United States Marine Corps

Center for Irregular Warfare Integration Division (CIWID)

Marine Corps Irregular Warfare Capability Based Assessment Final Report

US Marine Corps
CIWID
Capabilities Development Directorate
Quantico, VA

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Enclosure (2)

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Center for Irregular Warfare Integration Division (CIWID) was directed to conduct a Capabilities Based Assessment (CBA) on Irregular Warfare (IW) to ensure that the Marine Corps is properly postured to conduct IW operations and activities in the future. This document provides the results of the analysis and the recommended way ahead. The IW CBA message directed CIWID to "provide insights/observations after each phase of the study which may be used in support of future force structure deliberations."

- Despite 10 years of war, the Marine Corps has yet to fully institutionalize IW across Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel and Facilities (DOTMLPF). The Marine Corps needs to preserve and document IW capabilities so that capacity may be regenerated, as required to meet future demand.
- IW activities are fully nested in all aspects of Forward Engagement, Crisis Response, Long Term IW and Major Combat Operations (MCO).
- The lack of a clear demand signal clouds the issue of the exact required IW capacity.

The Marine Corps fully participated in the IW Joint Operational Concept (JOC) Capabilities Based Assessment Process. That process led to 128 Joint DOTMLPF Change Requests (DCRs) and the revision of the IW JOC into a version 2 by 17 May 2010. These concepts and recommended DCRs were used to fully inform the internal Marine Corps IW CBA process. Marine Corps progress on the Joint IW DCRs is tied to implementation of the Service IW CBA and is updated through the Joint IW CBA Campaign O-6 Review Group.

The Marine Corps IW CBA identified 34 individual required capabilities. Of these, 13 were determined to have gaps in capability or capacity. CIWID mitigated one gap by related solutions. 75 solutions were recommended across DOTMLPF for the 12 solution sets.

Throughout the USMC IW CBA process, CIWID has kept the advocates (Ground Combat Element (GCE), Air Combat Element (ACE), Combat Element (CE) and Logistics Combat Element (LCE)) informed on the development of capabilities, gaps and solutions. The vast majority of IW solutions have fallen within the CE and the Command Element Advocacy Board (CEAB). Although IW capabilities did not achieve separate capabilities within Program Objective memorandum (POM) 15, they have been mapped and nested within existing gaps. Solution strategies from the IW CBA have been incorporated into the POM-15 Solutions Planning Directive (SPD).

The USMC IW CBA identified only one material solution, Civil Affairs Information Data Processing System (CIMDPS); known as Marine Civil Information Management System (MARCIMS) (MCPC: 460113). This program has been fully recognized and is currently competing in the Marine Corps Enterprise Integration Process (MCEIP). Recommended IW solutions that require additional resources will be consolidated into five separate proposed Marine Corps Requirements Oversight Council (MROC) Decision Memorandums (Advising, COIN, StabOps, IW Skills Tracking and IW Organizational solutions). The results of the MROC decisions will be incorporated into a Capability Investment Plan chapter of the MCEIP, and as well as integrated within the various phases of the Marine Corps Force Development System (MCFDS) process.

With the Marine Corps IW CBA complete, CIWID is prepared to fully participate in POM 16 and reexamine the capabilities, gaps and solutions based on solutions or changes to guidance.
CIWID will also consider conducting follow on CBAs to determine capability requirements for Security Force Assistance (SFA), Counterterrorism (CT) and Unconventional Warfare (UW).

DISCLAIMER

The findings of the Marine Corps Irregular Warfare Capabilities Based Assessment (IW CBA) are approved. This does not imply that every recommended solution will be implemented. The results of the IW CBA have been fully incorporated into the Marine Corps Solutions Planning Directive (SPD) for future consideration and potential implementation. As the Marine Corps enters this resource constrained fiscal environment, not every solution will be supportable or executable.

RICHARD P. MILLS

Enclosure (2)

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1.0 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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The USMC IW CBA identified only one material solution, Civil Affairs Information Data Processing System (CIMDPS); known as: Marine Civil Information Management System (MARCIMS) acronym: CIMDPS, (MCPC: 460113). This program has been fully recognized and is currently competing in the Marine Corps Enterprise Integration Process (MCEIP). Recommended IW solutions that require additional resources will be consolidated into five proposed Marine Corps Requirements Oversight Council (MROC) Decision Memorandums (Advising, COIN, Stab Ops, IW Skills Tracking and IW Organizational Solutions) for presentation to the MROC. The results of the MROC decisions will be incorporated into a Capability Investment Plan chapter of the MCEIP, and as well as integrated within the various phases of the Marine Corps Force Development System (MCFDS) process.

With the Marine Corps IW CBA complete, CIWID will be prepared to fully participate in POM 16 and will reexamine the capabilities, gaps and solutions based on solutions or changes to guidance.
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2.0 OVERVIEW

Throughout its history the Marine Corps has been engaged in Small Wars, now referred to as IW. Although the phrase is new, the operations and activities associated with it have been conducted throughout Marine Corps history. In fact, over 70% of USMC operations throughout its history have been conducted with operations and activities associated with IW. The challenges to the Marine Corps in IW is to not jettison those requirements that need to be established, maintained, or enhanced within budgetary constraints so that the Marine Corps, as the expeditionary force of readiness is postured to engage in the future complex operational environment across the range of military operations.

Since the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) in which IW was introduced there have been numerous studies, directives, instructions, joint CBA's and working groups addressing IW. The plethora of all these documents and requirements led the Director of CDD, to task CIWID to conduct a CBA to recommend how the Marine Corps should be postured for the future to address IW.

CIWID conducted a thorough literature search, engaged with Subject Matter Expert's (SME's) and developed a Study Plan (Appendix A) for the execution of the CBA for IW. In an off-site in March 2011, CIWID finalized the study plan, developing a USMC concept for IW and identifying an initial capabilities list for IW. Prior to the November off-site, sections within CIWID gathered, analyzed, and developed detailed briefs identifying the capabilities deemed required for the future to engage in IW.

-October 2011, IW CBA Study Plan approved.

-14-18 November 2011, CIWID brought together the Capabilities Assessment Working Group (CAWG), which included representatives from; Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC), Combat Development Directorate (CDD), Marine Corps Warfighting Lab (MCWL), Training and Education Command (TECOM) (Staff, Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning (CAOCL), Civil Affairs (CA) School), United States Marine Corps Special Operations Command (MARSOC), Office of Naval Research (ONR), Marine Forces Reserve (MFR), and Marine Forces Atlantic (MARFORLANT). The CAWG produced a recommended list of Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) IW Capabilities, which went through two formal Marine Corps Action Tracking System (MCATS) staffing and were approved by the director of Capabilities Development Directorate (CDD), BGen O'Donohue.

-December 2011, IW Concept was written and staffed.

-13-17 February 2012, CIWID brought together the same participants to conduct a Gap Assessment Working Group (GAWG), which evaluated the approved IW capabilities against the IW scenario to determine if gaps exist.

-March 2012, IW Concept of Operations (CONOPs) developed.

-21-25 May 2012, CIWID again brought together the same participants for a Solutions Analysis Working Group (SAWG) that reviewed and prioritized proposed solutions to mitigate the identified gaps.

3.0 SCOPE

Per the Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 3000.07 for IW, there are five major activities and operations associated with IW. They are CT, UW, Foreign Internal Defense (FID)/Security Force Assistance (SFA), COIN and StabOps. The focus of this capabilities identified in this document are associated with COIN, SFA/FID, and StabOps. Capabilities associated with CT and UW will be developed in a future CBA. The definitions of COIN, SFA, FID and StabOps are below:

a. **COIN**-Comprehensive civilian and military efforts taken to defeat an insurgency and to address any core grievances. (Joint Publication (JP) 3-24)

b. **FID**- Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security. (JP 3-22)

c. **SFA-** The Department of Defense (DoD) activities that contribute to unified action by the US Government to support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions. (JP 3-22)

d. **StabOps**- An overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. (JP 3-0)

The IW CBA incorporated the Ground Report 2-10 MARADMIN within the scope of the discussions which identified enduring IW capability areas. The excerpt is on IW capabilities for the Ground Report is provided below:

Discussion: DoD and service level guidance mandates the Marine Corps maintain capabilities and capacity in IW to ensure equal effectiveness exists in IW as in traditional warfare. The necessity for programs, organizations, and individual leaders to operate in an environment where StabOps occur across the range of military operations is an integral part of the Marine Corps future operating concept. The Ground Combat Element (GCE) Combined Operational Advisory Groups (COAG) were tasked with identifying enduring IW capabilities that should exist in a post-OEF environment in order to preserve critical skills learned and developed over the last decade of conflict and contingency operations. Skills were categorized as "core" and "core-plus" in order to associate an echelon of command responsibility for maintaining the capability; core is commensurate with a battalion or regimental Headquarters (HQ) and core-plus refers to the Division HQ or potentially the MAGTF HQ

Core

- Explosive detection & Improvised Explosive Device (IED) screening
- Battle Staff Training Program (BSTP)
- Intelligence (Intelligence Reconnaissance (ISR), Human Intelligence (HUMINT), Counter Intelligence (CI), Company Level Intelligence Cell (CLIC))
- Train, Advise, Assist Foreign Security Forces
- Company Commander (C2) Enhanced Company Operations (ECO) Suites
- Cultural, Regional, Language Skills (with Combat Hunter)

- Counter Network Operations (understand the network, Attack the Network (AtN))

Core Plus

- Interagency Collaboration
- Law Enforcement Advisor (EA) (Regiment (Regt)/Battalion (BN))
- Information Operations (IO) (Psychological Operations (PYSOP)/ Military Information Support Operations MISO))
- Biometrics and Forensics
- Engage adversaries non-kinetically (EA, Combat Analysis (CAN))

- Ground Board 1-12 moved Interagency Collaboration from a CORE PLUS to a CORE MET (MCT 5.5.1) Integrate and Operate with Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational Organizations. The latest CORE Plus METs are still under review and have not yet been updated.

4.0 Insights

The IW CBA message directed CIWID to "provide insights/observations after each phase of the study which may be used in support of future force structure deliberations." Most of the insights were cumulative in nature and matured as the process went on. Some of those insights from the Solutions Analysis are included below:

1. Despite 10 years of war, the Marine Corps has yet to fully institutionalize IW across DOTMLPF. The Marine Corps needs to preserve and document IW capabilities so that capacity may be regenerated, as required to meet future demand.
2. IW activities are fully nested in all aspects of Forward Engagement, Crisis Response, Long Term IW and MCO.
3. A collaborative framework to plan, act, assess and adapt is required to conduct effective Foreign Internal Defense (FID), COIN and Stab Ops.
4. A detailed analysis of the applicable IW Tables of Equipment is required to inform Systems Approach to Training (SAT) and make recommendations for modification to training programs.
5. The lack of a clear demand signal clouds the issue of the exact required IW capacity.
6. IW policy should inform Irregular Warfare capability development.
7. The MAGTF organizational construct does not always provide the most effective method for organizing for IW type missions.
8. A future formal analysis of the impact and utility of the Service's current Table of Equipment on IW tactics will assist in the shaping of the future force with regards to material acquisition have greater IW tactical equity.

5.0 Joint Capability Areas / Functional Area

The Marine Corps fully participated in the IW JOC CBA Process. That process led to 128 Joint DOTMLPF Change Requests (DCRs) and the revision of the IW JOC into a version 2 by 17 May 2010. These concepts and recommended DCRs were used to fully inform the internal Marine Corps IW CBA process. Many of the Marine Corps IW CBA capabilities, gaps and solutions are derived from or influenced by the Joint IW CBA results.

The Marine Corps internal IW CBA utilized an unclassified littoral scenario based on IR-1. The scenario follows the tenants of the Joint Operational Environment (JOE) and poses a very probable scenario

where USMC IW capabilities are called upon to address a fragile state threatened by an active insurgency and aggravated by a the effects of a natural disaster.

6.0 Required Capabilities

As a result of the 14-18 November 2011 CAWG, the following capabilities were developed as being required for Marine Corps forces to successfully operate in an unclassified littoral scenario based on IR-1. 34 individual required capabilities were identified. Detailed descriptions of each capability, with its gaps and recommended solutions are contained in Appendix F.

- Provide Forces to Conduct Stability Operations.
- Provide Training and Education for Stability Operations.
- Conduct Stability Operations Planning.
- Command and Control of Stability Operations.
- Assess Stability Effects.
- Train Civil Affairs Forces.
- Collect Civil Information.
- Manage Civil Information.
- Conduct Civil Analysis.
- Conduct Biometrics.
- Leverage Regional Cultural Language Capability.
- Provide Civil Affairs Forces.
- Support to HN Rule of Law Development.
- Support HN Economic and Infrastructure Development.
- Support to Essential Service Restoration.
- Support to HN Governance Development.
- Coordinate and Collaborate MAGTF Operations within the Interagency.
- Access and Engage HN Traditionally Inaccessible Population Groups.
- Conduct Contingency Contracting.
- Provide Forces for SFA/FID.
- Conduct SFA/FID.
- Conduct SFA/FID Planning.
- Command and Control SFA/FID.
- Assess SFA/FID.
- Train SFA/FID Forces.
- Provide Forces to Conduct COIN.
- Conduct COIN.
- Conduct COIN Planning.
- Command and Control COIN.
- Assess COIN.
- Train COIN Forces.
- Enhance/Develop HN Public Institutions.
- Identify Relevant Populations.
- Develop and Attack Networks.

7.0 Capability Gaps

13-17 February 2012, CIWID brought together the same participants to conduct a Gap Assessment Working Group (GAWG), which evaluated the approved IW capabilities against the IW scenario to determine if gaps exist. Of the 34 previous required capabilities, 13 were identified as having gaps in capability or capacity. The GAWG used a scoring tool to prioritize the gaps.

Gap Prioritization Methodology

Needs Analysis is the second step in the CBA process, and its primary purpose is to identify and prioritize gaps that will impede the future force from accomplishing its mission. The final product in this phase is development of a prioritized gap list. An analytical methodology was developed to support Needs Analysis. This methodology is rooted in POM-15 Force Development Analysis being conducted by CBA Branch (MAGTF Integration Division (MID) CDD), and is facilitated by the decision support tool Expert Choice.

Expert Choice is a decision support tool designed to help groups enhance the quality of their decisions. By using a pairwise comparison approach and other voting methodologies, groups are able to quantitatively assess the relative importance of key factors in the decision-making process. The tool:

- Brings structure to the decision-making process
- Provides a platform for stakeholders to share ideas, feelings and judgments
- Represents stakeholders' judgments as meaningful numbers
- Analyzes the sensitivity of those judgments to changes
- Synthesizes results

Prioritization criteria used in the Needs Analysis was based on the POM-15 Marine Corps Capabilities List (MCCL) prioritization criteria briefed to MAGTF Integration O6 OPT (25 Jan 2012). The criteria presented were taken from the prioritized missions from Marine Corps Strategic Campaign Plan (MCSCP) POM-15 Guidance:

1. Crisis Response
2. Forward Engagement
3. (Sustained) Irregular Warfare
4. (Sustained) MCO

To establish the weighting criteria, Advocate representatives (one voter from Aviation Combat Element (ACE), Combat Element (CE), GCE, Logistics Combat Element (LCE) conducted a pairwise comparison vote using Expert Choice on 1 February 2012. This weighting criteria was used to prioritize and tier capabilities in for the POM-15 MCCL during the MCCL Working Group 28-29 Feb 2012, and will serve as the foundation for subsequent forced POM-15 Force Development analysis.

Criteria Weighting

- Using pairwise comparison, Advocate representatives independently compared and voted on the relative importance of the 4 Mission types
  - 4 Voters: one each from ACE, CE, GCE, LCE
  - Advocates were instructed that they could not change the prioritization of the missions, but were voting on *how much more important* one mission is compared to another
  - The weighting vote on 1 Feb resulted in the following:



Series of questions

- How much more important?

1. Crisis Response than Forward Engagement?
2. Crisis Response than Sustained IW?
3. Crisis Response than Sustained MCO?

..... etc

Crisis Response	.535
Forward Engagement	.282
Sustained IW	.118
Sustained MCO	.065
Total =	1.0

Figure1 – Criteria Weighting.

Each of the four mission areas was broken down in to subtasks to facilitate the voter intensity scales. Given the mission definition and intensity scale, conditions were set for determination of gap importance.

Intensity Scale: Crisis Response

- Given the mission definition and intensity scale, determine the importance of gap as it relates to the contribution of the associated capability with respect to the mission.



Very High	High	High Medium	Medium	Low Medium	Low	Very Low	No Impact
Key contributor to all facets	Key contributor to most facets and contributor to all other facets	Key contributor to most facets and contributor to other facets	Key contributor to few facets and contributor to other facets	Contributor to all facets	Contributor to most facets	Contributor to few facets	Does not contribute to any facets
#Key tasks All = 5		Most = 3-4			Few = 1-2		None = 0

Figure 2 – Intensity Scale: Crisis Response.

Stakeholders (28 were identified, 22 participated) were asked to evaluate the identified gaps against the four criteria using the provided intensity scales. The higher a gap (and the associated capability)

contributes to the criteria, the higher its overall score will be. Gaps linked to capabilities which are most critical to the desired mission sets will rise to the top of the prioritized list.



Figure 3 – Gap evaluation against criteria example.

To capture these comparisons, each stakeholder accessed a web page to assign a rating scale that reflected the relative weight or importance of each decision factor.



Figure 4 – Expert Choice voter web page.

Gap scoring, based on the foundation of the 4 mission areas, and the weighting criteria was computed after voting using Expert Choice and the following methodology:

Intensity	Very High	High	High Med	Medium	Low Medium	Low	Very Low	No Impact
Value	**(1.000)**	**(0.857)**	**(0.714)**	**(0.571)**	**(0.429)**	**(0.286)**	**(0.143)**	**(0.000)**

Capability	**Avg.**	**Missions**			
		Crisis Response	**Forward Engagement**	**Sustained IW**	**Sustained MCO**
Build Capabilities and Capacities of Partners	.179	Hi Med (6) = 0.714	Very Hi (8) = 1.000	Low Med (4) = 0.429	Very Low (2)= 0.143

Weighted average for each Gap based on mission weight and intensity scale

Cells contain average of all voters

Criteria Weights
(transparent to voters)

Figure 5 – Expert Choice computation methodology example.

d. The following table lists, in priority order, the 13 Irregular Warfare capability gaps. The gap list will be the basis for creating the linkages between the IW capabilities and future force development effort. Figure 6 depicts the results of the prioritization of the 13 gaps. The linkages between the approved capabilities and the gaps are provided at Appendix D.

Priority	Alternative	Total	Crisis Response	Forward Engagement	(Sustained) IW	(Sustained) MCO
			53.5%	28.2%	11.8%	6.5%
1	STAB Gap List #3 - MAGTF has limited language and cultural capabilities impacting the ability to understand operational culture, negotiation, and mediation, to include the ability to identify training and education requirements and skills.	0.6678	0.6475	0.7332	0.7141	0.4665
2	STAB Gap List #2 - The MAGTF CE (MEF, MEB, MEU) lacks the ability to collect, manage, synthesize, datamine, analyze and share civil information and related assessments of the operational environment with the host nation, Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, Multinational (JIIM), and Nongovernment/Private Voluntary Organizations IOT assist the commander in achieving a holistic understanding of the operational environment.	0.6334	0.6380	0.6285	0.6951	0.5047
3	SFA Gap List #1 - Starting in FY2015 and beyond the Service will have a reduced institutional capacity to train to standard and therefore maintain scalable organizations, capable of conducting professional advise, train, and assist operations with foreign security forces in both permissive and uncertain environments.	0.6087	0.5238	0.7618	0.6951	0.4857
4	STAB Gap List #5 - The MAGTF CE (MEF, MEB, MEU) has limited ability to understand, collaborate/ coordinate/deconflict and/or employ forces with integrated civil-military skills sets underminds our capacity to support USG objectives and our capacity to engage and partner with indigenous governments and populations.	0.6004	0.5999	0.6285	0.6095	0.4667
5	COIN Gap List #5 - The Service has not institutionalized Attack the Network practices.	0.5991	0.6190	0.5334	0.6761	0.5808
6	STAB Gap List #1 - The MAGTF CE (MEF, MEB, MEU) lacks the inherent (organic) ability to plan, analyze and provide accurate assessments within the core MET of stability operations functional areas.	0.5911	0.6095	0.5524	0.6475	0.5047
7	STAB Gap List #4 - The Service will lack the ability to prepare Marines in FY 2013 and beyond to plan, facilitate, and conduct the core civil-military operations tasks of Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (FHA), Nation Assistance (NA), Populace and Resource Control (PRC), Civil Information Management (CIM), and Support to Civil Administration (SCA) ISO of the MAGTF and JIIM objectives.	0.5852	0.5809	0.6000	0.6191	0.4951
8	STAB Gap List #6 -The MAGTF CE (MEF, MEB, MEU) has limited doctrine and policy (legal ability) to conduct engagement with groups not typically engaged within the moral or social, gender, religious mores of the HN to support a holisitic understanding of the operational environment.	0.5668	0.5714	0.5714	0.5905	0.4667
9	COIN Gap List #4 - The MAGTF has the limited capability and capacity to Identify relevant populations with the completion of OCO funding.	0.5638	0.5237	0.5904	0.7142	0.5047
10	COIN Gap List #1 - The MAGTF lacks the organic capacity and capability to conduct COIN operations with the completion of OCO funding.	0.5589	0.5238	0.5523	0.7427	0.5428
11	SFA Gap List #2 - The MAGTF (MEF) lacks organic formal training process for staff's to professionally plan and assess successful SFA/FID operations in both permissive and uncertain environments post FY15.	0.5388	0.4476	0.6665	0.6761	0.4857
12	COIN Gap List #3 - The MAGTF has limited capacity and capability to develop HOST NATION Civil security forces with the completion of OCO funding.	0.5277	0.4667	0.5903	0.6570	0.5238
13	COIN Gap List #2 - The MAGTF lacks the ability to institutionalize training and education associated with COIN when OCO funding ends. COIN courses have not been formally approved using the Systems Approach to Training (SAT) process. The number of COIN SMEs needed in the USMC has not been identified.	0.5243	0.5049	0.5048	0.6856	0.4761

Figure 6 – Gap Priority Table.

8.0 Recommended Solutions

Director of CIWID made the decision to pursue solutions for 12 of the 13 identified gaps. It was determined that Stability gap #6 "access and engage HN traditionally inaccessible population groups" could be partially mitigated through related documentation of training and experience. 21-25 May 2012, CIWID again brought together the same participants for a SAWG that reviewed and prioritized proposed solutions to mitigate the identified gaps.

Solutions Prioritization Methodology

The Solutions Analysis is the third and final phase of the CBA process. It is also known as the "solutions recommendations phase." It is an assessment of potential materiel and non-materiel approaches to solving or mitigating capability gaps defined in the Capabilities Analysis Phase (Needs Analysis). During this phase the study team examined and assessed the potential DOTMLPF solutions and policy approaches that eliminate, or at least mitigate, one or more of the capability gaps identified in the Capabilities Analysis. At the heart of this final phase was prioritizing solution approaches. The best approaches are often the easiest and quickest to implement and at the least cost, the team used the following business rules regarding types of approaches:

1) Consider alternative CONOPS.
2) Consider changes to policy guidance, including force posture (this is a JCIDS requirement).
3) Consider changes to existing doctrine, organization, training and education.
4) Consider changes to personnel, including staffing, skill levels, and unit composition.
5) Consider adjusting the quantities or location of existing equipment and personnel.
6) Consider product improvements to existing materiel and facilities.
7) Consider adopting joint, interagency, or foreign-supplied materiel approaches.
8) Consider potential international cooperative developments.
9) Consider developing new information technology (IT) capabilities. Potential approaches include (in order of priority):
    - Mission area process re-engineering as described by integrated DOTMLPF and policy changes that leverage existing capabilities.
    - Improvements to existing processes or systems.
    - Adoption of inter- and intra-agency approaches.
    - Initiation of new programs.
10) Consider new materiel starts.

To prioritize the approaches, solutions were prioritized across DOTMLPF pillars using a pair-wise comparison (i.e Analytical Hierarchy Process). Within each DOTMLPF pillar, stakeholders compared a solution (e.g., Doctrine solution A) against another solution (e.g., Doctrine solution B). This comparison consisted of a "which one is higher priority" and "how much more" assessment using a 9-point scale (i.e. -4 to +4). This provided a weight for each solution within each separate pillar.

Next, stakeholders performed a pair-wise comparison of the DOTMLPF pillars themselves. This allowed the solution values to be further weighted based on their corresponding pillar. These final weights were sorted to produce a 1-n list of solutions within each mission set. The results of these votes are presented by stakeholder. The "Organization" pillar was assessed as a simple vote rather than a

pairwise-comparison. This process was replicated for each of the three mission sets (i.e. SFA, COIN, and STAB) and also for irregular warfare specialists.

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I
1	INFO BOX			CRITERIA B					
2				SFA T-1	SFA T-2	SFA T-3	SFA T-4	SFA T-5	SFA T-6
3									
4	CRITERIA A	SFA T-1		0	2	2	-1	-3	0
5		SFA T-2			0	2	-1	-3	-1
6		SFA T-3				0	-1	-2	-1
7		SFA T-4					0	-3	1
8		SFA T-5						0	3
9		SFA T-6							0

Figure 7 – Solution Prioritization Tool.

Solution Analysis Summary

The Solutions Analysis yielded 108 individual recommended non material solutions. By eliminating duplications and organizational solutions, this was reduced to 75. With the exception of the continuation of development for the Marine Corps Civil Information Management (MARCIM) system, there were no new recommended material solutions.

COIN

Pri		Recommended Solution	Scoring
1	COIN L-1	Add COIN to PME	**0.3464**
2	COIN P-1	Update MOS Manual	**0.0815**
3	COIN P-2	Create functional specialists	**0.0815**
4	COIN D-6	Develop Concept of Employment for CLICs	**0.0596**
5	COIN T-8	Study of TECOM ATN training for CIED	**0.0544**
6	COIN D-2	Update MCIP 3-33.1 Small Unit Ldrs Guide to COIN	**0.0454**
7	COIN D-1	Rewrite the COIN Manual	**0.0420**
8	COIN T-6	Track ATN training and experience	**0.0386**
9	COIN D-3	Develop a COIN T&R	**0.0339**
10	COIN D-4	Develop ATN doctrine	**0.0277**
11	COIN D-7	Method to capture COIN MCCLLs	**0.0232**
12	COIN T-7	Training plan for Identity Dominance Labs	**0.0223**
13	COIN T-1	More comprehensive MSTP training for COIN	**0.0206**
14	COIN T-5	Institutionalize ATN at MCTOG	**0.0192**

15	COIN M-2	Maintain Infantry Immersion Trainers	**0.0182**
16	COIN M-3	Track COIN related training and Experience	**0.0161**
17	COIN T-2	Include COIN in staff training	**0.0145**
18	COIN T-4	Evaluate COIN training and education	**0.0144**
19	COIN M-4	Develop collaborative tools for COIN integration	**0.0109**
20	COIN M-1	Long term care, employment and maintenance of biometrics	**0.0106**
21	COIN D-5	Doctrine for identifying relevant populations	**0.0100**
22	COIN T-3	Modify watch officer training for COIN	**0.0090**

Figure 8 - COIN prioritized solutions.

Stability Solutions

Priority		Recommended Solution	Scoring
1	STAB L-2	Teach interagency planning and assessment in PME	**0.1241**
2	STAB L-1	Update PME for employment of CMO	**0.0797**
3	STAB L-3	Track interagency training	**0.0540**
4	STAB T-8	State requirement for interagency training	**0.0496**
5	STAB T-9	Provide interagency training courses	**0.0418**
6	STAB P-3	Update MOS manual for stability ops	**0.0414**
7	STAB P-7	Approve TOECR for 0531 MOS	**0.0389**
8	STAB P-6	Conduct analysis for enduring solution for CULADS	**0.0383**
9	STAB T-7	Funding for MCCMOS	**0.0348**
10	STAB D-10	MCRP for stability operations	**0.0344**
11	STAB T-4	Conduct assessment of stability ops training	**0.0306**
12	STAB D-4	Publish interagency integration policy	**0.0292**
13	STAB D-6	Expand problem framing in MCPP to include ICAF	**0.0252**
14	STAB T-6	Conduct analysis of best STAB ops training venue	**0.0242**
15	STAB T-10	Research previous graduates of Foreign Service Institute (FSI)	**0.0242**
16	STAB P-2	Post-utilization tours for interagency billets	**0.0239**
17	STAB T-5	Require operational culture, negotiation and mediation in the Predeployment Training Program (PTP)	**0.0239**
18	STAB P-5	Create functional specialist for CIM data analyst	**0.0231**
19	STAB D-14	Develop a Publication Development Order (PDO) for operational culture, negotiation and mediation	**0.0227**
20	STAB M-3	Track stability skills	**0.0192**
21	STAB F-3	Baseline funding for Language labs	**0.0185**
22	STAB M-1	Approve TOCCR for AC CA Detachments unit T/E	**0.0175**
23	STAB P-1	Course codes for stability ops training	**0.0159**
24	STAB D-3	Develop MCRPs on stability functional specialties	**0.0158**
25	STAB P-4	Update MOS manual for stability functional specialties	**0.0157**
26	STAB F-2	Expeditionary capability sets for CA detachments	**0.0157**
27	STAB T-1	MSTP staff training for stability operations	**0.0154**
28	STAB D-13	Develop a stability operations T&R manual	**0.0125**
29	STAB T-2	Incorporate stability ops into exercise	**0.0122**
30	STAB D-2	Publish MCRP on interagency integration	0.0117

31	STAB D-7	Bridge to planning	**0.0105**
32	STAB M-2	Develop collaborative tools for stability	**0.0096**
33	STAB T-3	Modify watch officer training for stability operations	**0.0092**
34	STAB D-8	Develop stability functional concept	**0.0092**
35	STAB D-9	Develop stability policy	**0.0079**
36	STAB M-6	Publish the Interagency Tools for the Warfighter website	**0.0055**
37	STAB D-1	Publish USMC-Army Dual-Designated Core CMO tasks	**0.0051**
38	STAB F-1	Provide interagency partners access to USMC facilities	**0.0040**

Figure 9 –Stability prioritized solutions.

SFA/FID

Priority		Recommended Solution	Scoring
1	SFA L-1	Incorporate full spectrum SFA/FID into PME	**0.1596**
2	SFA D-1	Complete the Partnering Manual	**0.1470**
3	SFA T-5	Require SFA planners to attend Security Cooperation Planners Course (SCPC)	**0.1311**
4	SFA P-2	Institute an advisor free MOS	**0.0958**
5	SFA D-2	Accept Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance (JCSFA) SFA planners guide	**0.0888**
6	SFA T-6	SFA planners to Defense Institute Security Assistance Management (DISAM)	**0.0667**
7	SFA L-2	Teach full spectrum SFA/FID into SNCO PME	**0.0595**
8	SFA P-1	Ensure advisor experience is tracked	**0.0459**
9	SFA F-1	Maintain Language Regional Expertise and Culture (LREC) program.	**0.0425**
10	SFA T-2	Prescreening for advisors	**0.0409**
11	SFA P-3	Career roadmap for advisors	**0.0406**
12	SFA T-4	Develop criteria for 3 levels of advising	**0.0358**
13	SFA T-1	Fund ATG post OEF	**0.0296**
14	SFA T-3	Institute advisor sustainment training	**0.0164**

Figure 10 - SFA/FID prioritized solutions.

The IW Solutions Analysis also recommended the creation of nine IW specialists. These specialists would be Marines who either already possess the documented training or experience in a given field or could be trained in a reasonable time using the Certification function of the Electronic Training Jacket (ETJ) of the Marine Corps Training Information Management System (MCTIMS). The prioritized ranking based on voting is contained in Figure 11.

Pri	Recommended IW Specialist	Score
1	Foreign Military Advisor	**0.2192**
2	Law Enforcement Advisor	**0.1981**
3	Attack the Network Specialist	**0.1783**
4	Rule of Law Specialist	**0.1432**
5	Essential Services Specialist	**0.0824**
6	Governance Specialist	**0.0581**
7	Economic Stability Specialist	**0.0489**
8	Counter Threat Finance Specialist	**0.0377**
9	Agriculture Specialist	**0.0341**

Figure 11- Prioritization of IW specialists.

These specialists currently are being filled by contractors and do not exist on an approved T/O. Organizational structure must be created in order to maximize the capability. As an example, this requirement was temporarily met by UUNS for the Law Enforcement Professionals (LEP) and the Stability Operations Information Center (SOIC) in support of I and II MEF for OEF-A.

- MROC DM 17-2010 23 DEC 2009 LAW ENFORCEMENT/COIN (LE/COIN).
- MROC DM 35-2011 4 MAY 2011 STABILITY OPERATIONS INFORMATION CENTER (SOIC).

The IW specialists are seen as an enduring requirement for the planning, assessing and execution of both security cooperation and IW operations. The IW CBA did not recommend specific organizational constructs to incorporate the IW specialists. MCIP 3-17.02 MAGTF Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Operations (24 Jan 2011) has already provided a fully staffed and coordinated recommendation for CIED Cell staffing at the MEF/Div, MEB/RCT, GCE/LCE/ACE Bn and Squadron level. It is acknowledged that many of these billets can and will be filled as required by individual augmentation and contract support. However, the core of IW specialists should be Marines and be retained on the staff in order to both maintain situational awareness in the planning process and serve as a "train the trainer" to orient and employ augmentees. A separate MROC DM will be formally staffed to address proposed organizational changes to establish an enduring requirement for IW specialists.

9.0 Integration to date

Throughout the USMC IW CBA process, CIWID has kept the advocates (GCE, ACE, CE and CSS/SE) informed on the development of capabilities, gaps and solutions. The vast majority of IW solutions have fallen within the Command element and the Command Element Advocacy Board (CEAB). Although IW capabilities did not achieve separate capabilities within POM 15, they have been mapped and nested within existing gaps as depicted in Appendix E. Marine Corps progress on the Joint IW DCRs is tied to implementation of the Service IW CBA and is updated through the Joint IW CBA Campaign O-6 Review Group.

The USMC IW CBA identified only one material solution, CIMDPS; known as: MARCIMS. Approved acronym: CIMDPS, (MCPC: 460113). This program has been fully recognized and is currently competing in the MCEIP.

Within MCFDS, deliberate capability development is captured by the Solutions Planning Directive (SPD). The SPD details the results of the DOTMLPF assessments completed against identified gaps and is used to drive future capabilities development. It outlines overarching solution strategies and the specific steps to be taken within the DOTMLPF pillars to either mitigate or eliminate a capability gap described in the Marine Corps Gap List (MCGL). Solution strategies from the IW CBA have been incorporated into the POM-15 SPD. With the transition to a 1-year MCFDS and POM cycle, and the demand for more responsiveness and clear analytic foundations, the SPD will become a living document that is reassessed and adjusted annually, pending changes in strategic guidance and priorities.

10. Recommended Way Ahead

The results from the Solutions Analysis phase are hollow without implementation. Recommended IW solutions will be consolidated into MROC Decision Memorandums for presentation to the MROC. The results of the MROC decisions will be incorporated into a Capability Investment Plan chapter of the MCEIP, and as well as integrated within the various phases of the MCFDS process.

With the Marine Corps IW CBA complete, CIWID is prepared to fully participate in POM 16 and reexamine the capabilities, gaps and solutions based on solutions or changes to guidance. Recommended priority lines of effort will be:

- Implementation of the Law Enforcement Professional (LEP) to Law Enforcement Advisor (LEA) initiative.
- Establishment of an institutionalized advisor capability and capacity.
- Fully implement the IW Manpower Skills Tracking initiative.
- CDD will explore potential organizational solutions to mitigate or close the identified IW gaps.
- CIWID will also consider future analysis on SFA, CT, UW and optimal Table of Equipment (T/E) for IW operations.