

Chapter 3 Attack-the-Network (AtN)

Attack the Network (AtN)

Integration of actions conducted across all elements and levels of the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) (including Joint/Combined/Inter-Agency partners as applicable) to neutralize threat networks. Activities include, but are not limited to; intelligence fusion, operational maneuver, kinetic and non-kinetic fires in order to influence critical nodes (financial, leadership, propaganda, recruitment, C2), local support and / or infrastructure base, logistics channels, materiel and manpower resources.

3001. Network Defined

a. A network is a series of direct and indirect ties from one actor to a collection of others. Enemies use technological, economic, and social means to recruit partners into their networks.

(1) Networking is a tool available to territorially rooted insurgencies such as the FARC in Colombia. It extends the range and variety of their military and political actions. Other groups have little physical presence in their target countries and exist almost entirely as networks.

b. Networked organizations are difficult to destroy. In addition, they tend to heal, adapt, and learn rapidly. However, such organizations have a limited ability to attain strategic success because they cannot easily muster and focus power. The best outcome they can expect is to create a security vacuum leading to a collapse of the targeted regime's will and then to gain in the competition for the spoils. However, their enhanced abilities to sow disorder and survive present particularly difficult problems for counterinsurgency. [FM 3-24 / MCWP 3-33.5 Counterinsurgency, para 1-94]

c. By its nature, a network can be hostile, neutral or positive. In most cases, a network might actually be a mixture of all three characteristics. Lastly, networks will be composed of both people and materiel. Thus, network parts can be identified and targeted using a variety of non-kinetic and kinetic means — often simultaneously. The bottom line requirement, however, for effective network targeting is intelligence collections — by all echelons of command — and not just by intelligence professionals.

d. Figure 3-1 illustrates the pillars for counterinsurgency intelligence. These are applicable to the irregular warfare environment.




Figure 3-1 Counterinsurgency Pillars

3002. USMC Definition and Context of Attack-the-Network

a. Definition — Integration of actions conducted across all elements and levels of the MAGTF (including Joint/Combined/Inter-Agency partners as applicable) to neutralize threat networks. Activities include, but are not limited to intelligence fusion, operational maneuver, kinetic and non-kinetic fires in order to influence critical nodes (financial, leadership, propaganda, recruitment, C2), local support and / or infrastructure base, logistics channels, materiel and manpower resources.

b. Sourcing — This definition of Attack-the-Network was developed by a succession of operational planning teams (OPT) in the USMC Counter-IED OAG (Operational Advisory Group) and through the TECOM AtN OPT, which included Operating Force personnel.

c. The activities noted in the definition will often occur simultaneously, even within the battlespace of a single unit. Figure 3-2 illustrates how a unit might build a campaign plan incorporating counter-IED activities.




Figure 3-2 Example of CIED Vision and Accompanying Strategies

d. Figure 3-3 depicts the three main thrust areas to execute the vision and strategies in Figure 2. Note the three possible activities that a unit will need to execute at the same time in the same battlespace.




Figure 3-3 TITLE?

3003. Non-Kinetic Fires

a. These include but are not limited to the following:

(1) Stability Operations – primarily involve USMC Civil Affairs Group (CAG) units as well as US Navy Medical Personnel

b. Other co-located agencies/organizations might include

(1) US Army Veterinarian personnel

(2) DOS organizations such as a PRT working with United States Agency for International Development (USAID)

c. DoD Instruction 3000.05 outlines the role of the US military in stability operations.

d. Information Operations. Refer to Marine Corps Information Operations Center.

e. Challenge:

(1) The results/effects of non-kinetic fires need to be tied to the measures of effectiveness defined by the commander and staff.

(2) Lessons from GWOT (Global War on Terror) have shown that focusing on the perceptions of the local populace is critical – identifying those perceptions and how to influence them. Thus, the important task of collections (atmospherics & TCAPF from patrols) is reinforced.

(3) Note that non-kinetic fires can both project influence and also serve as a venue for collecting intelligence information.

Measuring the Effectiveness of Stability Operations

If U.S. government personnel believe access to information about Western culture will undercut insurgent recruiting and provide a village with an Internet café, but the village elders tell the U.S. personnel they want more water—the village is not being efficiently or effectively stabilized. By ignoring the village elders, U.S. government personnel undermine the legitimacy of the village elders within their own population, and undermine the elders' ability to maintain some semblance of order, thereby contributing to the instability. Access to information about the rest of the world via the Internet café may create a rising tide of expectations that cannot be met by the village elders or the host nation government. The U.S. government's desire to make things better and to share technology with others can lead to more, not less instability. Understanding the causal relationship between needs, wants, and stability is crucial, and in some cases are directly related, and in others, they are not.

Source: Assessment and Measures of Effectiveness in Stability Operations Handbook from Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) Handbook via Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) Newsletter dated June 2010

3004. Context:

a. Recent Marine Corps experiences in OIF and OEF have illuminated the need for greater focus on countering threat networks. This is not a fundamental departure from our traditional doctrine. All military units (in the modern sense) operated using some sort of network, usually easily represented by a hierarchical command and control diagram shaped like a pyramid.

b. The threat now operates from within the local population in irregular manner – without a defined identity and utilizing guerrilla tactics. This forces the Marine Corps to refine and evolve its procedures to ensure that it is faster and more effective than the threat forces. Rather than a change of some magnitude, it is more of a refinement from a historical perspective. The processes by which past units have made decisions, shared information, and communicated still serve as a solid guide to current planning.

c. Intelligence is an area where the most significant refinements are required.

(1) Both AtN and COIN operations rely upon the same intelligence data.

(2) Consequently, staffs at every level need to coordinate, integrate, and leverage the information collected by various assets or enablers. This is especially true of units at the lowest echelons of command. Significantly, non-intelligence professionals might collect most of the useful information.

d. While some enablers may be focused specifically upon the IED threat, the information from these resources can also be leveraged for the entire mission.

3005. Building the Intelligence Picture

- a.** In the irregular operating environment, the threat exists in and among the general population. This context presents a significant challenge in having to collect and analyze extensive amounts “people” information; e.g., physical description, name, location, relationships, biometrics, job, etc. To effectively discern targets and deliver precision kinetic and non-kinetic fires, friendly units – especially units below battalion level – are required to collect and exploit large amounts of this complex people information.
- b.** The processes of collecting and processing information into intelligence need to be executed by *all* echelons of command, using all available personnel and organizations. Many will be organic to the operating unit (e.g. – Combat Hunter Marines on patrol and in the CLIC and CLOC). Other organizations and units will be co-located but not organic or under the same chain-of-command (e.g. – Joint units or Department of State personnel); these must be coordinated informally.
- c.** As with so much in the irregular environment, these processes are implemented by lower level units such as company, platoon, and squad with junior leaders – Lieutenants and NCOs. And, the most junior Marines (LCpl, PFC, and Pvt) will be executing the tactics/techniques of these processes such as collecting census data through Combat Hunter, Tactical Questioning, and biometrics enrollment. An often overlooked aspect is that many of these junior Marines, because they are handling classified information, will require SECRET clearances.
- d.** Significantly, the use of Female Engagement Teams (FETs) and Female Search Teams (FSTs) will be key enablers to collecting information in a culturally effective manner.
- e.** USMC personnel on Training Teams or serving with PRTs and working closely with local security and/or government (GREEN category) personnel – generally defined as “partnering” – are key to gaining information to build an overall understanding of the battlespace.
- f.** Figure 3-4 shows information flow into company level units. This illustrates that C2 in an irregular warfare environment, especially for lower level units, is exceedingly complex.




Figure 3-4 Information Flow in an Irregular Environment

3006. Specialized Intelligence Collection Programs and Equipment

a. There are highly specialized programs and/or items of equipment for collecting intelligence information; e.g., Alternate Compensatory Control Measures (ACCM), Special Technical Operations (STO), Special Access Programs (SAP), etc.

(1) Due to the highly sensitive nature of these programs, their use will most likely require detailed read-in procedures by only approved authorities.

b. In order to effectively employ these assets, the MAGTF needs to do the following:

(1) Gain an understanding of the available programs.

(2) Develop a CONOPS for use of the programs.

c. Based upon the CONOPS, determine who needs to be read-in. Often this will need to include personnel (both officer and enlisted) at the battalion and company levels.

d. Conduct training with the programs at both home station and Mission Rehearsal Exercise (MRX) with the ultimate goal of adding the programs in the unit SOP.

e. Execute operations in theater.

3007. Targeting the Network

a. Targeting utilizes continuous collections and information management to deliver effective kinetic and non-kinetic fires. Targeting the network requires a holistic approach to selecting and prioritizing targets and then matching them with the appropriate engagement effort(s) while taking into account the operational requirements and capabilities.

b. Targeting is an integral part of operations. It begins during planning and continues throughout the operations process. It is a mechanism for the commander and his staff to continually update and refine the plan and assess operations through a cyclical process. Targeting priorities are continually modified as mission requirements change or as the operational environment evolves.

(1) Based on the commander's guidance and objectives, the targeting board determines what targets to attack and why; as well as how, where, and when to attack in order to achieve the desired effects.

(2) The established targeting process for engaging conventional or irregular forces is sound. The remainder of this section will focus on the targeting process as it relates to AtN. Figure 3-5 is an overview of the integration of Intelligence and targeting.




Figure 3-5 Intelligence and Network Targeting

3008. Targeting Process Refinements for AtN

a. In its methodologies of executing the targeting process, AtN targeting differs from conventional or traditional targeting. Below are some specific challenges of AtN targeting. These challenges apply to kinetic and non-kinetic engagement.

b. Intelligence:

(1) Target identification in austere and culturally diverse environments requires that the operating forces first and foremost collect and process large amounts of complex information on their AO. This requirement for collections by the “battlespace owners” will never cease. While HHQ can assist with amplifying information, the local battlespace owner needs to understand that the targeting process cannot function successfully without the precision of this locally obtained information.

(2) Further, the collections efforts need to be geared towards not only the commander’s PIRs but also fulfill the information requirements of the engagement criteria (as part of the rules of engagement [ROEs]).

(3) After collections, the operating unit will need to analyze the information into intelligence and then exploit through its targeting process. The precise delivery of fires in an irregular environment requires very specific intelligence which has been successfully harvested from the AO.

c. Engagement Criteria for Target Packages:

(1) Assume that the MAGTF will operate in an irregular operating environment composed of multiple command relationships and agreements among coalition forces and the HN.

(2) These command relationships and HN agreements will impose specific criteria for kinetic and non-kinetic engagements. Commanders and Staff should be prepared for these criteria to be political in nature and, thus, understand that these can be friction points for quick military action.

(3) The sooner that the AO target package requirements are understood, the sooner that Commanders and Staff can execute the appropriate staff actions to fulfill these requirements in a timely manner for effective operations.

d. Simultaneous and Continuous Operations will create a battle rhythm of simultaneously collecting intelligence, building target packages, and engaging multiple targets using kinetic and non-kinetic fires. This is the result of time required to collect intelligence and build target packages while proactively applying pressure to the battlespace.

(1) This means that units need to be resourced (people and systems) and trained to execute targeting and operations simultaneously and continuously during the entire length of deployment.

3009. Refined Targeting Paradigm

a. In the irregular warfare environment, targeting includes not only degrading threat capabilities but also creating conditions for success among population as a whole. Because threat forces exist and operate in and amongst the general population, target engagement requires a much greater level of precision to be successful. Thus, conventional forces need to target individuals and populations in much the same manner as special operations forces have in the past. This approach is called Personality Targeting.

b. The targeting methods of UD3EA and F3EAD have to work together. See Figure 3-7. While F3EAD is the preferred method for delivering effects on an individual, units must project the second and third order of effects. Operations on a population, with which the targeted individual interacts, may have second and third order effects on that targeted individual (e.g. – he may increase communications or flee the area). This illustrates the complexity of conducting AtN in

an irregular warfare environment and emphasizes the need for the Targeting Board to consider the holistic effect on actions in the area of operation.




Figure 3-7 Effective AtN Targeting Process

c. Personality based targeting does not always mean kill/capture exclusively. Instead, this methodology focuses on identifying the individual (as well as the population); determines his/her role within a network and then seeks to influence him through all means available to the MAGTF.

d. It is important to set the conditions for success for the general population. Experience from OIF and OEF shows that employing the kill/capture of threat individuals (sometimes called “whack-a-mole”) as the exclusive operational tactic is not going to ensure operational success within the battlespace.

e. Standing doctrinal targeting concepts remain applicable in AtN. Friendly forces have to be engaged with the population to gain positive influence. Threat individuals/groups are targeted in the same way. Personality Targeting and its resource intensive intelligence requirements must be pursued as a part of the more classical methods.

(1) Targets will be engaged through either non-kinetic or kinetic means; sometimes the same target might also be engaged using both methods.

(2) Non-kinetic personality targeting might involve persons such as community leaders and others who should be engaged through outreach, negotiations, meetings, and other interaction.

(3) Kinetic Personality Targeting can be used to kill or capture an enemy leader in order to remove his influence on a group's actions.

(4) Another example is engaging an individual who is simultaneously a Threat Shadow Governor and Local Leader. We seek the best method of engagement to control/influence this valuable local leader while limiting his influence on local threat forces. How we target this individual will be dependent on the effect we wish to have on each of these roles as well as how these roles overlap within the social structure.

(5) Personality Targeting increases the detail and amount of intelligence that has to be produced in pursuit of a target. To manage this information requires categorizing targets in a standardized way so that actions on a given target can be synchronized across the echelons of command. The level of precise information required to operate effectively at attacking a network will require organizing the information in useable chunks. An effective method is to characterize personality target by their functions in the network, the relative importance of that function, and accessibility of the individual. Personality targeting lends itself to this by reducing the opposition to its smallest form: the individual.

f. It is important to group these individuals and targets to ensure that effective action is taken and that the efforts against one target do not unknowingly undermine actions against another.

g. There will be situations where commanders will knowingly choose to have an effect against one target as the detriment of the objective for another target.

h. The key is to know what is going to happen so that it is a conscious choice rather than an unintended consequence. This awareness can only be achieved through continuous and effective intelligence collection and information management. It is critical to recognize that efforts against these targets will not progress in a linear manner.

(1) Attacking a network will require a simultaneous blending of efforts to identify and engage against all parts of the network – people and materiel, hostile and benign aspects.

i. Organizing Target Information – Establishing a Common Nomenclature for Targeting

(1) The increased demand for precise intelligence requires a robust system for managing targets that is easily understood across all echelons of command and across all types of units and staff sections. The bottom line requirement is that the senior command HQ must define and implement a standard methodology for naming and categorizing targets.

(2) Rather than stifling subordinate unit input, this “top-down” standard will facilitate the cross-leveling and coordination of targeting information provided by those units.

(3) The targeting information standard probably will not be able to match every target perfectly (some targets will cross multiple lines of operation or categories). It is designed to organize the targeting effort so that it can be responsibly managed across the force.

(4) A significant challenge as the G3/S3 implements a targeting nomenclature is to ensure that all supporting units/sections use the designated standard. While this sounds simplistic, it should be understood that the various intelligence communities such as HUMINT and SIGINT may use different internal systems to name and categorize individuals; and their standards may be tied to higher national agency standards (e.g. – DIA and NSA).

(5) While these communities may not be able to modify their internal standards, their input to the targeting process will have to be “translated” into the standard nomenclature established by the G3/S3.

(6) Below are general definitions of how to organize target information. The most important thing is to have a common definition across all echelons of command so that there is a shared understanding.

(7) After the target nomenclature is established, its vocabulary needs to be used by the intelligence staff maintaining the IPB products. This will ensure focus of effort during collections and analysis.

3010. Organization by “Tier”

a. Individuals are assigned a “Tier” based upon the target’s importance and the level of asset required to affect it.

(1) Targets are assigned to a line of operation, such as enemy or corruption, based on how their actions affect the friendly campaign plan.

(2) Targets are further assigned a color based on who they are in relation to the coalition force.

(3) Targets are owned by a unit commander based on the area of operation relative to the target or line of operation. A system of Tiers is commonly employed as follows.

b. Tier I – Commonly this Tier is made up of IED emplacements, trigger-men, local cell leaders.

(1) In OEF, some of these individuals are known as “lunch-pail insurgents” after the notion that they are just participating in the enemy as a means of financial gain.

(2) While generally supportive of the Threat’s political goals, they are much more interested in earning a living than dying for a cause.

(3) These are the targets that an Infantry Battalion will generally have to deal with on a daily basis. One way to apply “Tactical Patience” is to track a Tier I emplacement to find his Tier II facilitators.

c. Tier II – The low density facilitators of the enemy.

(1) Usually these individuals represent a critical capability for the enemy in a geographic location or over a number of areas, such as a bomb maker or financier.

d. Tier III. The ideological and military leadership of the enemy.

(1) Often these individuals are not located in the AO. They reside in an adjacent country for security purposes.

(2) Consequently, a Tier III Target is the hardest to target due to location and often require National level assets to engage or even uncover.

3011. Organization along Lines of Operation (LOO):

a. While there is not a limit to the number of lines of operation a command can have, it is recommended that a commander select 3-5 lines of operation for focus. It is important to note that assigning a target to one of these lines of operation does not remove it from being affected by the other lines of operations.

b. LOO by functional area:

(1) Enemy (violent threat against coalition forces)

- (2) Criminal (e.g. – narcotics, gangs, etc.)
- (3) Corruption (of HN government and/or security forces)
- (4) Population

c. Figure 3-6 from FM 3-24 / MCWP 3-33.5 Counterinsurgency, provides a reference for organizing along other functional areas




Figure 3-6 Organization Along Functional Lines

3012. Organization Relative to Friendly Forces

a. Targets are also categorized by their relation to the friendly war effort and objectives. This system serves as a guideline for general target categorization in order to manage the target set. It is not a rigid or inflexible construct. Rather, a target may fall into more than one category by definition, but the targeting board will have to determine which category is most appropriate based upon its objectives. The system is as follows:

- (1) Red for threat elements
- (2) White for general population

(3) Green for host nation government entities (security, government)

(4) Black for malign actors such as criminal entities

b. These designations are generally self explanatory, with the exception of Black. There may be elements within an AO that are not directly hostile to friendly forces but potentially serve as threat facilitators.

(1) Narcotics transportation might include IED components.

(2) The amount of money generally associated with narcotics makes it a corrupting force and thus undermines the coalition attempts to establish legitimate local government. These actors are designated as Black, and need to be targeted in an appropriate manner to achieve coalition objectives. Often, Narcotics operations are steeped in violence and, thus may receive a red designation; such has been seen in the Central American conflicts.

3013. Constructs for Engaging Targets

a. These can be as diverse as the commander has tolerance for and the rules of engagement authorize. However, the methods can be roughly grouped into one of the following categories. Although represented as distinct categories, each of these constructs can be applied simultaneously depending upon the operating environment and situation. Regardless of the engagement method, commanders must understand how their actions are viewed and interpreted by the local populace and to use that influence to further the objective of their mission. This, then, implies that each engagement needs to be followed by collections which focus on the population's impressions of the actions.

b. Kill/Capture

(1) Probably the most widely understood method for engaging targets.

(2) Bottom line is to remove the individual from the battlespace, if even for only a short duration.

(3) These missions are dependent on external/situational factors, especially the rules of engagement (ROE) and local government guidelines or a status-of-forces-agreement (SOFA).

c. Detaining for prosecution. As a campaign progresses, and the government infrastructure of the HN matures, some kill/capture missions might be replaced by warrant-based targeting.

(1) Typically this is an even higher threshold for action in that the intent is to have enough intelligence on a target to not only locate and apprehend, but also to obtain a conviction in the HN court of law.

(2) Sometimes, warrant-based apprehension is an indicator that coalition forces are effective because the host nation government has a functioning judicial system.

d. Influence Targeting

(1) Sometimes used as a general term for non-kinetic targeting.

(2) IO, strategic communications, key leader engagement, and civil affairs fall in this category.

(3) The professionalism shown by Marines is also an influencing factor on local populations. See also non-kinetic engagements listed in this chapter.

e. Figure 3-7 arrays the effective targeting process for AtN,

3014. Intelligence Support to Targeting

a. Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (IPB) – the systematic, continuous process of analyzing the threat and environment in a specific area.

(1) The commander uses IPB to understand the battlespace and the options it presents to friendly and threat forces.

(2) By applying the IPB process, the commander gains the information necessary to selectively apply and maximize his combat power at critical points in time and space on the battlespace.

b. Irregular Warfare IPB

(1) The principal difference between IPB for a conventional warfare environment and that of irregular warfare is the focus on people and the accompanying high demand for detailed information (e.g. – census data and demographic analysis) required to support the commander’s decision-making process.

(2) Figure 3-8 further outlines the differences between conventional and irregular warfare IPB.




Figure 3-8 COIN IPB

c. Geospatial considerations are a key aspect of IPB. People and event information need to be tracked and displayed graphically on maps/imagery. Pattern analysis and terrain analysis should be used to support a more rapid OPTEMPO than the enemy forces. To understand IED threat factors, the following geospatial factors and practices should be considered during planning:

(1) Track EH (explosive hazard) incidents and represent them geospatially. After an EH is detonated, categorize, map, and analyze for patterns that can lead to a better understanding of enemy practices.

(2) Track the technologies used (thrown versus buried EH, shaped charge versus blast/fragmentation, and so forth) and represent them geospatially to convey an operational understanding of enemy EH use.

(3) Categorize and map the bomb maker's "signature" (technology used, tactics used, etc.

(4) Map out the EH density with the location, dates, and frequency.

(5) Map out locations of preexisting ASPs and ammunition-handling areas, to include caches with the ordnance types found at each.

(6) Filter out "white noise" EH from mass casualty EH. Display different types of EH geospatially, with color-coded representation, to better convey knowledge to decision makers.

(7) White noise EH is quickly employed and hard to stop, but create less damage. Mass casualty EH takes longer to emplace and create more damage.

(8) Use micro terrain, where possible, for line-of-sight analysis, to include fire points, observation points and distances, range fans for potential enemy EH employment, and rapid response by friendly forces.

(9) Identify ideal pre-staging locations for engineer and EOD equipment and/or teams to achieve a rapid response.

(10) Identify ingress and egress routes to potential EH event sites for enemy interdiction and friendly response COA analysis.

(11) Fuse EH information with other data, such as cultural inferences (such as friendly or hostile mosque and/or ethnic group), civil affairs data (sewer, utilities, and transportation).

(12) Map out HUMINT, such as a hostile leader who was detained at one location and resides at a different location.

(13) Build patterns that can be used to geospatially understand the flow of enemy personnel, information, and weapons.

(14) Understand how the enemy thinks using geospatial tools to grasp potential enemy TTPs and the corresponding potential locations in the AO.

(15) Know which route(s) could be used by friendly forces. Know what location(s) along the route(s) would be most vulnerable/favorable to an IED attack (e.g. – locations for good visibility of the route and standoff for the triggerman egress after the attack). The MCOO product is especially helpful for this task.

(16) Know what areas offer the best concealment for EH.

(17) Determine a feature that could serve as an aiming point for EH detonation.

(18) Know locations where the terrain could enhance the EH blast effects.

(19) Know where the EH could be emplaced to destroy friendly forces but not injure civilians who are allied with the enemy.

d. IPB products include the MCOO (modified combined obstacle overlay), enemy situation templates, event templates, and recommendations to the high-value target list (HVTL). These IPB products must be rigorously maintained in order to provide key information in building the COP and decision-support template.

3015. Trust Tactics for Command & Control.

a. To some degree, AtN requires echelons of command to reverse the focus of effort between them.

b. The higher level of command needs to be more concerned with setting conditions for the subordinates' success – to push information and resources down to the lower levels.

(1) Intelligence staff and systems should be pushed down to the initial points of collection for the most valuable information – people data – at the company and battalions.

(2) Low-density/high-demand ISR resources should be concentrated or stretched to support success across the entire AO.

(3) In doing so, HHQ does not relinquish the responsibility to gain and maintain situational awareness of operations. Instead, HHQ will receive more accurate information on which to make decisions for the entire battlespace and to better support subordinate unit operations.

3016. Collaborative Planning to Build a Friendly Network

a. Information on each unit/organization in a battlespace has to be known by the Commander

b. Most important, the information from each of these entities needs to be comprehensively fused. These organizations could be one or all of the following:

(1) Joint partners

(2) Inter-Agency entities such as FBI, DEA, DHS

(3) Coalition/Allied partner such as UK, Poland, or Columbian forces.

(4) NGOs such as Doctors Without Borders, etc.

c. The recommended methodology for fusing this information is:

(1) Establish communications – face-to-face meeting is best.

(2) Determine mission, tasks, and mutual goals; discuss points of divergence, etc.

(3) Determine and discuss what information supports these missions, tasks, etc.

(4) Understand the sourcing of the information.

(5) Discuss methods of communication; including any HN persons with whom they interact.

(6) Determine respective battle rhythms and decide when/where to meet.

(7) Gain a better understanding of the information and determine the right types/amount of information to share.

3017. Case Study– Stability Operations Information Enterprise (SOIE)

a. This is an example drawn from Employed by Regional Command (RC) West SOIC Director, Counterinsurgency Advisory and Assistance Team (CAAT).

b. The SOIE is a concept to overcome the challenges of sharing information and concepts across the multiple entities that will impact the success of efforts to AtN as well as other aspects

common to Stability Operations. It is a tool through which the Commander builds understanding of the complexities of the operational environment

c. The SOIE consists of a team of teams with links to local, regional, and national actors. It is a primary tool for the commander to leverage in order to understand his AOR. It focuses on utilizing information from normal intelligence organization as well as those organizations that are vital to the mission but lay outside the normal customer base of the military intelligence system.

d. It is vital that not only military “land owners” have access, but also PRTs, SOF, HN security force and government organizations, NGOs, community organizations, and any other relevant actor that has a stake in the operating environment.

e. Figure 3-9 illustrates SOIE Concept of Operations.




Figure 3-9 SOIC Concept of Operations

f. A SOIE should be organized by functional teams. These teams must be tailored to the Logical LOO that a commander determines are vital to achieving success in his given area of operations. In RC west, the SOIC consisted of a Population Support Group as the main effort, a Fusion Cell (traditional intelligence functions), an Exploitation Cell (IED/ law enforcement functions), a

support cell, and liaisons cells for the military commands and special operations organizations operating in the area.

g. While this is a template for other SOIEs, the organization must be tailored to the operational area and the associated problems determined by the commander's estimate.

(1) Expect to update/change over time as the problems and the understanding thereof evolve.

(2) Adapt the structure to the feedback generated from the AO.

(3) It is also critical that these teams share information and ideas to facilitate intellectual creativity and aggressive thinking in support of the commanders vision of success for that AO.

h. Figure 3-10 Show a sample Table of Organization for a SOIE.




Figure 3-10 SOIE Task Organization

3018. Staff Process Refined for AtN

a. The following figure illustrates the interactive process for targeting networks.

b. Figure 3-11 is a Sample Staff Process.




Figure 3-11 Sample Staff Process

c. Information Management to Enable Shared Understanding. Refining staff processes for AtN is necessary to adjust to the amounts of and demand for information at the lower levels of the command structure. The following are a few of these refined processes.

d. IPB. Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (IPB) is fully covered in other publications. While conducting Attack-the-Network operations, the IPB must be viewed with an eye towards continuous refinement. Operations only serve to validate previous detail of the IPB, or feed to data to derive changes to the IPB. It is useful for commanders to view the IPB as a hypothesis about the nature of the environment, and their operations are the experiments to determine the validity of that hypothesis or change it if required.

e. Staff Considerations for AtN Targeting: Since the overwhelming majority of intelligence required for targeting is collected from the “bottom-up” or through the lowest echelons operating in the AO and since specialized collections assets are too few to be with all operating forces, then small units with junior leaders and Marines will be tasked with Intelligence collections. Here are the key challenges of bottom-up collections:

(1) Determining what is important information. Leaders need to determine PIRs for each mission.

(2) Determining where to start – in terms of information or geography. Based upon key terrain (human and/or geographic).

(3) Determining the best means for documentation and dissemination of information. This depends upon communications assets and battle rhythm. Unit SOP needs to account for Primary, Alternate, and Tertiary means.

(4) The recommended battle rhythm for building the intelligence picture is [1] IPB – [2] Brief – [3] Debrief – [4] IPB Update.

(5) Small Unit operations are integral to AtN. Individual and small units contribute heavily to successful AtN. A Squad on patrol represents one of the best sources of information for units to gain information on the population.

(6) The training programs that build skills for collecting, managing, and exploiting AtN information are Combat Hunter, the Company Level Intelligence Cell (CLIC), and Company Level Operations Center (CLOC).

f. Combat Hunter teaches the fieldcraft of observation, tracking, and profiling. While these skills are paramount for gaining tactical advantage in direct confrontation, it also encourages Marines to gain and process information about their environment on their own. Combat Policing is included and gives the squad a context for organizing the information they are gathering by exposing themselves to the environment and population directly. An example of this is noting what type of fertilizer is used in a given area and how much is reasonable for a field in a given planting season. Gathering of that data by a squad coupled with the observation of specific behaviors may lead to a HME Lab. Combat Hunter training is delivered by the School of Infantry.

(1) The Company Level Intelligence Cell (CLIC) provides accurate, timely, and relevant knowledge about the enemy and surrounding environment to the company (and, by extension, higher / adjacent / supporting units) in order to reduce uncertainty and support the commander's decision-making process. The CLIC can receive its best information from Combat Hunter-trained Marines. At its essence, the CLIC serves as a mechanism to support the collection and exploitation of information collected by the lowest tactical operating units such as companies, platoons, and squads. The CLIC is not a substitute for the unit's Intelligence Section. Rather, the CLIC serves as an enhancement and facilitator to the unit's Intelligence Operations. The CLIC needs to be integrated into the unit's operations/mission planning and support processes. If these operations processes do not integrate with the CLIC, then there is wasted effort and lost information; and the CLIC ultimately becomes non-effective. The size, configuration, and specified tasks of CLICs will vary per the mission and the commander. The mission debrief process is the mechanism for gathering and compiling the information gained by the squad. The CLIC then shares the information with the battalion G2/S2, as well as disseminates information requirements from the Company Commander and higher. CLIC training is delivered by Marine Corps Intelligence Schools which also publishes the *CLIC Template SOP* as its main reference guide. A key aspect often overlooked by commanders is the relationship of the CLIC to the various echelons of command. Since the CLIC exists to ultimately serve the information needs of the battalion, a co-located Direct Support (DS) relationship has proven to work best. This enables a TACON relationship between the CLIC and the company commander while preventing the CLIC from being assigned "non-intelligence" duties which would adversely affect mission performance. Attached and General Support (GS) command relationships have proven much less effective.

(2) The Company Level Operations Center (CLOC) [sometimes called Co COC] functions as the company's Combat Operations Center. Integrates all warfighting functions at the company level.

Operations in the irregular environment will probably require the company to manage many warfighting functions previously done so by the battalion. This is especially true of the Intelligence and Fires warfighting functions. This management will most likely require extensive resourcing from within the company to form the CLIC and CLOC. Also, both leaders and individual Marines will need to be trained in these challenging skills. CLOC training is delivered by the Marine Corps Tactics and Operations Group (MCTOG).

g. Intelligence Staff Actions for Targeting:

(1) Intelligence officers must continuously coordinate with the entire staff to determine what information will bypass the normal intelligence processing functions and be sent directly to the commander based on the importance and perishable nature of the information and proximity to LTIOV (Latest Time Information of Value).

(2) Determining the time sensitivity of each report enables the best decisions on the optimal means of dissemination. Mission-critical information may require point-to-point dissemination depending on the overall execution timelines and planning requirements. In order to be responsive, the intelligence officer maintains awareness on the current and developing situation.

(3) Continuous coordination is essential within the intelligence section, targeting cell, and the operations staff. If the information meets the attack guidance matrix criteria, immediately disseminate it to the targeting cell before further processing or analysis.

(4) UD3A and F3EAD are used in conjunction with one another. There must be a “Decide” that occurs prior to F3EAD. The end state tactical imperatives for both D3A and F3EAD are the same.

3019. Working Groups / Boards

a. Traditional military organization has worked effectively against conventional threats. Units operating in an irregular warfare environment, however, must organize differently in order to ensure proper communication, information flow, and prioritization of target packages. In order to create cross functional teams, the Marine Corps has set up cells, working groups, and boards. This is represented by a matrix organization.

b. Matrix Organization. A matrix structure groups employees by both function and products produced. A matrix organization frequently uses teams of Marines to accomplish work, in order to take advantage of the strengths, as well as make up for the weaknesses, of functional and decentralized forms.

c. Targeting Board. An irregular operating environment demands precise and accurate operations due to potentially disastrous second and third order effects. The following are recommended staffing actions which will enable the MAGTF to collect, integrate, and exploit intelligence for targeting networks.

d. Targeting Working Group Composition. The fight in an irregular warfare environment is heavily intelligence driven. Accurate and timely intelligence is imperative. All G2/S2 assets and enablers must be brought to bear on the enemy in order to win this fight.

e. The targeting cell must be composed of both intelligence and operations personnel. This is a G2/S2 and G3/S3 fight. Cooperation between the G2/S2 and G3/S3 is imperative. The traditional line of thinking, where the G2/S2 has all of the information behind a closed door must go away, and information must flow freely between the G2/S2 and G3/S3. All G2/S2 resources must be made available and deployed IOT be most effective.

f. The intelligence personnel supporting the targeting cell should represent a cross section of all available intelligence disciplines. These intelligence enablers are involved in all phases of the F3EA process. The echelon at which the targeting cell is located will dictate its size. At a minimum, there should be a dedicated targeting cell at battalion level and higher. In some instances, a large targeting cell has been utilized in organizations with a dedicated, direct-action mission to capture enemy. In addition to intelligence personnel the following representatives will often be part of the targeting working group:

- (1) G3/S3
- (2) FSC
- (3) G3/S3 Future Ops
- (4) TIO
- (5) Air Officer
- (6) IO Officer
- (7) CA Planner
- (8) G2/S2 Officer
- (9) Target Intel Officer
- (10) SJA
- (11) Battle space owner reps
- (12) LOO Managers
- (13) HET OIC
- (14) PSYOP Team OIC
- (15) SOF Rep
- (16) Engineer Rep
- (17) Collections Manager
- (18) PAO

g. Collections Working Group (WG).

(1) This is typically a regimental level working group. This group coordinates and synchronizes the ISR process. The WG provides recommendations to the commander on what assets to request and how they should be employed.

h. Collections WG Participants. This is a grouping of designated staff to Coordinate & Synchronize the ISR process. They provide recommendations to commander and match organic collection assets to PIRs, then prioritize and submit remaining collection requirement to HHQ for sourcing. The result is a Draft Collection Plan and priorities.

i. Leader: Collections Officer or G2/S2/G2 will chair this WG unless otherwise designated by the CO. Other Participants are:

- (1) Engineer Coordinator
- (2) Regt G2/S2
- (3) Intelligence Cell Fusion Element Representative
- (4) Fire Support Coordinator (Direct Support BN CO)
- (5) Fires Battalion G3/S3 and G2/S2

- (6) Reconnaissance Battalion G3/S3 and G2/S2
 - (7) Maneuver Battalion G3/S3 and G2/S2
 - (8) Intelligence Battalion G3/S3 and G2/S2
 - (9) Sustainment Cell Representatives (S1 and S4) – if available
 - (10) SOF representatives – if available
 - (11) The senior representative from the Targeting WG and the CIED WG (if not already represented from one of the above).
- j.** Collections WG Inputs. This WG must be integrated effectively into the battle rhythm to ensure the ISR collection effort provides focus to operations, rather than disruption of operations. Preparation and focus are essential to have a successful meeting. Each representative must come to the meeting prepared to discuss available assets, capabilities, limitations, and IR related to his staff area. Some of the inputs are the following:
- (1) PIRs from MEB, higher, and lower commands
 - (2) Collections Emphasis Message
 - (3) GCE, LCE, ACE collection requirements and current status
 - (4) Requested changes in priority of collection from various working groups
 - (5) Intel Ops Updates
 - (6) Combined HPTL/AGM
 - (7) NAIs, NPIs and TAIs status
 - (8) Available collection assets
 - (9) HHQ plans and orders
 - (10) Commander's Guidance
 - (11) Intel Synch Matrix
 - (12) ISR Overlay
 - (13) G3/S3 must be prepared to provide the following information:
 - (14) Current friendly situation
 - (15) Current CCIR
 - (16) ISR assets available
 - (17) Requirements from higher HQ (including recent FRAGOs/Taskings)
 - (18) Changes to the commander's intent
 - (19) Changes to the task organization
 - (20) Planned Operations
- k.** G2/S2 must be prepared to provide the following:
- (1) Current Enemy Situation
 - (2) Current ISR plan
 - (3) Planned enemy course of action (ECO)A) tailored to the time period discussed.
 - (4) Collection assets available and those the G2/S2 must request from higher HQ
- l.** Collections WG Outputs.

- (1) These outputs will include proposed collections plans, and prioritized collection requirements. It will also include recommendations for updates to PIRs and proposed ISR tasks.
- (2) Once the collections plan is established, the assets will be distributed according to the plan. Those assets will begin to collect based on the guidance given to them, and the information collected by these assets will then be sent back to the intelligence analysts.
- (3) The intelligence analysts will then digest the information and turn the raw data into something that can be used by the commander, CIED WG, and Targeting WG in order to make decisions that will move the unit closer to destroying the enemy network.
- (4) Other Working Groups. Other working groups whether standing or temporary feed the Targeting Board with analysis and recommendations from their area of expertise. Further collaboration between these groups is encouraged. The goal is to provide the commander with timely and accurate recommendation for action.