Executive Summary

Current "Attack the Network" (AtN) strategies in Afghanistan are biased toward lethal actions. As such, they are necessary, but insufficient to co-opt the local populace's support and disrupt the adversary's network. Myriad discussions with war fighters from Afghanistan reveal two major barriers to success: *an operational framework* that captures the range of necessary AtN actions and *an integrated set of solutions* that satisfy their operational needs across these AtN actions.

Attack the Network: An Innovation Project adapts a proven customer profiling and innovation methodology from commercial industry to understand the needs of people involved with the IED situation in our geographic focus of Helmand province.

This method delivers a framework and an integrated set of solutions to co-opt the local populace and attack the adversary network.

This project's innovative methodology analyzed the holistic experiences of individuals from the C-IED force, the IED network, and the local populace to identify their needs related to AtN in Helmand province. Our analysis examined the mental, emotional, physical, and tactical experiences within these three groups. Such a comprehensive examination of the AtN experience had never been accomplished.

This playbook represents their voices and those of the other 80 persons we interviewed. The integrated set of 16 solutions presented here address their needs across the a comprehensive range of AtN actions. The actions include building relationships with the local populace while simultaneously gaining valuable intelligence on the adversary network that lead to lethal *and* non-lethal actions to neutralize the adversary:

ATN Fundamentals

- Prioritizing AtN
- Unloading Legacy Training
- AtN Building Blocks
- Multimedia Training Vignettes

Build Relationships

- Partnering Not Translating
- Tailoring Language Training
- ANA Co-location Continuum

Gain Valuable Intel

- Intelligent Intelligence Collection
- WiMAX for War Fighters
- Eliciting Intelligence
- Hitting the Ground Running
- Integrating Red, White and Blue
- Battalion-Level Cultural Advisors

Neutralize the Adversary

- Grassroots Information Operations
- Religious Information Operations
- Restoring Honor Nonviolently

The Integrated Set of AtN Solutions Based on the Needs of Our Interviewees

Many of the solutions are new and some currently exist, but the integrated set is novel in that it identifies for the first time a precise set of solutions that satisfy the needs at the tactical level. They offer the US government's best opportunity to change Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF) to attack the adversary network.

This Project in Context

This innovation project seeks to address the challenges of attacking the network (AtN) of IED actors in Afghanistan, specifically in Helmand province. For over nine years dedicated persons have worked diligently to reduce IED fatalities against an enemy that remains fierce, motivated and permitted to operate. Unfortunately, IED fatalities continue to plague our military, suggesting the need for an evaluation of war fighter needs when attacking the network.

This project began with four key challenges as context. First, "Attack the Network" has different meanings to people in different functions and echelons of the C-IED forces. Without a standard definition, AtN is interpreted by intelligence personnel as social network analysis, by war fighters as kinetic action against network nodes, and by civil agencies as construction of new Afghan infrastructure and institutions.

Second, there is no common and consistent operational framework that serves as a guide for the range of lethal and non-lethal actions that attacking the network requires. As a result, war fighters lack the appropriate and comprehensive training in AtN that prepares them for the activities they will execute in theater.

Third, many experts in government hold the belief that current AtN activities are biased towards lethal actions directed at perceived "key nodes" in the enemy network. These lethal actions are necessary, but insufficient to co-opt the local populace's support and disrupt the adversary's network. Non-lethal training and equipment is necessary to compliment these lethal actions.

Fourth, agencies responsible for providing training and equipment to the war fighter are working diligently, and the war fighter receives a steady stream of training and equipment to the point that the war fighter's precise requirements for attacking the network are lost.

To address these challenges, *Attack the Network: An Innovation Project* adapts a proven customer profiling and innovation methodology to understand the precise needs of people involved with the IED situation across the range of lethal and non-lethal actions.

This project is a proof of concept. Its content, including recommendations, is based on our geographic focus of central and southern Helmand province. As a result of this focus area and the timing of the project, most of our data and interviews are from the US Marine Corps. Similarly, the solutions are based on the conditions and perspectives of individuals in that area of Afghanistan only. This includes the needs, language and structure of the solutions, which are intended for US Marines in Helmand.

Our Approach

***Attack the Network: An Innovation Project* adapts a proven customer profiling and innovation methodology from commercial industry to understand the needs of people affected by IEDs in Helmand province, Afghanistan. This method delivers an integrated set of solutions to co-opt the local populace and attack the adversary network.**

As of today there is no official and unified definition for "Attack the Network" in the US Government. For our purposes we used this definition: *"Activities that occur prior to an IED event that prevent the acquisition, assembly, transport, or placement of an IED and those activities that deter individuals from participating in any of these activities."*

This method examined the "holistic experience" of specific groups of people within the context of AtN in order to understand their essential needs. We chose individuals from three groups in Helmand: the local populace, the C-IED force, and IED actors. The insights derived from their holistic experiences led to an integrated set of 16 solutions that when applied together satisfy the precise needs of the war fighter and local populace who are attacking the network in Helmand province. These solutions combine innovations with current best practices for implementation in southern Afghanistan.

We generated this new knowledge through exhaustive research including over 275 hours of interviews with war fighters, Afghan nationals, and subject matter experts (SMEs) from government, academia, and NGOs. Applying our holistic mapping technique to Afghans and US war fighters revealed the authentic experiences and needs of people engaging the adversary network.

The solutions within this AtN Playbook are a tool for prioritizing resource allocation and improving the way C-IED forces are trained for and conduct AtN operations to defeat the adversary network in Afghanistan.



Our Approach

Our approach creates and refines solutions over iterations of "playbooks." These playbooks are proposed solutions that we evolve and improve over time. We inform these playbooks with exhaustive research, interviews, and "holistic experience maps" based upon the experiences of selected members within our chosen groups. The final playbook presents an integrated set of 16 solutions that when applied together satisfy the precise needs of the war fighter and local populace who are attacking the network in Helmand province.

Our Approach



Our Differentiation

This project delivers 16 integrated solutions built on insights drawn from seven "holistic experience maps." Each map details the holistic experience of an individual relative to the topic being explored, in this case, the experience of war fighters attacking the adversary network or local Afghans working with ISAF to eliminate IEDs in their home village.

While many research methods (e.g. focus groups, surveys, traditional interviews) elicit the surface level experiences of subjects, our maps represent an in-depth understanding of the respondent's:

- "Mind": Mental experience including beliefs, needs and decisions
- "Body": Sensorial experience such as hot, cold, tired or awake
- "Soul": Emotional experience including emotions and frustrations
- "Task": Actions taken during the experience

A "holistic map" renders the Mind, Body, Soul, and Task elements of the respondent's experience



Our seven maps inform the integrated set of solutions to help war fighters and locals attack the adversary network in Afghanistan. Based on the in-depth depiction of the holistic experience of each individual, the maps allow us to exhaust the creative space when identifying innovations to surmount the barriers that prevent a desired experience.

Multiple insights in a map inform solutions that reflect an individual's entire need set



Insights from multiple maps inform an integrated set of solutions



Our Project Goal and Strategic Vision

This project's specific goal is to prevent the local populace from participating in the adversary's IED network, thereby reducing the number and effectiveness of IEDs in Lashkar Gah, Garmsir, and Nawa. This goal represents one step toward our two-fold, strategic vision: first to shift the weighting of C-IED efforts from "Defeat the Device" to "Attack the Network," and second to shift the focus of AtN efforts as far left of boom as possible.



We assert that defeating IEDs in a sustainable and cost-effective way requires a shift in focus to as far "left of boom" as possible, thereby attacking the network that creates and uses them. Long-term fiscal constraints will require focused investments with the highest returns. Focusing as far "left of boom" as possible produces the greatest benefit per taxpayer dollar invested.

Attack the Network Gets "Left of Boom"



The Problem

Our interviews and experiential maps reveal a central problem that prevents the US military from successfully disrupting the adversary network: *the US force's inability to build trusted relationships with the local populace limits its ability to isolate and target IED actors within the population and disrupt the adversary network of a culturally integrated adversary.*

Underlying the problem is a series of barriers that hinders and frustrates the C-IED forces' ability to engage the local populace in disrupting the adversary network. These barriers fall into three logical categories:

- **Building Relationships**
  - US forces do not understand each village's complex set of cultural norms
  - US forces lack language skills to build rapport and relationships with locals
  - C-IED forces cannot readily discern which locals are most influential over community members' decisions to participate or not participate in the adversary network
  - As foreigners, US forces are initially mistrusted upon arrival
  - C-IED forces are not organized, trained nor equipped to effectively build relationships
- **Gaining Valuable Intelligence**
  - Enemy actors are difficult to identify because they are not easily distinguished from other members of the local population
  - C-IED forces at the tactical level lack resources or access to resources to quickly synthesize and analyze intelligence
  - US forces lack the ability to effectively retain and transfer intelligence across local areas or between deployment cycles
- **Neutralizing the Adversary**
  - Adversaries' cultural ties, existing relationships, or employment in the local populace allows them to influence locals to the benefit of the adversary network
  - The enemy threatens retaliation and delivers violence against people who cooperate with C-IED forces
  - Many adversary network activities are difficult to distinguish from legitimate activities
  - Kinetic action alone is not sufficient for neutralizing a very numerous adversary, yet US forces do not adequately train in non-lethal options

Our Proposition

Current AtN activities across the DOTMLPF are imbalanced toward lethal actions against adversary networks. While important, these lethal actions do not include the essential non-lethal actions implemented by successful war fighters that attacked the adversary network in Helmand. Our myriad interviews with veterans revealed this gap: a common and consistent, operational framework that captures the range of attack the network actions. This graphic organizes what they said they did to attack the network successfully. It is the logical, organizational framework for our integrated set of AtN solutions.

This organizational framework for AtN requires building relationships with the local populace while simultaneously gaining valuable intelligence on the adversary network in order to neutralize the adversary through kinetic and non-kinetic operations.

Build Relationships
Build effective relationships with the right people in order to gain the cooperation of the local power base.

Gain Valuable Intel
Gather intelligence on the location of IEDs, the identities of people participating in the adversary network, and ways to influence people from participating in the adversary network. Then share and transfer this knowledge between deployment cycles.

Neutralize the Adversary
Eliminate through lethal and non-lethal means the IED network's ability to operate effectively by co-opting the adversary network, removing the local populace's active and passive support for the adversary network, and disrupting IED activities and supplies.

Our Geographic Focus

Afghanistan in not homogenous. Every village and valley is unique and has distinct challenges. For the purpose of this project and in order to craft operationally relevant solutions, we chose a specific and critical geographic location: Helmand province.

Our geographic focus shaped our research, our choice of subject matter experts, and the selection of our interview candidates for holistic experience mapping. These holistic experience maps revealed the authentic experiences of persons encountering the adversary network in Helmand province. Thus, the solution concepts presented in this playbook reflect the aspirations and needs of those operating and living in Helmand.

Helmand Province

- A critical province in the US's strategy for Afghanistan
- Greatest numbers of ISAF casualties in the past year as of December 2009
- Home to sophisticated narco-trafficking and human smuggling networks that support the adversary network

Lashkar Gah, Garmsir, and Nawa Districts

- Home to significant C-IED presence: the Provincial Reconstruction Team, US Marines, and various NGOs
- Proximity to Kandahar Province and Ring Road and Pakistan that make it a hot-bed of illicit activities

Our Focus Populations

Within the geographic context of Helmand, we focused our research on experiences within three groups: the local populace, the C-IED force, and the adversary network. Successfully attacking the adversary network in Helmand requires an understanding of the needs of each group and the barriers to fulfilling those needs. The integrated set of solutions in this playbook seek to overcome those barriers and satisfy said needs to defeat the adversary network in Helmand.

We presume that the actions of the local populace are the key to the IED problem in Helmand. This project seeks to understand why they choose either to assist the IED actors, assist the C-IED forces, or remain neutral.

Local Populace
Local residents not currently participating in the adversary network

Adversary Network
Members of the local populace and non-resident actors who participate in IED activities for a variety of reasons

C-IED Forces
US service members and Afghan National Army who aim to create security from the adversary network

Local Populace Needs

Many tribal and ethnic groups are represented in the local populace in Lashkar Gah, Garmsir and Nawa, but those who choose to participate in the adversary network are primarily Pashtun men. This analysis focuses primarily on those Pashtun men who represent the neutral center for which the C-IED forces and IED actors must compete to win their loyalty.

This figure describes the hierarchy of needs for typical Pashtun men in this area of Helmand province. Their basic needs must be met before they can focus on aspirations.

Local Populace Needs

Basic Needs

Pashtun men need to provide physical and financial security for their families. They also need to maintain their personal honor and the honor of their tribe by maintaining a position of respect in their communities. These men want to be pious Muslims.

Aspirations

Pashtun men in Lashkar Gah, Garmsir and Nawa seek a stable environment where their physical security is assured so that they can once again focus their attentions on creating a prosperous future for their families. They wish this security to be provided primarily by forces and leaders drawn from the local populace who are loyal and accountable to the local community. They desire secular and religious education for their children, thus ensuring their long term prosperity and adherence to Islam.

Barriers to Desired Experience

- Threats of violent retaliation by insurgents
- Threats of being branded an infidel for cooperating with the Afghan government (GIRoA) or C-IED forces
- Dishonor to them caused by the actions of foreign forces
- Lack of employment opportunities
- Lack of economic infrastructure
- Corrupt leaders who are appointed by the GIRoA and not accountable to the local populace
- Need to side with any armed forces who will have a long term presence in their village
- Lack of a swift, fair justice system functioning in accordance with their religious and cultural norms

C-IED Force Needs

C-IED forces in Lashkar Gah, Garmsir and Nawa consist primarily of US Marines in partnership with other ISAF contingents, the Afghan National Army, the Afghan National Police, district and provincial officials and representatives of the GIRoA, multiple non-military governmental organizations such as USAID, and NGOs.

Due to project limitations, this analysis focused primarily on the needs of the US Marines. This illustration describes the typical hierarchy of needs for the US Marines as a member of the C-IED forces operating in our focus area of Helmand province. Their basic needs must be met before they can focus on aspirations.



C-IED Force Needs

Basic Needs

C-IED forces, as represented in this study by US Marines, need the ability to succeed at their mission and return home safe with their fellow war fighters. They seek to permanently end the enemy's influence on the local populace so that they can safely leave Afghanistan comforted by the knowledge that they have accomplished their mission.

Aspirations

C-IED forces understand the central role played by the local populace in this endeavor and they desire more effective tools and methods to interact with the local populace. They wish to arrive in theater with all possible situational awareness about the theater they are entering, and equipped with the training and resources required to defeat the adversary. They desire communication skills to build relationships with members of the local populace, ANA, and ANP, and technologies to collect and analyze data about the local populace and the adversary network.

Barriers to Desired Experience

- Lack of access to and time for training on the skills needed to successfully attack the network
- Much current training is either ineffective or irrelevant for AtN
- Leadership emphasizes and rewards conventional warfare skills and attributes that are ill-fitted for AtN
- Lack of intelligence collection and analysis capabilities needed to quickly understand the environment
- Limited access to interpreters with the right qualities to adequately support their needs for communicating with the local populace in their environments
- Lack of training and resources to navigate a foreign cultural landscape to gain intelligence from the local populace or gain support for their mission
- Inability to build on the successes and relationships of their predecessors due to poor transfer of knowledge, including lessons learned and intelligence, across deployment cycles
- Inadequate training, equipment and facilities to counter the enemy's influence over the local population through shared cultural or religious commonalities
- Local perception that the US will leave Afghanistan while the adversary will endure

Adversary Network Needs

The adversary network in Lashkar Gah, Garmsir and Nawa consists primarily of Pashtun men drawn from the local area, but also includes individuals from other Pashtun-dominated areas in Afghanistan and Pakistan and "foreign fighters" who are neither local nor Pashtun.

Prior to making the decision to participate in IED activity, some IED actors are members of the local populace group. We presume that attacking the adversary network successfully requires a focus on the members of the local populace who choose to join, or at least assist, the adversary network. These local IED actors are generally not unconvertible ideologs, as the foreign fighters often are, but participate in the adversary network for a variety of non-ideological reasons.

During this project a number of issues prevented us from interviewing individuals who have conducted IED activities. As such, we were unable to assess their basic needs, aspirations, and barriers to their needs as we were for the local populace and C-IED forces. However, we accessed transcripts from interviews with 40 members of the Taliban who were interviewed by a journalist from the *Globe and Mail* in Canada. The graphic below represents a high level summery of their overall needs and beliefs as expressed in those interviews.



A Framework for the AtN Solutions

The contemporary approach to attacking the adversary network is imbalanced toward lethal actions against adversary networks. This approach must be expanded. We propose a more comprehensive framework that represents the range of actions implemented by war fighters who successfully attacked the adversary network in Helmand province. This includes building relationships to gain valuable intelligence that informs lethal and non-lethal actions to neutralize the adversary. The solutions on the following pages correspond to this framework, and together they provide an integrated set of solutions that aim to address the needs of war fighters and the local populace across the range of AtN actions.

Build Relationships
Build effective relationships with the right people in order to gain the cooperation of the local power base.

Gather Valuable Intel
Gather intelligence on the location of IEDs, the identities of people participating in the adversary network, and ways to influence people from participating in the adversary network. Then share and transfer this knowledge between deployment cycles.

Neutralize the Adversary
Eliminate through lethal and non-lethal means the IED network's ability to operate effectively by co-opting the adversary network, removing the local populace's active and passive support for the adversary network, and disrupting IED activities and supplies.

An Integrated Set of AtN Solutions

The collective expertise of 85 subject matter experts consulted during this project plus the holistic experience maps from the C-IED forces and local populace reveal these integrated and reinforcing solutions for successfully attacking the adversary network in southern Afghanistan.

AtN Fundamentals

- Prioritizing AtN
- Unloading Legacy Training
- AtN Building Blocks
- Multimedia Training Vignettes

Build Relationships

- Partnering Not Translating
- Tailoring Language Training
- ANA Co-location Continuum

Gain Valuable Intel

- Intelligent Intelligence Collection
- WiMAX for War fighters
- Eliciting Intelligence
- Hitting the Ground Running
- Integrating Red, White and Blue
- Battalion-Level Cultural Advisors

Neutralize the Adversary

- Grassroots Information Operations
- Religious Information Operations
- Restoring Honor Nonviolently

Prioritizing AtN

Elevate the priority of AtN initiatives by pushing the value of AtN from General Officers on down

Make AtN skills and tradecraft a top-down priority and implement it across DOTMLPF.

C-IED forces need a range of AtN skills and resources across the DOTMLPF spectrum to effectively disrupt adversary activity. Many of these changes depend on leadership guidance and support. Currently, the value and relevance of AtN is misunderstood, or it is inconsistently supported across the force. As a result, AtN provisioning is largely in the form of equipment or isolated, inconsistent training - not a holistic approach to changing the war fighter's focus as this solution recommends.

Steps to Making AtN a Leadership Priority



"We must truly understand 'Attack the Network.' We don't do it because we don't understand it. We need a passion for learning." – USMC Battalion Commander formerly stationed in Helmand

Unloading Legacy Training

Eliminate non-essential training to free up time and resources for more essential AtN training

Inventory all existing pre-deployment, home-station, and reset training with a team of returning veterans that aligns training with AtN, fills AtN gaps, and discards antiquated requirements.

War fighters need tailored training on AtN skills, including those for building relationships, gaining intelligence and neutralizing the adversary. The current training regime overwhelms them with pre-deployment training requirements – some unnecessary - in a compressed timeframe. Until requirements are lessened, C-IED forces will spend valuable time and financial resources on training that does not prove to be necessary in theater, and they will have less time for new training that has proven necessary in attacking the adversary network.

Training Evaluation Team

"You also need to look at this from the back-end. What did I train to and not use? Drop it." – USMC Intelligence Officer formerly stationed in Helmand

AtN Building Blocks

Restructure pre-deployment training from the ground up around AtN building blocks to shift the war fighter's attention to "left of boom"

Redesign the Pre-deployment Training Program (PTP) to include more and relevant and sustained AtN skills that target the right groups.

War fighters need training that is tailored towards those skills that have proven to be successful in attacking the adversary network. The current PTP training is imbalanced toward kinetic skills at the expense of training that will result in intelligence or local support in defeating the enemy (often non-lethal skills). Moreover, where these AtN skills are practiced, they often are singularly exercised and not sustained. As a result many forces who must exercise the spectrum of AtN skills arrive in theater unprepared for the reality they face.

Selection of AtN Training Blocks for PTP



"The way we operate in Afghanistan is not the way we train... I agree whole heartedly with this." – USMC Platoon Commander formerly stationed in Helmand

Multimedia Vignette Training

Meet the war fighter's demand for a multimedia library of tailored AtN vignettes to accelerate his understanding of AtN principles

Accelerate the war fighter's experience now by capturing lessons learned in various multimedia, organizing them around AtN principles, tailoring them for specific audiences, and making them available at all times.

Because each Afghan locality can differ greatly, war fighters often find that they cannot directly apply skills or best practices as they learned them. Currently, they receive training or lessons learned that offer prescriptive actions and conclusions, not principles that can be adapted easily to unique environments. Furthermore, the current media (often paper-based) does not tailor their presentation to the audience to maximize learning. As a result, the war fighter does not benefit from his predecessor's AtN experience, or does not learn from it in a way that is easily applied. As a result the war fighter runs the risk of repeating mistakes or losing time "re-learning" old lessons.

Multimedia Vignette Library Based on AtN METLs



Vignettes emphasize AtN principles like engaging the local populace, developing intelligence, and countering the enemy

Vignettes include details that show the direct impact of the actions on attacking the adversary network

- Tailors vignettes to learning styles of individual Marines and Soldiers
- Uses multiple techniques and media sources (i.e. articles, blogs, videos, leadership speaker series, computer-based training, etc.)
- Available during pre-deployment and deployment, such as through an unclassified web portal
- Tagged with location and date so that war fighters can seek out locally relevant cultural knowledge

"I want to learn from others' experiences before I go – what did or did not work for someone who has been there." – USMC Intelligence Officer formerly stationed in Helmand

Partnering Not Translating

Reform the processes that screen, train, and embed interpreters to give war fighters what they need: partners, not translators

Overhaul the hiring, development, and deployment of interpreters to radically change the war fighter's experience with the local populace.

War fighters must be able to communicate with and engage the local populace to gain intelligence and support for their C-IED activities. Unfortunately, war fighters have limited access today to interpreters with the right skills and attributes to build those relationships. These include people skills, physical stamina and the ability to work well with the US military. These qualities are not evaluated during hiring, nor trained to and nurtured in theater. As a result, war fighters are often unable to effectively communicate with the local populace, and miss opportunities to gain their support.

Overhauling Interpreter Management



"The implicit communication that Marines develop when operating tactically can be developed with an interpreter…. You get them to have a vested interest in your success and, therefore, you are more successful." – USMC Platoon Commander formerly stationed in Helmand

Tailoring Language Training

Fix language training with tailored language skills to enhance every squad's ability to engage the local populace

Empower each squad in every battalion to build relationships with new and improved tactical language capability that augments interpreters.

The war fighter needs basic language skills in order to engage the local populace for short periods of time so he can build a rapport in instances where limited interpreters are not immediately accessible. This rapport helps them engage the local populace in defeating the adversary network. Current language training is inadequate to enable more war fighters to initiate these basic exchanges, either because it is not given to everyone who engages with locals (e.g. squad- level patrols), it is not given in a format that is useful, or it is not sustained. As a result, patrols are sent out without an inadequate ability to engage the locals at a basic level.

Steps Towards Tailored Language Training

Screen for the right people

- Screen for the right people to receive language training, identifying individuals with the desire and aptitude to learn the local language
- Every squad trains one person to communicate with the local populace for short, simple interactions without an interpreter

↓

Provide scenario-based training

- Provide training in scenario-based formats based around the interactions most likely to occur in country
- Tailor proficiency and scenario for each level of "relationships builder' (e.g. patrol leader, civil affairs, battalion commander)

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Repeat and sustain

- Repeat training across pre-deployment and home station training; cannot be a one-time only class
- During language training, participants cannot be distracted by other taskings
- War fighters should have basic phrases memorized and cannot rely on notes

"Need to give language training to the squad leaders and up. The four day training we got was crap!" – USMC Squad Leader formerly stationed in Helmand

ANA Co-location Continuum

Co-locate elements of the ANA with the war fighter from pre-deployment to theater to strengthen partnerships and facilitate turnover

Co-locate local ANA with US forces end-to-end, from work-ups through deployment.

C-IED forces need to train with the ANA because it will facilitate relations and improve operations with them in theater. Currently, war fighters report that they are unprepared for the Afghan culture and unfamiliar with the ANA, which hurts their ability to fight effectively alongside them. The ANA must be their partners for co-opting the adversary network.

Changes Required to Co-Locate ANA



"This is the real 'out-of the-box' thinking. It's a big part of the exit strategy that the President needs to articulate." – USMC Battalion Commander formerly stationed in Helmand

Intelligent Intelligence Collection

Militarize commercial collection and analysis technologies to enable war fighters to identify and separate the enemy from the local populace

Update collection capabilities for AtN at the tactical level with 3G handhelds, portable census tools, easily-deployed sensors nets, and long-dwell sensors.

War fighters need the ability to collect information on both the local populace and the adversary network in order to target IED actors while maintaining the support of the local populace. Currently, they report that they are insufficiently trained and equipped to collect intelligence to support this type of information. War fighters at the tactical level do not have access to enough of or the right kind of collection assets (both hardware and human). As a result, their ability to collect data that identifies who's who in their area is woefully inadequate in terms of attacking the adversary network.

Features of an "Intelligent" Collections Capability



1. Each patrol has a man-portable census device with real-time, active/passive facial recognition linked to census data in the rear to capture and recognize persons; rides on new Net (WiMax for War fighters)
2. Each patrol has a hand-held, geo-rectified info device that shares person/event/pattern of life data between patrol and base in real-time; can overlay relevant data on what the patrol is looking at/who they're talking to; connected to census data
3. Each squad has low-maintenance nano-sensors for cleared areas that detect and engage IED emplacers in real time
4. Each company or platoon has 24/7 over-watch capability to include trained observers
5. Supplement military personnel with contractors to do pattern of life observations

"If we had the equipment to maintain persistent surveillance from Leatherneck to supply points we'd eliminate IEDs." – USMC Battalion Operations Officer formerly stationed in Helmand