to reflect praise or criticism of particular units or commanders. Grappling with the issue is therefore uncomfortable and requires a tremendous act of will. But these issues are too fundamental to be avoided. If they are not discussed and decided inside the military, then they will be discussed and decided in the press and the political establishment.

SIDEBAR

Surveys of the Anbar population show that civilians are much more afraid of coalition forces than of the insurgents.

FOOTNOTE

Notes

1. This story reflects an actual event that occurred in Al Anbar Province, Iraq during the fall of 2006. Details have been obscured for security reasons.

2. Flex-cuffs, or quick ties, are plastic handcuffs used by coalition troops to secure detainees.


11. Iraqi Security Forces also cause many civilian casualties and are, arguably, more dangerous to civilians than U.S. forces. The "Iraqi death blossom," where Iraqi Security Forces fire in all directions when under attack, is infamous. Polling results indicated that civilians feared Iraqi Security Forces also—the Iraqi Army more than the police.

12. The polls made a distinction between "foreign fighters" and "armed resistance," the former being foreign jihadists, the latter Iraqi natives. Foreign fighters are regarded as much more threatening than the armed resistance. These results have not changed substantially over the last year despite recent improvements in security conditions, Al Anbar Trend Survey April 2007 and Final Survey Report Al Anbar IO Survey 11.

13. Estrada, Oscar, "The Military: Losing Hearts and Minds?," The Washington Post, 6 June 2004. Estrada worked north of Baghdad, not in Al Anbar, but the dilemma he described was universal.


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GRAPHIC: Photographs

IMAGE PHOTOGRAPH, Warfighting success has to be judged in part by its effect on the populace. (photo by Cpl Joel Abshier.)

IMAGE PHOTOGRAPH, We're now relying more on soft power to influence the local populace. (Photo by Cpl Rick Nelson.)

IMAGE PHOTOGRAPH, The civilian population has become the battlefield. (Photo by Cpl Thomas J. Griffith.)

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Countering Evolved Insurgent Networks
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ABSTRACT
It must have multiple targets (the hostcountry population, U.S. population, international community, insurgents and their supporters); it must be integrated into all aspects of the overall campaign; and it can only be effective if it is based on the truth-spin will eventually be discovered, and the government will be hard-pressed to recover its credibility. To study a highly effective information campaign, I recommend looking at the one conducted by the Palestinians during Intifada I. A detailed examination of how and why it was so successful can be found in Intifada, by Schiff and Ya'ari. Summary

Today's counterinsurgency warfare involves a competition between human networks-ours and theirs.

FULL TEXT
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The first step in meeting the challenge facing us in Iraq today or in similar war zones tomorrow is to understand that insurgency and counterinsurgency are very different tasks. The use of Special Forces against insurgents in Vietnam-'out-guerrilla-ing the guerrillas' - provided exactly the wrong solution to the problem. It assumed that the insurgent and the counterinsurgent can use the same approach to achieve their quite different goals.

To define insurgency, I use Bard O'Neill's definition from Insurgency and Terrorism. He states: "Insurgency may be defined as a struggle between a nonruling group and the ruling authorities in which the nonruling group consciously uses political resources (e.g., organizational expertise, propaganda, and demonstrations) and violence to destroy, reformulate, or sustain the basis of one or more aspects of politics."1

Counterinsurgency, as defined by Ian Beckett, "is far from being a purely military problem . . . co-ordination of both the civil and military effort must occur at all levels and embrace the provision of intelligence. . . ."2

On the surface, these definitions suggest that insurgency and counterinsurgency are similar because each requires political and military action. However, when one thinks it through, the challenge is very different for the government. The government must accomplish something. It must govern effectively. In contrast, the insurgent only has to propose an idea for a better future while ensuring the government cannot govern effectively.

In Iraq, the resistance does not even project a better future. It simply has the nihilistic goal of ensuring the government cannot function. This negative goal is much easier to achieve than governing. For instance, it is easier and more direct to use military power than to apply political, economic, and social techniques. The insurgent can use violence to de-legitimize a government (because that government cannot fulfill the basic social contract to protect the people). However, simple application of violence by the government cannot restore that legitimacy. David Galula, in his classic Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, expresses the difference between insurgency and counterinsurgency very clearly: "Revolutionary warfare . . . represents an exceptional case not only because as we suspect, it has its special rules, different from those of the conventional war, but also because most of the rules applicable to one side do not work for the other. In a fight between a fly and a lion, the fly cannot deliver a knockout blow and the lion cannot fly. It is the same war for both camps in terms of space and time, yet there are two distinct warfares [sic]-the revolutionary's, and shall we say, the counterrevolutionary's."3

Enduring Traits of Insurgency

Mao Tse Tung wrote his famous On Guerilla War [Yu Chi Chan] in 1937. Despite the passage of time, many of his basic observations about insurgency remain valid. First and foremost, insurgency is a political, not a military, struggle. It is not amenable to a purely military solution without resorting to a level of brutality unacceptable to the Western world. Even the particularly brutal violence Russia has inflicted upon Chechnya-killing almost 25 percent of the total population and destroying its cities-has not resulted in victory.
The second factor has to do with the political will of the counterinsurgent’s own population. If that population turns sour when faced with the long time-frame and mounting costs of counterinsurgency, the insurgent will win. This has been particularly true whenever the United States has become involved in counterinsurgency operations. Insurgents have learned over the last 30 years that they do not have to defeat the United States militarily to drive us out of an insurgency; they only have to destroy our political will. Today’s insurgents in both Afghanistan and Iraq understand this and have made the political will of the U.S. population a primary target of their efforts.

A third unchanging aspect of insurgency involves duration. Insurgencies are measured in decades, not months or years. The Chinese Communists fought for 27 years. The Vietnamese fought the U.S. for 30 years. The Palestinians have been resisting Israel since at least 1968. Even when the counterinsurgent has won, it has taken a long time. The Malaya Emergency and the El Salvadoran insurgency each lasted 12 years.

Finally, despite America’s love of high technology, technology does not provide a major advantage in counterinsurgency. In fact, in the past the side with the simplest technology often won. What has been decisive in most counterinsurgencies were the human attributes of leadership, cultural understanding, and political judgment.

In short, the key factors of insurgency that have not changed are its political nature, its protracted timelines, and its intensely human (versus technological) nature.

 Emerging Traits of Insurgency

While these hallmarks of insurgency have remained constant, the nature of insurgency has evolved in other areas. Like all forms of war, insurgency changes in consonance with the political, economic, social, and technical conditions of the society it springs from. Insurgencies are no longer the special province of single-party organizations like Mao's and Ho Chi Minh's. Today, insurgent organizations are comprised of loose coalitions of the willing, human networks that range from local to global. This reflects the social organizations of the societies they come from and the reality that today’s most successful organizations are networks rather than hierarchies.

In addition to being composed of coalitions, insurgencies also operate across the spectrum from local to transnational organizations. Because these networks span the globe, external actors such as the Arabs who fought alongside the Taliban in Afghanistan, the Afghans who fought in Bosnia, and the European Muslims who are showing up in Iraq are now a regular part of insurgencies.

In a coalition insurgency, the goals of the different elements may vary too. In Afghanistan today, some of the insurgents simply wish to rule their own valleys; others seek to rule a nation. Al-Qaeda is fighting for a transnational caliphate. In Iraq, many of the Sunni insurgents seek a secular government dominated by Sunnis. Other Sunnis—the Salafists—want a strict Islamic society ruled by Sharia. Among the Shi’a, Muqtada Al-Sadr operated as an insurgent, then shifted to the political arena (while maintaining a powerful militia and a geographic base in the slums of Sadr City). AlQiada temporarily out of the insurgent business, his forces remain a factor in any armed conflict. Odier Shi’a militias are also prepared to enter the military equation if their current political efforts do not achieve their goals. Finally, criminal elements in both Afghanistan and Iraq participate in the unrest primarily for profit.

At times, even their hatred of the outsider is not strong enough to keep these various coalition groups from fighting among themselves. Such factionalism was a continuing problem for anti-Soviet insurgents in Afghanistan in the 1980s, and savvy Soviet commanders exploited it at times. We see major signs of the same symptom in Iraq today.

This complex mixture of players and motives is now the pattern for insurgencies. If insurgents succeed in driving the Coalition out of Afghanistan and Iraq, their own highly diverse coalitions of the willing will not be able to form a government; their mutually incompatible beliefs will lead to continued fighting until one faction dominates. This is what happened in Afghanistan when the insurgents drove the Soviets out. Similar disunity appeared in Ghechnya after the Soviets withdrew in 1996, and infighting only ceased when the Russians returned to install their own government. Early signs of a similar power struggle are present in the newly evacuated Gaza Strip.

The fact that recent insurgencies have been coalitions is a critical component in understanding them. For too long, American leaders stated that the insurgency in Iraq could not be genuine because it had no unifying cause or leader; therefore, it could not be a threat. The insurgents in Afghanistan, Chechnya, and Palestine have never had a unified leadership or belief other than that the outside power had to go. Yet these insurgents have driven out the Soviet Union and continue to contest the United States, Russia, and Israel. The lack of unity in current insurgencies only makes them more difficult to defeat. It is a characteristic that we have to accept and understand.
Showing the adaptability characteristic of successful organizations, many insurgencies are now transdimensional as well as transnational. As Western efforts have reduced the number of insurgent safe havens, insurgents have aggressively moved into cyberspace. There, the higher capacity of broadband has greatly increased the Internet’s utility for insurgents. Expanding from simple communications and propaganda, insurgents and their terrorist counterparts have moved to online recruitment, vetting of recruits, theological indoctrination, training, and logistical arrangements. Insurgents never have to meet an individual recruit until they feel comfortable, then they can use the Internet as a meeting site that they control. The wide availability of password-protected chat rooms allows insurgents to hold daily meetings with very little chance of discovery. Not only do Western intelligence agencies have to find the insurgents’ chat room among the millions out there and crack the password, but they also must do so with a person who can speak the insurgents’ language and who is convincing enough to keep the other chat participants from simply logging off. And, of course, insurgents can also move out of the larger chat room into private chat, which makes the infiltration problem even harder.

Another major change in insurgencies is that they are becoming self-supporting. Modern insurgents do conventional fundraising, but they also run charity organizations, businesses, and criminal enterprises. In the past, most insurgencies depended on one or two major sponsors, which the United States could subject to diplomatic or economic pressure. Now, the insurgents’ more varied money-raising schemes, combined with the ability to move funds outside official banking channels, make it increasingly difficult to attack insurgent finances.

Enduring Characteristics of Counterinsurgency

Just as insurgencies have enduring characteristics, so do counterinsurgencies. The fundamental weapon in counterinsurgency remains good governance. While the insurgent must simply continue to exist and conduct occasional attacks, the government must learn to govern effectively. The fact that there is an insurgency indicates the government has failed to govern. In short, the counterinsurgent is starting out in a deep hole.

The first governing step the counterinsurgent must take is to establish security for the people. Without effective, continuous security it does not matter if the people are sympathetic to the government—they must cooperate with the insurgent or be killed. Providing security is not enough, however. The government must also give the people hope for a better future for their children if not for themselves. Furthermore, this better future must accord with what the people want, not what the counterinsurgent wants. The strategic hamlets campaign in Vietnam and the ideological emphasis on freedom in Iraq are examples of futures the counterinsurgent thought were best, but that didn’t resonate with the population. In Vietnam, the peasants were intensely tied to their land; in Islamic culture, justice has a higher value than freedom.

The view of the future must address the “poverty of dignity” that Thomas L. Friedman has so clearly identified as a driving motivator for terrorists.4 The people must have hope not just for a better life as they see it, but also the feeling of dignity that comes from having some say in their own futures.

There has been a great deal of discussion recently about whether the war in Iraq has progressed from terrorism to an insurgency and then to a civil war. While this is very important from the insurgents’ point of view, it does not determine the first steps a counterinsurgent must take to win. As always, the first step is to provide security for the people. If the people stop supporting the government out of fear of insurgents, terrorists, or other violent groups, the government can only begin winning back its credibility by providing effective security. How that security is provided can vary depending on the threat, but the basic requirement is nonnegotiable. Thus, the fundamental enduring concept of counterinsurgency is to provide security for the people and genuine hope for the future.

Emerging Characteristics of Counterinsurgency

The counterinsurgent must also come to grips with the emerging characteristics of insurgency. To deal with the networked, transnational character of insurgent, the counterinsurgent must develop a truly international approach to the security issues he faces. In addition, he must counter not just a single ideology, but all the ideologies of the various groups involved in the insurgency. This is daunting because attacking the ideology of one group might reinforce that of another. Successful ideological combat also requires the counterinsurgent to have deep cultural and historical knowledge of the people in the conflict. Success in this kind of fight will be difficult to achieve, but it can be attained if the government attacks the insurgents’ coalition by exacerbating individual group differences.

Finally, the government must find a way to handle the numerous external actors who will come to join the insurgency. The true believers among them can only be killed or captured; the rest must be turned from insurgents to citizens. If possible, the counterinsurgent should keep foreign fighters from returning to their homes to spread the conflict there. Obviously this will require a great deal of international cooperation. However, the nations involved should be anxious to cooperate to prevent these violent, potentially rebellious fighters from returning home.
Visualizing the Insurgency

With the mixture of enduring and emerging characteristics in insurgencies, the question arises as to how best to analyze the modern form. A clear understanding of the insurgency is obviously essential to the counterinsurgent. Unfortunately, recent history shows that conventional powers initially tend to misunderstand insurgencies much more often than they understand them. In Malaya, it took almost 3 years before the British developed a consistent approach to the communist insurgency there. As John Nagl has noted, "Only about 1950 was the political nature of the war really grasped."5 In Vietnam, it took until 1968 before General Creighton Abrams and Ambassador Robert Komer provided an effective plan to deal with the Viet Cong in the south. In Iraq, it took us almost 2 years to decide that we were dealing with an insurgency, and we are still arguing about its composition and goals.

To fight an insurgency effectively, we must first understand it. Given the complexity inherent in modern insurgency, the best visualization tool is a network map. The counterinsurgent must map the human networks involved on both sides because -

* A map of the human connections reflects how insurgencies really operate. A network map will reveal the scale and depth of interactions between different people and nodes and show the actual impact of our actions against those connections.

* A network map plotted over time can show how changes in the environment affect nodes and links in the network. Again, such knowledge is essential for understanding how our actions are hitting the insurgency.

* Models of human networks account for charisma, human will, and insights in ways a simple organizational chart cannot.

* Networks actively seek to grow. By studying network maps, we can see where growth occurs and what it implies for the insurgent and the government. By studying which areas of the insurgent network are growing fastest, we can identify the most effective members of the insurgency and their most effective tactics, and act accordingly.

* Networks interact with other networks in complex ways that cannot be portrayed on an organizational chart.

* Network maps show connections from a local to a global scale and reveal when insurgents use modern technology to make the "long distance" relationships more important and closer than local ones.

* Networks portray the transdimensional and transnational nature of insurgencies in ways no other model can. Networks can also reveal insurgent connections to the host-nation government, the civilian community, and any other players present in the struggle.

* Finally, if we begin to understand the underlying networks of insurgencies, we can analyze them using an emerging set of tools. In Linked: The Science of Networks, Albert-Laszlo Barabasi points to these new tools: "A string of recent breathtaking discoveries has forced us to acknowledge that amazingly simple and far reaching laws govern the structure and evolution of all the complex networks that surround us."6

We should also use network modeling when we consider our own organizations. Unlike the hierarchical layout we habitually use when portraying ourselves, a network schematic will allow us to see much more clearly how our personnel policies affect our own operations. When we chart an organization hierarchically, it appears that our personnel rotation policies have minimal effect on our organizations. One individual leaves, and another qualified individual immediately fills that line on the organization chart; there is no visual indication of the impact on our organization. If, however, we plotted our own organizations as networks, we could see the massive damage our personnel rotation policies cause. When a person arrives in country and takes a job, for some time he probably knows only the person he is working for and a few people in his office. In a network, he will show up as a small node with few connections. As time passes, he makes new connections and finds old friends in other jobs throughout the theater. On a network map, we will see him growing from a tiny node to a major hub. Over the course of time, we will see his connections to other military organizations, to U.S. and allied government agencies, host-nation agencies, nongovernment organizations (NGOs), and so forth. Just as clearly, when he rotates we will see that large hub instantaneously replaced by a small node with few connections. We will be even more alarmed to see the massive impact the simultaneous departure of numerous hubs has on the functionality of our network.

To assist us in building our network maps, we can use any of a number of sophisticated anti-gang software programs that allow us to track individuals and visualize their contacts. Essentially sophisticated versions of the old personalities-organizations-incidents databases, these programs allow us to tie together the intelligence reports we get to build a visual picture of the connections revealed. For instance, we pick up a suspect near a bombing site, check him against the
A database, and find that although he has not been arrested before, he is closely related to a man we know to be involved in a political party. We can dien look at other members of the family and party to see if there are other connections to the incident, to the person we arrested, or to the organization possibly involved.

Good software will allow for instant visualization of these relationships in a color-coded network we can project on a wall, print out, or transmit to other analysts. Good software almost instantly accomplishes the hundreds of hours of scut work that used to be required to tie isolated, apparently unrelated reports together. It allows us to look for diird- and even fourth-level connections in a network and, thus, to build a much more useful network map. In particular, we will be able to see the gaps where we know there ought to be connections.

Ten years ago, software of this analytical quality was available and being used to track gang activity in the United States. I am uncertain of the status of current DOD [Department of Defense] human intelligence software, but I doubt it reaches down to the critical company and platoon levels of the counterinsurgency fight. We have to take aggressive action to get better software and make it work. If cities can give this kind of information to policemen on the streets, we owe it to our companies and platoons.

By mapping the human connections in insurgent networks and then applying cultural knowledge and network theory to the networks, we can understand them more clearly. We can also apply the common-sense observation that most networks grow from pre-existing social networks. In fact, such an approach has already been used. Marc Sageman has done a detailed study of Al-Qaeda and its affiliated organizations, mapped the operational connections, and dien compared them to pre-existing social connections. His work points the way to much more effective analysis of insurgent and terrorist organizations.

Sageman's studies have revealed the key nodes and links in each of Al-Qaeda's parts and how changes in the operating environment over time have affected those parts. Sageman has also identified both the real and virtual links between individuals and Al-Qaeda's constituent organizations. Most important, however, the studies give us a starting point from which to examine any network: the preexisting social connections of a society. Rather dian starting from scratch, we can analyze the limited intelligence we do obtain within the social and cultural context of the insurgency. In short, Sageman's approach allows us to paint a picture of the enemy network that we can analyze.

Security Not Defensive

For the counterinsurgent, the central element in any strategy must be the people. The counterinsurgent has to provide effective government in order to win the loyalty of the people. This is easy to say, but helping another country establish good governance is one of the most challenging tasks possible. The conflict in Iraq highlights how difficult it is to help establish a government in a fractious society. Beyond the discussion of whether or not there is a civil war in Iraq, we can't even agree on whether a strategy that focuses on the people is inherently offensive or defensive. Obviously, if our approach is perceived to be a defensive one, most strategists will be reluctant to adopt it, simply because defense rarely wins wars.

Actually, the entire thesis of providing security for the people as the only effective approach for counterinsurgency is based on the fact that providing security is an offensive action. During conventional wars, attacks that seize enemy territory to deny the enemy resources, a tax base, and a recruiting base are considered offensive actions. But for some reason, when we conduct population control operations in counterinsurgency, they are considered defensive even though these operations have the same effect: They deny the insurgent the diings he needs to operate.

A population control operation is the most offensive action one can take in a counterinsurgency. Just like in conventional war, once you have seized a portion of the enemy's territory, you cannot dien evacuate it and give it back to him. If you do so, you simply restore all the resources to his control while eroding the morale of the government, the people, and your own forces.

In a counterinsurgency, big-unit sweeps and raids are inherently defensive operations. We are reacting to an enemy initiative that has given him control of a portion of the country. We move through, perhaps capture or kill some insurgents, and then move back to our defensive positions. In essence, we are ceding the key terrain-the population and its resources-to the insurgent. We might have inflicted a temporary tactical setback on our enemy, but at a much greater cost to our operational and strategic goals. The fact that we sweep and do not hold exposes the government's weakness to the people. It also exposes them to violence and does little to improve their long-term security or prospects for a better life.

Clearly, population control operations are the truly offensive operations in a counterinsurgency. Just as clearly, host-government and U.S. forces will rarely have sufficient troops to conduct such operations nationwide at the start of the
countering insurgent effort. Thus, we need to prioritize areas that will receive the resources to provide full-time, permanent security, population control, and reconstruction. The clear, hold, and build strategy is the correct one. However, it must recognize the limitations of government forces and, for a period, cede control of some elements of the population to the insurgent to provide real protection for the rest of the population. This is essentially the "white, grey, and black" approach used by the British in Malaya.8 As Sir Robert Thompson has noted, "Because a government's resources, notably in trained manpower, are limited, the [counterinsurgent] plan must also lay down priorities both in the measures to be taken and in the areas to be dealt with first. If the insurgency is countrywide, it is impossible to tackle it offensively in every area. It must be accepted that in certain areas only a holding operation can be conducted."9

Further, by focusing our forces to create real security in some areas rather than the illusion of security across the country, we can commence rebuilding. The resulting combination of security and prosperity will contrast sharply with conditions in insurgent-controlled areas. When we have sufficient forces to move into those areas, the people might be more receptive to the government's presence.

Command and Control

There is an old saying in military planning: Get the command and control relationships right, and everything else will take care of itself. It is a common-sense acknowledgement that people provide solutions only if they are well-led in a functional organization. Thus the first and often most difficult step in counterinsurgency is to integrate friendly-force command and execution. Note that I say "integrate" and not "unify." Given the transnational, transdimensional nature of today's insurgencies, it will be impossible to develop true unity of command for all the organizations needed to fight an insurgency. Instead, we must strive for unity of purpose by integrating the efforts of all concerned.

While the U.S. military does not like committees, a committee structure might be most effective for command in a counterinsurgency. There should be an executive committee for every major political subdivision, from city to province to national levels. Each committee must include all key personnel involved in the counterinsurgency effort—political leaders (prime minister, governors, and so on), police, intelligence officers, economic developers, public services ministers, and the military. The political leaders must be in charge and have full authority to hire, fire, and evaluate other members of the committee. Committee members must not be controlled or evaluated by their parent agencies at the next higher level; otherwise, the committee will fail to achieve unity of purpose. This step will require a massive cultural change to the normal stovepipes that handle all personnel and promotion issues for the government. One of the biggest hindrances to change is that many think the current hierarchical organization is effective. They think of themselves as "cylinders of excellence" rather than the balky, inefficient, and ineffective stovepipes they really are.

Above the national-level committee, which can be established fairly quickly under our current organization, we need a regional command arrangement. Given the transnational nature of modern insurgency, a single country team simply cannot deal with all the regional and international issues required in effective counterinsurgency. Thus we will have to develop a genuine regional team. The current DOD and Department of State organizations do not lend themselves well to such a structure and will require extensive realignment. This realignment must be accomplished.

Once the national and regional committees are established, Washington must give mission-type orders, allocate sufficient resources, and then let in-country and regional personnel run the campaign. Obviously, one of the biggest challenges in this arrangement is developing leaders to head the in-country and regional teams, particularly deployable U.S. civil leaders and host-nation leaders. An even bigger challenge will be convincing U.S. national-level bureaucracies to stay out of day-to-day operations.

Once established, the committees can use the network map of the insurgency and its environment to develop a plan for victory. The network map provides important information about the nature of the interaction between the key hubs and smaller nodes of the insurgency. While the hubs and nodes are the most visible aspects of any network, it is the nature of the activity between them that is important. We must understand that well to understand how the network actually functions. This is difficult to do, and what makes it even more challenging is that one cannot understand the network except in its cultural context. Therefore, we must find and employ people with near-native language fluency and cultural knowledge to build and interpret our map.

Speed Versus Accuracy

For counterinsurgencies, Colonel John Boyd's observation-orientation-decision-action (OODA) loop remains valid, but its focus changes.10 In conventional war, and especially in the aerial combat that led Boyd to develop his concept, speed was crucial to completing the OODA loop—it got you inside your opponent's OODA loop. We have to use a different
approach in counterinsurgency. Stressing speed above all else in the decision cycle simply does not make sense in a war that can last a decade or more.

In counterinsurgency, we still want to move speedily, but the focus must be more on accuracy (developed in the observation.orientation segment of the loop). The government must understand what it is seeing before it decides what to do. To date, network-centric concepts have focused on shortening the sensor-to-shooter step (Boyd's decision-action segment). Now, we must focus on improving the quality—and the speed, too, if that's compatible with accuracy—of the observe.orientation segment. Even more important, the OODA loop expands to track not just our enemy's reaction, but how the entire environment is reacting—the people, the host-nation government, Our allies, our forces, even our own population.

Attacking the Network

Because effective offensive operations in a counterinsurgency are based on protecting the people, direct action against insurgent fighters is secondary; nevertheless, such action remains a necessary part of the overall campaign plan. Once we understand the insurgent network or major segments of it, we can attack elements of it. We should only attack, however, if our attacks support our efforts to provide security for the people. If there is a strong likelihood of collateral damage, we should not attack because collateral damage, by definition, lessens the people's security. In addition, the fundamental rules for attacking a network are different from those used when attacking a more conventional enemy. First, in counterinsurgency it is better to exploit a known node than attack it. Second, if you have to attack, the best attack is a soft one designed to introduce distrust into the network. Third, if you must make a hard attack, conduct simultaneous attacks on related links or else the attack will have little effect. Finally, after the attack, increase surveillance to see how the insurgency tries to communicate around or repair the damage. As they are reaching out to establish new contacts, the new nodes will be most visible.

Information Campaign

An integral part of counterinsurgency is an effective information campaign. It must have multiple targets (the hostcountry population, U.S. population, international community, insurgents and their supporters); it must be integrated into all aspects of the overall campaign; and it can only be effective if it is based on the truth—spin will eventually be discovered, and the government will be hard-pressed to recover its credibility.

Further, our actions speak so loudly that they tend to drown out our words. When we claim we stand for justice, but then hold no senior personnel responsible for torture, we invalidate our message and alienate our audience. Fortunately, positive actions work too. The tsunami and earthquake relief efforts in 2004 and 2005 had a huge impact on our target audiences. Consequently, our information campaign must be based on getting information about our good actions out. Conversely, our actions must live up to our rhetoric.

To study a highly effective information campaign, I recommend looking at the one conducted by the Palestinians during Intifada I. A detailed examination of how and why it was so successful can be found in Intifada, by Schiff and Ya'ari.11

Summary

Today's counterinsurgency warfare involves a competition between human networks—ours and theirs. To understand their networks, we must understand the networks's preexisting links as well as the cultural and historical context behind the struggle. We also have to understand not just the insurgents' network, but those of the host-nation government, its people, our coalition partners, NGOs, and, of course, our own.

Counterinsurgency is completely different from insurgency. Rather than focusing on fighting, strategy must focus on establishing good governance by strengthening key friendly nodes while weakening the enemy's. In Iraq, we must get the mass of the population on our side. Good governance is founded on providing effective security for the people and giving them hope for their future; it is not based on killing insurgents and terrorists. To provide that security, we must be able to visualize the fight between and within the human networks involved. Only then can we develop and execute a plan to defeat the insurgents.

SIDEBAR

What has been decisive in most counterinsurgencies were the human attributes of leadership, cultural understanding, and political judgment. . . .

SIDEBAR
New Insurgency Traits
Emergence of networked coalitions of the willing.
Evolution into transdimensional organizations.
Ability to fund themselves.
Wide variety of motivations behind different coalition elements.

FOOTNOTE

Notes
8. Used by the British in Malaya, the white-grey-black scheme is a corollary of the clear-hold-build strategy now in use in Iraq. White areas were those declared completely cleared of insurgents and ready for reconstruction and democratic initiatives. Grey areas were in dispute, with counterinsurgents and insurgents vying actively for the upper hand. Black areas were insurgent-controlled and mostly left alone pending the reallocation of government resources from other areas. See Sir Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency: The Lessons of Vietnam and Malaya (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), Chapter 10.
9. Thompson, 55.

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GRAPHIC: Photographs
IMAGE PHOTOGRAPH, Photo: Counterinsurgency forces cannot fight with the same tactics as the insurgent. (Photo by Cpl Ryan M. Blaich.)
IMAGE PHOTOGRAPH, Trust is built from the ground up. (Photo by Cpl Eric C. Schwartz.)
IMAGE PHOTOGRAPH, To prevail, the government must prove it can govern effectively. (Photo by Cpl Rick Nelson.)
IMAGE PHOTOGRAPH, No stone can be left unturned in rooting out the insurgent (noto by Cpl Ryan C. Heiser.)
Identity-Based Conflict

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ABSTRACT
It is, simply stated, a stunning compilation of the most provocative and prescient writing on foreign affairs and future national security challenges you can buy in a single volume. The author takes the Services to task (with the Marine Corps charitably cited as an exception) for designing Service strategies and concepts around systems they want to buy, rather than developing capabilities and hardware to best support our strategy and our understanding of future warfare.

FULL TEXT

Ralph Peters has established a reputation as one of the most fearless, most perceptive, and most accurate analysts of modern conflict. He is also a prolific writer. He is a regular contributor to the Armed Forces Journal and several other journals and newspapers. Stackpole Books has bundled together this Army intelligence veteran’s best material over the past 2 years into Wars of Blood and Faith. It is, simply stated, a stunning compilation of the most provocative and prescient writing on foreign affairs and future national security challenges you can buy in a single volume.

This latest anthology is organized into five parts. The opening section on the 21st century military begins with a searing essay titled, "The Shape of Wars to Come." It’s a fabulous introduction to this millennium’s new normalcy of religious-based violence. Our biggest challenges will come "from governments and organizations willing to wage war in spheres now forbidden or still unimagined."

The American infatuation with bloodless war is a theme in one of the opening essays. The author takes the Services to task (with the Marine Corps charitably cited as an exception) for designing Service strategies and concepts around systems they want to buy, rather than developing capabilities and hardware to best support our strategy and our understanding of future warfare. Sterile visions of technowar are deeply rooted in our American culture, but they are increasingly at odds with the nature of modern conflict.
Peters' best essays and articles address the human dimension of modern conflict better than any other analyst today. To the author, we have exited a brief aberration of conflict and reentered a much longer era of fundamental struggles over God and blood. "No matter how vociferously," we want to deny it, "our wars will be fought over religion and ethnic identity. Those wars will be cruel and hard."

Modern theories of irregular warfare, including the new counterinsurgency manual, come in for some sustained commentary in Wars of Blood and Faith. With little tact, Peters argues that the manual's authors "ignored myriad relevant historical examples and focused instead on the counterinsurgency campaigns with which they were comfortable." The prescriptions in Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency, are outdated. The manual is replete with remedies tied to political struggles over social organization and the distribution of resources. The manual claims, "You cannot fight former Saddamists and Islamic extremists the same way you would have fought the Viet Cong, Moros, or Tupamaros." But it never really accepts or makes any distinctions in approach; the Maoist-era counterinsurgent model is the default position. But as LtCol Peters emphasizes:

A Maoist in Malaya could be converted. But Islamist terrorists who regard death as a promotion are not going to reject their faith any more than an ethnic warrior can-or would wish to-change his blood identity.

The remaining sections are even more controversial and address Peters' take on Iraq and the summer of 2006 Israeli campaign against Hezbollah. The final section deals with the "The World Beyond" and provides assessments of the pending geostrategic center of gravity in the Indian Ocean and emerging hotspots in Africa.

When you need to get past the media's mendacious meddling and twisted presentation of facts, turn to Ralph Peters for a dose of reality and realism. His is a coherent assessment of today's most pressing problems. Ralph Peters and Wars of Blood and Faith provide the most penetrating assessment of the emerging age of extremism.
SECTION: MAJGEN RICHARD C. SCHULZE MEMORIAL ESSAY; Pg. 18 Vol. 91 No. 11 ISSN: 0025-3170

LENGTH: 4582 words

ABSTRACT

The integrated employment of the core capabilities of electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations [PsyOps], military deception, and operations security, in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our own.5 Unfortunately, this definition is so broad it confuses rather than clarifies the discussion. Unfortunately, given the U.S. military's gravitation toward the technical side of war, we have expended great efforts on electronic warfare and computer network operations while relegating the other three segments to minor league status.

FULL TEXT

Strategic communications in the society at war

Worldwide there is a growing awareness of the importance of information operations (IO) in modern insurgencies. In fact, Bin Laden's statement that it is about preparation of the battle indicates he is behind the times. His deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, came closer to understanding the situation when he stated that over half the actual battle takes place in the media. LTG Thomas Metz, who commanded the Multinational Coalition-Iraq, showed a true understanding of the situation when he noted that "victory can be secured in this domain alone." Reinforcing this view, COL Roger O. Baker, USA, has written that IO is the decisive weapon in the insurgency in Iraq.4

Since astute practitioners on both sides of the conflict have reached the conclusion that the key weapon of insurgency is a strategic communications campaign, we have to ask ourselves if this is a truly accurate portrayal of today's battlespace or if it is a misreading based on recent experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan. This article will argue that modern insurgency has become essentially a strategic communications campaign supported by military action rather than a military campaign supported by effective strategic communications. Further, this is not a surprising development but the logical coevolution of warfare and society.

First, Get the Definitions Right

Before we explore why strategic communications has become the weapon of choice in insurgencies, it is important to better define the term. U.S. forces generally refer to IO rather than strategic communications. However, I do not think IO correctly identifies the key battlespace in an insurgency. The Department of Defense (DoD) defines IO as:

The integrated employment of the core capabilities of electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations [PsyOps], military deception, and operations security, in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our own.5

Unfortunately, this definition is so broad it confuses rather than clarifies the discussion. Lumping five disciplines-electronic warfare, computer network operations, PsyOps, military deception, and operations security-means a conversation about IO can be like the proverb of the five blind men and the elephant.

Each element is, in fact, a real and important part of modern warfare. Unfortunately, given the U.S. military's gravitation toward the technical side of war, we have expended great efforts on electronic warfare and computer network operations while relegating the other three segments to minor league status. Even the inclusion of PsyOps only touches on the core struggle for perceptions that is central to insurgency today. In particular, too many military officers see PsyOps as only a supporting element of the tactical fight—merely one among many elements that support the truly important fire and maneuver elements. At best, using the term IO does not specify which activity is actually being undertaken unless it is carefully clarified. At worst, using the term diffuses the commander's emphasis over a broad range of activities not essential to the counterinsurgency (COIN).

I prefer the term strategic communications, which DoD defines as:

... focused United States Government efforts to understand and engage key audiences to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of United States Government interests, policies, and objectives through the use
of coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages, and products synchronized with the actions of all instruments of national power.6

This second term is much more useful in that it assigns a much broader role to strategic communications even if it does not state it is the central element in an insurgent campaign. The primary drawback of this term is that, while called "strategic" communications, such activities must range from strategic to tactical. They have a much more direct impact than simply setting favorable conditions.

Why Is Information Dominant Now?

No less an authority than Carl von Clausewitz declared that "Military institutions and the manner in which they employ violence depended on the economic, social and political conditions of their respective states."7 This is a central theme of the generations of war theory. As economic, political, and social conditions evolve, so does war. It was inevitable that as the economy moved from an industrial to informational base, war would also move in that direction. In fact, a quick review of recent insurgencies highlights how information has become the central operation of such conflicts.

While Mao Tse Tung was not the first political insurgent, he was perhaps the most influential. Reprints of his writings have been found in insurgent camps across the globe. His three-phased insurgency with its final conventional phase was a brilliant concept for the Chinese civil war-and led to victory. Yet, less than a decade later, Ho Chi Minh was faced with a situation that precluded a final conventional campaign to defeat the army of his main enemy. Ho simply could not mount military campaigns that could defeat the United States militarily. So he modified his campaign. He used the emerging global communications network-televison, radio, and print-as a pathway to break the will of the American people. He effectively used a strategic communications campaign to convince the American people that we could not win in Vietnam. He accomplished this despite the fact that after 1968 the increasing stability and prosperity of the South meant the North had to resort to two conventional campaigns to defeat the South.

Today, Vietnam is referred to as "the first televised war." Yet, at the time, television news was limited to three daily network news programs, and each provided only 5 to 10 minutes of coverage about Vietnam. Compare that sparse flow of information to the dozens of hours of video provided by today's 24-hour news programs, talk radio, websites, blogs, cell phone alerts, etc. The frequency, speed, and impact of today's media make it a vastly more powerful tool for the insurgent than the Vietnam-era system.

Ho's ability to modify Mao's concept demonstrated one of the primary traits of successful insurgencies-adaptability. Naturally, subsequent insurgent groups have taken advantage of accelerating political, social, and economic changes. The Sandinistas, Afghans, Chechens, Palestinians, and Iraqis all came to understand that they could not inflict a military defeat on the outside forces they were fighting. Recognizing this fact, they, for the most part, simply stopped planning for major military campaigns. Instead they focused on using the ever-expanding global communications network to conduct aggressive, long-term strategic communications campaigns to break the will of the outside power. They did so with the full knowledge that while strategic communications campaigns could defeat an outside power, they would not end their war. They knew they still faced the interfactional fight for ultimate control.

This fact can be traced to another major development in insurgencies. During the past 30 years many insurgencies have moved from the monolithic, communist-inspired model to broad coalitions of the angry. Reflecting the divisions in their own societies, the Afghans, Palestinians, Chechens, and Iraqis are unable to unify their insurgencies under a single political leader. Instead, each faction participates as part of a loose coalition-often fighting each other as hard as the outside power. Many of the factions of these coalitions are identity based and therefore cannot unite in a common outlook. Thus, at the same time that strategic communications has become vital to defeating the outside power, its value has actually decreased in the subsequent internal struggles. No amount of propaganda can convince a person he is no longer Pashtun or Tajik, Arab or Kurd, Sunni or Shi’a. It takes a great deal of time for a national identity to replace the more basic ethnic or confessional identity. And when national governments fail to provide basic security, people are forced to turn back to these earlier social, ethnic, or religious identities to find it.

American strategists must be aware of both trends. First, we must clearly understand that most insurgencies will involve aspects of multisided civil war. We have to be attuned to that probability and understand when the conflict has tipped primarily into a civil war. This does not mean we have to withdraw, only that we have to understand the different character of a civil war. Civil wars, while often even more brutal than insurgencies, do offer opportunities for further dividing the enemy but only after gaining a thorough understanding of the conflict.

Second, if we plan to inject our forces into an insurgency, it is critical that we understand the use of strategic communications. Clearly, in their campaigns to drive out an external power, today's insurgents conduct communications campaigns
on all levels and for multiple audiences. At least since Intifada I, Arab insurgents have tailored a message for the outside, primarily Western audience; another for the population engulfed in die conflict; and yet another for their supporters.

Da’wa

As stated earlier, warfare flows from society as a whole. Thus, the use of strategic communications by Islamic insurgents is strongly reinforced by their own history and culture. As early as 1928 the Muslim Brotherhoods leadership adopted the concept of da’wa as a foundation of its movement to change society from below. The Brotherhood intended to establish Islamic governments by creating an Islamic community through teaching and social work.

Da’wa literally means call or appeal but can also be translated as missionary work and, for the Brotherhood, it was the essence of their program to spread a message of revival and renewal.

While today’s Islamists have rejected the brotherhood's concept of changing society from below, they have kept the concept of da’wa and expanded on it. Islamists have redefined it as an all-encompassing invitation to see things the Islamists’ way and made it central to their strategic approach.

Islamist insurgent activities indicate they understand and are acting on the requirements for an effective, broadly based, multipath, strategic communications campaign. Besides an aggressive effort to get their story out through both Arab and Western traditional media, radical Islamists run almost 5,000 websites. In addition, building on the remarkable success that Grand Ayatollah Khomeini achieved in Iran with his simple audiotapes, the Islamists have expanded to digital versatile discs (DVDs), video clips posted to websites, cell phone videos, ring tones, and downloadable computer files. They have even developed “top 10 clips” that provide frequent updates of the top 10 insurgent attacks on coalition forces in Iraq. They do not limit this effort to regional outlets but exploit the Internet to provide worldwide dissemination of their messages. Even before YouTube, their videos were regularly posted to ogrish.com. On 24 September the Times reported that al-Qaeda central is now releasing two to three high-quality video- or audiotapes per week.

In their online discussions of previous successful campaigns, the insurgents have stated that they will win by breaking American political will while reinforcing their own status within the Islamic world. As early as January 2002, Ubeid AlQurashi chastised those who despaired because of American success in Afghanistan. He stated that al-Qaeda would use fourth-generation warfare and capitalize on its ability to influence the minds of enemy decisionmakers. Since that time Islamist websites have repeatedly stressed the importance of breaking the will of the American people. Their propaganda products demonstrate this awareness in steadily improving quality, production values, and speed of transmission. If you view the early "ambush" videos produced by the insurgents, it is clear that filming was often an afterthought resulting in bad camera angles and unclear images. Essentially, they slaved the camera to the guns, doing their best to film the attack as it occurred. They saw the video as only a byproduct of the attack.

Since then we have seen quality progress to the point one has to believe many insurgent groups are now slaving the guns to the camera with the video being the primary product of the attack. It appears the insurgents are making strategic communications central to even tactical-level operations. Thus, from tactical to strategic level, the insurgents are focused on breaking the will of the American people. Recent events show it is working. Only a major effort by the administration turned back an effort to legislate a withdrawal schedule from Iraq.

The second target of the insurgents strategic communications campaign is the population of the Islamic world. Using the Internet to disseminate their intent for al-Qaeda's strategic communications campaign, its leaders have written:

... the media strategy should target in depth middle ranking officers in the armed forces [of Muslim nations] to push them to join the jihad. It should aim at every stage to justify operations to the populous legally and intellectually given that, assuming that our long struggle will require half a million mujahideen, getting such a number from a nation of millions is easier than from the ranks of the Islamic movement.

To achieve their goal of reaching the Islamic and particularly Arab world, the insurgents are tapping into two deep needs-empowerment and catharsis. Empowerment addresses one of the fundamental drivers of terror and insurgency—the sense of helplessness. Thomas Friedman refers to this as the “poverty of dignity.” It is not economic poverty that drives the individual terrorist but the despair caused by the complete inability to influence his own future. By clearly demonstrating the capability of Arab men to fight back against the most powerful army in the world, Islamist websites have brought a piece of dignity to every Arab male. The insurgents also understand the need for catharsis—the release of tension and pain for people living in extremely tough conditions with little hope of change. Fulfilling these combined needs explains the explosive popularity of the videos, DVDs, and even cell phone ring tones produced by insurgent groups.
Fortunately, some insurgent groups have not grasped the critical role strategic communications plays. Al-Qaeda in Iraq, despite constant hectoring by al-Qaeda's central leadership, focused on intimidation and terror. Their message became "submit to us or be destroyed" and triggered the "Anbar awakening." The Sunni tribal leadership presented a better message and a better future to the Sunnis, and they fought back hard against al-Qaeda in Iraq. Globally, many insurgent groups have failed to understand the importance of their message. This is one of the reasons more insurgencies fail than succeed.

Failure of Governments To Respond

In contrast to the varied and highly effective insurgent use of all available communications tools in Iraq, the U.S. Government's response has been anemic at best. The failure of our public diplomacy campaign has been well documented. While there have been efforts to improve, the results have been marginal at best. Individual commanders have sought out Arab media, but as a whole, the U.S. Government has not made a concerted effort to speak via these widely accepted channels. On its website, the DoD provides a "bloggers' roundtable." However, it is simply upbeat stories authored by military officers concerning the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan-and all stories are in English. There is no link, in Arabic or any other language. As far as actively entering die blog debates, it was not until late September that the Department of State hired two Arabic speaking bloggers to join the blogosphere discussions on the Middle East. Up until then, we had left the field to the radicals. Clearly the U.S. Government has failed to engage in this critical battle. Now we are matching our two bloggers against the hundreds of anti-American bloggers online.

Amplifying our failure to engage is the fact that what we do as a nation speaks so loudly our audience cannot hear what we say. While we say our agenda is democracy, we have assisted in the bombing of one Arab democracy (Lebanon) and refused to acknowledge the election of a second Arab government (Hamas in Palestine). These actions, plus events like hosting anti-Islamic fundamentalist preachers at the White House and retaining senior administration officials who have made anti-Islamic statements in public, have severely undercut U.S. credibility throughout the Middle East. The uncomfortable fact is that in a globally networked world, it is impossible to compartmentalize foreign policy actions from domestic politics.

Insurgency and COIN Are Not the Same

While the insurgent can focus on strategic communications as his primary weapon, the government must also provide security as an integral part of its campaign. This provides the insurgent with a tremendous advantage. He simply has to promise to make things better. As long as he does not control the operational area, he has a readymade excuse for failing to live up to his promises. Quite simply, he can say, "The government controls the area and is preventing us from helping the people." In contrast, any promises that are part of the government message must be rapidly fulfilled. Any failure to do so not only represents a physical setback but also a psychological setback that undercuts the government's legitimacy. At its root, the government is in a campaign for legitimacy, and a fundamental requirement for legitimacy is security. No matter how well thought out a communications campaign is, it still has to produce that fundamental element of the contract between the governed and government.

Yet, success is not just improved security but must be accompanied by the population's perception that security has improved. Thus the entire COIN campaign is tied not just to the provision of critical security and services but doing so in a manner that convinces the population that in fact things are getting better.

What Can We Do?

At the tactical level, the most important step is to understand that strategic communications/IO is not something done by die public affairs officer or the PsyOps team. It is a critical operational function that requires the personal attention of the commander and his key staff officers. Marines would do well to study and implement the system proposed by COL Baker in his previously cited article. The following summarizes COL Baker's exceptional guidance concerning the use of IO in a tactical environment:

* IO are operations and therefore require a commander's direct involvement.

* Because IO require quick action they cannot be centralized but must be guided by commanders intent just like any other form of maneuver.

* Commanders must talk to the media—with emphasis on the local media. Failure to do so cedes critical battlespace to the enemy.
* IO must be based on trust developed by building relationships with local leaders and influencers. The focus must be on earning respect and credibility not love.

* If you screw up, admit it. Clearly, COL Baker's campaign was really strategic communications rather than just IO.

Strategic communications at die operational and strategic levels is a much greater challenge. The commander carries the baggage of the national- and operational-level strategic communications campaigns and the actions of the U.S. Government. Obviously, the military will not control the national message or be able to overcome damage inflicted by competing elements of our national power structure.

However, commanders must understand the essential role strategic communications plays and conduct operations accordingly. Strategic communications must be an integral operational element of every plan. Further, it must be dealt with through missiontype orders that must start with commanders intent at the most senior levels. Like all operational concepts in maneuver warfare, the commander's communications intent must provide sufficient guidance for subordinate commanders to exploit fleeting opportunities by matching the commander's intent to the situation on the ground. Our current system of centralized approval is essentially the French system of methodical battle that German maneuver shattered in 1940. It is not surprising that our centralized system for communications operations is also being easily beaten by the much more flexible, mission order-based insurgent system. We have to fit our strategic communications policies into our maneuver warfare concepts.

Field Manual 3-24/Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.5, Counterinsurgency Manual, provides some guidance. While the manual provides very little discussion of IO, two diagrams represent how U.S. forces should think of these operations. Figure 1 represents 1st Marine Division's operational design for Operation IRAQI FREEDOM II. It shows IO as the single foundation block for all other activities. Figure 2 shows all lines of operations encompassed by IO. These two diagrams provide effective illustration of the fact that everything in COIN flows from the communications campaign. We now have to expand on those diagrams in our doctrine and then routinely incorporate that doctrine into our operations.

**Summary**

The concept that insurgency is now a strategic communications campaign supported by military operations may seem a bit over the top. But studies of recent insurgent victories show that it was not military defeat but loss of political will that led to the withdrawal of the external powers. Today's insurgents discuss the outcome in Vietnam, Somalia, Lebanon, Afghanistan, and Chechnya. They know that in each case the United States, the Soviet Union, or Israel committed only a fraction of its available military power, and the insurgents could not militarily defeat even that fraction. They know just as surely that the insurgents won the war despite losing most of the fights. They state that the insurgents won because they broke the political will of their enemies, and they openly plan to do the same in Iraq and Afghanistan. They know it was the message that defeated the outside powers. Their convictions are reflected in the sophisticated multimedia campaign targeted to break the will of the U.S. population, motivate their own fighters, and keep the local population neutral or actively supporting the insurgents. Until we make the mental leap the insurgent's have made and engage in this critical battlespace, the insurgents may prove to be right again.

**SIDEBAR**

MajGen Richard C. Schulze Memorial Essay

The MajGen Richard C Schulze Memorial Essay, honors the memory of the Marine Corps general officer for whom it is named. MajGen Schulze, a native of Oakland, CA, died in November 1983, 2 years after his retirement. An enlisted Marine at the time of his commissioning in 1951, he earned his B.A. in Far East history from Stanford University in 1954 and later earned an M.S. in public administration from George Washington University (1971).

He was a mortar section leader with the 1st Marines in Korea and commanded 3d Battalion, 3d Marines in Vietnam. MajGen Schulze served as director of three different divisions within the Manpower Department at Headquarters. He also served as Inspector General of the Marine Corps and as Commanding General, Marine Corps Recruit Depot San Diego.

He was a frequent contributor to the Gazette and wrote with philosophical insight on many of the Intractable problems confronting the Armed Forces—thus the naming of this annual essay in his honor is singularly appropriate.
The Schulze Memorial Essays have been published each year since 1984. They are made possible by the earnings of an endowment fund established by friends of MajGen Schulze. Authors of the essays are chosen by the Editorial Board of the Gazette.

"It is obvious that the media war in this century is one of the strongest methods; in fact its ratio may reach Supercent of the total preparation for the battles."1

-Osama bin Laden

Col Hammes is the author of The Sling and the Stone (Zenith Press, 2004) and is an MCG Distinguished Author.

"I say to you: that we are in a battle and that more than half of this battle is taking place in the battlefield of the media. And that we are in a media battle in a race for the hearts and minds of ourUmma."2

-Ayman al-Zawahiri

"10's importance grows daily, and our enemy, who recognizes that victory can be secured in this domain alone, has seized the opportunity to be the best at operating in the information domain."3

-LTG Thomas Metz, USA

SIDEBAR

. . . the insurgents are tapping into two deep needs-empowerment and catharsis.

FOOTNOTE

Notes

1. Huffman, LtCol Frank G., USMCR(Ret), "Neo-Classical Counterinsurgency?" Parameters, Summer 2007, p. 80.


6. Ibid.


LOAD-DATE: November 5, 2007

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The Message Is the Insurgency Marine Corps Gazette November 2007

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**GRAPHIC:** Photographs

IMAGE PHOTOGRAPH, An image that al-Qaeda will not publish. The problem is neither do our media. We have tactical and operational plans but not a strategic communications plan. (Photo by LCpl Kevin N. McCall.)

IMAGE PHOTOGRAPH, This Marine can only physically touch a few Iraqis. We need to get our message to the masses. (Photo by Cpl Tom Sloan.)

IMAGE PHOTOGRAPH, He may not be carrying a weapon, but his blog could be just as deadly and more effective. (Photo by Cpl Michael J. O'Brien.)

IMAGE ILLUSTRATION, Figure 1., Figure 2.

IMAGE PHOTOGRAPH, Everything accomplished in IO should enable this Marine to execute his mission more effectively. (Photo by Cpl Trenton E. Harris.)

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**(Re)Shaping the Battlespace**

**BYLINE:** Durant, Duane A

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**ABSTRACT**

Infantry battalions are often subject to the effects of insurgent attacks in their AO that catch them completely off guard. The terrorists do not limit themselves by operating in strict unit boundaries and often use this to their advantage by working along the seams of coalition forces. In the Marine Corps, the unit comparable to the fusion cell is the tactical fusion center (TFC), an asset of the Marine expeditionary force (MEF). In areas where Coalition forces have aligned their division, brigade, and battalion boundaries with Iraqi geopolitical divisions, there is a greater unity of effort and consistency in dealing with Iraqi governments. Assigning unit boundaries within an AO needs to be given careful consideration, particularly as the Marine Corps enters into the next generation of modern warfare and faces an operating environment filled with insurgents and insurgent activities.

**FULL TEXT**

Unit boundaries in counterinsurgency operations

"A Marine unit may have a 'beat,' much as police do—an area where they are responsible for maintaining order and perhaps delivering other vital services as well. The unit must harmonize its local, tactical actions with higher strategic and oper-
ational goals, both of which must be pursued consistently on the local level. (When a unit is assigned a 'beat,' it is important that the beat's boundaries reflect real local boundaries, such as those between tribes and clans, and not be arbitrary lines drawn on a map at some higher headquarters.)"

-William S. Lind

The ways in which wars are being fought are evolving into the fourth generation. This fourth generation of modern warfare is characterized by a decentralized, non-nation-state, transnational insurgency that uses guerrilla tactics. Operations IRAQI FREEDOM and ENDURING FREEDOM are not the first insurgency-type operations the U.S. Marine Corps has fought, and they will not be the last. The Marine Corps has made significant strides in developing tactics, techniques, and procedures to fight in the insurgency environment. However, if the U.S. Marine Corps is to be successful in fighting in this new generation of warfare, it must change the way it manages the battlespace. Current infantry unit's areas of operations (AOs), particularly boundaries at the battalion level, must be revised because they do not surround the enemy action that the battalion is assigned to defeat, they restrict intelligence collection from the lowest levels, and they restrict intelligence-driven operations.

Doctrine

Current doctrine and practice reflect the assignment of unit boundaries based primarily on the land space or geography. (see Figure 1.) Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1-0 (MCDP 1-0), Marine Corps Operations, defines a boundary as the following:

A boundary is [a] line that delineates surface areas for the purpose of facilitating coordination and de-confliction of operations between adjacent units, formations, or areas. They are used to define the forward, flank, and rear limits of an AO and when possible should be drawn along identifiable terrain to aid in recognition.1

All too often the practice of establishing boundaries has been for the sole purpose of facilitating coordination and de-confliction of operations between adjacent units and formations, not necessarily between areas. It is internally focused on the unit as a battlespace control measure for the command and control of friendly forces. Instead, the focus of establishing boundaries should be external; it needs to be on the organization of the enemy forces within the battlespace. Boundaries established for the primary purpose of command and control work well in conventional operations, but they are quickly becoming outdated for the counterinsurgency (COIN) operations of fourth-generation warfare (4GW). This conventional application of boundaries results in battalions being unable to defeat the enemy action they are assigned to defeat because their AOs do not surround that enemy action.

Fails to Surround Enemy Action

The problem with the current shape of the friendly battlespace is that it doesn't surround enemy action, and enemy action certainly does not conform to it. Current Marine Corps practice is to create unit AOs that are adjoining (contiguous) in operating environments that are noncontiguous. Enemy lines of communications (LOCs) run through multiple unit AOs. Maj Eric Hilliard, USAF, highlights this point in an article written about U.S. operations in Baghdad. Maj Hilliard writes:

The terrorists do not limit themselves by operating in strict unit boundaries and often use this to their advantage by working along the seams of coalition forces.2

Outsourced insurgency is another common problem in the current operating environment that the Marine Corps' practice of assigning unit boundaries does a poor job in resolving. These outsourced insurgents may be migrant foreign fighters, such as Shi'ite militia coming into Iraq from Iran, or they may be Iraqi militia like Sunni Arabs who live in Tikrit but travel to and execute terrorist operations in Mosul. An obvious extension of this idea that insurgents move between cities along certain LOCs is the idea that insurgents smuggle weapons (e.g., improvised explosive devises) along these same LOCs. These LOCs often run through the boundaries of multiple infantry battalions. It would take battalions whose AOs surround the smuggling routes to stop it. The boundaries of infantry battalions need to reflect the noncontiguous nature of the insurgency threat because the reality of 4GW is that insurgencies do not adhere to Marine Corps boundaries. Insurgent residences, LOCs, and AOs may span the boundaries of several units.

Restricts Intelligence Collection

Intelligence drives operations. Its collection is critical to success in COIN operations. It must be done at the lowest levels to exploit its time-sensitive nature. In a new Marine Corps publication, LtGen James N. Mattis emphasizes the importance of the intelligence-operations relationship:
Because of the dispersed nature of COIN, counterinsurgents' own operations are a key generator of intelligence. Effective operations are shaped by carefully considered actionable intelligence, gathered and analyzed at the lowest possible levels and disseminated and distributed throughout the force. ... A cycle develops where operations produce intelligence that drives subsequent operations. Tactical reporting by units, members of the country team, and associated civilian agencies is of equal or greater importance than reporting by specialized intelligence assets. These factors, along with the need to generate a superior tempo, drive the requirement to produce and disseminate intelligence at the lowest practical level.3

Yet intelligence collection at the lowest levels is hampered by the current small unit (infantry battalion-sized) boundaries. Because boundaries oftentimes split tribal and family lines, a unit sees only a small and often incomplete portion of the intelligence picture—the portion that takes place within its boundary. This limited intelligence picture causes friction and minimizes the unit's effectiveness in dealing with tribal issues. Establishing boundaries around LOCs would facilitate a more complete intelligence picture for that unit's assigned mission.

Restricts Intelligence-Driven Operations

In addition to hampering intelligence collections at the lowest levels, current practices for establishing boundaries restrict operations driven by intelligence. Infantry battalions are often subject to the effects of insurgent attacks in their AO that catch them completely off guard. Units are surprised because all of the phases leading to the attack, to include the planning and preparation, typically happen outside of their AO. As infantry battalions begin to develop the situation on the ground within their AO, they often are stopped short of acting on this intelligence because it leads to a source or target outside of their area.

Opposing Argument

Some argue that the current practice of assigning infantry unit boundaries is not outdated for COIN operations. They would also argue that any issues presented by unit boundaries are solved by the intelligence collection and cross-boundary analysis assigned to special units. These cross-boundary intelligence collection/analysis and operation units are known as "fusion cells" at the level of U.S. coalition forces. These fusion cells were implemented because, again, senior military officials understand that:

...the terrorists do not limit themselves by operating in strict unit boundaries and often use this to their advantage by working along the seams of coalition forces.4

In the Marine Corps, the unit comparable to the fusion cell is the tactical fusion center (TFC), an asset of the Marine expeditionary force (MEF).

Counterargument

The problem with the cross-boundary analysis and centralized intelligence collection effort in the Marine Corps’ TFC is that it takes place at the MEF level. And as LtGen Mattis points out in Fleet Marine Force Manual 3-24 (FMFM 3-24), Counterinsurgency, in COIN operations the lowest levels are where intelligence needs to be collected and disseminated. The MEF level is the higher headquarters organization that is farthest removed from the infantry battalions. This separation between units slows the intelligence-operations cycle. Besides, completely relying on a fusion center to handle the issues of enemy LOCs, or “rat lines” that run through several unit boundaries, would be putting all of the “intelligence eggs” into one basket. Relying on them for collections and information dissemination is waiting for centralized intelligence in a decentralized fight. The intelligence-operations cycle has got to take place at the lowest levels in a COIN battle, and the current operating battlespace needs to be reshaped in order to surround the enemy actions that the units are tasked with defeating.

Conclusion

Current infantry battalion AOs do not surround enemy action that the battalion is assigned to defeat, they restrict intelligence collection at the lowest levels, and they restrict intelligence-driven operations. The Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) produced a newsletter that summarizes their observations of practices in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM:

Furthermore, it is important to overlay military sectors upon existing geopolitical boundaries in Iraq. Iraq is divided into eighteen provinces and Coalition forces have established military boundaries throughout the country. In some cases, the military boundaries do not correspond with the geopolitical boundaries. This results in the Iraqi governor having to deal with more than one military chain of command, as well as military chains of command having to deal with multiple Iraqi governance and administrative structures. It also necessitates military forces establishing habitual relationships with more than one CPA [Coalition Provisional Authority] regional office, since the CPA has aligned itself with existing Iraqi ge-
opolitical divisions. The effects are similar at the battalion level, where town and county leaders are forced to deal with more than one battalion commander. In areas where Coalition forces have aligned their division, brigade, and battalion boundaries with Iraqi geopolitical divisions, there is a greater unity of effort and consistency in dealing with Iraqi governments.5

Assigning unit boundaries within an AO needs to be given careful consideration, particularly as the Marine Corps enters into the next generation of modern warfare and faces an operating environment filled with insurgents and insurgent activities. The current battlespace needs to be reshaped with the primary purpose of effectively dealing with the enemy situation instead of with the internal focus of internal unit coordination.

FOOTNOTE
Notes

by Capt Duane A. Durant
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GRAPHIC: Illustrations
IMAGE ILLUSTRATION, Figure 1.
IMAGE PHOTOGRAPH, Does this boundary restrict information collection or unit cross-boundary coordination? (Photo by Cpl Andy Hurt)

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Tribalism Under Fire

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ABSTRACT
While the moral, social, and religious influence of tribal leaders is an important precondition for achieving popular support, the limits of tribal bonds in a violent third party counterinsurgency result in an environment where the strength and resolve of neighborhood security groups ultimately trump tribal bonds and prove the decisive factors for achieving security. Galula states, "If the insurgent manages to dissociate the population from the counterinsurgent, to control it physically, to get its active support, he will win the war..." Galula adds that physical security ranks ahead of all factors and warns that counterinsurgency forces should not begin actively approaching the population for information on insurgent movements until such force can commit itself fully to the population's protection. Thompson adds that rural areas in particular represent the frontline of the insurgent battlefield.

FULL TEXT
A reexamination of tribal mobilization patterns in a counterinsurgency

In an October 2007 interview, Army LTG Raymond Odierno estimated that al-Qaeda in Iraq's (AQIs) infrastructure was "degraded" by 60 to 70 percent during 2007. Truly, 2007 was a year defined by unparalleled security strides in Al Anbar Province, as Marine Corps leadership of Multinational Forces-West combined an aggressive counterinsurgency campaign with the mobilization of Iraq's western tribes.

While many officials remain cautious of the movement described as the "Anbar Awakening," this approach remains the best avenue for future success throughout Iraq. Consolidating these gains and beginning to successfully apply this approach to other areas of Iraq first requires accurately understanding the exact nature of the success of 2007. Yet, because of a fundamental misunderstanding of tribal bonds within the Marine Corps, the principal contributing factors that led to the security gains of 2007 have gone largely unrecognized. Instead, security gains have been almost entirely attributed to the role of tribal leaders. While the moral, social, and religious influence of tribal leaders is an important precondition for achieving popular support, the limits of tribal bonds in a violent third party counterinsurgency result in an environment where the strength and resolve of neighborhood security groups ultimately trump tribal bonds and prove the decisive factors for achieving security.

This article first outlines the key characteristics of the Marine Corps' current approach to counterinsurgency, as outlined in the Army and Marine Corps' 2006 counterinsurgency manual (Field Manual 3-24 (FM 3-24)/Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.5 (MCWP 3-33.5), Counterinsurgency). From this foundation, the article focuses specifically on the Marine Corps' current approach to tribalism in both operations and training. The last pan of the article advances an alternative definition of tribalism based on the work of prominent Middle Eastern anthropologists. The concluding section offers a conceptual framework that better accounts for the interaction of tribal bonds and the combat realities inside the present counterinsurgency in Iraq, deconstructing current thinking about the relationship between tribal leaders and tribesmen. The inclusion of such a framework in future Marine Corps doctrine is critical to ensuring that the primary factors that led to security in 2007 are accurately captured for the leaders of the current fight and for future generations of small unit leaders.

Counterinsurgency
FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 outlines the fundamentals of an effective counterinsurgency campaign. It opens by acknowledging the contributions of David Galula's Counterinsurgency Warfare and Sir Robert Thompson's Defeating Communist Insurgency. The principal conclusions of both tie directly into the foundation of FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5. Among the most important is the realization that the protection of the population is central to success. Galula states, "If the insurgent manages to dissociate the population from the counterinsurgent, to control it physically, to get its active support, he will win the war..."1 Galula adds that physical security ranks ahead of all factors and warns that counterinsurgency forces should not begin actively approaching the population for information on insurgent movements until such force can commit itself fully to the population's protection.2 Thompson adds that rural areas in particular represent the frontline of the insurgent battlefield. He states, "The political aim is to gain control over the population, starting in the rural areas, and to destroy the government's prestige and authority."3 The important realization that the protection of the population is the primary mission of the counterinsurgency force forms an important part of the foundation of FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5.

While containing many vital lessons and principles, FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 falls short in two important areas. First, it fails to acknowledge that an insurgency rarely, if ever, is limited to the actions and influences of those within the confines of a given area of operations (AO) or bounded geographical region. This approach, seen also in Galula, leaves the impact of AQI and other transnational forces largely unaddressed. For example, in describing various "population control measures," FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 states that harmful outside influences can be mitigated through "limits on the number of visitors from outside the area combined with the requirement to register them with local security forces or civil authorities."4 Additionally, in outlining the steps necessary for the protection of the populace, FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 lists "(securing) national and regional borders," as the fourth of five steps required for achieving security.5 Yet the recommendation to require those from outside a given area to "register" with local forces is impractical, and the assumption that international borders can be secured conceives of such borders in a Cold War mentality.

The most important omission resulting from this approach is the absence of any extensive treatment of the suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive devise (SVBIED), the main byproduct of transnational terrorism. This is seen in the fact that IED, suicide bomb/bomber, and SVBIED do not appear anywhere in the publication, despite the fact that such attacks continue to prove devastating to the Iraqi population and coalition forces. An April 2007 estimate by Iraq Body Count (a website that keeps count of Iraqi civilians killed since the military intervention in 2003), estimated that a total of 1,050 car bomb attacks have taken place since August 2003.6 Given the extensive focus on protecting the population, stressed by Galula and Thompson and embodied in FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, the SVBIED and other transnational factors must be addressed head on in FM 324/MCWP 3-33.5. While many may argue that FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 is not designed solely for Iraq, such a view is dismissive of the fact that commanders continue to rely on its lessons for modeling their counterinsurgency campaigns. Also important is the fact that annexes including Iraq-specific "lessons learned" are included throughout to reinforce many of the most important conclusions. Finally, the publication continues to form the foundation of many predeployment reading lists.

The second principal shortfall of FM 3-24/MCWP 333.5, tied closely to the first, lies in the fundamental way the insurgency is viewed in relation to the population. This approach views an insurgency as taking place between two separate and distinct groups-the population and the insurgency. Chapter five of FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, "Executing Counterinsurgency Operations," adopts this approach in outlining tactics designed to separate insurgents from the population. In what becomes one of the chapter's basic maxims, a call to "isolate the insurgent from the population" is made. Under the approach, "Clear-Hold-Build," the hold phase is described as a phase in which the counterinsurgency force must "continuously secure the people and separate them from the insurgents."7 The Marine Corps' Small Unit Leader's Guide to Counterinsurgency, a work targeted at company-level leadership, shares this same approach as seen in its conception of a population neatly arrayed in fixed categories of "support" or "nonsupport" of the insurgency. This approach misses the fact that within a counterinsurgency, the population and insurgency are inextricably linked. Ascribing the title of insurgent or coalition supporter to an individual or group and then proceeding with a specific policy based on this definition fails to account for the fluid nature of a population under demanding and often contradictory circumstances where individuals may move back and forth on a daily basis. This framework of a duality between insurgent and population serves to limit the ability of commanders to properly frame the actions of those within their AO.

Like attempting to differentiate insurgents from "friendlies, attempting to classify the people of the Middle East in terms of religious, tribal, or sectarian loyalties has proven trying for observers and practitioners of the region. The resulting misconceptions of the "organization" of a given population that result from this approach are well documented within anthropology. One such example is seen in anthropologist Emrys Peters (1916-87) work in Southern Lebanon. In 1963, after an examination of land ownership, marriage patterns, and the annual ritual commemorating the battle of Karbala, Peters concluded that each member of the village belonged to one of three groups-religious elites, traders, or peasants. He
stated that the three lived in a state of equilibrium, each filling a specific function within the social and political framework of the community. Peters concluded that the land-owning religious leaders exercised complete political authority over the community. Years later, however, a poor showing by this group in local election results led him to recant his earlier conclusions after recognizing that his functionalist approach had blinded him to the fact that the village was an "open-ended" system. Peters recognized that the primary reason why his initial read of the community was incorrect was a result of his perception of the community's "isolation," which led him to overlook powerful external ties that linked people to outside markets, educational opportunities, and ideas.

Peters' example shows that a functionalist approach to any community or region leads to a serious misunderstanding of the social and political organization of that area. Continued reliance on FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 in a conflict characterized by the influence of powerful external actors will, ultimately, limit the ability of commanders on the ground to properly frame the actions and organization of the population.

Tribalism in the Marine Corps

Marine Corps doctrine and training continues to approach tribalism as a primordial form of social organization, fundamentally averse to the modern state. Among the documents recommended by the Marine Corps' Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning (CAOCL) for The Basic School students is retired Army COL Maxie McFarland's "Military Cultural Education." The article is also part of the written curriculum of the Expeditionary Warfare School nonresident education program, targeted at company grade officers. While stating that success in future operations is tied to knowing the cultural background of those you operate amongst, in her brief treatment of tribalism we find a definition that continues to inhibit just that understanding. She states:

Tribal cultures, prevalent in developing countries, are often the only structure in ungoverned areas. . . . (Tribes) arise from a social tradition that often lacks written histories of philosophies and independent perspectives, and they espouse ideas and beliefs held unanimously by the entire tribe.8

Under this definition, tribalism is held as a lesser form of social organization inherently "developmental" in nature and lacking "written histories." The role of individual agency (the will of the individual) is notably absent, and the will of the larger unit prevails. In such a dynamic, loyalty to tribal leaders is facilitated by the absence of "independent perspective" and maintained by primordial or religious bonds of commitment. In combining these assumptions, what's left is a primitive social structure of a developing people, defined by a population that is unwilling and unable to exercise individual agency and blindly committed to the will of tribal leaders. Another such example of this approach is Steven Pressfield's widely circulated 2006 article, "It's the Tribes, Stupid," available on the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) website. In it Pressfield states:

In the end, unless we're ready to treat them the way we did Geronimo, the tribe is unbeatable. They're just too crazy. They're not like us. Tolerance and open-mindedness are not virtues to them; they're signs of weakness. The tribe is too rigid to bend, and it can't be negotiated with.9

A search of the MCCLL site yields many other works, such as those cited above, not possible to cite or reference here. Tied closely to this primordial view of tribalism, is an approach that strives to highlight the differences between Western and Arab cultures. One such work, Raphael Patai's The Arab Mind (republished in 2002), has penetrated many predeployment reading lists, including that of Marine Corps University (MCU). Patai's work is one of generalizations and blanket insults against Arab sexuality and child-rearing practices that falls short in its methodology by any standard. Its central theme, that among Arabs force is the only answer, serves to inflame a difficult operational environment by providing a contradictory message to the escalation of force and law of war training that troops receive during predeployment training. Patai states, "Once aroused, Arab hostility will vent itself indiscriminately on any and all outsiders."10 He also attempts to draw major inferences from Arab child-rearing practices asserting that because Arab boys are "traditionally" allowed to breast-feed up to the age of 6, as men they will act out violently whenever a request goes unanswered. Despite these shortcomings, MCU lists this work as one of six books for captains and Chief Warrant Officer 3s.11 Patai's work is also listed by the Commander, U.S. Forces Central Command as one of five books recommended for "corporals and below" who are preparing for deployment to the Middle East.12 II Marine Expeditionary Force's (II MEF's) reading list also includes Patai's work as one of 27 books on "culture and history" suggested as "further reading."13

It goes without saying that McFarland's primordial view of tribalism, Pressfield's assertion that tribal leaders understand only violence, and Patai's racist generalizations of Arabs are certainly not embraced unanimously by all Marines. Nor do these materials represent the entirety of the volumes of invaluable materials and resources available through CAOCL and
MCCLL. One such example, David Kilcullen’s "Twenty-Eight Articles of Kilcullen," (MCG, Jul06, reprinted Oct07) is a collection of commonsense principles that recognizes the complexity of the situation in Iraq while focusing on the shared humanity and commonalities between U.S. forces and the Iraqi populace. The result is a work that provides an excellent framework for working with a tribal population and its leaders. Additionally, II MEF’s reading list includes Margaret Nydell’s Understanding Arabs: A Guide for Modern Times (Intercultural Press, London, UK, 2006), a universalistic work that builds understanding by outlining the struggles faced by the people of the Middle East in the 20th century. Yet, at a time when adherence to the laws of war is a priority for the Commandant of the Marine Corps, such materials as those examined earlier hinder this effort by promoting fundamental misconceptions of tribalism and Arab life.

In addition to the tendency to view tribalism as a less advanced form of social organization, many leaders continue to misunderstand tribal organization patterns. This skewed view of the way in which tribes mobilize during conflict results from a belief that the theory of segmentation alone determines mobilization patterns in tribal societies. The theory of segmentation, as described by anthropologist Elaine Combs-Schilling, holds that among Middle Eastern tribal societies, ties of kinship and genealogy alone determine political and social organization and regulate entirely the duties and roles of every individual during conflict. She states that this model is best captured by the phrase, “I against my brothers; my brothers and I against my cousins; my cousins, my brother and I against the world.”14 As a whole, the Marine Corps has not moved beyond this basic understanding of tribal organization. Few troops in Iraq have not heard of this theory either formally or informally, through the oftencited phrase above. Many Marines see the validity of this theory in the widely publicized cases of tribal blood feuds and honor killings that continue to capture headlines today. However, the problem lies in the fact that this dynamic, which relates to intertribal mobilization, has been taken as the model by which Iraq’s tribes can be mobilized for action against a highly lethal and adaptable external threat. To overlay a pattern observed in intertribal mobilization on a strategy pitting tribal loyalties against AQI and other external threats assumes that the primary strength of the motivation that drives mobilization in the former, most commonly the defense of shared honor, has equal strength in the case of the latter. It is important to remember that intertribal conflict takes place among two groups that share a common religion and culture as well as a respect for a common third party capable of mediating an end to conflict.15 Still another limiting factor to this approach lies in the fact that even in intertribal conflict, the theory of segmentation only partially explains mobilization patterns. Examples from across the Middle East highlight the fluid nature of identity in which the effects of other factors compete with tribal loyalty to affect mobilization patterns during times of conflict.

Defining Tribalism

Reflecting on the "exact nature" of tribalism in the Middle East, anthropologist Dale Eickelman remarks that while it is indisputably tied to "common patrilineal descent," other factors are clearly at work.16 Anthropologist Steven Caton states that the theory of segmentation drastically overstates the role of physical violence and that power must be understood not merely as physical compulsion but as persuasion seen in "dialogue" and "poetics." He states:

... when one examines the ethnographic record to determine what it is that Middle Eastern tribesman are doing in political acts, one finds that they are talking to each other probably more than they are fighting... power is persuasion rather than the exercise of force.17

Caton then adds that the role of the mediator is central to the process of deescalating any intertribal feud. In Agha, Shaikh and State, Martin Van Bruinessen states that among Kurdish tribes, the Kurdish language itself does not reflect the clear distinctions predicted by the theory of segmentation. He notes that terms that he used to denote tribal divisions proved difficult to elicit from Kurdish tribesmen, further adding, "... it was rather difficult to elicit these terms, some people could not produce them even after prolonged interrogation and discussion."18 He concludes that lineage and kinship are fluid concepts that often have less to do with "blood ties" than other forms of identity.

From a recognition of the limits of the theory of segmentation, this article advances a definition of tribalism in which tribal bonds are essentially "bonds of obligation" between tribesmen and their leaders. Nowhere is this better articulated than in Linda Layne's study of the Abbadi tribesmen of the Jordan Valley. Layne shows that individual autonomy and tribal loyalty are twin virtues of tribal society in Jordan. Her work outlines the various ways in which tribesmen set favorable conditions for all forms of interaction among family, tribal leaders, and neighbors through their use of the space inside their homes, in seating patterns, and in greeting rituals. From the results of the 1984 Jordanian Parliamentary election she affirms this position noting:

Although most tribespeople in the Valley chose to use one of their votes for a member of their own tribe, tribal membership did not automatically lead to mass support .... 19
For Layne, voter behavior was driven primarily by "self interest," a calculation based on what the candidate could do in return for the tribesmen. A similar pattern was noted in Fredrik Barth's 1954 examination of the Swat Pathans of western Pakistan. Barth notes that among Yusufzai tribesman of the Swat valley, tribal chiefs were obliged to redistribute specific amounts of grain to their tribesmen in order to maintain their allegiance. Barth notes:

In such a framework, allegiance is regarded not as something which is given to groups, but as something which is bartered between individuals and against a return in other advantages.20

So too does Lawrence Rosen's 1984 work, Bargaining for Reality, reinforce this definition of tribalism. Rosen's work, based in Seffou, Morocco, offers an examination of the daily process of bargaining that takes place among individuals during nearly all forms of public interaction. Rosen observes that individuals constantly attempt to test one another over the exact obligations due each, a process he describes through the term "performance." Rosen applies this important realization to understanding the fluid nature of tribal bonds in Morocco, which he likewise views as subject to negotiation. Rosen states:

. . . [tribesmen] themselves give no evidence of employing an exclusively biological view not do they even think that other groups follow such lines . . . patronage and friendship structure the actual claims of affiliation.21

He concludes that in Morocco "the fundamental social unit is not some aggregate of persons, but the single individual acting as the locus of a set of personal ties and personal attributes."22

Mobilization

The previous sections have outlined the two critical shortfalls that stand in the way of a more complete understanding of the successes of 2007. First is an approach to counterinsurgency limited in its treatment of the harmful effects of external actors. This approach, combined with a functionalist approach to the Iraqi population, creates a picture of tribesmen who are fixed in either their support or opposition for coalition and Iraqi security Forces (ISF). second is a fundamental misconception of tribalism that is rooted in a social evolutionary mentality, distorted by misconceptions of Arab culture, and overreliant on the theory of segmentation. This dynamic in turn reinforces the first, creating a picture of the Iraq population where unidimensional subordinate actors must either be mobilized through tribal leaders or isolated and destroyed. This conclusion incorporates earlier arguments against both shortfalls into the drafting of an operational framework that better accounts for the nature of tribal bonds and how these bonds are affected by the realities of a violent counterinsurgency.

Although much of the literature on counterinsurgency focuses on the question of how to mobilize the population, few sources clearly define mobilization. Instead, mobilization is commonly used interchangeably with gaining recruits into the ISF or gaining pledges of support from prominent tribal leaders. An entirely different form of mobilization occurs when individuals resolve to provide realtime information to security forces about insurgent movement and locations, as highlighted by Thompson. The nature of both forms of mobilization are strikingly different. The first subjects the individual to a general threat of retaliation, while the second makes his household the sole target of retaliation.

It is important here to address the differences between urban and rural mobilization patterns based on the above distinction. As shown earlier, because tribalism is commonly associated with a lesser form of social organization that is characteristic of rural life, the tendency to discount the merits of an approach to work through tribal leaders in cities such as Baghdad is often dismissed.23 Yet the strength of tribal loyalty is often overstated and any differences in the mobilization potential of Baghdad's tribes are better understood in terms of the very nature of an insurgency—an insurgency whose tactics more commonly test the will of the individual rather than the strength of a "mobilized" tribe.

From an integration of the important realization that tribal bonds are bonds of obligation and an understanding of the dynamics inside a counterinsurgency, the following framework is offered.

Anonymous mobilization. Characterized by support for the counterinsurgency force that does not single out the individual or place his household under individual threat through his actions. The most common form of this type of support is entry into the security forces, where a degree of unanimity is afforded to both member and family. The nature of this type of support is best characterized by the fact that nearly all members of the ISF wear face coverings while on mission. While returning to and from duty continues to be dangerous for many, the sheer volume of people involved in the security forces makes retaliation a random and not specific threat that many have learned to live with. Under this form of mobilization, wages from ISF service are the direct result of supporting tribal leaders.
Individual mobilization. Characterized by time-sensitive decisions for individuals who must weigh support for tribal leaders against the high likelihood of retaliation from insurgents if information is provided to security forces. This dynamic is most crippling in urban environments where larger foreign populations and platforms of observation heighten insurgent/terrorist observation abilities, both real and perceived. Because of the common practice of keeping IEDs under observation after emplacement, the threat of retaliation from a nearby triggerman inhibits many from warning security forces. The strength of the tribe is diminished by the inability of a tribe to protect the individual against targeted retaliation. Because tangible return from tribal leaders or U.S. forces is less certain of bringing a return for this type of sacrifice, support of this type is given out of a conscious weighing of the threat of retaliation versus the benefit of cooperation. Here, such factors as strong neighborhood networks, observation ability, and knowledge of the surrounding population (greater in a rural area), as well as the possession of sufficient firearms, are all crucial factors.

These definitions are offered as an important addition to FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, designed to more accurately reflect the dynamics of tribal mobilization inside a counterinsurgency. An embrace of these definitions first requires a fundamental shift away from the current treatment of tribalism toward an approach that recognizes that tribal bonds are bonds of shared obligation. This in turn forces a reevaluation of the position that support of tribal leaders was the primary factor that led to the unparalleled security gains achieved throughout 2007. Fully consolidating the precious gains of 2007 requires a concerted focus on empowering household heads and local security networks in their battle against AQI, in partnership and cooperation with Iraq and coalition security forces.

Author's Note: The insights into Middle Eastern identity and tribal structure reflected in this article would not have been possible without the assistance of Professor Carol A. O'Leary, Scholarin-Residence, Middle East Initiative, American University Center for Global Peace.

FOOTNOTE

Notes
5. Ibid., Figure 5-2.
7. FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, p. 5-66.

15. The acknowledgement that all conflict takes place against a backdrop where third party mediators can work for a peaceful "honor saving" peace is one of the main conclusions in Steven C. Caton's Peaks of Yemen I Summon, University of California Press, Berkeley, CA, 1990.


22. Ibid., p. 112.

23. For example, the counterinsurgency manual states, "It is more important in tribal or remote environments than in settled districts and towns, but remains a prominent feature of any interaction between security forces and the populace," p. 42.

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GRAPHIC: Photographs
IMAGE PHOTOGRAPH, Photo: ISF grow in strength as tribal leaders realize the need for social stability.
IMAGE PHOTOGRAPH, How well do we understand the dynamics of tribalism?
IMAGE PHOTOGRAPH, A new class of policemen has graduated. Mobilizing the population does not just include gaining recruits for the ISF. (Photo by Capt Hob James)

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Turning the Tide in the West

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by Col Michael D. Visconage, USMCR

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ABSTRACT

By July 2007 Al Anbar saw the number of attacks on both civilian and military targets drop to an average of less than 100 per week.1 The work of the coalition forces in these areas is now to engage with the local populations and channel the anti-AQI energy into positive acts. Even during the campaign there was some criticism that the elusive insurgents were often able to slip back and forth under the guise of being residents, or sometimes in trace of humanitarian relief operations that followed the clearing operations. In balancing support for the Iraqi Security Forces, giving breathing room for the Government of Iraq to continue maturing, and setting the conditions for economic recovery, coalition forces are still conscious of striking the right timing for moving Al Anbar to PIC.

FULL TEXT

New initiative and new opportunities

As the latest strategy in Iraq began to take shape early in 2007, it became clear that al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) was the number one danger to the Government of Iraq and stabilization of the country. Also apparent by late summer 2006 was that, in the west at least, AQI was losing support in this region—a part of the country where they had traditionally found sanctuary. AQI’s use of terror techniques was not that different than other insurgencies. They used not only threats of violence but also perpetuated acts of astounding brutality against any Iraqi they deemed to be less than loyal to their cause. This brutality included beheading of children as a “lesson” to their parents, kidnappings, and bombings. The civil situation in general had deteriorated to a point where many thought the fight in the west was not winnable.

The killing of tribal leaders who failed to cooperate, and the subsequent AQI refusal to disclose the location of their bodies for burial as called for in Islamic custom, was a seminal moment. Apparently, enough was enough for many Anbaris. The “Awakening of Anbar” had begun—a turning away from die extremism and tyranny of this element. What began as a variety of key tribal sheiks rebelling against AQI was clearly a watershed event by early 2007. Sheik Sittar lost two brothers and his father to AQI. Sheik Sittar is the head of a group of tribal elements in the Ramadi area and helped form the Anbar Awakening Council that led the overt action to reject AQI. Other Sunni extremist groups who had cooperated with AQI began to turn their backs and establish tentative contacts with coalition and Iraqi Security Forces. Towns like Husaybah on the Syrian border and Qaim were the first to turn. Moving east, the biggest success so far has been in Ramadi, the provincial capital—a site AQI had declared as the capital of their caliphate, The Islamic State of Iraq.

By July 2007 Al Anbar saw the number of attacks on both civilian and military targets drop to an average of less than 100 per week.1 The work of the coalition forces in these areas is now to engage with the local populations and channel the anti-AQI energy into positive acts. The focus of this local engagement is on restoring basic services and establishing effective local security-security that will ultimately rest in the hands of the Iraqi Army (IA), Iraqi police (IP), and local police "auxiliaries.” This was no small task given the track record of either total intimidation or infiltration of local security elements by AQI.

Fallujah—A Way Ahead for the Heart of the Insurgency?

In Fallujah Marines are able to patrol on foot and meet with local citizens and community leaders. The city is not yet functional in terms of infrastructure. Investors are not knocking on the door; saying Fallujah has an image problem is probably an understatement. As the residents of Fallujah like to say, “It’s the world against Fallujah."2 They have traditionally seen themselves as unique.
Even under the regime of Saddam Hussein, they saw themselves at odds with the central government. Still, there is a bit of optimism about the future and a sense that the people here are ready for change and want to be a part of taking things in a new direction. After being at the center of the Sunni insurgency, Fallujah seems ready for a change and a new direction other than violence.

Fallujah has seen the expulsion of the al-Qaeda elements that had continued to infiltrate back into the city after both the April 2004 and November 2004 engagements with Army and Marine forces. Operation AL FAJR leveled many areas and saw the city depopulated for a time. Even during the campaign there was some criticism that the elusive insurgents were often able to slip back and forth under the guise of being residents, or sometimes in trace of humanitarian relief operations that followed the clearing operations.

At the time of this writing (summer 2007), 2d Battalion, 6th Marines (2/6) is the latest unit charged with responsibility for the Fallujah area. In a matter of a few months, their routine has migrated from small arms fire and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) to engagement and rebuilding. Once tied to larger compounds with in-depth security, Marines are now spread out at different outposts in the city.

As an outsider, it is difficult to tell if the character of this most violent of cities has changed, but two of the company commanders are on their fourth deployment to Iraq, with previous experiences specifically in Fallujah. Many of their Marines have also been to Fallujah before. All say the IA is much better. The IP seems to be coming along, but as is true elsewhere, it’s a bit slower with the IP.

An Arab-American interpreter who has been in Fallujah for 7 months summed it up well as he watched Iraqis line up for new identification cards at Observation Post Fenton, along Route Fran, the main east-west road through the city. In the past, few made eye contact. Now they are more open and willing to interact with the IP, IA, and Marines. In addition to lining up for identification cards, many want to volunteer for the police auxiliary.

Leading 2/6 is LtCol William F. Mullen III. Mullen is a smart leader and, like his company commanders, has deployed to the Fallujah area before. After his first few weeks leading his 900-man battalion through some of the traditional patrolling, raids, and cordons, Mullen seized on a good idea from another battalion commander in Ramadi and exported it to Fallujah with a few modifications.

The intent in Fallujah is for the IA and IP to be in the lead. There is recognition at all levels that this is critical to success. The commanders believe that the current IA and IP commanders in Fallujah are strong and able to be an active part of positive change. This, too, is a change from even 1 year ago when confidence in the IA and IP varied widely.

The specific strategy of 2/6 in Fallujah involves continuing to develop the IA, IP, and Marine alliance. One joint decision was to close the city off to vehicle traffic, which cut down dramatically on IED incidents. They have divided the city into 11 precincts, and in each precinct they conduct a tactic called a "swarm," with each swarm taking place over the course of 3 to 7 days in the specific precinct. Once streets are sealed off to traffic in that area, IP, IA, 2/6 Marines, and the civil affairs group (CAG) occupy preselected building(s) as the precinct headquarters.

Almost immediately they begin a recruiting drive for the police auxiliary or neighborhood watch program in that precinct. The job pays a meager $50 a month, but in a city with few jobs, this is a start. Neighborhood watch officers are given blue T-shirts as a means of identification, and their identification cards are marked to indicate that they are authorized to carry weapons if they so desire (weapons they must provide). These auxiliaries are given basic instructions on their responsibilities; the job is a familiar one since it mirrors a neighborhood watch program from the Saddam era. They are quickly put to work in their own communities. The IA are the professionals who train the neighborhood watch officers in basic patrolling and weapons handling.

The CAG arranges for food bags to be handed out (through the IP), and the battalion information operations program begins a 3-times a week loud-speaker broadcast program at each precinct that provides local news and information narrated by the local IP precinct captain.

In the short term, the battalion focuses on restoring critical basics. With the security situation making gains, the opportunity for services to be restored is emerging. Ninety percent of the electric grid was destroyed in the previous fighting, so generators are the primary power source, and they are difficult to maintain in the heat and sand. According to LtCol Mullen, the "big three" for basic services in Fallujah are electricity, water, and sewage. After the basics, the shift will be to stimulating economic activity. For this, the Provisional Reconstruction Team, facilitating engagement by the U.S. Agency for International Development, and microloan programs will come into play.
LtCol Mullen assesses their progress using a "precinct assessment report" that measures key indicators that help them know when an area is ready to be turned over to the IP. At this point the Marines can fall back to an overwatch role and shift focus to coordinating with reconstruction partners or planning the next swarm. By 1 August 2007, the battalion had executed the swarm phase of Operation ALLJAH in 6 of 11 precincts and planned to complete the process before their relief arrived in late summer.

GEN David H. Petraeus, Commanding General, Multinational Force-Iraq, summed up the situation in Fallujah at a morning battle update assessment as he heard the report in the latest phase of 2/6's actions, "Operation ALLJAH is a metaphor for what we are trying to accomplish. It's representative of what we're trying to do with what were al-Qaeda sanctuaries."

The Meaning of Reconciliation

One of the broader initiatives for the Government of Iraq, and one encouraged by the United States, has been a broadbased reconciliation effort. In the west, reconciliation has come to have a different definition. Rather than the reconciliation between Shi'ia and Sunni, or former Ba'athists and the current government, the practical reality of reconciliation has been the rapprochement between coalition soldiers and former Sunni factions. For both soldiers and Marines, especially those with previous tours of duty in Iraq, the issue of teaming up with Iraqis who at some point may have fought against coalition forces is something that must be reconciled. Mullen is a commander who has trained his subordinate leaders to understand that this is a necessary next step to "winning" in the regions west of Baghdad. At the company level, their captains put this guidance into practice.

For Capt Jeffrey S. McCormack, the turning point came when they teamed up with the IP and were led to a vehicleborne IED (VBIED) site in late April where at least one truck was in the final stages of preparation to serve as a rolling bomb. "They walked us right to a VBIED factory. We found a dump truck loaded with explosive shaped charges ... all kinds of explosives in the house," McCormack said. "It ended up totaling 10,000 pounds of homemade explosive. Since then we're believers in the police. Since May ninth we've only had one sustained contact."

Back to the Future

The change in the dynamic against AQI has allowed coalition forces an opening to focus on the aspects of counterinsurgency strategy that are key to success in the long term. In MNF-W this implementation is part of Operation Anbar Dawn.

Conditions are now set for a renewed effort to work the governance issues in Al Anbar—railroad service, fuel supplies, agriculture, microloans, telecommunications, education, and banking to name only a few areas that MNF-W is now focusing on. Al Anbar Governor Ma'amoun Smai Rashid Al-Alwani, once the sole member of the provincial government still at his desk at the Government Center in Ramadi, again works with the provincial council and is able to fly to cities in the province to meet with mayors and municipal leaders. As BGen Allen said:

We very quickly instituted something called 'helicopter engagement' where we threw the Governor and key leaders onto the helicopter and flew them around from city to city to have them establish a relationship with the cities. We took the Governor into Baghdad constantly for him to establish relationships with the ministries to get the money to start to flow to the Province.

According to BGen Allen, the moment of opportunity is now, both for further action against AQI and for advancing the relationship with the Iraqis.

In each area the common theme, from battalion commanders to general officers, is the speed at which things have turned—"riding a wave." BGen Allen made the following comment:

It was much quicker than we had anticipated. This unexpected breakthrough in security was largely a result of very aggressive activity on the part of our conventional forces reinforced by the 4,000 surge troops. The 4,000 surge troops put us over the top here. That, in conjunction with the Iraqi police ... along with the Iraqi Army at our shoulder. The exploitation forces now became economics, governance, and rule of law. Because that was what was going to make the most difference on the battlefield immediately in the postkinetic phase.

Ultimately, the next step in the formal process will be the transition of Al Anbar Province to provincial Iraqi control (PIC), a status that more formally positions Iraqi Security Forces in the lead and coalition forces in a tactical overwatch role. Even the predicted timeline for PIC has moved up, according to BGen Allen:
Somewhere way out on the horizon, there was this thing called provincial Iraqi control, which for all intents and purposes is our turning over the security control of the province to the Iraqis. We didn't believe we would come near PIC during this deployment . . . . We weren't even sure the next MEF [Marine expeditionary force] would be able to achieve PIC.

For BGen Allen, the most critical piece for keeping ahead of the wave includes managing the expectations of the people: Once expectations for the future begin to turn into despair that nothing will ever get better for them, then we have a problem, a serious problem. We're at that critical moment now where we've got to keep ahead of expectations.

In balancing support for the Iraqi Security Forces, giving breathing room for the Government of Iraq to continue maturing, and setting the conditions for economic recovery, coalition forces are still conscious of striking the right timing for moving Al Anbar to PIC. Anbari leaders seem to understand the balance between Iraqis wanting U.S. forces to leave but not so quickly that AQI rises again. The timing of that shift in control will be crucial. It will need to be soon, but only when the Iraqi Security Forces are strong enough to prevent the return of AQI.

Conclusion

The war in Iraq is a decentralized one. Each region has a unique set of challenges and different enemies. Certainly the situation in Iraq is still difficult, and there are other enemies, different insurgent groups, and factions at odds with each other. But, the shift against al-Qaeda has created an opportunity. It is an opportunity to carry out the plans that were laid in early 2004 but which were sidetracked by unexpected events in Fallujah and elsewhere. The region that was the flashpoint for diverting us away from an effort to build a relationship with Iraqis that wanted a better future is now at the center of what may be the turning point in the fight for a stable Iraq.

The changing conditions and shift in popular support has allowed military forces to do what they do best—locate and destroy the enemy. The follow-on mission to train the Iraqi security Forces is also showing positive results. While the military continues to be on the leading edge for beginning the rebuilding and stabilization of Iraqi cities, this process will need to transition to those agencies with civilian expertise in aid and development. The keystone element in determining if the present tide is short lived or a turning point remains solely with the Iraqi Government and people. That element is their willingness to engage in reconciliation and expel or exterminate those extremists who refuse to be part of this process.

**SIDEBAR**

"The provincial council had fled to Baghdad. There was no rule of law; the weekly incident rates numbered between 350 and 400. It looked grim."

-BGen John R. Allen,
Deputy Commanding General,
Multinational Force-West (MNF-W)

**SIDEBAR**

"Fallujah's tribal makeup isn't like Ramadi's tribal makeup . . . there's no clear contiguous lines of tribes within Fallujah. Fallujah's unique in that sense."

-Maj George S. Benson, Executive Officer, 2/6

**SIDEBAR**

"We had to come up with something different We saw what happened in Ramadi-something was different there."

-LtCol William F. Mullen III, Commanding Officer, 2/6

"Now we have the means to open up some of these things. We have a means for them to get into that city . . . ultimately what we're trying to do is leverage that money as a weapons system. It's us doing what AQI can't"

-Maj George S. Benson
"We have had some real focused talks with the units that lost a Marine. The police were completely ineffective in 2004; they were just paid insurgents. It's tough. It's tough realizing these guys probably fought against you in the summer of 2004. But you also realize we need these guys. We absolutely need these guys."
-Capt Jeffrey S. McCormack, Commanding Officer, Company G, 2/6

SIDEBAR
"Within 90 days of coming over here, virtually the entire situation had turned around. We were faced suddenly with the reality that if we didn't do something quickly about governance, and get the government some quick traction, we were going to have pretty serious difficulty."
-BGen John R. Allen

SIDEBAR
"Al-Qaeda so badly overplayed their hand in their desire to have a caliphate. Al-Qaeda planned to occupy them and set up an Islamic state."
-Maj Gen Walter E. Gaskin, Commanding General, MNF-W

FOOTNOTE
Notes

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GRAPHIC: References
IMAGE PHOTOGRAPH, LtCol Mullen talking to a local Iraqi in Fallujah. (Photo courtesy of the author.)
IMAGE PHOTOGRAPH, Iraqis line up to join the neighborhood watch program. (Photo courtesy of the author.)
IMAGE PHOTOGRAPH, A Marine on duty in Fallujah. (Photo courtesy of the author.)

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Marine Corps Gazette
March 2008
Infantryman's Perspective

BYLINE: Mann, Morgan G.
by Maj Morgan G. Mann, USMCR
Maj Mann is the Operations Officer, 2d Battalion, 24th Marines.

SECTION: IDEAS & ISSUES (COMMENTARY); Pg. 16 Vol. 92 No. 3 ISSN: 0025-3170

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ABSTRACT
Of all that he does, two tasks are critical to a battalion's success when conducting counterinsurgency operations in Iraq: * Ensure that the battalion complies with appropriate rules and regulations of the day concerning detainee procedures to ensure that detainees are detained for as long as possible while hostilities are ongoing. * Ensure that possible violations of rules of engagement as published by the combatant commander and appropriate portions of the Uniform Code of Military Justice are rapidly, accurately, and transparently investigated. In a March 2007 article, Col Raymond E. Ruhlmann III advocates that the establishment of the rule of law is a critical component of a JAG's mission in an infantry battalion. In fact, the focus on the rule of law for a battalion tasked with conducting combat operations is incongruent with a battalion's mission to ensure security for the force and citizenry of its area of operations (AO), kill or capture the enemy insurgents, and train and operate with the Iraqi Security Forces in order to develop Iraq's ability to provide for its own internal defense.

FULL TEXT
The rule of law and the infantry battalion
The battalion judge advocate general (JAG) conducts many important duties in an infantry battalion. Of all that he does, two tasks are critical to a battalion's success when conducting counterinsurgency operations in Iraq:

* Ensure that the battalion complies with appropriate rules and regulations of the day concerning detainee procedures to ensure that detainees are detained for as long as possible while hostilities are ongoing.

* Ensure that possible violations of rules of engagement as published by the combatant commander and appropriate portions of the Uniform Code of Military Justice are rapidly, accurately, and transparently investigated.

In these functions, the "judge" provides critical assistance. JAGs have become common additions to every infantry battalion deploying in support of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF). As the JAG community gains tactical experience working with infantry battalions, they are able to offer more capabilities to the battalion commander. This ability can be seen with the increase of "operational law" articles published in the Marine Corps Gazette. In a March 2007 article, Col Raymond E. Ruhlmann III advocates that the establishment of the rule of law is a critical component of a JAG's mission in an infantry battalion. In fact, the focus on the rule of law for a battalion tasked with conducting combat operations is incongruent with a battalion's mission to ensure security for the force and citizenry of its area of operations (AO), kill or capture the enemy insurgents, and train and operate with the Iraqi Security Forces in order to develop Iraq's ability to provide for its own internal defense. These three often-specified tasks are designed to lead to conditions such that the institutions of government can in fact operate and that the rule of law can be enforced. To suggest that the rule of law comes as part of the battalion's mission in an AO with an active insurgency is to put the cart before the horse.

What is rule of law? The new counterinsurgency manual discusses the concept in several areas, though never actually defines it in a formal way. However, it does state that "key aspects of the rule of law include" a government that derives its powers from the governed, sustainable security institutions, and fundamental human rights.

The Operational Law Handbook states that there can be "rule of law operations." The manual defines these operations in the context of civil affairs as a potential operation conducted in the aftermath of military operations. In addition, the handbook states that rule of law operations are a mission for JAGs as part of a civil affairs team or working in conjunction with public safety specialists. The manual never states that an infantry battalion would be tasked with a rule of law mission.
Two examples are often cited regarding the rule of law and counterinsurgency. One is President Abraham Lincoln's establishment of General Order 100 in 1863 during the Civil War, and the second is the Philippine Insurrection of 1899-1902.

General Order 100 goes a long way to formalize the maturation of the way combatants and noncombatants were treated in the late 19th century. Fundamental rights of noncombatants and prisoners of war were not so fundamental back then, and the order did an excellent job of establishing new norms for rules of the battlefield. However, the general order also recognized the need for harsh action in securing occupied territory. Three articles of the order are of particular relevance for this discussion:

Art. 15. Military necessity ... allows of all destruction of property, and obstruction of the ways and channels of traffic, travel, or communication, and of all withholding of sustenance or means of life from the enemy; of the appropriation of whatever an enemy's country affords necessary for the subsistence and safety of the army.

Art. 17. War is not carried on by arms alone. It is lawful to starve the hostile belligerent, armed or unarmed, so that it leads to the speedier subjection of the enemy.

Art. 28. Retaliation will, therefore, never be resorted to as a measure of mere revenge, but only as a means of protective retribution, and moreover, cautiously and unavoidably; that is to say, retaliation shall only be resorted to after careful inquiry into the real occurrence, and the character of the misdeeds that may demand retribution.

These are 3 of the 80 articles in the general order. What is striking throughout the document is the balance between the need to maintain centralized control and the need to maintain moral authority, while at the same time recognizing the need for the option to use very harsh measures when appropriate. In fact, GEN William T. Sherman used this order as part of his justification to burn his way to Savannah. What the three articles above do not suggest is that the rule of law is of primary importance for a tactical maneuver unit in the field.

The next example is that of the Philippine Insurrection. I am by no means an expert on the war; however, one cannot paint the war with one brush. On some islands civil affairs-type missions were appropriate and successful. However, in the southern islands, such as Samar, far more brutal methods were used to successfully destroy the insurgency and pacify the region. General Order 100 was used for protecting prisoners but also as the legal basis for destroying infrastructure. In one example, Marine Maj Littleton Waller conducted a campaign along "the Samar coast, burning villages and slaughtering water buffalo and rebels alike," turning the area into "a howling wilderness." Rule of law was never a priority for the political and military leaders conducting the counterinsurgency. Separating the populace from the guerrillas, facilitating economic improvement, and destroying the insurgency were the operational goals of the campaign.

The point in these examples is not to disparage the rule of law. However, focusing on the rule of law when a battalion is battling an active counterinsurgency should not be a priority. I think an informal survey of Iraqis would overwhelmingly show they prefer some level of sustainable security even at the expense of some legal institutional processes. During my time in Iraq during OIF II, I felt that some JAGs were too hasty in attempting to bring American-style rule of law to Iraq. The argument for establishing rules and procedures similar to the American criminal justice system is based in the belief that government institutions and the rule of law are preconditions to winning the insurgency—or at least a parallel requirement to security. I would claim that the rule of law is not a condition for success but rather an outcome to providing security and neutralizing the insurgency. In fact, implementing rule of law-type concepts too soon can negatively impact success when insurgents are still active and have the support of the population from which they operate.

An example of this conflict is how various commands deal with detention policies. Our battalion worked for three Army brigades and one Marine expeditionary unit. Each time we were under tactical control of a new higher headquarters, the rules of detention changed. The Multinational Force-Iraq detention policy never changed; however, based on a given higher headquarters JAGs desire to more strictly enforce the detention policy, there could be far greater perceived rules of evidence needed to detain a suspected insurgent. For instance, timelines for getting a detainee to a detention facility could be anywhere from 24 to 72 hours from time of detention. Short time periods significantly impeded a unit's ability to interview detainees to build a better intelligence picture at the local level. In another instance, in order to detain a suspected enemy, a witness statement from an Iraqi citizen was required. Of course, getting a witness statement from an Iraqi about an insurgent is like giving the person a named parking spot at the forward operating base—his life expectancy would be measured in days. Both of these examples demonstrate how attempting to bring too much legal procedure to a combat zone can negatively impact mission accomplishment.

JAGs are critical personnel in an infantry battalion in a war where more and more lawyers are involved at the operational and tactical levels of war. Our JAG was instrumental to the lasting detention of over 600 insurgents because of his strict
methodology for Marine statement writing and complying with chain of custody procedures. He enabled us to be successful given the policies in place, and his legal knowledge was a force multiplier.

A JAG's ability to be a force multiplier becomes uncertain when he turns from a legal advisor into a policy creator or attempts to make rule of law operations a mission priority. This type of mission should not be ignored. Enhancing government control and rebuilding social and political institutions are specified tasks of civil affairs and provincial reconstruction teams. Coordinating the effects of civil affairs and provincial reconstruction team units working in a battalion AO would probably increase the success of both missions. An infantry battalion has a diverse set of specified and implied tasks when conducting counterinsurgency operations in an environment that is fluid and crosses the complete range of the force continuum. Nevertheless, as long as the unit is in a war that is not formally a peacekeeping operation then a rule of law operation is not an appropriate mission for a Marine infantry battalion.

FOOTNOTE

Notes

4. All articles are taken directly from General Order 100 written by Francis Lieber and signed by President Lincoln, 1863. The actual text is available at http://lawofwar.org/general_order_100.htm.

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GRAPHIC: Photographs

IMAGE PHOTOGRAPH, Bringing about the rule of law is an outcome not a condition of success. (Photo by hoe F. Seigle.)

IMAGE PHOTOGRAPH, A rifle company, 1st Marine Battalion during the Philippine Insurrection, 1901. 'Civilize 'em with a krag!' was weir view of establishing the rule of law. (Photo courtesy of Leatherneck magazine.)

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Marine Corps Gazette

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Distributed Operations

BYLINE: Grice, Michael D

SECTION: IDEAS & ISSUES (LEADERSHIP); Pg. 20 Vol. 92 No. 3 ISSN: 0025-3170

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ABSTRACT
A squad leader today carries better and more reliable radio equipment than a company commander did in Operation DESERT STORM, and the maturing of unmanned aircraft and remote viewing systems has created a capability that brings a view of the battlefield to anyone with a video feed. Instead of allowing the leader at the point of friction to make the decision for kinetic engagements based on the tactical situation, employment of supporting arms for troops in contact situations has been significantly slowed or denied on many occasions because commanders at the level empowered to make kinetic decisions make them based on the video feed (or lack thereof) transmitted by an unmanned aircraft system and the fragmentary reports presented by a well-meaning staff.

FULL TEXT
Is the Marine Corps ready

February 2007. A small team of Marines and soldiers is conducting covert operations in an Iraqi dry. Their squadsized team is compromised by insurgent forces, and their position comes under small arms and rocket propelled grenade fire. The team joint terminal attack controller observes the attacking insurgents' position and sets up an airstrike to destroy it. Unfortunately, even though he can see the enemy Bring a t him and he can validate the geometry of fires, the airstrike is denied by higher headquarters, and the team must extract from their position utilizing only their organic weapons. On the way out the team is hit by rocket propelled grenades and automatic weapons from the very insurgents whom they were denied the authority to attack with supporting arms. Strike one team from the friendly order of battle.

The discussion of distributed operations (DO) has become de rigueur in the Marine Corps, but is the Marine Corps truly ready to embrace such a dynamic and decentralized doctrine? The technology certainly exists. A squad leader today carries better and more reliable radio equipment than a company commander did in Operation DESERT STORM, and the maturing of unmanned aircraft and remote viewing systems has created a capability that brings a view of the battlefield to anyone with a video feed. Training and equipment stand ready. Each Marine is issued the best small arms available and participates in deployment workups that are aggressive, realistic, and eminently professional. The sum of these parts should equal a capability to create small and scalable combat teams adept at leveraging technology and expertise into an unstoppable combat force. However, there is one factor of the equation that is missing, and its absence can make the whole equation invalid. The missing component is probably the most important-the human component of leadership and trust.

For DO to work it is necessary for leaders at all levels to be able to act decisively at the right time and in the right place. The principles of war are the same for the small team leader and the maneuver commander; the only difference between them is the level at which they are applied. Where the maneuver commander may apply the principle of mass by weighting the main effort with additional units, the small team leader has the option of creating mass by leveraging the effects of supporting arms to bolster his unit's relatively petite organic weaponry. Small teams of Marines in harm's way will certainly have enough combat power to get into trouble; the problem comes in when they lack the organic combat power to get back out. The leader at the point of friction must be enabled to make the appropriate decision in a timely manner in order to be able to bring to bear the full power of the Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) where and when he needs it. If he cannot, the lurking specter of tactical defeat may well become a disastrous reality.

Unfortunately, today's Marines at the small team level lack the trust and authority to employ the full weight of the MAGTF-even when they are in contact with the enemy. Due to existing rules of engagement and localized command restrictions, Marines and sailors are placed in the uncomfortable position of relying on commanders who reside at much higher levels and are often significantly removed from the tactical situation to authorize the employment of supporting arms. DO doctrine posits that small teams will be able to utilize supporting arms as the decisive combat multiplier to dominate the enemy and counter his attacks. Further, it states that the increased operational tempo created by decentral-
ized decisionmaking at the lowest level will create an insoluble dilemma for the enemy. Unfortunately, if the leaders at the lowest level are neither empowered nor trusted with the authority to employ the full spectrum of fires, they face domination and destruction by a foe that is able to establish a local superiority that the small team may not be able to rebuff.

Further muddying the waters are the instances that lead to increased scrutiny of decisions and additional restrictions placed on leaders at all levels. Incidents such as those in Haditha, Hamidiya, and the Marine special operations engagement in Afghanistan serve to add further restrictions on subordinate leaders. They certainly do not result in a loosening of the reins; violations of the law of war create uncertainty, and uncertainty leads to a restriction on the amount of trust that can be meted out to junior leaders. When something bad happens, the first reaction is to find out what caused it and to make sure that it never occurs again. The result is usually the levying of more restrictions and increased centralization of control, which in turn reduces uncertainty by removing some of the latitude previously enjoyed by junior leadership.

Our technology, which can be used to give commanders at all levels greater situational awareness of the battlespace, has become an obstacle to decisiveness in its own right. Instead of allowing the leader at the point of friction to make the decision for kinetic engagements based on the tactical situation, employment of supporting arms for troops in contact situations has been significantly slowed or denied on many occasions because commanders at the level empowered to make kinetic decisions make them based on the video feed (or lack thereof) transmitted by an unmanned aircraft system and the fragmentary reports presented by a well-meaning staff. It is human nature; if a leader at the colonel level is required to authorize a kinetic strike, then he will want to know why he is being asked to do so. This usually results in a flurry of activity in the operations center and a series of questions up and down the chain of command in order to determine if the strike meets the commander's criteria for execution. As the decisionmaker who is authorized to employ supporting arms garners the information necessary to make the call, things continue to heat up at the point of friction. If the kill chain is such that decisionmakers at multiple levels must pass the request higher and higher until someone is capable of pulling the trigger, the heat may become unbearable for the team that called for and needs the fires, or the target set may vanish, giving the enemy another day to fight.

DO requires unfettered leaders at all levels who are empowered to make the decisions necessary to leverage the strengths of the MAGTF over the enemy. Restrictive rules of engagement and command directives are anathema to such a concept, as they serve to restrict the autonomy of leaders at lower levels. Can a squad leader in contact with the enemy have his platoon commander authorize the employment of supporting arms? Currently, the answer is almost always no. He must ask his platoon commander, who must ask his company commander, who must ask his battalion commander, who must ask his regimental commander. As the request rises through each level, a bit of the tactical urgency is mitigated and a bit of uncertainty creeps in. By the time the request has made it through the wickets, the crucial advantage of time has been lost, and the initiative may well have passed to the enemy. At most, the squad leader should have to ask his platoon commander for approval. To have to wait for the regimental commander's decision to employ ordnance costs him, at a minimum, the synergy created by aggressive action and combined arms and, at the maximum, the very real possibility of friendly casualties.

Is the Marine Corps ready for DO? Until the restrictions of rules of engagement and employment of supporting arms are reconciled with the autonomy of decisionmaking required for such doctrine, the answer is not yet. The Marine Corps has the tools and Marines have the talent, but for DO to become more than a theoretical methodology for future warfare it will require that leaders at the lowest levels be entrusted with both the ability to employ supporting arms as well as the authority to do so. Capability and authority together will prove unstoppable, and the key to their happy marriage is endowing the leadership principle of trust on leaders at all levels. Without trust, however, we trade away the advantages of tempo, leveraging supporting arms, and flexibility, and give the enemy the opportunity to strike more small teams of Marines from the friendly order of battle.

**SIDEBAR**

Gen Robert E. Hogaboom Leadership Writing Contest: Honorable Mention

**SIDEBAR**

Is the Marine Corps ready for DO?

by Maj Michael D. Grice

Maj Grice completed his second tour in Iraq where he served with 1st Air/Naval Gunfire Liaison Company, 2d Platoon, Ar Ramadi. He is currently deployed in support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM.
Training in Transition

BYLINE: Friedman, Brett A.

by 1stLt Brett A. Friedman

1stLt Friedman is an artillery officer currently assigned to a military transition team in Iraq. He wrote this article following the team's predeployment training.

SECTION: IDEAS & ISSUES (TRAINING); Pg. 34 Vol. 92 No. 6 ISSN: 0025-3170

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ABSTRACT

Now that the military has finally come around to a counterinsurgency mindset and realized the importance of embedded advisors to the war effort, both the Marine Corps and the Army have been turning out various advisor teams, including military transition teams, police transition teams, border transition teams, and provincial reconstruction teams. The military developed the Military Assistance Training Advisory Course that taught future advisors such subjects as counter-insurgency and basic infantry skills and included 46 hours of Vietnamese language training.

FULL TEXT

A call for a restructuring of transition team training

In describing the current U.S. effort in Iraq, President George W. Bush has repeatedly stated that we are in Iraq to "allow the Iraqis to stand up, so that we can stand down." Those U.S. policymakers and candidates opposed to the war in Iraq call for a withdrawal of U.S. combat troops, but not a withdrawal of advisors and other U.S. support assets. Now that the
military has finally come around to a counterinsurgency mindset and realized the importance of embedded advisors to the war effort, both the Marine Corps and the Army have been turning out various advisor teams, including military transition teams, police transition teams, border transition teams, and provincial reconstruction teams. However, prior to Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM, these teams and the assets needed to train them were nonexistent outside of special forces. The Marine Corps, proving once again its adaptability, has generated ad hoc structures to produce and prepare these teams for deployment. Unfortunately, this is not the first time the U.S. military has been caught with its trousers down by a large need for embedded advisors. In searching out trends in Marine Corps advisor training, I found the Global Wzr on Terrorism Occasional Paper 18, by Robert D. Ramsey III, which examined advisor teams in Korea, Vietnam, and El Salvador.

In 1948 the Republic of Korea took over control of South Korea from the U.S. Army Military Government that had run the country since 1945. To assist the fledgling government, the U.S. Government formed the Provisional Military Advisory Group, which was shortly replaced by the United States Military Advisor Group to the Republic of Korea (K MAG). The intent behind K MAG was to provide U.S. military advisors to the South Korean military down to the battalion level. (Shortages prevented K MAG from ever providing many advisors lower than the regimental level.) Advisors were chosen according to rank and military occupational specialty (MOS) requirements. While the billet fulfilled an overseas requirement, it was not a desirable one, and advisors were typically passed over for promotions and assignments in favor of those serving with American units. As for preparation, prior to 1953 oncoming K MAG advisors were given nothing more than an introductory brief. Later the preparation eventually evolved into a brief, a handbook, and a list often commandments” given to each advisor.

As for Vietnam, U.S. support began in 1950 with the Military Advisory and Assistance Group, Indochina, which by 1955 was replaced by the Military Advisory Assistance Group, Vietnam (MAAG-V). MAAG-V built the Army of the Republic of Vietnam and other South Vietnamese military forces from the ground up, and as the U.S. involvement ramped up, so did the military advisor effort. By the end of 1963 there were 1,451 advisors assigned to MAAG-V. As the situation in Vietnam worsened, the advisory effort branched out to include provincial and civilian advisors as well as military advisors. Many different advisory methods were tried throughout the U.S. involvement, and the military did succeed in pushing two-man advisor teams down to the battalion level, but many of the same problems existed as in Korea. The military developed the Military Assistance Training Advisory Course that taught future advisors such subjects as counterinsurgency and basic infantry skills and included 46 hours of Vietnamese language training. Amazingly, this course included 40 hours of instruction in counterinsurgency. By 1970 die Marine Corps developed its own 3-week course for oncoming advisors, taught at Quantico. Over 50 percent of the course was language instruction alone. As for the selection of advisors, prior to the major U.S. buildup, advisors were chosen based on rank, MOS, and experience. Once more and more military personnel were needed in Vietnam, the advisory effort took a back seat, and there was virtually no requirement for potential advisors.

In 1981 the United States restored aid to El Salvador, after a civil war following the overthrow of GEN Carlos Romero in 1979, in the form of a 55man advisory effort known as the MilGroup. Because this was a smaller effort (limited by law to 55 personnel), it was better staffed than the advisory efforts in Korea or Vietnam. Assigned personnel were mostly drawn from special forces. For El Salvador, advisors were chosen based on their Spanish language skills and their experience in the region rather than just on rank and MOS. However, oncoming advisors received no training of any kind prior to joining the MilGroup and were simply given a brief or a few binders of advice to read. Additionally, their effectiveness was limited by their restricted size. The U.S. advisors did, however, manage to improve the El Salvadoran Armed Forces enough that the last U.S. advisors were able to leave El Salvador in 1991.

Now that the U.S. military has been called on once again to provide a large number of military advisors to not one but two nations at war, we have made improvements to the advisory mission but continue to make some of the same mistakes. Advisor teams now consist of 11 soldiers for Army battalion-level teams and 14 Marines and 1 sailor for Marine Corps battalion-level teams. Modern advisor teams undergo 5 to 6 months of training before leaving the United States and an additional training course at the Phoenix Academy in Taji, Iraq. This training is intensive and greatly prepares the teams to defend themselves. However, as excellent as the predeployment training package is at training advisor teams to operate like reinforced rifle squads, the training practically ignores advising. Military transitions teams, police transition teams, and other transition teams are given "Advisor 201" and "Advisor 202." which are two Microsoft PowerPoint presentations full of important information but total a mere 2 hours of lecture. As for counterinsurgency instruction, that is also "completed" by another 1-hour-long PowerPoint presentation. What has been called the "graduate level of war" is given less time than the Twenty-nine Palms welcome aboard brief. We seem to have learned the importance of an understanding of counterinsurgency for advisors by the end of the Vietnam involvement, but have completely forgotten it for the current
conflicts. Additionally, advisor teams are given a grossly insufficient language course consisting of 4 days at their home stations and two review sessions at Twenty nine Palms. Rather than focusing on the grammar of the language they will be using, the language course provided by the Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning consists of an instructor demonstrating the pronunciation of canned phrases that the team members are expected to utilize in Iraq or Afghanistan by rote memorization. While we obviously cannot repeat the El Salvador system because of a lack of personnel with the appropriate language skills currently in the military, neither should we be repeating the mistakes of the Korean- and Vietnam-era systems. Furthermore, as much as they profess to have realized the importance of this challenging and essential duty, there are still no special requirements for prospective advisors or a screening process for those involved. Advisory duty is not for everyone. It is an intellectually demanding duty that requires experience, a variety of military knowledge, and an open mind to dealing with an unfamiliar culture. Those whose mindset is perhaps too focused on "total war" combat, and who then undergo 5 months of strictly kinetic-focused training, may not enter the challenge of advising as well prepared as they should be.

While the U.S. military at large and the Marine Corps specifically have done well adapting to unforeseen advising requirements, this should be the last time an advisor system is created on the fly. The requirement for competent, trained combat advisors will only increase in the execution of the global war on terrorism. In June 2007 LTC John A. Nagl, USA, a renowned counterinsurgency expert, wrote a paper, entitled Institutionalizing Adaptation: It’s Time for a Permanent Army Advisory Corps, calling for a unit of advisers above and beyond those already operating under U.S. Special Operations Command. In the same vein the Marine Corps has recently created the Marine Special Operations Command (MarSOC) Advisory Corps (formerly the Foreign Military Training Unit) as part of MarSOC and the Marine Corps Training and Advisory Group to organize Marine Corps advisory teams. The challenge facing these new organizations is to improve the training of Marine Corps transition teams.

The training of Marine Corps transition teams as it stands now is horribly skewed toward force protection to the detriment of the mission itself. Counterinsurgency knowledge and cultural familiarity provide the groundwork for mission accomplishment of an advisory team. While the Phoenix Academy reinforces the counterinsurgency “introduction” given by the Adviser Training Group at Twenty nine Palms for teams headed to Iraq, this training is completed after the team has formed and trained for months. A team cannot have a good idea how to train if it is unfamiliar with its mission until it arrives in Iraq. Furthermore, all of the training and know-how in the world will serve the adviser no purpose if he cannot build a relationship with his counterpart. Without a good language base that is impossible. The current effort to teach advisory teams the language of their area of operations during 4 days of lecture can only be described as negligent. The training of Marine Corps transition teams of all types needs to undergo a radical reorganization. Rather than having transition teams focus on tactics, techniques, and procedures for literally 5 months before even being introduced to their role in the “big picture,” the teams should undergo a thorough counterinsurgency and advising instructional package as soon as they are formed. Once the advising teams understand their role in the counterinsurgency fight and begin their grammar and concept-focused language training they can go through the rest of the predeployment training package with the correct mindset to utilize the force protection skills they will learn and begin utilizing the language while training those skills. An advisory team trained with the proper mindset and with a strong language and culture base will gain a battalion of warrior brothers in their host nation, and that is better force protection than any training the Marine Corps can provide.

**SIDEBAR**

The training of Marine Corps transition teams as it stands now is horribly skewed. . . .

**FOOTNOTE**

Note


* Author’s Note: Special thanks to Robert D. RamseyIII. His paper, entitled Advising Indigenous Forces: American Advising in Korea, Vietnam, and El Salvador, Global War on Terrorism Occasional Paper 18, Combate studies Institute Press, Fort Leavenworth, KS, and his exhaustive research were essential to this article.

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Teamwork in Counterinsurgency

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by 1stLt Sayce W. Falk

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ABSTRACT

Even the most cursory study of the United States' bodies of foreign policy reveals that the various lines have been given to various bodies; the Department of Defense (DoD) remains primarily responsible for security while the Department of State (DoS), as the overarching institution for the U.S. Agency for International Development, provincial reconstruction teams, and its own diplomats, remains responsible for the other three. The focus on overall defensive, targeted offensive, and technological solutions is a reflection of the current shortsighted and politically motivated foreign policy priorities of enhancing armor and electronics in an effort to stop bullets and bombs after they are already on their way, rather than getting behind those kinetic efforts and erasing the insurgency that uses them.

FULL TEXT

Why the Departments of State and Defense need each other to succeed

Almost 5 years into what is low acknowledged as a boody counterinsurgency COIN), a number of shortcomings are coming increasingly to light at both the highest and lowest levels. There has been an acknowledgment at both ends of the decisionmaking spectrum that high-value targeted raids and purely kinetic operations, while necessary, are not winning hands in Iraq. The resultant increased focus on COIN operations has been developed along four broad lines of operation-governance, security, culture, and the economy. Even the most cursory study of the United States' bodies of foreign
policy reveals that the various lines have been given to various bodies; the Department of Defense (DoD) remains primarily responsible for security while the Department of State (DoS), as the overarching institution for the U.S. Agency for International Development, provincial reconstruction teams, and its own diplomats, remains responsible for the other three. This is as it should be; security is a unique line of operation in that it is a necessary but not sufficient requirement for success in COIN. That is to say, it must be achieved before any of the other three lines can be developed, but achieving it does not necessarily guarantee mission accomplishment.

While the division of the lines of operation into the two departments is correctly made, the execution of these four lines in concurrence with one another remains at best imperfect. Each department is run in the model of a 19th century vertical monopoly, stovepiping resources and effort from basic materials (e.g., graduates of civilian schools, budgets from Congress, and reputations with foreign states, organizations, and groups) to end products with little to no input or observation from other American agencies. Civilian businesses and universities have long ago abandoned this type of production as inefficient, ineffective, and unwieldy. Recognizing this and understanding that many of the best practices and principles within military institutions are derived from their civilian counterparts, a renewed effort must be made to view the DoS and DoD as counterparts and coexisting organizations, each of which can be successful in its own myopic worldview but which, in COIN, can never succeed on its own.

The current state of affairs as experienced by some Marine units operating in Iraq is that other agencies have been reluctant to step in as quickly as necessary in a rapidly changing environment. Momentum and tempo are as critical in a nonkinetic environment as they are in full out war. The forces of stability and instability are competing, not for terrain or critical infrastructure or valuable goods and resources but for the hearts and minds of the local populace. Maintaining a constant, legitimate presence that demonstrates its ability to exercise power and provide solutions is a goal of both sides in this fight.

As it now stands, military forces across Iraq have recently or are currently securing the areas in which they operate. What follows is most often a period of calm that can be seen by some military leaders as success. Attacks have dropped off drastically, and we have always measured our success by some measure of kinetic effectiveness, so doesn’t that mean victory? The answer is that it depends at what level success is defined. Militarily leaders have made their areas secure, and they rightly dust off their hands in the middle of avenues formerly known as "Ambush Alley" before strolling off into an Arabian sunset.

But insurgencies are movements that develop over many years as "the inevitable result of the clash between oppressor and oppressed when the latter reach the limits of their endurance."1 What must be recognized is that the absence of attacks—security—is success only if it is seen while wearing the blinders of the DoD. Unit leaders have created necessary but not sufficient conditions for the defeat of an insurgency, for the removal of conditions that cause the oppressed to rise up against their oppressor. There must also be the development of a stable government, a powerful but law-abiding indigenous police (not military) force, an economy strong enough to create its own wealth, and a culture that no longer values or extols violence as the means to achieve.

With those ends in sight, it becomes clear that there is a lag in counterinsurgent operations in Iraq; what might be called a critical time gap has opened up whereby the success of the military is not immediately capitalized on by other American and foreign agencies. This critical time gap creates an opportunity for an insurgency to regroup, rearm, refit—in short, revitalize—and take to the offensive again. Viewed through Air Force Col John Boyd's OODA (orient, observe, decide, act) loop, the forces of stability have, through their own inability to act at the decisive moment handed the initiative right back to the insurgent forces.

Think of the most dedicated "irhabi" (Arabic for terrorist), haunted and harried for months by night-stalking, fastmoving, powerfully equipped Marine and Army forces, finding himself at last within his own house again, weaponless, without money, at the mercy of his friends and neighbors if they so wish to expose him. But as he waits, alone, afraid to leave by front door or back, a strange thing occurs. Nothing. No local government coalesces, no local security force receives the logistical and financial backing necessary to maintain itself, no social leader rises up to decry the nation's violent past, secure in the knowledge that he will be protected from retribution. Indeed, the forces that so recendy defeated him still rumble through his village in their large machines, neither reaching out nor giving back to the communities that they wrested from such stubborn hands. Cautiously at first, then with more confidence, the irhabi begins reaching out, recreating his networks, seeking gaps in the forces of stability, sourcing money and weapons from faraway or foreign cities. Soon he is back on the offensive, and the cycle begins afresh, though not anew.

There are only two ways to patch up the critical time gap between the different lines of operation—slow the development of security or speed the development of the other three. Given the unpalatability of the first option, let us focus on the second.
There are many ways to speed the redevelopment of government, the economy, and society, but they all involve, to a greater or lesser extent, a closer working relationship between the DoS and DoD. Only by linking America's two chief foreign policy bodies effectively can we ever hope to achieve success along all four lines of operation efficiently.

A proposed solution to this problem would be the creation of COIN teams, modeled-albeit at a much higher level-along the lines of combined antiarmor team units. These units are a direct derivative of maneuver warfare and its "fix and flank" precept of combining different weapons into a unit capable of using all of them simultaneously and appropriately. This model, employed in a networked foreign policy action rather than a stovepiped one, could create a unit capable of achieving returns on a scale significantly above anything currently in use. That a military force would retain an antiair capability at the battalion level that has never been used as intended but ignore the idea of a COIN team after countless experience in Vietnam, Grenada, Somalia, Yugoslavia, and Iraq seems almost patently counterintuitive.

The model of a COIN team would look something very much like what is created on an ad hoc and temporary basis during operations currently in Iraq. A civilian from the DoS, specializing in a region, country, or academic focus (developmental politics, economics, education, or civil engineering, for example) would head the team. He could have some number of assistants, according to his needs, or work alone. Accompanying him and acting as his deputy in all matters (to include outranking any other civilian assistants) would be a Marine officer or staff noncommissioned officer (SNCO), accompanied by a unit that could be scaled from a fire team all the way through a platoon, depending on the dangers of the operating environment. The head of the COIN team would determine what ends must be met-his commander's guidance on what he must see, who he must meet, where he must go, and when-with his military deputy, acting as security commander, determining the means to meet those ends. For example, a DoS engineer might decide that he must visit a city sewer pump at some point during daylight hours over the next 3 days in order to determine whether it is working as reported. The Marine security commander would take this goal as his mission, planning the necessary weapons, vehicles, logistics, route, formation, timeline, etc. to achieve it.

The military personnel required for these COIN teams could be sourced by drawing from the pool currently slated for Marine security guard (MSG) duty, with a commensurate expansion of the number of slots open in MSG for Marines leaving operational units. Officers and SNCOs who choose to move into COIN teams could be routed into the regional affairs officer or foreign affairs officer military occupational specialties (MOSs) in lieu of the current track into that MOS. Logistically, each COIN team would require only as much as any other similarly sized unit operating in country, with mobility or other extra requirements coming from DoD/DoS budgets that currently purchase customized sport utility vehicles and completely Americanized major firm bases.

The bottom line is this: the American military is currently spending vast amounts of money on new technologies, such as the Joint Strike Fighter and the mine resistant ambush protected vehicle. It is also dedicating many of its best and brightest to the U.S. Special Operations Command. The focus on overall defensive, targeted offensive, and technological solutions is a reflection of the current shortsighted and politically motivated foreign policy priorities of enhancing armor and electronics in an effort to stop bullets and bombs after they are already on their way, rather than getting behind those kinetic efforts and erasing the insurgency that uses them.

As a result, the Marine Corps and other important foreign policy bodies must renew their focus on all four lines of COIN operations. The creation of a COIN team is one proposed suggestion but by no means the only possible solution. What is necessary is the breakdown of a vertically integrated, stovepiped monopoly on security by the DoD and on politics, economics, and culture by the DoS. These two Cabinet-level government institutions must work more closely together on a formal, long-term, and well-defined basis in order to succeed. All too often military unit leaders are left attempting to fill the critical time gap that currently inevitably follows security. Some do it well, and some become frustrated at their own lack of formal knowledge in nonmilitary areas of expertise. Still others rest satisfied on their laurels thinking that they have achieved all that the Marine Corps has asked of them. However, given a mission of defeating an insurgency, and recognizing that this happens only with the concurrent development of security, government, the economy, and society, the Marine Corps must commit itself to doing more than succeeding along one line and waiting for others to catch up. It must actively move to solve its own identified critical vulnerabilities and close its own gaps by whatever means possible. In the short term we will succeed-after all, we are Marines. But in the long run, only by working more closely at all levels with the DoS, with its pool of formal educational and institutional expertise, can the Marine Corps succeed in defeating the insurgencies it is bound to encounter with increasing frequency in the future. We face these emergencies as a Nation, not just as a Corps, and think that they can be defeated through only one arm of the government against the very principles of maneuver warfare that we have used to such great success in recent conflicts.

**SIDEBAR**
The creation of a COIN team is one proposed suggestion but by no means the only possible solution.

**FOOTNOTE**

Note


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IMAGE PHOTOGRAPH, Success in COIN requires both DoD and DoS coordination and commitment of assets. (Photo by Sgt Robert A. Sturkie.)

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**Weighting a Main Effort**

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**ABSTRACT**

The USZs house the vast majority of the 500,000 Anbaris in AO Denver and are the key to controlling and positively influencing the population. The Marine Corps has already recognized shortfalls in TT training, thus the creation of the Marine Corps Training and Advisor Group in Fort Story, VA and site visits by MOJAVE VIPER instructors to AO Denver to assess the situation and develop realistic training packages supporting the transition effort. Including items listed in the previous paragraph, a PTT training plan should include instruction on police administration, patrol distribution planning, developing a police training plan, dispatching procedures, department management, Iraqi and Ministry of Interior logistics, the Iraqi pay cycle, operating a joint coordination center, proper investigative techniques, and the Iraqi judicial system.

**FULL TEXT**

Fully commit to assigning the right Marines to the task
Regimental Combat Team 2 RCT-2) has 19 Army and Marine police transition teams (PTTs) training, mentoring, and advising its Iraqi counterparts in Area of Operations (AO) Denver, a 30,000-square-mile battlespace in western Iraq characterized by vast expanses of open desert and major population centers along the Euphrates River. These teams made tremendous progress in professionalizing the Iraqi police (IP) force, but the Marine PTTs in particular operate at suboptimal levels due to staffing and training not in sync with either the improving security situation or the development of IP core competencies across the Al Anbar Province. The Marine Corps remains an agile force capable of rapid and aggressive change. Rectifying issues associated with the PTT mission is a prime opportunity to demonstrate this competency.

An institutional misunderstanding about the new responsibilities PTTs encounter negatively impacts all facets of their creation and development. The current PTT staffing model served the Marine Corps well when direct fire engagements in urban areas were common, but it is no longer valid or effective with a neutralized insurgency. Also ineffective, consequently, is the kinetic military transition team (MiTT)centric predeployment training plan that all transition teams (TTs) execute. The recently stabilized security situation in AO Denver necessitates immediate change if the Marine Corps is to fully capitalize on the unique position PTTs enjoy in developing IP stations and districts.

The impetus for this article is RCT-2’s belief that transition from coalition forces (CF) to Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) control is essential to defeating the insurgency and returning a sense of normalcy to the people of western Al Anbar. After nearly 5 years of disorder, the Anbaris in AO Denver are ready for a change. A successful IP force is the key to law and order, and the Marine Corps would be remiss not to provide PTTs with the numerically appropriate mix of correctly trained personnel to meet this objective. The upcoming months and years will likely see all components of the ISF in more visible roles, with CF primarily serving as enablers. The various TTs are connecting files in achieving this end and are therefore deserved of full resource, training, and personnel support.

Lines of Operation

Past Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) iterations found battalion, regimental, and division staffs organized along familiar Napoleonic lines. A recent shift from an almost purely kinetic fight to the broader scope of counterinsurgency (COIN) operations, however, required increased flexibility and a focus on areas not traditionally associated with combat action. In recognition of this new environment, RCT-2 embraced the vital security, transition, rule of law, economics, governance, and communication lines of operation (LOO); appointed LOO managers; and overlaid this construct on its existing staff sections.

The objective of the transition LOO is to develop the ISF so they are no longer dependent on coalition support for normal operations. RCT-2’s campaign plan details transition through three components-transition of the Iraqi Army (IA) units to Iraqi Ground Forces Command (IGFC), transition of security responsibility to the ISF, and transition of the local governments to self-reliance. The first two components are directly linked to TT actions while the third works primarily in concert with civil affairs and embedded provincial reconstruction team efforts. In October 2007 the RCT assessed the security LOO as effective throughout AO Denver, and the commander elevated transition to his top priority.

Transition as a Main Effort

There is a simple philosophical debate as to whether or not the Marine Corps believes transition is important enough to be a main effort. If so, it must be weighted appropriately with requisite assets and resources. The Marine Corps made a clear commitment to the MiTT mission, evidenced by many combat arms battalions providing their operations or executive officers to source battalion team chief or brigade operations advisor billets. A similar commitment does not appear to exist for the PTT mission, even though the IP requires a greater level of assistance than the IA.

Overall, the IA is effective and poised for further successes. RCT-2's partnered IA battalions and brigade headquarters proved their mettle and skills through validation operations in July and September 2007, respectively. Through these operations, all IA units achieved Operational Readiness Assessment (ORA) Level 2, meaning they are capable of planning, executing, and sustaining COIN operations with ISF or coalition support. On 1 October 2007, control of the entire 7th IA Division transitioned to IGFC, highlighting the effectiveness of the MiTTs and the progress of the IA. Although not fully capable of independent operations, the IA is sufficiently equipped and trained to conduct COIN missions in the 468 square miles of its battlespace inside of AO Denver. In reference to the first two components of the RCTs transition definition, the IA met its objectives.

The IP also achieved significant gains over the past several months. It matured from fledgling stations stymied in even the most rudimentary actions to a professional organization of districts approaching ORA Level 2. Similarly to the IA, they assumed partial ownership and responsibility for battlespace urban security zones (USZs), encompassing the major population centers in AO Denver. The IP also began specialized training in advanced policing techniques that aided them.
in operating functional and efficient police stations. Each police district now has a cadre of certified IP instructors to teach personnel on site in law enforcement fundamentals and more advanced subjects. An expected and commensurate adaptation of PTT sourcing, staffing, and training to match this rapid development has not yet materialized.

Much like the priority shift to transition over security, IP development enjoys a new preeminence with the RCT. The ISF now control security inside IA battlespace and in combined operating areas, but this necessary transition has not yet fully occurred in the IP USZs. The USZs house the vast majority of the 500,000 Anbaris in AO Denver and are the key to controlling and positively influencing the population. The IP are inextricably linked to these pivotal urban centers because their forces are largely composed of locals with close tribal affiliations to key sheiks, city council members, and the citizenry. A professional IP force, legitimate in the eyes of those it is built to protect and serve, ultimately assists local governments and judiciaries in gaining self-sufficiency and influence. The IP is essential to realize success in the last two components of transition—full transition of security to ISF at the local, provincial, and ultimately national level and the transition to self-sustaining governments.

The dramatic improvements in IP capabilities and their recent ascendance in importance throughout Al Anbar Province require PTTs of the highest caliber. These teams undeniably need the proper equipment, mindset, and training, but most importantly, they need the right Marines.

**Hire the Right Man for the Job**

The Marine Corps' practice of sourcing PTT leadership with combat arms Marines served us ideally when the IP was performing paramilitary duties. With substantial numbers of proficient and highly trained IP now conducting legitimate law enforcement duties in AO Denver, the possibility exists for the IP to outpace combat arms-centric PTTs in terms of police work. Not diminishing the impact that credible Marine Corps leadership brings to any organization, the reality remains that the IP need training in policing, not in combat operations. Sourcing an adequate number of properly experienced or credentialed Marines to lead and staff PTTs is critical to preventing stagnation in IP development.

The IP must transition to civil vice martial law; combat arms Marines (and Marines in general) are much more adept at the latter. When we do not know what to do, we do what we know. Consequently there is a better than even chance that PTT leadership will lean more toward "close with and destroy" than "protect and serve." Such a stance is not due to a lack of knowledge or effort but simply due to familiarity and muscle memory. Combat arms Marines are not a hindrance to a PTT mission, but they are no longer an automatic asset either. Other military occupational specialties (MOSs), educational backgrounds, or civilian employment experiences provide a better swath of candidates for filling PTTs and training the IP in accepted law enforcement tenets.

The organizational structure of PTTs needs refinement to best align teams with the regular responsibilities encountered with rapidly developing IP stations. At best, in a district PTT, there are five personnel who have duties and responsibilities clearly aligned with routine police operations—the team leader, the team operations chief, the logistics advisor, the administration advisor, and the international police advisor (IPA). The remaining personnel are dedicated primarily to general responsibilities, such as providing mobility, security, and medical coverage for the team. In the smaller station PTT, only the team leader, team operations chief, and IPA are clearly aligned with station duties. Local police stations have requirements, just as their districts, to be organized in terms of operations, logistics, and administration. Station PTTs should have dedicated personnel with the requisite experience and credentialing to oversee these station functional areas.

The current table of organization (T/O) for a district PTT makes it potentially more conducive to productive police development than a station PTT, yet both are hindered by MOS requirements unaligned with billet assignments. A brief look at some of RCT-2's current and previous district PTTs (see Table 1) demonstrates that sourcing was not done as a deliberate effort. At least for some PTTs it was instead a timeconstrained effort based on who was available with the requisite dwell time. These team assignments are largely in line with requirements that lack specificity except for minimal combat arms stipulations. The issue is not that parent units are ignoring their sourcing obligations; it is that the PTT T/O is outdated. In Table 2, the current PTT T/O,1 there is inexplicably no requirement for administration Marines to be assigned as administration advisors or for logistics Marines to be assigned as logistics advisors. In a MiTT, there is a direct correlation from MOS and experience to billet assignments (i.e., intelligence officers assigned as intelligence advisors, artillery officers assigned as field artillery/effects advisors, infantry officers assigned as operations advisors, etc.), begging the question of why MOS or experience is unmatched to billets for PTTs now tasked with training, mentoring, and advising the IP on advanced policing techniques.
Albeit unintentional, the structure of PTTs also implies that law enforcement experience is unimportant for Marines working with the IP. As depicted in Table 2 there is only one member from each PTT with a dedicated law enforcement background the civilian IPA. The IPA, however, is not a universal answer to problems as his central prerequisite for employment is 5 years of experience as a police officer, regardless of specialization. Therefore, an IPA with primarily penal institution employment could be inexplicably assigned to a highway patrol PTT. There is also no requirement for any PTT members to come from the military police (MP) occupational field (MOS 5800).

Military policing is similar but not identical to civil law enforcement; therefore, an MP is not automatically a good fit for a PTT leader. Even if a direct correlation between the two assignments existed, the Marine Corps does not have a glut of MP officers to dedicate solely to the PTT mission. The challenge is thus not only finding Marines with some type of law enforcement background but also finding those with experience in constabulary work. A focus on local policing over paramilitary or COIN operations is necessary when considering the changes in security occurring throughout all of AO Denver and the remainder of Al Anbar Province.

While the Marine Corps tracks civilian employment in its Reserve personnel database, identifying and sourcing Active and Reserve Marines with either civilian, military, or academic law enforcement experience and training for PTT leaders or operations chiefs remains a challenging undertaking. Cognizant of these difficulties, additional related qualities should likewise be sought for those in team leadership positions. The paramount requisites in a PTT leader are optimism and patience, but these criteria are too intangible to serve as functional selection filters. Easier to identify as potential candidates for district and station PTT service are postcompany command officers with experience and knowledge of maintenance, operations, administration, and logistics. These areas are as important to a police station as they are to a tank company or artillery battery. Additionally, Marines previously filling independent duty or B billet assignments characterized by an emphasis on charisma and interpersonal relationships (recruiting, Marine security guard, etc.) vice positional leadership are primed for PTT service. The days of ISF beholden to the wishes of CF are gone, so building rapport often realizes the largest dividends.

Two final prerequisites worth examining are the rank and age of PTT leaders. In most cases, a district PTT leader is partnered with a district chief of police who is between 40 to 50 years old, has 10 to 15 years of police or military experience, and is a major or lieutenant colonel. RCT-2 currently has district PTTs led by master sergeants and lieutenants. Regardless of the capabilities, intellect, or experience of these PTT leaders, they are clearly outranked. Regardless of the maturity, humility, and openness of the district chief of police, he is clearly aligned with someone perceived as significantly junior. Station PTTs are encumbered by similar rank deficiencies in that a station chief is generally a major who is 30 to 40 years old. By T/O his CF partner could conceivably be a 25-year-old staff sergeant or lieutenant. These Marines may be top performers in their MOSs but, unfortunately, lack the clout to garner respect and influence with station chiefs. If the Marine Corps intends to treat the Iraqis as legitimate partners, then it should strive to establish near-peer-to-peer relationships between the police and the PTT leaders.

With the right types and ranks of Marines identified for PTT leadership positions, simply determining the proper size of the supporting staff becomes the last requirement. Based solely on numerical composition, PTTs are staffed inadequately and thus require augmentation from CF battalions to accomplish their mission. As depicted in Table 2, a district PTT has 14 personnel and a station PTT has 12. Particularly with station PTTs, their diminutive size only provides enough personnel to conduct one task at a time due to patrol and convoy size requirements. A 16-person minimum is an absolute baseline for station and district PTTs, enabling them to maintain a fire team-sized element at an assigned station while concurrently providing a three-vehicle complement to a given mission.

The revised T/Os in Tables 3 and 4 are presented as a means of reducing, if not alleviating, many of the challenges facing station and district PTTs. Both PTTs need the same depth and breadth of knowledge in their teams, with only subtle rank differences represented to mirror their IP counterparts. The proposed T/Os provide greater seniority within the teams, an overall increase in their numerical composition, and directly align MOSs with billet assignments. There are several challenges, unidentified in this article, to sourcing an increased number of Marines from very specific communities, but the potential gains are well worth the expended effort.

Training

Due to the radically different security environment now enjoyed in AO Denver as opposed to 18 months ago, PTT predeployment training must mature to meet the new situations the teams face. Not only must infantry-based exercises and classes take a secondary role to police training, but PTT law enforcement preparation must advance from the very basics to more specialized techniques.
A broad focus on infantry universalities no longer suits the PTT mission in AO Denver, yet these topics fill the preponderance of predeployment training for all TTs. The lack of significant law enforcement preparation casts an unintentional perception that police training is unnecessary for police work and that "if you can be a grunt, you can be a cop." When the security situation in all urban areas was tenuous, a MiTT-centric training package sufficed for PTTs and IP saddled with establishing vehicle checkpoints and conducting clearing operations. The IP still conduct these paramilitary functions, but they are also spending increased amounts of time on establishing the rule of law and linking police actions to a civil judiciary. The PTT predeployment preparation has not yet caught up to this new reality and likewise has not made a shift to police vice infantry training.

The little specialized police training PTTs did receive was limited to either very basic policing practices or to rehearsing situations unlikely to be encountered. Classes on handcuffing and baton techniques are no longer valid or needed because the IP now teaches these themselves. In fact, the IP in AO Denver has certified trainers already teaching logistics, administration, crime scene investigation, sensitive site exploitation, vehicle maintenance, jailer/bailiff fundamentals, and basic leadership at its stations. A PTT arriving in Iraq without similar training starts at an immediate disadvantage. Some of the more advanced training PTTs did receive from former police officers during a dedicated 1- to 2 week police training period were on bounding overwatch, evasive driving (taught using standard police cruiser sedans regardless of the conspicuous lack of Ford Crown Victorias on a PTT table of equipment), and immediate action drills to ambushes and improvised explosive devices. Without delving into anecdotal vignettes about this training, it suffices to say that these periods of instruction were either unrelated to a police training package, taught by instructors lacking subject matter expertise, or conducted using unsuitable training aids. To be fair, there were some elements of PTT preparation that were both relevant and effective, but they were more the exception than the norm. It is a bit too dramatic to state that PTTs are destined for failure, but they certainly are not set up for success.

The Marine Corps has already recognized shortfalls in TT training, thus the creation of the Marine Corps Training and Advisor Group in Fort Story, VA and site visits by MOJAVE VIPER instructors to AO Denver to assess the situation and develop realistic training packages supporting the transition effort. Both actions are refreshing and bode well for future PTT deployment, so long as there is immediacy in designing and implementing a revised training regimen. Including items listed in the previous paragraph, a PTT training plan should include instruction on police administration, patrol distribution planning, developing a police training plan, dispatching procedures, department management, Iraqi and Ministry of Interior logistics, the Iraqi pay cycle, operating a joint coordination center, proper investigative techniques, and the Iraqi judicial system. The RCT-2 district PTTs also recommended an immersion scenario for several days at MOJAVE VIPER during which they would manage and supervise the routine functions of a police station, such as conducting inventories, dispatching mounted and dismounted patrols, distributing pay, and conducting vehicle maintenance.

Without trying to oversimplify a revised training plan, it should prepare PTTs for what they will do on a daily, weekly, and monthly basis. After-action reviews and personal interviews with redeploying PTTs are obvious mechanisms for gathering this information. Returning teams are a source of institutional memory ready to be tapped and should be incorporated into future training development, or the actual training itself, as much as possible. The time is ripe for the Marine Corps to refine its PTT training focus to address specific areas needed to prepare future teams for the rapidly improving situation in Al Anbar Province.

Success by Design, Not by Luck

Marine PTTs are successful in AO Denver due to a combination of force and good fortune; it is largely through determination and untrained Marines rising to the occasion that they achieve their substantial gains. They are not staffed or trained for success in transitioning responsibility of security to the ISF through developing the IP who are pivotal to assisting local governments achieve self-sufficiency. At some point, doing more with less ceases to be a source of pride and starts to become one of aggravation, frustration, and inefficiency. As the IP all across Al Anbar continue to develop, the Marine Corps must match these gains with a concerted effort to bolster manning and preparation of the district and station PTTs.

There is no greater goal than transition for Al Anbar as it truly is the catalyst for continued stability and development in the region. Transition teams, in general, and PTTs in particular, are the primary vehicles for achieving this end. The teams need a full commitment from the Marine Corps if they are to succeed in promoting the IP to a fully functioning force capable of independent operations. When the IP are capable of standing on their own, they will be a visible representation of overall ISF and civil judiciary legitimacy in the eyes of the Anbaris.
SIDEBAR

Authors’ Note: Source information contained in this article is largely anecdotal from conversations, e-mails, after-action reports, and Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned solicitations. While research techniques were based more on convenience and circumstance than strategy, the overwhelming concurrence and commonality in opinions from past and present station and district PTT personnel lend strong credence to the assertions and recommendations found in this article.

FOOTNOTE

Note

1. District and station PTT /O requirements are based on an unclassified 2d Marine Division general administration message dated 17 September 2007, Subject: "Reporting Instructions for OIF Transition Teams." by RCT-2, Iraqi Security Forces Liaison Cell

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IMAGE PHOTOGRAPH, Police transition teams have to be staffed appropriately to succeed. (Photo by Cpi Thomas Lew.)

IMAGE TABLE, Table 1., Table 2., Table 3.

IMAGE TABLE, Table 4.

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Reorganize Marine Corps Civil Affairs

BYLINE: Ubaldi, John; Piedra, Jose; Kline, Mark

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ABSTRACT
It reinforced the belief that technological superiority was paramount to American security and essential for the United States to fulfill its role as the world's sole superpower. Nations around the globe witnessed all too well the overwhelming military power that the United States could bring to the modern battlefield during Operation DESERT STORM and again to devastating effect during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF). Countersurgencies fell into the category of "small wars," which also include peacekeeping, stability operations, and humanitarian missions. The Marine Corps Small Wars Manual defines small wars as: ... operations undertaken under executive authority, wherein military force is combined with diplomatic pressure in the internal or external affairs of another state whose government is unstable, inadequate, or unsatisfactory for the preservation of life and of such interests as determined by the policy of our nation.

**FULL TEXT**

Being prepared for contingencies

For the second time in a generation America went to war prepared to fight utilizing a conventional war strategy against an irregular army. Again, the United States failed to understand what Clausewitz was talking about, by entering into a war that we wanted to fight, not the war that we ended up with. Historically the U.S. defense and Military Establishment has focused efforts on the institutionalized combat operations of modern warfare, never completely understanding the enemy we were fighting. This lack of strategic vision severely crippled efforts in trying to stabilize Iraq and Afghanistan, and now has the United States embroiled in a counterinsurgency fight. The United States again is seeing the emergence of fourth-generation warfare, where terrorist groups and other factions use irregular warfare to devastating effect. Defense and military staff planners have failed to move beyond the concept of the traditional high-technology, conventional, attrition warfare that is ingrained in the military strategic warfare doctrine. The insurgency war that the United States found itself in after the 2003 invasion of Iraq was the result of three failed premises of strategic planning—overutilization of traditional military doctrine, failure to plan for poststabilization operations, and not embracing the concept of civilmilitary operations (CMO).

**Background**

While serving as Commandant of the Marine Corps during the mid-1990s, Gen Charles C. Krulak outlined the changing dynamic of warfare facing the U.S. military, but more importantly, he outlined what the Marine Corps would face in future combat operations. In a speech to the National Press Club he stated:

In one moment in time, our service members will be feeding and clothing displaced refugees, providing humanitarian assistance. In the next moment, they will be holding two warring tribes apart—conducting peacekeeping operations—and, finally, they will be fighting a highly lethal mid-intensity battle—all on the same day ... all within three city blocks.2

What Gen Krulak was trying to say is that warfare had now evolved into fourth-generation warfare or irregular war, and we had better begin planning for a different kind of conflict. The world witnessed the magnificent performance of the U.S. Armed Forces in removing Saddam Hussein, validating the conventional theory of the American way of fighting. The long-term implication failed in the premise to prepare for the counterinsurgency that followed. In the wake of World War II and throughout the Cold War, the United States established its conventional force structure and doctrine on a foundation of technological superiority as a tradeoff for numerical inferiority. When the Soviet Union collapsed, many defense analysts attributed its demise and the end of the Cold War to the inability of the Kremlin to maintain pace with U.S. advancements and costs in high-technology weaponry. It reinforced the belief that technological superiority was paramount to American security and essential for the United States to fulfill its role as the world's sole superpower.3

Nations around the globe witnessed all too well the overwhelming military power that the United States could bring to the modern battlefield during Operation DESERT STORM and again to devastating effect during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF). Potential adversaries now have begun to exploit the glaring weakness in the U.S. military arsenal, which is our inability to fight and win a counterinsurgency. Military defense strategists often discuss asymmetric warfare but only pay lip service to its applications. Focusing on the strategy and tactics of past conflicts, military and defense theorists prepared the Armed Forces to fight a highly technological and conventional war paying little or no attention to counterinsurgency. With this lack of focus, the various insurgent groups have found a gap in the U.S. military and exploited our weakness in irregular warfare.

Counterinsurgencies fall into the category of "small wars," which also include peacekeeping, stability operations, and humanitarian missions. The Marine Corps Small Wars Manual defines small wars as:
operations undertaken under executive authority, wherein military force is combined with diplomatic pressure in the internal or external affairs of another state whose government is unstable, inadequate, or unsatisfactory for the preservation of life and of such interests as determined by the policy of our nation.

Future warfare will have the United States involved in more counterinsurgency, stability operations, and nation building than has been witnessed in the past. With no clear dominant threat on the horizon, threats to the security of the United States will come from unstable regions and nations. Operations in the future must incorporate and plan for stabilization and not believe that reconstruction will be the sole responsibility of the Department of State. Had there been better planning in poststability operations immediately following the end of major combat operations in Iraq, we would have seen a smoother transition in stability operations.

Future intervention by the United States will be multifaceted, having military forces engage in full military interventions, such as was the case in Iraq, but also including humanitarian and stability operations of different degrees. Marine Corps units that engage in combat operations from battalion to Marine expeditionary force (MEF) level will inadvertently cross over into stabilization operations. The focus of efforts inevitably will be on the civilian population.

Counterinsurgency rests on the importance of using the civilian population. In counterinsurgency operations, CMO is the combat multiplier that will focus the center of gravity on the civilian population. The new counterinsurgency manual that was recently published places emphasis on the significance of CMO. The integration of civilian and military efforts is crucial to a successful counterinsurgency operation. All efforts are channeled into the support of the local populace and the host nations government. Political, social, and economic programs are often more valuable than conventional military operations in addressing the root causes of conflict and undermining an insurgency.

During 2000 Gen Anthony C. Zinni, then-Commanding General, U.S. Central Command (USCentCom), relinquished command to GEN Tommy Franks, USA. During his time at USCentCom, Gen Zinni initiated combat operations against Iraq in December 1998 with Operation DESERT FOX. During that period, Gen Zinni developed the strategy for a post-Saddam Hussein environment, and he initiated a series of wargame exercises named DESERT CROSSING to plan for this eventuality. Gen Zinni stated:

And it struck me then that we had a plan to defeat Saddam's army, but we didn't have a plan to rebuild Iraq. And so I asked the different agencies of government to come together to talk about reconstruction planning for Iraq ... I thought we ought to look at political reconstruction, economic reconstruction, security reconstruction, humanitarian need, services, and infrastructure development. We met in Washington, DC. We called the plan, and we gamed it out in the scenario, Desert Crossing.

By not understanding the concept or embracing the need for poststabilization operations, the United States has repeated the mistakes of Vietnam. Eventually the conflict in Iraq will end, and the Marine Corps will move into other realms of the globe. This past year Gen James T. Conway suggested that the Marine Corps move its forces exclusively to the Afghanistan theater of operations. Even though the Department of Defense rejected this proposal, the Marine Corps is sending an infantry battalion to Afghanistan, and with it a team of civil affairs (CA) Marines will be attached to the incoming unit. The importance of CMO will enhance the battalion commander's overall focus and allow him the flexibility to channel his efforts into the security situation.

Integrated Operations

A clear distinction between governance operations that are integral to war and the myriad missions referred to in peace operations discourse would be hugely beneficial. Such a distinction would allow U.S. defense planners to focus on the political and economic reconstruction that is a part of war, while relegating humanitarian and nationbuilding missions to other organizations. Moreover, equating governance tasks that occur in all wars with the broader missions associated with peace operations and humanitarian assistance reinforces the tendency to avoid planning for governance operations in tandem with planning for combat operations. The essential point is that combat operations and governance operations are both integral to war and occur in tandem.

Combat operations that involve the Marine Corps in future operations will have to incorporate various planning in stability operations and embrace the concept of CMO. This is the challenging part for the Marine Corps to embrace as we have been the premier force-in-readiness and continue to serve the Nation well with our expeditionary nature. The Marine Corps needs to integrate the concept of CMO in any action it conducts in the future as it will be the force multiplier to the Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) commander. In the past the Marine Corps was unsure or unaware of how to use its CA units. A total integration and organization of CA units that are employed will enhance the battlefield commander's mission.
At the beginning of OIF, 3d Civil Affairs Group (3d CAG) deployed in support of 1 MEF when it conducted combat operations in Iraq. CA teams operated at the battalion to MEF levels, but unfortunately they came lightly equipped operating in small five-man teams at the battalion level. The table of organization and table of equipment did not support the mission, but in spite of these imposed limitations, the Marines overcame these shortcomings and accomplished the mission tasked to them.  

After back-to-back deployments by 3d and 4th CAGs, the Marine Corps stood up two provisional CAGs to relieve the burden on 3d and 4th CAGs. In 2007 and 2008 the Marine Corps assigned the mission of CMO to the artillery regiments as a secondary military occupational specialty. 10th Marines from Camp Lejeune deployed to Iraq to fulfill the CMO mission and would be relieved by 11th Marines from Camp Pendleton in March 2008.  

Currently, Security Cooperation Education and Training Center, located at Quantico, is beginning the coordination of how CA is organized and staffed in the Marine Corps. The underlying problem for the Marine Corps in relation to CA units in the other Services is that there is no central CA command structure currently operational. As of right now both CA units are commanded by a colonel, and for all practical purposes operate independently of each other.  

The Marine Corps needs to establish a central CA command structure that will coordinate the two current CA units in the Marine Corps and oversee how they are assigned to the MEE. Currently, requests come in similarly to the recent task of attaching a team of CA Marines to 2d Battalion, 7th Marines as they deployed to Afghanistan. A central CA command structure can begin the coordination with U.S. Army CA, which has a long history with the U.S. Special Operations Command. The Marine Corps needs to build a relationship with the Army but not fall under the Army in this capacity. The Army's mission is similar, but the Marine Corps has a more expeditionary mindset. With the Air Force and Navy establishing CA units, a central command structure would coordinate between the Services and Active and Reserve Components CA units.  

The new Marine Corps CA command should be based out of Marine Corps Base Quantico as to better coordinate CA issues with Headquarters Marine Corps and the other Services. This command structure would have one unified voice that oversees Marine Corps CA in all areas of training and establishes policy for its assignment to various units in the Marine Corps.  

Beyond building relationships with the other Services regarding CA, relationships need to be built with the various commands in the Marine Corps. Starting with Marine Forces Pacific/Atlantic, MEFs and the various Marine expeditionary units need to work with the operational commander by incorporating CMO into his operational plan enabling him to focus on the combat situation.  

To maintain the operational tempo of CA in the Marine Corps, the structure of the CAGs needs to increase, along with the funding, equipment, and a dedicated inspector-instructor staff to maintain the operational tempo. At the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned, interviews were conducted with over 50 key personnel involved in interagency activities supporting stability, security, transition, and reconstruction operations (SSTRO) in Iraq in late 2006. There was almost uniform agreement that military liaison officers are key to coordinating between military and civilian agencies. Many noted that experts in governance, economics, and agriculture are needed in all key areas of responsibility in order to effectively carry out SSTRO.10  

The Marine Corps needs to look beyond Iraq when reorganizing CAG and realize that the world that we once knew has radically changed, and we, as Marines, need to change how we operate in the future. The Marine Corps will always be America's expeditionary force, but a viable and robust CA unit would enhance the mission capability of the MAGTF commander enabling him to accomplish the mission given by the Nation.  

**SIDEBAR**

"The First, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish by that test the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, that [which] is alien to its nature."  

-Carl von Clausewitz  

**SIDEBAR**

Counterinsurgency rests on the importance of using the civilian population.
SIDEBAR

"The military probably since Vietnam, maybe before, became more and more saddled with conflict resolution-strange conflict resolution-peacekeeping, humanitarian efforts, nation building. The military has resisted this. They don't like it. They're not trained for it. But there's no one else to do it and it continues to be the mission that confronts us.

"Now either we legitimize it for the military, which means we would revamp civil affairs, have a large and more powerful, more robust capabilities, psychological operations, we would have the ability to reconstruct economies, reconstruct the political systems or we find other agencies of government to pick up that slack. It can't be dumped on a military that is not trained, equipped or organized for that mission."

-Gen Anthony C. Zinni

FOOTNOTE

Notes


by MGySgts John Ubaldi & Jose Piedra & MSgt Mark Kline

* MGySgt Ubaldi is currently Operations Chief, 3d CAG. He has deployed to Iraq with 5th CAG and served with Combined Joint Task Force 180 in Afghanistan in 2002.
* MGySgt Piedra is currently the S-2 Chief, 3d CAG. He has deployed twice to Iraq and has served in Bosnia/Kosovo, all with 3d CAG.
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The authors argue for a centralized CA command structure to better support operations. (Photo by Cpl Mike Escobar.)

**Sustaining COIN**

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**ABSTRACT**

The chapter, to include the vignettes (a total of 20 pages), was starkly similar to my overall experience in coordinating logistics support throughout the 13 months in Iraq. Since RCT-2's deployment coincided with the manual's publication, I have the unique opportunity to provide feedback to the concepts introduced in the sustainment chapter. [...] Army heavy equipment transport (HET) teams were forward deployed to increase response time for recoveries.

**FULL TEXT**

Capabilities requirements to support operations

On 15 December 2006, the joint Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency (COIN) Manual (Field Manual 3-24 (FM 3-24)/Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.5 (MCWP 3-33.5)) was published, replacing the interim COIN manual (FMI 3-07.22). Unlike the interim version, the new manual features a chapter focused on sustainment for COIN. Fifteen days after the publication, I deployed with Regimental Combat Team 2 (RCT-2) for 13 months to Area of Operations (AO) Denver, western Al Anbar Province, Iraq. Serving as the logistics officer during this period, I found the chapter on sustainment especially useful as a baseline for supporting COIN. The chapter, to include the vignettes (a total of 20 pages), was starkly similar to my overall experience in coordinating logistics support throughout the 13 months in Iraq. Since RCT-2's deployment coincided with the manual's publication, I have the unique opportunity to provide feedback to the concepts introduced in the sustainment chapter. Accordingly, the following observations and recommendations are provided to further discuss the logistics topics presented in the manual.

To put things in perspective, AO Denver is a 30,000-square-mile area, roughly the size of South Carolina. RCT-2 pushed logistics from Al Asad Airbase to six forward operating bases (FOBs), each belonging to a battalion task force. In addi-
tion, there were 29 transition teams (TTs) operating in AO Denver, including teams for ports of entry, border enforcement, police, and army, all of which received support. A direct support combat logistics battalion (DS CLB), an Army combat support sustainment battalion (CSSB), a naval mobile construction battalion, and contracted services provided the logistics support beyond RCT-2's capabilities.

Concept of Support

The overall concept of support for AO Denver fell under three major categories: (1) scheduled and on-call sustainment and support to static positions; e.g., FOB, combat outpost; (2) supporting maneuver generally involving platoon- and company-level disruption operations in the open desert; and (3) support to the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and their TT counterparts. Meeting these three major support requirements concurrently stretched the logistics capabilities of RCT-2 and its external support elements. Enemy and terrain posed obvious challenges, but these were compounded by the "tyranny of distance" uniquely attributed to the sheer size of AO Denver. The enemy targeted the few main lines of communications utilized by logistics convoys. The lack of crossing points along the Euphrates River also reduced flexibility for alternate routes, making logistics movements predictable and more vulnerable to attack. Convoys also took a beating from the poor conditions faced along the main supply routes (MSRs), and on unimproved routes convoys encountered fine, loose sand called "moondust" that severely degraded traction and visibility. The concept of support leveraged available capabilities, such as air delivery, helicopter external loads, rapid ground refueling (RGR), and retail operations to reduce the impact posed by these factors. These capabilities enabled the RCT to bypass the threat or at least mitigate the number of convoys required to replenish the AO.

Fixed- and rotary-wing assets were critical to the support concept. To illustrate this point, C-1 30 drops and CH-53/CH-47 external loads delivered supplies on a scheduled basis to two forward positions on the far side of the Euphrates River. With unimproved routes and the lack of crossing points, ground resupply to these distant outposts would have involved a 2-day evolution, consisting of a 10- to 14-hour movement per day and exposing convoys to routes heavily targeted with improvised explosive devices. Via helicopter, supplies delivered to one of these outposts involved a 10-minute flight.

In support of maneuver elements, logistics trains integrated at least two Army M978 heavy expanded mobility tactical truck (HEMTT) fuel tankers, each with a 2,300-gallon combat carrying capacity. It was discovered early that the Army tankers were more resilient to the terrain, and it became standard procedure to have these assets support light armored vehicle and tank elements. Operations were extended with CH-53s equipped with tactical bulk fueling delivery systems conducting RGR to the ground units. Lastly, Army heavy equipment transport (HET) teams were forward deployed to increase response time for recoveries.

The aviation combat element once again proved critical during the security operations conducted in support of the Hajj pilgrimage in 2007. With CLB and CSSB capabilities already working at maximum capacity, a Marine wing support squadron (MWSS) was tasked to establish the FOB to support operations for the Hajj. In this situation, the MWSS took on a role traditionally executed by the Marine logistics group, albeit the FOB was built around an airfield. The MWSS had a unique opportunity to showcase its capabilities and its ability to go beyond its aviation ground support role by supporting the ground combat element.

The Army Corps Support Group and its subordinate CSSB were also tremendous support providers. The CSSB shared the logistics burden with the CLB, providing onsite life support and distribution to two FOBs. The CSSB possessed unique capabilities, such as shower, laundry, and clothing renovation/laundry advanced system (SLCR/LAD) units that rivaled the contracted shower/laundry services aboard Al Asad. The CSSB’s vehicle assets, which included the palletized load system, HEMTT fuel tankers, and HETs, were the preferred assets to conduct distribution in support of maneuver, engineer, and recovery operations.

As depicted in Figure 1, supporting AO Denver was a combined effort. Support packages were developed with the capability sets that optimally met the requirements. As a result, units assumed nonstandard missions to contribute to the overall support concept. It was not unusual to witness an Army support team providing life support to a Marine camp or maneuver element and vice versa. Overall, it was an effective cooperation that extended beyond service and doctrinal boundaries.

Clear, Hold, Build

The "clear, hold, build" concept implemented to establish permanent presence within AO Denver placed a huge strain on the logistics system described above. Unlike conventional operations where equipment, support, and services could be shifted from one position to another, permanent presence did not allow the ability to shift resources. As a result, there was a constant need to generate resources to meet the requirements presented by a newly built permanent presence position.
To put this in context, the RCT established more than 10 company- to platoon-sized combat outposts and patrol bases. Acquiring Class IV building materials from finite stocks was the first challenge. However, the plan to sustain the newly built position proved to be the most difficult task in the process. Primarily, the battalion was responsible for the sustainment and life support for the new position, and in most cases the battalion fulfilled this responsibility. In other cases, however, external support units went outside their traditional missions to render the support. The support took the form of life support services and/or retail distribution to the forward position. In the most extreme case, Camp Korean Village near the Jordanian border received direct Class I (subsistence) and Class III (fuel) replenishment from the theater sustainment command simply because of its close proximity along the theater MSR.

A number of key variables led to external support units assuming much of the burden traditionally borne by a battalion's organic capabilities. First, the battalions simply could not handle the additional distribution or onsite service responsibility. Second, contracted services could not distribute or establish onsite services in that area due to security, terrain, and contractual challenges. Third, the new position was located along an MSR where it was more efficient for CLB or CSSB to replenish that position vice the battalion combat train. Finally, there was the tendency to go beyond what was considered "expeditionary," resulting in the growing requirement to replicate at distant outposts the same amenities resident at Al Asad. In these cases, the Army provided an acceptable degree of the onsite services with their SLCR/LAD teams for showers and laundry. In the same vein, the SeaBees positioned six-man teams to provide onsite electrical and plumbing repair, and the CLB conducted scheduled mobile exchange, postal, and disbursing services. There was one service, however, that could not go beyond expeditionary - waste services. If a contractor could not travel to the site to remove the brown/gray water, then the only option was to burn waste and establish a leech field.

The main takeaway from this is that there was no cookie cutter solution to support the clear, hold, build concept. The concept of support was developed based on what capability - military or contracted, organic or external - could best provide the support. The fact that units took on nontraditional missions or went outside defined support relationships was a concern; however, it was often overlooked.

Weighting the Battalion

The size of AO Denver and the great dispersion between supporting and supported elements significantly impacted the responsiveness of the logistics support network. Within AO Denver, for a nonlife-threatening situation, distribution of supplies and support to a battalion FOB from Al Asad was totally dependent on the ground resupply schedule or space available air. A supported unit could wait on average 2 to 3 days for the delivery of support, whether it was the delivery of a unique item or a maintenance contact team. As a result, constant coordination within the support network was a must to allow for greater anticipation of requirements. It was also readily apparent that it was necessary to weight the battalions with additional capabilities to increase self-sufficiency and reduce response time to the forward positions. These additional capabilities improved distribution within the battalion AO, reducing the dependency on RCT coordinated distribution via external support. Again, formed from a combination of military and contracted assets, Figure 2 provides capability sets that were pushed from Al Asad to the battalion FOB.

Being resident at the battalion FOB, these capability sets eliminated the need to source from the RCT at Al Asad when the requirement arose. One can also discern from the list that these capabilities supported distribution requirements within the so-called "last tactical mile." Only on rare occasions as described above were external support units or contracted services utilized for retail distribution beyond the FOB to outlying positions. With these additional assets, the battalion was well equipped to quickly respond to the needs of its subordinate elements.

Support to the Host Nation

Logistics support to the host nation - military or civilian elements involved a balancing act as we attempted to implement a "tough love" approach to host-nation requirements while continuing to win their hearts and minds. Fuel for the Iraqi Army and police, restoring utilities to the cities, and bridge repair were the significant issues faced throughout the deployment. In terms of support to the cities, implementing a civil solution under the staff supervision of the G-5/RCT civil affairs group was the first option. Logistics support with military resources coordinated by the G-4/RCT S-4 served as the backup option or at times as the last resort. There were rare cases, however, in which military operations were negatively impacted; e.g., a damaged bridge, when military resources were immediately activated to effect repairs. In most situations the civil affairs approach was successful in implementing an Iraqi solution. Although highly positive, achieving an Iraqi solution did have a significant drawback. Since an Iraqi solution might take weeks to implement, it tied up military resources that were on standby to assist as the last resort. It also required considerable time to coordinate since some unique assets; e.g., a 60-ton crane, had to be sourced and transported from areas outside of AO Denver.
Fuel for the Iraqi military and police was a constant source of angst for logisticians and operators alike. This issue clearly captured the struggle faced by all who assisted in making a viable, self-sufficient ISF. The general policy of "providing emergency support to prevent mission failure" seemed applicable on any given day in terms of fuel. The fact that the Iraqi military and police operated with insufficient fuel allocations resulted in continued emergency fuel support from coalition forces, despite the dismay of higher headquarters. With no fuel delivery in sight, there was no other recourse but to ignore the policy and dispense fuel. Until Iraqi logistics mechanisms fully mature, this issue will continue to exist.

Contracted Support

Contracted support was utilized to reduce the burden on military resources or to provide a service that coalition forces could not generate in a timely manner. Contracted support fell under two major categories: onsite services at FOBs and procurement of materials or delivery of services through contracts.

The RCT conducted oversight of the onsite services at Camp Ripper, Al Asad and, at its peak, six battalion FOBs. Services rendered varied based on the classification of the camp or battalion FOB. Camp Ripper and three battalion FOBs (called B sites) received logistics civil augmentation program (LogCAP) coordinated services normally termed as Kellogg, Brown, and Root services. The contract guidelines were contained within Task Order 139 (TO 139), which explained the extent of onsite services. In general, dining facilities, trash and waste removal, shower and laundry, and bulk liquids generation were the life support services rendered under TO 139. The RCT and its battalions contracted other services, such as commercial generator upkeep and maintenance, separately from TO 139. For the battalion FOBs not classified as B sites, contracted services were completely outside the purview of TO 139. As a result, the RCT faced the difficult task of applying the proper contracting means to establish a service and dealing with a multitude of contractors once services were awarded.

Obtaining services via LogCAP was a very slow process since it was handled within the confines of TO 139. The first contracting package (a laundry facility at Haditha Dam) submitted after the RCT assumed control of AO Denver was not yet approved at the conclusion of the 13-month tour. On the other hand, obtaining services outside of TO 139, although a much quicker process, presented a riskier contract. In this situation, the RCT did not benefit from the LogCAP support system to enforce contractual obligations. There were many occasions when civilian companies failed to fulfill their contractual obligations. These failures resulted in a stoppage in essential services and forced the RCT to scramble to find a military solution until a new company was awarded the contract.

An unfulfilled contractual obligation was the main drawback to contracted services. In essence, it was a double-edged sword as the benefits gained from contracted services were offset by the dependence on the company to live up to the contract. The process of replacing a noncompliant contractor involved a long period of generating sufficient justification to cancel the contract. While wading through this process, the RCT suffered from the lack of services and was forced to redirect already strained military resources to provide the services in the interim.

One positive aspect of contracted services emerged as the security situation improved in AO Denver. Improved security increased the RCT’s ability to source contracts with local businesses. This practice improved the local economy and developed rapport with the local populace.

Recommendations

Units should make every attempt to acquire a contracting specialist on their manning document. A contracting specialist will be a key enabler in navigating through the nuances of contracting and providing the essential expertise on the ground to address and resolve issues, as well as developing and overseeing the unit’s contracting program.

Although the predeployment training program (PTP) is already stacked with critical training requirements, which include tactical vehicle incidental licensing, units should take every opportunity to provide incidental training for the following skill sets: generator, air conditioner, bulk liquids, food service equipment, material handling equipment, and helicopter support teams. Once trained, these incidental operators would bring to forward positions the capability to oversee life support and replenishment functions and act as first responders to any equipment malfunction. Further, units should also acquire school-trained logistics vehicle system (LVS) and wrecker operators, adding depth to the unit’s truck platoon attachment. The type and quantity of incidental skill sets could be determined by coordinating early on in PTP with the current battlespace owner in Iraq and validated during a unit’s predeployment site survey.

Change garrison support relationships to better develop the RCT/DS CLB working relationship. In garrison there is very little interaction between the RCT and its assigned DS CLB. The fact that an RCT headquarters does not normally train at
Exercise MOJAVE VIPER while the DS CLB does, further widens the gap between the two units. Bridging this gap well before deployment is crucial to establishing an effective logistics support network once in Iraq.

Stay the course on implementing Iraqi solutions to Iraqi military or civilian matters. As alluded to, it will be tough to go against our very nature as Marines to render assistance at a moment's notice. However, helping Iraqis to help themselves is the right approach to realizing a self-sustaining Iraq.

As the manual asserts, logistics for COIN "extends beyond sustaining operations; support provided to the population may become an important shaping operation or even the decisive operation.”2 The manual further refines this guidance by stating that the “paramount role of logistics units remains to support Soldiers and Marines in accomplishing the mission, . . . supporting other Logical Lines of Operations (LLO) must not detract” from this primary role.3 Logistics in AO Denver followed this overarching theme. The majority of time and effort expended by all was focused on sustaining the force; only when time or the situation allowed for it did logisticians take the opportunity to implement shaping actions in support of the LLOs. Staying true to its familiar role as the support base for all operations allowed logistics to clearly see through a fluid and dynamic environment and maintain its focus on the warfighter.

FOOTNOTE

Notes
1. There were more than 70 fixed positions in AO Denver at the time of RCT-2’s departure in January 2008.
2. FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, pp. 8-1 and 8-4.
3. Multinational Force- West utilized the term "lines of operation" vice LLO.

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GRAPHIC: Photographs
IMAGE PHOTOGRAPH, Marines with Task Force 3/2 (3d Battalion, 2d Marines), assisted by CLB-4, conduct a helicopter external load mission at Battle Position Da Nang. (Photo by Cpl James F. Cline Ill.)
IMAGE ILLUSTRATION, Figure 1.A0 Denver logistics operations.
IMAGE ILLUSTRATION, Figure 2 Additional battalion capabilities.
IMAGE PHOTOGRAPH, SeaBees constructing a Class I storage facility at a permanent presence position in the Haditha Triad. (Photo courtesy of the author.)
IMAGE PHOTOGRAPH, The author (R) with Capt Jason Miller, Battalion Landing Team 2/4 S-4, inspecting construction effort at a permanent presence position located in the Haditha Triad. (Photo courtesy of the author.)

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Information Operations [not equal to] Tactical Messaging

BYLINE: Roosa, Christopher.
by Col Christopher Roosa

Col Roosa has deployed four times to Afghanistan and three times to Iraq in support of liaison team operations. He is currently assigned to the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned.

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ABSTRACT

[...] we need to plan for the worst-case scenario when it comes to TM, for two reasons - just in case it comes true, and more importantly, because it will be the story that our enemy will use against us. [...] we can work to refine our TM. [...] we can inform our Marines of TM so they get it and help spread the word through their actions on the battlefield. [...] I would recommend: * In theater we must separate IO, which are enduring strategic themes and are focused on the macrolevel, from TM, which takes place at the tactical level of command. * We need Training and Education Command to address this issue in a systematic and formal fashion designed to preserve and disseminate this knowledge to all who can employ it. * We need to encourage engaged units to pass their experiences onto the Marine Corps for inclusion in the lessons learned database.

FULL TEXT

Speed of information on the battlefield is critical
US planes bomb wedding party in Iraq; 41 die

DUBAI, May 19, 2004: At least 41 civilians were killed on Wednesday in a US air raid on an Iraqi village celebrating a wedding. The Dubai-based Al Arabiya television network, quoting eyewitnesses in the town of Al Qaim, on the Syrian border, said the frontier village of Makr al Deeb was attacked before dawn. 'The US planes dropped more than 100 bombs on us,' an unidentified man who said he was from the village said on Al Arabiya. 'They hit two homes where the wedding was being held and then they leveled the whole village. No bullets were fired by us, nor was anything happening,' he added.1

Do you recall this story? This story is a lie. Through my deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq and by listening to those who have had to face the battle at the front, I have come to the conclusion that we need to improve our information flow at the point of the spear.

In fighting a counterinsurgency (COIN), I believe the critical element is speed - the speed in which intelligence on the counterinsurgent gets to the warfighter, the speed of the warfighter to get on location before the intelligence becomes perishable, and the speed in which you can combine these two elements to engage, capture, or kill the insurgent. However, there is another element of speed that is as crucial as these other factors, and it is often overlooked and poorly managed - the speed at which information flows back into the community regarding the impact of the mission.

It is one thing to be moving through an area and moving on, but in COIN, war is generally waged "within" the local population. The objective is not the capture of geographical terrain, as in conventional war; it is the "capture" of "human terrain" or, more accurately, the support of the local populace. The degree of success of the insurgent is going to depend upon the level of support he receives from this human terrain, and this support level will fluctuate. This then is the insurgent's critical vulnerability, his center of gravity. The loss and gain of support from the local population is a zero sum game, even if it varies over time. If we win the human terrain, he loses it, and he will eventually be forced to surrender the physical terrain.

When you are fighting in someone's backyard, front yard, playgrounds, and schoolyards, and intend to be a persistent presence in those areas, communication with the local populace is key. This means that we need to acquire sophistication in communicating with the local population. Communication is especially critical when choosing the manner of dis-
Semination of information - what has happened in their neighborhood, why it happened, and why their lives are better for the event happening. Some call this backflow of information to communities information operations (IO). I want to call it something else.

Let's first start with defining IO. Joint Publication 3-13 (JP 3-13), Information Operations, 13 February 2006, states:

Information operations (IO) are described as the integrated employment of electronic warfare (EW), computer network operations (CNO), psychological operations (PSYOP), military deception (MILDEC), and operations security (OPSEC), in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our own.

In the glossary, it goes on to state that the definition will be changed in the future to read:

Information operations. The integrated employment of the core capabilities of electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military deception, and operations security, in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our own.

Figure 1 shows what a notional IO cell will look like.

IO operates at what we may call the macrolevel and brings into play strategic-level manpower and equipment. IO involves, as Figure 1 recognizes, a network of IO cells, each of which have a function in the production, analysis, and delivery of strategic information. But while this plays a valuable role at the strategic level, it is an inappropriate and cumbersome tool at the tactical level. I would argue that we need something totally different at the tactical level because we lose the message "battle" every day in the neighborhoods.

"Repeat a lie often enough and it becomes true." This truism was originally authored by Vladimir Lenin and later used by the National Socialist Minister for Propaganda, Dr. Josef Goebbels. Both recognized that "truth" is subjective. We need to understand one of the primary tools of the enemy's tactics - "the lie." The use of the lie demands a need for speed in our responses.

Often we are so preoccupied with the mantra, "get the truth and the facts," that we pursue them at the expense of speed. While I don't believe it necessary to intentionally mislead the communities in which insurgents operate or even to lie to them, I do believe we need to get at least "some of our story" out onto the street. By the time we have gathered all of the facts the story is old, and we are forced into a reactive position to refute the different story told by our enemy. We lose the "information advantage" that timeliness brings. And we should not allow the classification of information, tactics, and methods to be compromised. As the locals can see, someone is dead; something got blown up; some other "event" happened - but in each case, the event needs to be addressed as quickly as possible.

Our opponents use all of the latest methods - Internet websites, YouTube, MySpace, cell phone text messages, handbills, billboards, and word of mouth - to get their story out. And yet we persist with more formalistic announcements - press releases, spokesmen, and other formal channels. While we are coordinating the press release, he is posting a near-realtime video on the Internet.

The insurgents already have a cultural advantage because they are intimately familiar with the cultural matrix of the country. They know how tribal societies operate, they know whom to pressure, and they share a common (or more common, as the case may be) religious and cultural background with the communities than the United States does. In that sense, they "know" and "understand" their audience far better than the coalition knows them, and they know how to pitch the story for maximum effect. This cultural understanding of the target audience is not to be underappreciated, and its impact should not be underestimated.

Part of the problem, I'd suggest, is conceptual. When the term IO is used to address this COIN requirement, it speaks of a formal process and one that addresses the problem at a strategic level. When a company or battalion commander wants to get a "message" out, he has to send the request up the chain of command for approval. This takes time. In a war that requires speed of information, we are without the luxury of time. Perhaps then we should not be calling such operations IO but rather "tactical messaging," or TM, because it addresses a need at the tactical level. This is the spot where boots are on the ground - the spot where the fight on the human terrain is taking place.

As a starting point I suggest we look at the definition of the 14th century word, message. Merriam-Webster defines it as "1: a communication in writing, in speech, or by signals 2: a messenger's mission 3: an underlying theme or idea." It is critical that we move TM down to the lowest levels. In the offense, the message can be used to drive operations. For
example, tactical messages can be used to flush out combatants from the local population and to reinforce positive beliefs about coalition forces and their role in the operations area. In the defense, or after the fact, TM can be used to explain the reasons behind the mission. Critically, in the postoperation environment, the mission reaffirms the tactical message that has been disseminated earlier. It reaffirms for the local populace the tactical messages they have already received, even if the operation itself has occurred on an ad hoc basis in reaction to an unexpected triggering event. The tactical message should be sufficient to explain to the local population what caused the mission and why someone or some group was targeted. This message needs to be on the street within 24 hours or less to reaffirm the earlier tactical messages the local population received. While we will not surrender the truth, we can at least tell what we knew at the time we knew it. Speed is key.

There are four parts to TM:

- The tactical messenger - responsible for drafting, creating, and disseminating the message.
- The tactical method - handbills, Internet, radio, television, newspapers, or a combination.
- The tactical message - what is the story that we are trying to convey?
- The tactical effect - did the local population actually receive and understand our message?

In delaying dissemination of information, we create an "opportunity space" for misinformation by the enemy. So we hear negative stories about the actions of coalition forces killing wedding parties, about hospitals and clinics raided and destroyed, and about young, innocent bystanders killed while doing no more than minding their own business. The list goes on. While the "facts" revealed by the insurgents about these events later prove to be false, the stories are already out, and the damage is done. In this COIN, the point is that our opponents will not hesitate to employ the lie. They have complete disregard for the truth. They understand that the speed of getting out the message is more important than the facts.

Thus, I believe we need to think of TM as artillery. It is a supporting arm. Artillery is the "king" of battle because of the rapid and massive damage it can inflict on an opponent. TM needs to be viewed as the king of the information battlefield. Artillerymen speak in terms of preplanned targets, on-call targets, and fire planning in the battle area; intelligence operators speak of the intelligence preparation of the battlefield. We need to do the same with TM.

We don't execute missions without a plan. So, what is the TM plan? Is there a message to be released prior to the operation to help set conditions? What is released immediately after the action? What is the message if the operation goes bad? How does the message of a particular operation support the enduring communications strategy? We plan for fires in the battle area never wanting to believe that we will be overrun; yet we plan for it just in case. Likewise we need to plan for the worst-case scenario when it comes to TM, for two reasons - just in case it comes true, and more importantly, because it will be the story that our enemy will use against us. Thus, we can work to refine our TM. And we can inform our Marines of TM so they get it and help spread the word through their actions on the battlefield.

At the tactical level commanders are not authorized to conduct IO without prior approval, or they must select themes from a standardized list. Either commanders develop their own methods of TM, or they wait on the more formal process of IO. This means that a commander either risks his career or he wastes time. These are both bad options. We must give some latitude at the command level because this is the place where the boots meet the fight. It makes no sense to give a commander decisionmaking authority over life and death in his area of operations and not the authority to spread his message to the neighborhoods he patrols each day. We must give some latitude at the place where the boots meet the fight. Therefore, I would recommend:

- In theater we must separate IO, which are enduring strategic themes and are focused on the macrolevel, from TM, which takes place at the tactical level of command.
- We need Training and Education Command to address this issue in a systematic and formal fashion designed to preserve and disseminate this knowledge to all who can employ it.
- We need to encourage engaged units to pass their experiences onto the Marine Corps for inclusion in the lessons learned database.

Only by getting the word out on our side on how to conduct TM will we be able to increase the speed in which TM reaches local ears. It is this increase in speed to influence the human terrain that is essential in the current COIN fight, and this increase in speed will give us advantage over the enemy.
SIDEBAR
In delaying dissemination of information, we create an "opportunity space" for misinformation. . . .

FOOTNOTE
Notes
1. This news story is available at http://www.dawn.com/2004/05/20/topl5.htm.
4. This definition was found at http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/message.

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GRAPHIC: Photographs
IMAGE PHOTOGRAPH, Tactical messaging is not about tactics. (Photo by Sgt Roe F. Seigle.)
IMAGE ILLUSTRATION, Figure 1. Notional IO cell. (Taken from JP 3-13.) 3
IMAGE PHOTOGRAPH, Get our story out to the street sooner to counteract enemy disinformation efforts. (Photo by Cpl Chris Lytle.)
IMAGE PHOTOGRAPH, Pass lessons learned through interaction with the population to the Center for Lessons Learned. (Photo by Sot Stephen M. DaBoard.)

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COIN Perspectives

BYLINE: Hanson, Michael

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ABSTRACT
Devices like night vision goggles, PEQ2 infrared laser aiming devices, ACOG (Advanced Combat Optical Gunsight - a 4 power rifle scope) advanced body armor. The insurgents are the underdog. [...] they will not present themselves to be massacred unless they are stupid.

FULL TEXT

This article is reprinted from the Small Wars Journal. November 2008, with permission of the author and the Small Wars Journal LLC

Tanks and artillery don't defeat insurgents, nor do warships, fighters, or bombers. Infantry defeats insurgents. These weapons can help the infantry man, but in the end it is the soldier on point that will locate, close with and destroy the enemy either by direct action or by denying the enemy the ability to operate against him. American infantry are outstanding troops, but there are simple ways to make them even more effective. If our infantry forces are restructured and reequipped, they can be better tailored to the fight they are currently engaged in. American infantry are equipped with a vast array of "force multipliers" and "battlefield dominators".

This is equipment that essentially gives an American Soldier the combat power of several enemy combatants. Devices like night vision goggles, PEQ2 infrared laser aiming devices, ACOG (Advanced Combat Optical Gunsight - a 4 power rifle scope) advanced body armor. The United States outfits its warriors with the best gear it can afford. "The best for our troops" is a universal ideal that the vast majority of Americans support.

So then how have small groups rag tag insurgents with no complex machines of their own confounded American efforts in Iraq for over four years? How have these bands of unrelated rebels armed with Soviet-era small arms and homemade weapons managed to hold on beneath massive American military might for as long as they have?

The answer is simple: our enemy has chosen not to allow itself to be slaughtered by our advanced machines and crack infantry troops. The enemy fights in the human domain. He has made our machines and tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) ineffective and obsolete by fighting in ways and places where we cannot use our machines to their potential.

We need to ask ourselves: "How do insurgents fight?" The answer lies in the fundamentals of guerrilla warfare. The insurgents are the underdog. Therefore, they will not present themselves to be massacred unless they are stupid. After four years of war most of the stupid ones are dead or have gotten smarter.

The insurgent fights on his terms. He only fights when he wants to fight. The combat zone is often his home. He has lived there his whole life and is not going anywhere else, and so he is patient. He will wait for an opportunity to arise. If no opportunity comes he will wait longer. He chooses when he wants to fight. He chooses how to fight. He chooses the ground on which he fights. He decides if a situation is favorable to him. And he will only fight if the situation is in his favor, when he has the advantage. That puts us at a disadvantage. If the time, place and method of attack are all decided by the enemy, then that means he has the initiative. He is proactive and we are reactive. If we ever gain the initiative in a fight he will break contact and disappear. The insurgent only fights when he wants to fight and when he is prepared to fight. The only time he fights when he doesn't want to is when he is trapped and has no choice but to fight his way out.

The initiative in this war was with the insurgents for a very long time. They had the advantages because we let them have the advantages. We are reactive by nature. We hoped to draw fire and then quickly counterattack and turn the fight. But we cannot seize the initiative by counter attacking if there is no one to counter attack. The enemy knows this and has made this his TTP. That is why the enemy began employing victim initiated IED's [improvised explosive devices]. They could hit us and we couldn't hit them back because they are not even there to hit back at.

We need to ask ourselves: "What would we do if we were the insurgents?" Look at the facts:

Insurgents typically operate in 3-4 man cells. Infantry Marines patrol with a squad consisting of 3 fire teams. Each fire team, ideally, has four Marines with hand grenades, one M249 Squad Automatic Weapon, one M203 40mm grenade launcher, and three M16's ideally with ACOG's and PEQ2's. Each man has night vision capabilities and is wearing full body armor kit. Within the squad, each fire team is its own maneuver element. If one team gets engaged it can establish a base of fire while the other two maneuver on the enemy. Three fire teams, or one squad, can easily surround or cordon off a building until support arrives.

If you were a 3-4 man insurgent cell would you attack a Marine rifle squad? Would you attack an Ml Abrams tank with its 120mm main gun? A Bradley fighting vehicle with its 25mm chain gun? An LAV [light armored vehicle]? A Stryker? Or an up armored humvee with a .50 caliber machine gun, a 40mm MK-19 or a TOW missile system? Would a fire team
sized insurgent cell come out and shoot at any of these vehicles, much less one in a convoy of many more? No, they would not come out and shoot at one of these war machines with an AK or an RPG [rocket propelled grenade] because they will get killed fast. They have done so in the past, and they have learned their lesson. The enemy has learned how we operate. They have learned that any of these war machines with whatever amount of firepower can only return fire. If they never fire on any of these machines then the machines can't fire back. They have neutralized our war machines, made them irrelevant.

The enemy won't openly shoot at our war machines, but they will put a bomb on a road 3 miles away where that machine has to drive on. Our war machines have been reduced to targets.

The enemy's weapon of choice among others is the Improvised Explosive Device, the IED. Made out of anything from military ordnance to home made explosives. The IED is the biggest threat to our troops in Iraq. The IED has evolved to meet everything we have developed to counter it. We add armor to our vehicles and they build bigger bombs to penetrate our armor. We develop TTP to catch triggermen using a command wire and then they use radio signals. We develop radio jamming devices to jam their signals and they create pressure plates and crunch wire initiators. A $3.5 billion jammer defeated by a $10 saw blade pressure plate. The enemy now employs EFP's, or Explosively Formed Projectiles which can penetrate almost all of our armor systems.

For a long time the IED was the number one weapon that was killing and wounding our troops and destroying our equipment. Though the IED may not have been the enemy's main effort, it was definitely a large threat to our troops. If we can take that weapon away from the enemy, deny him its effectiveness, then that will greatly upset his efforts against us. He will have to completely change his ways to fight us. Perhaps he will be forced to challenge us in open gunfights where our troops can kill him. We can ignore their IED's, like they ignore our machines, and make them obsolete by avoiding them.

Surfaces and Gaps - MCDP-1 [Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1], Warfighting, defines Surfaces and Gaps as such:

Surfaces are enemy hard spots or enemy strengths. Gaps are soft spots or enemy weaknesses. The goal is to avoid enemy strength and focus the efforts against enemy weakness. Putting strength against weakness reduces casualties and is more likely to yield decisive results. Whenever possible, Gaps should be exploited.

Judging by the Warfighting definition of Surfaces and Gaps it seems that we are avoiding gaps and traveling only on surfaces. We are running the gauntlet every time we go out in vehicles. Consider that roads are channelized avenues of approach. We can never have observation on all roads at all times. The same roads must be cleared over and over again, every day. And we are being blown up in the same spots by IED's often times emplaced in the same holes, craters and culverts. We are playing their game.

We can make IED's obsolete by avoiding them. Naturally, we can't completely stop using the roads. But if we can decrease our need to be on the roads so much we will decrease our casualties and upset the enemy's actions. Why not use more air assets? Instead of huge resupply convoys braving IED infested roads, why not use air resupply to fly over the danger areas? Do we not have enough air assets? If not, then we should get them.

Iraq has the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers, plus large lakes and countless wide canals. Why not use boats to insert/extract patrols? Or transport supplies? We already have off road vehicles, why not drive off road to avoid IED laden avenues? We need to avoid channelization. It is far fetched to propose to completely abandon using roads. But if we can decrease our need we can decrease casualties.

The best solution to this problem is to not expose ourselves to the threat. But in typical American fashion we developed an industrial war machine solution - the MRAP, Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicle. The MRAP is a big expensive piece of equipment that has all kinds of great stuff that still won't do much good. It can't even go off road without getting stuck. So we built a vehicle to counter IED's that can only drive where the IED's are.

The MRAP has a V shaped hull that deflects explosions from underneath it. And it has good armor on the sides. But it is vulnerable on top. The roof is thin. It is only a matter of time before the enemy figures out how to elevate IED's and rockets and point them down into the roof of an MRAP. Imagine an EFP in a tree, a telephone pole, on a roof or on top of a wall aimed down at the vehicle. The MRAP may not have been defeated yet, but the enemy will figure out something to counter it as they always have before. It is only a matter of time before our enemies design a bomb that can flip the MRAP.

What We Need- Now
We need more and better infantry. Our infantry is good, but it is trained and employed wrong. We think too much from the American perspective. Again, we need to ask ourselves, "What would I do if I was an insurgent?" Insurgents act individually or in small groups, 3-4 man cells. Marines patrol with a full squad. A Marine rifle squad is ideally thirteen men which includes 3 M249 Squad Automatic Weapons, 3 M203 grenade launchers, 9 M16's with ACOG's, 1 AT4 or LAAW [light antiarmor weapon] rocket launcher, hand grenades, full body armor kit and a radio to call in supporting arms or reinforcements. In short, a Marine rifle squad has a lot of fire power. Insurgents know this, we have been in Iraq for over five years, and they know how we operate. If you were an insurgent would you attack a Marine rifle squad with small arms? Probably not. In a straight up fire fight Marines come out on top.

Sometimes, rarely, but sometimes Marine squads get engaged by enemy with small arms. These engagements are normally ambushes initiated by the enemy. These attacks are short in nature. The enemy will make a quick attack and escape before the Marines can bring up their firepower or call for support.

Lately insurgents have been using more snipers. An enemy sniper shoots a Marine on an all too common "presence patrol". Where Marines slowly walk around shaking hands and talking to people. Enemy snipers have learned to shoot into the gaps in our armor. Marines are a sniper target from the minute they leave the wire to the minute they return.

We have tried to solve this by producing more armor for our troops. No Marine leaves the wire without helmet, flak jacket, front/back SAPI (Small Arms Protective Inserts) plates, side SAPI's, gloves and eye protection. All of this on top of the infantry man's already enormous load. The Personal Protective Gear (PPE) Marines wear, alone weighs about 40 pounds. His armaments and accessories add more weight to his load.

The average Marine Rifleman carries an M16, 180 rounds, 2 hand grenades, Night Vision Goggles (NVG's), PEQ2, ACOG, bayonet, and enough water to last the patrol, typically 1-1.5 gallons for a four hour patrol. The average Fire Team Leader carries all of this plus an M203 grenade launcher and 6-9 40mm grenades. A typical SAW gunner carries the M249 SAW, 400 rounds, a spare barrel (which he will never change), a Kabar knife, his NVG's, one set for his weapon & one set for his Kevlar, and water. A squad Radio Operator carries a rifleman's load plus a radio, sometimes two radios, and spare batteries. The Marine with an AT-4 or LAAW rocket carries the same as a rifleman plus his rocket. And distributed throughout the squad are pyrotechnics for signaling and Escalation of Force procedures. The average Marine's combat load is well over 60 pounds. An average squad radio operator's load is over 70 pounds. And the average SAW gunner carries over 80 pounds in gear.

Our Marines are overloaded. This weight limits their speed, mobility, range, stamina, agility and all around fighting capability. They can't go out far and they can't stay out long with all of this gear. It is simply too much. Combat patrols are typically four hours, and even that short amount of time is exhausting. Our Marines are being consistently outrun and outmaneuvered by an enemy with an AK, and they can't stay out long with all of this gear. It is simply too much. Combat patrols are typically four hours, and even that short amount of time is exhausting. Our Marines are being consistently outrun and outmaneuvered by an enemy with an AK, an extra magazine and a pair of running shoes.

The ideal of "all the best equipment for our soldiers" is responsible for this. The American people think they are helping their soldiers out by demanding they get as much protective equipment as possible. American civilians do not like seeing young Americans maimed and killed in foreign lands, rightly so. They see it on television, exploited by the news media and they demand "all the best equipment for our soldiers". And to satisfy Americans at home, the troops get weighed down with more and more gear. The more gear troops wear the "safer" they are, or so the thought goes. But to that Soldier and they demand "all the best equipment for our soldiers". And to satisfy Americans at home, the troops get weighed down with more and more gear. The more gear troops wear the "safer" they are, or so the thought goes. But to that Soldier or Marine on patrol staggering along under the weight of all of this unnecessary gear it doesn't seem to be in his best interests. No matter how new or expensive it is. All that matters to him is how much it weighs.

The first thing we need to do is drop all of the personal protective gear except for a helmet. All that other equipment is too heavy and hinders Marines more than it helps them. Do you get hit because your armor didn't stop the projectile or because you couldn't get out of the way fast enough? The protective gear the Marines carry is designed for close quarters combat, not for long patrols. The full armor kit can still be worn by Marines on post or riding in convoys.

The next thing that needs to happen is that we need to reorganize the structure of the combat patrols we're sending out.

The fire team is the decisive unit at this stage of the war. 4-6 men are much more likely to make contact with the enemy, draw the enemy into an open fight where we can destroy them with superior weapons and training. Imagine:

* 98 fire teams per battalion vs. 36 squads per battalion
* 36 fire teams per company vs. 12 squads per company
* 9 fire teams per platoon vs. 3 squads per platoon
We can cover three times as much ground using this concept. We can have three times as many units out. The chances of contact with the enemy are greater. These units should move covertly using cover and concealment. They set in hides to ambush the enemy in likely IED areas such as intersections, bridges, culverts, etc. When an enemy comes out to plant an IED they get ambushed. These units can call in illumination missions from mortars or artillery frequently to illuminate likely IED sites or suspicious areas. They can illuminate areas where there are no Marines to make the enemy think there are Marines observing those areas. This concept is similar to satellite patrolling, where there are many units out running parallel patrols. If a team gets engaged they can pop a red star cluster. The nearest unit moves quickly to their aid. If a team loses communications they return to base or link up with another unit. If they are being pursued by a larger enemy force they can escape and evade. These fire team (4-6 man) units will be able to move faster, quieter; they will be more agile; they will be able to fight harder, stay out longer and cover more ground. They will use hide sites, ambushes, covert movements and lots of, but not limited to, night operations. Teams could push enemies into ambush areas covered by other teams.

These units won't need to wear all the Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) that our current forces use because they are not going to be walking around in the open waiting to be shot by a sniper. There will be times when they cross open areas; this is not to say they will never be out of cover at all. But they will not expose themselves like our current patrols do. Instead of showing the enemy our presence through overt patrols, these units will be patrolling covertly, stealthily, undetected, covered, concealed. Tactical.

We will be ambushing the enemy. We will have the initiative. The enemy will know there are Marines out there somewhere. But they won't know where. They won't know when or where they are not being observed by Marines. That will deter them from misbehaving, for fear of being ambushed by an unseen Marine team.

Maneuver Warfare is the official Doctrine of the Marine Corps. According to MCDP 1, Warfighting Maneuver Warfare is defined as a:

\[ \ldots \] warfighting philosophy that seeks to shatter the enemy's cohesion through a variety of rapid, focused and unexpected actions which create a turbulent and rapidly deteriorating situation with which the enemy cannot cope.

This concept of fire team operations goes right along with the doctrine of maneuver warfare, at least in the counterinsurgency application. If the enemy is too afraid to plant IED's because there are swarms of unseen Marine teams running around in the palm groves, snaking through wadis in the desert and lurking in the shadows in the cities and villages then we will have accomplished our goal. The enemy may have to change his methods to confronting our Marines in open fire fights. If they attempt this, our men will be faster, more mobile and able to close with and destroy them. Without all of the cumbersome protective gear, our Marines will no longer be out run and out maneuvered. They will be able to go out farther, move faster, cover more ground and stay out longer. Instead of carrying over 60 pounds of gear and as many water bottles that they can fit in their pockets for a four hour patrol they can carry 30 pounds of equipment and enough chow and water to stay out for a few days.

We don't have to kill a lot of insurgents to defeat them. By constant presence and an aggressive patrolling routine we can deny the enemy the space and ability to operate against us.

Organization

The first thing we need to do to reorganize our structure is to identify correct billets for the leaders of these new billets. The leaders of these units are going to be Non Commissioned Officers (NCOs), Corporals and Sergeants, and often times Lance Corporals. We need to decentralize. We need to train these small unit leaders how to call for close air support, supporting arms, and medevacs. We need to train these Marines to be leaders, because they are going to be leading the Marines in country. The Marine Corps already has plenty of great schools in existence that we should expand and send more Marines to. For example: Squad Leaders Course, Advanced Machine Gun Leaders Course, Advanced Mortar Leaders Course, Forward Observer School, Designated Marksman School, Man Tracker Course, Point Man Course, Sniper School, Squad Medics Course, etc. Perhaps we should open new schools like an Infantry Fire Team Leaders Course or improvised courses at the unit level to teach the Marines the skills they will need to operate independently in country. Good training is the best force multiplier. Training that teaches, reafirms and tests Marines' combat skills, leadership abilities, decision making and fatigue/stress management. Not squad rushes against reinforced trench lines. The training we need to conduct can be done in the "back yard" and around the camp. We should model our training after the Scout Sniper Platoons, who don't go out to far away ranges and then sit on their packs all day. They make the most of the terrain around the barracks.
And lastly, but most importantly, we need to trust these leaders and support their judgment and decisions since they are the ones on the line.

Despite the fact that we have communications that can link a commander far removed from a scene of action to a patrol leader in a volatile situation, we should not rely on these links to carry the commander's wishes. We need to rely on the Marine on the scene to make the decision. He is there and knows what is going on around him. He is best qualified to make that decision, not someone in a command post or away on the other side of a radio handset.

Many enlisted Marines and NCO's will agree that the Marine Corps gives a lot of lip service to small unit leadership and initiative but in the reality of operations we keep these small unit leaders on a tight leash.

We need to trust and empower our NCO's and Marines that have been to Iraq 2 or 3 times. This is why they are in the billet they are in, for their knowledge and experience. They need a clear commander's intent and mission statement to set the tone for them to work for. But after that we need to allow them to act on their knowledge and experience, and allow them to draw from these to make decisions on the scene, and not rely on guidance from higher echelons nowhere near the scene of action.

This is an unconventional war and requires unconventional tactics, techniques and procedures. Yet we rely on the machines and force structure of conventional wars as if it was a conventional fight. Bigger guns and thicker armor are not the solution. The enemy ignores this. He finds gaps in our conventional structure and targets our weaknesses. Whether it's attacking weak supply lines or shooting Marines in the gaps of their armor. If their bombs can't penetrate a tank's armor they find ways to flip them. Three or four tank mines stacked up on each other with a couple 155mm artillery shells buried beneath them. An upside down tank with its turret 50 meters away is essentially as dead as a tank with a hole in it. They find ways to nullify our firepower.

We rely on too much technology, too much gear, and too much stuff holding us down in our rear areas. We are fighting an enemy with an AK-47 and a pair of Nikes. He uses copper wire, a battery and an artillery shell. We don't understand how he operates and thus, how to defeat him because we are an industrialized military organized around machines of war. We have taken for granted how effective a single man with a rifle can be.

This piece ends with a quote from Colonel David Hackworth:

taken for granted how effective a single man with a rifle can be.

This piece ends with a quote from Colonel David Hackworth:

In Vietnam, today's most successful infantry tactics and techniques were yesterday's heresy and madness. When these Overly reckless ideas were first introduced by farseeing innovators in 1965 and 1966, few commanders took them seriously. Most, because of parochial conventional orientation, looked upon these new concepts with contempt not unlike many reactionary English lords' attitude toward the longbow before Crecy. But today in Vietnam, these once 'wild schemes' have become standard drill. These bold techniques have changed the thrust of the war from uneconomical multi brigade operations to fights that are fought almost exclusively by the squad and platoon.

SIDEBAR

"... the advantage goes not to the side that starts the war with the best techniques, but to the side that can best adapt."

-MCI [Marine Corps Institute] 7403B, Combat Techniques

SIDEBAR

So we built a vehicle to counter IEDs that can only drive where the IEDs are.

SIDEBAR

"With conflicts of this type, you have to organize to fight. There's nothing sacrosanct about a battalion: 700 guys, four companies. Why can't you organize 700 guys into 70 10-man teams? Or 100 7-man teams? Again, the combat situation, the milieu, must dictate how you organize."

-Colonel Paul Melshen, USMCR

SIDEBAR
"Train people to carry only functional gear. This is essential for low-intensity ops. Ammunition, water, a little chow. You should be able to stay out for four or five days on beef jerky and water. Anything that's not essential shouldn't be carried."
-Col Paul Melshen, USMCR

"You will be weighed down with body armor, rations, extra ammunition, communications gear, and a thousand other things. The enemy will carry a rifle, an extra magazine, and a water bottle if he is lucky. Unless you ruthlessly lighten your load and enforce a culture of speed and mobility, the insurgents will consistently out-run and out-maneuver you."
-David Kilcullen, 28 Articles, Fundamentals of Company Level Counterinsurgency

"Establish patrolling methods that deter the enemy from attacking you. Often our patrolling approach seems to provoke, then defeat enemy attacks. This is counterproductive: It leads to a raiding, day tripping mindset, or, worse, a bunker mentality. Instead, practice deterrent patrolling. There [are] many methods for this, including 'multiple' patrolling where you flood an area with numerous small patrols working together. Each is too small to be a worthwhile target, and the insurgents never know where all the patrols are making an attack on one extremely risky."
-David Kilcullen, 28 Articles

**SIDEBAR**

"Conventional force structures, weapons, and tactics are not too applicable in this type of warfare."
-Col Paul Melshen, USMCR

**SIDEBAR**

"Once you are in theater, situations will arise too quickly for orders, or even a commanders’ intent. Your Corporals and private soldiers will have to make snap judgments with strategic impact. The only way to help them is to give them a shared understanding then trust them to think for themselves on the day."
-David Kilcullen, 28 Articles

"Train the squad leaders - then trust them - Battles are won or lost in seconds: whoever can bring combat power to bear on a street corner, will win. The commander on the spot controls the fight. You must train your squad leaders to act intelligently and independently without orders. If your squad leaders are competent, you can get away with average company or platoon staffs. The reverse is not the case. Training should focus on basic skills: marksmanship, patrolling, security on the move and the halt, basic drills. When in doubt spend less time training company and platoon drills and more time training squads. Ruthlessly replace leaders who do not make the grade. But once your people are trained, and you have developed a shared operational 'diagnosis', you must trust them. We talk about this, but few company or platoon leaders really do trust their people. In counterinsurgency, you have no choice."
-David Kilcullen, 28 Articles

**SIDEBAR**

"Rank is nothing, talent is everything. Not everyone is good at counterinsurgency. Many people don't understand the concept, and some who do can't execute it. It is difficult, and in a conventional force only a few people will master it. Anyone can learn the basics, but there are a few "naturals". Learn how to spot these people and put them into positions where they can make a difference. Rank matters far less than talent - a few good men led by a smart junior non-commissioned officer can succeed in counterinsurgency, where hundreds of well armed soldiers under a mediocre senior officer will fail."
-David Kilcullen, 28 Articles

"Burn into the small unit leader's mind that to defeat the guerrilla he must think and act like a guerrilla. He must adopt the guerrilla's tactics, stealth, cunningness, drive, motivation and operational techniques. As a leader, he must be more ruthless in his demands upon his people than the guerrilla is with his subordinates. He must understand that the guerrilla can only be defeated by rugged 'Gung-Ho', superbly led soldiers who can, because of outstanding training 'out guerrilla the guerrilla'."
-Colonel David Hackworth, US Army
This is an unconventional war and requires unconventional tactics, techniques and procedures. Yet we rely on the machines and force structure of conventional wars as if it was a conventional fight.

"I use the Rhodesian War as a case study, comparing it to Vietnam. Vietnam was high-tech with mountains of ammunition, guns and butter, all the supplies and equipment you could dream of, and Rhodesia was 'counting bullets'. Here was a pariah state, isolated with economic sanctions, and they fought that counterinsurgency to a stalemate. Sometimes more is not better. When you have to live on your wits, suddenly you devise techniques to defeat the insurgents. You don't rely so much on technology. When you rely so much on technology, as we do, it suppresses the ability to come up with new solutions and the ability to use your brain."

-Col Paul Melshen, USMCR

Agree or Disagree? Join the discussion at www.mca-marines.org/gazette/Hanson.

To read LtCol Kilcullens article go to www.mca-marines.org/gazette/Kilcullen.

by Sgt Michael Hanson

Sgt Hanson served with Company K, 3d Battalion, 1st Marines. The full title of the article as originally published is "COIN Perspectives From on Point: Lessons Learned in Iraq."

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GRAPHIC: Photographs

IMAGE PHOTOGRAPH, Full "battle rattle" may be the rule, but in many situations it doesn't make sense. Photo by LCpl Jerry Murphy.

IMAGE PHOTOGRAPH, Many NCOs feel we pay lip service to small unit leadership and that in reality we keep small unit leaders on a tight leash. (Photo by LCpl Jerry Murphy.)

IMAGE PHOTOGRAPH, Reduce the load carried by Marines in COIN. (Photo by Cpl Chris T. Mann.)

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Marine Corps Gazette
Reevaluating the CAP

BYLINE: Johnson, Katie Ann.

by 2dLt Katie Ann Johnson

2dLt Johnson recently graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy and is attending The Basic School.

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ABSTRACT

Because of the lack of training among the ING troops, the 2/7 CAP could not effectively establish the mission of joint combat patrols and was forced to serve more of a training command function.5 What is promising, however, is that since the initial CAP deployment in 2003-04, the IA has been through extensive basic training led by the Army and Marine Corps. According to the 2/7 battalion commander, 10,000 troops were needed for the Fallujah operation, which created a vacuum in western Al Anbar Province.

FULL TEXT

A viable option in the face of troop drawdown in Iraq

During the summer of 2008, then-Presidential candidate Barack Obama stated in an op-ed piece that he would like to pull the troops out of Iraq by the summer of 2010.1 Although there have been debates among politicians and military leaders on whether this choice is the right one, a drawdown in Iraq is a real possibility within the next 1 Â½ years. As a result, it is time for the Marine Corps and the U.S. military in general to develop tactics and programs that can achieve the current strategic goals in Iraq with a substantially smaller number of troops. Instead of developing these tactics from scratch, however, focus should be placed on those programs that have been used in the past and from which lessons can be learned. One example is that of the Combined Action Program (CAP). In an effort to counter local support for the insurgency in Vietnam with only a limited number of troops, the CAP intermixed local forces with U.S. Marines into small combat units that not only fought together but also lived and worked together amongst the local population.2 In addition to its Vietnam deployment, the CAP was implemented in Iraq under then-MajGen James N. Mattis’ 1st Marine Division in 2003 and 2004. This program was, however, only implemented on a small scale and was phased out in favor of other tactics.

Today there are units like the military transition team (MiTT) that operate very similarly to the CAP by eating, sleeping, and living among local forces. However, the main mission of the MiTT is more focused on the training and transition and not on joint combat patrols.3 Because of the MiTT’s lack of focus on combat, it may be beneficial to reexamine the CAP as a viable counterinsurgency tool in the months and years ahead. Before the CAP can be redeployed to Iraq, however, lessons learned from the first Iraqi deployment of the CAP must be studied and changes must be made. It is the purpose of this article to illustrate the friction points that the Iraqi CAP experienced and changes that could be made in order to ease this friction so that the redeployment of the CAP during the drawdown can become a feasible option.

Prior Experience of the Locals

The CAP was intended to create a unit by which combat-oriented missions could be conducted by joint forces. However, the lack of prior training among the Iraqis hindered the achievement of the mission in one of the major CAPs. After the disintegration of the Iraqi Army (IA), many of the former Iraqi soldiers turned to the insurgent groups and militias, leaving what would come to be called the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps and later the Iraqi National Guard (ING) with few highly trained members.4 As a result, CAPs like the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines (2/7) had very little to work with as far as prior experience was concerned. The 2/7 CAP was in charge of setting up a CAP in conjunction with the 503d ING. Those members of the 503d who had previous experience were made of- ficers while the rest of the 1,100-mem- ber brigade had no experience whatsoever. As a result, the 2/7 CAP was forced to establish an extensive training regimen for the members of the 503d before any combat-oriented missions were possible. Because of the lack of training among the ING troops, the 2/7 CAP could not effect- tively establish the mission of joint combat patrols and was forced to serve more of a training command function.5 What is promising, however, is that since the initial CAP deployment in 2003-04, the IA has been
through extensive basic training led by the Army and Marine Corps. Although the IA is by no means on par with the Marine Corps, this source of friction should at least be reduced from 2004.

Duration of the Program

When asked if they could change something about their CAP experience in Iraq, the commanders of both the 2/7 CAP and the 3/4 CAP stated that the tour should have lasted at least a year.6 Capt Matthew Danner of the 3/4 CAP stated:
The biggest problem is duration. We were in place for only six months. We were gone for a couple of weeks in the middle to fight in Fallujah.... We had to leave when the battalion left in July. There were genuine attempts to remain in place, but that was not practical even though we all volunteered.7

In both cases, the standard tour length was 6 to 7 months with each unit rotating as a whole. Additionally, the CAP mission, in the case of 2/7, was not even established until May 2004, 3 months after 2/7 had been in country. As a result, the 2/7 CAP only had 4 months to try to get the ING ready for combat patrols. This proved impossible due to the aforementioned lack of training on the part of the ING forces. Although morale and readiness concerns may be the reasoning behind the 7-month-long deployment of Marines, if the CAP is to be successful, it may be necessary to take up the Army model of at least 12-month-long deployments for CAP units.

Size of the Program

A third factor that contributed to the overall outcome of the CAP was its size. What was even more important than basic troop levels, however, when looking at the size of the CAP, was its level of implementation. The CAP in Iraq was instituted on a much lower level than the CAP in Vietnam, which many people argue contributed to its failure.8 As mentioned previously, the CAP in Iraq resulted from a directive from the 1st Marine Division commander. MajGen Mattis required that all battalions under his command designate a platoon that could be set up as a combined action platoon once they arrived in country. Outside of this directive, however, the CAP received no other guidance from the upper levels of the Marine Corps forces in Iraq. Individually, the 2/7 and the 3/4, received supporting units - logistics and communications - from the battalion level, but further guidance from higher up was not extensively provided.9 This lack of strategic- and upper-level integration can best be seen in the second battle of Fallujah in 2004. According to the 2/7 battalion commander, 10,000 troops were needed for the Fallujah operation, which created a vacuum in western Al Anbar Province. As units were moved out of cities like Haditha and Hit in order to fight in Fallujah, the insurgents moved into the cities that the Marines had vacated. If more troops were available to fight in Fallujah without leaving the rest of Al Anbar open to infiltration, the CAP may have been established more easily and operated more effectively.10 On top of the shortage of troops, the small number of CAPs (only two are known to have been set up) indicates the low priority and lack of importance Marine Corps leadership attached to the CAP in Iraq. In Vietnam, the CAP was viewed with strategic importance and supported at all levels of the chain of command. In Iraq the CAP lacked this importance and as a result lacked the guidance of the upper levels of leadership. By no means does the exclusion of the CAP at the strategic level speak to the skills of the upper echelon of leadership at the time but instead illustrates the focus on other priorities. Because of this lack of strategic support, the Commander, 2/7, LtCol Phillip C. Skuta, concludes that "[The CAP] went away when General Mattis went away, when the 1st Marine Division went away."11 As a result, major changes to the level of implementation of the CAP need to be made. The fact that only two CAPs were established in Iraq shows that the success of this program was not viewed as vital to the main effort of the war.

If the CAP is to be redeployed to Iraq, it must be viewed with strategic importance. This redeployment would require not just a single divisional implementation, but that every division within the Marine Corps designate CAP units and their locations in country before deploying. This would facilitate communications and turnover with those units already in theater and those units about to deploy. Additionally, these units need to be deployed throughout the country and not simply in one area like Al Anbar. Finally, before the CAP can be redeployed, the upper levels of leadership need to recognize its' importance and include the CAP in the overall battle strategy of the war.

As the number of troops reduces during the future drawdown, it will be impossible to conduct all of the necessary missions without the supplementation of another force. In Vietnam, a similar need for troops led LtGen Lewis Walt, Commander, III Marine Amphibious Force, to turn to the Vietnamese militia, and thus the CAP was born. If changes are made to the original Iraqi CAP, then this tactic may prove to be a viable resource for the future.

SIDEBAR

The CAP in Iraq was instituted on a much lower level. . . .
SIDEBAR
In Vietnam, the CAP was viewed with strategic importance and supported at all levels of the chain of command.

SIDEBAR
Read more about the CAP at www.mca-marines.org/gazette/CAP.

FOOTNOTE
Notes
2. CAP is sometimes the abbreviation for the combined action platoon which is a unit operating under the prescriptions of the overall Combined Action Program. For the purpose of this article, the CAP refers to the Combined Action Program.
6. Ibid.
10. Skuta interview.
11. Ibid.

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GRAPHIC: Photographs
IMAGE PHOTOGRAPH, CAP from Papa 3 preparing to cross the Song Cam Lo River. (Photo by Edward F. Palm.)
IMAGE PHOTOGRAPH, A reinvigorated CAP could provide a viable resource for the future at marginal cost (Photo by Cpl Tom Sloan.)
IMAGE PHOTOGRAPH, Successful CAP results are measured day by day. (Photo by Cpl Tom Sloan.)

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Thoughts Regarding the Company-Level Intelligence Cell

BYLINE: Driscoll, Michael; Mann, Morgan G.

by LtCol Morgan G. Mann, USMCR & Capt Michael Driscoll, USMCR

LtCol Mann is the CO, 1/25 and was the S-3 (operations) officer for 2/24 during OIF 08.1.
Capt Driscoll was the S-2 (intelligence) officer for 2/24 daring OIF 08.1.

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ABSTRACT

[...] the battalion commander must identify a main effort to ensure that the battalion intelligence section is focusing its limited resources on those areas that require the most attention to achieve the battalion commander’s objectives. Since January 2008 Marine Corps intelligence schools has taken ownership of curriculum development and training for the CLIC concept. * Training and Education Command (TECom) is revising the Infantry Training and Readiness Manual that reflects new tasks for infantry companies to organize and man a CLIC.12 Conclusion The Marine Corps will continue to fight on a distributed battlefield against an asymmetric threat.

FULL TEXT

An important component on the distributed battlefield

At this time in the global war on terror, every Marine Corps infantry battalion has deployed with some type of company-level intelligence cell (CLIC). The CLIC concept has been received favorably and embraced in the predeployment training program (PTP). The purpose of this article is to take a quick snapshot of the progress of the CLICs from the perspective of one battalion recently returned from Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) and to posit one possible future for this important resource.

Introduction

2d Battalion, 24th Marines (2/24) deployed to an environment ideally suited to the strengths of the CLIC. The battalion operated in a diverse battlespace that spanned over 800 square kilometers crossing tribal, political, and security boundaries. The battalion's companies operated from Habbaniyah to Saqlawiyah and up to the Lake Thar Thar desert regions of Iraq’s Al Anbar Province. Each area was a distinct operational and intelligence challenge. Key enemy linkages existed between the areas, but tribal and political issues were almost mutually exclusive to each company battlespace. The significant security improvements that developed in 2007 and 2008 meant that companies focused far more on nonkinetic efforts and that targeting remaining enemy required far more focused collection and analysis attention. Outlined below are several key takeaways for company-level intelligence-driven operations as seen from one battalion’s perspective.

Key Takeaways

Accept counterinsurgency as a political activity. An insurgency has political goals. Violence is but one element of power an insurgent movement asserts to achieve its objectives.1 As conditions change and counterinsurgents gain and maintain security, one can expect that political goals of insurgent movements will remain, though the strategies and tactics to achieve those goals will change. Oftentimes enemy efforts to achieve objectives will take place in the legitimate realm of local, provincial, and national politics. Thus it is critical that companies learn and track the political situation in their battle-space as best as possible. Local politics and power relationships are not just the realm of Marine expeditionary force (MEF)-level engagement teams.
Learn the political environment and attempt to understand agendas and alliances. How do changes in local political power impact the local security environment, and how will various insurgent groups attempt to take advantage of new opportunities to advance their agendas? Some of the answers will come from the multiple engagements companies will have with the population and local leaders. Each conversation can be a piece to the political puzzle and can lead to indications and warnings of destabilizing violence as a consequence of political change. The CLIC will need to assist the commander in compiling engagement reports and help put the pieces of the political puzzle together for the company's battlespace.

Recognize that immature security forces must be monitored. Security and political stability are two keys to the longterm defeat of an insurgent movement. Security institutions that are being reorganized or created are ripe opportunities for potential insurgent infiltration. Consequently, CLICs must ensure that they help commanders manage passive collection efforts focused on partnered units. Marines will be engaged daily with host-nation security organizations and must develop a detailed understanding of the units with which they partner. Key leaders, histories, family connections, and past military ties, to name a few, are all items that should be learned through friendly conversations and passive collection efforts. This information again must come back to the CLIC so that it can lead to further knowledge of the security environment and assist with identifying indications or warnings of any emerging threats arising from within the security organization with whom we partner.

Weighting the main effort. Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrate, battalions will operate over hundreds of square miles on a distributed battlefield. Each company assigned battlespace within the battalion's area of operations will be confronted with unique human terrain that may or may not interrelate with adjacent vil- lages and tribal areas. Assuming the battalion assigns battlespace to all four of its maneuver companies, an intelligence section without CLICs would be faced with collecting and analyzing information for four distinct and disparate areas. This is a tall order even for a regimental S-2 section with more personnel, let alone that of a battalion. Consequently, the battalion commander must identify a main effort to ensure that the battalion intelligence section is focusing its limited resources on those areas that require the most attention to achieve the battalion commander's objectives. For the companies that are not the main effort, the necessity for a top quality CLIC will become critical. With the bulk of the battalion intelligence resources focused elsewhere, CLICs will need to provide their company commander with the information management of collection efforts and limited analysis to maintain an understanding of the battlespace.

The CLIC team and the commander. The experiences of most infantry battalions reveal one well-known truism: the effort the company commander places on company-level intelligence is correlated to the amount of actionable intelligence the company produces. With little attention placed on intelligence collection, the company will have little effect on the battlespace. Ultimately, the CLIC the commander builds is a direct reflection of the value he places on understanding and influencing his battlespace. Whether Iraq, Afghanistan, or somewhere else, if a battalion is operating in a distributed environment the companies will never be satisfied with the level of battlefield level intelligence support. Only the company commander and his hand-picked CLIC will focus their full efforts within the area of operations that is most critical to the company's success.

One of the most influential decisions a company commander makes in collecting intelligence is the selection of the CLIC Marines. As the CLIC is sourced "out of hide," some commanders may want to shortchange the quality of the CLIC personnel. This choice may be "pennywise but pound foolish" and result in a "what did these guys do for me" reflection later in the deployment. Commanders must be willing to cut into muscle to build the CLIC. A stronger and more competent CLIC will result in a greater gain for the company than the cumulative loss felt by the squads. The counterinsurgent theorist, David Kilcullen, articulated this best, "Put the smartest soldiers in the [CLIC] . You will have one less rifle squad: but the [CLIC] will pay for itself in lives and effort saved."2 Maj Guillermo Rosales, credited with building Company Fs highly effective and flexible CLIC, echoes this sentiment, "If it doesn't hurt, you haven't picked the right Marines."3

Who, then, are the right Marines? From the battalion's experience, successful CLICs possess attributes that include analytical ability, prior operational deployment, language training, and computer skills. Curiosity, "street smarts," and effective written and oral communication are also keys to success.4 Finding Marines who possess all of these traits is extremely difficult, so selecting the CLIC Marines with complementary skills is necessary. Further, the battalions experience validated that noncommissioned officers from within the company are effective CLIC chiefs.

Relationship to the S-2 section. The purpose of the CLIC is to support the company commander with basic intelligence capability, such as estimates of the situation, indications and warning, and target development.5 It is not designed to let the S-2 section "off the hook" of its responsibilities or to create a self-sufficient company S-2 section. The CLIC, comprised of young infantrymen, should not solely shoulder the burden of making intelligence preparation of the battlespace;
scheduling intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance time with higher headquarters; or coordinating its intelligence support. Conversely, the S-2 section should not simply make map products and process security clearances. Instead, the S-2 officer should view the CLIC as a force multiplier that allows the S-2 section to focus on the battalion's main effort. The company commander should also see the CLIC as a force multiplier, giving him a concentrated ability to conduct patrol debriefs, manage information, and conduct basic analysis to map the human terrain of his battlespace.

More 0231s are good but... Supporting the CLICs with an 0231 (intelligence specialist) from the intelligence section increases the ability to process intelligence, but assigned intelligence Marines should not serve as CLIC chiefs. Using an 0231, likely a junior Marine, in a leadership position within the CLIC is not recommended because the Marine will not have the experience or the credibility necessary in company operations. He may be an unknown to the commander and his teammates causing further friction.

A better concept of support is to employ the 0231 in direct support. The direct support relationship provides the appropriate balance that ensures the commander has tasking authority for a key CLIC member, while still maintaining unity of effort with the S-2 section as a whole. The 0231 can provide expertise on biometric systems, unmanned aircraft systems, and intelligence systems. In addition, the 0231 in direct support can serve as the critical conduit between the S-2 section and the company and help reduce some of the reporting burdens on the company.

Technology is a force multiplier. Compared with 4 years ago, companies today enjoy a significant technology advantage. Much of this equipment is oriented toward intelligence collection. However, the systems and connectivity are boat anchors without Marines exercising excellent information management.

MarineLink is the best single technology acquisition for the CLIC and the battalion S-2 section. MarineLink provides a common portal to enter and access census data, pattern analysis, and other components of mapping the human terrain. The information can be shared across Marine boundaries and passed on to incoming units. While MarineLink is clearly a valuable tool for access to data and analytical tools, it does not provide a theater-wide database standard from which to collect population and human terrain data across battlespaces. Most importantly it does not share data with the U.S. Army's comparable system, thus reducing situational awareness with adjacent U.S. Army units.

More effective information fidelity within MarineLink must be better managed at the Multinational ForceWest/Marine expeditionary brigade level. There needs to be a standard template for entering information into MarineLink so all units know where and what to search when conducting intelligence research. In addition, a more sophisticated database hierarchy and sharing model must be implemented so that database information can be synchronized with all MarineLink user systems.

In less developed theaters than Iraq, there may not be the communications infrastructure to support a complete MarineLink suite of tools. Nevertheless we must still strive for a common database toolset at the company level for the purposes of managing information in counterinsurgency and stability operations. Juggling scores of Microsoft Excel spreadsheets or homegrown Access databases is a recipe for information management failure as units are relieved and operations continue. If the tool is not MarineLink it needs to be some other common database system capable of operating at the company level in a distributed environment.

But it doesn't trump a disciplined process. A disciplined process will prevail over technology every time. Many battalions' experiences have validated that no matter how many cameras, biometric devices, or computers, the company intelligence effort will not be effective without a disciplined approach to collections. Without a process, the squad leaders will not know what information is needed, the data collected will not be properly processed, and information will not be shared. This means that every patrol needs to be debriefed and that atmospherics and census data collected on a patrol are accurately entered into MarineLink. Enforcing the process becomes easy once Marines see the fruits of their information management labor, when name checks result in detentions, shifts in loyalties can be predicted, enemy can be killed, and lives can be saved.

Partnering with other intelligence support organizations. As the CLIC proves its worth to the company and battalion commander, it will need to be embraced by supporting intelligence organizations within the MEF. Of particular importance is the close coordination and partnership between human intelligence exploitation teams and the CLIC. Both of these entities working for the commander can provide tremendous intelligence fusion if both entities understand their roles and limitations. Establishing these relationships early in the PTP establishes this fusion.

Yesterday and Tomorrow
Just a few years ago the CLIC was still an emerging concept designed to mitigate the tactical intelligence gaps that existed in OIF II. During the battalion's 2004 deployment, the CLIC concept played a significant role in analyzing census data in Babil Province. Now widely adopted by deploying infantry battalions across the Marine Corps, the CLIC concept has matured considerably. Most importantly the concept now has widespread institutional support.

The Commandant recently declared:

Research, experimentation, and analysis must be performed to identify and develop a best practices model for a company-level intelligence capability that enables the company commander to collect, assess, and distribute actionable intelligence, up, down, and across.8

His commitment to the CLIC concept has fueled efforts to provide more structure and establish more formal tactics, techniques, and procedures for successful CLIC training and employment. The investments below will have a very positive impact on the future of the CLIC.

* Our Vision and Strategy 2025* and enhanced company operations documents10 dedicate intellectual energy to improving and sustaining the CLIC based on the likely conflicts we will face in the years ahead.

* As part of the Marine Corps' growth to 202,000, the battalion S-2 section is slated to grow from four 0231s to eight. This growth will enable the intelligence officer to provide one 0231 to each company while still retaining battalion-level analyst resources.

* Since 2007 the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory and Marine Forces Command have invested in CLIC-specific gear sets and training. These efforts have enabled over 56 CLICs and 2,400 Marines to be trained as part of the PTP cycle.11 New gear sets are being evaluated by deploying battalions to further mature proper gear sets for CLICs' human terrain mapping efforts. Since January 2008 Marine Corps intelligence schools has taken ownership of curriculum development and training for the CLIC concept.

* Training and Education Command (TECom) is revising the Infantry Training and Readiness Manual that reflects new tasks for infantry companies to organize and man a CLIC.12

Conclusion

The Marine Corps will continue to fight on a distributed battlefield against an asymmetric threat. Company-level intelligence-driven operations will be a core component of mission accomplishment. The Marine Corps must continue to devote both Marines and money to the CLIC concept so that we are not forced to relearn lessons. As David Kilcullen aptly observed, "Intelligence and operations are complementary."13 Without the CLIC neither is possible when operating in a distributed environment against the full spectrum of threats we will encounter in our future campaigns.

SIDEBAR

What do you think? Join the discussion at www.mcamarines.org/gazette/Mann.

FOOTNOTE

Notes
4. Ibid.
11. Statistics provided by Maj John Heye, Officer in Charge, CLIC TECOE, in an e-mail dated 30 December 2008.

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GRAPHIC: Photographs
IMAGE PHOTOGRAPH, Company-level generated intelligence may result in more rapid tactical-level successes, such as uncovering improvised explosive device material. (Photo by LCpi Shane s. Keller.)
IMAGE PHOTOGRAPH, One of the keys to success for members of the CLIC is "street smarts." (Photo by cpi Pete mbodeau.)

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Construction in Counterinsurgency

BYLINE: Parker, Kevin L.

by Maj Kevin L. Parker, USAF

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SECTION: IDEAS & ISSUES (ENGINEERS); Pg. 56 Vol. 93 No. 6 ISSN: 0025-3170
ABSTRACT

[... ] in certain instances, tactical warfighters are necessarily assigned a support role to engineers attempting to realize an operational objective. Once initial conditions are set, commitment of friendly forces is key to minimizing setbacks and maximizing the potential for success. Since police station construction triggers a commitment of forces, the locations for construction are crucial. Since tactical objectives must give way to operational objectives, this role reversal is appropriate and a key to success against insurgent activities.

FULL TEXT

Engineering shifts from support to driving operational objectives

What would drive an insurgency to take the inherent risks normally avoided to mass its limited forces? In Ramadi, Iraq, in spring 2006, it was the opportunity to attack the only operating police station in the contested city. The complex attack included two suicide vehicleborne improvised explosive devices followed by mounted small arms fire. The enemy recognized the value of its objective and was willing to extend itself against it. The attack was repelled, and the station continued operations.

Similarly, Iraqi police continued to work after two separate suicide bombings against the only operating station in the Syrian border town of Husaybah during its first 6 weeks of operation. We should view these engagements as successes but also brace for changing tactics as insurgencies apply their own lessons learned. An adaptive insurgency will quickly learn it is difficult to overcome an established police force. They will logically focus efforts on preventing the establishment of or furthering existing police forces. A critical vulnerability in the process of establishing a police force exists during the period of time when a police station is under construction. The enemy in Iraq displayed their awareness of this vulnerability and tried to exploit it through intimidation campaigns and even direct engagements of police station construction workers in Fallujah and elsewhere. They were able to set back police station establishment by weeks with mere threats and as little as one round of indirect fire. The minimal resources required and the asymmetric payoff of attacking unguarded construction sites is an easy choice when compared to attacks on established, even newly established, police forces. How friendly forces mitigate this critical vulnerability will greatly impact the timetable for strategic counterinsurgency success.

Traditional military engineering lies in the tactical realm or in a support role for warfighters to conduct combat operations. Experience in Al Anbar Province, with potential for success in upcoming deployments to Afghanistan, has proven that engineering functions, specifically reconstruction, can bring about operational effects in the campaign. Accordingly, in certain instances, tactical warfighters are necessarily assigned a support role to engineers attempting to realize an operational objective. This reversal of traditional roles is a result of the uniqueness of counterinsurgency conflict and key to its success.

Center of gravity (COG) analyses show a sympathetic populace as a key ingredient for insurgent operations. A sympathetic or tolerant populace is achieved when the people identify more closely with the insurgents (affiliations to tribes, religious beliefs, or "the cause") or through insurgent intimidation. Whatever the method, this COG provides sanctuary to insurgents for recruiting, rest/refit, and freedom of movement. The sympathetic populace COG must be controlled by friendly forces for counterinsurgency operations to be successful.

If infiltration and corruption can be minimized, local policing can be the most effective tool in controlling the sympathetic populace COG. Armed local police provide the people an organized mechanism to resist intimidation and a more approachable system to report insurgent activities. A capable police force is not just an additional friendly force but also a force multiplier and an enabler for stability and withdrawal of friendly military forces - a clear operational objective.

Several ingredients are required to establish a local police force. Community support, recruits, leadership, and facilities are key. Each vital ingredient has its own set of issues and challenges, but this article will focus on facilities, specifically police stations.

Insurgents understand the threat posed by a local police force, so police stations - even under construction have proven to be a prime target for insurgents. Targeting is performed by intimidation, kidnapping, and direct attacks on construction workers. The same activities continue against the police once construction is complete. For these reasons, police stations
must be defendable not only once complete and occupied but also during construction. From the moment a site is identified for (near) future construction of a police station, it becomes key terrain.

The majority of police station construction in Iraq has been performed by contract. With proper coordination and control, the construction contractor can provide some level of security at the construction site. This model can be and has been successful, but requiring the contractor to provide enough security to defend against sustained, complex attacks without assistance is cost-prohibitive. Whether or not securing the construction site is performed by the contractor, committed friendly forces are necessary to provide a layer of area security and an available quick reaction force. Without committed forces there is minimal chance for successfully completing any construction. This methodology makes a construction site, otherwise insignificant, ground to establish element command, a friendly operational objective for their combat forces. Committing limited resources to secure a construction site for a contractor may not feel like a natural choice for combat commanders when faced with competing objectives. However, if full consideration is given to the level of effect capable of an operating police force, the decision becomes much easier. Tactical-level objectives should give way to the operational objective, and resources should be apportioned accordingly. What seems to be counterintuitive to the military commander is actually quite doctrinally sound when applying effects-based planning. The operational effect of establishing a local police presence drove commanders to establish police station construction sites as friendly objectives in operations in Ramadi and elsewhere.

The question of where and when to build police stations can create a "chicken and egg" scenario. Should stations be built to consolidate gains where the conditions are safe enough to build without expectation of incidents, or should stations be built where conditions are poor so the police can help shape conditions? The responsible answer lies somewhere in the middle. On one hand, waiting for conditions to be safe enough to expect no incidents would create a timetable too long to be acceptable to commanders and not in concert with the theater strategy. On the other hand, charging into completely untamed areas (as may happen in Afghanistan) with only a construction crew would be asking for more setbacks than progress. Recruiting and community support in these areas would likely be unable to support establishing police anyway. To have an effect on the battlefield, police establishment can't wait until the conditions are completely calm. However, some preparation of the battlefield is necessary. Initial work must be done to capture community support, identify potential police leadership, and create a favorable perception of the police. The positive perception must be widespread enough to garner the support needed to establish and sustain an initial police presence while providing each other mutual support, especially off duty. Security conditions must be stable enough to reasonably expect construction completion even if faced with some setbacks. Material deliveries must be able to transit to the construction site, and workers must feel safe enough to stay on the job site. Once initial conditions are set, commitment of friendly forces is key to minimizing setbacks and maximizing the potential for success.

Since police station construction triggers a commitment of forces, the locations for construction are crucial. Choosing sites that will minimize construction time reduces the length of protection to attacks during construction but also reduces the length of commitment by friendly forces. Additionally, locations adjacent to or nearby existing friendly force positions can minimize the extension required of those forces to secure the construction site. Even if not ideal, long-term locations for police, sites with limited construction time nearby friendly force positions may be the best way to initially establish a police force. Further expansion could follow as conditions improve.

Counterinsurgency conflict has forced the military to perform many nontraditional roles. In some instances it has forced reversals of traditional roles as well. One such instance is police station construction in western Iraq where engineering functions have driven combat force objectives. Since tactical objectives must give way to operational objectives, this role reversal is appropriate and a key to success against insurgent activities.

SIDE BAR
An adaptive insurgency will quickly learn it is difficult to overcome an established police force.

SIDE BAR
Counterinsurgency conflict has forced the military to perform many nontraditional roles.

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Southwestern Afghanistan

BYLINE: Osborne, William V

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ABSTRACT
Afghanistan is landlocked, and there are few options for overland transport of goods and material from ports in friendly countries. Because of this, getting supplies and repair parts often takes longer than you may be used to. [...] the human environment, not the enemy situation, should be the primary focus.

FULL TEXT
A few things you should know
As with many units currently preparing to deploy, 2d Battalion, 7th Marines (2/7) received a short notice change of mission. Rather than Ramadi, Iraq, the battalion was deployed as an independent task force under the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan to northern Helmand and eastern Farah Provinces in Afghanistan. The order to deploy came in January 2008 and the deployment in March. While certainly a unique experience - deploying independent of a Marine air-ground task force and employed in a highly distributed manner (between 30 and 130 kilometers between platoon-sized positions) - 2/7 learned a number of points applicable to any unit bound for Helmand or Farah Province. Broadly, the situation there is much less mature than in Iraq. The nature of Afghan culture, the terrain, and the methods of the Taliban fighter are all different. By no means exhaustive, the following points are intended to give a broad audience some basic introduction to the area.

Taliban. The Taliban are not a monolithic, pro-Islamic group. As with other insurgencies, the Afghan insurgency is comprised of a complicated mix of criminals, tribal elements, warlords, officials from the pre-11 September 2001 Afghan Taliban Government, and other elements seeking money or power. Understanding the motivations and relationships of each center of power - friendly, enemy, and neutral is critical to understanding the population and where exploitable gaps in the enemy structure exist.
Two insurgencies. In many ways there are two different insurgencies in Afghanistan. Marines headed to Afghanistan will likely find themselves fighting in the south, which is dominated by the Pashtuns and based in Quetta, Pakistan. This ethnic group exists in both Pakistan and Afghanistan, and for many the international border seems largely meaningless. This allows insurgents from Afghanistan to use Pakistan as a safe haven, as well as providing a pool of recruits for the insurgency and a staging area for weapons and other supplies. In the majority of the Afghan-Pakistan border areas the Pakistani Government has deployed significant portions of the Pakistani Army to fight the Taliban.

The enemy. The Afghan insurgent is incredibly able at adapting. He will closely watch your patterns and your response to his attacks, then adapt them to capitalize on any perceptible weakness. When he is either forced into a direct engagement or when he judges that he has the upper hand and initiates an engagement, he will hold and fight. More impressively, he will undertake defense, reinforcement, attack, and withdrawal based on an impressive understanding of both terrain and our capabilities. He will attempt to flank you. In short, respect this enemy.

The enemy's weapons. He has extensive access to rifles, light and medium machineguns, rocket propelled grenades, mortars, rockets, and improvised explosive device (IED) making materials. His ability in employing the traditional weapons systems varies but is generally poor. His ability to employ the IED, however, is impressive. The devices themselves are not high tech, but they are clever and are almost always emplaced where you are likely to trigger them. His appreciation for terrain extends beyond good placement of the IED. He also understands where the best place to ambush you is and will take advantage of it. There are times when he will demonstrate proficiency with other weapons systems, especially mortars. Pay close attention to this as it indicates the presence of skilled outsiders in your area.

Language. Most people in the south speak Pashto. However, Afghan National Army (ANA) personnel are more likely to be from other parts of Afghanistan and will probably speak Dari. Throughout the region there are villages and areas where yet another language, such as Baluchi, may be spoken.

Tribes and power centers. Though Pashtun society is traditionally tribally based, years of war have severely fractured this structure. In the areas of great violence, which includes most of Helmand, nearly anyone with money or influence has moved to a city seen as safer, such as Gereshk or Lashkar Gah. It may be possible to reach out to the traditional leaders through the provincial government even when they are displaced. Younger men, often associated with Taliban or some criminal element (or both), fill the void. Representatives of the Government of Afghanistan, usually the local ANA garrison commander, Afghan National Police (ANP) chief, or appointed district governor (any of whom may have business or family links to Taliban or criminal elements) are also vying for influence. Determining who has power in each village and district and their individual motivations and relationships is critical. The tribes, subtribes, and villages are remarkably insular. Neighboring villages, even those of the same tribe, may have very little interaction with each other and cannot be expected to share the same interests or support the same groups.

Population centers. The population is largely rural, and small villages are spread throughout the deserts and mountains of the south. However, within that rural population there are key centers that have greater access to water and are more densely populated. In Helmand that area is along the Helmand Rud and goes from north of Sangin to south of Garmsir and is several kilometers wide on both sides of the river. While some specialized fighters (like trained mortar men) and senior Taliban leaders on command visits do transit into these populated areas, most of the fighters and lower level insurgent leadership is of, and thus lives among, the population throughout the region. As with the population generally, fighters tend to be concentrated in the more populated areas.

Sectarian differences are not a significant issue. The vast majority of Afghans are Sunni. However, there are ethnic fault lines that may become larger issues. Specifically, the Pashtun majority in the south may respond poorly to a central government that does not include a significant number of Pashtuns in important positions.

The needs of the Afghans in the south are very basic - security, clean water, and a steady food supply. Television and radio networks, vehicles, and even electricity, while mentioned as desirable things, are not usually asked for. Many Afghans still believe we can deliver on our promises - especially U.S. forces. In many villages there is a sense of good will and willingness to work with us.

Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) have a long way to go. The ANA are generally better than the ANP, but both still need plenty of work. Most ANA in the south are non-Pashtuns from the central or northern parts of Afghanistan. The ANP are generally local. It is important to keep this in mind when you are getting intelligence from either ANP or ANA. Consider the source, his connection to the community, and his own biases. Like most Afghans, ANSF are usually willing to fight when it is in their interest or when they know they have the tactical advantage. Pashtuns, while not militaristic, are very proud of their warrior heritage and the perception of military skill.
Opium Poppy is a black market crop. Much insurgent and Taliban activity is criminal activity related to the growing, harvesting, production, and transportation of the poppy and opium derived from it. In Helmand and Farah you will see hundreds of acres of poppy plants. The people growing the poppy are often regular farmers who are growing poppy because it is the best financial choice given the current economic and governmental structure as well as the lack of infrastructure. Because it is a black market crop, criminal and Taliban elements are able to reap monetary benefit from poppy to the point that it is a primary source of financial support for insurgent elements throughout the south.

Terrain is harsh and roads almost nonexistent. Other than a few major paved arteries, most of the roads are nothing more than well-worn dirt trails. There is a very high IED threat on them. This means that traveling off road is common. It takes forever to get anywhere, and the terrain eats up your vehicles. Axles, half shafts, and transmissions are frequently broken. Movements of 50 or 60 kilometers may take a day or more. The medium tactical vehicle replacement is the one vehicle that does well. It has enough power and is durable enough to withstand Afghanistan. The height of the turret also allows gunners to see over the walls surrounding many of the local compounds. Tracked vehicles (both assault amphibious vehicles and tanks) would be extremely useful, as would light armored vehicles. The greater mobility of these vehicles would allow Marines to more easily bypass the IED-laden roads as well as provide additional firepower - much needed in most of southern Afghanistan.

Afghanistan is landlocked, and there are few options for overland transport of goods and material from ports in friendly countries. Because of this, getting supplies and repair parts often takes longer than you may be used to. Living conditions are relatively austere. While more developed bases are under construction, most positions in the south do not have the amenities that are found in many of the places in Iraq. This goes beyond leisure-related amenities - coffee and ice cream shops and wireless Internet - and extends to contract support for fuel, electricity, billeting, and other kinds of contracted maintenance. Marines need to be prepared to live and operate without contracted support, just like we have for so much of our history.

Counterinsurgency doctrine as outlined in the counterinsurgency field manual (Field Manual 3-24, Marine Corps Warfare Publication 33.3.5, Counterinsurgency) works in Afghanistan just as it does elsewhere. First, the human environment, not the enemy situation, should be the primary focus. Second, the population must be secured where it lives. Third, the understanding of human terrain is the critical intelligence requirement.

It is likely that even small units will operate with or adjacent to a non-U. S. International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) element. Working with these NATO and ISAF allies brings a unique set of challenges across the warfighting functions. Figure out what additional restrictions they operate under as well as what cultural and tactical differences will impact your combined operations. These include different perceptions about immediate goals and methods relating to influencing the population. Be wary of preconceived notions of our allies' capabilities and limitations. Those you expect to be good might not be, and those of whom you expect little might surprise you.

There are no silver bullets to the fight in Afghanistan. Marines have built a large base of counterinsurgency experience. Many of the lessons of Al Anbar do apply to Afghanistan (best outlined in Carter Malkasian and Jerry Meyerle's article, "How Is Afghanistan Different From Al Anbar?").1 That experience, coupled with good application of the doctrinal planning process and the appropriate amount of flexibility, will smooth the transition to a new battlefield. As ever, Marines well schooled in the basics, well disciplined, and with a clear understanding of their task and purpose will succeed.

FOOTNOTE

Note


by Capt William V. Osborne

Capt Osborne was the S-2 (intelligence) during 2/7's deployment to Afghanistan in 2008.

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Adaptable leaders observe the rapidly changing situation, identify its key characteristics, ascertain what has to be done in consultation with subordinates, and determine the best method to accomplish the mission [authors emphasis]. The Marine small unit leader is expected to be thoroughly trained, an expert in the application of the tenets and nuances of COIN, and prepared to engage across a spectrum of operations that range from full-on kinetic firefights with diehard insurgents to building relationships by enthusiastically drinking chai with indigenous leaders. If we expect our small unit leaders to do great things then they must be empowered to do so.

As the level of the Marine Corps’ commitment in Afghanistan rises, so too does the likely requirement for small unit leaders to be placed in disparate locations and in harm’s way. The concept of ECO, in which a company commander essentially assumes many of the duties, roles, and responsibilities usually resident at the battalion level, may well become the model for the Afghan fight.

Full Text

2008 Chase Prize Essay Contest: Honorable Mention

Self-protection is not the most important piece of our warfighting functions

That force protection is important is an inarguable fact. Force protection, one of six warfighting functions, is defined in joint doctrine as "... protective measures taken to mitigate hostile actions against Department of Defense personnel...", and it is the duty of every commander to ensure that the men and women under his command are as safe as possible in the most unsafe of all environments - combat. Self-protection is not the reason that soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines deploy into war zones, however. As the military component of American national power, they are there to fight.
As such, decisions regarding force protection must be weighed against the other five warfighting functions of maneuver, logistics, fires, command and control, and intelligence. It is one complementary part of the warfighting pie, but it is not the singularly most important piece. However, for many reasons that are beyond the scope of this article, force protection has risen to a level of prominence above its functional peers as evidenced by the rigid, centralized, and autocratic level to which decisions that affect it have risen. For example, should a commanding general be the decider on whether or not a particular Marine has to wear a particular component on his flak jacket? In Iraq, that has proven to be the case. Although made with the best of intentions, decisions made by such centralized means undermine the authority and question the common sense of the entire chain of command. If a subordinate leader cannot be trusted or empowered to make such a simple decision based on his training, experience, and analysis of the situation, why is he put in a position to enact national policy on a microlevel as he prosecutes his small part of a counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign?

Force protection, and the level of decisionmaking required to effect it, provides a constructive point of discussion for the larger issue of centralization and decentralization of authority and responsibility. The discussion becomes critically important as the Marine Corps embraces enhanced company operations (ECO) and shifts its focus to Afghanistan where we have the opportunity to apply so many of the lessons learned in Iraq to a different counterinsurgency fight. In Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF), authority and responsibility for force protection were disparately assigned. Those with the authority to make decisions were not those who had the responsibility to perform the small unit actions that are so crucial to the successful prosecution of COIN, and such centralization of authority hindered the ability of small unit leaders to make relevant decisions at their level.

During OIF, force protection decisions were largely made at the highest echelons. Small unit leaders (those at the company level and below) were required to bring the strategic vision and operational goals to the tactical level, yet their abilities to make simple decisions about just this one of the six warfighting functions was denied. Regardless of physical conditions or local atmospherics, Marines on patrol were directed to wear personal protective equipment that may or may not have been appropriate for the mission being conducted. The flexibility of a junior or mid-level commander or leader to apply the basic tenets of planning and leadership, to conduct a mission analysis, or to address the physical wellbeing of his Marines was summarily denied. This centralized practice is directly contradictory to emerging COIN doctrine, as articulated in Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.5, Counterinsurgency.

Success in COIN operations requires small-unit leaders agile enough to transition among many types of missions and able to adapt to change. They must be able to shift through a number of activities from nation building to combat and back again in days, or even hours. Alert junior leaders recognize the dynamic context of a tactical situation and can apply informed judgment to achieve the commanders intent in a stressful and ambiguous environment. COIN operations are characterized by rapid changes in tactical and operational environments. The presence of the local populace within which insurgents may disappear creates a high degree of ambiguity. Adaptable leaders observe the rapidly changing situation, identify its key characteristics, ascertain what has to be done in consultation with subordinates, and determine the best method to accomplish the mission [authors emphasis].

The Marine small unit leader is expected to be thoroughly trained, an expert in the application of the tenets and nuances of COIN, and prepared to engage across a spectrum of operations that range from full-on kinetic firefights with diehard insurgents to building relationships by enthusiastically drinking chai with indigenous leaders. What he is not empowered to do, however, is alter the level of personal force protection that his Marines and sailors are required to wear; everything they do "outside the wire" must be performed in accordance with regulations promulgated by a headquarters that is many levels higher and significantly far removed from the tiny chunk of the operating environment that our young leader must influence. He must run the risk of reducing the tactical agility of his forces in the fight because they may be encumbered by excessive personal protective equipment, and he must also hazard the trust of the locals and their leaders by only appearing in their presence fully armed and equipped for combat.

A very wise man once said that leaders are paid to make decisions and live with the consequences. With leadership comes responsibility, and with responsibility should come the trust and confidence that the person in charge will make the best decisions possible given the operational mission, higher command's intent, local atmospherics, and the myriad other things that influence decisionmaking. Centralization of decisions as simple as what a Marine can wear and how he wears it seriously undercuts the tactical leader's ability to perform the tasks for which he is trained and is theoretically trusted to perform. If we expect our small unit leaders to do great things then they must be empowered to do so. If we require a small unit leader to shoulder the responsibility to accomplish the dynamic and complex goals of COIN, then that leader should be granted the commensurate authority to make decisions that affect mission accomplishment.
As the level of the Marine Corps' commitment in Afghanistan rises, so too does the likely requirement for small unit leaders to be placed in disparate locations and in harm's way. The concept of ECO, in which a company commander essentially assumes many of the duties, roles, and responsibilities usually resident at the battalion level, may well become the model for the Afghan fight. With this enhanced responsibility must come enhanced and decentralized authority, and part of that authority must include the ability to perform a mission analysis and to address local force protection. Overly restrictive measures dictated from Kabul or Kandahar will likely be wholly unsuited to those in the close fight; it may be snowing on Marines in the mountains while the mercury pushes into the triple digits as Marines patrol the desert plains. Interaction with the local leadership and population, the center of gravity in COIN, will be hampered if the small unit leader cannot embrace the culture, social mores, and customs of those he is so desperately trying to influence. He must be able to display the level of trust shown by open hands that do not carry a weapon.

Marines are not incapable of making such decisions; they are arguably the best trained, most highly skilled, and most superbly led full-spectrum warriors on the planet. They aren't going to run around the battlefield like children dressed for Halloween; they are professionals who will make the right decisions if we let them. They are in harm's way now and will be for the foreseeable future. They are fighting a form of warfare that is different from traditional peer competitor combat and one that has not been actively studied or considered until the rise of the insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan forced a fundamental change in how the Marine Corps fights. Unfortunately, some changes have yet to accompany the shift in doctrine, and the centralization of decisionmaking at the highest levels is one of the most significant. Small unit leaders are the ones out on patrol, establishing posts in austerity, and breaking bread with the very populations that we are trying to influence. If they can be trusted to put a bullet through the heart of an insurgent, then they should be trusted to make the simple decisions that can directly affect their ability to accomplish their mission, and we are behind the power curve in this regard. Our coalition partners have leveraged the flexibility to attend Shuras sans body armor and wearing soft covers, but our Marines have been required to show up armed to the teeth and clad in body armor. If we institutionally want to embrace COIN and all of its tenets, we simply must empower our small unit leaders with both the authority and the responsibility to exercise the good judgment that is a product of their experience and training. We have to trust their common sense.

SIDEBAR

The Marine small unit leader is expected to be thoroughly trained.

FOOTNOTE

Notes


by LtCol Michael D. Grice

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Combined Arms in Afghanistan

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ABSTRACT

Insurgents still fought with guerrilla tactics - shoot and move, use the terrain and local populace to hide, and attempt to demoralize ground forces with harassing fires and homemade bombs - however, this enemy seemed to learn more quickly than those in Iraq. The Marine air control group detachment never trained to DASC operations during MEU PTP with Special Operations Training Group, yet they controlled and coordinated more than 4,000 aircraft in a complex theater with U.S. and NATO aviation assets in support of combat operations.

FULL TEXT

CAX was not that bad

Let's take a look at Marine airground task force (MAGTF) fire support integration through an examination of a Marine expeditionary unit's (MEUs) experience in Afghanistan. It will provide valuable learning points for units preparing for their deployments.

Situation

In early 2008, 24th MEU was directed to deploy to Afghanistan in support of NATO and the International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF). In the following months the MAGTF was en- visioned to operate as a theater task force in response to troubled areas in the na- tion. Arriving in March, the Marines would soon utilize the critical MAGTF concept of combined arms in support of the ground combat element (GCE) scheme of maneuver. MEU fire support integration
would be greatly tested as U.S. Marines brought desperately needed help to those supporting Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF).

Enemy

The enemy in Afghanistan was not unlike the enemies seen in Operation Iraqi Freedom I (OIF I), albeit on a smaller scale. Insurgents still fought with guerrilla tactics - shoot and move, use the terrain and local populace to hide, and attempt to demoralize ground forces with harassing fires and homemade bombs - however, this enemy seemed to learn more quickly than those in Iraq. Lessons learned were available through discussions with ISAF counterparts; the enemy was utterly fearless, expectedly tenacious, and very adaptive.

They used the lineal terrain features like the canals, things they know we have a hard time crossing, to engage us from the other side. They thought we would not come at them, or if we did, we would have to [assault] into the teeth of their fire.1

Despite attempting to mass in greater numbers and reinforcing their fighters, the enemy would prove unable to repel the speed, strength, and agility of the MAGTF. "The enemy was completely overwhelmed by us and not used to the way we fought . . . ."2

Mission

As part of its first assigned mission, Operation AZADA WOSA (Be Free), 24th MEU would enter the southern Helmand Province town of Garmsir, a central point for the flow of personnel, weapons, and opium supporting the Afghan insurgents and terrorists. The Marines would establish ground lines of communications for subsequent tasking. Routes would be secured by Battalion Landing Team 1st Battalion, 6th Marines (BLT 1/6), with one company moving via convoy from the northwest, while two reinforced companies would be inserted by helicopter inside the eastern portion of the town. The BLT would secure the route and the surrounding area in conjunction with organic artillery and aviation fires.

Once the convoy and artillery support by fire were in position on the west side of Garmsir, the battalion (minus) helicopter insert could begin within the eastern sector. ISAF could not assist, as they were previously tasked or unable to fly in low ambient light levels. In the early morning hours, waves of CH-53E and CH-46E assault helicopters inserted two reinforced companies into the town. Harriers, Cobras, and Hueys waited overhead, providing close air support (CAS) and initial terminal guidance (ITG), while KC-BOs provided battlefield illumination and command and control. All assets provided crucial radio relay and pushed information back to the respective BLT and MEU combat operations centers (COCs). With the exception of minor injuries due to heavy pack loads and soft terrain, the insert was uneventful, and no enemy fire was received.

In the following days the BLT maneuvered through Garmsir, a village full of Afghanistan's primary cash crop - the opium poppy. While the MAGTF fought to expel a well-organized enemy from a trench system likened to those of World War I, it took equal care not to target civilians or the plants they grew. Throughout the battle, fire support integration was essential. Marine aviation provided CAS and urgent casualty evacuation (casevac) support; artillery provided destruction and suppression of enemy troops. MAGTF fires kept the enemy off balance as the BLT swept through the town. Combined arms were instrumental as the Marines took an enemy stronghold that had plagued ISAF and NATO for years. Imbedded reporters witnessing the operations generated media clips that often resembled trailers for war movies; however, the actions of the MEU simply demonstrated the execution of a well-conditioned MAGTF. Through combined arms and maneuver warfare, the Marines fixed, surrounded, and overwhelmed the enemy.

Combined Arms Support

"Our center of gravity is our combined arms." "We overwhelmed them with all the vehicles, air, and army." These quotes did not come from strategic planners or dusty publications. They came from a sergeant and a lieutenant who served in BLT 1/6. As proven in the past, and again in Garmsir, what sets the Marine Corps apart is our ability to train and fight as the "air-ground" team. CAS and supporting fires were in short supply and high demand for all of OEF, but the MAGTF possessed organic fire support. While retaining control of its aviation assets was difficult at times in this multinational arena, commanders made it clear that the MEU was not a "shopping cart of toys" to be disbanded or piecemealed; it was a team that trained, planned, and operated as a single unit. Organic fire support and fire support integration were critical to mission success.3

Aviation Fires and FAC(A)

Aviation was a vital part of the plan for the MAGTF, providing logistical mobility and fire support. Rotary-wing (RW) and fixed-wing (FW) CAS assets combined to deliver aviation fires as well as contingency battlefield illumination; non-
traditional intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); and casevac escort. With MEU KC-130 support, Harriers extended on-station times and increased ordnance loads, allowing multiple targets to be serviced in single sorties. Using a forward arming and refueling point collocated with the BLT COC, Hueys and Cobras provided maximum time overhead with continuous CAS coverage and minimal response time. "Every time we got shot at, the helicopters [and jets] would be right there ready . . . just looking for something to shoot."4

Equally as vital for fires integration was the presence of a forward air controller (airborne) (FAC(A)). The MEU possessed the only certified FAC(A)s in the entire country. MEU FAC(A)s received more extensive ISAF training in rules of engagement and were well versed in BLT tactics, techniques, and procedures and it's scheme of maneuver (SOM). FAC(A)s served to extend the tactical air control party by conducting terminal controls, but equally important were their abilities to provide radio relay, reconnaissance, asset coordination and deconfliction, coordinate generation, etc.5 While in positive contact with the ground FAC, air officer (AirO), fire support coordination center (FSCC), and other ISAF aviation assets, RW FAC(A)s coordinated target generation, developed nine-lines (required by ISAF), controlled artillery fires, and refined friendly positions. The GCE often moved with such speed that ground leaders' knowledge of forward units was difficult at best. RW FAC(A)s were ideal to coordinate friendly and enemy positions. They were close enough to see both friend and foe with the human eye, either directly or on night vision goggles, while out of the current threat envelope.

All RW CAS platforms were FAC(A) qualified; this unique capability proved essential to fires integration and mitigated risk of fratricide in numerous cases. Through practiced procedures via MAGTF workups and predeployment training (PTP), missions were approved by the FSCC in seconds, not minutes. The speed resulted from extensive practice, trust, and experience with detailed planning and integration between FAC(A)s, the FSCC, and GCE. The Harrier community recently instituted a single-seat FAC(A) program. The single-seat qualified FW FAC(A) was instrumental in similar coordination and provided unique capabilities with sensors that were superior to those of legacy AH-IWs. He was able to coordinate suspected improvised explosive device sites to the ground FACs. He also coordinated airspace, provided ITG and ISR as required, and then rapidly coordinated CAS and artillery fires with the FSCC. As the FSCC monitored the terminal attack direction net, attack briefs and enemy locations were relayed and missions were approved almost immediately. Targets were addressed most rapidly with aviation, allowing the Marines to maneuver in conjunction with those fires.6

Awesome isn't even the word. The air was really, really on target .... you knew you could bring in a 500 pound bomb 190 meters away from you and you weren't going to get anyone hurt because Ithe pilots] were that good.7

The MAGTF trained together, which facilitated accurate ordnance impacts, at times within danger-close distances, with minimal risk of fratricide and in harmony with GCE SOM. FAC(A) integration served as a battlefield multiplier and played critical roles in integration of timely and accurate supporting fires, to include artillery. MEU aviation dropped over 60 tons of ordnance during operations in OEF.8

Artillery Fires

Artillery fires with the M777 provided effects on targets and “suppression” of threats as the BLT pressed forward in Garmisir. The enemy possessed little air defense artillery and only "possible" man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS), so traditional suppression of enemy air defense was not applicable. Enemy compounds or positions that could affect RW CAS were addressed using sequential timelines with aviation and artillery. These "packages" were strikingly similar to those taught at combined arms exercises (CAXs) and were used to facilitate deliberate assaults on major objectives; they required extensive, detailed coordination between artillery, aviation, the GCE, and the FSCC. "When the grid to suppress or the grid to mark changes [is] 5 minutes before the TOT [time on target], that’s when the pressure is really on."9

As S-2 (intelligence) reports of possible MANPADS increased, artillery was used in situations that were deemed prohibitive to aviation. Marine artillery proved vital to cover gaps that aviation could not fill due to the threat or limitations with time on station. Artillery fire support required meticulous coordination, essential to assist Marines fighting an enemy only meters away. "Nearly all missions were fired danger close." Artillery also provided critical fires that diverted enemy attention at night, allowing the BLT to refit and rearm for follow-on offensive operations. Marine artillery fired over 1,200 rounds in support of the BLT.10

FSCC

The FSCC functioned as advertised to integrate all MEU fires into a synergistic effort. Located in a Hesco bunker, the BLT S-3 (operations), the fire support coordinator (FSC), the AirO, and the direct air support center (DASC) sat shoulder to shoulder. Friendly positions were reported by ground units, refined by aviation and unmanned aircraft system (UAS)
assets, and plotted by hand on a simple board with pins and strings representing MEU units and gun target lines. The artillery battery commander, serving as the FSC, and the AirO worked to approve fire missions as they coordinated with the BLT operations officer. RW CAS and casevac crews standing alert were also present in the COC and FSCC. Alert aircrews followed all developments via radio, mIRC (Internet relay chat client), and Scan Eagle. UAS and remotely operated video enhanced receiver feeds were critical as the COC and RW pilots gained higher situational awareness. With information influx to the COC, instructions for CAS and casevac crews were received directly from the FSCC prior to launch. This data allowed pilots better positive target identification and better weapons standoff.

DASC

The DASC performed its vital role in the Marine air command and control system integrating aviation assets and de-conflicting airspace. It provided control of MEU airspace through a high-density airspace control zone and owned the airspace covering 38 by 50 nautical miles and from the surface to 28,000 feet surrounding Garmsir. Although normally using solely procedural control and not equipped with radar, they were able to tie into radar pictures from other ISAF agencies for higher situational awareness.

[The DASC] was very helpful throughout operations . . . having a Direct Air Support Center right there next to us ... . We were really set up for success with the stuff we had.

Marines additionally controlled numerous NATO and U.S. Army aircraft in support of Operation AZADA WOSA. The DASC provided up-to-date information flow as it coordinated airspace and maximized communications regarding the friendly and enemy situation to Marine aviation. During Operation AZADA WOSA, the DASC controlled 3,631 sorties and supported 20 casevacs and medical evacuations and 76 troops in contact.

As the BLT continued to move throughout the town during the month of May, supporting fires were constantly available to the infantry to address enemy fire and support friendly maneuver. Integrated fire support was essential to destroy, neutralize, and suppress enemy positions in conjunction with ground SOM. These efforts required quick thinking and detailed planning and were only possible after months of MAGTF training. "The [enemy] only left, I think, when they couldn't deal with the combined arms anymore."

Lessons Learned and Future Training

According to ISAF, 24th MEU was "catastrophically successful." Simply stated, the MAGTF executed as trained. The proficiency with which the MEU integrated organic fire support with ground scheme of maneuver separates the MAGTF from any other force on the modern battlefield. MAGTF fires allowed 24th MEU to clear the most hotly contested southern Helmand Province enemy stronghold in roughly 1 month, a feat ISAF had been unable to accomplish in nearly 5 years. Even with the success in Garmsir, if the Marine Corps expects continued success with combined arms and fire support integration, we must refocus MAGTF training that has been lacking in past years. MAGTF training in combined arms integration has declined since OIF began. While the decline was arguably inevitable for a time, effective training in fire support coordination for the ALAGTF has fallen short in the past few years. The answer may not be the CAX of old, but the current training to bring the MAGTF together to plan, rehearse, and execute fires should be addressed Marine Corps-wide.

General training will continue to be a challenge for the entire Marine Corps as we battle operational tempo versus dwell time; finite training days are indeed treasures. However, more fire support coordination exercises must be executed to facilitate air-ground team and FSCC proficiency during PTP. In Operation AZADA WOSA, pilots and artillerymen often relied on previous experiences that dated back as early as CAX in 2002. Other Marine infantrymen and artillerymen had never trained to integrated fires or had seen them with much lower integration at revised CAX or Exercise MOJAVE VIPER.

The MAGTF was nothing more than MCDP-I [Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1, Warfighting, a concept in my head until I got here. I've been with the battalion for going on four years now, and this is the first time I've seen everything combined. It's pretty awesome.]

Make no mistake; BIT 1/6 was not inexperienced. They were a seasoned and tested group that had, only months before, returned from operations in Ramadi, Iraq.

Current training exercises do not address combined arms and integration with ground maneuver to a sufficient level. The lack of "sponsored" training has forced units to seek local solutions and train themselves. Marine Aircraft Group 39 (MAG-39) hosts its own fire support coordination exercise called SCORPION FIRE. 24th MEU conducted similar
"homegrown" training exercises. LOWLAND FURY, conceptualized by a 24th MEU Harrier pilot, provided focused training in ISR, FAC(A), and CAS between the BLT and the aviation combat element (ACE). The MEU also conducted its own integrated fires exercises focusing on combined arms integration and recertification of joint terminal attack controllers (JTACs) with evaluators organic to the MEU. FAC(A) training and proficiency were critical for ACE and BLT fires and should be considered mission essential. The Marine air control group detachment never trained to DASC operations during MEU PTP with Special Operations Training Group, yet they controlled and coordinated more than 4,000 aircraft in a complex theater with U.S. and NATO aviation assets in support of combat operations. Increased training in fire support coordination must be incorporated in PTP requirements.

If this critical training is not provided, accomplishment of proficiency falls on individual units amidst a storm of ever-increasing PTP requirements. If everything is important, nothing is important. PTP must be continuously reevaluated to guarantee that training is the absolute best use of the limited time to train. Twenty-nine Palms and CAX venues are ideal, but with strains in time and logistics on certain units, some solutions might involve alternative venues with MAG and regimental planners who are supervised by division, wing, the Marine expeditionary force, or other qualified Marine Corps representatives. The Marine Corps possesses agencies dedicated to MAGTF fires integration; we must continue to engage them, on some level, and guarantee fires standardization and training across the Operating Forces. In these areas, we can do better to ensure that the MAGTF remains proficient with supporting arms coordination, still a part of full-spectrum operations, as we prepare our deploying forces.

Summary

Aviation, artillery, and infantry units may be experts individually, but the MAGTF demands integration to overwhelm the enemy. The advantages of coordinating, planning, and executing as a MAGTF have not changed; success is still directly proportional to training. Our challenge is to continue to undertake tough training and to be flexible as we face high operational tempo and deployment rates. The answer must be agreed upon by the Marine Corps to ensure standardized and supervised training of the MAGTF in kinetic, integrated fires. The first time units experience combined arms and fire support integration should not be on the battlefield.

SIDEBAR

. . . the MAGTF demands integration to overwhelm the enemy.

FOOTNOTE

Notes

2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
7. 24th MEU GCE lessons learned.
8. 24th MEU ACE lessons learned.
9. Ibid.
10. 24th MEU GCE lessons learned.
11. 24th MEU ACE lessons learned.
12. 24th MEU GCE lessons learned.
13. 24th MEU ACE lessons learned.
14. 24th MEU GCE lessons learned.
15. Ibid.
16. 24th MEU ACE lessons learned.

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**GRAPHIC:** Maps
- **IMAGE PHOTOGRAPH:** Marines from 24th MEU moving through fields in Afghanistan in support of ISAF operations. (Photo courtesy of the author.)
- **IMAGE MAP:** The area of operations and Garmisir village. (Diagram courtesy of the author.)
- **IMAGE PHOTOGRAPH:** Harrier arms for CAS sortie. (Photo courtesy of the author.)
- **IMAGE PHOTOGRAPH:** Rotary-wing CAS was a vital part of the MAGTF fires plan and was invaluable. (Photo courtesy of the author.)
- **IMAGE PHOTOGRAPH:** Sequential timelines proved effective in taking out enemy positions using artillery and air combined-just like CAX. (Photo courtesy of the author.)

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**Defending Fallujah**

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**ABSTRACT**

[...] ACF had developed some of the most advanced unconventional tactics to date and had coalition forces struggling to find solutions to defeat a growing and evolving insurgency. U.S. Marine intelligence estimated that there were 17 insurgent groups operating in Fallujah with 12 key leaders.7 Insurgent groups inside the city were primarily Sunni Arab and were comprised of former regime elements, jihadists (foreign and Iraqi), and tribal elements.8 Some of the foreign
fighters were Chechen,9 and Syrian special forces identification cards were found by Marines clearing the town.10
Al-Qaeda in Iraq, led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, was also one of the major groups of foreign fighters in the city.11 If ACF
had succeeded in forming a national front, it is reasonable to conclude that a national leadership would not have chosen to
defend Fallujah during the assault of November 2004.

FULL TEXT
An analysis of insurgent leadership and factors

Throughout history insurgent groups have relied on unconventional tactics to counter conventional armies that possess
both superior numbers and firepower. Unconventional warfare is defined as:

A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted through,
with, or by indigenous or surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying de-
grees by an external source. It includes, but is not limited to, guerrilla warfare, subversion, sabotage, intelligence activi-
ties, and unconventional assisted recovery.

Some successful examples of the use of unconventional tactics against superior conventional forces were seen during the
Vietnam War; the Russian invasion of Chechnya; the attack on U.S. Rangers in Mogadishu, Somalia; the bombing of the
USS Cole in Aden, Yemen; and more recently during the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Unconventional tactics allow
insurgent groups operating in small cells to utilize "hit-and-run" tactics and fight at a time and place of their choosing.
These tactics deny conventional forces the use of their traditional strategy of massing firepower and personnel in a fixed
battle to gain and hold territory.

Prior to April 2004, anticoalition forces (ACF) in Iraq were successfully utilizing unconventional tactics to counter U.S.
led coalition forces on the battlefield. The evolution of the improvised explosive device (IED) gave ACF the ability to
conduct standoffs against coalition forces without having to place precious manpower in the direct line of fire. By
April 2004, IEDs, combined with sniper operations, suicide attacks, indirect rocket/mortar attacks, and small unit en-
gagements, were beginning to take a toll on coalition forces that could not research, develop, and field countermeasures
quickly enough to effectively counter ACF tactics. In short, ACF had developed some of the most advanced unconven-
tional tactics to date and had coalition forces struggling to find solutions to defeat a growing and evolving insurgency.

While ACF had developed advanced and successful unconventional tactics, they chose to defend Fallujah against coal-
tion forces in a conventional battle in November 2004. ACF adopted a flawed strategy, choosing to defend Fallujah by
engaging in a conventional battle against an overwhelming force counter to their strengths and previous successful op-
erational employment. Insurgency expert David Galula noted, "However desirable for the insurgent to possess territory,
large regular forces, and powerful weapons, to possess them and to rely on them prematurely could spell doom."2 The
factors that led ACF to mistakenly defend Fallujah were a lack of a unified national ACF command, overconfidence, an
underestimation of coalition forces' capabilities, and a flawed strategy employed by jihadist insurgent factions.

ACF Lacked a Unified Chain of Command

The U.S. Army/Marine Corps counterinsurgency field manual states, "Leadership is critical to any insurgency. An in-
surgency is not simply random violence; it is directed and focused violence aimed at achieving a political objective."3 A
lack of leadership and disunity within an insurgency has numerous detrimental effects. It can affect political and military
policies, operational planning, intelligence collection, and logistics.4 Throughout 2004 there was a lack of a unified
insurgent front on both the national level and inside Fallujah itself.

On the national level, by the end of 2004, nationalists, former regime elements, Iraqi Islamists, foreign Islamists, foreign
volunteers, and criminals made up the core of the Sunni insurgency. Within these categories, there were an estimated 35
insurgent groups that had claimed attacks within Iraq prior to 200.5 5 There was also a large Shi’ite contingent, the Mahdi
Army led by firebrand cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, that had orchestrated uprisings in Baghdad and Shi’ite-dominated southern
Iraq in April and August 2004. By late 2004 various insurgent factions throughout Iraq were attempting to create a unified
political front but ultimately failed due to conflicting interests.6

In many ways the number of insurgent factions operating in Fallujah in early 2004 was a microcosm of the factions op-

terating throughout the whole of Iraq. There was not one clear ACF chain of command within Fallujah. U.S. Marine
intelligence estimated that there were 17 insurgent groups operating in Fallujah with 12 key leaders.7 Insurgent groups
inside the city were primarily Sunni Arab and were comprised of former regime elements, jihadists (foreign and Iraqi),
and tribal elements.8 Some of the foreign fighters were Chechen,9 and Syrian special forces identification cards were
found by Marines clearing the town. 10 Al-Qaeda in Iraq, led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, was also one of the major groups of foreign fighters in the city. 11

If ACF had succeeded in forming a national front, it is reasonable to conclude that a national leadership would not have chosen to defend Fallujah during the assault of November 2004. There was evidence of this in October 2004 when some local insurgent leaders called for foreign fighters to leave the city to prevent an assault. 12 Rather, they would have moved manpower and supplies to a base of operations away from coalition forces and initiated traditional guerrilla tactics. This proven strategy, based on historical successes from past insurgencies, such as Algeria and Vietnam, would have allowed the force to reconstitute and continue a sustained campaign built around hit-and-run tactics rather than fighting in fixed defensive positions. Also, since many insurgents inside Fallujah were local residents lacking national leadership, they chose to stay and defend their homes from what they perceived were coalition occupiers. A unified command structure would have been able to make a strategic decision that benefited a unified nationwide insurgency, rather than making decisions based upon operational-level conditions, as was the case with the local ACF defending their city. The lack of a local command structure degraded ACF command and control of forces during the November 2004 battle.

Some would argue that a unified command would not have opposed al-Zarqawi's decision to defend Fallujah. Al-Zarqawi's organization was responsible for some of the most spectacular attacks in Iraq. The media coverage associated with those attacks was disproportionately greater than the coverage of attacks by the rest of the insurgency utilizing nonspectacular hit-and-run methods. This disparity in media coverage would lead some to believe that al-Zarqawi possessed more power within the insurgency than he actually did. In fact, as of October 2006, al-Zarqawi's foreign fighters only made up a small piece of the insurgency. 13 Being only a minor piece of the total insurgent force, al-Zarqawi would have had to work with a unified ACF command to achieve his aims and avoid infighting with larger local insurgent groups.

Overconfidence Consumed ACF

Military strategist Sun Tzu said, "One who lacks foresight and underestimates the enemy will be captured by him." 14 Throughout history, dating back to the time of Sun Tzu, military forces have underestimated their adversaries. The limited scope of the April 2004 assault and possible "victory disease" from a perceived victory in that battle led insurgents to underestimate coalition forces in November 2004.

The cancellation of Operation VIGILANT RESOLVE by coalition forces in April 2004 led insurgents inside Fallujah to underestimate the Marines leading up to Operation AL FAJR in November 2004. The limited scope of the April assault, and the subsequent withdrawal of the Marines from the city, could have contributed to an underestimation of the Marine force poised to assault Fallujah in November. Due to the limited time allotted to plan the April assault, the Marines initially only had two battalions available to attack, along with two additional Iraqi National Guard battalions with considerably less training and experience than their Marine counterparts. 15

Also, early on in the April 2004 assault, Col John Toolan, who had tactical control of the Marine force, determined there was no command structure among the groups they were fighting. It was mostly many different, small, unorganized cells, using hit-and-run tactics rather than a fixed urban defense, thus limiting the scope of the battle. 16 This type of defense could be attributed to the same lack of preparation time that the Marines had experienced. Col Toolan assessed that he did not need massive firepower to defeat ACF who were fighting a running battle. 17 If ACF had fought from static positions, the Marines would have been forced to use more supporting arms fire including air support, artillery, and armor to avoid the large number of casualties associated with assaulting fixed positions in an urban environment. This would be the case during the November operation, as insurgents had prepared for the inevitable Marine attack for 6 months and had built substantial fixed defensive positions. 18

Many of the fighters inside Fallujah may not have previously been exposed to a large coordinated attack before April 2004. A number of the insurgents inside the city were locals who were fighting to defend their city and may have had little or no previous military training. 19 Most of the fighting around Fallujah up to that point had been squad- and company-level attacks with limited supporting arms fire. Again, this was largely due to ACF hit-and-run tactics that did not require a large investment of coalition forces in response. These hit-and-run encounters were also often over before supporting arms could respond.

There were, however, a number of former Iraqi Army soldiers in the city who may have experienced the full force of U.S. combined arms during Operation DESERT STORM or the initial invasion of Iraq in 2003. 20 There were also a number of Chechens in the city 21 who could have seen intense street combat during the Russian assaults on Grozny in 1996 and 1999. However, it is highly unlikely that many of the insurgents had seen the effects of a well-coordinated combined arms assault by the world's most advanced military force. The effect of having never been exposed to the ferocity of a
large-scale conventional attack is that many of the insurgents inside the city may have thought that the April assault was indeed the full force of the Marines. That, added with the thought that they had beaten back a force with such a rich history as the U.S. Marine Corps, may have caused the insurgents to believe that they could defend the city against any attack. Once the Marines pulled back from the city in April, media reports indicated that insurgents perceived that they had militarily defeated the Marines. Insurgents and residents were in the streets celebrating victory.22 One insurgent declared, "We didn't want the Americans to enter the city and we succeeded."23 During an interview with Newsweek, another insurgent stated, "We fought in the streets, in the houses, on the rooftops. Even the Marines' tanks and helicopters could not stop us."24 After the perceived victory, insurgents may have fallen victim to victory disease. Victory disease "brings defeat to a previously victorious nation or military due to three basic symptoms: arrogance, complacency, and the habit of using established patterns to solve military problems."25 Throughout history, many military forces have fallen victim to victory disease including both Napoleon's and Hitler's invasions of Russia. Both had won repeated battles against multiple countries and thought they could easily defeat Russia. The arrogance of the victorious military force is the primary factor attributed to victory disease. Media reporting from Fallujah of a perceived insurgent victory in conventional battle with U.S. Marines is a clear sign of arrogance and shortsightedness on the part of the ACF.26 The failure of ACF to identify that they had not encountered the full brunt of Marine capabilities in April 2004 and the perceived victory in that battle were factors in choosing to defend Fallujah in November 2004.

Jihadist Strategy Clouded Decisionmaking

As water has no constant form, there are in war no constant conditions. Thus one able to gain the victory by modifying his tactics in accordance with the enemy situation may be said to be divine.27 The use of "fight to the death" tactics by the jihadist elements operating in Fallujah proved that these groups were tactically inflexible. The English meaning of jihad is "holy war." To die for jihad means that a jihadist would be sent to "paradise," which is viewed as better than earth. As Western thinking is to attempt to preserve life, jihadists are willing to go into battle and die to be sent to paradise. A good example of this is the use of suicide operations. This mentality was a driving factor in the jihadist decision to stand and fight the Marines.

Al-Zarqawi's writings show a lack of tactical flexibility that may have stemmed from the belief that U.S. forces were weak and could be ejected from Iraq with several large victories. In a letter to Osama bin Laden from early 2004, al-Zarqawi stated, "We know for certain that these Crusader forces will disappear tomorrow or the day after." He used past U.S. failed operations in Vietnam, Lebanon, and Somalia as proof that the United States would eventually leave Iraq.28 In the same letter, al-Zarqawi showed displeasure for the current hit-and-run tactics being utilized in Iraq:

Jihad here unfortunately [takes the form of) mines planted, rockets launched, and mortars shelling from afar. The Iraqi brothers still prefer safety and returning to the arms of their wives, where nothing frightens them. Sometimes the groups have boasted among themselves that not one of them has been killed or captured. We have told them in our many sessions with them that safety and victory are incompatible, that the tree of triumph and empowerment cannot grow tall and lofty without blood and defiance of death, that the [Islamic] nation cannot live without the aroma of martyrdom and the perfume of fragrant blood spilled on behalf of God, and that people cannot awaken from their stupor unless talk of martyrdom and martyrs fills their days and nights. The matter needs more patience and conviction.29

The letter indicates that al-Zarqawi believed bold action was required to expel U.S. forces from Iraq. It was widely publicized during the lead up to the November 2004 battle that al-Zarqawi's strategy was chosen as the primary means of defense for jihadists inside the city. Media outlets worldwide were filled with stories of the defenders of Fallujah willing to fight to the death.

The decision by jihadists to defend the city in this manner must have been well received by Marine planners. In front of the Marines now was a large group of ACF defending a fixed position with considerable stocks of weaponry. These stocks could have been better used at a slower rate in a traditional guerrilla campaign. This enabled the superior Marine led force to use their entire conventional arsenal comprised of aircraft, artillery, and tanks on a lesser force, which to that point had proven elusive.

Defending Fallujah "to the death" goes against most historical examples of successful insurgencies where the insurgent force was less powerful than the conventional government force. It shows a lack of tactical thinking and misunderstanding of the capabilities of the Marines on the part of al-Zarqawi and contributed to the defeat of ACF in the city along with the
loss of a significant arsenal of weapons. Jihadists realized their mistakes in strategy and shifted to more fluid hit-and-run tactics after the battle. This was documented in several al-Qaeda in Iraq lessons learned documents on the battle.30

Conclusion

ACF adopted a flawed strategy by choosing to defend Fallujah in November 2004. They chose a strategy opposite that of proven insurgent doctrine, and the end result was a major defeat at the hands of the VS. Marines and their full conventional arsenal. The battle was a major blow to the insurgency because it allowed the Marines to use a postbattle "clear and hold" strategy to maintain security in Fallujah. This strategy, which was also employed early on by the U.S. Army in Tar Afar, Iraq, laid the foundation for the successful countrywide clear and hold strategy that has largely pacified the insurgency. ACF also lost significant amounts of weapons and supplies during the battle. The lack of a national leadership of ACF in Iraq, overconfidence in their warfighting ability, and the inflexibility of jihadist strategy were major factors prompting ACF to defend Fallujah in November 2004.

Fragmented leadership denied ACF the ability to operate strategically throughout Iraq. The end result was that many ACF cells operated under their own guidance for their own objectives and seldom coordinated with other ACF cells. The decision to defend Fallujah in November 2004 is a good example of how a lack of leadership can affect any military command.

Overconfidence amongst ACF in Fallujah from surviving the limited Marine attack in April 2004 and the subsequent perceived victory in the battle aided in the decision to defend the city. Overconfidence is dangerous in military operations and has proven to be a downfall of armies throughout history.

The fight to the death mentality used by jihadists inside Fallujah in November 2004 went against proven insurgent tactics. To stand and fight a conventional force, such as the U.S. Marines, with a smaller, less equipped force was a recipe for disaster.

The combination of a lack of nationwide ACF leadership, overconfidence, and rigid jihadist tactics ensured that the battle for Fallujah in November 2004 was over before it began. These factors led ACF to defend and be defeated by a superior Marine force in a conventional battle that went against proven insurgent doctrine.

SIDEBAR

Insurgents and residents were in the streets celebrating victory.

FOOTNOTE

Notes

11. West, p. 42.


16. West, p. 68.

17. Ibid.

18. Zabaldo interview.

19. Todd.

20. West, p. 63.

21. Ibid., p. 303.


29. Ibid.


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GRAPHIC: Photographs

IMAGE PHOTOGRAPH, IEDs were an effective tool used by ACF against our Marines. (Photo by Cpl Mike Escobar.)

IMAGE PHOTOGRAPH, Local residents lacked national leadership and shifted allegiance to the insurgents. (Photo by ssgt Jim Goodwin.)

IMAGE PHOTOGRAPH, Insurgents miscalculated U.S. force capability when they decided to defend Fallujah. (noto by LCpl Will Lathrop.)

IMAGE PHOTOGRAPH, Culling the insurgent from the civilian is difficult but critical. (Photo by GySgt Mark Oliva.)
An insurgency is more than a threat to a single country; it is a threat to other countries since it is a breeding ground for international terrorists and a potential threat to the security of surrounding nations as well. As history has proven, failure to properly confront an insurgency leads to violence in neighboring countries as its bleeds over international borders. To fight the war against insurgencies, many nations have agreed to contribute civil and military forces to stand together and fight with a host nation to bring about law and order. Although a combat multiplier, a coalition of multiple nations, civil organizations, and Military Services can become a hindrance if not properly coordinated. Unity of command becomes an issue. As noted by David Galula:

. . . more than any other kind of warfare, counterinsurgency must respect the principle of single direction. A single boss must direct the operations from beginning to end.

Additionally, it can’t appear that a foreign invader has entered the country to put down the insurgency. The host nation must be in the lead. When conducting coalition counterinsurgency operations, unity of command and proper host-nation leadership are paramount to success.

Coalition unity of command in a counterinsurgency can take two forms - the committee system or the single commander system. As used by the British in Malaya in the 1950s, the committee system utilizes a chairman presiding over members taken from key civilian organizations, police, and military. Multiple levels of committees are established to focus on
specific areas of the counterinsurgency (e.g., district versus province). Decisions are made jointly by the committee with each member able to bring a unique perspective to the counterinsurgency fight. Keeping the committee small allows the organization to be more flexible. Implementation of decisions is actioned by the units or organizations of the committee members working in conjunction with each other. If this can be achieved, the committee system is very effective. However, a drawback is that this system can be slow if members are split on decisions and cannot agree on how to implement action. Personal agendas and egos have no place in the committee system and must be pushed aside to avoid this hindrance.

The other form of unity of command is the single commander system. Although the command is an integrated staff of civilian and military, a military commander normally leads the command, as seen in both Iraq and Afghanistan today. Modifying the committee system, the single commander system appoints the chairman of the committee as the commander of all organizations and units. The other members become his advisors or staff. This has the advantage of streamlining the chain of command resulting in speedier decisions as compared to the committee system. In a fluid, rapidly changing counterinsurgency, the single commander system holds an advantage. However, it is not as flexible as the committee system and can get tied up in “red tape” due to civil-military differences. Additionally, some coalition members may have national caveats that prohibit certain command relationships or actions, hindering the efforts of the single commander system.

The form of command implemented in coalition counterinsurgency operations should be situationally dependent. Whichever system is utilized, the key to success is not only unity of command but also for the host nation to be in the lead. For the populace to have faith in its government, the host nation must take charge of the coalition. A counterinsurgency force with a coalition member in the lead would be detrimental to the overall cause. As Frank Kitson stressed:

The host nation should be seen as the centre of the picture with the ally coming to its assistance. This impression can only be achieved if the ally is prepared to subordinate itself at every level to die host country. If there is the slightest indication of the ally taking the lead, the insurgents will have the opportunity to say that the government has betrayed the people to an outside power, and that they, the insurgents, are the only true representatives of the nation.3

As a result, not only do the nations involved in the coalition need to worry about providing civil and military support to the counterinsurgency, but they need to be aware of how that support is provided and ensure it does not appear that the host nation is not in the lead. Many times this is easier said than done. Coalition members will focus on the goal of overcoming the insurgency, but they will also have political and military constraints placed on them by their countries. These constraints sometimes will cause them to take a more aggressive approach within the coalition and appear to push aside the host nation. Sometimes, due to these national caveats, coalition members may be unable or unwilling to be led by host-nation leadership. This must be avoided or the counterinsurgency will fail. Coalition members must come into the counterinsurgency willing to subordinate their forces to the host nation if necessary. It is vital to the overall success of the counterinsurgency that the host nation takes the lead. If the host nation is to remain legitimate in the eyes of the populace, it can't surrender power to any member of the coalition. If it does, the insurgents will use it against the coalition to win the support of the local populace.

Counterinsurgency operations are extremely challenging since the enemy can blend into the populace - the same populace both sides are fighting to win over. The host nation can benefit from the assistance of allied countries to gain an edge over the insurgency. Adding the challenge of coalition assistance to a counterinsurgency can weight the fight in favor of the host nation, as long as it is properly executed. Choosing the right form of unity of command goes a long way toward properly employing the coalition in the counterinsurgency fight. Yet, it takes a combination of unity of command with the host nation in the lead for the coalition to achieve synergy and be the combat multiplier necessary for the host nation to be successful against the insurgency.

SIDEBAR

If the host nation is to remain legitimate in the eyes of the populace, it can’t surrender power to any member of the coalition.

FOOTNOTE

Notes
The 'Wild, Wild West'

BYLINE: Cuomo, Scott

SECTION: IDEAS & ISSUES (AFGHANISTAN); Pg. 22 Vol. 93 No. 10 ISSN: 0025-3170

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ABSTRACT

Hundreds of insurgents were entrenched among thousands of people in Al Qaim's four main towns. [...] moving in demanded detailed clearing operations that would leave no doubt in the minds of everyone in Al Qaim - insurgents and innocent residents alike - that the Marines had destroyed the insurgents and were there to stay.

FULL TEXT

Iraqi lessons for Afghanistan

Long before the "Anbar Awakening" and the 2007-08 "surge," a pivotal transformation occurred in what was once al-Qaeda in Iraq's home in the Al Qaim region of Al Anbar Province. Prior to Task Force 3d Battalion, 6th Marines' (TF
3/6's) arrival in Al Qaim in September 2005, this region was routinely described as Iraq's "wild, wild west." Up until now little has been written or discussed about this transformation. As thousands of Marines begin the transition from Iraq to Afghanistan, it is essential for us all to understand what happened in Al Qaim and why, so that, where and when appropriate, Marines can adapt and apply the lessons learned. This article seeks to help us understand the transformation.

TF 3/6 and "The Islamic Republic of Al Qaim

Background. "It appears that Al Qaeda in Iraq is kicking out local people from a lot of these towns (inside the Al Qaim region) . . ." * "For the time being, they (the insurgents) run these towns."2 "They're (the insurgents) dangerous, and they're extremely adaptive, but they can't beat us (the Marines) and the Iraqi army."3

The Al Qaim region is located adjacent to the Syrian border. (See Map 1.)4 By 2005 this region had long been an insurgent stronghold. As a primary foreign fighter infiltration route, Al Qaim had also become vital to Al Qaeda in Iraq's operations throughout most of the country. Following repeated U.S. operations in Ramadi, and Operation VIGILANT RESOLVE and Operation PHANTOM FURY in Fallujah in April and November 2004, respectively, the insurgency in Al Qaim grew stronger as hundreds of insurgents fled north and west along the Euphrates River toward the region. Additionally, prior to TF 3/6's arrival, Regimental Combat Team 2's (RCT-2's) operations elsewhere in western Al Anbar Province forced hundreds more insurgent holdouts to this area.5

When TF 3/6's leadership conducted its leader's reconnaissance months prior to its September deployment, the unit's leaders did not enter any of the towns in the region or meet a single local Iraqi Government official.6 Venturing into the towns at the time guaranteed attack. Minimal to no positive relationships existed between the Marines and local leaders.7 Map 1 depicts TF 3/6's force laydown upon conducting its relief in place. Approximately one-third of TF 3/6's Marines initially lived in Camp Gannon, west of Al Qaim's major population center in the town of Husaybah and adjacent to the Iraq-Syria border. The remaining two-thirds of the unit initially lived approximately 10 kilometers south of the region's main population centers in Camp Al Qaim, or the "train station." A reinforced squad of Marines operated a radio retransmission site approximately 7 kilometers north of Camp Al Qaim.

Transforming Al Qaim. When analyzing Al Qaim days into assuming command of the region, TF 3/6's Commanding Officer (CO), then LtCol Julian D. Alford, deemed the situation completely unacceptable. Col Stephen W. Davis, RCT-2's CO at the time, held similar views. Both leaders knew that the vast majority of Al Qaim's 200,000 residents wanted nothing to do with the insurgency. They also knew that without security, the majority of these residents had no choice but to accept Al-Qaeda in Iraq's presence.

With this understanding, the Marine leaders decided that they had to "move in" permanently among the people in order to protect them from Al-Qaeda in Iraq. Moving in to Al Qaim would further extend RCT-2's ongoing campaign plan that sought to establish a "combined permanent persistent presence" of U.S. Marines and Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) inside all of the towns in western Al Anbar Province. Taking this step in Al Qaim was by no means an easy thing to do. Hundreds of insurgents were entrenched among thousands of people in Al Qaim's four main towns. Thus moving in demanded detailed clearing operations that would leave no doubt in the minds of everyone in Al Qaim - insurgents and innocent residents alike - that the Marines had destroyed the insurgents and were there to stay. From March 2004 until this point in September 2005, Marine units had executed numerous clearing operations in Iraqi towns, to include those in the Al Qaim region, achieving varying levels of success. The most successful of these operations involved U.S. Marines and soldiers working in concert with ISF. These combined units held the ground that they cleared. Thus, Col Davis and LtCol Alford decided that their forces must be partnered with Iraqis in order to succeed. Col Davis requested 1st Brigade, 1st Iraqi Army Division (1-1 IA) to augment TF 3/6, while LtCol Alford and his staff exploited an ongoing tribal gap and obtained the support of hundreds of local scouts for the pending operations.8

Only after establishing this combined force did TF 3/6, on 7 October 2005, launch Operation IRON FIST. Operation IRON FIST sought to seize key terrain within Al Qaim and to move Marines and Iraqi Army soldiers in among the people. The operation resulted in TF 3/6 permanently occupying five battle positions (BPs) in the area of operations (AO), in addition to Camp Gannon and Camp Al Qaim. (See Map 2.)

Defeating the enemy in the locations in which these BPs were established allowed TF 3/6 to control key terrain while beginning to establish relations with local Iraqi leaders. TF 3/6 had a problem though. It achieved success in only part of the AO. More forces were required to clear the other parts of the Al Qaim region so that Marines and Iraqi soldiers could then move into these areas as well. Col Davis requested reinforcements. Battalion Landing Team 2/1 was sent to Al Qaim. On 3 November 2005, this combined force launched Operation Steel Curtain. Operation Steel CURTAIN sought to
clear the rest of the Al Qa'im AO for the purpose of establishing BPs that would protect all of the people in the region. The operation succeeded. (See Map 3.)

In less than 2 months time, TF 3/6 went from occupying two major camps and one radio retransmission site to having Marines and Iraqi Army soldiers spread in 17 permanent positions throughout Al Qa'im. Most of these positions were manned by reinforced platoon-sized Marine elements, collocated with platoon-sized Iraqi Army units. These BPs were either located less than 10 meters from ordinary Iraqis' homes (BP Tarawa) or in positions that dominated key terrain (BP Khe Sanh).

Cultural intelligence. Simply partnering with the Iraqi Army and moving in among the people were not guarantees for securing Al Qa'im. TF 3/6 also benefited greatly as a result of having a Marine regional affairs officer on the team. Former Marine Maj Ed Rueda, a specialist on Arabic culture and Middle Eastern tribes, also brought extensive experience in the conduct of postconflict operations. During mission analysis and when developing the plan to regain control of Al Qa'im, then-Maj Rueda advised LtCol Alford and the rest of TF 3/6's staff of the tribal breakdown in Al Qa'im. This breakdown included the history of these tribes pre-Saddam Hussein, while Saddam Hussein was in charge, and after he was eliminated, to include where and how al-Qaeda in Iraq had penetrated the tribes.9

This advice led LtCol Alford to assign unit AOs based on general tribal AOs. Going back to the map post-Operation Steel Curtain, five company AOs are depicted in Map 4.10 The five companies were:

* A light armored reconnaissance company north of the Euphrates River.
* India Company in vicinity of Karabilah.
* Kilo Company in vicinity of Sadah.
* Lima Company in vicinity of Husaybah.
* Weapons Company in vicinity of Ubaydi.

It is important to note that Map 4 does simplify the realities on the ground at the time. For example, the population in Husaybah did comprise elements of all Al Qa'im tribes, although the Al-Bumahal tribe had historically been the majority tribe in the town. Even this statement simplifies the realities in the fall 2005, as al-Qaeda in Iraq, supported by elements of the Al-Salmani tribe, had forced thousands of Al-Bumahal tribesmen out of Husaybah before TF 3/6's arrival.

Nevertheless, possessing a thorough understanding of the realities on the ground, combined with an appreciation for Al Qa'im's historical tribal dynamics, facilitated TF 3/6's assignment of "postconflict" company-sized AOs that set the conditions for long-term stability in the area. Specifically, LtCol Alford closely partnered each one of his companies with one of the region's five main tribes - Al-Bumahal, Al-Salmani, Karbuli, Ubaidi, and Al-Jurghafe. This close partnership ensured that each tribe had an equal voice and a vested interest in TF 3/6 and 1-1 IAs operations.11

Achieving unity of purpose with the five tribal sheiks, along with Al Qa'im's mayor and a few important religious leaders, was not an easy task. At first, two of the five tribal sheiks would not meet with TF 3/6 leaders because they were intimidated by or had previously supported al-Qaeda in Iraq. Maj Rueda advised LtCol Alford not to support any of the tribes until these two tribal leaders joined their meetings in order to avoid the perception that the Americans were playing favorites with the tribes. This initially caused tension between the parties, but ultimately, the three other tribal sheiks, along with the mayor, realized that TF 3/6 and 1-1 IA were not going to help rebuild their city unless they convinced the other two tribes to either break ties with al-Qaeda in Iraq or to work with the Marines and the Iraqi Army in order to destroy the remaining insurgent elements.

Indigenous three role in achieving long-term stability. Col Razak Salem, 1-1 IAs CO, and all of his Iraqi soldiers also proved vital to achieving stability in Al Qa'im. At the conclusion of Operation STEEL CURTAIN, Col Razak immediately established a productive relationship with Al Qa'im's mayor. A key part of this relationship involved Col Razak, in ways that only a fellow countryman was capable of doing, persuading the mayor to under- stand that TF 3/6 and 1-1 IA were committed to rebuilding the region only if all tribes were onboard. He also made clear that a key pan of this effort would include building a local police force that included members of all tribes. Rapidly establishing this police force was essential to mitigating the potential for sectarian conflict as 1-1 IA's soldiers were primarily Shi'ite Muslims, while the people in Al Qa'im were Sunni Muslims.

The Results
Within 2 months after Operations Iron Fist and Steel Curtain, establishing the 17 BPs, and bringing all of the local leadership together, Al Qaim had been transformed. It was no longer an al-Qaeda in Iraq base of operations, nor was it any longer the primary foreign fighter infiltration route into Iraq. One leading U.S. military analyst described the transformation in the following way:

'So how,' I asked (General) Casey, 'could you do more with less?' Casey urged me to visit Al Qaim. 'Look at what Alford accomplished,' Casey told me .... 'He showed how to turn a city around.' For two years, the Americans had fought al-Qaeda inside Al Qaim - Alford's battalion swept into the city from the west, battled the insurgents block by block .... Alford then broke his battalion down into smaller units to live alongside Iraqi soldiers, operating from austere combat outposts. He struck a bargain with the Al-Bumahal, a local tribe that was feuding with al-Qaeda, and the tribespeople agreed to form a police force. When I visited in October ... it was the only city in Anbar province where I could walk through a bustling market .... When I accompanied a foot patrol downtown, I noticed that none of the police wore masks - On one street corner, the balcony of a house had been demolished and the walls gouged by bullets. I asked the police whether they had done that. 'No,' they laughed. Trahibeen [terrorists] were hiding there, so we brought Marines.' The Corps had provided a Marine squad for every police patrol. When police and other tribal members pointed out al-Qaeda hideouts, the Marines attacked. The insurgents, stripped of anonymity, were driven from the city. The combination of aggressive Marine grunts with Iraqi forces who possessed local knowledge had worked. If there is a way forward in Iraq, Al Qaim and cities like it are the model.12

Lessons Learned

While TF 3/6 learned countless lessons during its deployment in Al Qaim, highlighted below are the lessons that Marines should focus on most as the transition into Afghanistan proceeds:

* "It's the people, stupid."13 When fighting an insurgency that hides among the people, if the counterinsurgent does not separate the insurgent by providing security for the people, he will not succeed in defeating the insurgency.

* Separating the insurgency from the people demands that the counterinsurgent have detailed knowledge of the human terrain. Obtaining this level of knowledge will often require the counterinsurgent to have specially trained personnel who focus on the human terrain.

* The counterinsurgent should place training, partnering, and operating with indigenous forces at the top of his priority list.

* Together this combined force should force the local leadership, both formal and informal power structures, along with the average local person, to make a conscious choice of which side to support, the government's or the insurgent's.

* A key aspect in ultimately persuading all players involved to side with the host-nation government is to understand that the proper counterinsurgency mindset often equates to that possessed by an "armed social worker."

* Counterinsurgents should think long and hard about clearing, or moving into what can't be or what is not planned to be held.

Conclusion

Southern Afghanistan is and will continue to be a different place than Iraq's Al Qaim region. This said, the counterinsurgency principles described above are exactly that, principles. TF 3/6 adapted and applied them, and they can and should be adapted and applied as appropriate when fighting an insurgency anywhere. Heeding these principles and using them to guide operations in southern Afghanistan will facilitate the Marine Corps' success in a part of the world that is often referred to as the "graveyard of empires."

SIDEBAR

The most successful of these operations involved U.S. Marines and soldiers working in concert with ISE

SIDEBAR

The insurgents, stripped of anonymity, were driven from the city.

FOOTNOTE

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. Al Qaim map graphics and pictures are from a TF 3/6 Microsoft PowerPoint brief titled "An Infantry Battalion in Irregular Warfare." TF 3/6's CO gave this brief to the author in March 2007.

5. Pan of the analysis provided in the article is based on in-person, e-mail, and phone interviews with Col Stephen W. Davis, who commanded RCT-2 in western Al Anbar Province in 2005-06. These interviews took place in December 2008 and January 2009.

6. On numerous occasions from March 2007 to January 2009, TF 3/6's CO at the time in Al Qaim, then-LtCol Julian D. Alford, shared his unit's experiences with the author. In addition, the author has interviewed Marines who served in the following billets during TF 3/6's deployment in Al Qaim: TF cultural advisor, two rifle platoon commanders, and one rifle platoon sergeant.

7. To be fair, TF 3/6 relieved TF 3/2 in September 2005. During its deployment in Al Qaim, TF 3/2 was minus one rifle company that was tasked with guarding Al Asad Airbase. And, unlike TF 3/6 that had an Iraqi Army brigade and a Marine light armored reconnaissance company attached throughout the majority of its deployment, TF 3/2 did not have these forces attached.


10. The author created this graphic based on numerous discussions with Col Alford and Ed Rueda.

11. Personal interviews with Col Alford, Ed Rueda, and Bill Roggio, "The Sulemani."


13. This is a direct quote from the "An Infantry Battalion in Irregular Warfare" presentation by Capt Scott Cuomo

Capt Cuomo is the CO, Company F, 2d Battalion, 2d Marines.

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GRAPHIC: Maps
IMAGE MAP, Map I.
IMAGE MAP, Map 2
IMAGE MAP, Map 3
IMAGE MAP, Map 4.
IMAGE PHOTOGRAPH, Overhead shots of two battle position dispositions during Stir Curtain, November 2005. (Photo courtesy of author.)
IMAGE PHOTOGRAPH, Local leaders must make the decision as to which side they support - the government or the insurgency. (Photo by Sgt Jerad W. Alexander.)

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An Enhanced Logistics Section Required

BYLINE: Meads, Jordan A.
by Capt Jordan A. Meads
Capt Meads served from 2005-08 as the S-4 (Logistics), 1/7. He deployed twice in support of OIF. He wrote this article while a student at Expeditionary Warfare School, 2008-09. He is currently an instructor at The Basic School.

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ABSTRACT
According to its table of equipment, an infantry battalion is allocated no medium-lift transportation or material handling assets. It is completely dependent on external support for the most basic medium-lift requirements. [...] a CLB is not familiar with the political, social, and/or economic pulse of the infantry area of operations (AO) because it does not live among the local population.

FULL TEXT
Logistical agility of a Marine Corps infantry battalion in the COIN fight
Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan during the past 6 years have proven that counterinsurgency (COIN) operations will be a major focus of the Marine Corps' future planning and training. In Marine Corps Vision and Strategy 2025, Gen James T. Conway states:

Our Corps must serve credibly as a persistently engaged and multicapable force, able to draw upon contributions from our Total Force, in order to address the full range of contingencies the future will undoubtedly present. In short, we must be prepared to move with speed, 'live hard,' and accomplish any mission.

This statement echoes many doctrinal COIN principles and confirms that the Marine Corps must prepare for COIN environments beyond Iraq and Afghanistan. However, current Marine Corps combat service support organizations do not provide adequate flexibility to counter the logistics demands of a COIN fight, specifically at the infantry battalion level. In order to solve the deficit of logistics capability experienced by Marine Corps infantry battalions engaged in COIN operations, it is essential to allocate permanent organic medium-lift assets and operators both on the battlefield and in garrison.

The COIN Logistical Web and the Needs of the Commander
While the battalion commander focuses on improving logical lines of operation, the logisticians focus in a COIN fight is on maintaining a responsive and efficient distribution network that satisfies logistical requirements in a timely manner. The logistician is challenged with balancing stockage of supplies, distribution methods, and immediate support requirements for Marine forces and hostnation security forces, as well as the general populace. Doctrinally, Marine forces
In COIN operations, logisticians must provide support through a careful mix of supply based or supply point practices with distribution based on unit distribution methods. Situations can swiftly develop that require equally rapid logistic responses to prevent further deterioration of security conditions.

To give the web flexibility, logisticians must ensure a balance between efficient dispersion of assets and maintaining a reserve capability to react to immediate demands. Often those immediate demands are given at the direction of the battalion commander. In many cases it is the commander's logistics capability that becomes the "tip of the spear." MCWP 3-33.5 explains:

In COIN, the support provided by sustainment units often extends beyond sustaining operations; support provided to the population may become an important shaping operation or even the decisive operation.

The bottom line is that if the logistics web is not built to withstand rapid redirection of personnel and assets, the counterinsurgent Marines mission will fail.

The Current Construct and Its Problems

In the current organization of Marine Corps logistics equipment and personnel, tactical control of mediumlift assets, such as medium tactical vehicle replacements (MTVRs), is maintained at too high a level to be effective in the COIN environment. According to its table of equipment, an infantry battalion is allocated no medium-lift transportation or material handling assets. It is completely dependent on external support for the most basic medium-lift requirements. Units that typically provide combat service support to an infantry regiment are the combat logistics battalion (CLB) and the division truck company. Subsequent support is portioned out according to regimental priorities. This leaves no organic capability for rapid reaction to immediate logistics requirements at the infantry battalion level.

The CLB is designed for general support missions across the Marine airground task force and has the ability to fulfill direct support roles down to the infantry battalion level. It is not designed for direct support missions to the subordinate units within an infantry battalion. When the logistics web of squad- and platoon-sized FOBs is considered, the idea of CLB general support assets and Marines being routinely devoted to resupply missions of small FOBs appears wasteful. This idea implies that a CLB would reduce its overall operational responsiveness to satisfy logistics requirements at the infantry squad or platoon level. The described use of CLB assets is unwise for many reasons. First, CLB Marines are not infantry Marines, and they are not logistics Marines who have trained with the respective infantry unit. They do not know the standing operating procedures (SOPs) of the supported battalion and therefore may be more of a liability than a combat multiplier. Second, the scope of a CLB’s responsibility does not allow for the planning and execution of an infantry platoon concept of support. A CLB needs to be focused on the transition of operational logistics to the tactical level and not ex-ecution of tactical-level logistics within a small unit. Third, a CLB is not familiar with the political, social, and/or economic pulse of the infantry area of operations (AO) because it does not live among the local population. In the COIN environment, a firm understanding of a population’s nuances is vital and any disruption in the confidence of the local population may cause severe setbacks in the mission. Ultimately, a CLB is best suited to execute the push of operational logistics to established unit distribution points at the infantry battalion tactical level.

The practice of attaching Platoons from division truck company to each deploying infantry battalion has become common but is a byproduct of the Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) model. In a conventional fight, tactical control of these truck Platoons resides with the regiment, not the battalions. The truck platoon is designed to provide general support transportation of personnel or supplies within the regiment. Though the truck platoon has a better knowledge of the AO and a closer relationship with the infantry battalions than the CLB, it does not fill the function of supply distribution between the battalion logistics sections and each of its FOBs. The missions of the general support truck platoon directly correspond to the regimental commander’s logistics priorities. However, if the truck platoon is attached to a battalion, the respective battalion logistics officer can harness the transportation capability of that platoon and efficiently respond to the immediate needs of the battalion and its unique AO. In order for that platoon to be truly effective, time for combined training and mastering battalion SOPs before deployment must be provided. Unless the truck platoon is at-
tached to his battalion, the battalion logistics officer (S-4) has no tasking authority and therefore cannot factor those assets into his immediate logistics planning, despite the unlimited potential for employment.

The Enhanced Logistics Section Model and Its Benefits

In a recent deployment to Afghanistan, Battalion Landing Team 1st Battalion, 6th Marines (BLT 1/6) faced extended lines of communications up to 55 kilometers, equipment shortages, and extremely high operations tempo.9 Marines adapted to resource shortfalls and responded to a volatile counterinsurgency environment. The BLT 1/6 after-action report cites logistical deficiencies throughout the 101-page document. Key recommendations from the battalion logistics officer include training and conducting exercises with forklift and MTVR wrecker operators. The report also suggests that 10 MTVRs be added to the infantry battalion table of equipment.10 These recommendations bear similar requirements realized by battalions serving in Iraq.11 By consolidating the common requirements, the framework for the enhanced logistics section is established. (See Figures 1 and 2.)

MTVRs provide personnel and support carrying capabilities that are versatile and configurable for almost any mission. M 105 cargo trailers and M 149 waterballs can be interchanged or dropped as the mission requires. These trailers give the unit additional cargo space as well as water storage and transportation capability. The Terex 5,000-pound forklift would be used to expedite the loading and unloading of resupply convoys, assist the offload of assault support missions, and facilitate the internal movement of supplies within the battalion command post. Finally, the MTVR wrecker not only provides a versatile recovery platform but also brings a mobile maintenance and crane capability that has proven invaluable to many units in Iraq, Afghanistan, and numerous training exercises.

These additions in equipment and personnel provide a much needed level of self-sufficiency that would benefit the infantry battalion, truck platoon, and CLB alike. By establishing a limited organic transportation, recovery, rapid onload/offload, and water storage capability at the infantry battalion level, routine requirements are solved at a lower level, therefore freeing assets in the general support units to conduct general support missions.

Regimental Combat Team 2 (RCT-2) experienced many logistics challenges in its deployment to Al Anbar, Iraq from December 2006 to January 2007. The concept of support established between the regimental headquarters, its combat service support units, and subordinate infantry battalions was designed to locate support capabilities as close to the battalion FOBs as possible. In a February 2009 Marine Corps Gazette article, the RCT-2 logistics officer observed:

The size of AO Denver and the great dispersion between supporting and supported elements significantly impacted the responsiveness of the logistics support network. It was also readily apparent that it was necessary to weight the battalions with additional capabilities to increase self-sufficiency and reduce response time to the forward positions. These additional capabilities improved distribution within the battalion AO, reducing dependency on RCT coordinated distribution via external support.12

In the same article, the author lists the equipment that he distributed to each subordinate element and states how these capability sets, when resident with the battalion FOBs, eliminated sourcing and the "last tactical mile" distribution requirements placed on the RCT and CLB. He further states, "With these additional assets, the battalion was well equipped to quickly respond to the needs of its subordinates." Each statement clearly reinforces the requirement for establishing a permanent medium-lift capacity at the battalion level.

The enhanced logistics section model provides a means to move troops and personnel internally without overburdening the CLB and truck platoon. It gives the commander an immediate tactical reach and swift response capability while increasing logistics efficiency. Movements of squad and platoon-sized elements are accomplished in a timely manner without pausing to conduct external coordination. Coordination is still required for larger movements involving one or more reinforced companies, but this would occur on a less frequent basis. Tempo is generated from being able to react quickly to immediate logistics requirements from Marine forces or the host nation. And finally, being a permanent part of the unit would allow for adequate training and standardization of skill sets for each vehicle operator and mechanic. Ultimately, the enhanced logistics section model presents the commander with options that have direct impact on his ability to achieve success in the COIN fight.

Counterarguments and Rebuttals

Critics argue that if an infantry battalion table of equipment is increased to include medium-lift assets and personnel, there would be a shortage of garrison maintenance and storage facilities.14 Admittedly, to accommodate an enhanced logistics section, expanded areas for equipment and personnel are required. Considerations for maintenance bays, tool sets, motor pool space, and living quarters are details that must be resolved. Adjustments in the current garrison support infrastructure...
will take time, but temporary solutions are available. There is nothing holding units back from constructing field-type maintenance bays. Testing and diagnostic equipment can be centralized to reduce the cost, or contracted maintainers can be organized and rotated between units. This practice has experienced success and generated higher maintenance readiness levels in OIF.

Training of the MTVR operators is also a concern for those worried about standardization and performance evaluation. School-trained Marine vehicle operators are currently operating MTVRs at the infantry battalion level. Incidental MTVR licensing programs are offered at most major subordinate commands and can be organized with- out much difficulty. One concern voiced is that of sustainment training and how an infantry battalion would ensure secondary and sustainment training of its operators. 1S Infantry units send infantry Marines to squad leader's courses and mortar team leaders courses; nothing stops the logistics munition within each infantry regiment from offering a course designed to train non-commissioned officer-level operators. Regiments can expertise and give classes designed to develop truck team leaders and sustain junior drivers on techniques taught in military occupational specialty school. Infantry battalions and regiments can adopt the same training a CLB uses train its drivers and eliminate any question of standardization.

Conclusion

The ability of a Marine Corps infantry battalion commander to sustain influence within his battlespace is directly proportional to the unit's logistics capability. In order to maximize the battalion's influence in COIN fight, its logistics section be enhanced with medium-lift assets and personnel. Recent conflicts proven the requirement for an enhanced logistics capability at the infantry battalion tactical level. If the Marine Corps heeds the words of Gen Conway and prepares for "the full range of contingencies the future will undoubtedly present," the enhanced logistics section model gives each infantry logistics officer the tools to ensure responsive support when any counterinsurgency environment.

SIDEBAR

Infantry battalions and regiments can adopt the same training a CLB uses to train its drivers and eliminate any question of standardization.

SIDEBAR


FOOTNOTE

Notes


3. Ibid., p. 8-S.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid., p. 8-1.


10. Ibid., p. 78.
11. Authors personal experience during two deployments, OIF 05-07 and OIF 06-08.2.
15. Author's conversation with Capt Christy McCutchan, 2 October 2008.

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IMAGE PHOTOGRAPH, In a conventional fight, the regiment would tactically control truck platoon assets, f Photo by LCpi Karim o. Delgado.)
IMAGE TABLE, Figure 1. Proposed equipment additions., Figure 2. Proposed personnel additions.

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Christmas in Fallujah

BYLINE: Armstrong, Charles L

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ABSTRACT

[...] I had arranged the meeting to discuss how Anbar University gradua tes, formerly hired by the Governmen r of Ira q but now sporting significant unemployment numbers, migfat diange the local employment model and make real money working for priva te companies. COIN activities in Al Anbar Province were anchored on simple concepts - kill identifi-able bad guys, rebuild broken infrastructure, support democracy as defined by U.S. and Iraqi political agenda, hire Iraqis to refrain from fighting us, declare victory, and come home. Veterans my age recall the disgraceful way returning troops were treated by a divided American society and the tremendous problems we faced as our participation in Southeast Asia
ended - heavy drug use, racial strife, insubordination bordering on mutiny, and induction of people who should have never been Marines.

FULL TEXT

Public opinion doesn’t impede the mission

On 17 December 2008, we dropped our body armor and helmets and settled into comfortable sofas in the dean’s office at College of Administration and Economics, Fallujah Campus, Al Anbar University, Iraq. My job as business advisor on (embedded) Provincial Reconstruction Team, Fallujah (PRT Fallujah) was to fade into private sector business. My personal agenda was to do so without using U.S. tax dollars. Consequently, I had arranged the meeting to discuss how Anbar University graduates, formerly hired by the Government of Iraq but now sporting significant unemployment numbers, migfat diange the local employment model and make real money working for private companies.

Before the customary, obligatory tea arrived, I heard disturbing chatter from the squad radio clipped to Sgt Vyvial’s harness, “Crowd gathering and looks hostile; get em outta there. “ Sgt V motioned to me with a sharp nod and said, “Sir, we have to go.” I glanced to my right and nudged our PRT leader, Phil Frendi, career Department of State (DoS) officer, to pass the word. Seconds later Sgt V took charge, idling me in no uncertain terms, “Sir, we gotta go now!”

My team, Phil, our bilingual bicultural advisor, Arabic interpreter, and other PRT members, stood up and grabbed our body armor. I shook the bewildered dean’s hand and said, “We’ll do it again sometime at my place. Sgt Vyvial led the way to our waiting mine resistant ambush protected vehicle (MRAP).

I had a surreal flashback to the Vietnam War, picturing in my mind’s eye how the Kent State campus might have looked that spring day in 1970. Hundreds of people, mostly students, I thought vaguely, were converging on isolated groups of Marines who constituted our personal security detail. As Sgt V hustled us into our MRAP, I heard the personal security detachment platoon commander, SSgt Cazee, giving hurried, calm orders to his troops.

Suddenly there was a burst of M16 rifle fire to my front. Through the MRAP rear door I saw angry students almost close enough to touch. Another burst of M16 fire split the air. Sgt V jumped into the MRAP and we started to move. As he dosed the door I heard the familiar cough of a heavier caliber rifle, the venerable AK-47, from the crowd.

SSgt V secured the rear door as young Iraqis approached, throwing rocks and building materials at us. One waved a hastily painted sign saying, “Iraqi shoes on American heads. “ SSgt Cazee held onto the lead MRAP’s outer door and led the withdrawal. He and his assistant patrol leader, Sgt Mendoza, fired warning shots over the students heads into empty desert ensuring that we didn’t hit anybody. Followup intelligence supported SSgt Cazee’s claim that no one was wounded by U.S. fire.

As we debriefed before our return to Camp Baharia, I thought about how the story would unfold in the world press. The key fact was simple. A Marine sergeant fighting his share of the three block war turned wha t could have been a Kent State -style international ‘modern into a mere bad day at the office. When I asked wha t drove his thinking he said, "At this point in the war, shouldn't we be coaching Iraqis its OK to disagree with authority once in awhile? Under the rules of engagement we could ha ve shot a bunch of those kids today, I just didn't think it was necessary."

He and other troops whacked in the face by rocks and debris laughed off their "wounds" as SSgt Cazee went through hours of debriefs with Marine general officers It was a privilege to recommend him tor a Navy and Marine Corps Commendation Medal with combat distinguishing V.

I went to Iraq in 2008 to make a small contribution in the global war on terrorism, as I had deployed multiple times since September 2001 to Yuma, Egypt, Fort Irwin, Fort Bragg, and Beirut. A few days after terrorist attacks leveled the Word Trade Center I received a quiet call from the Marine Corps asking what it would cost to rent my counterinsurgency (COIN) expertise. I replied that my price was nonnegotiable - round trip airfare, a dry place to sleep, and two beers, but they had to be draught beers. The startled officer on the other end of the phone said, "Uh, sir, we'll get back to you." In an era when some subject matter experts commanded thousands of dollars for speaking fees, my price was a bargain.

Before the old boy net call launched me to Iraq last year I did numerous coaching sessions at two beers each, but I hadn’t been up close and personal in that fight. I was scoping a gig in Afghanistan when the call came, "You may be the answer to our prayers; could you go to Iraq right now?" I glanced at my wife, Marlys, who was listening to the call. She simply asked, "Need help packing?” We had done pragmatic, patriotic math before other deployments - our country was at war, and I wasn't doing enough to help win. A few days later I was on the way.
While contemporary Marines need no education on general conditions in Iraq, some may not realize how reconstruction efforts have evolved. COIN activities in Al Anbar Province were anchored on simple concepts - kill identifiable bad guys, rebuild broken infrastructure, support democracy as defined by U.S. and Iraqi political agenda, hire Iraqis to refrain from fighting us, declare victory, and come home.

The PRT concept is not new. One can find antecedents across history. My personal calibration points are worlds apart: the Vietnam War's combined action platoon (village-level COIN effort based on embedding a Marine rifle squad with rural Vietnamese) and the post civil war Lebanon model, where a private sector renaissance led by business-man-turned-politician Rafik Hariri brought Beirut back as the most cosmopolitan city in the Middle East.

The PRT concept required eclectic skills ranging from gunfighters to bankers, agricultural specialists, business experts, diplomats, public health advocates, lawyers, and governance gurus. Civilians lead the teams in Iraq, with military officers as deputies. In Afghanistan roles are reversed, with military officers in charge and supported by civilian deputies. Such arrangements don't come without hiccups, no matter how professional and dedicated the people involved. During my tour I worked with two Marine Corps regimental combat teams, several infantry battalions, and various support elements. As the oldest Marine in Anbar, I found interface with those outfits pretty easy. That didn't translate to a perfect environment, however. At this stage of the war there is as much emphasis on force protection as mission accomplishment. Consequently, PRT Fallujah routinely scrubbed missions in the field if Marine protectors deemed the situation of the day too dangerous. With the military responsible for security and movement, PRT folks couldn't move outside the wire unless accompanied by military troops whose commanders decided it was relatively safe.

Early in my tour I routinely drove between Camp Baharia and Camp Fallujah (less than 10 minutes) alone, unarmed, and unafraid in an unarmored vehicle. The month before I left, when conditions were more peaceful and secure, I made the same trip leading a mission dubbed "Last of the Fallujans." Rules required my taking 25 Marines and 5 armored vehicles for protection. It was embarrassing. "Clearance to enter Iraqi battlespace" was achieved by our interpreter explaining to an aged Iraqi corporal that we needed to look at the local radio tower.

Another example relates to how we spent U.S. tax dollars during 2008-09 (the period during which I was embedded). Finger pointing in the U.S. press about wasted U.S. money aimed at questionable reconstruction projects was a cottage industry by Christmas 2008, and the Special Inspector General for Reconstruction office had been reinforced. While civilian PRT projects were being scrutinized at a microscopic level, Marine counterparts were pressing forward big dollar projects (some of which they had inherited) with little discernable oversight. With U.S. Government (USG) tax dollars drying up, our Iraqi counterparts played us against each other to finesse project money from dwindling coffers.

None of this commentary is criticism toward any entity engaged in Iraq reconstruction efforts. On the contrary, everyone with whom I worked was selflessly driving the U.S. agenda as he understood it. The problem is, were just not very good at nation building and, except for U.S. Army Special Forces (Green Berets), not institutionally comfortable with COIN warfare. There are a number of individuals who are sound COIN warriors, but most USG institutions don't "get it."

There is no question that generous application of U.S money as a weapon helped quell the insurgency in Anbar Province. My best reality checks with regard to progress were conversations with Marines who had previous tours in the area. According to them, the difference in everything from security to physical reconstruction of infrastructure was remarkable. We periodically took casualties, but by the time I left Iraq, the primary enemy was boredom.

Most Marines engaged in civil affairs (CA) operations had no military occupational specialty (MOS) related to that job. The ones closest to me were artillerymen, scout/snipers, and (in the case of women Marines on Lioness Teams) intelligence specialists, administrators, and logisticians. The highest compliment about Marines working so far afield from their MOSs came from an Ajmy CA battalion commander, "Those young officers of yours really took to the CA mission; in many cases they were like mayors, coaching Iraqis in town leadership."

PRTs will exist through the current wars. I support the concept as a COIN and nation-building tool. Based on my experience, I offer the following recommendations for improving the model:

* Fix unity of command. When I went through PRT prep training at DoS Foreign Service Institute (run, incidentally, by former Marines), the buzz phrase was "unity of effort." We got lots of exposure to cross-cultural stuff to make us aware of Department of Defense (DoD)/DoS differences. The ground truth is that if one outfit (DoD) can control movement in the area of operations and another (DoS) is responsible for mission accomplishment, die guys who control movement control it all. Collaborative efforts between PRTs and Iraqi leaders, which sometimes took weeks to coordinate, could be negated on no notice by local military commanders who thought movement was too dangerous.
* Put reconstruction money in one checking account and let one person write the checks. During my tour there were two principal means of spending U.S. tax dollars - military commanders' emergency response funds and PRTs' quick response funds. Although common sense dictates that military and civilian leaders march in lockstep with respect to what is funded, it is easy for well-meaning leaders on both sides to spend at cross purposes.

* Lighten up and shelve body armor. A recent Gazette article by a Marine sergeant addressed practical difficulties caused by overloading troops in counterinsurgent combat. (See Sgt Michael Hanson, "COIN Perspective," MCG, Apr09, p. 10.) This issue comes up every 20 years or so. (I raised it during my tour in El Salvador's civil war in a Gazette article, circa 1990. See "Combined Action Program: Variations in El Salvador," MCG, Aug90, p. 36.) MRAPs, Kevlar helmets, and body armor save lives; they also slow movement, impede observation, draw fire, and define wearers as hunter-killers. My team at Anbar University could have conceivably accomplished its mission if we'd driven aboard in nondescript cars, guarded by a couple of Marines wearing blue jeans and armed with concealed pistols. Stripping to the equivalent of local attire may cost casualties, but there's more to be gained by dialing down a war-like appearance during latter stages of an insurgency.

* Hire PRT members based on expertise rather than willingness to go in harm's way or ability to get along with the military. I was in Beirut during the autumn of 2007 when my team heard the incredible news that DoS employees ordered to Iraq were refusing to go. The solution was hiring contractors and beefing up DoS with temporary direct hires (called "3161s" after the directive authorizing their employment). I worked with some subject matter experts in Fallujah but saw no real method to how assignments worked. During PRT training we were repeatedly told that our work could have no relation to expertise. "You don't tell the team leader 'you don't do windows'; if your expertise is business development, but the team needs a public diplomacy officer when you report aboard, learn to write press releases." That's great bar talk, but hiring an excellent photographer to establish a credible banking infrastructure or calculate return on investment for a megamillion dollar agribusiness investment is counterproductive.

* Lengthen tours of duty. Everything in the Middle East depends on personal relationships, which take time to build. I went on short notice for what I thought would be a 1-year tour with an option to extend. I wasn't exactly short toured, but since I was hired to replace a guy whose contract was running I had less than 1 year in-country. My replacement was named, trained, and slated to deploy when the PRTs started consolidating, so he never reported for duty. My duties were spread across other team members. This diluted the momentum for business development and weakened the relationships I'd spent months developing.

* Send people who speak the language. Before going to El Salvador I got almost a year of intensive training (most of it Spanish language). Despite five tours of Middle Eastern duty in support of U.S. foreign policy, I have had only about 4 hours of formal Arabic language training. A colleague in Iraq told me that his company once had 9,000 Arabic interpreters in its employ; another told me that his company has 800 linguists working as interpreters in Afghanistan. Of 20 people on my PRT in Fallujah, only 1 American spoke Arabic. The ability to communicate with people in their native language needs no explanation here. We have engaged in geopolitical intervention in Middle Eastern countries for 60 years. We should be past hiring interpreters to help our interventionists communicate. We should also be teaching Marines a variety of languages based on contingency plans for other regions.

* Embed PRTs with Iraqi units closer to the population. This will be a terrified idea to some, but it's the only way to accelerate and fortify relationship building so necessary to COIN work.

The highlight of my tour was daily interface with the Marines of Regimental Combat Teams 1 and 6. It's uncool to compare the end of this war to the last days of Southeast Asia. For a Marine of my vintage and experience, however, it's impossible not to. Both wars were hugely popular when the first shots were fired. We went to Vietnam based on fabricated intelligence; the invasion of Iraq was based on faulty intelligence. Both wars were long, costly, and ultimately divisive at home. Although we lost one and won the other, neither was necessary to vital U.S. national interests. Both featured considerable sacrifice and heroism by a generation of young Americans and their older, grayer leaders.

The primary differences are the way our country has supported the troops and the quality of the Marine Corps. Veterans my age recall the disgraceful way returning troops were treated by a divided American society and the tremendous problems we faced as our participation in Southeast Asia ended - heavy drug use, racial strife, insubordination bordering on mutiny, and induction of people who should have never been Marines. Today, after almost a decade of combat in the war on terrorism and almost two decades of war with Iraq, our troops are warmly greeted and thanked for their service at every whistlestop between the Middle East and their hometowns.
Soon after the last shot in Southeast Asia was fired, we expeditiously discharged some 14,000 substandard Marines and started the long road to a true, all-volunteer force. Now career planners court virtually every combat veteran, offering a range of reenlistment bonuses and the second-best GI Bill in history to Marines who will fight another round. The Marines who evolved are those with whom I was embedded in Al Anbar Province. They are bright, fit, articulate, disciplined, and brave. Many have done multiple combat tours. They show no false bravado nor do they act like they're livin' the dream. Inside the wire they suffer the boredom, endure the climate, and count the days till rotation. When they roll on a mission outside the wire, however, they're all business - sharp, focused, alert, observant, and ready to fight.

I never smelled marijuana, saw a rusty weapon, stumbled onto unauthorized booze, or witnessed an incident of disrespect. Marine humor was everywhere, even among veterans recalled to active duty under circumstances that disrupted their lives. They were the most colorblind people I've ever known; if they realized there were racial differences in their ranks they never mentioned it where I could hear. They hurt for every casualty, whatever the circumstances. They respected rank without being awed by seniority; experience counted more than stripes. Across 40 years of being in and around the Marines, I've never been exposed to a better Corps than the one operating today.

I don't know how long it will take to determine whether our invasion of Iraq is worth the price in blood and treasure. No Marine in Baharia was shy about making his own judgment call, but no individual opinion ever impeded mission accomplishment.

With respect to Billy Joel, whose music I like and whose place in Americana is assured, he never spent Christmas in Fallujah. I did, and it was a place where United States Marines still gave a damn about each other .... Ooh-rah.

SIDEBAR

"Its Christmas in Fallujah, and no one gives a damn. . . . Ooh-Rah!"

-Billy Joel

by LtCol Charles L. Armstrong, USMC(Ret)

LtCol Armstrong is a retired infantry officer who has attended seven shooting wars. He recently completed a 2-year sabbatical from personal business interests to do public service including peacekeeping in Egypt training development in Lebanon, and provincial reconstruction work in Iraq. Back in the private sector leading his own company, he lives in Texas.

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IMAGE PHOTOGRAPH, The ability to communicate with people in their native language is vital. (Photo by Cpl Robert R. Attebury.)

IMAGE PHOTOGRAPH, Something as simple as testing chlorine levels in the water supply could be delayed or never happen when two departments each think they are in charge. (Photo by Cpl Samantha L Jones.)

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Do Surges Work?

BYLINE: Cancian, Mark F.

by Col Mark F. Cancian, USMCR(Ret)

*Col Cancian was an infantry and artillery officer. He held a variety of operational and staff positions over his 39-year career. During Operations DESERT STORM and IRAQI FREEDOM I, he oversaw the collection and analysis of lessons learned. From 2006-07 he was the G-7 Assistant Chief of Staff for Assessment at the Marine headquarters in Al Anbar Province.

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ABSTRACT

Once again Marines are part of a "surge" to retrieve a struggling military and political effort. Because surges have a cost in blood and treasure, it is worth asking whether surges work and, if so, why. [...] the locals can see a surge as positive if it brings stability and some economic benefits.

FULL TEXT

The experience in Al Anbar

Do surges work? Once again Marines are part of a "surge" to retrieve a struggling military and political effort. Because surges have a cost in blood and treasure, it is worth asking whether surges work and, if so, why.

Two schools of thought argue that they don't. One argues that any introduction of foreign and Christian troops into a Muslim country inevitably alienates the population and makes the situation worse. Thus fewer troops are better than more troops. A variety of often angry commentators have made this argument, from former Central Intelligence Agency operatives (Michael F. Scheuer, Imperial Hubris: Why the West Is Losing the War on Terror, Potomac Books, Inc., 2004) to highly visible politicians (former Presidential candidate Ron Paul).


In this debate the Marine experience in Al Anbar is relevant and encouraging. Although the awakening of the sheikhs, as the local resistance was called, had primary importance in turning Al Anbar around, the surge in Al Anbar, small though it was, complemented and reinforced the awakening. It is therefore worth looking at in some detail.

The Surge in Al Anbar

The surge in Al Anbar began in October 2006, several months before the surge in Baghdad. In that October, U.S. Central Command (USCentCom) agreed to release the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) (15th MEU (SOC)) to Multinational Force- West (MNF-W), the Marine headquarters in Al Anbar. For months the Marines had been requesting the MEU as reinforcement, but USCentCom had balked. The MEU is USCentCom's strategic reserve, and its release would constrain the command's ability to deal with unexpected events. However, the situation in Anbar in the fall of 2006 presented such opportunities and dangers that USCentCom decided to make the commitment.

The dangers came from a violent insurgency that had grown over the preceding year. Violent incidents had doubled, and the regional government had been driven out of the province. The infamous "Devlin Report," named for the MNF-W G-2
(intelligence), described a strengthening insurgency and the collapse of social order, such that "[the coalition] is no longer capable of militarily defeating the insurgency in al-Anbar." The situation appeared to be so dire that some commentators recommended abandoning the province entirely. The opportunities came from the local sheikhs. A number of them had just banded together to fight against al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) because of AQI's violence and mistreatment of the local citizenry.

The MEU landed in Kuwait in late November and was in position by early December. Contrary to doctrine, it was not used as a single force but was broken up in order to get maximum effect from its capabilities.

The air element went to the main Marine airbase at Al Asad where it could best support the dispersed elements of the MEU. The logistics element was parceled out to support the other combat elements.

Two companies reinforced the U.S. Army brigade (1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division, later 1st Brigade, 3d Infantry Division) in Ramadi. Ramadi was the center of the sheikh's awakening. The Army brigade was supporting the sheikhs' effort by steadily expanding its reach inside the city. Neighborhood by neighborhood it cleared out insurgents, constructed combat observation outposts and established police stations to hold what had been cleared. But its forces were stretched. The two additional companies allowed this "clear and hold" process to move into the worst neighborhoods of central Ramadi.

Two companies went to the Hadithah "triad," the three cities of Hadithah, Barwanah, and Haqlaniyah. Hadithah had been a problem since 2005 when the withdrawal of coalition forces for the retaking of Fallujah had allowed insurgents to isolate and destroy the local police. The two companies implemented the "block, berm, build, BAT (biometrics automated toolset)" strategy - isolating the triad and then sweeping through it to drive insurgents out, constructing (with a lot of engineering support) a 15-mile earthen berm around the cities to limit access, building combat observation outposts inside the city to secure it, and conducting a census using BAT systems.

The MEU headquarters and remaining ground elements went out west to Ar Rutbah, a forlorn desert town at the crossroads of the highways leading to Syria and Jordan. The highway was heavily traveled because of the high level of interstate commerce. However, insurgents and criminal gangs preyed on travelers and cargos, financing further violence, terrorizing the population, and disrupting commercial activity. As in the Hadithah triad, coalition forces implemented the block, berm, build, BAT strategy. They also patrolled the highway (Main Supply Route Mobile) with elements of the Iraqi Highway Police and conducted raids at the truckstops along the highway.

In terms of numbers this surge was unimpressive. The MEU added about 2,700 personnel to an existing 30,000 - less than 10 percent. But the MEU had an impact disproportionate to its numbers. In both Rutbah and the Hadithah triad, police forces were recruited and took hold. Prior to the surge, Rutbah had had virtually no police, while Hadithah's few police were hunkered down in a limited number of locations. Now they covered their entire towns. The number of incidents in the Hadithah triad plummeted. In Ramadi the number of police grew, and their coverage spread to every neighborhood, although the level of violence remained high for many months.

The real effect became apparent in March, after 6 months, when the force reinforcement, combined with other positive developments - sheikh support, expanded police forces, political accommodation, maturing Iraqi Army capabilities - fundamentally changed the situation on the ground. The number of violent incidents in the province dropped precipitously and kept going lower. In a year Anbar went from a "lost cause" to a model province. The number of incidents decreased from about 400 per week in the fall of 2007 to about 15 per week a year later.

Without question the awakening was the key element in achieving success in Al Anbar. Under the awakening the sheikhs suppressed insurgents in their territories, encouraged their tribesmen to join the police, and began working with coalition forces and the official governmental institutions. However, the surge supported the awakening in two key ways. First, it showed that the coalition was serious about winning the war so the sheikhs of the awakening did not have to fear being abandoned. Second, the surge eliminated the "white spaces" in the province - those areas where the coalition had no effective presence. Thus, once AQI was driven out of the main cities, it could not safely regroup elsewhere within the province. It had to move elsewhere - north to Mosul or Diyala Province. Some observers dismiss this as whack-a-mole, not accomplishing anything, just moving insurgents around. But moving was dangerous for insurgents. Many supporters gave up rather than leave their homes. Moving exposed insurgents to informers and security checkpoints. Upon arriving in a new area the network of safe houses and support had to be reestablished. Thus in moving, AQI lost much of its strength.

Application to Afghanistan?
Extrapolations from the experience in Al Anbar to what might work in Afghanistan must be made with caution, as many observers have noted that the two conflicts are different. Nevertheless, the real-world experience of Anbar’s surge is valuable because it is so recent, and as in Afghanistan today, it faced an enemy of Islamic extremists and took place when many observers had despaired of success. Two insights emerge.

First, although local people always resent foreign troops, they are not stupid. They balance this resentment against other factors, such as the tribesmen’s natural desire to be left alone and to live their lives in peace. As was seen in Al Anbar, these other factors can be paramount if the insurgents intrude too much on the locals' livelihoods and daily routines. Thus the locals can see a surge as positive if it brings stability and some economic benefits.

Second, enablers are not enough without boots on the ground. Some commentators, frustrated with casualties and the difficulties of battling a stubborn insurgency, have proposed withdrawing into fortified bases and fighting remotely through indigenous forces and raids by special operators. However, the presurge situation in Al Anbar, where some areas lacked troop coverage, shows that ceding the countryside to the insurgents would be disastrous. All this would produce is a collection of isolated and besieged coalition fortresses, each one a potential Alamo and requiring a major military effort just to resupply.

There are no guarantees in war, and as many have pointed out, what worked in Iraq may not work in Afghanistan. Nevertheless, the experience in Al Anbar shows that surges can work and suggests that the current effort in Afghanistan is a reasonable response to a difficult situation.

SIDEBAR
In this debate the Marine experience in Al Anbar is relevant and encouraging.

SIDEBAR
Read more about Iraq at www.mca-marines.org/gazette/cancian.

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IMAGE PHOTOGRAPH. Developing and maintaining cordial and workable relationships is required if troop surges are to succeed. (Photo by cPi Tm Sloan.)

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ABSTRACT

Though no two operations are ever the same, with lessons from one completely applicable and transferable to the other, I believed then, and as events have borne out, believe now, that many of the issues in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM about rules of engagement (ROE), chain of command, “transition” battlespace ownership, advisors, etc., to name a few, might be resolved, or at least improved, if some of the observations noted below are considered. [...] the counterinsurgency (COIN) fight may be the toughest mentally and emotionally of any form of conflict. Having sufficient force to secure population centers, emplacing robust advisor presence with all HN forces, and working with HN forces as true partners with the goal of transitioning the fight to them when they are ready constitutes a basic template that I believe has, with account for variations dependent on the culture and situation, universal application as a basic concept of operation for COIN.

FULL TEXT

Some thoughts on COIN

I wrote this article in February 2009 upon the 2-year anniversary of my return from Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF). At the time, as Commanding General (CG), 3d Marine Division (3d MarDiv), I was able to see many of the issues addressed below as being relevant for operations in Afghanistan. Though no two operations are ever the same, with lessons from one completely applicable and transferable to the other, I believed then, and as events have borne out, believe now, that many of the issues in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM about rules of engagement (ROE), chain of command, “transition” battlespace ownership, advisors, etc., to name a few, might be resolved, or at least improved, if some of the observations noted below are considered. In the end, the counterinsurgency (COIN) fight may be the toughest mentally and emotionally of any form of conflict. It deserves our fullest attention and thought. Hopefully the following will assist you in your own professional development and mission accomplishment. Stay safe.

It has been 2 years since I redeployed from Iraq after having served just shy of 1 year as the Deputy CG, Operations, Multinational Forces West, during OIF 05-07. I have had ample time to reflect on what transpired during the year we were in Al Anbar - the successes, the failures, the sacrifice, the frustration and, most importantly, the results. Over the course of the deployment, everyone involved learned much, grew professionally, and changed personally. I was no exception. The following are a few distilled lessons I learned about COIN during that year. Despite the fact that these lessons may not directly apply to all Marines, I believe they will cause the reader - corporal or colonel - to think about and consider their applicability for both today and future fights.

Know Your Mission

Our command had a very clear mission - to train Iraqi security forces and transition responsibility to them as they became capable in order to bring about the larger goal of transferring Al Anbar to Provincial Iraqi Governmental control. We necessarily planned to concurrently, and sometimes independently, fight those who resisted the efforts to establish a secure environment for the people until our primary task was achieved. I doubt that these two basic tasks will change in other insurgencies. If the host nation (HN) has competent security forces, the necessity of large conventional formations is mitigated. Once you sufficiently develop the support structure for HN forces to operate effectively, they must be put into the fight.

In the interim, our forces must be prepared to tackle the insurgents and buy time/space for this development. There should naturally follow a period of increased combined operations. Measurable positive progress in both the HN security force capacity and in the security situation should trigger incremental decreases in both size and responsibility of our force in operations as the HN force inversely increases. Ultimately, departure is the plan. That departure often takes longer than initially estimated. Efforts to artificially or prematurely speed up the process can also have the opposite effect. Building a
competent and self-sustainable HN army and a police force simply takes time. Hopefully the political leaders who make policy and pay the bills understand this, but as they say, "if you want it bad, you get it bad."

People Are the Prize

Like politics, all COIN operations are local, and the people are the prize - not terrain, not a body count, not the number of patrols run or civil affairs projects completed. The security and well being of the people are the only metrics that determine your success. Everything you do, or in some cases not do, must be directed with this end state in mind. Must we always win "hearts and minds"? Not always, but if we can gain their trust and at least their neutral acceptance; i.e., that we and the HN security forces have a better plan for the people than the insurgents, we will get information and support. How do you measure this? The best measure of success to me is a decreasing level of violence, an increase in volunteers for service in the HN security forces, and the increased provision of information leading to the arrest of insurgents and the discovery of arms caches. Though reactions are culturally dependent, most people still vote with their feet.

Protect the People

Population centers are the "critical ground" and the most important places to secure since they are home to most of the locals and the center for government and business. The issue is separating the good citizens from the insurgents. In most cases entire villages or portions of cities can be bermed with dirt or barricaded using concrete barriers. Vehicle and pedestrian entry control points can control entrance to the restricted area. This will significantly restrict an insurgent's movement and force him under your technical and human "sensors." Once an area is bermed/barricaded then a count of legitimate citizens can be accomplished by conducting a census or, ideally, doing the census with biometric automated tools (BATs). Once all are "BATed," then the locals can be given identification cards tied to their biometric data. Anyone found inside the "secure" area is then readily identifiable.

Don't Commit Decisive Force Unless You're Willing to Stay

There's much talk about "clear, hold, and build" as a methodology for COIN operations. You cannot perform these tasks if you don't stay in an area and establish a presence and, more importantly, a relationship with the people. Without sufficient forces available, you cannot persevere and succeed in improving security in a given area of operations (AO). Lacking the adequate numbers of "boots on the ground," you must prioritize those places that you can properly secure and make reasonable efforts to mitigate the risk in the "uncovered" areas in order to deny their use as sanctuary to the enemy.

Another option is to try to be everywhere, moving from area to area in an attempt to limit the enemy's ability to gain a foothold. This approach can result in your being stuck in a never-ending cycle of "whack a mole" that never achieves your end state. The preferred course of action is always, in my opinion, to maintain a permanent presence in the population centers. This is true for big cities or small villages. Without a permanent and credible security force presence, which may initially be a coalition force prior to building and transitioning to HN responsibility, the people will neither trust nor provide information.

You cannot protect them if you don't stay. This lesson learned is probably the most important of all that I gained from my experience in Anbar. We made a commitment to not leave any populated areas where we were already established. This meant that certain areas remained without coalition forces (CF) or Iraqi presence until either our force and/or the Iraqi force increased in size. In the end, maintaining security in population centers is the only sure way to get the locals to cooperate with, and ultimately join, the security forces. This security also creates the opportunities for real progress in the critical economic and governance lines of operation.

Advisers Are Critical

There are some who think that merely collocating (partnering) a coalition unit with an HN unit will suffice in achieving the development and maturation of the HN force. I strongly disagree. Advisers are the key to developing competent HN forces. A group of competent advisers who live, train, and operate with an HN force is the key to making it capable. The holistic development of a unit across all battlespace functions, but especially combat service support; e.g., administration, pay, supply, maintenance, is what will make these units truly professional. Adviser teams need to have representatives from across the functional areas of the Marine air-ground task force and should be experienced and mature leaders. This is one of the few times it can be advantageous to be an "old guy."

Advisor teams have also traditionally been undermanned with organic mobility and security - drivers and gunners. This can be remedied by reinforcing them with a squad of Marines to provide them with security and the means to move around the AO, thus freeing up their time to focus on advisor tasks. In 2006 we reinforced all military transition teams with
anywhere from 10 to 30 personnel to support their mission, which I believe significantly increased their effectiveness and expedited the development of the Iraqi Army (IA). When units asked how they were supposed to do their own operations while providing more Marines to the IA, my response was, "You're not. They are supposed to be doing the operations."

As HN forces assume battlespace, the number of personnel assigned to adviser teams must increase, at least initially. We still absolutely need to partner; i.e., to operate alongside our HN forces. But the purpose of partnering is not merely to put "their face" on operations but to leverage their skills in working with the locals and, more importantly, to reinforce the fact that it is ultimately the HNs fight. As the HN forces mature in their battlespace, the need for both partnering and advising will decrease. The optimal solution at the outset is to begin with the application of smart partnering and good advisors.

One Commander Has to Own the Ground and Have a Plan to Transition It

In Anbar the answer to the question, "Who owns the ground?" was pretty simple. The CF did. However, as the size and capability of the IA, border forces, and police grew, this issue became more and more complex and contentious. In fact, our goal was to transition responsibility for separate and independent battlespace to units as they became capable, in some cases, this took place even before they came under Iraqi Ministry of Defense or Ministry of Interior control. Eventually our plan came to fruition. The two LA divisions in Anbar were transferred to the command of the Iraqi Ground Forces Command (subordinate to their own Ministry of Defense) and became our "adjacent units." Because the provincial/city police also worked in these AO and were under Ministry of Interior control, this transition was more difficult but achievable through close cooperation with the police and use of embedded advisors to bridge the gaps between all three parties (IA, Iraqi police, and CF).

In some of the other AOs in Iraq, this form of coordination and cooperation did not always occur. In many cases there were no command relationships established between coexisting coalition and the HN units and/or too few advisors to adequately enable critical coordination and cooperation between them. The absence of a coherent plan for transitioning responsibility from CF to the HN security forces results in duplication of effort, confusion, physical and/or psychological "seams" and, potentially, fratricide. The bottom line is that you cannot have two organizations responsible for the same geographical area. Someone is in the lead and the rest are under operational control, tactical control or, in the case of the police, control by direct influence (also known as HandCon) of that lead entity. Working as adjacent units is fine as long as there is a mechanism - in most cases advisors - to communicate and coordinate the activities of both groups.

The end state for all CF in a COIN environment is the transitioning of battlespace to the HN security forces. If there is no plan to transition responsibility, which requires the training and forming of a competent HN force, you are saying the equivalent of "we will never leave."

Improving and Sustaining Security: Build the ‘Trinity’ of Police, Army, and Local Government

In every town where we were able to improve the security environment, we were also able to recruit men for the HN security forces. As security improved we were able to find local leaders to provide local government. When we had security forces and local government the insurgents soon departed, life improved, shops opened, roads were repaired, and children went back to school. In maintaining the security environment, the police are more effective than the army. Normally recruited from the local men, they know the town, the people, and the streets - who belongs and who does not. The local citizenry trusts them because many are related and provide them with intelligence. Though there can be issues of too much familiarity and corruption, I cannot imagine conducting a successful COIN without the development of a local police force.

See the Enemy

It has been stated many times that "the people are not the enemy, but the enemy hides among the people." So how do you distinguish friend from foe? Several ways are available. First, our enemies do things to identify themselves that we can exploit. It could be the color or style of their clothes or the type and color of cars they drive. Not unlike gang members, they act, dress, and drive in certain discernable styles and patterns. They may use native language stickers on the back window of the cars that we cannot read. Or they may remove a certain hubcap or mark their hubcaps with symbols. Once you find these details you must inform and educate the force. HN forces are critical in both identifying these tippers and sensitizing us, if we ask and make an effort to learn from them.

Know Your ROE and Continually Reinforce Their Purpose

When quick decisions must be made about employing force, you cannot afford time to ponder basic questions about the ROE. For example, who can go into the mosque? Can I shoot back at enemy in the schoolhouse? Can I approve the tar-
gathering of this building in a built-up area? Who has the authority to approve the target or deliver air ordnance? Can/Should we detain women? These are all examples of types of questions that arise in COIN. Before those situations arise, you must have the ability to quickly answer these questions, or better yet, you must know the rules up front and have rehearsed all of the scenarios and tested your responses. In a crisis be prepared to rapidly huddle in the combat operations center with the senior watch officer, the staff judge advocate, and the public affairs officer to answer ROE questions. I would strongly recommend having a quick reference on the ROE available to all addressing the rules for all contingences that can be reasonably foreseen, from building entry to collateral damage estimates.

All Marines who have daily interaction on the ground need to know and be trained daily in application of the ROE. They must at a minimum know the practical definitions and understand how to determine and apply the following: hostile act, hostile intent, positive identification of a target, collateral damage estimation, and the minimum force to counter. More importantly, Marines must understand why the ROE exist. Marines need to be "educated" in the application of these rules and the consequences of their application, as well as the potentially disastrous consequences of improper application. On occasion you will hear about units or individuals with their own interpretation of the ROE. If you are made aware of these contrary views, they must be dealt with swiftly and, if necessary, harshly. To train only in the rote memorization of the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) of ROE and not educate as to the reasoning and applicability of those rules may cause the force to inappropriately act.

It is the easy way out to always go kinetic. Though the inherent right of self-defense will always remain paramount, in a COIN environment the default reaction must always be to "not shoot."

Never Underestimate Our Enemy; Anticipate His Adaptation to Your Countermeasures

Our enemy is neither stupid nor afraid to die, making him very dangerous. In a war with a thinking enemy, every action elicits a counteraction. When you change your TTP or add additional capabilities, you must anticipate the enemy's reaction and plan your next move. Your foremost aim is to make the enemy react to you and strive to avoid frequently reacting to him. We are our own worst enemies in this game. We are creatures of habit who like and encourage routine. Our routines and rhythms; e.g., chow hall hours, drive us into patterns that we often overlook, ignore, or dismiss at our own peril. Take the time to analyze your patterns against enemy actions. Look at when things happen, how they happen, and to whom they happen in order to determine if you are becoming too predictable. Be your own red cell.

Conclusion

Operating effectively in COIN is a thinking man's game. Playing the kinetic card is not always the answer and, in many cases, may be absolutely the wrong course to pursue. Having sufficient force to secure population centers, emplacing robust advisor presence with all HN forces, and working with HN forces as true partners with the goal of transitioning the fight to them when they are ready constitutes a basic template that I believe has, with account for variations dependent on the culture and situation, universal application as a basic concept of operation for COIN. Little has been mentioned here about the other lines of operation needed for long-term success - good governance, the rule of law, and economic opportunity - all critical to the ultimate end state. However, without the blanket of security ultimately provided by the HNs security forces, police, and army, none of these lines of operations will take root, and we risk not leaving on our own terms.

* Author's Note: The author would like to acknowledge the assistance of Dr. Carter Mallakan, Center for Naval Analyses, and LTCol Vic Bunch, G-2 (Intelligence), 3d Mar Div, in the editing of this rude.

SIDEBAR

As HN forces assume battlespace, the number of personnel assigned to adviser teams must increase. . . .

by MajGen Robert B. Neller

*MajGen Neller is the CG, Education Command, and the President, Marine Corps University.

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Hybrid Challenges

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ABSTRACT
While we can never allow our core competencies to atrophy, I will argue that to win in the current operating environment we must increase our ability to combat criminals and their networks. [...] the Marine Corps must increase its ability to establish the "rule of law" on the battlefield. In hybrid challenges our enemy's interests may be more financial then ideological. [...] we must recognize that resolving political conflict and removing the cause for ideological opposition may not be enough to neutralize an insurgency or achieve stability.

FULL TEXT
The rule of law on the battlefield

Much has been published in the past year about the current and future operating environments and the growing fusion of crime and warfare. Marine Corps Vision and Strategy 2025 describes the:

. . . blurring of what was previously thought to be distinct forms of war or conflict - conventional war, irregular challenges, terrorism, and criminality - into what can be described as hybrid challenges.

As the form of future conflict is shifting, we must adapt to fight and win these "new wars." Regardless, some argue that focusing on these environments distract us from our needed focus on conventional operations. While we can never allow our core competencies to atrophy, I will argue that to win in the current operating environment we must increase our ability to combat criminals and their networks. Therefore, the Marine Corps must increase its ability to establish the "rule of law" on the battlefield.

Experience in Iraq demonstrates the symbiotic relationship between crime and insurgency. Fuel and other goods were routinely stolen by insurgents and sold on the black market to finance their operations. Criminal networks would in turn
employ insurgents to hijack fuel trucks and other goods. Criminals looked and acted like insurgents, and insurgents engaged in crime. When simply looking at physical and operational characteristics, the differences between criminal and insurgent groups are difficult to discern, but the ideology and motivations that separate them are significant. Criminals and insurgents are very different enemies and the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) to fight them have important differences. To succeed in an environment where crime supports insurgency, we must be prepared to combat both.

The blending of war and crime is not new. Presley O’Bannon’s assault on Derna was against the state sponsors of piracy. Ho Chi Minh needed to expel the French from the valley of Dien Bien Phu because it was where he grew opium that financed the war.4 Warlords and “freedom fighters” in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq have all used crime to support their operations as well as to make a handsome profit. The chaos of war provides opportunities for criminals to operate with impunity, and combatants often need the profits of crime to support operations. With the absence of consequences for crime, lawlessness grows and “crime pays.” Additionally, as most societies have social mores that look negatively on crime, criminals attempt to disguise their actions as being ideological to give their criminal actions legitimacy. MajGen Smedley Butler once said that “war is a racket” and that to end it “profit must be taken out of war.” Although he was speaking in a different context, the lesson is just as valid. As long as there are profits to be made, criminals will continue to cause and support conflict.

There are countless similar situations today. Pirates from a lawless Somalia prey on ships in international waters. Narcotics gangs in Mexico engage in violence with each other and the security forces deployed to combat them. The rise of cocaine trafficking in West Africa threatens to destabilize Sierra Leone and Liberia. Nonlegitimate actors like drug cartels not only undermine state authority, they can replace it.5 The vacuums of power that result can lead to the failed states or “ungoverned spaces” that provide our Nation’s enemies a place to hide. Recendly, the Secretary of Defense stated that:

. . . The most likely catastrophic threats to the U.S. homeland - for example, that of a U.S. city being poisoned or reduced to rubble by a terrorist attack - are more likely to emanate from failing states than from aggressor states.

While rogue nations are dangerous threats, and we must remain ready to meet their militaries in combat, we must also be ready to bring stability to the failed states and ungoverned spaces that pose significant security challenges. A key task in achieving stability in these ungoverned spaces will be establishing the rule of law.

Unfortunately, whenever and wherever Marines deploy, new opportunities for crime and violence emerge. Humanitarian aid can be stolen and sold at a profit. Contractors or local security forces who work with Marines can be robbed, extorted, or kidnapped and ransomed. Supply convoys can be attacked and their pilfered goods sold. Access to civil affairs projects can be controlled by the powerful and exploited for personal gain. When we deploy to a new area of operations we must recognize these criminal opportunities and work to ensure that our presence does not undermine the existing rule of law. If deployed to an environment lacking the rule of law, we must be prepared to enforce and establish our own to prevent the emergence of criminally linked insurgencies.

The Marine Corps has gained an immense amount of experience in conducting counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Combined with our history of “small wars,” the Marine Corps has proven its ability to adapt to and succeed in asymmetric and complex environments. But as the form of conflict continues to change, we will face new challenges. The operational concepts outlined in The Long War: Send in the Marines describe a clear path to position the Corps to meet these security challenges. It states that Marines must be prepared to conduct missions including:


In light of the emerging threats, the changing forms of warfare, and these anticipated missions, we must increase the ability of Marine units to combat crime and support the rule of law.

Establishing the rule of law encompasses more than simply detaining insurgents or criminals and preventing their actions. It includes the creation of disincentives for criminal or insurgent behavior that do not create more enemies in the process. This can be done through creating a process that respects rights and allows the prosecution of these criminals under a locally legitimate law. This is obviously extremely difficult in a violent, chaotic environment. Because of these difficulties, some have argued that the establishing of rule of law is not an appropriate mission for an infantry battalion.8 Playing the role of an international policeman (or even an expeditionary legal system) certainly lacks appeal for many reasons. But the Corps’ experience in these missions predates its development of amphibious doctrine.9 To ignore this mission requirement limits us to only fighting half of the enemy, and for us to claim that we are not an appropriate force for the mission will ensure our obsolescence.
Most importantly, we need to continue to develop TTP and equipment to be employed by our maneuver units in enforcing the rule of law. While balancing force protection requirements, we should look at ways to further disaggregate infantry squads and allow them to cover more ground within the range of reaction forces. Individual communications and position locators along with persistent overwatch from airborne and ground-based sensors can support this. The effect could be to appear as a couple of policemen on a beat vice an infantry squad on patrol. This could increase deterrence to criminal and insurgent activity while minimizing impacts and negative perceptions on a population. But supporting the rule of law doesn’t just apply to the individual Marine or rifle squad. The entire system must be supported for the rule of law to function legitimately. In Iraq, infantry Marines have partnered with police at every level to include corrections functions. Staff judge advocates have partnered with Iraqi judges and prosecutors to ensure legitimacy of detentions. In some cases, battalion forward air controllers partnered with the local directorate generals to reduce corruption and decrease the availability of black market fuel. Every member of the MAGTF can play a part in establishing or maintaining the rule of law in a future operating environment.

Just as in America, these environments have "white-collar" criminals, and there is no shortage of white-collar insurgents either. We cannot limit our focus to only the "soldiers" of these insurgent and criminal networks and hope to be effective. Unfortunately, conducting operations against "highvalue" white-collar criminals and insurgents is difficult without alienating the population. In many cases, these men may be local leaders or members of local government. There are countless examples in Iraq of local government or military leaders who abused their power or were in the employment of insurgents and criminals. Despite its challenges, we must target the whitecollar level of criminal and insurgent organizations. We can and should take advantage of the lessons learned from Federal agencies like the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Drug Enforcement Agency, and Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms in combating criminal organizations and their leaders. We have many Reserve Marines who work in these organizations and who could bring their expertise to these hybrid challenges. Efforts against the white-collar level can be complex but they are worth it if we want to create stability in ungoverned spaces.

This stability is the key to promoting development and reducing the conditions that lead to extremism. Recently the President of the World Bank stated, "The most fundamental prerequisite for sustainable development is an effective rule of law."10 Whether mentoring partner-nations in stability operations as a part of a security cooperation MAGTF, transitioning to Phase IV in the hours and days following cessation of major hostilities, or ensuring that the introduction of humanitarian aid does not create violence and exacerbate a disaster, maintaining and supporting the rule of law is a key task for the MAGTF.

Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1, Warfighting, defines war as a "a violent clash of interests between or among organized groups characterized by the use of military force."11 In hybrid challenges our enemy’s interests may be more financial then ideological. Therefore, we must recognize that resolving political conflict and removing the cause for ideological opposition may not be enough to neutralize an insurgency or achieve stability. As long as there remains an opportunity for profit, there will be criminals who oppose our actions and impact mission accomplishment.

Recently a U.S. Senator recommended the creation of a "non-military deployable police force to train foreign forces and help maintain law and order in places threatened by state collapse.12 Unless such a force is created, we can assume they will continue to look to the Corps. Fortunately, the Marine Corps Task List (MCTL) identifies tasks and conditions that support establishment of the rule of law in MCT 1.6.6.9 (Conduct Stability Operations). The requirement has been identified, and we have the training tools. What is needed is the comprehensive focus. While less traditional, we must embrace the mission of supporting rule of law with the same intensity we do toward conventional operations.

SIDEBAR
As long as there are profits to be made, criminals will continue to cause and support conflict.

SIDEBAR
. . . we must target the white-collar level of criminal and insurgent organizations.

FOOTNOTE
Notes
1. INC 2025 Global Trends, Jane Opcraang Environment 2008, and The Long Via r. Send in the Marines have all described increasing fusion of different types of warfare and increasing influence of criminal networks as challenges to governance.


3. Kaldor, Mary, New and Old Wars Orgmized Violence in the Global Era, Stanford University Press, Stanford, CA, 1999, p. 12. Mary Kaldor describes "New Wars" as a "mixture of war, crime and human rights violations." She continues to state that "peace keeping should be reconceptualized as cosmopolitan law enforcement," and therefore these "agents of cosmopolitan law enforcement must be a mixture of soldiers and police."


by Maj Mark J. Broekhuizen

Maj Broekhuizen is an infantry officer and foreign area officer. He is currently studying Indonesian at the Defense Language Institute, Monterey, CA His fast operational assignment was as the Operations Officer, 2d Bn, 8th Mar. This article was his Chase Prize Essay Contest entry.

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GRAPHIC: Photographs

IMAGE PHOTOGRAPH, Insurgents and criminals have extensive networks that must be targeted and rooted out. (Photo by ssgt wunam Greeson.)

IMAGE PHOTOGRAPH, We must continue to build our credibility with indigenous personnel. (Photo by Sgt Pete Thibodauau.)

IMAGE PHOTOGRAPH, It's not his job to establish the rule of law-or is it? (Photo by LCpl Ronald W. Stauffer.)

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Fixing Intel in Afghanistan

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ABSTRACT

Ignorant of local economics and landowners, hazy about who the powerbrokers are and how we might influence them, incurious about the correlations between various development projects and the levels of cooperation of villagers, and disengaged from people in the best position to find answers - whether aid workers or Afghan soldiers - O.S. intelligence officers and analysts can do little but shrug in response to high-level decisionmakers seeking the knowledge, analysis, and information they need to wage a successful counterinsurgency (COIN). Lacking adequate analysts and guidance from commanders, battalion S-2 shops rarely gather, process, and write up quality assessments on census data and patrol de-briefs, the minutes from shuras and Jirgas with local farmers and tribal leaders, after-action reports from civil affairs officers and provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs), polling data and atmospherics reports from psychological operations and female engagement teams, translated summaries of radio broadcasts that influence local farmers, and the observations of Afghan soldiers, United Nations officials, and nongovernmental organizations.

FULL TEXT

A longer version of this article was originally published by the Center for New American Security

Eight years into the war in Afghanistan, the U.S. intelligence community is only marginally relevant to our overall strategy.* Having focused the overwhelming majority of our collection efforts and analytical brainpower on insurgent groups, our vast intelligence apparatus still finds itself unable to answer fundamental questions about the environment in which we operate and the people we are trying to persuade. Ignorant of local economics and landowners, hazy about who the powerbrokers are and how we might influence them, incurious about the correlations between various development projects and the levels of cooperation of villagers, and disengaged from people in the best position to find answers - whether aid workers or Afghan soldiers - O.S. intelligence officers and analysts can do little but shrug in response to
high-level decisionmakers seeking the knowledge, analysis, and information they need to wage a successful counterinsurgency (COIN).

This problem or its consequences exists at every level of the U.S. intelligence hierarchy, from the ground level up to headquarters in Kabul and the United States. Down at the battalion level and below, intelligence officers know a great deal about their local Afghan districts but are generally too understaffed to gather, store, disseminate, and digest the substantial and crucial body of information that exists outside traditional intelligence channels. A battalion S-2 (intelligence) shop will, as it should, carefully read and summarize classified human intelligence (HumInt), signals intelligence (SigInt), and significant activity reports that describe improvised explosive device (IED) strikes and other violent incidents. These three types of reports deal primarily with the enemy and, as such, are necessary and appropriate elements of intelligence.

What lies beyond them is another issue. Lacking adequate analysts and guidance from commanders, battalion S-2 shops rarely gather, process, and write up quality assessments on census data and patrol debriefs, the minutes from shuras and Jirgas with local farmers and tribal leaders, after-action reports from civil affairs officers and provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs), polling data and atmospherics reports from psychological operations and female engagement teams, translated summaries of radio broadcasts that influence local farmers, and the observations of Afghan soldiers, United Nations officials, and nongovernmental organizations. This vast and underappreciated body of information, almost all of which is unclassified, admittedly offers few clues about where to find insurgents but provides information of even greater strategic importance: a map for leveraging popular support and marginalizing the insurgency itself.

The present tendency to overemphasize detailed information about the enemy at the expense of the political, economic, and cultural environment that supports them becomes even more pronounced at the brigade and division levels. Understandably galled by IED strikes that are killing our soldiers, brigade and division intelligence shops react by devoting most of their resources to finding the people who emplace devices. Analysts painstakingly diagram insurgent networks and recommend who should be killed or captured. Aerial drones and other collection assets are tasked around the clock with scanning the countryside in the hope of spotting insurgents burying bombs or setting up ambushes. Again, no one argues that these are not fundamentally worthy objectives, but relying too exclusively on these forms of intelligence baits us into always reacting to the enemy's tactics at the expense of finding ways to strike at the very heart of the insurgency itself. These labor-intensive intelligence efforts, taken by themselves, fail to advance our war strategy and, as a result, expose more of our troops to danger over the long run. Overlooked amid these reactive intelligence efforts are two inescapable truths:

* Regimental, brigade, and division analytic products, in their present form, tell ground units little they do not already know.

* Lethal targeting, by itself, will do nothing to help us win in Afghanistan.

Speaking to the first point, enemycentric and counter-IED reports published by higher commands are of little use to warfighters in the field, most of whom already grasp who it is they are fighting and, in many cases, are the sources of the information in the reports in the first place. Some battalion S-2 officers say they acquire more helpful information reading U.S. newspapers than regional command intelligence summaries. Newspaper accounts, they point out, at least discuss more than the enemy and IEDs. What battalion S-2 officers want from higher up intelligence shops are analysts who would be more productive working at the battalion and company levels. The same conclusion applies to collection efforts. Officers in the field believe that the emphasis on force protection missions by spy planes and other nonHumInt platforms should be balanced with collection and analysis of population-centric information. Is that desert road we're thinking of paving really the most heavily trafficked route? Which mosques and bazaars are attracting the most people from week to week? Is that local contractor actually implementing the irrigation project we paid him to implement? These are the kinds of questions - more than questions about the enemy - that are going unanswered, and which military and civilian decisionmakers in the field need help answering. They are the questions and answers that help bring people over to our side who, in turn, are far better than we are at spotting insurgents and their bombs and giving us indications and warnings "left of boom."

The second inescapable truth is that merely killing insurgents usually sets us to multiply our enemies rather than subtract them. This counterintuitive dynamic is common in many guerrilla conflicts, but is especially true in the revenge-prone Pashtun communities whose cooperation we are trying to earn and maintain. The Soviets proved this truth in the 1980s when, despite killing hundreds of thousands of Afghans, they actually faced a larger insurgency near the end of the war than they did at the beginning.
Given these two lessons, we must ask ourselves why, out of the hundreds of intel analysts in regimental-, brigade-, and division-level headquarters, only a miniscule fraction are assigned to study governance, development, and the local population - all topics we must understand in order to prevail. "Why the Intel Fusion Center can't give me data about the population is beyond me," said the operations officer of one U.S. task force, echoing a common complaint. "I don't want to say we're clueless, but we are. We've no more than fingernail deep in our understanding of the environment."

At the next level up we find the top of the intel pyramid. Dozens of intelligence analysts in Kabul, plus hundreds more back in Tampa, in the Pentagon, and in the national capital region, are committed to answering critically important questions about the state of the conflict and the impact of our actions. These questions are posed by International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Commanding General, GEN Stanley McChrystal; LTG David Rodriguez of the ISAF Joint Command; and other decisionmakers, up to and including the President of the United States. Their answers are essential to making informed strategic decisions.

The problem is that the analysts - the core of them bright, enthusiastic, and hungry - are starved for information from the field. So starved, in fact, that many say their jobs feel more like fortunetelling than serious detective work. In one recent project ordered by the White House, analysts could barely find enough information to scrape together even rudimentary assessments of pivotal Afghan districts. Little wonder, then, that many decisionmakers rely more on newspapers than military intelligence in order to obtain "ground truth."

The deficit of data needed by highlevel analysts does not arise from a lack of reporting in the field. There are literally terabytes of unclassified and classified information typed up at the grassroots level. The most salient problems are attitudinal, cultural, and human. The intelligence community's standard mode of operation is emphatic about secrecy but regrettably less concerned about mission effectiveness. To quote GEN McChrystal in a recent meeting:

Our senior leaders - the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense, Congress, the President of the United States - are not getting the right information to make decisions with. We must get this right. The media is driving the issues. We need to build a process from the sensor all the way to the political decision makers.

This article is the blueprint for such a process. Its contents should be considered as a directive by the senior author, who is the top intelligence officer in Afghanistan. The document is aimed at commanders as well as intelligence professionals. If intelligence is to help us succeed in the conduct of the war, the commanders of companies, battalions, brigades, and divisions must clearly prioritize the questions they need answered in support of our COIN strategy, direct intelligence officials to answer them, and hold accountable those who fail. Military doctrine could hardly be clearer on this point:

Creating effective intelligence is an inherent and essential responsibility of command. Intelligence failures are failures of command - [just] as operations failures are command failures.

Intel at the Grassroots: The Battalion and Below

In late June 2009, a small number of U.S. Marines and British soldiers were the only foreign forces in Nawa, a district of 70,000 farmers in Helmand Province. The American and British troops could not venture a kilometer from their cramped base without confronting machinegun and rocket fire from insurgents. Local farmers, wary of reprisals by the Taliban, refused to make eye contact with foreign soldiers, much less speak with them or offer valuable battlefield and demographic information.

The tide began to turn in Nawa on 2 July, when 1st Battalion, 5th Marines (1/5) descended in helicopters and began sweeping across the district on foot, establishing nearly two dozen patrol bases in villages and cornfields along the way. Several months later the situation in Nawa is radically different. Insurgents find it substantially more difficult to operate without being ostracized or reported by farmers, government officials meet regularly with citizens to address their grievances, the district center has turned from a ghost town into a bustling bazaar, and IED incidents are down 90 percent.

Nawa's turnaround, although still fragile, could not have occurred without: population-centric COIN techniques. The turnaround also illustrates the pivotal role intelligence plays when a battalion commits itself to understanding the environment at least as well as it understands the enemy.

The battalion S-2 and deputy intelligence officer, finding their unit widely dispersed across an alien environment without classified or unclassified data networks, responded with two particularly farsighted decisions. First, they distributed their intelligence analysts down to the company level, and second, they decided that understanding the people in their zone of influence was a top priority.
By resisting the urge of many intelligence officers to hoard analysts at the command post, the S-2 and his deputy armed themselves with a network of human sensors who could debrief patrols, observe key personalities and terrain across the district, and - crucially - write down their findings. Because there were not enough analysts to send to every platoon, the infantry companies picked up the slack by assigning riflemen to collate and analyze information full-time. 2 Alpha Company, for instance, dedicated five NCOs to their intelligence cell.

The battalion intelligence officers refused to allow the absence of a data network to impede the flow of information. Each night the deputy intelligence officer hosted what he called "fireside chats" during which each analyst radioed in from his remote position at a designated time and read aloud everything he had learned over the last 24 hours. Using this approach, daily reports incorporated a wide variety of sources - unclassified patrol debriefs, the notes of officers who had met with local leaders, the observations of civil affairs officers, and classified HUMINT reports. The deputy intelligence officer typed up a master report of everything called in by his analysts and closed each "chat session" by providing the analysts with an updated list of questions - called "intelligence requirements" - for the companies to attempt to answer. 3

As the picture in Nawa gradually developed, the effort homed in on identifying what the battalion called "anchor points" - local personalities and local grievances that, if skillfully exploited, could drive a wedge between insurgents and the greater population. Anchor points, in other words, were the enemy's critical vulnerabilities.

The battalion soon found one to exploit. Many local elders, it turned out, quietly resented the Taliban for threatening their traditional power structure. The Taliban was empowering young fighters and mullahs to replace local elders as the primary authorities on local economic and social matters. Despite this affront to the elders, they were too frightened to openly challenge the Taliban's ironfisted imposition of its status quo.

As a result of its integrated intelligence, 1/5 took steps to subvert the Taliban power structure and strengthen the elders' traditional one. The battalion commander partnered with the district governor, traveling with him constantly and participating in impromptu meetings with citizens to build their confidence in Afghan and U.S. security. To demonstrate the benefits of working with the government, the battalion facilitated development projects that addressed grievances identified through coordinated surveys of the populace by Marines and civilian officials. These efforts paid off. The district governor persuaded elders to reconstitute a traditional council featuring locally selected representatives from each sub-district. The council now serves as the primary advisory board to the Afghan Government in Nawa.

To be sure, various chips had to fall the right way in order for our forces to enable this positive turn of events. But the battalion's intelligence effort played a significant role. Battalion leadership geared its intelligence toward understanding the environment, knowing this would ultimately make Marines safer than would overconcentrating on the IED threat.

Regiments and Brigades Must Fight To Be Relevant

Above the battalions, on large forward operating bases isolated from population centers, are regiment- and brigade-level intelligence shops. Although they are usually only a few dozen geographic miles from battalions, operationally they are worlds apart. The problems faced by regiment- and brigade-level shops are the reverse of battalion S-2 shops. Resources are abundant. What they lack is what the battalions have in spades - information about what is happening on the ground.

Brigade intelligence officers keep their analysts busy creating charts linking insurgents, building Microsoft PowerPoint "storyboards" depicting violent incidents from around the area of operations and distilling the intelligence summaries from units in the field. Much of the effort is geared toward keeping the brigade commander updated with news from the battlefield.

But the most competent regimental and brigade intelligence shops, according to the battalions they support, are ones that do three specific things. First, they make every effort to advertise collection and production capabilities and make these capabilities available to the battalions. Second, they send analysts down to augment battalion- and company-level intelligence support teams even if only on a rotating basis. And third, they produce written summaries that incorporate everyone's activities in the area - civil affairs, PRTs, the Afghan Government, and security forces - rather than merely rehash kinetic incidents already covered in battalion-level intelligence summaries.

Battalion S-2 officers give high praise to brigade-level officers and NCOs who routinely determine what maps, imagery, surveillance, and SigInt support the battalions need. The hallmark of good regiment- and brigade-level intelligence support is a proactive approach: officers use telephones or show up in person to walk the battalion S-2 through the support they can provide, like tailors fitting a customer for a new suit. 15 Too often battalion S-2s are kept in the dark about the full spectrum of collection platforms that can be tasked on their behalf by the brigade. And too often they are frustrated to learn that these capabilities are devoted mostly to serving brigade staff rather than battalions in the field.
Regiments and brigades that rotate their analysts down to the battalion and company levels benefit themselves and the units they support. Time spent by an analyst away from the brigade is more than compensated for by the knowledge he brings back, the personal contacts he establishes and maintains, and the sense of urgency and equity he develops about the fight being waged at the ground level. Now he personally knows the Marines going out on patrol each day, and as one would expect among fighting men and women, this makes a difference.

COIN Warfare Calls for COIN Analysts

A key reform at the brigade and division levels must be to authorize a select group of analysts to retrieve information from the ground level and make it available to a broader audience, much the way journalists do. These analysts must get out of their chairs and visit the people who operate at the grassroots - civil affairs officers, PRTs, atmospherics teams, Afghan liaison officers, female engagement teams, willing nongovernmental organizations and development organizations, United Nations officials, psychological operations teams, human terrain teams, and staff officers with infantry battalions, to name a few.

People at the grassroots level already write reams of reports and are willing to share them. Little of what they write, however, reaches Afghanistan's five regional commands, and still less reaches top decisionmakers and analysts in Kabul and beyond. Some of the reports remain trapped at the ground level because of a lack of bandwidth, while others get pushed up only to be "stovepiped" in one of the many classified and disjointed networks that inevitably populate a nation coalition. But even where there is a commonly available network, such as the unclassified Internet, little information from the ground level in Afghanistan reaches a central repository where it can be accessed and searched by the customers who need it. Instead, vital information piles up in obscure SharePoint sites, inaccessible hard drives, and other digital junkyards.

Although strenuous and costly efforts are underway to move to a common, classified network and establish a few master databases, 8 years of disunity has shown that technology alone will not save us. The problem cannot be solved unless select, specially trained analysts are empowered to methodically identify everyone who collects valuable information, visit them in the field, build mutually beneficial relationships with them, and bring back information to share with everyone who needs it.

Once gathered, information must be read and understood. These select teams of analysts will take the first crack at making sense of what they have gathered by writing periodic narrative reviews of all that is happening in pivotal districts: who the key personalities are, how local attitudes are changing, what the levels of violence are, how enemy tactics are evolving, why farmers chose to plant more wheat than poppy this winter, what development projects have historically occurred or are currently underway, and the like. This means dividing their workload along geographic lines instead of along functional lines, with each covering a handful of key districts.

The importance of this integrated, district-focused approach is difficult to overstate. The alternative - having all analysts study an entire province or region through the lens of a narrow, functional line (e.g., one analyst covers governance, another studies narcotics trafficking, a third looks at insurgent networks, etc.) - simply cannot produce much meaningful analysis.

This notion may be novel to much of our current military intelligence model, but it is not unusual in other information dependent enterprises. Consider, for instance, the sports page of a New York City newspaper. When the editor assigns his reporters to cover football, he has one cover the Jets and another cover the Giants. He does not tell the first to write about all NFL linebackers and the second to write about the league's punters. Determining whether the teams have a shot at the Super Bowl requires analysis of them as a whole, not in vertical slices.

Conclusion

The U.S. intelligence community has fallen into the trap of waging an anti/insurgency campaign rather than a counter-insurgency campaign. The difference is not academic. Capturing or killing key mid-level and high-level insurgents - antiinsurgency - is without question a necessary component of successful warfare, but far from sufficient for us to succeed in Afghanistan. Real change will not happen until commanders at all levels take responsibility for intelligence.

The format of intelligence products also matters. Commanders who think PowerPoint storyboards and color-coded spreadsheets are adequate for describing this conflict and its complexities have some soul searching to do. Sufficient knowledge will not come from slides that have little more text than a comic strip. Commanders must demand substantive written narratives from their intel shops and make the time to read them. There are no shortcuts. Microsoft Word, more than PowerPoint, should be the tool of choice for intelligence professionals in COIN.
Our single-minded obsession with IEDs, while understandable, is inexcusable if it causes commanders to fail to outsmart the insurgency and wrest away the initiative. GEN McChrystal and U.S. Forces-Afghanistan Commander SGM Michael T. Hall recently wrote:

A military force, culturally programmed to respond conventionally (and predictably) to insurgent attacks, is akin to the bull that repeatedly charges a matador's cape - only to tire and eventually be defeated by a much weaker opponent.7

The intelligence community - the brains of our military bull - is still much too mesmerized by the Taliban's cape. If that does not change, our success will depend on the dubious premise that a bull will not tire as quickly as a Russian bear.

SIDEBAR

Too often battalion S-2s are kept in the dark about the full spectrum of collection platforms that can be tasked on their behalf by the brigade.

SIDEBAR

To read the entire article please go to: www.cnas.org/node/3524, or go through the Gazette website at www.mca-marines.org/gazette. (Photo courtesy of author.)

FOOTNOTE

*The intelligence community referred to throughout this document is the thousands of uniformed and civilian intelligence personnel serving with the Department of Defense and with joint interagency elements in Afghanistan.

FOOTNOTE

Notes

1. The italics are as they appear in the original text, which is contained in Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 2, Intelligence, Headquarters Marine Corps, Washington, DC, 1997, p. 77.

2. In our view, it is advisable to augment company-level intelligence cells with trained intel analysts from the battalion S-2 who are in direct support of, but not attached to, the companies. The direct support status protects the analyst from being misused by a company commander while also giving the analyst an incentive to provide information to the battalion S-2 and beyond. A succinct discussion of intelligence at the company level may be found in the article by LtCol Morgan G. Mann, USMCR, and Capr Michael Driscoll, USMCR, "Thoughts Regarding the Company-Level Intelligence Cell," Marine Corps Gazette, June 2009, p. 28.

3. 1/5 was commanded in Nawa by LtCol William F. McCollough.


5. A passive approach to intelligence support does not work. Intelligence shops that merely set up a “request for information portal” and wait for customers to fill out formal requests online are not doing their job. Civilians and military officers who need support usually are either unaware of the location of such portals, cannot access them due to bandwidth constraints, or need to speak with a person via telephone in order to explain and shape the products or collection support they are requesting.


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ABSTRACT

NTM-A/CSTC-A provides advisors, mentors, and trainers to assist both the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Interior (MoI) in organizing, recruiting, training, equipping, employing, and supporting the ANSF in order to defeat the insurgency, provide internal security, extend and enforce the rule of law, set conditions for economic development, and gain the trust and confidence of the citizens of Afghanistan. [...] police corruption plays into the Taliban's hands as they stand ready to offer quick, cost free, and impartial justice.

FULL TEXT

An opportunity to build long-term Marine Corps security cooperation capacity

President Barack Obama's decision to provide a ”surge” of 30,000 troops to Afghanistan in support of the Commander, International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) has further sharpened the Marine Corps' focus on the tactical/operational level of war in Helmand Province. Concurrent with the surge into Regional Command-South, there has been an increased focus on the strategic-/operational-level development of Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF). One intent of the surge is the suppression of Taliban insurgents in order to provide sufficient time and space for ANSF development. The ANSF development effort is led by the recently established NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A)/Combined
Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTCA) for which the U.S. Army and NATO have been the principal force providers.

Despite the challenges associated with signing the Marine Corps up for further troop requirements, a judicious selection and assignment process supporting the NTM-A mission would provide an excellent opportunity to develop Marines (language skills and advisor experience) for subsequent assignment to the Marine Corps Training Advisory Group (MCTAG). Specific Marines who would benefit from service with NTM-A include foreign area officers, regional affairs officers, and officers, SNCOs, and NCOs who have been assigned as regional specialists in accordance with the Commandant's recently created Career Marine Regional Studies (CMRS) program.1

The overall purpose of this article is to explain NTM-A's background and its roles and missions as they relate to the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP). It will also provide the development status of the ANSF, comprised of the ANA and the ANP, as well as examine some of the ANSF's ongoing challenges.

Background

The mission of the NTM-A/CSTCA is to generate the ANSF, develop capable ministerial systems and institutions, and resource the fielded force to build sustainable capacity and capability in order to enhance the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan's ability to achieve stability and security in Afghanistan. NTMA/CSTC-A is a joint Service and coalition organization headquartered in Kabul with military personnel from the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Poland, Albania, Germany, France, and Romania, as well as contracted civilian advisors, mentors, and trainers.

NTM-A/CSTC-A provides advisors, mentors, and trainers to assist both the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Interior (MoI) in organizing, recruiting, training, equipping, employing, and supporting the ANSF in order to defeat the insurgency, provide internal security, extend and enforce the rule of law, set conditions for economic development, and gain the trust and confidence of the citizens of Afghanistan. Mission success for NTM-A/CSTC-A is defined as fielding an ANSF that is professional, literate, ethnically diverse, tactically competent, and capable of providing security throughout Afghanistan.

NTM-A/CSTC-A is subordinate to the Commander, ISAF, and is the three-star command responsible for ministerial and institutional-level interactions and mentoring leading to policies affecting the recruitment, training, and equipping of the ANSF. Operating in parallel to NTM-A/CSTC-A is the ISAF Joint Command (IJC). The IJC is the three-star command responsible for the operational and tactical deployment and employment of trained ANSE (See Figure 1.) The following sections will detail the background, roles and missions, and goals associated with the ANA and ANP.

ANA

The ANA is a relatively new institution built "from scratch" beginning in December 2002. It is an all-volunteer force that is inclusive of all social and ethnic groups and replaces the previous national army, which essentially ceased to exist during the 1992-96 mujahideen civil war and the 1996-2001 Taliban period. When the ANA was first established, Tajiks, largely from the Northern Alliance, formed a large percentage of the new recruits. In response, many Pashtuns shunned recruitment or left the ANA program. This ethnic disparity has been overcome by the ethnic integration of each unit with elements from the major ethnic groups - Pashtun, Tajik, Uzbek, Hazara, and Turkmen - better recruitment pay, and the close involvement of Western forces. The Defense Minister since 2004, Abdul Rahim Wardak, is an ethnic Pashtun, whose appointment has helped reduce Pashtun desertions. The Army Chief of Staff, GEN Bismillah Khan, is a Tajik who was a Northern Alliance commander.

The ANA is primarily a light infantry-based army equipped with towed artillery and mortars. Each Afghan recruit receives entry and advanced skills training at either the Kabul Military Training Center or a regional basic warrior training center. ANA battalions, or "Kandaks," are the main Afghan force unit whose goal is to take the lead in securing and defending Afghanistan's independence, national sovereignty, and territorial integrity against all enemies, foreign and domestic.

The ANA is composed of 109 Kandaks that are trained and mentored by coalition forces called Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams (OMLTs). Each OMLT - of which there are about 61 - has between 12 to 19 personnel. Among the partner countries contributing to the OMLTs are Canada, Croatia, the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Britain, and the United States. The ANA has at least some presence in most of Afghanistan's 34 provinces, and it deployed outside Afghanistan to assist relief efforts for victims of the October 2005 Pakistan earthquake. The ANA seeks to demonstrate clearly to the Afghan people and to the international community that the Afghan National Government's authority extends throughout the nation.
The ANA maneuver corps are assigned the following areas of operational responsibility:

* 205th Corps. Headquartered in Kandahar and responsible for Kandahar, Zabul, Oruzgan, Helmand, Nimruz, and Dai-Kundi. (Will be affected by standup of 215th Corps.)
* 207th Corps. Headquartered in Herat and Mir Daud and responsible for Ghor, Baghdis, Heart, and Farah.
* 215th Corps. Currently being formed. Headquarrers will be at Lashkar Gah with responsibility for Helmand, Nimruz, and Farah.
* National Commando Brigade. Headquartered in Kabul and responsible for the Commando Kandaks within each corps' area of responsibility.
* Capital Division. Headquartered in Kabul and responsible for defending the greater Kabul area.

**ANAAC**

The ANA Air Corps (ANAAC) suffers from equipment, maintenance, and logistical difficulties. The ANAAC is an important element of the ANA that is a carryover from the Afghan Air Force that existed prior to the 1979 Soviet invasion. In the intervening years, the former air force's equipment was virtually eliminated in the United States' 2001-02 operations against the Taliban regime. The ANAAC, located at Kabul, now has about 400 pilots and 22 helicopters and cargo aircraft that is largely a mix of Soviet Union-era fixedand rotary-wing assets.

Defense Minister Wardak stated in September 2008 that it will remain mostly a ground operations support force rather than a combat-oriented air force. The ANAAC is training to perform a wide range of missions that include presidential airlift, medical and casualty evacuation, battlefield mobility, airlift, reconnaissance and airborne command and control, and light air attack. The ANAAC presently flies 90 percent of all Afghan missions.

**ANP**

Reformation of the ANP officially began in 2003 with Germany as the lead nation for ANP training. In 2005 the ANP training lead transitioned to the U.S. State Department and, subsequently, to the U.S. Department of Defense. NTM-A/CSSTC-A has officially assumed the lead U.S. role in the ANPs reformation.

U.S., NATO, and Afghan officials believe that developing a credible and capable national police force is at least as important to combating the Taliban insurgency as building the ANA. There is widespread consensus that ANP development lags the ANA by about 18 months and that it also has a higher desertion rate. The ANP's major criticism is that it suffers from widespread corruption, to the point where many Afghans are more afraid of the police than they are of the Taliban. One of the ongoing efforts to blunt this is to bring ANP pay on par with the ANA.

ANP entry-level training is conducted at Kabul's Central Training Center or at one of seven regional training centers located in Kandahar, Herat, Gardez, Mazar-e-Sharif, Kunduz, Jalalabad, and Bamyan. Trainees attend an 8-week program of instruction in the areas of general police duties, weapons proficiency, first aid, human rights training, community policing, basic border police training, and Afghan law and culture. They also conduct specialized training courses in bomb disposal, fingerprinting, traffic management, unarmed combat, crime scene investigation, advanced firearms instruction, and civil order/riot control skills.

The National Police Academy, under the management and supervision of a European Union Police Mission, conducts a comprehensive 3-year training program for officers and a 9-month program for NCOs. Training at the National Police Academy consists of police operations, tactics, traffic policing, management, and criminology.

The ANP consists of the following organizations:

Afghanistan Uniformed Police (AUP). The AUP is the single largest police element. The AUP is assigned to police districts and provincial and regional commands throughout the country. The AUP does not include police assigned to Afghanistan Gendarmerie Force (AGF), criminal investigative division (CID), border police, medical, counternarcotics,
customs, and the MoI or training institutions. The AUP includes traffic police and a United Nations (UN) Protection Force. AUP not assigned as traffic police or UN Protection Force serve in districts and provinces throughout Afghanistan. Six regional commanders exercise operational control of AUP forces. Each region is semiautonomous and reports ultimately to the Deputy Minister of Security. Regional commanders are responsible for managing resources and personnel within their regions. Kabul district command falls under Central Command; however, the Kabul district commander is authorized direct coordination with the MoI headquarters. (Current authorized strength is 62,229.)

Afghanistan Border Police (ABP). The ABP provides the MoI with a broad law enforcement capability at international borders and entry points. It polices the "green" international border and the border security zone, which extends 50 kilometers into the territory of Afghanistan, to deter and detect illegal entry and other criminal activity. In addition, the ABP controls pedestrian and vehicular traffic at border crossing points, including international airports, and is responsible for airport security. ABP receive 8 weeks of initial training through the Border Police Training Course at one of the regional training centers. (Current authorized strength is 17,376.)

AGE The AGF, alternatively known as the Afghanistan National Civil Order Police, is a specialized police force, split into rural and urban units, trained and equipped for the counterinsurgency fight and developed to respond to civil disturbances in large urban areas and patrolling in high-threat areas. Rural units provide a police presence in high-threat remote areas in order to maintain law and order and establish an acceptable level of security. The AGF maintains security and protects the people. While the Focused District Development (FDD) program is conducted throughout Afghanistan, AGF has the additional mission of providing law and order in designated districts while the local district police attend 8 weeks of AUP training at the regional training center. This mission includes conducting two relief-in-place operations when the AUP depart and return from training. AGF personnel require 16 weeks of initial training at a regional training center, followed by 60 days of field training, ideally with a partnered coalition/ISAF unit assisting course instructors and mentors. (Current authorized strength is 5,365.)

There are three other police organizations that are smaller and have more specialized missions:

Counter narcotics police. The counternarcotics police is the lead law enforcement agency charged with reducing narcotics production and distribution in Afghanistan. It fulfills this task via a comprehensive approach to counternarcotics operations, incorporating public information, intelligence, interdiction, and eradication efforts. Counternarcotics training is conducted in a 5-week course taught at the individual level.

CID Police. The CID investigates a wide range of criminal offenses with most personnel assigned to investigative positions at the provincial level and below. Attendance at the CID course is mandatory for personnel serving with the CID. Their training consists of a 6-week course conducted at the individual level.

Counterterrorism (CT) Police. The CT Police are responsible for conducting CT and counterinsurgency operations. Their training consists of the Counternarcotics Course with an additional week of CT-focused training conducted at the individual level.

In late 2007 the MoI began the FDD retraining program in an effort to further reform in the AUP. The FDD program, which is NTM-A/CSTC-As main police effort, allows the MoI to take a more focused approach toward assessing, training, mentoring, and validating the uniformed district police. (A district is the basic geographic area of ANP activity. There are about 10 districts in each of Afghanistan's 34 provinces.) In this program, a district's force is taken out and retrained, its duties temporarily performed by more highly trained police, and then reinserted after the training is complete. As of August 2009, more than 4,000 ANP officers had undergone this process, which is expected to take 5 years to complete for the remainder of the country. A similar process is being applied to Afghanistan's border forces.

There are many challenges and problems inherent in the development of any new organization. As a society ravaged by over three decades of conflict and civil war, Afghanistan is no exception. The following are the most significant challenges associated with manning, training, and sustaining the ANSF.

Retention/Recruitment goals (manning the force). The principal challenges to manning the force are not only getting people to join but also persuading them to reenlist. Over time the principal impediment to attracting people into the ANP has been the disparity in pay. Until late 2009, the average entry level ANP salary was half that of his ANA counterpart. This disparity has led the ANP to lag behind the ANA. However, beginning in late 2009, ANP salaries were increased to near parity with the ANA. As a result, December 2009 saw a surge in interest in joining the ANP. It remains to be seen if this surge is a short-term spike caused by seasonal factors unrelated to the wage increase or the beginning of a longterm surge in ANP recruiting efforts.
When analyzing ANSF personnel numbers one must consider the ANA and ANP holistically. One reason the ANA has been more successful, and ANP development has lagged behind the ANA, is that the ANA has received priority attention in terms of resources and focus. A second reason is that the ANP has been conducting counterinsurgency missions for which they are not equipped, and they have suffered as a result. One rationale for the ANA and ANP having insufficient officers and NCOs is that the ANA and ANP are competing for the most qualified citizens required to serve in leadership positions. It is crucial that the ANSF leaders coordinate and not undermine their recruitment, retention, training, and employment efforts so that, rather than competing for resources and missions, they complement and support one another.

Leadership (train the force). As with any military force, leadership and professionalism development at all levels is crucial and must be a priority, with the training methods utilized adjusted to satisfy the desired goal. One program being developed for senior leaders is a leadership forum whereby foreign senior leaders and academics provide presentations and interactive discussions focused on the philosophy and methodology of leadership from a broad academic perspective. The development of this distinctive program not only provides exposure to different leadership styles but also provides the opportunity for practical application.

Corruption (credibility of the force). Corruption is a corrosive and destabilizing force rampant within Afghan society that undermines both the effectiveness and the legitimacy of all Afghan institutions. Some analysts define corruption as falling along a spectrum ranging from grand to petty corruption with grand corruption defined as taking bribes with greed as the motivation as opposed to feeding a family. Ironically, it is the development of bureaucracy, including rule of law structures, that tends to foster corruption. The low wages of public servants, to include prosecutors, facilitate corruption, and the formal rule of law structures designed to keep corruption in check have embedded disincentives: they are costly, they take a great deal of time, and some judges are corrupt.

Regardless of why corruption exists, many people believe that the police are corrupt - more so than the army. It may be that ANP corruption is easier to detect because the police have more contact with people, have much more oversight, are transparent, and have had substantially less training than the army; however, ultimately it is irrelevant. In the end, police corruption plays into the Taliban's hands as they stand ready to offer quick, cost free, and impartial justice. Key efforts to rooting out corruption include making rules as clear as possible, providing leadership training, instituting a fair salary scale, disciplining offenders, and reinforcing honest leadership.

Conclusion

As the Marine Corps continues to develop the long-term capabilities associated with security cooperation, it has an excellent opportunity to enhance further the skills and experiences required to support its MCTAG and CMRS programs. The unique requirements associated with NTM-A/CSTCA's mission to generate the ANSF and develop institutional capacity are crucial to achieve stability and security in Afghanistan. The Marine Corps' support of NTM-As strategic/operational mentoring and training efforts in support of the ANSF offers a unique opportunity both to develop Marine Corps capacity and to suppress the Taliban. It is an opportunity that should be capitalized upon.

FOOTNOTE

Note


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GRAPHIC: Charts

IMAGE CHART, Figure 1. NTM-A command brief, 26 January 2010.
IMAGE PHOTOGRAPH, Our credibility with host-nation forces and citizens is critical to our success. (Photo by Cpl Andrew J. Carlson.)
IMAGE PHOTOGRAPH, Open communications benefit our efforts. (Photo by LCpl James Purschwitz.)

DOCUMENT-TYPE: Feature
Afghanistan

BYLINE: "Swami" Sanders, Douglas C.

by Maj Douglas C. "Swami" Sanders

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ABSTRACT

The war in Afghanistan, despite its complexity, must have a coherent political/strategic end that allows the military to operate with greater success. [...] counterinsurgency (COIN), nation building, and counter terrorism are not the ends but rather a dichotomy of various military operations - the ways.

FULL TEXT

The ends, the ways, the means

America's forgotten war - Afghanistan - has dramatically moved to the public forefront, fostered by a vicious cycle of violence not witnessed since the Soviet-Afghan War.' Each respective Service has contributed to the war effort, operating in a joint manner based on its individual strengths. The lessons learned since Goldwater-Nichols have promulgated throughout the joint operating forces, culminating in the integration of aviation assets, logistical support, and unity of command.2 Despite this progress, Afghanistan remains an almosi untenable situation and proves to be cumbersome for U.S. forces.

Afghanistan's state of affairs is attributed to one fundamental faux pas - unfocused effort. This article examines the focus of effort in Afghanistan and assesses whether enduring security can be achieved through the ends-ways-means (E-W-M) paradigm.

The E-W-M Paradigm

Clausewitz denotes that the balance of the ends, ways, and means is nested in strategy, which entails employing armed forces (means) in a series of engagements (ways) to achieve campaign victory (ends). Each facet of this continuum - the objectives (ends), the efforts (ways), and the resources (means) - are unequivocally interdependent. This interdependence means that with every action in a particular facet a reaction occurs in another; a change in the ends alters the ways and means. This symbiotic relationship is the basic premise for the EW-M paradigm.
In symmetric nation-state warfare, belligerents use conventional means and ways in an attempt to defeat one another to achieve a political/strategic objective (ends). Afghanistan's situation, that is, a complex, multibelligerent insurgency, is not so straightforward. The E-W-M paradigm provides a simple prism to examine this asymmetric war.

Ends

What is the strategic objective (ends) in Afghanistan? This question was asked to a group of 10 multi-Service field grade officers, along with a representative from a governmental agency, and the answers varied from security/stability operations to nation building. Moreover, all members of the group were combat experienced, having served multiple tours in Iraq or Afghanistan. Interestingly, each member knew the strategic end for Iraq - installation of a constitutional representative government; however, not one officer could state the strategic ends for Afghanistan. This case signifies the problem. If experienced officers do not know Afghanistan's end state, then how plausible is it for U.S. citizens to comprehend or support the war?

The war in Afghanistan, despite its complexity, must have a coherent political/strategic end that allows the military to operate with greater success. Moreover, counterinsurgency (COIN), nation building, and counter terrorism are not the ends but rather a dichotomy of various military operations - the ways.

Ways

Despite the United States' Herculean efforts in Afghanistan, without justified ends, the ways are in vain. U.S. efforts in Afghanistan are aligned along logical lines of operations (LLOs). Afghanistan's intricacy of circumstances requires U.S. forces to conduct full-spectrum operations in an interconnected operational environment. For example, U.S. COIN operations against the Taliban are traditional with a growing nontraditional emphasis on drug enforcement; meanwhile, the counterterrorism mission focus on al-Qaeda continues.

Furthermore, nation building, essential services, and other stability operations are directed toward the indigenous population in order to build rapport and further legitimize the host-nation government. To complicate matters, these diverse and often conflicting missions must occur simultaneously and can vary by area of operation. Afghanistan's reality simply stated is that multiple LLOs lack an overarching framework.

Yet a framework is provided in the COIN field manual (Marine Corps Wi ??f ting Publica don 3-33. 5 (MCWP 3-33.5), Counterinsurgency), which details three historic stages of COIN. The steps are annotated here using a medical analogy: (1) stop the bleeding, (2) inpatient care - recovery, and (3) outpatient care - movement to self-sufficiency. This is the fundamental overarching framework for COIN. Although the transition between stages is indistinct, there is a distinct sequential approach to COIN. Stage one is "to protect the population, break the insurgents' initiative and momentum, and set the conditions for further engagements [stages two and three]." Herein lies the problem: an overarching strategic framework comprised of LLOs was not implemented.

Once kinetic operations ceased and COIN ensued, the United States never attempted to stop the bleeding in Afghanistan. U.S. forces did not adhere to the COIN principles, or historic stages, and became entwined in a complex insurgency without proper guidance or planning because of the military and diplomatic focus on Iraq. This predicament was evidenced by the rush to install a government without appropriate attention to nation-building preconditions or the cultural aspects of tribalism. The immediate jump to the later stages of COIN only convoluted the situation and made it difficult for the ways to achieve the ends.

Means

The resources (means) needed to conduct operations in Afghanistan are in short supply. The "Iraq first" strategy consumed vast amounts of resources (troops, rime, and U.S. public support). After the recent violence uptick it became apparent that more troops are required to secure the population and to continue offensive operations against the Taliban and al-Qaeda. In retrospect, one of the major shortfalls of the Soviet's Afghan strategy was the lack of troops in the field. This dilemma also has plagued the United States.

Time is another resource that has dwindled. Between 2003 and 2008, Iraq and other global commitments garnered the United States' attention. The Afghans, who have been at war since 1 979, are waiting to see what the United States decides will be the end state - to leave or to stay. This lack of focus in U.S. strategy is a credibility issue. MCWP 3-33. 5 states, "Any perceived inconsistency destroys credibility and undermines COIN efforts."

Last, time is linked with public support. The American taxpayers have grown impatient with the situation in Afghanistan. Without a clear strategic end state, Americans are unclear about the purpose of remaining in Afghanistan. Troops can be...
recruited, but more time and support cannot easily be replenished. As the death toll and monetar)' requirements increase, it is difficult for policymakers to justify the ends.

Conclusion

Is the effort in Afghanistan unfocused? The answer is yes. Is Afghanistan a lost cause? This answer belongs to the American public and, to an extent, the policymakers. The U.S. military is more than capable of winning an insurgency. However, trying to conduct combat operations (ways) without a strategic end state (ends) and with a lack of resources (means) is a recipe for failure. History has proven this maxim time and again. For enduring security in Afghanistan to occur, the United States must accurately balance and refocus the ends, ways, and means.

SIDEBAR

Despite the United States' Herculean efforts in Afghanistan, without justified ends, the ways are in vain.

SIDEBAR

The resources (means) needed to conduct operations in Afghanistan are in short supply.

SIDEBAR

Author’s Note: 777eumor wrote this article in October 2009 as a response to these questions: Are U.S. Armed Forces operating in a joint manner in Afghanistan? Are U.S. efforts in Afghanistan coordinated?

SIDEBAR

Agree or disagree? Join the discussion at www.mcamarines.org/gazette/sanders.

FOOTNOTE

Notes


4. Held Manual 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, Counterinsurgency', Headquarters Marine Corps, Washington, DC, 15 December 2006, p. 154. LLO is a logical line that connects actions to nodes and/or decisive points related in time and purpose with objectives.

5. Afghanistan is a semifailed state administered by a weak and semilegitimatc national government. The country is riddled with a growing insurgency, poverty, terrorism, and illegal drug cultivation. Moreover, each circumstance is linked and fuels the others.

6. MCWP 3-33. 5, p. 154.

7. Ibid., p. 152.

8. Ibid., p. 153.


10. Ibid. At the height of the Soviet-Afghan War during 1983-85, there were 108,000 Soviet troops deployed in Afghanistan. As of 1 October 2009, there were less than 70,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan.

11. MCWP 3-33.5, p. 45.
Victory in Afghanistan

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SECTION: IDEAS & ISSUES (OIF/OEF); Pg. 22 Vol. 94 No. 7 ISSN: 0025-3170

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ABSTRACT
JSAS teaches all of the required core-level skills prescribed by the Kabul Police Academy, but the Marines go the extra mile to teach “critical combat skills” - primarily shooting and combat patrolling - that will ensure victory for the Afghan police in southern Afghanistan. Since the police will face a wide array of enemy in the south, the insurgents must not only see the “cop on the beat,” but must also recognize that it is the insurgent who is clearly outmatched in combat skills.

FULL TEXT
The Marine Corps and Afghan Uniformed Police
Ultimate success in counterinsurgency (COIN) is gained by protecting the populace, not the COIN forced It is likewise the police officer, operating in his "battlespace" or in his precinct, who serves as the living embodiment of long-term security in a civilized society. With that framework in mind, the most important legacy that the United States Marines can leave behind in the COIN fight in Afghanistan is credible, local Afghan police forces. Victory in Afghanistan will ultimately revolve around the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan's (GIRoA) ability to assume the responsibility for security within its own borders, and to provide good spervance and measurable improvements in the delivery of services. While the Marine Corps is a supporting actor in the quest to establish strong local governance in Afghanistan, it can - and will - take the lead in training and mentoring local Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP). U.S. Marines only know one acceptable outcome: once combat is joined - victory! If the Afghan police cannot fight, though, then the Marines cannot win decisively in this COIN. A well-trained local AUP is arguably the key to fully establishing local government on the provincial and district levels and thereby allowing for the transfer of lead security responsibility (TLSR) to GIRoA and its Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF).

When the 2d MEB arrived in southern Afghanistan in April 2009, there were less than 300 police officers within their Area of Operations (AO) Sea Dragon. Moreover, the vast majority of these police were untrained and largely ineffective. As of the first of this year, however, there are over 400 trained AUP operating within the 7 districts controlled by the Marines within Helmand, Nimroz, and Farah Provinces, and there are plans to train hundreds more at the Joint Security Academy Shorabak (JSAS), a Marine Corps-led academy at Camp Shorabak, the Afghan National Army's (AN As) facility adjacent to the MEBs headquarters at Camp Leatherneck, Helmand Province. Until October 2009 the Marine Corps had relied on Afghan police recruits generated from two nationally run police academies in the capital city of Kabul and Spin Boldak in Kandahar Province. Nevertheless, the Commanding General (CG), 2d MEB, BGen Larry Nicholson, quickly recognized the need to accelerate this process and subsequently ordered the establishment of the Marine's own police training academy. The result is an 8-week course at JSAS that is taught by eight Marine instructors, three AUP instructors, and five contracted civilian police trainers/advisors. Furthermore, the academy's curriculum has been refined to reflect the challenging security environment facing the graduating police. JSAS teaches all of the required core-level skills prescribed by the Kabul Police Academy, but the Marines go the extra mile to teach "critical combat skills" - primarily shooting and combat patrolling - that will ensure victory for the Afghan police in southern Afghanistan. Since the police will face a wide array of enemy in the south, the insurgents must not only see the "cop on the beat," but must also recognize that it is the insurgent who is clearly outmatched in combat skills. The first 52 recruits of this "new" police proudly graduated at a formal ceremony held on 10 December 2009 at Camp Leatherneck, the headquarters for the 2d MEB. As each new policeman accepted his graduating certificate from Governor Mangal of Helmand Province and Governor Azad of Nimroz Province, he loudly declared to the assembled crowd of Afghan, U.S., and NATO dignitaries, "I pledge to work in the service of Afghanistan!"

More important than their appearance in front of these Afghan officials, though, the Afghan population needs to see these police out in their villages - day in and day out. Persistent presence is critical watchword. If the populace cannot see the "cop" in the bazaars and at vehicle checkpoints, then security does not exist in their minds. This is why this first step in Marine Corps training, mentoring, and partnering with the local police forces of southern Afghanistan is so very important. With President Barack Obama's declaration at West Point on 1 December 2009 that we will begin the transfer of our forces out of Afghanistan in July of 2011, the Marine Corps needs to already start thinking about how to conduct transition of lead security responsibility with GIRoA and the ANSF. So, what should transition of lead security responsibility look like? We should start with two basic assumptions.

The long-term presence of U.S. Marines in Afghanistan's provinces and districts is not a normal stare of affairs. This is true for not only all foreign troops (like our partners in AO Sea Dragon - the British, the Danes, the Italians, the Bahrainis, etc.), but it is likewise true for the ANA. The ANAs ultimate role for GIRoA is to defend the nation from external threats. The use of independent - many of whom are either of non-Pashtun tribal ethnicity or Pashtuns from eastern Afghanistan - should only be a temporary stopgap, similar to the employment of U.S. Marines "to clear" but not necessarily "to hold" or "to build," especially over the long haul.

"Normalcy" is local Afghan Government officials providing for the basic needs of their citizens and a credible, experienced local AUP guard? teening internal security and stability. Everywhere Marines have been and conducted tactical conflict assessment planning and framework surveys, they have heard the same thing from the local citizens. Their primary concern in all districts is "security, security, security." This is reminiscent of the immediate period in Fallujah, Iraq, following Operation AL FAJR in November 2004. The only security footprint were Marines and a largely Shi'a Public Order Brigade. Locals did not truly feel secure until a local (Sunni Arab) Fallujah City Police Force under BG Salah was established in the summer of the following year.
So, how does the Marine Corps get from here to there? First, it is important for Marines to continue to do much of what they are already doing in southern Afghanistan. Infantry and light armored reconnaissance battalions are out daily (and nightly) conducting multiple ground security patrols. They are engaging in a positive manner with the local citizens within all of the Afghan districts under their watch. Attached civil affairs teams are out initiating reconstruction and development projects using Commanders Emergency Response Program funds, implementing cash for work projects, and working with the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) to plan for even larger projects. Operating right alongside them are the civilian advisors who constitute the district stabilization teams (DSTs), coordinating with their military partners, engaging daily with Afghan district subgovernors, developing and partnering with local Afghan community councils, working with district ministry representatives, etc. Nevertheless, there is at present a dearth of Afghan civil servants - educated and experienced bureaucrats and technocrats. No matter how determined the United Kingdom's District Stabilization Advisors, U.S. Department of State officials, or USAID officials on these DSTs are, some factors are simply beyond their control when it comes to attracting more qualified Afghan civilians to fill critical government jobs in the districts. In particular, there is a need for more qualified civilian servants to fill out the tashkilis of the district subgovernors or the ministry representative's offices. Some of the reasons for this current state of affairs have to do with the poor state of education in Afghanistan. Over 75 percent of the Afghan population is illiterate and there just are not enough highly educated individuals who are willing to work as civilian servants. Low pay, danger, or poor living conditions all lead to a negative situation in most cases. The provincial reconstruction teams are all striving with Regional Platform-South and/or with the U.S. Embassy, and in turn with the organs of GIRoA, such as the Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG), to improve this situation. Furthermore, according to the Five-Year Strategic Workplan of the IDLG, much of the reform in Afghan civil service is years away - 2011 and beyond. Here is one example from the workplan:

By the end of 1389 'hejira date (20 March 2011), the Government will build institutional and administrative capabilities in provincial, district and, municipal administrations to manage basic service delivery through reforming organizations structures, streamlining management processes, developing essential skills and knowledge of civil servants and, improving; management of public service delivery.

With this in mind, the Marines need to set their sights at how to best support the governance effort, and the ideal way to do that is to expand the security zone in districts and to set the stage for transition of lead security responsibility. What Marines can therefore most affect is the development of AUP - from recruiting them (with the help of the DSTs and local Afghan civil, tribal, and religious leaders) and sending them to formal schooling at JSAS to welcoming them back to their districts along with local Afghan officials and elders, to partnering with and thoroughly training them to become the best police in the country. If the Marines have learned anything from their experience in Al Anbar Province in Iraq, it is the necessity of achieving security first. One cannot win where the native population is intimidated, threatened, and abused by insurgents. Moreover, the Marines' superb combat forces constitute the security blanket that provides the necessary time - even as little as 1 year or 18 months - to get the police forces trained and in place. It might seem counterintuitive at first, but the U.S. Marines in Afghanistan need to return to their "Smedley Butler roots" and his training of the Haitian Gendarmerie in the earlier part of the last century. We should realize that the training of indigenous police forces is part of Marine Corps history, and it should be done again. Indigenous police are indeed the cornerstone and bedrock of the rule of law in a society; they are the first rung on the national security ladder. Conversely, the Taliban largely offers death, destruction of schools, tyranny, ignorance, and poverty. One of the reasons that local Afghans have told us that they have sometimes sided with the Taliban "shadow governments," however, is that in the absence of any GIRoA capacity, the Taliban at least represent some minimal form of justice, as barbarous as it may be. Yet even the Afghans admit that the Taliban largely enforce their "justice" through medieval, cultish fear, and Afghans - like all men - if given the choice of living in fear or free, will all choose to live in freedom.

The Marines of 2d MEB and their associated civilian counterparts have set the stage for success in southern Afghanistan through their valiant efforts during much of 2009. The 2010 0-11 time frame, though, is the period in which they should continue the emphasis on JSAS and should focus more and more on generating quality AUP and partnering with them to the greatest extent possible. Marines will also set high standards for these police. No underage men are allowed, there is no tolerance for illegal drugs, and all of the police in the Marines AO will be systematically sent for formal schooling at JSAS. They must also strengthen the ethics training for the Afghan policemen. One of the many complaints from local Afghans against GIRoA is the graft, greed, and corruption of the Afghan security forces in the past, particularly the police. The Marines need to improve how the Afghan police view themselves within their society and with respect to their relations with the local population they serve. Along these lines, the Marines must also make aggressive attempts toward improving the Afghan policemen's general level of education, even basic civics, lessons on good governance, and rule of law. Nevertheless, the Marines must also be realistic and accept the fact that the finished product will not necessarily
reflect a Western construct. The police of 2050, just like the state of GIRoA in 2050, will largely rely on Afghans embracing institutions that fit with their cultural norms. What we, the Marines, need to focus on is training to win... now! Shooting and combat patrolling skills, basic ethics education and training, and confidence through experience on the ground, partnered with the world's finest warriors, will all pave the path to success. If the Marines put in a maximum effort from now through the next 18 months, they will achieve victory - the successful transfer of responsibility to local security in many of the districts currently under the MEB's control, a plan for future transition of lead security responsibility in the remaining districts, and a long-term partnership between the Government of the United States of America and the GIRoA to continue to develop more and more Afghan civilian government capacity.

**SIDEBAR**

... it is important for Marines to continue to do much of what they are already doing in southern Afghanistan.

**SIDEBAR**

... the Taliban at least represent some minimal form of justice, as barbarous as it may be.

**FOOTNOTE**

Notes


3. ANSF is an "umbrella" term that includes all Afghan Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Defense forces.

4. Golestan and Bakvva Districts (Farah Province), Delaram District (Nimroz Province), and Now Zad, Nawa, Garmsir, and Rig Districts (Helmand Province).

5. Camp Shorabak is also the headquarters for the 3d Brigade, 205th Corps of the ANA, the ANA unit that is closely partnered with the 2d MEB.

6. President Obama's speech at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, 1 December 2009.

7. After security, one finds the basic needs of the Afghan people are clean water for human consumption and agricultural projects, education/schools, medical care, infrastructure, and a justice system.

8. An Arabic/Pashto word meaning "organization," but roughly the equivalent of our Marine Corps term for table of organization.


11. All Afghan police recruits must be 18 years of age to apply for the AUP
A Blueprint for Success

BYLINE: Oliver, Timothy.

by LtCol Timothy Oliver

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SECTION: IDEAS & ISSUES (INTELLIGENCE); Pg. 78 Vol. 94 No. 7 ISSN: 0025-3170

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ABSTRACT

The rationale for consolidating and coordinating research, collections, information processing, or the analytical functions of any complex corporate activity for the sake of efficiency and synergy is well understood. In The Way Ahead While the Marine Corps experience in Anbar provides a sound point of departure for the ongoing efforts in Helmand Province, Afghanistan, the Marine Corps must not rest on its laurels or assume that "we know how to do this." Beyond the aforementioned initiatives, language and cultural training centers are being put in place, cultural intelligence teams are providing those anthropology and social science skills sets fused with current intelligence to the enterprise, and a variety of initiatives are bringing law enforcement and forensic skills and capabilities to the force.

FULL TEXT

Marine Corps intelligence operations in Anbar

The Marine Corps is beginning its second year as a major force provider and regional command holder in Afghanistan. While there may be refinements to intelligence manning and equipping to adapt to this particular environment, the original architecture and capabilities have been established based upon the operational similarity to the Iraq problem space. The Marine Corps experience in western Iraq from 2004 to early 2010 provides a good framework for how we approach the current counterinsurgency (COIN) fight. The Marine Corps waged an arguably successful campaign in AJ Anbar Province (see Figure 1), during which intelligence played a significant role. The discussion that follows outlines the nature of the intelligence organization and processes in that campaign, and of our intelligence organization to operate effectively, and should be the basis for orientation to the intelligence effort in Helmand.

In Anbar much of the initial focus of the intelligence effort was directed at the insurgency and kinetic efforts. While development and engagement efforts were important and were tracked, the effectiveness of the insurgency’s murder and
intimidation campaign completely overwhelmed these other lines of operation. Establishing security was the prerequisite to building a civil society. This necessitated a "red" focus for the initial intelligence effort.

As the security environment improved, the intelligence focus shifted to support engagement and governance and improved the opportunities for collecting information from organic nonintelligence sources, such as engagement activities, civil affairs units, patrol reports, census operations, etc., but there was always a need to vet and integrate that information with traditional intelligence means, primarily signals intelligence (SigInt) and human intelligence (HumInt). In Iraq, accepting any information at face value was ill-advised. For a variety of reasons, locals often did not share the U.S. agenda, and deep-seated resentment of being occupied by infidels, murder, intimidation campaigns, greed, shame, etc. all played a part in determining the accuracy of open source information.

So what then did Marine Corps intelligence do in Iraq that was so effective? On the face of it nothing so very different from what others did there. In general terms what it was successful in doing was getting the intelligence support to whom and where it was needed, and sufficiently integrating the intelligence effort across the force to produce actionable intelligence and something close to a net assessment. Net assessment is defined by Department of Defense Directive 5111.11 as:

... the comparative analysis of military, technological, political, economic, and other factors governing the relative military capability of nations. Its purpose is to identify problems and opportunities that deserve the attention of senior defense officials.

The key here is intelligence support. Multinational Force-West (MNF-W) was not able to hand every echelon of the force a neat, orderly, all-encompassing assessment. What they did was provide them the tools to do their job, supporting them as best they could, and archiving their efforts. What was delivered were the geospatial products, the HumInt and SigInt support, the overhead coverage, and the construction of and access to a database that allowed the force to learn, remember, make associations, and do what was necessary in order to be successful. This was greatly facilitated by dealing with intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) functions as an "enterprise," working together holistically across the force rather than a series of unrelated actions and activities.

There were many discrete incidences of astounding tactical successes, combining precision technical means, excellent all-source analysis, and "detective" work to achieve high-profile successes. These events saved lives and forwarded the agenda, but COIN is about draining the swamp not swatting mosquitoes. The most important intelligence work is the never-ending grind of collecting, processing ever larger amounts of data, and building an accurate picture that, little by little, strips away the anonymity and freedom of movement from adversaries.

In broad terms the great degree of success achieved by the Marine Corps in MNF-W was most attributable to continuity of experienced personnel, the synthesized intelligence from the tactical fusion center (TFC), focus on the tactical fight, good information management, and effective leadership.

Continuity

The duration and intensity of the Marine Corps intelligence community experience in MNF-W required the same two intelligence and radio battalions (who provided nearly all Service intelligence capabilities beyond allsource analysts at tactical units) to alternate rotations in Iraq beginning in 2003. Seven years of 7 months in and 5 months out to the same place and the same problem set developed an area expertise among the MNF-W all-source analysts, HumInt and SigInt collectors, collection managers, and the organizations themselves. An analyst or collector with this sort of experience can and did provide useful analysis, perspective, and support to decisionmakers at all levels. Practice may not have made perfect, but it made pretty good.

There is little substitute for this kind of experience, both in an individual sense and in a corporate sense. An analyst working on a problem for a year may gain this level of understanding toward the end of his deployment but takes this knowledge with him upon rotation. Additionally, the synergy gained from maintaining unit integrity should not be undervalued; teamwork, corporate knowledge, and individual commitment matter.

Fusion centers and other organizations made up of an endless rotation of individual augments can never achieve this same effectiveness. All organizations are more than the sum of their parts. Building a net assessment is a team effort. All of the disciplines understand their piece of the elephant. Putting that elephant together requires sustained teamwork. The Marines in Anbar benefited from deploying their intelligence capabilities as a unit rather than a collection of capabilities to be subdivided and farmed out.
TFC

The concept of intelligence operations centers, fusion centers, joint intelligence centers, or stability operations information centers (civil-military operations centers) is not new or unique to the Marine Corps or the intelligence community. The rationale for consolidating and coordinating research, collections, information processing, or the analytical functions of any complex corporate activity for the sake of efficiency and synergy is well understood.

The first Marine Corps intelligence operations center in Iraq in 2003 had “air” and “ground” order of battle sections and was geared toward supporting the march on Baghdad. When the Marine Corps took over much of the south after the regime fell, it started initial efforts to track individuals, political affiliations, infrastructure, and those vaguely defined “atmospherics.” This was, at best, an ad hoc effort.

As the nature of the fight changed, the focus of the TFC evolved, adding teams to work economic and political intelligence, focus on particular insurgent groups, train and mentor Iraqi police intelligence units, conduct forensic work, and coordinate detainee exploitation and prosecution. In the spring of 2006 for example, very little effort was placed on tracking government and political intelligence. By 2008, governance was a primary focus.

In execution the TFC was not so much a building as an operating principle, ensuring the optimal employment of enablers, fostering integration, producing assessments and, most importantly, maintaining the databases and institutional memory. Often associated solely with the intelligence summary, the real TFC success in Anbar was its ability to unite and integrate the intelligence effort across the force.

The TFC further served to integrate the Anbar intelligence effort through virtual collaborative intelligence forums. A TFC analyst was able to maintain chat links with analysts at the regimental combat teams (RCTs), battalions, many company-level intelligence cells (CLICs), and adjacent units, as well as other agencies. This ongoing, unconstrained collaboration was exceedingly useful. As ideas were exchanged and techniques and advice passed, situational awareness greatly increased. Often this interaction is transparent to leadership, but it is increasingly effective in maintaining intelligence connectivity with a generation more technology savvy than the one currently in charge.

The MNF-WTFC analysts seldom told an infantry battalion or RCT what was happening in their area of operations (AO), but they facilitated this process by collaborating, assisting, integrating, and maintaining the database.

Tactical Focus

As previously noted, in a war among the people, intelligence needs to be collected (and usually acted upon) among the people. Since the infantry battalions and other tactical and advisor elements are living among the people, they are the logical focus of the intelligence effort. MNF-W was successful in enabling these tactical elements to read their environment and maneuver in the complex human terrain through a combination of deliberate organizational decisions and the ability to capitalize on Service-unique capabilities.

After establishing a force-level TFC to ensure adequate integration and support to the tactical efforts, the MEF G-2 (intelligence) pushed the necessary enablers down to the lowest tactical level. The small organic intelligence sections in each infantry battalion (initially one officer and three enlisted) were reinforced with a HumInt exploitation team (HET), a ground sensor employment team, additional TFC analysts, and generally a SigInt element. These enablers more than doubled the size of those sections and exponentially increased their capabilities. These organic Marine Corps enablers, most of which participated in the battalion’s workup, gave them the tools they needed to better understand their battlespace and ensured that they remained integrated with the larger MNF-W intelligence effort.

Putting analyzes up front. While virtual connectivity is good, there is no substitute for firsthand experience. MNF-W TFC analysts began a rotational program in 2005 on an ad hoc basis and formalized it in 2006. The tactical fight was not an abstraction for those analysts. They walked the ground and knew personally the Marines on the other end of the radio. In 2007 more than 38 percent of intelligence battalion personnel were assigned to the battalion, and an additional 25 percent were directly supporting those same battalion operations from the TFC. The remainder was spread out between the RCTs and other elements operating in Anbar. These numbers included 16 TFC analysts attached to infantry battalion S-2 sections on any given day.

CLICs. The CLIC concept, which is now being codified in doctrine, is an outgrowth of the early experiences in Anbar. As Marines dispersed ever more widely over the western Euphrates River Valley in order to get out among the people, distributed operations became the norm. Companies, and sometimes platoons, became widely separated in time and space and responsible for waging their own campaigns among the people at the street level.
As this became common practice and was reinforced with additional personnel, equipment, training, and other support, the benefits were undeniable: more astute and informed collections deeper into the human terrain, more firsthand understanding and, most importantly, the ability to provide intelligence at the point where it was most needed. This practice benefited not just the Marines supported directly by the CLIC, but the entire MAGTF through the two-way flow of information. While these organizational decisions to push the enablers down were a key to success, they would have been of limited utility if the Marine Corps had not already built a solid tactical intelligence capability across the force.

Since the early 1990s the Marine Corps has been creating intelligence officers directly out of The Basic School and having them cut their teeth as reconnaissance platoon commanders, HumInt and SigInt officers, or aviation intelligence officers before becoming MAGTF intelligence officers. Further, efforts to rotate them through both leadership and staff jobs as they progress have greatly improved the operational focus of the community. It is an imperfect system, but over the last 15 years it has created a cadre of high-quality company, field grade, and general officers who are not just competent analysts but also experienced leaders and operators.

HETs. The first and probably most important intelligence capability deployed in Anbar was the HET One of these teams usually supported each infantry battalion with trained collectors to ensure that there was a HumInt collector present with each rifle company in the field and a team leader available to advise and assist the battalion command?is. These teams established habitual relationships with their supported battalions early in the workup cycle and were fully integrated into their predeployment training. The organic HumInt effort provided the lion's share of actionable intelligence in Anbar and was the primary factor in understanding the AO. The HumInt effort, like the rest of the intelligence effort, also derived a significant benefit from the continuity factor. Rotating to the same AO for 2 and 3 years allowed them to maintain a familiarity with the people and the environment.

Organic tactical SigInt. The capability to employ organic SigInt teams, trained and equipped, to support MAGTF operations was a tremendous force multiplier. Like the HETs, these capabilities were fully integrated into the larger effort and pushed down to the absolute lowest tactical level. This focus, combined with the continuity gained by the unique deployment cycle and habitual integration with the other disciplines in the TFC, provided the Marines in Anbar with a responsive capability that could not be replicated by theater or general support assets that lacked familiarity with the supported unit's mission, requirements, and AO.

Information Management

Few things in a COIN environment are as important as keeping good intelligence information records and centrally managing and integrating these record keeping efforts across the force. For years in Anbar, every unit on the battlefield maintained its intelligence information in a different format, if it kept records at all. In most cases this practice rendered that unit's hard-won information unusable to adjacent units, higher headquarters, or the unit that relieved them.

In many cases the most useful function a TFC analyst could perform for a tactical unit was not to tell them what was happening or going to happen, but to tell them what had happened 2 years before their rotation. In the COIN environment, the past matters. Knowing that the new favorite local notable had previously been detained, had a brother in Bucea, absconded with a government payroll, or was the cousin or mortal enemy of some other local notable was useful to know. Making this happen was a function of information management.

Being able to process and correlate all of the information produced on the battlefield is not just the key to "net assessment" but to a thousand other discrete actions needed to drain the swamp. The ability to connect biometric databases to SigInt reporting to census data to everything else and further provide that ability to a Marine or soldier manning a checkpoint or that civil affairs unit digging a well is critical. This data archiving and retrieval, or information management function, enables analysis and assessment at all levels but is a distinct function from analysis. No matter how experienced or proficient the analyst, effective analysis is constrained by the quality of information management.

The Marine Corps fielded a software and server program in Anbar that provided a common environment to do this. Establishing common formats, data repositories, common naming conventions, etc., became a mission essential task for intelligence. The effort to build relevant information management systems was supported by Marine Corps Systems Command and Marine Corps Combat Development Command, but much of the databases, tools, and software programs were built onsite in the TFC. In one example, lacking any reliable means for tracking the records of the many thousands of detainees or correlating records and intelligence reports relating to them (other than extremely labor intensive and cumbersome key word searches), systems Marines in the TFC built an interactive database that correlated and tracked thousands of detainees and their associated reporting, hearing, and release dates. By mid-2007 the joint prosecution and ex-
ploitation center within the TFC was tracking 3,600 detainees while adding 50 new entries a day. This system eventually became a theater standard.

More than just a labor-saving device, this system led to vastly improved exploitation of detainees for intelligence value and directly led to an exponential increase in the number of detainees who were transferred into long-term detention. This greatly improved the 1 4-day revolving door that was the detention system in Anbar. Without question, more insurgents were kept off the streets through the integrated mining of the detainee tracker database, biometrics, and census data than by kinetic actions alone.

Much progress has been made toward better information management, but much more needs to be done. Theater-specific data formats, contractor controlled proprietary information management systems and, in some cases, unwillingness to adhere to reporting standards continue to plague this process. It did so in Anbar and is apparently doing so in Afghanistan. This is both a policy and education problem, as well as a technical one.

Finally, Leadership

Any success or failure of intelligence stems from the same source as other types of military failures, from the leadership. Intelligence must be an "all hands" effort, and commanders, consumers, and producers all must drive this process and insist on its success. Complaining is not enough; leaders must make it their business to understand the whole process and make it work. There is no substitute for leaders understanding, monitoring, and directing the intelligence process.

Experience has begun to teach the force and its leadership what intelligence can and can't do for them, how to collect and use intelligence, and how to employ its enablers. A large number of commanders in 2003 were exceedingly resistant to the idea of "wasting lift" on any intelligence enabler; that has changed. The leadership in the Marine Corps saw the need and gave improving and supporting the process the attention it needed to succeed.

The Way Ahead

While the Marine Corps experience in Anbar provides a sound point of departure for the ongoing efforts in Helmand Province, Afghanistan, the Marine Corps must not rest on its laurels or assume that "we know how to do this." The Marine Corps must continue to be both a learning and an adapting organization. What the Service Supporting Establishment must do is work the doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel and facilities processes to institutionalize those lessons that have been learned and provide the necessary enablers to the Marines forward. To this end, Marine Corps intelligence is focusing on several initiatives to better support efforts in the current fight and ensure it is better prepared for the next one. As outlined in the intelligence annex of the Marine Corps Service Campaign Plan, the focus going forward will be building a Marine Corps ISR Enterprise (MCISR-E). MCISR-E is an operating concept that will achieve the:

. . . synergistic and holistic integration of all ISR elements, to include the Supporting Establishment, into a single capability or system: Centrally organized, integrated, and networked across all echelons.

This operating concept will institutionalize the CLICs and those operating principals, open architecture, nonhierarchical intelligence architecture, synergistic integration of intelligence across disciplines and echelons, etc., that have proven successful.

Analysis training. In addition to optimizing the operating concept, the Service Campaign Plan intelligence annex lays out a plan for a new emphasis on developing better analysts. This will begin with more rigorous entrylevel screening for aptitude and provide the long-term career development to ensure that written and analytical skills are world class and equal to highest government/academic standards.

Developing nontraditional skills. The Service is, through a variety of initiatives, enhancing the Marine Corps intelligence community's and the MAGTF's capabilities to maneuver in the "complex human terrain." Beyond the aforementioned initiatives, language and cultural training centers are being put in place, cultural intelligence teams are providing those anthropology and social science skills sets fused with current intelligence to the enterprise, and a variety of initiatives are bringing law enforcement and forensic skills and capabilities to the force. Though blurring the line with more traditional military intelligence functions, the current operating environments requires these capabilities, and they are being integrated into and enhancing the larger intelligence enterprise.

Conclusion
The current environment requires an intelligence Marine who is part police officer, social worker, amateur anthropologist, and linguist. It also demands the production of actionable intelligence on an ever larger and more complex problem set. It's a challenge for the MAGTF to be sure, but the Marine Corps believes that it has a proven template for doing this and is pursuing the initiatives necessary to improve upon past success and field an intelligence enterprise equal to the challenges in Helmand and beyond.

Editor's Note: A complete copy of this article with footnotes may be found on the MCG website at www.mcj-marines.org/gazette.

SIDEBAR
The key here is intelligence support.

SIDEBAR
TFC analyst supporting forward deployed HET, Ramadi, 2006. (Photo courtesy of author.)

SIDEBAR
In the COIN environment, the past matters.

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GRAPHIC: Maps
IMAGE MAP, Figure 1. Intelligence played a significant role in Al Anbar operations. (Courtesy of author.)
IMAGE PHOTOGRAPH, Marine intelligence battalion returns for fifth consecutive deployment in 2007. (Photo courtesy of author.)
IMAGE PHOTOGRAPH, Cultural interaction requires experience and maturity. HET Marines in Anbar, 2007. (Photo courtesy of author.)
IMAGE ILLUSTRATION, CLIC logo and the 10-day CLIC training curriculum. (Courtesy of author.)
IMAGE PHOTOGRAPH, Leadership matters: ground sensor operators being briefed before an operation. Fallujah, 2007. IMAGE PHOTOGRAPH, A long road ahead: on the road in Anbar, 2006. (Photo courtesy of author.)

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ABSTRACT

The complicated nature of current military operations, the unquestioned importance of the fickle Afghan civilian population, and the primacy of cultural and religious sensitivity logically leads to the conclusion that a Marine armed with training that emphasizes history, familiar with the tools of critical thinking, and exposed to the hostnation's culture and language will be more successful than one who is not in possession of these skills. In order to win the support of the people, the government (and COIN forces) must fulfill two basic requirements: * Convince the people that the government is capable of meeting and defeating the guerrillas and protecting the civilian population from attack and reprisal. * Convince the discontented that their legitimate desires can better be achieved under the established government.* Military planners and intelligence officers need to engage academe to explore the nuance of building an effective "soft power" narrative to neutralize a culturally savvy enemy who will use their cultural knowledge and powers of influence against the COIN force at every turn.

FULL TEXT

The key to COIN success?

A frustrated young Marine corporal screams at his interpreter and pleads with civilians in a small Afghan town. He is frustrated, the interpreter is frustrated, the local population is frustrated, and I sit with my head in my hands watching the 13 October 2009 Public Broadcasting Service (PBS) Fron dine special, "Obama's War." It seems so clear that everyone in this conversation wants the same thing - stabilir)- and security. All three parties are trying to overcome the barriers of language, culture, and history. Innately those who find themselves embroiled in the confusing, contradictory, and dynamic undertaking called "modern warfare" realize the fight cannot be won by force alone. Whether the current National Security Council opts for a counterterrorism (CT), counterinsurgency (COIN), or a cocktail strategy in Afghanistan, the outcome will be reliant on the individual Marine and that Marine's ability to understand and communicate with the local population. How can young Marines be better prepared for combat on the modern battlefield?

The complicated nature of current military operations, the unquestioned importance of the fickle Afghan civilian population, and the primacy of cultural and religious sensitivity logically leads to the conclusion that a Marine armed with training that emphasizes history, familiar with the tools of critical thinking, and exposed to the hostnation's culture and language will be more successful than one who is not in possession of these skills. Unfortunately, current academic and military cultures only collide on single case issues or accidentally. The only military members offered the opportunity for advanced cultural or language training remain our overstretched and sparse special operations forces, foreign area officers, or senior officers. It seems selfevident that a military embroiled in a COIN/CT fight would want to enlist the help of experts who know the history, culture, language of the people, and region. These experts can help Marines learn techniques and methods to effectively influence the local population. This article will attempt to demonstrate how training in "soft" subjects, such as history, culture, and language, at the most junior level of the Marine Corps can form the foundation of an effective COIN strategy.

A Tale of Two Battlefields

Academic professionals embrace ideas and fix their gaze and attention on philosophies and histories often with little consideration for their pragmatic use or practical application on a battlefield. Although these ideas and histories are contrived in the most peaceful of environs, academics wage a battle of ideas on a daily basis. This academic warfare is harsh and ruthless and the competition yields clear winners and losers. Unfortunately these winning ideas usually either collect dust on shelves throughout our university system or become distant echoes in coffee houses and libraries. Winning ideas are rarely plucked and put to use on the battlefield or during military planning processes or to create an effective narrative or historically and culturally contextualized CX)IN strategy.
An insurgent war is fought not merely with weapons but also in the minds of men who live in the villages and hills, and by the spirit and policy of those who run the local government. In order to win the support of the people, the government (and COIN forces) must fulfill two basic requirements:

* Convince the people that the government is capable of meeting and defeating the guerrillas and protecting the civilian population from attack and reprisal.

* Convince the discontented that their legitimate desires can better be achieved under the established government.

Military planners and intelligence officers need to engage academe to explore the nuance of building an effective "soft power" narrative to neutralize a culturally savvy enemy who will use their cultural knowledge and powers of influence against the COIN force at every turn. If the local population is the "high ground," then the advantageous territory is lost by allowing the insurgent/terrorist ownership of history, culture, and language. When the enemy owns the narrative, they are able to alienate the local population from COIN forces and increase recruitment for the insurgent or terrorist organizations. COIN forces need to effectively engage the local population while providing security and stability.

Academics who develop winning ideas are rarely afforded the opportunity to teach or train our military leaders and never interact with young officers and enlisted warriors on the "pointy end" of the spear. The military must leverage academic professionals and create a training system whereby the winners on the battlefield of ideas can be taught to frontline warriors for use on the battlefields of the global war on terror. In order to train effective COIN warriors who are capable of carrying a message to the local population, an investment must be made in our young officers and enlisted Marines to give them the tools for success on a fourth-generation battlefield. Academics should be recruited to provide training for Marines on the battlefield of ideas before they are forced to learn on the far less forgiving kinetic battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan, but academics may not be willing to assist military operations. Academic groups, such as the American Association of Anthropologists (AAA), are reluctant to assist military operations citing an ethical conflict of interest.

Building a Narrative, Shaping Perception

Imagine that a surfer from California is asked to go to Central Asia and teach surfing to a group of people who have never been exposed to the ocean. How would it be done? I submit that instruction would necessarily begin with three steps:

* Language. The surfer would have to learn how to communicate with the people he hopes to teach.

* History and culture. The surfer would have to learn something of the history and culture of the people to understand their point of view and find a way to put surfing in a local context.

* Analogy. It would be impossible for the surfer to demonstrate surfing, but it is possible to find something analogous in the history or culture of the target audience to help explain surfing.

"COIN is an argument between two ideas." The COIN argument is waged on the streets of each town, in the individual valleys of a country, and in the places where people interact. If COIN forces hope to effectively "teach" a narrative to the local population, the argument needs to be clear, codified, and tailored to each valley, each town, and each place. The construction of an effective narrative is also dependent on awareness of the mindset of the local population.

Until then American commanders had been operating under the assumption that their presence among Iraqis was feeding resentment. Yet the more they withdrew from towns, the more the insurgency intensified. Mr. Ricks quotes one key commander as recounting how American forces would tell Iraqis: 'Don't worry, we're leaving.' With the new tactics, they would tell them: 'We're staving until we win this fight.'

A narrative must be local, concise, and historically and culturally appropriate to influence the target audience. The narrative must then be communicated from the mouths of forces that interact and work with the local population and host nation forces every day. Without daily interaction by a culturally and historically trained Marine able to communicate with the local population, the narrative is never communicated to the individual. Capt Barrett Bradstreet eloquently discussed the effectiveness and necessity for empowering enlisted Marines on the COIN battlefield in his essay, "An Ordinary Superman." He rightly concludes that young enlisted Marines are talented and intelligent enough to be educated and operate on the "graduate level" of warfare.

* Reliance on the individual Marine. This fight is not just for experts; grunts can do this graduate work. COIN and unconventional operations more generally are quite similar to all those parts of a person's life that do not involve deadly combat.
* Human emotion. Leverage personal connections. Only the trust and confidence of local partners will transform your actions from "give a man a fish" to "teach a man to fish" in nature.

Expecting enlisted Marines to be ordinary supermen without outfitting them with the tools of local language, culture, and history is demanding that they learn these lessons on their own, on the battlefield. As an initial step, GEN Stanley A. McChrystal wants to change the goal of public relations efforts in Afghanistan from a "struggle for the 'hearts and minds' of the Afghan population to one of giving them 'trust and confidence' in themselves and their government."1

The component parts of a comprehensive COIN strategy can be found in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) guidance documents released on 10 November 2009. Strategic corporal, basic language skills, relationship and rapport building, and cultural understanding are all mentioned.10 However, what these documents lack is a metric for training goals in these areas or a method for bringing these component parts together into a plan to spread the American narrative in a coherent and effective way.

The construction of a concise, contextualized, local narrative and the communication of that message to the local population is only the first step in winning the trust and confidence of the local population. Reinforcement of the narrative through cooperative action is essential for "sealing the deal." The narrative must be pressed by living with, suffering with, and fighting alongside local forces and the local population. Working beside and suffering with the local population will facilitate an intellectual and emotional investment in the ISAF narrative. COIN forces should not attempt to change the identity of the local population but simply allow the local population to take ownership of the narrative and encourage autonomy and confidence in the local forces, town, and government. Figure 1 is an example of how the attributes of COIN can be combined into an engagement strategy.

The goal of COIN forces should be to convince the local population that ISAF ideas are superior to insurgent ideas. As the local population invests in the narrative and realizes that the COIN force is the winning side, recruitment for local forces will increase. Local forces are the best weapons against the insurgent and the terrorist because they take away the enemy's ability to hide in plain sight. Local forces also provide "realtime" spin on events, which increases the effectiveness and reach of our narrative.

Reliance on translators and denying our young Marines training in local culture and history eliminates the inherent interpersonal skills of our greatest asset, the individual Marine. Investing in the individual Marine allows flexibility and nuance in the articulation of strategy at the lowest level. The Marine Corps must train officers and recruit civilians to train our enlisted Marines in areas such as culture, history, and language so that they can bring street smarts and interpersonal talents to wrench the narrative away from the enemy and push the ISAF narrative. This author is not advocating training every young Marine to be a linguist. Rather, the Marine Corps should ensure that a large percentage of Marines patrolling and interacting with the local population are versed in language, culture, or history. In fact, an imperfect grasp of the language will humanize COIN forces and allow the local population to see them as human. Humanizing the force makes them more approachable and facilitates investment in the narrative. Empowering young Marines with language and encouraging interaction with the local population allows them not only to talk but, perhaps more importantly, also to listen.

Engaging the Enemy Relentlessly

Soft power alone, however, will never succeed in Afghanistan, and the tactical proficiency and warfighting ability of the individual Marine remains the foundation of any COIN strategy. COIN forces must ensure that no insurgent or terrorist ever wins a kinetic confrontation or gets a "free shot" at friendly forces or civilians on the battlefield. The security of the local population depends on that population knowing beyond a shadow of a doubt that the COIN force will always win every fight against the insurgents or terrorists. When those battles take place, Marines must do what Marines do best and eliminate the threat quickly and decisively. Kinetic operations out of context alienate the local population, driving them into the waiting arms of insurgents, terrorists, or criminals. These "bad actors" are more historically and culturally aware than COIN forces and therefore shape and contextualize events for local consumption. Marines must provide an alternate view of kinetic confrontations to the local population. When a significant event takes place or a confrontation between insurgents and Marines happens, COIN forces must immediately deploy "spin" to the local population through culturally trained warriors. Interacting with the local population will ensure that battle is not used to reinforce the insurgent narrative. The culturally trained soldier or Marine creates a "double victory" by counteracting kinetic victories and spinning events to fit the ISAF narrative. COIN forces must be immersed in the local population and fight alongside local forces to effectively neutralize the enemy's ability to spin friendly actions to fit the insurgent narrative.

Conclusion
The amazing turnaround in Iraq has been largely overlooked due to the shift in focus to Afghanistan. Even more disturbing than the disquieting silence regarding the success in Iraq is the lack of analysis as to why it occurred. Even the most thoughtful consider the increased troop levels in Iraq to be the primary reason for the success. What if the turnaround that happened during the surge was largely due to the return of seasoned Iraq vets who understood what it took to succeed in the towns and cities? Many of the returning Marines in the surge picked up language skills and cultural knowledge during their first deployments to Iraq. These Marines then utilized this knowledge on their second and third deployments. On-the-job training allowed second- and third-time deployers to know which techniques were culturally viable and effective. It was the return of the Marines who possessed these skills, combined with the change in strategy to leave the forward operating bases and engage the population, that precipitated winning the trust of the Iraqi people and allowed the rapid turnaround on the ground.

The Marine Corps implemented an impressive cultural education campaign as the war in Iraq progressed and evolved into a COIN fight. The Corps must not allow this valuable lesson to be relearned as our focus turns to Afghanistan and beyond. Training for a portion of enlisted Marines (25 to 50 percent) in the areas of language, culture, and history of the microareas where they will be asked to operate should be a requirement for all deployments. Marines can then truly be strategic corporals and turn the tide of the battle for the high ground, which is the local population. The Marine Corps already has a structure in place for predeployment training, Exercise MOJAVE VIPER, and a bureaucratic structure in place for recruiting and employing academic professionals, Marine Corps University. MOJAVE VIPER could be expanded to include language, culture, and history training similar to the training offered by the Cultural Training Facility at Camp Pendleton. A cadre of language, culture, and history instructors should be created and permanently maintained to administer training to enlisted Marines and young officers who will interact with the local population. The Marine Corps used MOJAVE VIPER successfully to train Marines deploying to Iraq, and thankfully the Marine Corps has not allowed this lesson to be lost and relearned as the National Security Council shifts focus to Afghanistan and beyond. Not only should this capability be maintained, it should be supplemented by host-nation instructors and returning Marines who can instruct deploying Marines on how to build relationships with local forces and the population. The shift to regionally focused MEFs and the free language training offered on Marine.net is a good start, but specific metrics need to be established and integrated into current deployment requirements. Many of the training assets available in the Marine Corps are not widely known by individual officers. The Marine Corps needs a "one-stop shop" that contains all available training offered throughout the Marine Corps and attached organizations and units. Individual commanders should be allowed wide flexibility to tailor training to ensure that Marine units are prepared to deal with an adaptive enemy. It is time for the Marine Corps to get serious about preparing Marines for this COIN fight. As officers we have an obligation to equip our young Marines with the tools they need to win the COIN fight; we should not force them to learn on the job.

SIDEBAR

"A Society which separates its scholars from its warriors will have its thinking done by cowards and its fighting done by fools."
- Thucydides

SIDEBAR

In the battle for the narrative, the United States must not ignore its ability to bring its considerable soft power to bear in order to reinforce the positive aspects of joint force operations.

- The Joint Operating Environment 2008 5

SIDEBAR

"When Americans think of themselves . . . they think of the future. When Afghanis think of themselves . . . they think of the past."
- Author Unknown

SIDEBAR

"Speak softly and carry a big stick; you will go far."
- Teddy Roosevelt, 1903
FOOTNOTE

Notes


2. This article could easily be titled, "What I Learned at the Counterinsurgency Leadership Conference," presented by the Marine Corps University on 23 September 2009. Many of the ideas for this article were presented at that conference. Unfortunately, I was part of the approximately 5 percent of the conference attendees who were majors and below, with almost no enlisted Marines present. See Counterinsurgency Symposium for more information about the COIN symposium.


4. AAA's Executive Board Statement on the Human Terrain System Project, 31 October 2007. This release outlines the reluctance of die AAA to participate in military projects. Academic groups often cite ethical conflicts as the main reason they refuse to assist military projects. Available at http://www.aaanet.org/pdf/EB_Rcsolution_J10807.pdf


6. Tarzi, Amin, instructor at Marine Corps University, quote from his presentation at the conference, "Counterinsurgency Leadership: In Afghanistan, Iraq, and Beyond." 23 September 2009.


8. Bradstreet, Capt Barrett, An Ordinary Superman: Why we really can trust die grunts to do well in the graduate /eve/ of war, presented at the academic conference. Pedagogy for the Long War, Teaching Irregular Warfare, presented by Training and Education Command and the U.S. Naval Academy.


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GRAPHIC: Charts
IMAGE CHART, Figure 1. COIN: winning the battle of the narrative. (Figure provided by author.)
IMAGE PHOTOGRAPH, Interacting with local authorities or the local populace can be an effective way to dispel the insurgent storyline, but it takes cultural and language acumen. (Photo courtesy of SSgt Luis R. Agostini.)
IMAGE PHOTOGRAPH, Focused cultural training before deployment helps make our Marines more effective ambassadors to the local populace. (Photo courtesy of LCpl Brian D. Jones.)

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The Need for Enlisted Intelligence Analysts

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ABSTRACT
While we have become highly effective with enemy force-oriented intelligence, our lack of focus, patience, and understanding of the cultural, sociopolitical, tribal, terrain, economic, and other essential factors that encompass the operating environment still hinders the ability of intelligence professionals to provide commanders with the essential information needed to make timely and sound decisions, reduce uncertainty, and protect the force. In 2009, MarCorDet, N M ITC, launched a 40-hour battlefield study program focused on the Chancellorsville campaign of May 1862 to provide a historical lens to focus critical readings, the interface between intelligence and operations, the connection between decisions and decisionmakers through the use of tactical decision games and, finally, a walk across battlefield decision points where events took place some 150 years ago.

FULL TEXT
We need better awareness and understanding of the battlefield
"Counterinsurgency is not just thinking man's warfare; it is the graduate level of war."
- Special Forces Officer in Iraq, 2005

At tremendous cost, the Marine Corps has relearned that success in counterinsurgency (COIN) requires timely and relevant intelligence to drive operations. This seemingly simple lesson has not been institutionally easy and is contrary to many lessons "learned" in conventional conflict, specifically including the opening stages of Operations IRAQI FREEDOM and ENDURING FREEDOM in which overwhelming tactical and operational dominance against symmetrical threats rendered intelligence mission enhancing, though not necessarily mission critical.

Our enemies continue to evolve and adapt. Insurgents and extremists shift cross-spectrum from conventional to asymmetrical operations. Our immediate, and intuitive, institutional response has been to do more of what made us successful at the tactical level - more cordon and search, more large unit sweeps, and more raids. And while we often gain repeated shortterm success in metrics of enemy casualties and terrain temporarily cleared, we also find ourselves ever further from higher order strategic objectives of building awareness and understanding of the battlespace beyond the traditional military 'lens', isolating the enemy from the populace, and gaining support of the locals.

One challenge has been to conceptualize nontraditional threats beyond a traditional military force to be engaged kinetically. Repeatedly, ground combat elements, supported by the full spectrum of combined arms, have been brought to bear, only to find that we miss critical fleeting targets - the enemy we actually face rather than the enemy we wish him to be. Another obstacle lies been that though Marines can kill or capture any enemy, anywhere, anytime, it is a prerequisite that intelligence must first identify who specifically the enemy is and precisely where he is located. While we have become highly effective with enemy force-oriented intelligence, our lack of focus, patience, and understanding of the cultural, sociopolitical, tribal, terrain, economic, and other essential factors that encompass the operating environment still hinders the ability of intelligence professionals to provide commanders with the essential information needed to make timely and sound decisions, reduce uncertainty, and protect the force. It is with this sense of awareness that we realize that in COIN, intelligence is mission critical.
The Intelligence Specialist

With intelligence prioritized as mission critical, the demand for increased numbers of better trained intelligence professionals spiked exponentially. The training and education of our intelligence professionals, specifically our 0231 intelligence specialists, assumed critical importance; just as intelligence drives operations, the backbone of the intelligence community, the 0231 intelligence specialist must drive intelligence. (See Figure 1.) This article will address a critical step in sustaining an institutionalized intelligence training and education transformation. We must change the paradigm from training technicians to educating analysts who anticipate requirements and conduct problem solving.

Currently, formal training for the 0231 consists of the MAGTF Intelligence Specialist Entry Course (MISEC) and the MACTF Intelligence Specialist Career Course (MISCC). Both courses are held at Marine Corps Detachment (MarCorDet), Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence Training Center (NMITC), with the former creating 540 basically trained intelligence professionals and the latter up to 80 career-level NCOs and SNCOs annually.

The MISHC is a formal MOS-producing program of instruction (POI) offering SSO hours of instruction over 65 training days. MISEC focuses on teaching the basics of the intelligence profession - the organization and mission of the intelligence community, intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB), collections, intelligence support to planning, intelligence support to targeting, and intelligence systems. Additionally, to ensure a Marine’s success as an intelligence professional, the schoolhouse plays a critical role in sustaining the transformation from civilian to Marine. To do this in today’s increasingly complex operational environments, our overarching imperative is that our 0231s are mentally sharp, physically hard, and morally sound. The moral imperatives and ethical implications on the COIN battleHeld require men and women of character. Mental, physical, and character development are all essential to the overall success as a Marine rifleman first and intelligence professional second.

For the career intelligence specialist, MISCC provides advanced analytical training and professional development for continued growth as a practitioner of his craft and also a trusted advisor to the commander on all issues relating to intelligence. Across a POI spanning 40 training days, career intelligence Marines are put to the test in a litany of tasks designed to test their knowledge and understanding of the intricate detail of analysis, collections, IPB, intelligence support to planning, and intelligence support to targeting that encompasses the majority of the intelligence profession. Due to a gap in both time and training between MISEC and MISCC, and limited intelligence sustainment training done in the Operating Forces, much of MTSCC is spent “fixing” or retraining skills supposedly mastered in MISEC. MISCC should commence where MISEC concludes.

Academically, both MISEC and MISCC focus on the basics of intelligence as espoused in doctrine, primarily the application of intelligence support to combat operations across the spectrum of conflict. Current curriculum for MISEC ensures a Marine intelligence specialist who understands the basics of intelligence but, to this point, one who has not yet focused on either COIN or critical analysis. While MISCC provides specific instruction in COIN, critical thinking, and structured analytic techniques, success in COIN demands that this instruction be offered at a point earlier in the Marine’s career than MISCC currently provides. This identified gap between MISEC and MISCC presents an excellent target of opportunity to train and educate intelligence specialists in analysis and synthesis. (See Figure 2.) This gap, and the fact that there is no way to distinguish between an 0231 private and an 0231 master sergeant, was addressed formally during the 2010 training and readiness (T&R) conference where participants identified and articulated the need for formal NCO-level 0231 intelligence tasks. These tasks provide a framework for bridging the current training gap and serve as the first progressive step in the intelligence specialist’s formal school education.

Additionally, Operating Forces’ expectations of what an intelligence specialist actually does vary greatly, resulting in some to proclaim that enlisted intelligence Marines “don’t do analysis.” Success in COIN demands otherwise. Officer and enlisted, entry level and advanced, all Marine Corps intelligence professionals must be trained and educated to do analysis. Feedback from the Operating Forces indicates that we are very successful in training and educating Marines in the “language of intelligence,” partially successful in training Marines to practically apply intelligence support to operations, but not yet decisively engaged in educating intelligence professionals to develop critical reading, research, analyzing, writing, and briefing skills to present intelligence products and analysis to become the basis for decisionmaking.

From Specialist to Analyst

Intelligence professionals face a challenge similar to that of first year law students. Both must learn a new language and thought process, both must learn a static process and apply past precedent to future actions in a dynamic setting of ever-changing situations and conditions, and both are absolutely reliant upon critical reading, research, analysis, writing,
and briefing scientists. Additionally, due to time constraints, both lawyers and intelligence professionals must apply these skills sets concurrently, vice sequentially in problem solving. For both professions, analysis forms the basic building block foundation upon which success depends.

Law students learn analysis primarily through creating daily legal briefs. Each day students are assigned multiple appellate cases to assess and prepare. The legal brief (see Figure 3) is a 1- to 2-page synopsis on a particular case in which students: (1) read anywhere from 6 to 20 pages per appellate case, (2) reduce the facts to a single paragraph that defines the case, (3) discern the single specific legal issue to one sentence, (4) explain the court's holding and rationale, and (5) articulate their own analysis as to future impact of the present case based on past precedent. This daily academic rigor has neither shortcuts nor expediency; it is a no-nonsense, Socratic education in which attrition rates are remarkably similar to Officer Candidates School. This academic crucible creates critical thinkers who possess a finely honed ability to distill knowledge and understanding from data and information, can recognize the specific essence and relevance of past and present situations to future actions, and can articulate clearly to decisionmakers potential impacts to future outcomes. (See Figure 4.) This education creates analysts well versed and confident in their abilities to critically read, think, write, and brief.

To create enlisted intelligence professionals who likewise can critically read, think, write, and brief, this educational approach need only be slightly modified to the requirements of the Marine Corps, as articulated by the Director of Intelligence, for better analysis through better analysts. Our 0231 intelligence professionals already learn a new language of intelligence, operations, and warfighting. Our formal schools programs, doctrine, and volumes of after-action reports and lessons learned provide a tremendous baseline of data and information. The challenge is to determine what the data means. To gain knowledge and understanding we must challenge our enlisted intelligence professionals within the entry-level IVIISC and the career-level MISCC to the same degree and intensity as the law school experience.

Instead of appellate cases for legal review, 0231 formal schools training should emphasize the interconnection and often disconnection between doctrine, operational environment, and lessons learned of both conventional and COIN battlefields. Every day, students must complete selected readings to determine the relevance of past actions on future operations. Students must read for understanding, vice information, and be able to reduce lengthy articles to their essence. They must define specific key points from the commander's perspective, and they must be able, both orally and in writing, to articulate these points. Mark Twain's quote that he didn't have time to write a short letter so he wrote a song is one must be our guiding principle. Just as law students become analysts through the daily grind of reading, assessing, writing, and briefing, our enlisted intelligence professionals must do the same.

This Socratic education is extremely demanding on both students and staff. Articles must be databased, archived based on difficulty, and provided to students within an educational forum that encourages not rote memorization as an end state but as the line of departure to build upon for greater levels of knowledge and understanding of intelligence, intelligence as a function of operations, and how both contribute to warfighting. Instructors must transcend into mentors to lead their students to levels of understanding of the intricacies of their profession, not just within the confines of intelligence as an occupational field but, more importantly, how intelligence is interwoven and cross-woven throughout all battlespace functions. Finally, and most importantly, institutionally we must have the courage to hold our students responsible for learning to the same degree we hold instructors to teaching - a shared responsibility and the actualization of Gen John A. Lejeune's teacher-scholar relationship.

To further reinforce this classroom academic rigor, analysis and critical thinking have already been implemented throughout MarCorDet, NMITC, utilizing the case study method popularized by the Central Intelligence Agency's Sherman Kent School for Intelligence Analysis. In 2009, MarCorDet, N M I T C, launched a 40-hour battlefield study program focused on the Chancellorsville campaign of May 1862 to provide a historical lens to focus critical readings, the interface between intelligence and operations, the connection between decisions and decisionmakers through the use of tactical decision games and, finally, a walk across battlefield decision points where events took place some 150 years ago. The imperative was to challenge participants, both students and staff, in instructor-led small unit guided discussions emphasizing a true teacherscholar dynamic. The results over multiple iterations conducted for students and staff at MarCorDet, NMITC; the commander and staff of the Center for Naval Intelligence; the NMITC; and a representative from the Marine Corps Intelligence Association, Inc. were exponentially beyond already high expectations. By challenging participants to take responsibility for their education at the knowledge and understanding level, vice spoon-feeding data and information to be regurgitated, results so greatly exceeded traditional classroom methods that further battlefield case studies and tours of Gettysburg, Yorktown and, For a COIN-specific example, Little Big Horn are being examined.

Setting the Stage
Viewing the 13-week MISEC and 8-week MISCC with an eye toward the same academic rigor and intensity of a postgraduate education has initiated major changes in how we train and educate our enlisted intelligence professionals. By demanding that our 0231 intelligence professionals critically read, think, and write, we have begun the transformation of specialists to analysts prepared for intelligence work throughout every echelon of the MAGTF. Our methods are not "the" answer, but "an" answer to a historical problem set, namely how do we distinguish between training and education, and more specifically, where along this continuum does intelligence and analysis lie as taught within the intelligence occupational field?

We have an entire generation of Marines and their commanders who not only desire intelligence but also demand it. We currently create 023 1 intelligence specialists who understand the basics to provide intelligence support to operations. The next threshold is taking this baseline education and demanding more of our Marines to create 0231 intelligence professionals who are trained, educated, and drilled relentlessly to become analysts with the tools and skill sets to apply critical research, analysis, and articulation to any battlefield environment. This is the prize - intelligence professionals who know "how" to think vice "what" to think. This is the near future of our enlisted intelligence Marines.

SIDEBAR
Students take time for battle studies where discussions can focus on intelligence requirements and operations.

SIDEBAR
There are no shortcuts or expethents in skill development for analysts. (Photo courtesy of author.)

SIDEBAR
. . . we must have the courage to hold our students responsible for learning. . . .

by The Commander and Staff of MarCorDet, NMiTC

With a staff of 160 Marines, sailors, civilians, and contractors, MarCorDet, NMiTC1 is a formal learning center providing intelligence training and education to over 2,000 Marines and sailors annually across 13 POIs and 12 MOSs, including 540 entry-level and 80 advanced 0231 intelligence specialists.

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