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**Civil Affairs Populace and Resources Control  
Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures**

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**AUTHOR'S DRAFT**

**May 2011**

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**Headquarters, Department of the Army**

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Author's Draft - Not for Implementation

# ***ATTP 3-57.10 Civil Affairs Populace and Resources Control Tactics, Techniques and Procedures***

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1 **Chapter 1**

2 **Introduction**

3  
4 Military operations are not conducted in a vacuum that is free of civilian  
5 presence or influence. No matter the operational environment, military  
6 operations can be disrupted by actions of the indigenous populace.  
7 Whether it is uncontrolled and uncoordinated movement of civilians within  
8 the operational environment, or the illegal activities of sectors of the  
9 population; combatant commanders must consider populace and resources  
10 control measures in the planning and execution of operations.

11  
12 **HISTORICAL APPLICATIONS**

13 1-1. Populace and resources control (PRC) operations have been employed by combatant commanders  
14 since the first recorded history of military conquest. Military government techniques developed by the  
15 Persians, the Greeks (during the reign of Alexander the Great), and later the Romans were the basis for the  
16 administration of occupied territory by military forces in the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> centuries. U.S. Army forces have  
17 a long history of imposing PRC in occupied territory. The Mexican War (1846-1848), the Civil War, and  
18 the War with Spain (1898) provide historical examples of Army military governors proclaiming and  
19 enforcing PRC measures over occupied territory.

20 **Prior to the 19<sup>th</sup> Century**

21 1-2. The millennia before the Common Era (BCE) provides examples of various military conquests and  
22 the development of empires based on controlling territory, populations, and resources. The earliest  
23 occupations were conducted mainly to secure trade routes and commerce. The exercise of political control  
24 through native rulers was common until the time of the Assyrians in the first millennium BCE. The  
25 Assyrians were the first conquerors to organize occupied areas into provinces and govern them with  
26 military governors. Perhaps the first real instance of military government, prior to the Romans, occurred  
27 under the Persians. They adopted and improved upon the Assyrian system of organizing the occupied areas  
28 into provinces. In twenty provinces, the Persians employed native personnel for the general administration  
29 and the collection of taxes under the supervision of Persian military officials.

30 1-3. The momentum which the Persians gave to the practice of occupation administration received  
31 tremendous impetus from the Greeks under Alexander the Great. Alexander practiced several military  
32 government techniques which are still employed today. He retained the Persian governors in office in  
33 charge of civil administration, since they knew the country and local customs. Key posts, such as financial  
34 officers, he assigned to Greeks. Not only did Alexander insist upon respect for private property, including  
35 reimbursement for the debts and requisitions of his troops, but also upon the continuity of local laws,  
36 officials, and customs. Alexander encouraged the development of local resources and promoted the  
37 merging of human progress in all occupied areas.

38 1-4. From the founding of Rome in 753 BCE until the 4th century A.D., a period of at least 1200 years,  
39 the Romans conquered and occupied all the lands bordering on the Mediterranean -Asia Minor, North  
40 Africa and Europe west of the Danube and Rhine rivers. Rome's administration of occupied areas was a  
41 synthesis of all prior occupation practices. It soon became customary to entrust the government of such  
42 territories to a single Roman magistrate. Thus, by a natural transition, the word *province* became a  
43 technical term for conquered territory ruled by a Roman governor. The word *provincials* became a  
44 technical term for the inhabitants of such a conquered territory.

45 1-5. The objective of the Roman system of military government was not to restore the conquered  
46 provinces to a local or independent native government but to make all provinces an integral and  
47 indistinguishable part of the Roman Empire. One practice of Roman provincial government was in marked  
48 contrast with the modern era. Sovereignty over foreign territory was considered as passing to the Roman  
49 Empire by the fact of conquest.

50 1-6. Although the Roman provincial governor in theory had absolute power, this power was limited by  
51 customs, traditions, unwritten, and written laws. The primary mission of the governor was to restore and  
52 maintain law and order within his province by all necessary means, including military force. Obedient  
53 subjects were allowed and encouraged to develop their own governmental responsibilities and to develop  
54 their own commerce and industry. It was a basic policy of the Romans to carry on governmental business  
55 of both supervision and operation by means of existing indigenous agencies consisting of desirable native  
56 personnel. The Roman military government staff was limited to the functions of supervision and technical  
57 counseling or trouble shooting.

58 1-7. Roman provincial administration was divided into two types – senatorial and imperial. Senatorial  
59 provinces included those areas considered pacified and secure and were controlled and managed by the  
60 Roman Senate. Imperial provinces, controlled by the Emperor, included areas that were geographically  
61 isolated or where the attitude of the inhabitants was uncertain requiring the presence of large numbers of  
62 troops to maintain order. Likewise, revenues from the provinces in the form of taxes were directed either to  
63 the Senate or the Emperor. Exceptions did exist, but taxes from the provinces were mainly used to maintain  
64 the military government system in the provinces and fund the Roman general budget.

65 1-8. The imperial conquests of the great ancient civilizations had several objectives in common. While  
66 not all inclusive, among these were the control of indigenous populations, protection of commerce and  
67 trade routes, and access to natural and produced resources. Through both established bodies of law and  
68 imposed proclamations, orders, edicts, and military force when necessary, provincial governors of the  
69 conqueror attempted to maintain order over the indigenous populace and manage resources.

70 1-9. In the period after the Romans up to the 19th century, there were few major occupations, other than  
71 racial or religious movements and the colonial expansion of European nations into the New World, Africa,  
72 and the Orient. In the few instances of occupation during this period, the impress of the Roman tradition  
73 was dominant. In the period after the Romans, the major advances in regard to belligerent occupation were  
74 in the field of law. This however, was more in the abstract or philosophical plane than in the practical  
75 conduct of nation states.

## 76 **19<sup>th</sup> Century U.S. Army Occupations**

77 1-10. The Mexican War brought about the first occupation of foreign territory by U.S. forces. Major  
78 General Winfield Scott, among his very first acts, put his views of conduct for occupying troops and  
79 inhabitants of the occupied country into the form of an order. He knew that an occupying power is judged  
80 by the manner in which its troops treated the occupied population. General Scott declared “*martial law*”  
81 that supplemented the then current U.S. law known as the Rules and Articles of War of 1806.

82 1-11. General Scott’s declaration addressed the conduct of both U.S. forces and the civilian population of  
83 areas of occupation. The order had the effect which General Scott desired. He felt that his first mission was  
84 to restore and maintain law and order. It was his conviction that he couldn’t maintain law and order unless  
85 both his troops and Mexican citizens understood their duties in this respect and the punishment which  
86 would be meted out to them if they did not fulfill their responsibilities. General Scott believed in military  
87 government as an indispensable aspect of the occupying authority’s task.

88 1-12. Through General Orders and proclamations during the campaign, General Scott addressed areas of  
89 civilian government administration. Populace controls were his main priority in order to maintain law and  
90 order, protect unoffending inhabitants and their property, and secure his extended lines of communication.  
91 Public health, education, and finance all were addressed during the occupation of Mexico. A number of

92 economic reforms were also instituted as a part of an overall resources control strategy that included  
93 revision to tax and tariff collection and the break-up of certain production monopolies.

94 1-13. The War with Spain resulted in the occupation of Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippine Islands by  
95 U.S. forces. All were initially administered by military governors under the direction of an Army general  
96 officer. The initial proclamations to the civilian populaces had common themes regarding the intentions of  
97 the occupying force. In all cases, control of the indigenous populations and the resources of the islands  
98 were a priority of the occupying forces. Each of the proclamations addressed—

- 99 • Maintaining the current laws and customs of the population.
- 100 • Overthrow of Spanish armed authority rule of the population.
- 101 • Physical protection of the civilian population and private property.
- 102 • Promotion of civilian prosperity.

103 1-14. Military governors administered Puerto Rico until May 1, 1900, when President McKinley appointed  
104 the colony's first civilian governor. Presidential appointees as governors continued until Puerto Rico was  
105 granted commonwealth status during President Truman's administration. Cuba remained under military  
106 government administration until granted independence in 1901 at which time, Major General Leonard  
107 Wood transitioned control to the civil administration of Cuban president-elect Palma.

108 1-15. The Philippines were administered by military governors until the first civilian Philippine  
109 Commission was appointed by the President in 1900. Military governors were designated in specific  
110 provinces within the Philippines to deal with various tribal insurgencies on an intermittent basis until 1908.  
111 Populace control measures were a mission priority in dealing with these insurgencies. The Philippines were  
112 granted full independence in 1946.

## 113 **20<sup>th</sup> Century Applications**

114 1-16. Historical applications of PRC operations in liberated territory and administration of occupied  
115 territory by military government both during and post World Wars I and II and the Korean War are well  
116 documented. Managing large populations of dislocated civilians, controlling black market activities, and  
117 implementing border security measures are examples of PRC operations executed by commanders to secure  
118 indigenous populations and enable force protection.

119 1-17. One of the most valuable and successful elements during the Vietnam conflict was the civil  
120 operations and rural development support (CORDS) program, which was the civil affairs operations/civil-  
121 military operations aspect of American forces. In mid-1968, the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam  
122 (MACV) commander and his civilian deputy used CORDS as the implementing mechanism for an  
123 accelerated pacification program that became the priority effort for the United States.

124 1-18. The effectiveness of CORDS was a function of integrated civilian and military teams at every level  
125 of society in Vietnam. Success in meeting basic needs of the populace led to improved intelligence that  
126 facilitated an assault on the Viet Cong political infrastructure. PRC measures implemented denied the Viet  
127 Cong access to and secured the population. Denial of access adversely impacted the insurgents' ability to  
128 sustain operations by removing their ability to obtain supplies and other resources.

129 1-19. The post-Vietnam era up to Operation DESERT STORM saw relatively few short term interventions  
130 by U.S. forces. After the end of the Gulf War, Saddam Hussein turned against his own people. Dissident  
131 Shiites in southern Iraq and Kurds in northern Iraq were emboldened by Hussein's defeat and revolted  
132 against his regime, but Hussein had withheld or evacuated forces sufficient to secure his hold on power in  
133 Iraq. Hussein crushed first the Shiite rebellion in the south, then the Kurds in the north causing a major  
134 refugee crisis.

135 1-20. The Kurds in northern Iraq were particularly hard hit; and over a half-million of them streamed north  
136 into the mountains of southern Turkey. Kurdish refugees in Turkey were in a desperate plight facing  
137 disease, cold, and hunger. Kurds were dying by the hundreds and quickly overwhelmed the capacity of  
138 relief agencies to support them in the border areas. The U.S. and North Atlantic Treaty Organization

139 (NATO) responded by initiating Operation PROVIDE COMFORT. The operation was based on three  
140 sequential mission imperatives: stop the dying and suffering in the mountains, resettle the refugees in  
141 temporary camps, and return the refugees to their original homes.

142 1-21. The initial phases of the operation combined humanitarian relief and populace control measures to  
143 stabilize the Kurdish refugee situation in southern Turkey. U.S. European Command (EUCOM) responded  
144 with Air Force assets and Special Operations Forces (SOF). These forces were soon reinforced with Civil  
145 Affairs and other forces awaiting redeployment in Saudi Arabia as the task organization matured. SOF's  
146 organizational and reach-back capabilities proved of great value in facilitating the integration of  
147 nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) into the overall relief effort. Over time, useful working  
148 relationships developed among SOF, the NGOs, other allied soldiers in the encampments, and the Kurdish  
149 family and clan leadership.

150 1-22. As the humanitarian situation improved, attention shifted to returning the Kurds to their homes in  
151 northern Iraq. This required, in effect, yet another invasion of Iraq. The Kurds would not return to homes  
152 the Iraqi Army occupied. Coalition forces would have to provide a security envelope within Iraq into which  
153 the Kurds could resettle. U.S., British, and French forces entered northern Iraq meeting little opposition.  
154 Trusting the security situation, the Kurds left the mountain camps and returned to their ancestral homes.  
155 Civilian relief agency volunteers accompanied the return, and international efforts to replant, rebuild, and  
156 refurbish soon followed the returning refugees.

157 1-23. During the 1990s, the U.S. intervened militarily in a number of peacekeeping and humanitarian  
158 operations that emphasized civil security and populace control. Operations in northern Iraq, Somalia, and  
159 Haiti reflected changing policies with respect to military intervention on the part of both the United Nations  
160 (UN) and the United States. Even when lead by the U.S., operations normally transitioned to a  
161 multinational force under UN command. Peacekeepers found themselves providing humanitarian aid and  
162 attempting to enforce cease-fire agreements in failed states.

163 1-24. The United States found itself heavily involved in multinational efforts to bring peace to the  
164 Balkans, especially Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Kosovo. Yugoslavia had been a post-World War  
165 I construct that artificially conglomerated Serbs, Slovenes, Croats, Bosnian Muslims, Albanians,  
166 Macedonians, Montenegrins, Hungarians, and others into a single state. After the death of Yugoslavia's  
167 communist leader, Tito, ethnic rivalries again emerged and the former nation of Yugoslavia disintegrated.  
168 Ethnic conflict ensued with Slovenia and Croatia successfully winning wars of independence during 1991.  
169 The Muslim plurality of Bosnia-Herzegovina attempt at independence was met with internal strife from  
170 Bosnian Serbs with support from the Serb-dominated Yugoslav National Army. The Serbs pursued a  
171 campaign of "ethnic cleansing" forcing Croats and Bosnian Muslims from areas they wanted to control by  
172 means of intimidation and mass murder. This resulted in the dislocation of over a million people.

173 1-25. The UN deployed a United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in 1992 to enforce agreed-upon  
174 cease-fires and to facilitate humanitarian relief. This force proved no match for the heavily armed Serbs.  
175 The Bosnian conflict continued to escalate with the Serbs laying siege to Sarajevo. In August 1995, NATO  
176 responded with a sustained air campaign against Serbian guns and heavy equipment surrounding Sarajevo,  
177 while the U.S. deployed forces to Macedonia to ensure that the conflict did not widen. A combination of  
178 international sanctions, NATO military action, and Serbian defeats by allied Croat and Bosnian Muslim  
179 forces resulted in the Serbs' ratification of the Bosnian Peace Agreement also known as the Dayton  
180 Accords.

181 1-26. The agreement authorized the deployment of a UN-sanctioned, NATO-led implementation force  
182 (IFOR) charged with—

- 183 • Compliance with the cease-fire.
- 184 • Separation of the forces.
- 185 • Withdrawal of forces out of zones of separation into their respective territories.
- 186 • Collection of heavy weapons into agreed cantonment sites.

- 187
- Safe withdrawal of UN forces.
- 188
- Control of Bosnian air space

189 1-27. IFOR assisted in humanitarian efforts and the repatriation of refugees. Crime was rampant and in the  
 190 absence of a capable and reliable police force, allied Soldiers soon found themselves deeply involved in  
 191 law and order issues. PRC measures were a priority mission in the separation of forces and protection of the  
 192 various ethnic populations from intimidation and reprisals. IFOR was followed by a UN-sanctioned,  
 193 NATO-led stabilization force (SFOR), supported by U.S. forces, that continued operations well into the  
 194 21st century.

195 1-28. Serbian nationalist aggression then turned on its province of Kosovo whose population was  
 196 overwhelmingly ethnic Albanian. Again, a campaign of ethnic cleansing atrocities was executed to change  
 197 the demographics of the province and bring about a Serbian majority. Serbian actions caused another  
 198 humanitarian crisis by forcing Kosovar Albanians to flee to the mountains, Macedonia, and Albania. The  
 199 sheer mass of the refugee crisis threatened to overwhelm those countries. The UN and NATO responded  
 200 with legal and economic sanctions against the Serbian government and an air campaign targeting Serb  
 201 forces and strategic infrastructure. Serbia eventually signed a Military Technical Agreement with NATO  
 202 that led to the deployment of a multinational peace enforcement military contingent.

203 1-29. Entitled Operation JOINT GUARDIAN, NATO divided Kosovo into five multinational brigade  
 204 sectors: MNB-North (France), MNB-Central (United Kingdom), MNB-West (Italy), MNB-South  
 205 (Germany), and MNB-East (United States) (See Figure 1-1). Other UN member states provided troops to  
 206 the Kosovo Force (KFOR) including Russia and several former Soviet Union countries.




Figure 1-1. Kosovo Force Sectors

207  
208

209 1-30. The mission priorities of KFOR included—  
210 • Establish a secure presence in Kosovo in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1244  
211 and the Military Technical Agreement between NATO and Yugoslavia.  
212 • Verify and enforce the terms of the Military Technical Agreement.  
213 • Establish a safe and secure environment for refugees and displaced persons.  
214 • Establish a secure environment to permit international organizations to operate, interim  
215 administrations to function, and humanitarian aid to be delivered.  
216 • Help achieve a self-sustaining, secure environment to transfer public responsibilities to civil  
217 authority.

218 1-31. As Serbian security forces withdrew, ethnic Albanians initiated a wave of destruction against  
219 indigenous Serbs that equaled in method what they had experienced earlier during the Serbian ethnic  
220 cleansing of the province. Anything Serbian was destroyed or vandalized. In the absence of an effective  
221 police force, PRC measures dominated daily KFOR operations to establish law and order. Curfews,  
222 restrictions on assembly, crowd and riot control, movement controls and border security were all used to  
223 institute order. KFOR Soldiers also supported humanitarian relief efforts, repatriation of refugees, and  
224 liaison with allies, NGOs, and local officials.

225 1-32. By 2000, United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) was adequately staffed at local levels to  
226 assume many of the civil administrative responsibilities. The UNMIK mission was to promote the  
227 commercial development of the province, rebuild the economy, oversee local elections, develop a civilian  
228 police force, and generally improve the quality of life for all Kosovars while KFOR provided continued  
229 security. UNMIK is still active today.

### 230 **Current Operations**

231 1-33. Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) (Afghanistan) and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF)  
232 have dominated Army deployments since 2001. Both operations' strategic imperative was regime change.  
233 The former to remove the Taliban and its support to international terrorist organizations; the later to remove  
234 Saddam Hussein and the Baathist party's grip on power in Iraq and its destabilizing influence in the Middle  
235 East.

236 1-34. With the fall of Baghdad early in OIF, Iraq's security apparatus collapsed and coalition forces  
237 proved too few to police the country and maintain law and order. The impoverished sections of the  
238 population saw their chance to seize something—anything—for themselves. Palaces were stripped of  
239 furniture, doorknobs, and electrical wire. Hospitals were stripped of diagnostic equipment and medical  
240 supplies. Power-transmission lines were toppled and the copper and other metals in them melted down for  
241 resale abroad. Government buildings were left as empty shells. There was no particular rhyme or reason for  
242 most of the looting, and the world viewed this through the media embedded with front line organizations.

243 1-35. After these regimes fell, the Army inherited security requirements that were complex, arduous, and  
244 of indeterminate duration. As operations moved into Phase IV, Stabilize, forces became extensively  
245 involved in peacekeeping, occupation duties, and reconstruction. Counterinsurgent operations focused on  
246 securing and controlling the population, resources, borders, and critical infrastructure of the countries while  
247 conducting combat operations against indigenous insurgents and foreign terrorist fighters.

248 1-36. Reconstruction and counterinsurgency operations continue in both Afghanistan and Iraqi today.  
249 Coalition forces continue to organize, train, and equip both police and military forces to assume internal  
250 security missions. Civil security remains a priority while interagency partners work to reinstitute  
251 governance, rule of law, and the economies.

252

253

## 254 **AUTHORITIES**

255 1-37. A commander's authority to institute PRC measures in a foreign country stems from an inherent  
256 command responsibility to protect the force and may originate from a number of different sources to  
257 include—

- 258 • International law.
- 259 • Intergovernmental resolution.
- 260 • Diplomatic agreement or treaty.
- 261 • Operation orders.
- 262 • Rules of engagement.

263 1-38. The conduct of armed hostilities by U.S. forces is regulated by international law, both written and  
264 unwritten, U.S. statutory law, and the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). Each of the Services  
265 publishes authoritative legal guidance on the conduct of warfare; for the Army this is known as the Law of  
266 Land Warfare (See FM 27-10).

### 267 **International Law**

268 1-39. International law addressing the conduct of warfare is inspired by the desire to diminish the  
269 destructive effects of war by—

- 270 • Protecting both combatants and noncombatants from unnecessary suffering.
- 271 • Safeguarding certain fundamental human rights of persons who fall into the hands of the enemy,  
272 particularly prisoners of war, the wounded and sick, and civilians.
- 273 • Facilitating the restoration of peace.

274 1-40. Lawmaking treaties agreed to by nation states, such as the Hague and Geneva Conventions, are one  
275 principle source of international law regarding warfare. Another principle source is known as customary  
276 law which is unwritten law firmly established by the customs of nations and well defined by recognized  
277 authorities on international law. A significant portion of international humanitarian law is considered  
278 "customary". A third source of international law comes from intergovernmental resolution, for example a  
279 UN Security Council resolution. Full text versions of existing treaties, conventions, and protocols may be  
280 obtained from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) (<http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf>).

281 1-41. With regard to PRC, international law identifies the necessity to protect non-combatants, public and  
282 private property, and cultural property during both international and non-international armed conflicts. An  
283 occupying power is specifically charged by Article 43 of the Hague Convention to "*...take all the  
284 measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while  
285 respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country.*" Coalition forces, in the initially  
286 phases of OIF, were considered "occupying" forces.

### 287 **Diplomatic Agreement or Treaty**

288 1-42. Agreements negotiated by the Department of State (DOS), in coordination with the Department of  
289 Defense (DOD), and a foreign government where U.S. forces are forward deployed delineate the legal  
290 status, actions, and authorities of those forces while stationed within the country. Commonly known as a  
291 Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), it provides the legal framework for day-to-day operations of U.S.  
292 personnel while in a foreign country. A SOFA is generally a stand-alone document concluded as an  
293 executive agreement and is often included, along with other types of military agreements, as part of a  
294 comprehensive security arrangement. The SOFA may be unique in that it may contain authorization by the  
295 host government for U.S. forces to engage in military operations within the country.

296 1-43. Mutual defense or security cooperation treaties ratified the U.S. and an allied nation also provided  
297 another source of authority for U.S. commanders to conduct military operations within a foreign country. In  
298 times of crisis, U.S. commanders may be authorized by a civil affairs agreement with the allied government

299 to exercise certain authority normally the function of the local government. Civil administration is often  
300 established in allied areas which are liberated from enemy occupation. It is normally required when the  
301 government of the area concerned is unable or unwilling to assume full responsibility for its administration.  
302 Military government may be established in the area as a provisional and interim measure and would include  
303 PRC operations in order to facilitate the return of public order and security to the area.

## 304 **Operation Orders**

305 1-44. Operation orders contain the authority for the execution of military operations. Dependent on the  
306 mission, planned PRC actions are addressed in Appendix 4, (*Populace and Resources Control*) to Annex K  
307 (*Civil Affairs Operations*) of the order. (See Appendix A). Planned PRC actions are coordinated with the  
308 staff protection cell and incorporated with the overall operational area security plan. Specific areas of PRC,  
309 such as dislocated civilian operations, are coordinated with the various staff cells and integrated with the  
310 overall plan.

## 311 **Rules of Engagement**

312 1-45. Rules of engagement (ROE) are directives issued by competent military authority that delineate the  
313 circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will initiate and/or continue combat  
314 engagement with other forces encountered. Standing ROE (SROE) are published as a Chairman of the Joint  
315 Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) to provide guidance to commanders on the development of theater or  
316 mission specific ROE. Operation orders tell troops what they should do while the rules of engagement  
317 instruct them what they can do.

318 1-46. The ROE authorized for a mission will typically include specific instructions regarding the use of  
319 force. In addition to self-defense, ROE reflect multiple components, including guidance from higher  
320 authorities, the tactical considerations of the specific mission, and international law. Succinct and  
321 unambiguous rules are essential. Planning considerations for ROE with regard to PRC include—

- 322 • Protection of freedom of movement of persons.
- 323 • Search and detention of persons.
- 324 • Use of force to protect property.
- 325 • Inspection, seizure, and destruction of property.
- 326 • Crowd and riot control.
- 327 • Use of force in assistance to host-nation civil authorities, including law enforcement.

328 1-47. ROE must be continuously reviewed to ensure that they are clear and lawful, that they are sufficient  
329 to address the requirements of the mission, and that they provide the commander with the necessary powers  
330 to deal effectively with the threat and security environment.

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## Chapter 2

# Populace Control

Populace control provides security for the indigenous populace, mobilizes human resources, denies access to the populace by the enemy, and detects and reduces the effectiveness of enemy agents. Populace control measures include, but are not limited to, curfews, movement restrictions, travel permits, registration cards, and resettlement of civilians. Dislocated civilian (DC) operations and noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs) are two special categories of populace control that require extensive planning and coordination among various military and nonmilitary organizations.

## OVERVIEW

2-1. Populace and resources control (PRC) consists of two distinct, yet linked, components: populace control and resources control. Both components are normally a responsibility of indigenous civil governments. During times of civil or military emergency, proper authorities define, enact, and enforce PRC measures. For practical and security reasons, military forces employ PRC measures of some type and to varying degrees in military operations across full spectrum operations. PRC operations are executed with, and as an integral part of, military operations.

2-2. Planning PRC measures occurs for every mission, in all environments. The extent of PRC measures that may be implemented is based on the operational environment in which military forces are employed. When U.S. forces are deployed in support of a host nation (HN), the sovereignty of the legitimate government to govern over the people and resources within its borders is upheld and strengthened by U.S. PRC policy. In the absence of a sovereign government, implementation of PRC policy begins with the establishment of an interim governing plan whether that is executed through the HN, military, or a transitional government. PRC measures implemented at the operational and tactical levels result from policy developed at national strategic and theater strategic levels.

2-3. Populace control measures are a key element in the execution of primary stability operations tasks in the areas of civil security and civil control. Populace control involves establishing public order and safety; securing borders, population centers, and individuals. International law requires the military force to focus on essential tasks that establish a safe, secure environment and address the immediate humanitarian needs of the local populace. This requires a capability to secure borders, protect the population, hold individuals accountable for criminal activities, control the activities of individuals or groups that pose a security risk, reestablish essential civil services, and set conditions in the operational environment that support stability unity of effort.

## OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

2-4. Joint doctrine defines an operational environment as a composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences which affect the employment of military forces and bear on the decisions of the commander. Operational concepts describe the future operational environment as “uncertain and complex” in an era of persistent conflict. The operational environment evolves over time and changes due to military operations. Operational environments vary across the spectrum of conflict based on a number of factors. Situational understanding develops with detailed analysis of the operational and mission variables of the environment. A component of this analysis is population centric.

2-5. The authority and extent of populace control measures that a commander may impose varies greatly with the type of mission and the operational environment. The operational environment includes a wide variety of intangible factors such as the culture, perceptions, beliefs, and values of adversary, neutral, or friendly political and social systems. These factors must be analyzed and continuously assessed throughout the operations process to develop situational understanding of the environment. The characterization of the

47 operational environment as permissive, uncertain, or hostile further impacts the planning for and the  
48 execution of populace control measures.

49 2-6. Determining what populace control measures to employ requires a framework that applies across the  
50 spectrum of conflict, from stable peace to general war. Measures are planned and integrated across the  
51 spectrum, reflecting the execution of a wide range of civil security and civil control tasks performed under  
52 the umbrella of various operational environments such as—

- 53 • Support of a partner nation as part of security cooperation.
- 54 • Actions after a natural or man-made disaster as part of a foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA)  
55 limited intervention.
- 56 • During peace operations to enforce international peace agreements.
- 57 • Support of a legitimate HN government during irregular warfare.
- 58 • During major combat operations to meet the requirements of international law with respect to the  
59 indigenous population and establish conditions that facilitate post-conflict activities.
- 60 • In a post-conflict environment following the general cessation of organized hostilities.

61 2-7. Analysis of the civil component of the operational environment includes the development of  
62 information critical to the planning of populace control measures. While not all inclusive, the following  
63 civil affairs operations (CAO) planning considerations provide a common framework for populace control  
64 planning and execution—

- 65 • What is the characterization of the operational environment (permissive, uncertain, or hostile)?
- 66 • What is the status and character of the indigenous civil government?
- 67 • Do the civil government public safety authorities have the capability and capacity to maintain  
68 public order within the area of operations?
- 69 • What are the numbers, ethnicities, demographics, religious affiliations, and concentrations of the  
70 indigenous population within the area of operations?
- 71 • Does a significant DC population currently exist?
- 72 • What are the numbers, ethnicities, demographics, point of origin, direction of movement, and  
73 modes of transportation of the DC population?
- 74 • What is the assessment of key indigenous organizations influencing the population (political,  
75 religious, economic, and private sector)?
- 76 • What is the attitude of the indigenous population (supportive, neutral, or hostile)?
- 77 • What is the assessment of key intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and nongovernmental  
78 organizations (NGOs) operating in the area of operation (AO)?
- 79 • What amount and type of physical damage is affecting the civil government, particularly in  
80 medical, transportation, public utilities, and communications infrastructure?
- 81 • What authority exists for the implementation of population control measures?
- 82 • Do the existing rules of engagement (ROE) address population control such as crowd and riot  
83 control, criminal activity, looting?

## 84 OPERATIONAL THEMES


85 2-8. Army doctrine uses the term *operational theme* to describe the character of the dominant major  
86 operation being conducted at any time within a land force commander's area of operations. Operational  
87 themes emphasize the differences among the various types of joint operations. Refer to FM 3-0, *Operations*  
88 for further information regarding operational themes.

89 2-9. Army operational themes consist of—

- 90 • Peacetime military engagement.
- 91 • Limited intervention.
- 92 • Peace operations.

- 93 • Irregular warfare.
- 94 • Major combat operations.

95 2-10. The probability that the execution of some form of populace control measures exists within all  
 96 operational themes. In fact, a number of joint operations are population centric such as NEO or FHA.  
 97 Figure 2-1 indicates that the necessity of instituting populace control measures within the operational  
 98 themes increases as the level of violence increases within the operational environment.



99 **Figure 2-1. Comparison of Populace Control measures and Operational Themes**

100 **PEACETIME MILITARY ENGAGEMENT**

101 2-11. Peacetime military engagement actions are designed to support a combatant commander’s objectives  
 102 within the theater security cooperation plan (TSCP). Activities within this operational theme encourage  
 103 regional stability by shaping the security environment in peacetime in conjunction with allied or coalition  
 104 military partners. National strategic policy, DOD directives, regulations, and TSCP frame the activities  
 105 executed within peacetime military engagement.

- 106 2-12. Populace control measures CAO planners consider during mission analysis in support of peacetime  
107 military engagement activities include–
- 108 • Indigenous populace access control measures to areas and facilities occupied by U.S. forces during  
109 multinational exercises and training events.
  - 110 • Theater policies regarding the interactions of U.S. forces and the indigenous populace.
  - 111 • ROE regarding crowd and riot control measures.
  - 112 • Populace control authority granted by bilateral agreement with a partner nation in support of  
113 counterdrug operations.
  - 114 • Populace control advisory and assistance requirements in support of a HN in the execution of  
115 security assistance missions.

### 116 **LIMITED INTERVENTION**

117 2-13. Limited intervention missions are clearly defined and limited in scope. Restrictions placed on the  
118 types of supporting operations, the size of force, and the duration of operations are characteristic of limited  
119 intervention operations. The most common joint operations requiring detailed populace control planning  
120 and execution within this operational theme are NEO, FHA, and consequence management (CM).

121 2-14. CAO planning considerations with regard to populace control measures in support of limited  
122 intervention operations include–

- 123 • Common framework CAO planning considerations for populace control (see paragraph 2-7  
124 above).
- 125 • DC planning considerations (see Appendix B) in support of FHA and CM.
- 126 • NEO planning considerations (see Appendix C).
- 127 • Mission specific ROE regarding populace control actions.
- 128 • Legal authority to execute populace control measures.
- 129 • Mission restrictions regarding the interactions of U.S. forces with the indigenous populace.

### 130 **PEACE OPERATIONS**

131 2-15. Peace operations include peacekeeping, peace enforcement, peacemaking, peace building, and  
132 conflict prevention efforts (JP 3-07.3). The character of each peace operation is unique, reflecting the  
133 political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure characteristics of the operational  
134 environment. Peace operations may be conducted under the sponsorship of the United Nations (UN),  
135 another intergovernmental organization (IGO), within a coalition of agreeing nations, or unilaterally.

136 2-16. Populace control measures implemented during peace operations directly support the  
137 reestablishment of a safe and secure environment to set the conditions for progress towards long-term  
138 political settlement. The authority to impose populace control measures originates from the political  
139 mandate that establishes the force; refined by mission specific ROE. Most prevalent during peace  
140 enforcement and peacekeeping operations, populace control measures may include–

- 141 • Control measures for urban and rural areas.
- 142 • Establishment and enforcement of curfews.
- 143 • Control measures supporting the separation and neutralization of belligerent forces.
- 144 • Establishing indigenous population movement restrictions.
- 145 • Controlling the borders to prevent external support to a conflict.
- 146 • Restrictions on civilian assembly.

### 147 **IRREGULAR WARFARE**

148 2-17. Irregular warfare is a violent struggle among state and nonstate actors for legitimacy and influence  
149 over a population. Irregular warfare is warfare among and within the indigenous population. Joint  
150 operations grouped within this operational theme include; foreign internal defense (FID),  
151 counterinsurgency, combating terrorism, support to insurgency, and unconventional warfare. Special

152 operations forces' (SOF) core activities directly correspond with these operations. Most irregular warfare  
 153 operations are executed by SOF and supported by conventional forces. FM 3-05, *Army Special Operations*  
 154 *Forces* provides additional information on SOF core activities.

155 2-18. Populace control measures are a key enabler of the SOF core activities grouped under the irregular  
 156 warfare operational theme. FM 3-57, *Civil Affairs Operations*, provides additional information on CAO  
 157 support to SOF core activities.

158 **MAJOR COMBAT OPERATIONS**

159 2-19. Successful major combat operations defeat or destroy the enemy's armed forces and seize terrain.  
 160 The impact on the indigenous population of the operational environment in which major combat operations  
 161 occur can be devastating. Interruption of civilian supply activities, dislocation of civilian populations, and  
 162 numerous casualties are just several of the detrimental effects major combat operations may impose on an  
 163 indigenous population.

164 2-20. Populace control measures executed during major combat operations are designed to support the  
 165 commander's concept of operations (CONOP) by–

- 166 • Fulfilling the commander's responsibilities under U.S. domestic and international laws relevant to  
 167 civilian populations.
- 168 • Controlling and coordinating movement of dislocated civilians in the environment to support  
 169 freedom of maneuver of the force.
- 170 • Relocating the population as necessitated by military operations.
- 171 • Controlling the movement of civilians in the environment conducting legitimate activities.
- 172 • Minimizing civilian interference with military operations and the impact of military operations on  
 173 the civilian populace.

174 **DISLOCAED CIVILIAN OPERATIONS**

175 2-21. The term “*dislocated civilian*” refers to several categories of civilians such as a displaced person, an  
 176 evacuee, an internally displaced person, a migrant, a refugee, or a stateless person. Legal and political  
 177 considerations define these categories. DCs are civilians who have been removed or left their homes, or  
 178 places of habitual residence for reasons such as fear of persecution or to avoid the effects of armed conflict,  
 179 situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights, natural or human-made disasters, or  
 180 economic privation. FM 3-57, *Civil Affairs Operations*, provides additional information on the categories  
 181 of DCs.

182 2-22. DC operations (also commonly referred to as resettlement operations) pertain to those actions  
 183 required to move civilians out of harm's way or to safeguard a displaced population in the aftermath of a  
 184 disaster. The disaster may be natural, as in a flood or an earthquake, or human-made, as in combat  
 185 operations, social or political strife, or a hazardous material emergency, such as a chemical, biological, or  
 186 radiological spill. DC operations may occur across the spectrum of conflict or be the main focus of a  
 187 limited contingency operation such as FHA.

188 2-23. Typically, the UN or other IGOs and NGOs build and administer DC camps, if needed, and provide  
 189 basic assistance and services to the affected population. However, when the U.S. military is requested to  
 190 provide support, dislocated civilian support missions may include camp organization (basic construction  
 191 and administration); provision of care (food, supplies, medical treatment, and protection); and placement  
 192 (movement or relocation to other countries, camps, and locations). An important priority for the  
 193 management of DCs is the utilization of the services and facilities of non-DOD agencies when coordination  
 194 can be accomplished. DC operations are often long-term and require resourcing normally not immediately  
 195 available through DOD sources.

196 2-24. DC operations are the most basic collective task performed by CA Soldiers. The goals of DC  
 197 operations are to protect civilians from the effects of violence or disaster and to minimize civilian  
 198 interference with military operations. DC operations include the planning and management of DC routes,  
 199 collection points, assembly areas, and camps in support of the efforts of the HN, NGOs, and IGOs. They

200 also include FHA support to the affected populace. The military police (MP) are a key component to the  
201 successful planning and execution of DC operations. The protection staff should be involved early in the  
202 planning process.

203 2-25. In rare instances, Army forces may be called upon to establish dislocated civilian camps in a HN. In  
204 these cases, the force must take into account: legal considerations regarding availability and ownership of  
205 land for camps; logistic factors connected with shelter, food, sanitation, and medical care; and possible  
206 contracting requirements for construction. In planning DC operations, the primary factor is transition  
207 planning for the care and transfer of responsibility for the DC population to a controlling agency.  
208 Controlling agencies (for example, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Office for  
209 the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs [OCHA], International Committee of the Red Cross [ICRC], or  
210 HN) normally care for the basic needs of DCs—food, water, shelter, sanitation, and security. Controlling  
211 agencies also must be prepared to prevent or arrest the outbreak of communicable disease among DCs. This  
212 last point is important for the health of the populace and supporting military forces.

213 2-26. DC plans support the commander's OPLAN and require extensive coordination among operational,  
214 legal, logistics, interagency, HN, NGO, and IGO partners. As a minimum, DC plans must address—

- 215 • Authorized extent of migration and evacuation.
- 216 • Minimum standards of care.
- 217 • Status and disposition of all DCs.
- 218 • Designation of routes and control measures for movement control.
- 219 • Cultural and dietary considerations.
- 220 • Designation and delegation of responsibilities.

221 2-27. The CA supporting tasks in DC operations support the commander's CONOP and administer DC  
222 control measures. Generally, CA Soldier tasks include—

- 223 • Identifying or evaluating existing HN and international community DC plans and operations.
- 224 • Advising on DC control measures that would effectively support the military operation.
- 225 • Advising on the implementation DC control measures.
- 226 • Publicizing control measures among the indigenous population.
- 227 • Assessing measures of effectiveness (MOEs).
- 228 • Participating in the execution of selected DC operations and activities, as needed or directed in  
229 coordination with internationally mandated organizations (for example, UNHCR, OCHA, and  
230 ICRC) for their care.
- 231 • Providing liaison to controlling agencies.
- 232 • Assisting in the arbitration of problems arising from implementing DC control measures.

## 233 **NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS**

234 2-28. By Executive Order, the Department of State (DOS) is responsible for the protection or evacuation  
235 of U.S. citizens and nationals abroad and for safeguarding their overseas property abroad, in consultation  
236 with the Secretaries of Defense (SecDef) and Health and Human Services. During NEOs the U.S.  
237 Ambassador, not the combatant commander (CCDR) or subordinate joint force commander (JFC), is the  
238 senior United States Government (USG) authority for the evacuation and, as such, is ultimately responsible  
239 for the successful completion of the NEO and the safety of the evacuees. The decision to evacuate an  
240 American Embassy and the order to execute a NEO is political.

241 2-29. Evacuations occur in response to diverse crises and differ considerably in scope, size, and  
242 complexity; large-scale evacuations of American citizens are rare. In recent years, evacuations have  
243 occurred on a regular basis—over the period 2002-2006, DOS authorized or ordered evacuation on an  
244 average of one overseas post every three (3) weeks. According to data compiled by DOS, DOD has  
245 provided assistance on only four (4) occasions during this same period.

246 2-30. NEO refers to the authorized and orderly departure of noncombatants from a specific area by the  
 247 DOS, DOD, or other appropriate authority. Although normally considered in connection with combat  
 248 operations, NEO can also include evacuations in anticipation of, or in response to, any natural or human-  
 249 made disaster in a foreign country and when evacuation is warranted to safe havens or to the United States  
 250 because of civil unrest.

251 2-31. DOD defines two categories of noncombatant evacuees—

- 252 • U.S. citizens who may be ordered to evacuate by competent authority, including—
- 253     ▪ Civilian employees of all agencies of the USG and their dependents.
- 254     ▪ Military personnel of the U.S. Armed Forces specifically designated for evacuation as
- 255     noncombatants.
- 256     ▪ Dependents of members of the U.S. Armed Forces.
- 257 • U.S. (and non-U.S.) citizens who may be authorized or assisted (but not necessarily ordered) by
- 258 competent authority to evacuate, including—
- 259     ▪ Civilian employees of USG agencies and their dependents, who are residents in the country,
- 260     but are willing to be evacuated.
- 261     ▪ Private U.S. citizens and their dependents.
- 262     ▪ Military personnel and their dependents, short of an ordered evacuation.
- 263     ▪ Designated aliens, including dependents of civilian employees of the USG and military
- 264     personnel of the U.S. Armed Forces, as prescribed by the DOS.

265 2-32. NEOs remove threatened civilians from locations in an HN to safe havens or to the United States.  
 266 The United States uses military assets in an evacuation only when civilian resources are inadequate. The  
 267 DOS may request assistance from DOD in conducting evacuations to—

- 268 • Protect U.S. citizens abroad.
- 269 • Minimize the number of U.S. citizens at risk.
- 270 • Minimize the number of U.S. citizens in combat areas to avoid impairing the combat effectiveness
- 271 of military forces.

272 2-33. The CA supporting tasks in a NEO are of support to the commander’s operational function and to  
 273 the administration of certain aspects of the NEO. Generally, CA tasks include—

- 274 • Advising the commander of the CAO aspects and implications of current and proposed NEO
- 275 plans, including writing the CAO annex to the OPLAN.
- 276 • Performing liaison with the embassy, to include acting as a communications link with U.S. forces
- 277 in the operational area.
- 278 • Conducting an initial CAO assessment of the AO to validate information and assumptions of the
- 279 CAO running estimate and advising the commander of CAO-related issues affecting the NEO.
- 280 • Supporting the operation of evacuation sites, holding areas for non-U.S. nationals denied
- 281 evacuation, and reception or processing stations.
- 282 • Assisting in the identification of U.S. citizens and other evacuees.
- 283 • Assisting in the receiving, screening, processing, briefing, and debriefing of evacuees.
- 284 • Recommending actions to the commander to minimize population interference with current and
- 285 proposed military operations.
- 286 • Assisting in safe-haven activities, as required.

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287 *Note.* JP 3-68, *Noncombatant Evacuation Operations*, and FM 3-05.104, *Army Special*  
 288 *Operations Forces Noncombatant Evacuation Operations*, provide additional information  
 289 on NEO.

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## Chapter 3

# Resources Control

Resources control provides security for the indigenous natural and produced materiel resources of a nation state, mobilizes economic resources, denies access to resources by the enemy, and detects and reduces the effectiveness of enemy and criminal activity. Resources control measures include, but are not limited to, licensing, regulations or guidelines, checkpoints, border security to include customs inspections, ration controls, amnesty programs, and inspection of facilities.

## OVERVIEW

3-1. Resources control directly impacts the economic system of a host nation (HN) or territory occupied and governed by U.S. forces. Resources control measures regulate public and private property and the production, movement, or consumption of materiel resources. Controlling a nation's resources is normally the responsibility of indigenous civil governments. During times of civil or military emergency, proper authorities define, enact, and enforce resources control measures to maintain public order and enable the execution of primary stability operations tasks in the areas of civil security, civil control, restoration of essential services, and support to economic and infrastructure development.

3-2. Resources control, to include control of public and private movable and unmovable property, is most prevalent during a U.S. forces' occupation of a foreign territory. However, control measures may be implemented across the spectrum of conflict based on specific authorities granted to a commander for a particular mission. Effective resources control requires the combined efforts of all instruments of national power. The Hague Conventions of 1907 and the Geneva Conventions for the Protection of Civilians of 1949 set forth rules relating to property in occupied territories. Territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of a hostile force. (Coalition forces early in OIF were legally considered as occupation forces.) The occupation extends only to the territory where such authority has been established and can be exercised. International law recognizes five basic powers that a military commander of an occupation force possesses in relation to property in enemy territory—

- Destruction.
- Confiscation.
- Seizure.
- Requisition.
- Control.

3-3. **Destruction** is to so badly damage an item or system that it cannot perform any function or be restored to a usable condition. All categories of enemy property may be destroyed when dictated by military necessity. However, military necessity will not justify those acts of destruction specifically forbidden by customary and conventional laws of war. There must be some reasonable connection between the destruction of property and the overcoming of the belligerent. Damage may lawfully result from such activities as combat operations, movements, or activities of the military force such as marches, constructing field fortifications, clearing fields of fire, or other necessary measures. Additionally, where an area is about to be taken by the enemy, international law justifies the destruction of property that is of value to the enemy. No payment is required for such lawful destruction and damage.

3-4. **Confiscation** is the taking of property for direct military use. No payment is required and title to the property passes to the occupying government. As a general rule only public movable property may be confiscated. However, the specific rules depend upon where the property is found – on the battlefield or in the occupied territory.

- 46 • In occupied territory, only public movable property that is susceptible to military use may be  
47 confiscated. All such public movable property belonging to the enemy state may be confiscated  
48 for use in military operations. While the law allows confiscation of most of the enemy's public  
49 movable property, exception is made to that without a military use. This is a limited class of  
50 property, but typical examples would include archives and public records, cultural property, zoo  
51 animals, and so forth. Since there is no military value, the occupier is prohibited from converting it  
52 to its own use or ownership. This type property is, however, subject to the commander's power of  
53 control for purposes of custody and safekeeping. It is not necessary that the property remain in the  
54 occupied territory.
- 55 • On the battlefield, all public movable property may be confiscated even if not for direct military  
56 use. Also, any private movable property that has been used in the military effort may be  
57 confiscated (e.g. privately owned weapons or privately owned vehicles used to transport enemy  
58 soldiers). The legal principle behind this exception is that private property, which is used in the  
59 public service of the enemy, loses its protection against confiscation. Thus it may be treated as  
60 public property. However, the confiscation of private movable property is an exceptional  
61 circumstance and it is more important to remember the general rule that only public movable  
62 property may be confiscated.
- 63 3-5. **Seizure** is the taking of property for direct military use, but unlike confiscation title to the property  
64 does not pass to the occupying government. Payment for the property is required at the end of occupation.  
65 Three types of private movable property may be seized—
- 66 • Communications equipment adapted to the transmission of public information.  
67 • Transportation equipment.  
68 • Depots of arms and all ammunition.
- 69 3-6. While the law speaks in terms of seizing movable property in fact, if the property falls into any of  
70 the aforementioned classes, it can be seized in its entirety regardless of its immovable character. For  
71 instance, together with the seized rolling stock of the railroad would be the rail yards, roundhouses, depots,  
72 and so forth. In theory, public movable property could also be seized. However, this category of property  
73 may be confiscated with no payment required.
- 74 3-7. **Requisition** is the acquisition of property needed for use by the occupation force without regard to  
75 the willingness of the owners to provide it, as distinguished from normal procurement. Requisition requires  
76 payment of fair value for the property. It differs from seizure in four respects: first, the items taken may be  
77 used only in the occupied territory; second, practically everything may be requisitioned that is necessary for  
78 the day-to-day maintenance of the occupation force; third, private immovable as well as private movable  
79 property may be affected; and fourth, the owners are to be compensated as soon as possible without having  
80 to wait for the restoration of peace.
- 81 3-8. In determining what property may be requisitioned, commanders must consider the sustainment  
82 needs of the indigenous population. Careful consideration of requisitioning expendable commodities,  
83 specifically, foodstuffs including water, medical supplies, and clothing is necessary to reduce the  
84 detrimental impact on the population. Civilian relief supplies provided by a third party organization receive  
85 special protection under international law.
- 86 3-9. **Control** is the measures executed by the occupation force regarding property within occupied  
87 territory to the degree necessary to prevent its use by or for the benefit of enemy forces or in any manner  
88 harmful to the occupation force. As a general principle of international law, the occupation commander is  
89 required to maintain public order. Included within this general mandate is the requirement for the  
90 occupation forces to take control of and to protect abandoned property. In this respect, the power of control  
91 is one of care and custody. It may be permanent with a view to ultimate return to the owner, or it may be  
92 with a view for subsequent requisition or other appropriate disposition.
- 93 3-10. Resources control measures may be implemented in collaboration with a host-nation government  
94 during peacetime military engagement, limited intervention, peace operations, irregular warfare, and major  
95 combat operations missions. Authority for the execution of such measures originates from a formal  
96 agreement, negotiated by the DOS, such as a SOFA, mutual defense treaty, or security cooperation treaty  
97 ratified by the U.S. and an allied nation. In times of crisis, U.S. commanders may be authorized by a civil

98 affairs agreement with the allied government to exercise certain authority normally the function of the local  
 99 government. Civil administration is normally required when the indigenous government of the area  
 100 concerned is either unable or unwilling to assume full responsibility for its administration. Common  
 101 resources control areas and measures are shown in Table 3-1, page 3-3.

102

103

**Table 3-1 Resources control areas and measures**

Public and Private Property	Financial Assets	National Resources	Food and Agriculture	Critical Infrastructure
Immovable (real) property <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Destruction</li> <li>• Confiscation</li> <li>• Seizure</li> <li>• Requisition</li> <li>• Control</li> </ul>	Secure records and archives  Block Transactions  Freeze assets	Secure the means of production storage and distribution of– <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Fossil fuels</li> <li>• Minerals</li> <li>• Precious stones and metals</li> </ul>	Price and ration controls  Secure the means of production, storage and distribution of– <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Processed food</li> <li>• Food imports</li> <li>• Agricultural products</li> <li>• Forestry products</li> <li>• Fisheries</li> </ul>	Secure infrastructure– <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Public utilities</li> <li>• Transportation</li> <li>• Communication</li> <li>• Health services</li> <li>• Public safety</li> <li>• Cultural</li> <li>• Governmental</li> <li>• Industrial</li> </ul>
Movable property <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Destruction</li> <li>• Confiscation</li> <li>• Seizure</li> <li>• Requisition</li> <li>• Control</li> </ul>	Seize assets  Regulate banking  Regulate trading of financial instruments and commodities	Export regulations  Border security  Production regulations	Redistribution regulations	Identify/manage key personnel  Regulate usage
Secure records of ownership				

104 **HOST-NATION POLICY**

105 3-11. The laws and regulatory policies of a HN are the basis for resources control measures implemented  
 106 by U.S. or multinational forces during operations, especially during missions other than occupation. Formal  
 107 diplomatic agreements and detailed ROE define the authorities of a commander in the execution of  
 108 resources control measures. While these authorities may be limited both by HN and U.S. policy,  
 109 commanders must be prepared to plan and execute resources control measures in support of an allied or  
 110 partner nation. Examples of types of operations that may require implementation of resources control  
 111 measures include–

- 112 • Counterdrug operations in support of a partner nation during peacetime military engagement.
- 113 • Consequence management as part of a FHA limited intervention.
- 114 • Border security during peace enforcement operations.
- 115 • Counterinsurgency operations support of a legitimate HN government during irregular warfare.
- 116 • Support of a legitimate HN government during post-conflict in a FID environment.

117 3-12. Enactment of resources control measures must conform to legal and regulatory policy and be  
 118 enforced justly and firmly by the HN. U.S. forces will not execute these measures unless the requirements  
 119 are clearly beyond the capabilities of the host-nation’s security forces, the HN has requested assistance, and  
 120 appropriate U.S. authorities (to include the U.S. Ambassador) have granted such assistance. U.S. forces  
 121 support the HN’s lead normally by facilitating interagency and HN government coordination and providing  
 122 advice, assistance, training, and security for HN forces executing these missions.

123 3-13. Implementing effective resources control requires the HN government to inform the populace of the  
 124 measures to be imposed and the justification for the action. The HN’s message to the population must be  
 125 clear that the control measures are necessary due to the security threat the HN is experiencing. Enforcement  
 126 of the restrictions must be consistent and impartial so the government establishes and maintains legitimacy  
 127 among the populace. A well-crafted PRC plan limits control measures to the least restrictive measures

128 necessary to achieve the desired effect. Continuous assessment of the operational environment measures  
 129 the effectiveness of the restrictions, the attitude of the population towards the government, and the impact  
 130 the restrictions are having on the operational environment. As the security situation improves, restrictions  
 131 should be modified or rescinded.

## 132 NATIONAL RESOURCES

133 3-14. A nation's resources not only include those properties and enterprises owned wholly or in part by the  
 134 government, but also those licensed, regulated, and leased. National resources include–

- 135 • Public real property – government buildings and facilities.
- 136 • Public utilities, corporations, or monopolies.
- 137 • Extractive property – petroleum, natural gas, minerals, precious metals and stones.
- 138 • Agricultural, forest, and fishing property.
- 139 • Publicly owned transportation and communications property.
- 140 • Fiscal property – property used to deal with monies, securities (bonds, stocks, and so forth), and  
 141 negotiable instruments.

142 3-15. Key to the control of national resources is the primary stability operations task: *establish civil*  
 143 *security*. An essential task of establish civil security is border control and boundary security of the nation's  
 144 borders and points-of-entry and embarkation (FM 3-07). Border controls regulate immigration, control the  
 145 movements of the local populace, collect excise taxes or duties, limit smuggling, and control the spread of  
 146 disease vectors through quarantine. In controlling national resources, emphasis must be placed on the  
 147 illegal exportation of assets by means of smuggling or through the corruption of border officials.

148 3-16. Understanding the operational environment is vital for the development of an executable operational  
 149 plan. Resources control operations are conducted among the people, where military interaction with the  
 150 local populace is inherent to the mission. Detailed civil considerations analysis provides the required  
 151 information necessary for the supported commander to develop the concept of operations that drives the  
 152 planning process. With regard to resources control operations, the commander's concept of operations  
 153 should address the following–

- 154 • What are resources control measures attempting to accomplish?
- 155 • What conditions, when resources control measures are established, constitute the desired end  
 156 state?
- 157 • What resources control measures are most likely to attain these conditions?
- 158 • How will the force enforce the resources control measures?
- 159 • What military assets are required, and how can they be applied to accomplish enforcement of  
 160 resources control measures?
- 161 • What risks are associated with enforcement of resources control measures, and how can they be  
 162 mitigated?

163 3-17. Effective resources control measures are attained through unity of effort by the host-nation  
 164 government, interagency, host-nation security forces, and U.S. military forces. Control of national  
 165 resources is attainable only through the unified actions of all instruments of national power at the strategic  
 166 level with execution down to the tactical level.

## 167 FOOD AND AGRICULTURE

168 3-18. The term "food and agriculture" includes the production, processing, storage, and distribution of  
 169 food, fiber, and wood products plus the development and management of resources essential to these  
 170 activities. Food and agriculture responsibilities are not limited to the planting and harvesting of crops, but  
 171 include every activity necessary to place agricultural commodities into the hands of the consumer.

172 3-19. There are two types of agriculture – subsistence and commercial. Both types may exist in a country  
 173 simultaneously.

- 174 • Subsistence agriculture is the type of farming where farmers produce only enough food to support  
175 their own families and livestock. This type of farming is usually limited to geographically or  
176 historically isolated areas. A chronic shortage of food is, to some degree, a common occurrence in  
177 these typical, developing countries.
- 178 • In commercial agriculture, farmers concentrate on producing crops for the market, either domestic  
179 or foreign. Family food is produced simultaneously or purchased from the local market.  
180 Production for the market may be specialized or diversified.
- 181 • More common in developing countries is semi-subsistence agriculture in which small farms are  
182 worked primarily to feed the farmers' families but do produce a small surplus. This surplus is sold  
183 at the local market to provide money to obtain certain items the families cannot produce and meet  
184 other financial obligations.
- 185 3-20. Food and agriculture production and distribution directly impacts the economic condition of a  
186 country based solely on the numbers of people employed either directly or indirectly. This includes  
187 businesses that provide farms with production inputs (seeds, fertilizer, and equipment), as well as industries  
188 that market, handle, process, store, and distribute agricultural products. In less developed countries, the  
189 percentage of the population involved in agriculture production may range between 70 and 90 percent. In  
190 more industrialized countries this percentage may range between 10 and 40 percent.
- 191 3-21. Resources control measures in the area of food and agriculture may impact civilian agriculture  
192 production and the means of production, and the processing, storage, and distribution of foods to include  
193 the importation of food. Control measures may also extend to humanitarian organizations providing  
194 foodstuffs during a crisis of emergency. Objectives of food and agriculture resources control measures may  
195 include–
- 196 • Denial of access to food resources by the enemy.  
197 • Redistribution of food resources to meet indigenous population humanitarian needs.  
198 • Organization of efficient processing, storage, and distribution facilities for food and agricultural  
199 products.  
200 • Maximizing local agricultural production capacities.  
201 • Disrupting illegal activity.  
202 • Stabilizing market prices and rationing food and agriculture resources to meet the nutritional  
203 demands of the indigenous population.
- 204 3-22. The identification of effective food and agriculture resources control measures is a result of the  
205 information collected during mission analysis of the civil domain and preparation of the CAO running  
206 estimate. While not all inclusive, examples of information requirements include–
- 207 • The dietary habits of the indigenous population based on tradition, custom, and religion.  
208 • The nutritional requirements of the indigenous population.  
209 • Estimated numbers and demographics of the population requiring special diets, such as–  
210     ▪ Hospital patients and the infirmed.  
211     ▪ Pregnant and nursing mothers.  
212     ▪ Children under the age of five years.  
213     ▪ Dislocated civilians.  
214 • Estimates of food stocks in storage.  
215 • Areas of production, collection, processing, control, storage, and distribution of food and other  
216 agricultural products.  
217 • Estimates of food and agricultural product production capacity.  
218 • Planting and harvest seasons.  
219 • IGOs and NGOs providing humanitarian food relief in the AO.  
220 • Prevalence of food and agriculture black market activities and hoarding.  
221 • Identification of food and agriculture civil authorities.

## 222 CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE

223 3-23. Resources control measures in the area of critical infrastructure play a significant role in the  
224 functioning of civilian societies and institutions. Examples of critical infrastructure include–

- 225 • Government facilities to include records storage facilities and archives.
- 226 • Medical treatment facilities.
- 227 • Fiscal property - the central bank, national treasury, and integral commercial banks.
- 228 • Cultural sites, such as monuments, religious shrines, libraries, museums, and so on.
- 229 • Facilities with practical applications, such as detention facilities and warehouses.
- 230 • Power generation and transmission facilities.
- 231 • Transportation grids and port, rail, and aerial facilities.
- 232 • Water purification and sewage treatment plants and distribution systems.
- 233 • Public safety and emergency management facilities and equipment.
- 234 • Telecommunications production and transmission facilities.
- 235 • Fuel production and distribution systems.

236 3-24. The long-term success of any intervention often relies on the ability of military forces to protect and  
237 maintain critical infrastructure until the HN can resume that responsibility. Critical infrastructure resources  
238 control measures directly support the primary stability task – establish civil security. One essential task  
239 within this sector is *Protect Key Personnel and Facilities*. The initial response aim is to establish a safe and  
240 secure environment in order to enable HN and other actors to sustain and further develop infrastructure  
241 capability.

242 3-25. Infrastructure control measures may extend beyond security to the regulation, production, and  
243 distribution of services. This is especially true in the area of public utilities (power, water, sewage, and  
244 telecommunications) and privately owned facilities (fuel, transportation and medical). Based on the  
245 resources control authority granted to the commander, U.S. forces facilitate interagency and HN  
246 government coordination and provide advice, assistance, training, and security to the HN in the  
247 management of critical infrastructure. The restoration of essential services to the indigenous population is  
248 dependent on infrastructure resources control measures enacted by the HN and supported by military  
249 forces.

250 3-26. Planning of effective infrastructure resources control measures is a result of detailed mission  
251 analysis of the civil component of the operational environment. Analysis of the size of the population  
252 served, the criticality of the service, and alternate means of service influences the identification of security  
253 priorities and the degree of control required. The development of information critical to the security and  
254 management of critical infrastructure includes–

- 255 • Size, location, primary function, and condition of–
  - 256 ▪ National, provincial and local government buildings and facilities.
  - 257 ▪ Government records and archives storage facilities.
  - 258 ▪ Cultural sites, monuments, religious shrines, libraries, and museums.
  - 259 ▪ Public safety and emergency management facilities.
- 260 • Location, ownership, types of equipment, capacity, facility and equipment maintenance condition  
261 of–
  - 262 ▪ Rail terminals, maritime ports, and airfields.
  - 263 ▪ Public conveyance systems.
  - 264 ▪ Road networks.
  - 265 ▪ Utilities (power, water, sewage, fuel and telecommunications)
  - 266 ▪ Health services.
- 267 • Location, capacity, and condition of border control points and points-of-entry and embarkation.

268 3-27. Continuous analysis of the civil domain of the operational environment is required to determine the  
269 effectiveness of infrastructure resources control measures and the impact on the population. Critical is the

- 270 identification of second and third order effects of control measures having a detrimental impact on the  
271 population, such as–
- 272 • Actual or perceived gaps in delivering essential services to a particular sector of the population.
  - 273 • Inefficiencies in the distribution of essential services.
  - 274 • Interruptions in the provision of essential services.

## 275 **CRIMINAL ACTIVITY**

276 3-28. Planning of resources control measures must consider illegal activity and the impact of such  
277 activities have on the management of resources within the operational environment. Black market  
278 activities, smuggling, theft, and corruption of host-nation officials are examples of criminal activities that  
279 may cause a detrimental impact on the availability of critical resources. Criminals dealing in contraband  
280 items, such as arms and ammunition, pose a security threat to the population, the host-nation government,  
281 and the deployed military force.

282 3-29. Rule of law cannot expand or be sustained in crime-ridden environments where citizens fear for their  
283 safety due to criminal activity. Resources control measures specifically targeted towards criminal activity  
284 earns the trust and confidence of the local populace while strengthening the legitimacy of the host-nation  
285 government.

286 3-30. An essential element in controlling criminal activity in the area of resources is border security and  
287 control. Border security activities include managing land border areas, airspace, coastal and territorial  
288 waters, and exclusive economic zones. The control of border areas and crossings deters smuggling,  
289 movement of irregular forces into host-nation territory, and uncontrolled flow of dislocated civilians.  
290 Border security forces monitor, detect, and prevent crime in border areas, including illegal entry and the  
291 illicit trafficking of goods, services, and human capital.

292 3-31. Ineffective border control and management systems can frustrate efforts to detect and prevent  
293 organized criminal activity. This often results in increased trafficking in illegal arms, goods, and human  
294 capital, and impacts the host-nation's ability to generate revenue through duties and import and export fees.  
295 While conventional military forces may be capable of providing immediate border security, they are an  
296 inappropriate law enforcement force unless acting as an occupying force.

297 3-32. Whether in a transitional military authority role or supporting a legitimate host-nation government,  
298 commanders plan for mitigating the impact of criminal activity through resources control measures. These  
299 actions may include–

- 300 • Securing stocks of critical commodities from theft or pillage.
- 301 • Supporting border security and customs enforcement.
- 302 • Identifying and mitigating black market activities dealing in critical commodities.
- 303 • Securing stockpiles of natural resources.

304 3-33. Satisfying information requirements pertaining to criminal activity relies mainly on threat and police  
305 intelligence. Analysis of the civil component of the operational environment enhances understanding by–

- 306 • Identifying areas of criminal enclave activity.
- 307 • Detailing the culture, traditions, and means of operations of criminal organizations based on tribal  
308 or clan affiliations.
- 309 • Identifying sectors of the population that traditionally support criminal organizations based on  
310 culture, tribal, or clan affiliations.
- 311 • Identifying chronic shortages of critical commodities openly traded through black market  
312 activities.

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## Appendix A

# Population and Resources Control Appendix 4 to Annex K

The PRC appendix serves three primary purposes:

- The situation paragraph provides operational details on the situation from a PRC perspective.
- The execution paragraph and matrix provide the direction needed to focus the effects of the PRC measures.
- The assessment matrix displays the information needed to assess PRC measures.

The PRC appendix also addresses sustainment and mission command aspects of CAO that are not covered elsewhere in the OPLAN or OPORD. Much of the information in the PRC appendix is derived from the CA area study or area assessment and the CAO running estimate. Major portions of the appendix can be written directly from the CAO running estimate.

## OVERVIEW

A-1 The PRC appendix succinctly describes the populace and resources control measures that the task organization of the command executes in support of the command's stated mission and commander's intent. The appendix organizes the information developed from the MDMP analysis of the civil component of the operational environment not addressed in the base order or the CAO annex. The appendix also provides information to facilitate coordination among organizations (higher, adjacent, and civil) outside of the command tasked to implement PRC measures.

A-2 The PRC appendix, together with its associated tabs and exhibits, is an information management tool. It simplifies the base order by providing a structure for organizing information. Just as the annex expands the information contained in the base order, appendixes contain information necessary to expand annexes; tabs expand appendixes. The G/S-9 staff is responsible for the preparation of the PRC appendix and its attachments when required.

A-3 Details of PRC support to the commander's intent and concept of operations not readily incorporated into the base order or the CAO annex are contained in the PRC appendix. The appendix also describes the command's CAO linkage to the next higher command's plan and its support of the overall joint force's PRC objectives.

## APPENDIX FORMAT

A-4 The PRC appendix follows the five (5) paragraph format of the base order – Situation, Mission, Execution, Sustainment, and Mission Command. Information developed during MDMP and recorded using the CAO running estimate is used to complete the majority of the appendix. The following discussion provides doctrinal guidance for completing the PRC appendix.

### Situation Paragraph Information

A-5 The situation paragraph provides operational details on the situation from a PRC perspective. The situation paragraph of the PRC appendix does not repeat the OPLAN or OPORD situation paragraph. It is tailored to aspects of the operational environment that affect PRC. The situation paragraph describes how

42 the PRC environment may affect friendly, adversary, and other operations. It should discuss how PRC  
43 would influence friendly operations. Discussion of the subparagraphs of the Situation paragraph follows:

44 A-6 *Area of Interest*: Describe the PRC specific components of the area of interest defined in Annex B  
45 (Intelligence) as required.

46 A-7 *Area of Operations*: Refer to Appendix 1 (Operations Overlay) to Annex C (Operations).

47 A-8 *Terrain*: List all critical terrain aspects that impact PRC. Refer to Tab B (Terrain) to Appendix 1  
48 (Intelligence Estimate) to Annex B (Intelligence) as required. Critical PRC terrain includes borders, border  
49 crossing points, and ports of entry.

50 A-9 *Weather*: List all critical weather aspects that impact PRC. Refer to Tab A (Weather) to Appendix 1  
51 (Intelligence Estimate) to Annex B (Intelligence) as required.

52 A-10 *Enemy Forces*: List known and templated locations and activities of enemy CAO units for one  
53 echelon up and two echelons down. List enemy maneuver and other capabilities that will impact friendly  
54 PRC. State expected enemy courses of action and employment of enemy PRC assets. Refer to Annex B  
55 (Intelligence) as required.

56 A-11 *Friendly Forces*: Outline the higher headquarters' plan as it pertains to PRC. List the designations,  
57 locations, and outlines of plans of higher, adjacent, and other PRC assets that support or impact the issuing  
58 headquarters or require coordination and additional support. Include additional information on interagency,  
59 intergovernmental, and nongovernmental organizations that may impact PRC.

60 A-12 *Other*: List other elements in the area of operations which may impact the conduct of PRC  
61 operations or implementation of PRA-specific equipment and tactics. This section provides the PRC  
62 analysis of the civil component of the area of operation developed during mission analysis. This  
63 subparagraph includes a description of the general civil situation as it relates to PRC. It lists the major  
64 strengths and vulnerabilities of civil components of the AO and how they relate to the overall PRC mission.  
65 When developing this information, it is key to think in terms of nodal interaction that ultimately leads to  
66 supporting the overall joint force PRC strategy, with its inherent MOPs and MOEs. This information is  
67 normally recorded in the "civil considerations" subparagraph of the *Characteristics of the Area of*  
68 *Operations* paragraph [2.b.(5)] of the CAO running estimate.

69 A-13 *Civil Considerations*: Using the memory aide ASCOPE, identify critical civil considerations that  
70 impact PRC. Refer to paragraph 1.f. of the base plan/order as required. Subsequent subparagraphs under the  
71 civil considerations subparagraph contain discussions, in terms of ASCOPE, as analyzed in the CAO  
72 running estimate and area assessments of the nodes and relationships essential for success of the  
73 commander's mission.

74 A-14 *Areas*. This subparagraph lists the key civilian areas in the supported commander's operational  
75 environment as they relate to PRC. It approaches terrain analysis from a civilian perspective. Commanders  
76 analyze key civilian areas in terms of how they affect the PRC mission as well as how military operations  
77 affect these areas. Examples of key civilian areas are areas defined by political boundaries (districts within  
78 a city, municipalities within a region; locations of government centers; social, political, religious, or  
79 criminal enclaves; agricultural and mining regions; trade routes; possible sites for the temporary settlement  
80 of dislocated civilians or other civil functions. Refer to Annex K (Civil Affairs Operations) as required.

81 A-15 *Structures*. This subparagraph lists the existing civil structures such as bridges, communications  
82 towers, power plants, and dams (traditional HPTs). Churches, mosques, national libraries, and hospitals are  
83 cultural sites that need to be listed and are generally protected by international law or other agreements.  
84 Still others are facilities with practical applications, such as jails, warehouses, schools, television stations,  
85 radio stations, and print plants, which may be useful for military purposes. This section identifies structures  
86 or infrastructure targeted for specific PRC measures.

87 A-16 *Capabilities*. This subparagraph lists civil PRC capabilities of the Host Nation (HN) by assessing if  
88 the legitimate HN government is capable of sustaining itself through public administration, public safety,

89 emergency services, and food and agriculture. It should also include whether the HN needs assistance with  
90 public works and utilities, public health, public transportation, economics, and commerce.

91 A-17 *Organizations*. This subparagraph lists civil organizations directly involved with the implementation  
92 of PRC measures. These organizations may or may not be affiliated with either USG or HN government  
93 agencies. They can be church groups, ethnic groups, fraternal organizations, patriotic or service  
94 organizations, IGOs or NGOs.

95 A-18 *People*. This subparagraph lists civilian and nonmilitary personnel encountered in the supported  
96 commander's operational environment directly involved with PRC measures. The list may extend to those  
97 outside the area of operation/area of interest whose actions, opinions and/or influence can affect the  
98 supported commander's operational environment.

99 A-19 *Events*. This subparagraph lists the categories of civilian events that may affect military missions.  
100 These events include harvest seasons, elections, riots, and evacuations (both voluntary and involuntary).  
101 Determine what events are occurring, and analyze the events for their political, economic, psychological,  
102 environmental, and legal implications directly related to PRC measures.

103 A-20 *Attachments or Detachments*: If not covered in the task organization, all military and nonmilitary  
104 organizations participating in CMO operations and PRC should be included; for example, in support of  
105 reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) plans; CA assets detached for liaison duties, and so on.

106 A-21 *Assumptions*. This paragraph includes—

- 107 • Only part of an OPLAN, not an OPORD.
- 108 • Critical planning considerations and unknown conditions that must be confirmed by deliberate  
109 assessments.
- 110 • Statement describing the operational risks associated with not engaging the civil component of the  
111 AO through PRC.

## 112 **Mission Paragraph Information**

113 A-22 Cite the approved restated PRC mission resulting from mission analysis – short description of who  
114 (unit or organization), what (task), when (by time or event), where (AO, objective, grid location), and why  
115 (purpose, mission objective, end state). For example, The 101<sup>st</sup> Airborne (Air Assault) Division (*who*)  
116 plans, coordinates, and executes populace and resources control measures (*what*) ISO JTF GOLD in AO  
117 EAGLE (*where*) to accomplish foreign internal defense objectives (*why*) commencing upon receipt of this  
118 order (*when*) to support Country X in executing their Internal Defense and Development (IDAD) program  
119 (*why/end state*).

## 120 **Execution Paragraph Information**

121 A-23 The execution paragraph provides the direction needed to synchronize the effects of PRC and related  
122 CMO addressing the scheme of support, subordinate unit tasks and any additional coordination instructions  
123 not addressed elsewhere. It outlines the effects the commander wants PRC to achieve. It describes the  
124 activities of the force executing PRC in enough detail to synchronize them by means of incorporating PRC  
125 tasks into the CAO execution matrix. The CAO execution matrix is normally Appendix 1 to Annex K  
126 (Civil Affairs Operations) of the supported unit's OPLAN/OPORD.

127 A-24 The matrix shows when each PRC task is to be executed. The execution matrix helps the G/S-9  
128 representative in the current operations integration cell (COIC) of the command monitor and direct PRC  
129 during execution. The execution matrix is a tool to execute PRC effectively without incurring unanticipated  
130 interference or duplication of effort. PRC tasks are incorporated and synchronized in the G/S-3 execution  
131 matrix contained within Annex C. The CAO execution matrix is not a tasking document. The PRC tasks are  
132 detailed under tasks to subordinate units in paragraph 3.b. of the PRC appendix or in the appropriate tabs.

133 A-25 *Scheme of Support*: Describes how PRC supports the commander's intent and the command's  
134 concept of operations. This discussion details the PRC concept of operations supporting the approved  
135 course of action which comes from paragraph 4, *Analysis*, of the CAO running estimate developed during  
136 MDMP. This discussion includes the principle tasks required, the responsible subordinate unit(s), and how  
137 the principle tasks complement each other.

138 A-26 This paragraph should include a discussion of PRC objectives, civil decisive points, MOPs and  
139 MOEs and transition for each phase of the operation and a general timeline for the operation. Each phase of  
140 the operation should be discussed in greater detail in the appendixes where the key nodal relationship will  
141 be further defined. The PRC discussion here must be finitely detailed in this paragraph.

142 A-27 *Tasks to Subordinate Units*: This paragraph lists the specific PRC tasks to the elements listed in the  
143 task organization and attachments or detachments subparagraphs of the task organization. The MOPs for  
144 each task should be stated along with their corresponding MOEs. MOPs and MOEs detailed in this  
145 paragraph come from paragraph 4, *Analysis*, of the CAO running estimate and referred from the *Assessment*  
146 *Matrix* appendix. Assessment of MOPs and MOEs are synchronized with the G/S-3's overall assessment  
147 plan contained at ANNEX M (Assessment).

148 A-28 *Coordinating Instructions*: This subparagraph provides instructions and details of coordination that  
149 apply to two or more subordinate units not covered by SOP. This includes civil CCIR/EEFI, policy  
150 statements, special reporting procedures, force protection guidance, effective time of attachments or  
151 detachments, references to annexes not mentioned elsewhere in the appendix, coordinating authority, and  
152 so on.

153 A-29 PRC support of the command's identified minimum essential stability operations tasks are detailed  
154 in the coordinating instructions subparagraph. Units responsible for an area of operations must execute the  
155 below listed tasks with available resources if no civilian agency or organization is capable. Minimum  
156 essential stability operations tasks include-

- 157 • Civil Security
- 158 • Restoration of Essential Services
- 159 • Civil Control

## 160 **Sustainment Paragraph Information**

161 A-30 This paragraph provides instructions and details concerning the service support relationship between  
162 the PRC elements and their supported units. Identify priorities of sustainment for PRC key tasks and  
163 specify additional instructions as required for-

- 164 • Logistics: *Refer to Annex D (Logistics) as required*
- 165 • Personnel: *Refer to Annex E (Personnel) as required*
- 166 • Health Service Support: *Refer to Annex Q (Health Service Support) as required*

## 167 **Mission Command Paragraph Information**

168 A-31 This paragraph details specific PRC mission command instructions and information that is not  
169 covered in the base order. Specify additional instructions as required for-

- 170 • Command:
  - 171 ▪ Location of key PRC HN leaders.
  - 172 ▪ Location and alternate locations of the supported command's PRC point of contact.
- 173 • Liaison Requirements
  - 174 ▪ PRC liaison requirements to military organizations/Services
  - 175 ▪ PRC liaison requirements to host-nation agencies
  - 176 ▪ PRC liaison requirements to civilian organizations (NGOs, IGOs)

- 177           • Communication and Information Networks.
- 178           ▪ PRA-specific communications requirements or reports.
- 179           ▪ Primary and alternate means of communicating with participating PRC civilian organizations.
- 180           ▪ Instructions regarding maintenance and update of the civil information management database.

181   **Tab Information**

182   A-32 *Tabs*: Tabs include task related plans, diagrams, synchronization matrixes, and civil overlays  
183 relating to specific aspects of PRC. The following are possible Tabs for the PRC appendix:

- 184           • Dislocated Civilian Plan
- 185           • Noncombatant Evacuation Plan

186   A-33 Appendix Example. Figure A-1, pages A-6 through A-13, is an example of the PRC appendix.

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188

**[CLASSIFICATION]**  
**(Change from verbal orders, if any)**

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194

**APPENDIX 4 (Populace and Resources Control) to ANNEX K (Civil Affairs Operations) TO OPLAN ## (OPORD ##) - (Corps / Division / Brigade) [code name] [(classification of title)]**

195 **(U) References:** *List documents essential to understanding the APPENDIX. List references concerning PRC.*  
196

197 (a) (U) *List maps and charts first. Map entries include series number, country, sheet names, or numbers,*  
198 *edition, and scale.*

199  
200 (b) (U) *List other references in subparagraphs labeled as shown. Examples: CAO annex of higher*  
201 *headquarters / Relevant civilian agency operations guides and standards documents / Relevant plans of*  
202 *participating civilian organizations / Coordinated transition plans / International treaties and agreements /*  
203 *PRC legal authority / Operational CA database (civil information management [CIM], reachback, etc.) /*  
204 *Others, as applicable.*

205  
206 **(U) Time Zone Used Throughout the OPLAN/OPORD:** *State the time zone used in the area of operations*  
207 *during execution. When the OPLAN or OPORD applies to units in different time zones, use Greenwich Mean*  
208 *(ZULU) Time {example ZULU (Z) or LOCAL}.*

209  
210 **1. (U) Situation.** *Include items of information affecting PRC support not included in paragraph 1 of the*  
211 *OPORD or any information needing expansion. The situation paragraph describes how the implementation of*  
212 *PRC measures may affect friendly, adversary, and other operations. It should discuss how PRC would influence*  
213 *friendly operations. The situation paragraph describes the conditions and circumstances of the operational*  
214 *environment that impact PRC measures in the following subparagraphs:*

215  
216 a. (U) **Area of Interest.** *Describe the area of interest. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence) as required.*

217  
218 b. (U) **Area of Operations.** *Describe the area of operations (AO). Refer to the appropriate map by its*  
219 *subparagraph under references (for example, “Map, reference (b).” Refer to Appendix 2 (Operations Overlay)*  
220 *to Annex C (Operations) as required.*

221  
222 (1) (U) **Terrain.** *Describe the aspects of terrain that impact operations. Refer to Tab A (Terrain) to*  
223 *Appendix 1 (Intelligence Estimate) to Annex B (Intelligence) as required. (ex: Consider indigenous population*  
224 *centers and likely border crossing points/ports of entry that may impact PRC measures / Identification of PRC*  
225 *related COGs).*

226  
227 (2) (U) **Weather.** *Describe the aspects of weather that impact operations. Refer to Tab B (Weather) to*  
228 *Appendix 1 (Intelligence Estimate) to Annex B (Intelligence) as required. (ex: Consider seasonal events (rain,*  
229 *flooding, wind storms, and snow) that may impact commercial mobility or agricultural production, farmer to*  
230 *market access capability in the AO related to PRC – impacts on time to implement PRC measures associated*  
231 *with inclement weather.*

232  
233 c. (U) **Enemy Forces.** *Identify enemy forces and appraise their general capabilities. Describe the enemy’s*  
234 *disposition, location, strength, and probable courses of action. Identify known or potential terrorist threats and*  
235 *adversaries within the AO. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence) as required. (ex: Consider maintaining continuous*  
236 *coordination with the intelligence staff to develop potential impact of enemy forces on the PRC mission / enemy*

237 capabilities by considering sabotage, espionage, subversion, terrorism, / enemy sympathizers / PRC measures  
238 to deny the enemy access to the civil populace and deny materiel to the enemy)

239

240 d. (U) Friendly Forces. Outline the higher headquarters' plan as it pertains to PRC. List the designation,  
241 location, and outline the plans of higher, adjacent, and other PRC assets that support or impact the issuing  
242 headquarters or require coordination and additional support. Include additional information on HN,  
243 interagency, intergovernmental, and nongovernmental organizations that may impact PRC measures.

244

245 (1) (U) Higher Headquarters' Mission and Intent. Identify and state the PRC mission and commander's  
246 intent for the higher headquarters of the issuing headquarters.

247

248 (2) (U) Missions of Adjacent Units. Identify and state the PRC missions of adjacent units and other  
249 units whose actions have a significant impact on the issuing headquarters.

250

251 e. (U) Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Nongovernmental Organizations. Identify and state the  
252 objective or goals and primary tasks of those non-Department of Defense organizations that have a significant  
253 role within the AO. Refer to Annex V (Interagency Coordination) as required. Do not repeat information listed  
254 in Annex V. Take into consideration any and all organizations that could have a vested interest (ex: Host nation  
255 [to include the HN military], multinational agencies and organizations, indigenous populations and institutions  
256 [IPI], and to a lesser degree the private sector).

257

258 (1) (U) Interagency Organizations. Assessment of the ability of key interagency organizations  
259 operating in the AO to support the unit's PRC mission to include; the agency's missions, capabilities, capacity,  
260 and coordination points of contact (POCs) if not listed in Annex V. Identify known unit requirements to support  
261 interagency operations.

262

263 (2) (U) Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs). Assessment of the ability of key IGOs' (especially UN  
264 agencies) operating in the AO to support the unit's PRC mission to include; the agency's missions, capabilities,  
265 capacity, and coordination points of contact (POCs). Identify known unit requirements to support  
266 intergovernmental operations.

267

268 (3) (U) Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs). Assessment of key nongovernmental organizations  
269 (NGOs) operating in the AO to support the unit's PRC mission to include; the agency's missions, capabilities,  
270 capacity (e.g. ability to support civil relief systems), and coordination points of contact (POCs). Identify known  
271 unit requirements to support nongovernmental operations.

272

273 f. (U) Civil Considerations. Describe the critical aspects, strengths and weaknesses of the civil situation  
274 that impact operations. Liaise with the G-2 (S-2) and refer to Tab C (Civil Considerations) to Appendix 1  
275 (Intelligence Estimate) to Annex B (Intelligence) as required. Address the general overview of civil  
276 considerations for the AO (described by mnemonic ASCOPE - areas, structures, capabilities, organizations,  
277 people, and events). Review the critical aspects of the civil situation by applying each of the operational  
278 variables political, military, economic, society, information, infrastructure, - physical environment and time  
279 (PMESII-PT) that could impact the civil considerations analysis.

280

281 (1) (U) Areas. List the key civilian areas in the supported commander's operational environment. It  
282 approaches terrain analysis from a civilian perspective. Commanders analyze key civilian areas in terms of  
283 how they affect the mission as well as how military operations affect these areas. Examples of key civilian areas  
284 are areas defined by political boundaries (districts within a city, municipalities within a region); locations of

285 government centers; social, political, religious, or criminal enclaves; agricultural and mining regions; trade  
286 routes; possible sites for the temporary settlement of dislocated civilians or other civil functions.

287

288 (2) (U) Structures. List the locations of existing civil structures (critical infrastructure) such as ports,  
289 air terminals, transportation networks, bridges, communications towers, power plants, and dams (traditional  
290 high payoff targets [HPTs]). Churches, mosques, national libraries, and hospitals are cultural sites that need to  
291 be listed and are generally protected by international law or other agreements. Other infrastructure includes:  
292 governance and public safety structures, national, regional, and urban government facilities, record archives,  
293 judiciary, police, fire, emergency medical services, and economic and environmental structures (banking, stock  
294 and commodity exchanges, toxic industrial facilities, pipelines). Still others are facilities with practical  
295 applications, such as jails, warehouses, schools, television stations, radio stations, and print plants, which may  
296 require specific PRC protection measures.

297

298 (3) (U) Capabilities. Describes civil capabilities for implementing PRC measures by assessing the  
299 populace capabilities of sustaining itself through public safety, emergency services, and food and agriculture.  
300 Include whether the populace needs assistance with public works and utilities, public health, public  
301 transportation, economics, and commerce. (ex: Restoration of law enforcement is limited and will require  
302 support from UN/coalition forces /HN basic emergency and medical services is reportedly adequate to support  
303 the local populaces). Analysis of the existing capabilities of the AO is based on the 14 CA functional specialties  
304 (refer to the preliminary area assessment developed during mission analysis).

305

306 (4) (U) Organizations. List civil organizations that may or may not be affiliated with government  
307 agencies, such as church groups, ethnic groups, multinational corporations, fraternal organizations, patriotic  
308 or service organizations, IGOs, or NGOs / Do not repeat those listed in Annex V or paragraph 1.e. above  
309 (Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Nongovernmental Organizations) (ex: There are several charitable  
310 organizations in the AO / Religious groups are providing minimal support but lack internal transportation).  
311 Include HN organizations capable of forming the nucleus for PRC and humanitarian assistance (HA)  
312 programs, interim-governing bodies, civil defense efforts, and other activities.

313

314 (5) (U) People. List key personnel and linkage to the population, leaders, figureheads, clerics, and  
315 subject matter experts such as plant operators and public utility managers. (NOTE: This list may extend to  
316 personnel outside of the operational environment whose actions, opinions, and influence can affect the  
317 supported commander's operational environment (ex: See III US Corps CAO running estimate). Categorize  
318 groups of civilians such as: local nationals (town and city dwellers, farmers and other rural dwellers, and  
319 nomads); local civil authorities (elected and traditional leaders at all levels of government); expatriates; tribal  
320 or clan figure heads and religious leaders; third-nation government agency representatives; foreign employees  
321 of IGOs or NGOs; contractors (US citizens, local nationals, and third-nation citizens providing contract  
322 services); the media (journalists from print, radio, and visual media); dislocated civilian population (refugees,  
323 displaced persons, internally displaced persons, evacuees, expellees, migrants, stateless persons).

324

325 (6) (U) Events. Determine what events, military and civilian, are occurring and provide analysis of  
326 the events for their political, economic, psychological, environmental, moral, and legal implications.  
327 Categorizes civilian events that may affect PRC measures / Events may include harvest seasons, elections, riots,  
328 and voluntary evacuations, involuntary evacuations, holidays, school year, and religious periods (ex: The  
329 school year has been suspended / The HN does not have the assets to enforce curfews / This is not an electoral  
330 year).

331

332 g. (U) **Attachments and Detachments.** *List units attached to or detached from the issuing headquarters.*  
 333 *State when each attachment or detachment is effective (for example, on order, on commitment of the reserve) if*  
 334 *different from the effective time of the OPLAN/OPORD. Do not repeat information already listed in Annex A*  
 335 *(Task Organization). This paragraph includes all military and nonmilitary organizations participating in*  
 336 *CMOC operations and PRC. Identify other CA resources attached and detached, including effective times of*  
 337 *transfer if appropriate.*

338  
 339 h. (U) **Assumptions.** *Assumptions are only listed when preparing a CAO Annex to an OPLAN. (When*  
 340 *preparing a PRC appendix to an OPORD, this step may be omitted) / Assumptions developed in preparing the*  
 341 *CAO running estimate and not yet validated / List key assumptions used in the development of the*  
 342 *OPLAN/OPORD if pertaining to PRC/CMO mission.*  
 343

344 (1) (U) *Identifies critical planning considerations and unknown conditions that must be confirmed*  
 345 *during the initial assessment(s) (examples: military and interagency support will be available; Personnel and*  
 346 *facilities of relief/welfare organizations will continue to provide a basis for civilian relief programs; and the*  
 347 *civilian populace will continue to offer resistance to the opposing force).*  
 348

349 (2) (U) *Provides a statement describing the operational risks associated with not engaging the civil*  
 350 *component(s) of the AO.*  
 351

352 **2. (U) Mission.** *Include a clear, concise statement of the PRC task— "Who (type of forces will execute the*  
 353 *tasks), what (tasks are to be accomplished), when (are the tasks to occur), where (are the tasks to occur), and*  
 354 *why (will each force conduct its part of the operation)?" Prioritize multiple PRC tasks. Include a task and a*  
 355 *purpose in all mission statements. (Can obtain the mission statement from paragraph 1 of the CAO running*  
 356 *estimate / can be extracted from the estimate verbatim). Example:*  
 357

358 *The 422<sup>nd</sup> Civil Affairs Battalion plans, coordinates, and conducts CAO in support of the 101<sup>st</sup>*  
 359 *Airborne (Air Assault) Division in AO Talon Eagle to assist in shaping the operational*  
 360 *environment through population and resources control measures; providing security to the*  
 361 *local populaces from insurgent intimidation, coercion, and reprisals. On order (o/o) be*  
 362 *prepared to assist in implementing dislocated civilian (DC) operations; and support to*  
 363 *noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO).*  
 364

365 **3. (U) Execution.** *The execution paragraph provides the direction needed to synchronize the effects of*  
 366 *PRC/CMO efforts and related activities. It outlines the effects the commander wants PRC to achieve while*  
 367 *prioritizing CA tasks. It describes the activities of the force conducting PRC/CMO in enough detail to*  
 368 *synchronize them by means of an execution matrix. The execution matrix is an appendix to the CAO annex. The*  
 369 *matrix shows when each PRC task is to be executed. The execution matrix helps the G/S-9 representative in the*  
 370 *current operations integration cell (COIC) of the command monitor and direct PRC during execution. The*  
 371 *execution matrix is a tool to execute PRC effectively without incurring unanticipated interference or duplication*  
 372 *of effort. PRC tasks are incorporated and synchronized in the G/S-3 execution matrix - Tab A (Execution*  
 373 *matrix) to Appendix 3 (Decision Support Products) to Annex C (Operations). The PRC execution matrix is not a*  
 374 *tasking document. The PRC tasks are detailed under tasks to subordinate units in paragraph 3.b. of the CAO*  
 375 *Annex or in the appropriate appendixes. The activities needed to synchronize the PRC/CMO elements and*  
 376 *related activities include the following:*  
 377

378 a. (U) Scheme of Support. Describes how PRC supports the commander's intent and the command's  
379 concept of operations. This discussion details the PRC concept of operations supporting the approved course of  
380 action which comes from paragraph 4, Analysis, of the CAO running estimate developed during MDMP. This  
381 discussion includes the principle tasks required and how the principle tasks complement each other. This  
382 paragraph should include a discussion of PRC objectives, civil decisive points, measures of performance  
383 (MOPs) and measures of effectiveness (MOEs), transitions for each phase of the operation, and a general  
384 timeline for the operation. Each phase of the operation should be discussed in greater detail where the key  
385 nodal PRC relationships are defined.

386  
387 b. (U) Tasks to Subordinate Units. State the PRC task(s) assigned to each unit that reports directly to the  
388 headquarters issuing the order. Each task must include who (the subordinate unit assigned the task), what (the  
389 task itself), when, where, and why (purpose). Use a separate subparagraph for each unit. List units in task  
390 organization sequence. Place tasks that affect two or more units in paragraph 3.c. (Coordinating Instructions).  
391 (ex: Provide assessment of HN PRC needs / Provide liaison and staff expertise to HN PRC assets in AO).

392  
393 c. (U) Coordinating Instructions. List only instructions applicable to two or more units not covered in unit  
394 SOPs.

395  
396 (1) (U) Commander's Critical Information Requirements. List commander's critical information  
397 requirements (CCIRs) pertaining to the PRC mission.

398  
399 (2) (U) Essential Elements of Friendly Information. List essential elements of friendly information  
400 (EEFIs) pertaining to the PRC mission.

401  
402 (3) (U) Rules of Engagement. List rules of engagement impacting the PRC mission here. Refer to  
403 Appendix 12 (Rules of Engagement) to Annex C (Operations) as required.

404  
405 (Note: For operations within the United States and its territories, title this paragraph "Rules for the Use of  
406 Force").

407  
408 (4) (U) Risk Reduction Control Measures. Refer to Annex E (Protection) as required. (ex:  
409 Consideration to physical, personnel, computer security, and continuity-of-operations issues, particularly those  
410 associated with critical resources of the HN. Do not omit the situation threat and vulnerability assessment to  
411 determine security requirements.

412  
413 (5) (U) Environmental Considerations. Refer to Appendix 5 (Environmental Considerations) to Annex  
414 G (Engineer) as required. Review environmental planning guidance and, if available the Environmental  
415 Management Support Plan (EMSP) for implied PRC tasks that support environmental activities. (Consider the  
416 infrastructure and projects. As an example: Establishment of and support to environmental standards for HN  
417 resources such as air, water, (drinking and waste), hazardous waste and materials, solid and medical waste  
418 planning needs to be addressed. May include noise, pesticides, historic and cultural resources, toxic chemicals  
419 such as asbestos associated with civil industrial sites which may have already been addressed / utilize the  
420 ASCOPE analysis methodology.)

421  
422 (6) (U) Stability Operations. PRC support of the command's identified minimum essential stability  
423 operations tasks (civil control, civil security, and restoration of essential services) are detailed in the  
424 coordinating instructions subparagraph. Units responsible for an area of operations must execute the minimum

425 essential tasks with available resources if no civilian agency or organization is capable. Address PRC support  
 426 to governance and economic stability if required by mission taskings of the higher headquarters.

427

428 **4. (U) Sustainment.** This paragraph provides instructions and details concerning the service support  
 429 relationship between the PRC elements and their supported units. Identify priorities of sustainment for PRC  
 430 critical tasks and specify additional instructions as required.

431

432 a. (U) Logistics. Refer to Appendix 1 (Logistics) to Annex F (Sustainment) as required. Discuss specific  
 433 PRC requirements if not covered in unit(s) SOP:

434

435 b. (U) Personnel. Refer to Appendix 2 (Personnel Services) to Annex F (Sustainment) as required. For PRC  
 436 considerations use the following if not covered in Annex K or the unit(s) SOP:

437

438 (1) (U) Location and contact information of the US Chief of Mission (or Ambassador), Country Team  
 439 and affiliated US Government Civilian Response Corps (Advance Civilian Team [ACT], Field Advance Civilian  
 440 Team [FACT], etc.).

441

442 (2) (U) Location and contact information of the SJA. Location and contact information of the media  
 443 information bureau etc.

444

445 (3) (U) Lists location and contact data of key non-military personnel supporting PRC (Examples:  
 446 Mayor / Police chief / Religious Leaders / Local security leaders / School leaders / Tribal leaders / other  
 447 leaders (include gender, age, politics, demeanor, and influence- if applicable). IGOs/NGOs/OGAs in the area  
 448 (list all entities providing assistance, including POC and type, quantity, and frequency of assistance) if not  
 449 listed elsewhere.

450

451 c. (U) Health System Support. Refer to Appendix 3 (Army Health System Support) to Annex F  
 452 (Sustainment) as required.

453

454 **5. (U) Mission Command.**

455

456 a. (U) Command.

457

458 (1) (U) Location of Commander.

459

460 (a) (U) State where the commander intends to be during the operation (by phase if applicable).

461

462 (b) (U) List location and contact information of key PRC action officers and staff.

463

464 (c) (U) Location of key PRC HN leaders.

465

466 (2) (U) Succession of Command.

467

468 (a) (U) State the succession of command if not covered in the unit's SOPs.

469

470 (b) (U) Identify command and support relationships of all units conducting or supporting PRC.

471

472 (3) (U) Liaison Requirements.

473

474 (a) (U) State PRC liaison requirements not covered in the unit's SOP.

475

476 (b) (U) Include military (other Services, adjacent units, etc.) and non-military (i.e., interagency,  
 477 intergovernmental, nongovernmental, HN government, private sector, etc.).

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b. (U) Control.

(1) (U) Command Posts. *Describe the employment of command posts (CPs), including the location of each CP and its time of opening and closing, as appropriate. State the primary controlling CP for specific PRC tasks or phases of the operation.*

(2) (U) Reports. *List reports not covered in SOPs (Designate PRC reporting requirements for subordinate units) Refer to Annex R (Reports) as required.*

c. (U) Signal. *Lists signal operating instructions (SOI) information for PRC as needed, as well as primary and alternate means of communications, with both military and non-military organizations conducting PRC.*

(1) (U) *Describe the nets to monitor for reports.*

(2) (U) *Designate critical PRC reporting requirements.*

(3) (U) *Address any PRC specific communications or digitization connectivity requirements or coordination necessary to meet functional responsibilities (consider telephone listing). Provide instructions regarding maintenance and update of the civil information management (CIM) database with regard to PRC.*

(a) (U) *Lists SOI information for PRC.*

(b) (U) *Determines PRC primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency means of communications with military and non-military organizations (consider all aspects of operations security [OPSEC]) conducting PRC.*

**ACKNOWLEDGE:** *Include only if attachment is distributed separately from the base order*

**OFFICIAL:**

[Authenticator's name]  
[Authenticator's position]

*Either the commander or coordinating staff officer responsible for the functional area may sign attachments.*

**TABS:**

Tab A – Dislocated Civilian (DC) Operations (if required).  
Tab B – Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) (if required).

527 *NOTE: additional tabs as required (ex: Border Crossing Overlay, Access Control Points, etc.).*

528

529

530 **Distribution:** *Show only if distributed separately from the base order or higher level attachment.*

531

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[K-4-(page number)]

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**[CLASSIFICATION]**

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**Figure A-1: Appendix 4 (Populace and Resources Control) OPLAN Format**

539

## Dislocated Civilian Operations Tab A to Appendix 4 to Annex K

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Tab A (Dislocated Civilian Operations) to Appendix 4 (Populace and Resources Control) to Annex K (Civil Affairs Operations) serves as the primary planning and execution document for addressing a dislocated indigenous population. Dislocated civilian populations may occur across the spectrum of conflict, but are most prevalent during Foreign Humanitarian Assistance missions, peace operations, and major combat operations.

The DC operations tab also addresses sustainment and mission command aspects directly related to the task that are not covered elsewhere in the OPLAN or OPORD. Much of the information in the DC operations tab is derived from CAO mission analysis and the CAO running estimate. Major portions of the tab can be written directly from a detailed CAO running estimate.

### OVERVIEW

A-34 The DC operations tab succinctly describes the DC control measures that the task organization of the command executes in support of the command's stated mission and commander's intent. The tab organizes the information developed from the MDMP analysis of the civil component of the operational environment not addressed in the base order or the CAO annex. The tab also provides information to facilitate coordination among organizations (higher, adjacent, and civil) outside of the command tasked to implement DC control measures.

A-35 The DC operations tab, together with its associated exhibits, is an information management tool. It simplifies the base order by providing a structure for organizing information. Just as the annex expands the information contained in the base order, appendixes contain information necessary to expand annexes; tabs expand appendixes. The G/S-9 staff is responsible for the preparation of the DC operations tab and its attachments when required.

A-36 Details of DC operations support to the commander's intent and concept of operations not readily incorporated into the base order or the CAO annex are contained in the DC operations tab. The tab also describes the command's CAO linkage to the next higher command's plan and its support of the overall joint force's DC objectives.

### TAB FORMAT

A-37 The DC operations tab follows the five (5) paragraph format of the base order – Situation, Mission, Execution, Sustainment, and Mission Command. Information developed during MDMP and recorded using the CAO running estimate is used to complete the majority of the tab. Figure A-2, pages A-15 through A-21, is an example of the DC operations tab.

**[CLASSIFICATION]**  
**(Change from verbal orders, if any)**

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**TAB A (Dislocated Civilian Operations) to APPENDIX 4 (Populace and Resources Control) to ANNEX K (Civil Affairs Operations) to OPLAN ## (OPORD ##) - (Corps / Division / Brigade) [code name] [(classification of title)]**

584 **(U) References:** *List documents essential to understanding the TAB. List references concerning DC operations.*  
585

586 (a) (U) *List maps and charts first. Map entries include series number, country, sheet names, or numbers,*  
587 *edition, and scale.*

588 (b) (U) *List other references in subparagraphs labeled as shown. Examples: CAO annex of higher*  
589 *headquarters / Relevant civilian agency operations guides and standards documents / Relevant plans of*  
590 *participating civilian organizations / Coordinated transition plans / International treaties and agreements /*  
591 *PRC legal authority / Operational CA database (civil information management [CIM], reachback, etc.) /*  
592 *Others, as applicable.*

593  
594 **(U) Time Zone Used Throughout the OPLAN/OPORD:** *State the time zone used in the area of operations*  
595 *during execution. When the OPLAN or OPORD applies to units in different time zones, use Greenwich Mean*  
596 *(ZULU) Time {example ZULU (Z) or LOCAL}.*  
597  
598

599 **1. (U) Situation.** *Include items of information affecting DC operations support not included in paragraph 1 of*  
600 *the OPORD or any information needing expansion. The situation paragraph describes how the implementation*  
601 *of DC measures may affect friendly, adversary, and other operations. It should discuss how DC operations*  
602 *would influence friendly operations. The situation paragraph describes the conditions and circumstances of the*  
603 *operational environment that impact DC operations measures in the following subparagraphs:*

604  
605 a. (U) **Area of Interest.** *Describe the area of interest. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence) as required.*  
606

607 b. (U) **Area of Operations.** *Describe the area of operations (AO). Refer to the appropriate map by its*  
608 *subparagraph under references (for example, "Map, reference (b))." Refer to Appendix 2 (Operations Overlay)*  
609 *to Annex C (Operations) as required.*  
610

611 (1) (U) **Terrain.** *Describe the aspects of terrain that impact operations. Refer to Tab A (Terrain) to*  
612 *Appendix 1 (Intelligence Estimate) to Annex B (Intelligence) as required. (ex: Consider indigenous population*  
613 *centers and likely border crossing points/ports of entry that may impact DC operations / Identification of DC*  
614 *related COGs).*  
615

616 (2) (U) **Weather.** *Describe the aspects of weather that impact operations. Refer to Tab B (Weather) to*  
617 *Appendix 1 (Intelligence Estimate) to Annex B (Intelligence) as required. (ex: Consider seasonal events (rain,*  
618 *flooding, wind storms, and snow) that may impact commercial mobility capability in the AO related to DC*  
619 *operations – impacts on time to implement DC operations measures associated with inclement weather.*  
620

621 c. (U) **Enemy Forces.** *Identify enemy forces and appraise their general capabilities. Describe the enemy's*  
622 *disposition, location, strength, and probable courses of action. Identify known or potential terrorist threats and*  
623 *adversaries within the AO. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence) as required. (ex: Consider maintaining continuous*  
624 *coordination with the intelligence staff to develop potential impact of enemy forces on the DC operations*

625 mission / enemy capabilities by considering sabotage, espionage, subversion, terrorism, / enemy sympathizers /  
626 DC operations measures to deny the enemy access to the civil populace and deny materiel to the enemy)

627  
628 d. (U) Friendly Forces. Outline the higher headquarters' plan as it pertains to DC operations. List the  
629 designation, location, and outline the plans of higher, adjacent, and other DC operations assets that support or  
630 impact the issuing headquarters or require coordination and additional support. Include additional information  
631 on HN, interagency, intergovernmental, and nongovernmental organizations that may impact DC operations.  
632

633 (1) (U) Higher Headquarters' Mission and Intent. Identify and state the DC operations mission and  
634 commander's intent for the higher headquarters of the issuing headquarters.  
635

636 (2) (U) Missions of Adjacent Units. Identify and state the DC operations missions of adjacent units  
637 and other units whose actions have a significant impact on the issuing headquarters.  
638

639 e. (U) Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Nongovernmental Organizations. Identify and state the  
640 objective or goals and primary tasks of those non-Department of Defense organizations that have a significant  
641 DC operations role within the AO. Refer to Annex V (Interagency Coordination) as required. Do not repeat  
642 information listed in Annex V. Take into consideration any and all organizations that could have a vested  
643 interest (ex: Host nation [to include the HN military], multinational agencies and organizations, indigenous  
644 populations and institutions [IPI], and to a lesser degree the private sector).  
645

646 (1) (U) Interagency Organizations. Assessment of the ability of key interagency organizations  
647 operating in the AO to support the unit's DC operations mission to include; the agency's missions, capabilities,  
648 capacity, and coordination points of contact (POCs) if not listed in Annex V. Identify known unit requirements  
649 to support interagency operations.  
650

651 (2) (U) Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs). Assessment of the ability of key IGOs' (especially UN  
652 agencies) operating in the AO to support the unit's DC operations mission to include; the agency's missions,  
653 capabilities, capacity, and coordination points of contact (POCs). Identify known unit requirements to support  
654 intergovernmental operations.  
655

656 (3) (U) Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs). Assessment of key nongovernmental organizations  
657 (NGOs) operating in the AO to support the unit's DC operations mission to include; the agency's missions,  
658 capabilities, capacity (e.g. ability to support civil relief systems), and coordination points of contact (POCs).  
659 Identify known unit requirements to support nongovernmental operations.  
660

661 f. (U) Civil Considerations. Describe the critical aspects, strengths and weaknesses of the civil situation  
662 that impact operations. Liaise with the G-2 (S-2) and refer to Tab C (Civil Considerations) to Appendix 1  
663 (Intelligence Estimate) to Annex B (Intelligence) as required. Address the general overview of civil  
664 considerations for the AO (described by mnemonic ASCOPE - areas, structures, capabilities, organizations,  
665 people, and events). Review the critical aspects of the civil situation by applying each of the operational  
666 variables political, military, economic, society, information, infrastructure, - physical environment and time  
667 (PMESII-PT) that could impact the civil considerations analysis.  
668

669 (1) (U) Areas. List the key civilian areas in the supported commander's operational environment. It  
670 approaches terrain analysis from a civilian perspective. Commanders analyze key civilian areas in terms of  
671 how they affect the mission as well as how military operations affect these areas. Examples of key civilian areas  
672 are areas defined by political boundaries (borders between countries, provinces within countries); locations of

673 *dislocated populations; points of origin dislocated civilians; possible sites for the temporary settlement of*  
674 *dislocated civilians; or other civil functions related to dislocated civilian operations.*

675

676 (2) (U) Structures. *List the locations of existing civil structures (critical infrastructure) such as ports,*  
677 *air terminals, transportation networks, bridges, communications towers, power plants, and dams whose normal*  
678 *operation and function are impacted by the movement of large numbers of DCs. Further identify those facilities*  
679 *with practical applications, such as jails, warehouses, and schools, which may be utilized in the execution of*  
680 *DC operations.*

681

682 (3) (U) Capabilities. *Describe the civil capabilities for implementing DC operations by assessing the*  
683 *populace's capabilities of sustaining itself. Include whether the dislocated populace needs assistance with basic*  
684 *life sustaining essentials (food, water, shelter), public works and utilities, public health, and public*  
685 *transportation. Analysis of the existing capabilities of the AO is based on the 14 CA functional specialties (refer*  
686 *to the preliminary area assessment developed during mission analysis).*

687

688 (4) (U) Organizations. *List civil organizations that may or may not be affiliated with government*  
689 *agencies, such as church groups, ethnic groups, multinational corporations, fraternal organizations, patriotic*  
690 *or service organizations, IGOs, or NGOs / Do not repeat those listed in Annex V or paragraph 1.e. above*  
691 *(Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Nongovernmental Organizations) Include HN organizations capable of*  
692 *forming the nucleus for DC operations and humanitarian assistance (HA) programs, interim-governing bodies,*  
693 *civil defense efforts, and other activities related to DC operations.*

694

695 (5) (U) People. *List key civilian personnel and linkage to the dislocated population. (NOTE: This list*  
696 *may extend to personnel outside of the operational environment whose actions, opinions, and influence can*  
697 *affect the supported commander's operational environment. Categorize the dislocated population groups such*  
698 *as refugees, displaced persons, internally displaced persons, evacuees, expellees, migrants, stateless persons.*  
699

700

701 (6) (U) Events. *Determine what events, military and civilian, are occurring that are impacting the*  
702 *dislocated population and provide analysis of the events for their political, economic, psychological,*  
703 *environmental, moral, and legal implications. Categorize civilian events that may affect DC operations / Events*  
704 *may include riots, voluntary evacuations, involuntary evacuations, manmade disasters or environmental*  
705 *disasters.*

706

707 g. (U) Attachments and Detachments. *List units attached to or detached from the issuing headquarters.*  
708 *State when each attachment or detachment is effective (for example; on order) if different from the effective*  
709 *time of the OPLAN/OPORD. Do not repeat information already listed in Annex A (Task Organization). This*  
710 *paragraph includes all military and nonmilitary organizations participating in DC operations. Identify other*  
711 *CA resources attached and detached, including effective times of transfer if appropriate.*

712

713 h. (U) Assumptions. *Assumptions are only listed when preparing a CAO Annex to an OPLAN. (When*  
714 *preparing a DC operations tab to an OPORD, this step may be omitted.) List assumptions developed in*  
715 *preparing the CAO running estimate and not yet validated / List key assumptions used in the development of the*  
716 *OPLAN/OPORD if pertaining to DC operations mission.*

717

718 (1) (U) *Identifies critical planning considerations and unknown conditions that must be confirmed*  
719 *during the initial assessment(s) (examples: military and interagency support will be available; Personnel and*  
720 *facilities of relief/welfare organizations will continue to provide a basis for civilian relief programs; and the*  
*civilian populace will continue to offer resistance to the opposing force).*

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(2) (U) *Provides a statement describing the operational risks associated with not engaging the dislocated population of the AO.*

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**2. (U) Mission.** Include a clear, concise statement of the DC operations task— "Who (*type of forces will execute the tasks*), what (*tasks are to be accomplished*), when (*are the tasks to occur*), where (*are the tasks to occur*), and why (*will each force conduct its part of the operation*)?" Prioritize multiple DC operations tasks. Include a task and a purpose in all mission statements. (Can obtain the mission statement from paragraph 1 of the CAO running estimate / can be extracted from the estimate verbatim).

**3. (U) Execution.** The execution paragraph provides the direction needed to synchronize the effects of DC operations efforts and related activities. It outlines the effects the commander wants DC operations to achieve while prioritizing DC operations tasks. It describes the activities of the force conducting DC operations in enough detail to synchronize them by means of an execution matrix. The execution matrix is an appendix to the CAO annex. The matrix shows when each DC operations task is to be executed. The execution matrix helps the G/S-9 representative in the current operations integration cell (COIC) of the command monitor and direct DC operations during execution. The execution matrix is a tool to execute DC operations effectively without incurring unanticipated interference or duplication of effort. DC operations tasks are incorporated and synchronized in the G/S-3 execution matrix - Tab A (Execution matrix) to Appendix 3 (Decision Support Products) to Annex C (Operations). The CAO execution matrix is not a tasking document. The DC operations tasks are detailed under tasks to subordinate units in paragraph 3.b. of the CAO Annex or in the appropriate appendixes or tabs. The activities needed to synchronize the DC operations elements and related activities include the following:

a. (U) **Scheme of Support.** Describes how DC operations supports the commander's intent and the command's concept of operations. This discussion details the DC operations concept of operations supporting the approved course of action which comes from paragraph 4, Analysis, of the CAO running estimate developed during MDMP. This discussion includes the principle tasks required and how the principle tasks complement each other. This paragraph should include a discussion of DC operations objectives, civil decisive points, measures of performance (MOPs) and measures of effectiveness (MOEs), transitions for each phase of the operation, and a general timeline for the operation. Each phase of the operation should be discussed in greater detail where the key nodal DC operations relationships are defined.

b. (U) **Tasks to Subordinate Units.** State the DC operations task(s) assigned to each unit that reports directly to the headquarters issuing the order. Each task must include who (the subordinate unit assigned the task), what (the task itself), when, where, and why (purpose). Use a separate subparagraph for each unit. List units in task organization sequence. Place tasks that affect two or more units in paragraph 3.c. (Coordinating Instructions). (ex: Provide assessment of HN DC operations needs / Provide liaison and staff expertise to HN DC operations assets in AO / Establish DC collection point vic \_\_\_\_\_ / Establish division DC assembly area vic \_\_\_\_\_ / Establish DC emergency rest area vic \_\_\_\_\_).

c. (U) **Coordinating Instructions.** List only instructions applicable to two or more units not covered in unit SOPs. Include DC handling and routing instructions coordinated with the military traffic circulation plan.

(1) (U) **Commander's Critical Information Requirements.** List commander's critical information requirements (CCIRs) pertaining to the DC operations mission.

768 (2) (U) Essential Elements of Friendly Information. List essential elements of friendly information  
 769 (EEFIs) pertaining to the DC operations mission.

770  
 771 (3) (U) Rules of Engagement. List rules of engagement impacting the DC operations mission here.  
 772 Refer to Appendix 12 (Rules of Engagement) to Annex C (Operations) as required.

773  
 774 (Note: For operations within the United States and its territories, title this paragraph “Rules for the Use of  
 775 Force”).

776  
 777 (4) (U) Risk Reduction Control Measures. Refer to Annex E (Protection) as required. (ex:  
 778 Consideration to physical, personnel, computer security, and continuity-of-operations issues, particularly those  
 779 associated with critical DC operations resources of the HN. Do not omit the situation threat and vulnerability  
 780 assessment to determine security requirements.

781  
 782 (5) (U) Environmental Considerations. Refer to Appendix 5 (Environmental Considerations) to Annex  
 783 G (Engineer) as required. Review environmental planning guidance and, if available the Environmental  
 784 Management Support Plan (EMSP) for implied DC operations tasks that support environmental activities.  
 785 (Consider the infrastructure and temporary DC facilities that may be activated. As an example: Establishment  
 786 of and support to environmental standards for HN resources such as air, water, (drinking and waste),  
 787 hazardous waste and materials, solid and medical waste planning needs to be addressed.)

788  
 789 (6) (U) Stability Operations. DC operations support of the command’s identified minimum essential  
 790 stability operations tasks (civil control, civil security, and restoration of essential services) are detailed in the  
 791 coordinating instructions subparagraph. Units responsible for an area of operations must execute the minimum  
 792 essential tasks with available resources if no civilian agency or organization is capable.

793  
 794 **4. (U) Sustainment**. This paragraph provides instructions and details concerning the service support  
 795 relationship between the DC operations elements and their supported units. Identify priorities of sustainment  
 796 for DC operations critical tasks and specify additional instructions as required.

797  
 798 a. (U) Logistics. Refer to Appendix 1 (Logistics) to Annex F (Sustainment) as required. Discuss specific DC  
 799 operations requirements if not covered in unit(s) SOP:

800  
 801 b. (U) Personnel. Refer to Appendix 2 (Personnel Services) to Annex F (Sustainment) as required. For DC  
 802 operations considerations use the following if not covered in Annex K or the unit(s) SOP:

803  
 804 (1) (U) Location and contact information of the US Chief of Mission (or Ambassador), Country Team  
 805 and affiliated US Government Civilian Response Corps or OGAs.

806  
 807 (2) (U) Location and contact information of the SJA. Location and contact information of the media  
 808 information bureau etc.

809  
 810 (3) (U) Lists location and contact data of key non-military personnel supporting DC operations  
 811 (Examples: Mayor / Police chief / Religious Leaders / Local security leaders / School leaders / Tribal leaders /  
 812 other leaders (include gender, age, politics, demeanor, and influence- if applicable). IGOs (especially any UN  
 813 contingent) and NGOs in the area (list all entities providing assistance, including POC and type, quantity, and  
 814 frequency of assistance) if not listed elsewhere.

815  
 816 c. (U) Health System Support. Refer to Appendix 3 (Army Health System Support) to Annex F  
 817 (Sustainment) as required.

818

819 **5. (U) Mission Command.**

820

821 a. (U) Command.

822

823 (1) (U) Location of key host nation, IGO, and NGO leaders for DC Operations. *Identifies primary and*  
824 *alternate locations for POCs responsible for the conduct of DC operations by organization, if not listed*  
825 *elsewhere.*

826

827 (a) (U) *Location and alternate locations of the supported command's DC point of contact.*

828

829 (b) (U) *List location and contact information of key DC operations action officers and staff.*

830

831 (c) (U) *Identify command and support relationships of all units conducting or supporting DC*  
832 *operations.*

833

834 (2) (U) Liaison Requirements.

835

836 (a) (U) *State DC operations liaison requirements to military organizations/Services not covered*  
837 *in the unit's SOP.*

838

839 (b) (U) *State DC operations liaison requirements to non-military (i.e., interagency,*  
840 *intergovernmental, nongovernmental, HN government, private sector, etc.).*

841

842 b. (U) Control.

843

844 (1) (U) Command Posts. *Describe the employment of command posts (CPs), including the location of*  
845 *each CP and its time of opening and closing, as appropriate. State the primary controlling CP for specific DC*  
846 *operations tasks or phases of the operation.*

847

848 (2) (U) Reports. *List reports not covered in SOPs (Designate DC operations reporting requirements for*  
849 *subordinate units) Refer to Annex R (Reports) as required.*

850

851 c. (U) Signal. *Lists signal operating instructions (SOI) information for DC operations as needed, as well as*  
852 *primary and alternate means of communications, with both military and non-military organizations conducting*  
853 *DC operations.*

854

855 (1) (U) *Describe the nets to monitor for reports.*

856

857 (2) (U) *Designate critical DC operations reporting requirements.*

858

859 (3) (U) *Address any DC operations specific communications or digitization connectivity requirements*  
860 *or coordination necessary to meet functional responsibilities (consider telephone listing). Provide instructions*  
861 *regarding maintenance and update of the civil information management (CIM) database with regard to DC*  
862 *operations.*

863

864 (a) (U) *Lists SOI information for DC operations.*

865

866 (b) (U) *Determines DC operations primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency means of*  
867 *communications with military and non-military organizations (consider all aspects of operations security*  
868 *[OPSEC]) conducting DC operations.*

869

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871

872 **ACKNOWLEDGE:** *Include only if attachment is distributed separately from the base order*

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878 **OFFICIAL:**

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882 [Authenticator's name]

883 [Authenticator's position]

884

885 *Either the commander or coordinating staff officer responsible for the functional area may sign attachments.*

886

887 **EXHIBITS:**

888

889 Exhibit 1 – Dislocated Civilian (DC) Collection Overlay (if required).

890 Exhibit 2 – Dislocated Civilian (DC) Movement Table (if required).

891

892 *NOTE: additional exhibits as required (ex: Border Crossing Overlay, Designated DC Route Overlay, DC*  
893 *Collection Point Layout).*

894

895

896 **Distribution:** *Show only if distributed separately from the base order or higher level attachment.*

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[K-4-A-(page number)]

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**[CLASSIFICATION]**

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904

**Figure A-2: Tab A (Dislocated Civilian Operations) OPLAN Format**

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## Noncombatant Evacuation Operations Tab B to Appendix 4 to Annex K

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Tab B (Noncombatant Evacuation Operations) to Appendix 4 (Populace and Resources Control) to Annex K (Civil Affairs Operations) serves as the primary planning and execution document for addressing the care, handling, and disposition of a NEO population from the initial assembly area to arrival at a safe haven. NEOs may occur across the spectrum of conflict, but are most prevalent during Foreign Humanitarian Assistance missions, crisis action missions, and major combat operations.

The NEO tab also addresses sustainment and mission command aspects directly related to the task that are not covered elsewhere in the OPLAN or OPORD. Much of the information in the NEO tab is derived from CAO mission analysis and the CAO running estimate. Major portions of the tab can be written directly from a detailed CAO running estimate.

### OVERVIEW

A-38 The NEO tab succinctly describes the actions that the task organization of the command executes in support of the command's stated mission and commander's intent. The tab organizes the information developed from the MDMP analysis of the civil component of the operational environment not addressed in the base order or the CAO annex. The tab also provides information to facilitate coordination among organizations (higher, adjacent, and civil) outside of the command tasked to implement NEO control measures.

A-39 The NEO tab, together with its associated exhibits, is an information management tool. It simplifies the base order by providing a structure for organizing information. Just as the annex expands the information contained in the base order, appendixes contain information necessary to expand annexes; tabs expand appendixes. The G/S-9 staff is responsible for the preparation of the NEO tab and its attachments when required.

A-40 Details of NEO support to the commander's intent and concept of operations not readily incorporated into the base order or the CAO annex are contained in the NEO tab. The tab also describes the command's CAO linkage to the next higher command's plan and its support of the overall joint force's NEO objectives.

### TAB FORMAT

A-41 The NEO tab follows the five (5) paragraph format of the base order – Situation, Mission, Execution, Sustainment, and Mission Command. Information developed during MDMP and recorded using the CAO running estimate is used to complete the majority of the tab. Figure A-3, pages A-23 through A-29, is an example of the NEO tab.

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**[CLASSIFICATION]**  
**(Change from verbal orders, if any)**

**TAB B (Noncombatant Evacuation Operations) to APPENDIX 4 (Populace and Resources Control) to ANNEX K (Civil Affairs Operations) to OPLAN ## (OPORD ##) - (Corps / Division / Brigade) [code name] [(classification of title)]**

**(U) References:** *List documents essential to understanding the TAB. List references concerning NEO.*

(a) (U) *List maps and charts first. Map entries include series number, country, sheet names, or numbers, edition, and scale.*

(b) (U) *List other references in subparagraphs labeled as shown. Examples: CAO annex of higher headquarters / Relevant civilian agency operations guides and standards documents, especially the emergency action plan (EAP) of the American Embassy of the target country / Relevant plans of participating civilian organizations / Coordinated transition plans / International treaties and agreements / Operational CA database (civil information management [CIM], reachback, etc.) / Others, as applicable.*

**(U) Time Zone Used Throughout the OPLAN/OPORD:** *State the time zone used in the area of operations during execution. When the OPLAN or OPORD applies to units in different time zones, use Greenwich Mean (ZULU) Time {example ZULU (Z) or LOCAL}.*

**1. (U) Situation.** *Include items of information affecting NEO support not included in paragraph 1 of the OPORD or any information needing expansion. The situation paragraph describes how the execution of a NEO may affect friendly, adversary, and other operations. The situation paragraph describes the conditions and circumstances of the operational environment that impact NEO measures in the following subparagraphs:*

a. (U) **Area of Interest.** *Describe the area of interest. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence) as required.*

b. (U) **Area of Operations.** *Describe the area of operations (AO). Refer to the appropriate map by its subparagraph under references (for example, "Map, reference (b).") Refer to Appendix 2 (Operations Overlay) to Annex C (Operations) as required. Describe the type of operational environment expected – permissive; uncertain; or hostile.*

(1) (U) **Terrain.** *Describe the aspects of terrain that impact operations. Refer to Tab A (Terrain) to Appendix 1 (Intelligence Estimate) to Annex B (Intelligence) as required. (ex: Consider indigenous population centers and likely border crossing points/ports of embarkation that may impact NEO / Identification of NEO related COGs).*

(2) (U) **Weather.** *Describe the aspects of weather that impact operations. Refer to Tab B (Weather) to Appendix 1 (Intelligence Estimate) to Annex B (Intelligence) as required. (ex: Consider seasonal events (rain, flooding, wind storms, and snow) that may impact commercial mobility capability in the AO related to NEO – impacts on time to implement NEO measures associated with inclement weather.*

c. (U) **Enemy Forces.** *Identify enemy forces and appraise their general capabilities. Describe the enemy's disposition, location, strength, and probable courses of action. Identify known or potential terrorist threats and adversaries within the AO. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence) as required. (ex: Consider maintaining continuous coordination with the intelligence staff to develop potential impact of enemy forces on the NEO mission / enemy*

992 capabilities by considering sabotage, espionage, subversion, terrorism, / enemy sympathizers / security  
993 measures to deny adversaries access to the populace to be evacuated and deny materials to the enemy).

994

995 d. (U) Friendly Forces. Outline the higher headquarters' plan as it pertains to NEO. List the designation,  
996 location, and outline the plans of higher, adjacent, and other NEO assets that support or impact the issuing  
997 headquarters or require coordination and additional support. Include additional information on HN,  
998 interagency, intergovernmental, and nongovernmental organizations that may impact NEO.

999

1000 (1) (U) Higher Headquarters' Mission and Intent. Identify and state the NEO mission and  
1001 commander's intent for the higher headquarters of the issuing headquarters.

1002

1003 (2) (U) Missions of Adjacent Units. Identify and state the NEO missions of adjacent units and other  
1004 units whose actions have a significant impact on the issuing headquarters.

1005

1006 e. (U) Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Nongovernmental Organizations. Identify and state the  
1007 objective or goals and primary tasks of those non-Department of Defense organizations that have a significant  
1008 NEO role within the AO. Refer to Annex V (Interagency Coordination) as required. Do not repeat information  
1009 listed in Annex V. Take into consideration any and all organizations that could have a vested interest (ex: Host  
1010 nation [to include the HN military], multinational agencies and organizations, indigenous populations and  
1011 institutions [IPI], and to a lesser degree the private sector).

1012

1013 (1) (U) Interagency Organizations. Assessment of the ability of key interagency organizations  
1014 operating in the AO to support the unit's NEO mission to include; the agency's missions, capabilities, capacity,  
1015 and coordination points of contact (POCs) if not listed in Annex V. Identify known unit requirements to support  
1016 interagency operations especially the American Embassy of the affected country.

1017

1018 (2) (U) Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs). Assessment of the ability of key IGOs' (especially UN  
1019 agencies) operating in the AO to support the unit's NEO mission to include; the agency's missions, capabilities,  
1020 capacity, and coordination points of contact (POCs). Identify known unit requirements to support  
1021 intergovernmental operations.

1022

1023 (3) (U) Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs). Assessment of key nongovernmental organizations  
1024 (NGOs) operating in the AO to support the unit's NEO mission to include; the agency's missions, capabilities,  
1025 capacity (e.g. ability to support civil relief systems), and coordination points of contact (POCs). Identify known  
1026 unit requirements to support nongovernmental operations related to the execution of the NEO mission.

1027

1028 f. (U) Civil Considerations. Describe the critical aspects, strengths and weaknesses of the civil situation  
1029 that impact operations. Liaise with the G-2 (S-2) and refer to Tab C (Civil Considerations) to Appendix I  
1030 (Intelligence Estimate) to Annex B (Intelligence) as required. Address the general overview of civil  
1031 considerations for the AO (described by mnemonic ASCOPE - areas, structures, capabilities, organizations,  
1032 people, and events). Review the critical aspects of the civil situation by applying each of the operational  
1033 variables political, military, economic, society, information, infrastructure, - physical environment and time  
1034 (PMESII-PT) that could impact the civil considerations analysis.

1035

1036 (1) (U) Areas. List the key civilian areas in the supported commander's operational environment. It  
1037 approaches terrain analysis from a civilian perspective. Commanders analyze key civilian areas in terms of  
1038 how they affect the mission as well as how military operations affect these areas. Examples of key civilian areas  
1039 are areas defined by political boundaries (borders between countries, provinces within countries); current

1040 *locations of evacuees; points of origin of evacuees; possible sites for the temporary assembly of evacuees; or*  
 1041 *other civil functions related to NEO.*

1042

1043 (2) (U) Structures. *List the locations of existing civil structures (critical infrastructure) such as ports,*  
 1044 *air terminals, transportation networks, bridges, communications towers, power plants, and dams whose normal*  
 1045 *operation and function are impacted by the movement of large numbers of evacuees. Further identify those*  
 1046 *facilities with practical applications, such as jails, warehouses, and schools, which may be utilized in the*  
 1047 *execution of NEO.*

1048

1049 (3) (U) Capabilities. *Describe the civil capabilities for implementing NEO by assessing the evacuees'*  
 1050 *capabilities of sustaining themselves. Include whether the evacuee populace needs assistance with basic life*  
 1051 *sustaining essentials (food, water, and shelter), public works and utilities, public health, and public*  
 1052 *transportation. Analysis of the existing capabilities of the AO is based on the 14 CA functional specialties (refer*  
 1053 *to the preliminary area assessment developed during mission analysis). Capabilities analysis also assesses the*  
 1054 *capabilities of the HN to maintain order within the indigenous population and provide additional security to*  
 1055 *evacuee assembly and processing sites.*

1056

1057 (4) (U) Organizations. *List civil organizations that may or may not be affiliated with government*  
 1058 *agencies, such as church groups, ethnic groups, multinational corporations, fraternal organizations, patriotic*  
 1059 *or service organizations, IGOs, or NGOs / Do not repeat those listed in Annex V or paragraph 1.e. above*  
 1060 *(Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Nongovernmental Organizations). Include organizations whose personnel*  
 1061 *have been identified as eligible for evacuation.*

1062

1063 (5) (U) People. *List key civilian personnel and linkage to the evacuee population. (NOTE: This list may*  
 1064 *extend to personnel outside of the operational environment whose actions, opinions, and influence can affect*  
 1065 *the supported commander's operational environment.) Categorize the evacuee population groups such as:*  
 1066 *numbers to be evacuated by major categories; American citizens, foreign service nationals, national employees*  
 1067 *of the U.S. Government, and eligible non-Americans who are seriously ill, injured, or whose lives are in*  
 1068 *imminent peril but who do not qualify for a higher priority.*

1069

1070 (6) (U) Events. *Determine what events, military and civilian, are occurring that are impacting the*  
 1071 *evacuee population and provide analysis of the events for their political, economic, psychological,*  
 1072 *environmental, moral, and legal implications. Categorize civilian events that may affect NEO / Events may*  
 1073 *include political instability, demonstrations, riots, manmade or environmental disasters.*

1074

1075 g. (U) Attachments and Detachments. *List units attached to or detached from the issuing headquarters.*  
 1076 *State when each attachment or detachment is effective (for example; on order) if different from the effective*  
 1077 *time of the OPLAN/OPORD. Do not repeat information already listed in Annex A (Task Organization). This*  
 1078 *paragraph includes all military and nonmilitary organizations participating in NEO. Identify other CA*  
 1079 *resources attached and detached, including effective times of transfer if appropriate.*

1080

1081 h. (U) Assumptions. *Assumptions are only listed when preparing a CAO Annex to an OPLAN. (When*  
 1082 *preparing a NEO tab to an OPORD, this step may be omitted.) List assumptions developed in preparing the*  
 1083 *CAO running estimate and not yet validated / List key assumptions used in the development of the*  
 1084 *OPLAN/OPORD if pertaining to the NEO mission.*

1085

1086 (1) (U) *Identifies critical planning considerations and unknown conditions that must be confirmed*  
1087 *during the initial assessment(s) (examples: military and interagency support will be available; Personnel and*  
1088 *facilities of relief/welfare organizations will continue to provide a basis for civilian relief programs; and the*  
1089 *civilian populace will continue to offer resistance to the opposing force).*

1090  
1091 (2) (U) *Provides a statement describing the operational risks associated with not engaging the civil*  
1092 *component of the AO during the execution of NEO.*

1093  
1094 **2. (U) Mission.** *Include a clear, concise statement of the NEO task— "Who (type of forces will execute the*  
1095 *tasks), what (tasks are to be accomplished), when (are the tasks to occur), where (are the tasks to occur), and*  
1096 *why (will each force conduct its part of the operation)?" Prioritize multiple NEO tasks. Include a task and a*  
1097 *purpose in all mission statements. (Can obtain the mission statement from paragraph 1 of the CAO running*  
1098 *estimate / can be extracted from the estimate verbatim).*

1099  
1100 **3. (U) Execution.** *The execution paragraph provides the direction needed to synchronize the effects of NEO*  
1101 *efforts and related actions. It outlines the effects the commander wants NEO to achieve while prioritizing NEO*  
1102 *tasks. It describes the activities of the force conducting NEO in enough detail to synchronize them by means of*  
1103 *an execution matrix. The execution matrix is an appendix to the CAO annex. The matrix shows when each NEO*  
1104 *task is to be executed. The execution matrix helps the G/S-9 representative in the current operations integration*  
1105 *cell (COIC) of the command monitor and direct NEO during execution. The execution matrix is a tool to*  
1106 *execute NEO effectively without incurring unanticipated interference or duplication of effort. NEO tasks are*  
1107 *incorporated and synchronized in the G/S-3 execution matrix - Tab A (Execution matrix) to Appendix 3*  
1108 *(Decision Support Products) to Annex C (Operations). The CAO execution matrix is not a tasking document.*  
1109 *The NEO tasks are detailed under tasks to subordinate units in paragraph 3.b. of the CAO Annex or in the*  
1110 *appropriate appendixes or tabs. The activities needed to synchronize the NEO elements and related activities*  
1111 *include the following:*

1112  
1113 a. (U) **Scheme of Support.** *Describes how CA support to NEO supports the commander's intent and the*  
1114 *command's concept of operations. This discussion details the NEO concept of operations supporting the*  
1115 *approved course of action which comes from paragraph 4, Analysis, of the CAO running estimate developed*  
1116 *during MDMP. This discussion includes the primary tasks required and how the primary tasks complement*  
1117 *each other. This paragraph should include a discussion of NEO objectives, civil decisive points, measures of*  
1118 *performance (MOPs) and measures of effectiveness (MOEs), transitions for each phase of the operation, and a*  
1119 *general timeline for the operation. Each phase of the operation should be discussed in greater detail where the*  
1120 *key nodal NEO relationships are defined.*

1121  
1122 b. (U) **Tasks to Subordinate Units.** *State the NEO task(s) assigned to each unit that reports directly to the*  
1123 *headquarters issuing the order. Each task must include who (the subordinate unit assigned the task), what (the*  
1124 *task itself), when, where, and why (purpose). Use a separate subparagraph for each unit. List units in task*  
1125 *organization sequence. Place tasks that affect two or more units in paragraph 3.c. (Coordinating Instructions).*  
1126 *(ex: Provide liaison and staff expertise to American Embassy / Establish evacuee collection point vic \_\_\_\_\_ /*  
1127 *Establish evacuee assembly area vic \_\_\_\_\_ / Support American Embassy evacuee processing center vic \_\_\_\_\_).*

1128  
1129 c. (U) **Coordinating Instructions.** *List only instructions applicable to two or more units not covered in unit*  
1130 *SOPs. Include evacuee handling and routing instructions coordinated with the military traffic circulation plan.*  
1131

- 1132 (1) (U) Commander's Critical Information Requirements. *List commander's critical information*  
 1133 *requirements (CCIRs) pertaining to the NEO mission.*  
 1134
- 1135 (2) (U) Essential Elements of Friendly Information. *List essential elements of friendly information*  
 1136 *(EEFIs) pertaining to the NEO mission.*  
 1137
- 1138 (3) (U) Rules of Engagement. *List rules of engagement impacting the NEO mission here. Refer to*  
 1139 *Appendix 12 (Rules of Engagement) to Annex C (Operations) as required.*  
 1140
- 1141 (4) (U) Risk Reduction Control Measures. *Refer to Annex E (Protection) as required. (ex:*  
 1142 *Consideration to physical, personnel, computer security, and continuity-of-operations issues, particularly those*  
 1143 *associated with critical NEO resources within the HN. Do not omit the situation threat and vulnerability*  
 1144 *assessment to determine security requirements.*  
 1145
- 1146 (5) (U) Environmental Considerations. *Refer to Appendix 5 (Environmental Considerations) to Annex*  
 1147 *G (Engineer) as required. Review environmental planning guidance and, if available the Environmental*  
 1148 *Management Support Plan (EMSP) for implied NEO tasks that support environmental activities. (Consider the*  
 1149 *infrastructure and temporary evacuee facilities that may be activated. As an example: Establishment of and*  
 1150 *support to environmental standards for resources such as air, water, (drinking and waste), hazardous waste*  
 1151 *and materials, solid and medical waste planning needs to be addressed.)*  
 1152
- 1153 (6) (U) Stability Operations. *NEO support of the command's identified minimum essential stability*  
 1154 *operations tasks (civil control, civil security, and restoration of essential services) are detailed in the*  
 1155 *coordinating instructions subparagraph. Units responsible for an area of operations must execute the minimum*  
 1156 *essential tasks with available resources if no civilian agency or organization is capable.*  
 1157
- 1158 **4. (U) Sustainment**. *This paragraph provides instructions and details concerning the service support*  
 1159 *relationship between the NEO elements and their supported units. Identify priorities of sustainment for NEO*  
 1160 *critical tasks and specify additional instructions as required.*  
 1161
- 1162 a. (U) Logistics. *Refer to Appendix 1 (Logistics) to Annex F (Sustainment) as required. Discuss specific*  
 1163 *NEO requirements if not covered in unit(s) SOP:*  
 1164
- 1165 b. (U) Personnel. *Refer to Appendix 2 (Personnel Services) to Annex F (Sustainment) as required. For NEO*  
 1166 *considerations use the following if not covered in Annex K or the unit(s) SOP:*  
 1167
- 1168 (1) (U) *Location and contact information of the U.S. Chief of Mission (or Ambassador), Country*  
 1169 *Team and affiliated U.S. Government Civilian Response Corps or OGAs.*  
 1170
- 1171 (2) (U) *Location and contact information of the SJA. Location and contact information of the media*  
 1172 *information bureau etc.*  
 1173
- 1174 (3) (U) *Lists location and contact data of key non-military personnel supporting NEO (Examples:*  
 1175 *Mayor / Police chief / Religious Leaders / Local security leaders / School leaders / Tribal leaders / other*  
 1176 *leaders (include gender, age, politics, demeanor, and influence- if applicable). IGOs (especially any UN*  
 1177 *contingent) and NGOs in the area (list all entities providing assistance, including POC and type, quantity, and*  
 1178 *frequency of assistance) if not listed elsewhere.*  
 1179
- 1180 c. (U) Health System Support. *Refer to Appendix 3 (Army Health System Support) to Annex F*  
 1181 *(Sustainment) as required.*  
 1182

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**5. (U) Mission Command.**

a. (U) Command.

(1) (U) Location of key American Embassy personnel. *Identifies primary and alternate locations for POCs responsible for the conduct of NEO by organization, if not listed elsewhere.*

(a) (U) *Location and alternate locations of host nation, IGO, and NGO leaders for NEO.*

(b) (U) *Identify command and support relationships of all units conducting or supporting NEO.*

(2) (U) Liaison Requirements.

(a) (U) *State NEO liaison requirements to military organizations/Services not covered in the unit's SOP.*

(b) (U) *State NEO liaison requirements to non-military (i.e., interagency, intergovernmental, nongovernmental, HN government, private sector, etc.).*

b. (U) Control.

(1) (U) Command Posts. *Describe the employment of command posts (CPs), including the location of each CP and its time of opening and closing, as appropriate. State the primary controlling CP for specific NEO tasks or phases of the operation.*

(2) (U) Reports. *List reports not covered in SOPs (Designate NEO reporting requirements for subordinate units) Refer to Annex R (Reports) as required.*

c. (U) Signal. *Lists signal operating instructions (SOI) information for NEO as needed, as well as primary and alternate means of communications, with both military and non-military organizations conducting NEO.*

(1) (U) *Describe the nets to monitor for reports.*

(2) (U) *Designate critical NEO reporting requirements.*

(3) (U) *Address any NEO specific communications or digitization connectivity requirements or coordination necessary to meet functional responsibilities (consider telephone listing). Provide instructions regarding maintenance and update of the civil information management (CIM) database with regard to NEO.*

(a) (U) *Lists SOI information for NEO.*

(b) (U) *Determines NEO primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency means of communications with military and non-military organizations (consider all aspects of operations security [OPSEC]) conducting NEO.*

**ACKNOWLEDGE:** *Include only if attachment is distributed separately from the base order*

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[Authenticator's name]  
[Authenticator's position]

*Either the commander or coordinating staff officer responsible for the functional area may sign attachments.*

**EXHIBITS:**

Exhibit 1 – Noncombatant Evacuation Collection Overlay (if required).  
Exhibit 2 – Noncombatant Evacuation Movement Table (if required).

*NOTE: additional exhibits as required (ex: Designated NEO Route Overlay, NEO Assembly Point Layout).*

**Distribution:** *Show only if distributed separately from the base order or higher level attachment.*

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Figure A-3: Tab B (Noncombatant Evacuation Operations)

1 **Appendix B**

2 **Dislocated Civilian Operations Techniques**

3 DC operations are a special category of PRC and the most basic collective task  
4 performed by CA Soldiers. The goals of DC operations are to minimize civilian  
5 interference with military operations and to protect civilians from the effects of  
6 combat operations, natural, or man-made disasters. DC operations are part of the  
7 JFC's CMO plan, but because of expertise, CA operators need to be prepared to be  
8 the lead elements in DC operations. This appendix addresses techniques for meeting  
9 those goals.

10 **Introduction**

11 B-1. People may become dislocated from their homes or villages for a variety of reasons across the  
12 spectrum of conflict. The following are some examples:

- 13 • Destructive forces (both natural and man-made) cause people from a devastated area to pursue  
14 sources of basic needs, such as food, water, shelter, security, and health care.
  - 15 ▪ Anticipation or expectancy that basic needs will not be met by the existing government or  
16 infrastructure in an impending disaster cause voluntary or forced evacuation.
  - 17 ▪ Political or ethnic persecution force portions of a population to seek a safer environment.
- 18 • Movement based on a need for economic improvement.

19 B-2. Based on national policy directives and other political efforts, the theater commander provides  
20 directives on the care, control, and disposition of DCs. The operational force commander integrates the  
21 theater commander's guidance with the ground tactical plan. At division, and other subordinate command  
22 levels, the DC plan must—

- 23 • Allow for accomplishing the tasks assigned by the higher command echelon.
- 24 • Be within the restrictions imposed by the higher HQ.
- 25 • Guide the subordinate commands in the handling and routing of DCs.
- 26 • Synchronize and integrate with the commander's intent and selected COA.

27 B-3. DC plans support the commander's OPLAN and require extensive coordination among operational,  
28 legal, logistics, interagency, HN, NGO, and IGO partners. As a minimum, DC plans must address—

- 29 • Authorized extent of migration and evacuation.
- 30 • Minimum standards of care.
- 31 • Status and disposition of all DCs.
- 32 • Designation of routes and control measures for movement control.
- 33 • Cultural and dietary considerations.
- 34 • Designation and delegation of responsibilities.

35 **DC Templating**

36 B-4. There is no doctrinal template or metrics for determining how many people of a certain area will  
37 leave their homes in response to actual or perceived threats and disasters. As illustrated above, every  
38 situation is different. Some people may be able to survive the situation in relative comfort and safety, while  
39 others may choose or be forced to leave their homes for relative comfort and safety elsewhere.

40 B-5. In the absence of a doctrinal template, DC planners conduct comprehensive civil considerations  
41 analysis, using all the factors of METT-TC, to analyze the DC situation. They consider the centers of  
42 gravity, decisive points, and stability operations lines of effort in their analysis.

1 B-6. DC planners use this analysis to create a series of civil situation templates. The first of the civil  
2 templates describes civil dispositions under normal conditions and circumstances. The remaining civil  
3 templates describe the possible COAs a populace, or portions of a populace, may take given certain criteria or  
4 stimuli. Ideally, the templates will indicate the anticipated speed, direction, and flow pattern of DC movement,  
5 which are described later in this appendix.

6 B-7. DC templating is more of an art than a science. Planners will often need to call on knowledgeable  
7 representatives of various CA specialties to fully understand the civil environment. Examples of additional  
8 information requirements that may result from initial mission analysis are—

- 9 • What is the status and resiliency of the civilian support infrastructure in the area?
- 10 • What is the level of preparedness for this type of situation (for example, how effective are the  
11 area's emergency management or civil defense plans and resources)?
- 12 • Are there any political, economic, military, informational, demographic, historical, or other  
13 reasons that indicate the populace, or portions of the populace, may leave their homes?
- 14 • Are there any political, economic, military, informational, demographic, historical, or other  
15 reasons that indicate the populace, or portions of the populace, may remain in or near their  
16 homes?
- 17 • What conditions or actions might mitigate a DC problem and how can we influence the  
18 realization of those conditions or actions?

19 B-8. DC planning must be integrated across the staff. DC planners must make the DC templates available to  
20 other operational planners during problem-solving and decisionmaking processes. They must also coordinate  
21 with interagency, HN, NGO, and IGO partners as the situation and OPSEC requirements permit.

## 22 DC Movement Planning Factors

23 B-9. DC planners must consider several variables, or factors, when creating SITTEMPs for DC  
24 movements. These factors assume a controlled movement and apply to all DC movements regardless of  
25 type or size. Planners assume values for the variables, based on logical assumptions, until verified by  
26 observation. For DCs moving through denied areas, planners should consider requesting unmanned aerial  
27 system (UAS) support to determine actual values. DC movement planning factors include the following:

- 28 • Distance factors:
  - 29 ▪ *Dislocated civilian road space (DCRS)*: Used in determining time length of the DC column.  
30 DCRS consists of two parts: the space occupied by one DC alone and distance between another  
31 DC, and the sum of the distance between elements of a number of DC foot columns. (Total  
32 DCRS = RS [individual DC] + DCRS column distances).
  - 33 ▪ *DC column gap*: The space between two organized DC elements following each other on  
34 the same route.
  - 35 ▪ *DC traffic density*: The average number of DCs that occupy 1 kilometer, expressed in  
36 DC/KM (DCs per kilometer).
  - 37 ▪ *Length of DC column*: The length of roadway occupied by a column, including gaps,  
38 measured from front to rear inclusive.
  - 39 ▪ *Road gap*: The distance between two DC march elements.
- 40 • Rate factors:
  - 41 ▪ *Speed*: The actual rate of speed at a given moment.
  - 42 ▪ *Pace*: The regulated speed of a DC column or element set by the column.
  - 43 ▪ *Rate of March*: The average number of kilometers traveled in any given period of time,  
44 including short delays or periodic halts. Expressed in kilometers per hour (km/h).
- 45 • Time factors (must be adjusted for demographic of column, health, and weather conditions):
  - 46 ▪ *Arrival time*: The time when the head of the DC column arrives at a designated point.
  - 47 ▪ *Clearance time*: The time when the last of a DC column passes a designated point.
  - 48 ▪ *Completion time*: The time when the last element of a DC column passes a designated  
49 point.

- 1           ▪ *Extra time allowance (EXTAL)*: Time added, based on assessment of situation, to the pass
- 2           time.
- 3           ▪ *Pass time*: Actual time required for a DC column, from the first to the last element, to pass
- 4           a given point.
- 5           ▪ *Road clearance time*: The total time a DC column requires to travel over and clear a section
- 6           of road.
- 7           ▪ *Time distance (TDIS)*: The time required to move from one point to another at a given rate
- 8           of march.
- 9           ▪ *Time gap*: Time measured between rear and front of successive DC columns as they move
- 10          past any given point.

- 11          • Formulas:
  - 12           ▪ Distance = Rate x Time.
  - 13           ▪ Distance/Time = Rate.
  - 14           ▪ Distance/Rate = Time (or TDIS).

15          EXAMPLE: Determine TDIS of a DC column moving on foot traveling 20 kilometers at a rate  
 16          of 4 km/h.  
 17          TDIS = 20 km/4km/h = 5 hours.

18          **NOTE:** An EXTAL of 3 hours is added based on assessment of demographic (women, children,  
 19          elderly) composition of the DC column and weather conditions. It is anticipated that the head of  
 20          the DC column will arrive at completion point in approximately 8 hours.

- 21           ▪ Completion Time = SP (Start Point) + TL (Time Length) + Scheduled Halts + EXTAL.

- 22          • Time Length, Foot Column (Rate Formula):
  - 23           ▪ 0 km/h            TL (min) = RS (meters) x .0150.
  - 24           ▪ 3.2 km/h          TL (min) = RS (meters) x .0187.
  - 25           ▪ 2.4 km/h          TL (min) = RS (meters) x .0250.
  - 26           ▪ 1.6 km/h          TL (min) = RS (meters) x .0375.

27          **NOTE:** DC movement rate 4 km/h during day slows to 3.2 km/h at night. Cross-country DC  
 28          movement rate 2.4 km/h during day slows to 1.6 km/h at night.

- 29           ▪ Formation            2 meters per DC   5 meters per DC
- 30           ▪ Single file            2.4                   5.4
- 31           ▪ Column of twos        1.2                  2.7
- 32           ▪ Column of fours       0.6                  1.3

33          **NOTE:** Distance between DCs during day is 2 to 5 meters, 50 meters between columns.  
 34          Distance between DCs during night is 1 to 3 meters, 25 meters between columns.

### 35          DC Movement Graph

36          B-10. A DC movement graph (Figure B-1, page B-4) is a time-space diagram that visually depicts a DC  
 37          movement from start point to completion point. It is used during the DC movement planning phase to  
 38          integrate, coordinate, prevent congestion along the route-of-march, and deconflict route usage with the  
 39          military highway regulation and traffic circulation plan. It is also used to prepare or check the DC road  
 40          movement table. It shows the relative time and location of the head and tail of each DC march-column at  
 41          any point along the route, arrival and clearance times of DC columns at critical points, and restrictions and  
 42          congestion in the network.

43          B-11. DC planners transfer information derived from march-formulas or obtained from DC march-tables  
 44          directly to the graph. To complete the DC movement graph, planners must determine time-distance, arrival  
 45          time, and pass time for each identified DC column based on data collected on organized DC columns.




Figure B-1. DC Movement Graph

**DC Movement Table**

B-12. A DC movement table is a convenient way of transmitting time schedules and other essential details of a DC move. The accompanying example (Figure B-2, page B-5) of a DC movement table is a general use blank form. The following notes assist in the use of this form:

- Only the minimum number of headings should be used. Any information common to two or more movements under general data paragraphs of the DC movement plan should be included.
- Because the table may be issued to personnel concerned with control of traffic, the security aspect must be remembered. Including dates and locations may not be desirable.
- If the table is issued by itself and not as an exhibit to a detailed order, the table must be signed and authenticated by the proper authority.
- A critical point is a selected point along a route used for reference in giving instructions, coordinating for required support, and deconflicting, as required. It includes start points, completion points, and other points along a route where interference with military movement may occur or where timings are critical.
- The DC movement number (Column) identifies a DC column (or element of a column) during the whole movement.
- To obtain due times for DC columns, DC planners transfer directly from the road movement graph or calculate using time-distance table and strip map.
- To obtain DC column clear times, DC planners add march-unit pass time to due time.
- To complete the schedules for successive DC columns, DC planners add pass time plus graph time to due time.

**EXHIBIT ## (DC Movement Table) to TAB A (Dislocated Civilian Operations) to APPENDIX 4 (Populace and Resources Control) to ANNEX K (Civil Affairs Operations) to OPLAN #####**

**General Information:**

a = DC Column #\_\_\_\_ g = Route to SP\_\_\_\_ 1. Speed\_\_\_\_ 9. To\_\_\_\_  
 b = Date\_\_\_\_ h = Reference\_\_\_\_ 2. Rate of March\_\_\_\_ 10. Critical Points:  
 c = Estimated # DCs I = Due\_\_\_\_ 3. Open/Closed Column\_\_\_\_ a. Start Point  
 d = From\_\_\_\_ j = Clear\_\_\_\_ 4. Traffic Density\_\_\_\_ b. Collection Point  
 e = To\_\_\_\_ k = Route to Camp 5. Time Gap\_\_\_\_ c. Assembly Areas  
 f = Route\_\_\_\_ l = Remarks 6. Halts\_\_\_\_ d. Emergency Rest Areas  
 7. Route\_\_\_\_ e. Camps  
 8. From\_\_\_\_

**Critical Points**

a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	j	k	l

1 **Figure B-2. DC Movement Table Format**

2 **Mitigating the DC Problem - DC Control Techniques**

- 3 B-13. Once DC planners have identified the parameters of the expected DC situation, they must determine  
 4 how to deal with the DC problem. Potential COAs include—  
 5
  - Prevent or minimize dislocations.
  - Bypass or ignore DCs.
  - Control DC movement using various techniques.
  - Any combination of the above.  
 6  
 7  
 8

9 **Prevent Or Minimize Dislocations**

10 B-14. This COA involves executing populace control measures, such as a stay put policy, curfew, and  
 11 controlled evacuations. Each measure requires detailed assessment and planning, as well as coordination  
 12 with, and support of HN civil authorities and, at times, NGO, and IGO partners. Public information and  
 13 PSYOP assets will increase the chance of success.

14 **Stay Put Policy**

15 B-15. A stay put policy is, essentially, an order to citizens to stay within the confines of their homes,  
 16 communities, or other defined boundaries. Successful execution of a stay put policy requires that the  
 17 citizens be provided with sufficient necessities of life (food, water, shelter, security, and health care)  
 18 (according to accepted international standards; for example, the Sphere Project), during and after the  
 19 period the policy is in effect. Mitigation measures conducted during pre-disaster emergency services  
 20 programs (building individual and community survival shelters, stockpiling food and medicines, and  
 21 conducting preparedness exercises) will enhance the willingness of citizens to abide by stay put policies.  
 22 Emergency response operations, such as the airlift of disaster relief into the populated area, may also be  
 23 required.

1 B-16. The policy is designed to minimize civilian interference with military operations and, just as  
2 importantly, to minimize civil collateral damage. HN authorities should enforce a stay put policy whenever  
3 possible. When enforced by military forces, the policy requires an agreement among participating nations  
4 and the appropriate military command. This section provides guidance on what such agreements should or  
5 could contain.

## 6 **Stay Put Policy Agreement - General Provisions**

7 B-17. This agreement should state that in matters concerning population movement, military commanders  
8 will always deal through and with the appropriate national commanders or authority.

9 B-18. “Stay put” means that civil authorities will do everything in their power to stop DCs in their own  
10 country—especially preventing them from passing from one country to another. Neighboring countries  
11 should cooperate closely to help in the implementation of this policy within common frontiers. If, for  
12 whatever reason, some movement does take place, the receiving country should do all in its power to hold  
13 DCs in appropriate areas and return them to the country from which they were dislocated, as soon as  
14 circumstances permit. Any such movement might gravely prejudice national, multinational, or coalition  
15 operations and the possibility of civilian survival.

16 B-19. In crisis and wartime, indigenous national authorities retain full responsibility for their populations,  
17 institutions, and resources unless otherwise arranged for by special agreement.

18 B-20. Evacuations of populations in times of crisis short of war may become a necessity to ensure the  
19 population’s survivability and no less to ensure freedom of military operations.

20 B-21. During crisis or wartime, civilian populations may start to move of their own volition and thus  
21 become DCs. Unless such movements are fully controlled by proper authorities and agencies, they may  
22 lead to chaos. National authorities shall take all possible steps—

- 23 • To prevent unauthorized population movement.
- 24 • To control and organize DCs should such movement occur.

25 B-22. Should refugee movements occur, commanders must cooperate with and assist national authorities  
26 in preventing such movements from interfering with military operations. National law normally dictates  
27 whether and under what conditions commands can take control of DC movements, if that is necessary for  
28 the achievement of their operational mission and for the protection and safety of the population. If such  
29 control has been granted to commanders, it will be handed back to the proper national authorities as soon  
30 as possible.

31 B-23. All actions taken with respect to DCs must be in consonance with the applicable provisions of the  
32 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, and other rules of the  
33 International Law of War, especially The Hague Land Warfare Conventions.

## 34 **Details of the Agreement**

35 B-24. Commanders and national authorities must consider the overall problem of population movements  
36 against the background of the circumstances likely to prevail at the time. Panic and fear among the civilian  
37 population caused by weapon effects—including WMD—may induce large numbers of civilians to flee  
38 their homes and take to the roads. Should this happen, DCs would use all means of transport available.  
39 Unless controlled, they may—

- 40 • Interfere with military operations.
- 41 • Increase the risk to their safety.

42 B-25. All commanders must be aware of—

- 43 • The responsibilities of national authorities. The responsibility for all planning and  
44 implementation measures concerning population movements rests with the national authorities.
- 45 • Their own responsibilities. Commanders will—

- 1           ▪ Contact and assist national authorities to coordinate military planning with national
- 2           planning and national implementation of measures concerning the evacuation of the
- 3           civilian population and the control of refugee movements, as appropriate.
- 4           ▪ Assist, on request, national authorities in the implementation of the above plans, as long as
- 5           they are compatible with the existing operational situation.
- 6           ▪ Assume control of population movements if so granted as described above.
- 7           ▪ Keep the appropriate national authorities advised of the development of operations.
- 8           ▪ Provide appropriate national authorities with information concerning the adverse effect of the
- 9           refugee situation on the preparedness or operations of the military forces under their
- 10          command.
- 11          ▪ Work with national authorities to obtain information concerning the population movement
- 12          situation and associated matters, which could have adverse effects on the preparation and
- 13          conduct of operations.

14          B-26. In the event the military assumes direct control of the population, which is the last resort to ensure  
15          the safety of the population and the conduct of operations, the military commanders will inform higher HQ  
16          of the following:

- 17           • Period of assistance.
- 18           • Composition of military forces to be provided.
- 19           • Mission command of these forces.
- 20           • Powers granted to the commanders of these forces (should be the same as those held by
- 21           equivalent national authorities and must in any case ensure the security of the military forces).
- 22           • Any restrictions on the employment and conduct of military forces.
- 23           • Logistic support for the assistance of military forces where special measures are necessary.

## 24          **Curfews**

25          B-27. Curfews and other movement restrictions discourage unauthorized civilians from moving during  
26          certain time periods or into certain areas. These restrictions should be codified in a policy that is legal,  
27          practical, enforceable, and well publicized. Exceptions to the policy may be granted using a strict  
28          identification or pass system. In addition, restrictions should be enforced by a system of measures,  
29          including patrols, checkpoints, and roadblocks, or any combination thereof.

## 30          **Controlled Evacuations**

31          B-28. Controlled evacuations are a way of minimizing the chaos that exists when civilians will not or  
32          should not stay where they are. Forced dislocations may be appropriate to protect civilians from combat  
33          operations, as well as impending natural disasters, such as hurricanes or volcanic eruption. They also may  
34          be appropriate to protect military operations, as in the removal of civilians from port areas or areas adjacent  
35          to main supply routes to promote the efficiency of logistics operations and minimize the possibility of  
36          sabotage.

## 37          **DC Avoidance**

38          B-29. Some military operations may dictate that DCs can or must be ignored or bypassed to ensure  
39          military success. An example is rapid offensive operations in which maintaining momentum is required.  
40          Commanders should consider the use of PSYOP leaflets or loudspeakers to instruct or bolster the morale of  
41          bypassed DCs.

42          B-30. The decision to bypass or ignore DCs depends on the factors of METT-TC and may require the  
43          approval of the chain of command. Bypassed or ignored DCs must eventually be controlled by some  
44          military or civilian organization in the AO. Since bypassed groups of DCs may include enemy infiltrators  
45          attempting to pass through friendly lines, the military or civilian organization must be prepared to take  
46          security and force protection measures when assuming this control.

## DC Movement Control

B-31. DC movement must often be controlled to minimize interference with planned or ongoing military operations. Planners may use several techniques to control the movement of DCs. These techniques require detailed assessment and planning, as well as coordination with and support of HN civil authorities and, at times, NGO, and IGO partners. These techniques include blocking, clearing, and collecting (Table B-1).

**Table B-1. Measures to Control Civilians**

Control Measure	Effectiveness of Measure	Special Requirements	Personnel Resource Intensity
Blocking	Medium–High	Conducive Terrain	Low–Medium
Clearing	Low–Medium	Dedicated Vehicle(s)	Low–Medium
Collecting	Low–High	Special Training	High–Very High

### Blocking

B-32. Blocking uses roadblocks, which may be supported by checkpoints, to prevent DCs from flowing onto roads or into areas essential for the conduct of military operations. Blocking involves preventing DCs from entering those areas and redirecting them to some other area, such as back to their homes or along a designated DC route. Depending on the security situation and other factors, civilians and their means of transport may or may not be searched at the blocking position.

B-33. The following questions must be considered when planning DC blocking operations:

- What is the likely timing, direction, route, rate, and flow of DCs? (This is required to mass forces when and where they are most needed.)
- Where is terrain that canalizes DCs?
- Does the ability exist to reinforce a roadblock under pressure?
- Does the flexibility exist to disengage on order?

### Clearing

B-34. Clearing directs DCs from main supply routes, alternate supply routes, and other areas of military significance to keep them from interfering with operations. Clearing is conducted at the small unit level by assigned Soldiers or by small, specialized teams whose sole purpose is to confront DCs, remove them from their current location, and orient them toward the location to which the commander wants them to go. In some cases, this may simply be the shoulder of the road.

B-35. Clearing is intended for fast-paced, unit-level operations. It is not an effective method for large-scale DC operations. It must be deliberately planned and integrated with other control techniques. Clearing is merely intended to channel or direct DCs in specified directions, away from military operations, installations, or encampments, until they can be assimilated by more organized DC operations, such as collecting.

B-36. Some of the challenges of clearing operations include the following:

- Clearing is temporary in nature; units must continually sweep or direct new or returning DCs.
- External support is often required to transmit the intended message in a way that the DCs will understand.
- DCs present a continuing security concern for friendly forces (for example, potential for terrorist acts, such as car or suicide bombings).
- A unit's resources can be quickly overwhelmed if the numbers of DCs are great or the DCs need emergency assistance.

## 1 Collecting

2 B-37. Collecting provides positive control of concentrations of DCs at various holding areas to prevent  
3 them from interfering with operations and to foster care and processing. The collection plan is resource-  
4 intensive and must be coordinated and synchronized with operations, logistics, and security plans.  
5 Whenever possible, existing HN facilities should be considered for use as collection points.

6 B-38. Collecting must also be planned and executed in collaboration with HN authorities NGO, and IGO  
7 partners that specialize in public health, public safety, public communications, transportation, public works  
8 and utilities, and mass care and feeding. Its main features are collection points, DC routes, assembly areas,  
9 and DC camps.

## 10 Collection Points

11 B-39. These are temporary holding areas for gathering small numbers of DCs before moving onward along  
12 DC routes to assembly areas or DC camps. Units establishing DC collection points provide minimal  
13 emergency relief supplies that address only short-term (less than 1 day to 3 or 4 days) immediate needs (for  
14 example, water and trauma first aid).

## 15 DC Routes

16 B-40. DC routes are routes that offer protection to DCs by moving them away from the main effort of  
17 military, logistics or humanitarian assistance operations.

## 18 Assembly Areas

19 B-41. Assembly areas are larger and more elaborate than collection points. They provide DCs with  
20 emergency relief, such as food, intermediate medical care, and temporary shelter. Designated personnel  
21 (military or civilians of the interagency, HN, NGO, and IGO partners) begin screening and registering DCs  
22 to identify family groups, determine points of origin and intended destinations, and other pertinent  
23 information. They also begin to segregate enemy prisoners of war (EPWs), hostile civilians, and deserters.  
24 Assembly areas are typically located in division security areas and may host DCs for a week or longer.  
25 Authorities may decide to send DCs from assembly areas to camps, allow them to continue to their  
26 intended destination, or to return home. Assembly areas may evolve into DC camps, if required.

## 27 DC Camps

28 B-42. DC camps are semi permanent, carefully planned facilities where administrators prepare DCs for the  
29 return to their homes, resettlement, repatriation, or other disposition. Host nation authorities, NGOs, or  
30 IGOs normally administer DC camps. U.S. forces may temporarily administer camps or provide  
31 humanitarian assistance when necessary. Designated personnel continue to detect hostile civilians who  
32 should be interned. Camp administrators also begin examining and monitoring the DC population for  
33 disease. DCs should receive identification cards, records, food, clothing, and medical care in the camp.  
34 Camps are generally located in the division or corps security area or theater security area. Figure B-3, page  
35 D-10, shows a typical DC collection plan.


36 B-43. Ideally, HN authorities handle mass DC operations by implementing planned and rehearsed  
37 evacuation plans. When a military force assumes responsibility for planning DC operations, DC planners  
38 should consider incorporating HN assets in the planning and implementation of DC plans. Figure B-3, page  
39 B-10, shows a typical DC collection plan.

## 40 DC Route Planning

41 B-44. Considerations with respect to the movement of civilians are as follows:

- 42 • *Selection of routes.* All DC movements take place on designated routes that are kept free of  
43 civilian congestion. When selecting routes for civilian movement, CA Soldiers must consider  
44 the types of transportation common to the area. They coordinate these routes with the traffic  
45 circulation plan proposed by the transportation officer and MP personnel.

- 1 • *Identification of routes.* After designating the movement routes, CA Soldiers mark them in  
2 languages and symbols the civilians, U.S. forces, and allied forces can understand. U.S. PSYOP  
3 units, HN military, and other allied military units can help mark the routes.
- 4 • *Control and assembly points.* After selecting and marking the movement routes, CA and HN  
5 authorities establish control and assembly points at selected key intersections. The G9 or S9  
6 coordinates with the provost marshal, the movement control center, and the G-4 for the  
7 locations of these points for inclusion in the traffic circulation plan.
- 8 • *Emergency rest areas.* CA Soldiers set up emergency rest areas at congested points to provide  
9 for the immediate needs of the DCs. These needs include water, food, fuel, maintenance, and  
10 medical services.
- 11 • *Local and national agencies.* Use of local and national agencies is essential for three reasons.  
12 First, it conserves military resources. Second, civilian authorities normally have legal status and  
13 are best equipped to handle their own people. Third, the use of local personnel reduces the need  
14 for interpreters or translators.



**Figure B-3. Typical DC Collection Plan**

15  
16 B-45. When routing DC movements, CAO planners should consider three fundamentals and four  
17 principles that govern routing. The three fundamentals that govern routing are—

- 18 • *Balance:* The process of matching DC column characteristics with route characteristics. Balance  
19 ensures that DC traffic never routinely exceeds the most limiting features of a route. Balancing  
20 also identifies requirements for upgrading routes or ordering cautions for certain areas along the  
21 route. Route characteristics are identified during the planning process.
- 22 • *Separation:* The process of allocating road space for movements to ensure that movements do  
23 not conflict. The goal of separation is to reduce the potential for congestion.

- 1 • *Distribution*: The process of allocating as many routes as possible to reduce the potential for  
2 congestion. Distribution also promotes passive security by distributing and separating traffic.

3 The four principles that govern routing are—

- 4 • Assign highest priority traffic to routes that provide the minimum time-distance.  
5 • Consider sustainability of route network when assigning movements.  
6 • Separate motor movements from pedestrian movements.  
7 • Separate civilian traffic (vehicular or pedestrian) from military movements.

8 B-46. Effective routing of DCs requires a detailed understanding of the military highway regulation and  
9 traffic circulation plan. Route classification and traffic control measures currently in use by military  
10 movement control agencies are applicable during the planning and execution of DC operations. These  
11 measures include—

- 12 • Open routes.  
13 • Supervised routes.  
14 • Dispatch routes.  
15 • Reserved routes.  
16 • Prohibited routes.

17 B-47. OPSEC considerations are important. Planned DC routes may be an indicator for the location of the  
18 main effort in the attack or defense. By attempting to minimize interference by DCs with military  
19 operations, planners may inadvertently disclose the location of the main effort. Because opposing forces  
20 seek to discover seams and boundaries to exploit them, DC planners should not consistently move DCs  
21 along seams or unit boundaries. The following example discusses DC road space usage calculations.

#### EXAMPLE OF DC ROAD SPACE USAGE CALCULATIONS

1. TASK. Visualize, Describe, and Direct DC Operations.
2. FACT. The city of An Nasiriyah is key to the Corps' river crossing operation. The population of An Nasiriyah is approximately 400,000.
3. VISUALIZE DC FLOW. Will DCs displace north as opposing forces move north; will DCs displace south into path of friendly forces moving north; will DCs displace east or west? Assess likelihood of DCs moving south into a fight or away from a fight. Assess percentage of total numbers of DCs that will move north, south, east, or west. Divide AO into zones based on operational phase for ease of computation and assessment.
4. DESCRIBE. Apply concept of elasticity to determine approximate DCs. Concept of elasticity states that 50% of an urban area must be destroyed before 20% of a given population departs the area.
  - a. Application of concept of elasticity. Total population of An Nasiriyah is estimated at 400,000. If 50% of An Nasiriyah is destroyed, then we can expect 20% of the population to depart the area. Additionally, concept of elasticity states that food is less elastic than housing. A food shortage will cause people to depart an area in search of food.
  - b. Formula.  $400,000 \times 20\% = 80,000$  expected DCs departing the An Nasiriyah metropolitan area.
  - c. Subtract percentage of total estimated number of DCs that are assessed to move north, east, west, or south. Out of 80,000 expected DCs to depart An Nasiriyah, 40% are assessed to depart with opposing forces displacing north, 20% to move east due to affiliation with co-religionists, 10% west, and 30% south to search for food.
  - d. Calculations.

80,000 x 40% move north = 32,000 DCs

80,000 x 20% move east = 16,000 DCs

80,000 x 10% move west = 8,000 DCs

80,000 x 30% move south = 24,000 DCs

e. Assessment. The 320,000 persons remaining in An Nasiriyah will be engaged with IO to support stay put objective. Concept of elasticity suggests that availability of less elastic than housing and if food is supplied in a timely manner will assist in keeping population in place. Coordination for delivery of food and medical supplies forward into vicinity of An Nasiriyah supports enforcement of stay put policy.

f. Describe DC columns. Depict what DC columns will look like and the amount of road space the columns will utilize. Apply road usage formula in DC Model.

(1) Step 1. Determine optimum size of DC column (packet) based on control and sustainability (DC road network) considerations. Divide 24,000 by number of DCs determined to be optimum size of a DC column for control and sustainability. Example: If 2,000 DCs is optimum size then  $24,000/2,000$  DCs = 12 DC columns; if 1,000 DCs, then  $24,000/1,000$  DCs = 24 columns; if 500, then  $24,000/500$  DCs = 48 DC columns; if 250, then  $24,000/250$  DCs = 96 columns.

(2) Step 2. Determine road space usage of DC columns. Measurement is based on a 2–5 meter distance between DCs during the day and 50 meters between columns and 1–3 meter distance between DCs at night and 25 meter distance between columns.

Example: To determine the road space requirement for 12 x DC columns of 2,000 (4 x 5,000 DCs) during the day, multiply:

(a) 4 x DC columns x 2 meters = 8 meters wide.

(b) Divide 2,000 DCs by 4 (column of four):  $2,000/4 = 500$  DCs per file x 2 meters separation between DCs = 1000 meters for one DC column.

(c) DC column of 2,000 DCs is approximately 8 meters wide and 1,000 meters long.

(d) Multiply DC column length x number of columns: 1,000 meters x 12 = 12,000 meters long, divided by 1,000 meters = 12 km.

(e) Add 50 meters between columns during day moves: 12 columns x 50 meters = 600 meters.

(f) Total road space requirement of all DC columns = 12.6 km.

(3) Step 3. Determine time distance (TDIS) rates of DC columns. Example: To determine TDIS rates, divide the distance between stops by the rate of march of the DC column in kilometers per hour (km/h). DC column movement rate is 4 km/h during the day.

(a) The TDIS of a DC column moving on foot traveling 20 kilometers at a rate of 4 km/h =  $20 \text{ kilometers}/4 = 5$  hours. Add extra time allowance (EXTAL) if assessment of demographic (women, children, elderly, medical condition) composition of DC column and weather conditions warrant.

(b) Compute DC moves for all columns for total DC operations timeline.

(c) Multiply 5 hours x 12 DC columns = 60 hours or 7.5 days if conducting DC moves 8 hours/day, 5 days if conducting DC moves 12 hours/day, or 3 days if

conducting DC moves 18 hours/day.

(d) Multiply 5 hours x 24 DC columns = 120 hours or 15 days if conducting DC moves 8 hours/day, 10 days if conducting DC moves 12 hours/day, or 7 days if conducting DC moves 18 hours/day.

(e) Multiply 5 hours x 48 DC columns = 240 hours or 30 days if conducting DC moves 8 hours/day, 20 days if conducting DC moves 12 hours/day, or 13 days if conducting DC moves 18 hours/day.

1

(f) Multiply 5 hours x 96 DC columns = 480 hours or 60 days if conducting DC moves 8 hours/day, 40 days if conducting DC moves 12 hours/day, or 27 days if conducting DC moves 18 hours/day.

5. DIRECT. Based on the various DC operation timelines above, coordinate and direct DC movements on established DC route network IAW routing fundamentals. Apply combination of blocking, redirecting, clearing, or collecting DCs, as appropriate. Coordinate, integrate, and regulate DC operations with inform and influence activities, Movement Control, MEDCOM, maneuver enhancement brigade (MEB), and G-2. Coordinate and integrate IGOs and NGOs, as required.

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## Combined DC Control Methods

B-48. An analysis of METT-TC may indicate that several of the DC control methods may be required simultaneously or sequentially. In a port city, for example, the people in a predominantly neutral area may be ordered to stay in their neighborhoods and conform to such restrictions as curfews. Meanwhile, civilians in a hostile section of the city may be quarantined (no one may enter or leave without permission and escort), and those in the areas closest to critical port facilities and adjoining the main inland supply routes may be selectively evacuated.

## Task Force Control

B-49. One technique for controlling DCs in a tactical AO is to organize organic forces into a task force specifically tailored for this mission. Known generically as TF DC Control, this task force has four imperatives:

- Implement an integrated system of control.
- Help provide life saving and life sustaining care, such as oral rehydration therapy (ORT) and water.
- Help process civilians to determine their identity and status and to collect military and civil-military information.
- Transition control operations in an orderly manner.

Table B-2 depicts a generic organization for TF DC control.

**Table B-2. Generic Organization for TF DC Control**

Equipment	GP Block/Collect Team	GP Clear Team
Vehicles	MP vehicle and infantry or combat engineer vehicle, supplemented by vehicles obtained through foreign nation support.	MP vehicle.
Control Materials	Pepper spray (oleoresin capsicum – OC) with ultraviolet identification dye for marking individuals and heavy-duty foggers for mass dispersion.  CS riot control agent (RCA) with means of mass dispersion, such as M203.  Flash bangs, riot batons (and riot gear), and other crowd control equipment.  Flex cuffs/cable ties.	Pepper spray (oleoresin capsicum – OC) with ultraviolet identification dye for marking individuals and heavy-duty foggers for mass dispersion.  CS riot control agent (RCA) with means of mass dispersion, such as M203.  Flash bangs, riot batons (and riot gear), and other crowd control equipment.
Care Materials	Water/cups for thirst and RCA flushing.  ORT mixes/ingredients.  Emergency medical kits.  Humanitarian rations (emergency only).	Water/cups for thirst and RCA flushing.  ORT mixes/ingredients.
Local Security	Lethal weapons (organic).	Lethal weapons (organic)

	Magic wand metal detector. Undercarriage inspection device.	
Barrier Materials	Concertina/gloves.	
Information	Loudspeaker with approved tape-recorded messages.	Loudspeaker with approved tape-recorded messages.

1 B-50. Generic TF DC Control is a combined arms force revolving around combined arms teams of  
 2 infantry with MP, PSYOP specialists, and CA specialists or CA-trained personnel. Teams control civilians  
 3 by the basic techniques of blocking, clearing, and collecting described earlier.

4 B-51. The basic action element for blocking and collecting is the same—a combined arms block/collect  
 5 team of one infantry squad with organic armored vehicle (if mechanized), one MP team with organic  
 6 vehicle, one tactical PSYOP team (TPT), and one tactical CA team or several CA-trained personnel. The  
 7 basic action element for clearing is the combined arms clearing team, consisting of one MP team with  
 8 organic vehicle and one TPT. TF DC Control may modify one or more combined arms teams based on the  
 9 civil-military situation and/or its tasks, the terrain, and the assets available (for example, using an MP  
 10 squad instead of an MP team as a basic building block of all combined arms teams and/or augmenting the  
 11 teams with combat engineers).

12 B-52. Generic TF DC Control also has five special purpose teams, each designed to accomplish particular  
 13 missions requiring special training and/or equipment:

- 14 • *Negotiation team.* The primary purpose of the negotiation team is to assist in intense  
 15 negotiations that have a potential for creation or expansion of unrest or may result in highly  
 16 adverse public perceptions beyond the battlefield. Negotiations include meetings with civil  
 17 leaders, but not hostage incidents—hostage rescue and similar means of resolving a hostage  
 18 situation are beyond the scope of generic TF DC Control. Instead, the goals of negotiation are  
 19 to contain the incident or issue so that the populace is not adversely and unduly influenced by it  
 20 and, if possible, to resolve it peacefully so that civilian lives are not unduly jeopardized and the  
 21 incident does not become a focus of the local or international news media.
- 22 • *Special reaction team (sniper).* The primary purpose of the special reaction team (sniper) is to  
 23 neutralize special threats effectively and safely as they arise in blocking, clearing, and collecting  
 24 operations. Another purpose is to support the apprehension of troublemakers and ringleaders by  
 25 a team assigned to remove them from a crowd. However, apprehending a suspect in other  
 26 circumstances is beyond the scope of generic TF DC Control.
- 27 • *Special reaction team (armored vehicles).* The primary purposes of the special reaction team  
 28 (armored vehicles) are to conduct show-of-force operations (especially at road blocks), protect  
 29 task force elements and any civilians in their charge, and assist the task force, as needed, to  
 30 include the execution of apprehensions in crowds.
- 31 • *Medical care team.* The primary purposes of the medical care team are to respond quickly to  
 32 civilian mass casualties to begin triage and coordinate further medical response with the parent  
 33 unit’s surgeon and medical operations center, or the equivalent, and to provide medical care  
 34 above the level of emergency first aid, as needed by the task force.
- 35 • *Counterintelligence (CI) team.* The primary purpose of the CI team is to exploit the potential for  
 36 military and civil-military information from civilians encountered by the task force. CI agents  
 37 are often fluent in the primary language of the AO or come with a translator. Moreover, there is  
 38 a synergy to be gained when CI and CA work together. CA, CI, and PSYOP form a strong triad  
 39 within TF DC Control and for the parent JTF.

40 Table B-3, depicts the basic equipment the various teams should have to perform their tasks.

41 **Table B-3. Basic Equipment of Combined Arms Teams**

Equipment	Block/Collect Team	Clear Team
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Vehicles	MP vehicle and infantry or combat engineer vehicle, supplemented by vehicles obtained through foreign nation support.	MP vehicle.
Control Materials	Pepper spray (OC) with ultraviolet identification dye for marking individuals and heavy-duty foggers for mass dispersion. CS RCA with means of mass dispersion, such as M203. Flash bangs, riot batons (and riot gear), and other crowd control equipment. Flex cuffs/cable ties.	Pepper spray (OC) with ultraviolet identification dye for marking individuals and heavy-duty foggers for mass dispersion. CS RCA with means of mass dispersion, such as M203. Flash bangs, riot batons (and riot gear), and other crowd control equipment.
Care Materials	Water/cups for thirst and RCA flushing. ORT mixes/ingredients. Emergency medical kits. Humanitarian rations (emergency only).	Water/cups for thirst and RCA flushing. ORT mixes/ingredients.
Local Security	Lethal weapons (organic). Magic wand metal detector. Undercarriage inspection device.	Lethal weapons (organic).
Barrier Materials	Concertina/gloves.	
Information	Loudspeaker with approved tape-recorded messages.	Loudspeaker with approved tape-recorded messages.

1 **Planning DC Control Measures**

2 B-53. The senior commander in the AO provides guidance pertaining to the designation of DC control  
3 measures. Typically, this guidance provides for bottom-up or top-down planning.

4 **Bottom-Up Planning**

5 B-54. In bottom-up planning, each subordinate unit commander selects routes for movement of DCs and  
6 tentative DC collection points within his designated unit boundaries. His staff sends this information up to  
7 the next level commander for consolidation into his DC plan. The senior commander’s staff deconflicts  
8 duplication and sends the approved plan back to subordinate commanders for implementation.

9 **Top-Down Planning**

10 B-55. The senior commander may designate and assign specific routes and collection points to subordinate  
11 units for implementation based on METT-TC. This action does not preclude the subordinate commander  
12 from adding to the plan as he sees fit. The subordinate commander’s staff forwards additional control  
13 measures to the senior commander to allow the senior commander’s staff to refine his plan.

14 B-56. Whatever the planning method, commanders responsible for implementing DC control measures  
15 ensure the measures are known to all participants and, as applicable, are fully resourced for their intended  
16 purpose. Commanders also ensure those Soldiers and civilians who man DC collection points, areas, and  
17 camps are trained and rehearsed to perform their tasks.

## 1 DC Communication

2 B-57. Persuading people to comply with the terms of a DC plan is often a difficult endeavor. HN public  
3 information programs and PSYOP assets may assist by providing mass media broadcasts, loudspeakers  
4 with prerecorded messages, signs (with culturally correct graphics), and leaflets.

5 B-58. The following messages, prerecorded in the dominant language of the AO, are useful for controlling  
6 civilians in tactical situations:

- 7 • Standard roadblock recording:
  - 8 ▪ This is a roadblock.
  - 9 ▪ For your safety, you will not be allowed to pass this point.
  - 10 ▪ Return to your homes.
- 11 • Standard clearing recording:
  - 12 ▪ Stay off the road. **or** Leave this area.
  - 13 ▪ If you do not comply, you will be detained or arrested.
  - 14 ▪ Return to your homes.
- 15 • Standard recording for a DC collection point:
  - 16 ▪ This is a civilian collection point.
  - 17 ▪ You will not be harmed.
  - 18 ▪ Everyone will be searched. Vehicles will be searched and parked. Some belongings may be  
19 taken from you temporarily for everyone’s safety.
  - 20 ▪ Water and emergency medical care will be provided to you after you have been searched.
  - 21 ▪ If we take any of your belongings, you will receive a receipt. If any of your belongings for  
22 which you have a receipt are not returned to you, you will be compensated for them.


23 B-59. These words should also be printed in English and the predominant language of the AO on 3x5  
24 cards which can be used to “point and talk” by number. A well-prepared DC control site will have the same  
25 words in the same order on a large sign.

26 B-60. There are 10 words or phrases that every Soldier should be able to say in the dominant language of  
27 the AO. “Put down your weapon” and other phrases are also important, but “hands up” is a simpler way to  
28 express surrender, control, and related concepts. The ten words or phrases are—

- 29 • Go.
- 30 • Stop.
- 31 • Hands up.
- 32 • Right.
- 33 • Left.
- 34 • Stand.
- 35 • Sit.
- 36 • Yes.
- 37 • No.
- 38 • Water.

## 39 Techniques for DC Collection Points

40 B-61. A technique for designating hasty sites to control noncombatants and other groups is the quadrant  
41 method. By this method, each quadrant of a crossroads may be designated for a likely group or purpose, as  
42 depicted in Figure B-5. In this example, West is designated as a hasty collection point (CIV); Northeast is  
43 designated as a hasty EPW or detainee (DET) site; Southeast is designated as a hasty casualty collection  
44 point (CCP); and Southwest as a multipurpose quadrant for maintenance, supplies, and other purposes.



**Figure B-5. Designation of Hasty Control Sites by Quadrant**

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B-62. Each control point is located 50 to 100 meters from the roads to keep the groups sufficiently separated. This distance improves the safety and security of each group, minimizes manpower requirements, and reduces potential for terrorism by keeping people a reasonable distance from passing troops. Prior training and rudimentary supplies, including water cans or water bottles and large quantities of chemical lights, facilitate the day and night operation of a hasty DC collection point.

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B-63. Upon activation of a hasty DC collection point, designated personnel transform the site into a deliberate DC collection point. There are five key tasks that must be accomplished at a deliberate DC collection point. These tasks are illustrated in Figure B-6, page B-18, and explained in detail in the following paragraphs.

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**Local Security**

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
B-64. The collection point should be located so that DCs will not suffer any greater exposure to the effects of combat than would exist for them away from the collection point. Local security should be established to protect the occupants, persons operating the collection point, and friendly troops adjacent to or passing by the collection point. Guards should be posted at the entrance and exit of the collection point and given special orders, as required.

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1 **Figure B-6. DC Collection Point Layout Model**

2 **Physical Security within the Collection Point - Vehicle Search and DC Search**

3 B-65. This task requires setting up special purpose areas within the collection point and following certain  
 4 procedures. CA Soldiers—

- 5
- 6 • Ensure that all private autos, public conveyances, and the like (including livestock and carts) are
  - 7 parked outside or on the fringes of the collection point in the vehicle search area until they have
  - 8 been searched, and make all passengers dismount.
  - 9 • Direct passengers to the DC search area.
  - 10 • Make the driver remain with the vehicle until it is searched. Designated personnel search the
  - 11 vehicle. If an undercarriage observation device is available, it is used. When the search is over,
  - 12 the driver and the searchers together move the vehicle, livestock, or cart to the vehicle hold
  - 13 area.

14 B-66. Many vehicles will contain household goods, suitcases, and other items. These vehicles should be  
 15 searched for bombs and other dangerous items if the vehicle holding area is within 50 meters of the people  
 16 holding area. Searching for contraband is not standard procedure, but it may be mandatory under the  
 17 OPORD or if given special orders. Searchers inform the driver that once the vehicle is searched, it will be  
 18 secured and placed off limits so that no DC will be allowed to retrieve any of the items in the vehicle.  
 19 Searchers communicate as described above. Searchers treat livestock as vehicles, and treat pets as livestock  
 20 if this does not create more problems than it avoids. A searcher then escorts the driver to the DC search  
 21 area. Designated personnel—

- Search DCs and their belongings for prohibited items.

- 1           • Vary search methods. A quick pat down is used for some people. A more invasive search is  
2 done for others. If a handheld metal detector is available, it should be used to expedite the  
3 searches. Any property taken under the searcher's control should be tagged and a copy given to  
4 the owner. A Field Property Control Card should be used, as well as an Explanation Card, as  
5 necessary.
- 6           • Always use trained personnel to perform searches. If possible, females are used to search  
7 females, infants, and little boys. If a female searcher is not at the collection point but is close  
8 enough to get there in a reasonable time, these searches are deferred until she arrives. The  
9 unsearched people are set aside until then so that they do not pose a clear and present potential  
10 danger to others. If a female searcher cannot be obtained, a trained male searcher should do the  
11 search using the back of the hand technique if its use is not contrary to orders and special  
12 security concerns require a search.
- 13          • Always use a searcher (unarmed) and an over watcher (armed). They must be trained in these  
14 skills and to work together.

## 15           **DC Processing and Property Control**

16           B-67. This part of operating a deliberate DC collection point may be deferred for a while, but full waiver is  
17 not advisable as a general practice. DC processing consists of two stages. All persons go through stage one.  
18 Stage two may be deferred or delayed, reserved for certain people, or not take place at all.

### 19           **Stage One Processing**

20           B-68. This is the quick screen to identify EPWs and others (civilian internees and detainees) that must be  
21 segregated immediately from everyone else. This processing may be done without a translator. Searchers  
22 should beware of irregulars and infiltrators trying to pass as civilians. Upon discovery, all EPWs, civilian  
23 internees, and detainees are placed in the short-term detainee holding area. Normally, anyone who is  
24 causing a problem at the collection point is detained. Although civilian internees and detainees should be  
25 further segregated from EPWs, rarely is the time or resources available to do this.

26           B-69. Consistent with orders, searchers take control of all items that may cause harm to the team, friendly  
27 forces passing the collection point, or the DCs. In addition, searchers confiscate and tag all items that  
28 noncombatants are not permitted to have according to U.S. or HN policy.

29           B-70. If available, a Field Property Control Card is affixed to the vehicle or animal. The Field Property  
30 Control Card contains, at a minimum, the following information: the DC collection point number, the date,  
31 the seized item quantity, the seized item description, and a signature block for the collection point officer in  
32 charge (OIC) or NCOIC. A copy is given to the driver.

### 33           **Stage Two Processing**

34           B-71. This stage is intended to help more finely categorize DCs (for example, determining if anyone is a  
35 U.S. citizen), to reunite families within the collection point, to identify persons of influence, and to obtain  
36 information (from equipment, weapons, papers, and discussions) that may have intelligence value. This  
37 processing is done when the time and resources are available—it is not a high priority. A translator is  
38 almost always required.

## 39           **Limited Services (Medical, Food, Water, Shelter, and Sanitation)**

40           B-72. Services at a DC collection point may range from immediate care (attention to life-threatening  
41 conditions) to ancillary care (including food), depending on need and resources. However, only water and  
42 immediate medical care, to the extent they are emergency services provided consistent with the legal and  
43 moral obligations of the commander, are mandatory. Services are not provided to a DC until after he has  
44 undergone the quick-screen stage of processing, except for emergency care needed to prevent loss of life  
45 (death imminent). CA Soldiers should—

- 46           • Treat life-threatening emergencies, such as first aid for traumatic injuries and oral rehydration  
47 therapy (ORT) for dehydrated infants.
- 48           • Provide water as a preventive measure if an adequate supply is available for this purpose.

- 1 • Allow occupants to relieve themselves. CA Soldiers should provide one place for males and one  
2 for females and basic equipment (such as shovels and latrine screen expedients) to permit and  
3 encourage the occupants themselves to prepare rudimentary sanitation facilities (slit trenches).  
4 Occupants must be supervised.
- 5 • Give out food only to occupants who have been at the collection point 24 hours or more. Food  
6 handed out more generously can become a “pull factor.” Also, CA Soldiers should be aware that  
7 certain meal, ready to eat (MRE) items may be forbidden or inappropriate by religion or culture, or  
8 too rich for malnourished people and cause immediate sickness. (Yellow-packaged international  
9 humanitarian rations are safe.)
- 10 • Provide other services consistent with the commander’s legal, moral, and mission-specific  
11 obligations and requirements.

12 B-73. The following historical example discusses sanitation and is taken from notes of a CA soldier who  
13 served in Operation DESERT STORM.

#### **Lesson Learned During Operation DESERT STORM**

When disposing of waste, the burning procedure used in Vietnam would not work because the Moslem population has the habit of cleaning themselves with water. Therefore, instead of waste, there was a high level of water or waste liquid. This material would not burn. Consequently, it was recommended to have a deep hole where the waste could be disposed of and allowed to dry out. This was usually followed by burning or burial.

#### **Oral Rehydration Therapy**

14 B-74. Death from dehydration (extreme loss of fluids), especially of infants, the elderly, and the sick or  
15 injured, is a constant threat. People tend to experience extreme loss of fluids from diarrhea, bleeding, and  
16 hot weather. CA Soldiers must be aware of this threat and be prepared to respond to it effectively,  
17 especially when operating a DC collection point.  
18

19 B-75. Soldiers operating a DC collection point must be especially aware of—

- 20 • Infants.
- 21 • Nursing mothers.
- 22 • Very thin people with sallow eyes.
- 23 • Persons who are heavily bandaged.
- 24 • Persons on litters.
- 25 • The elderly

26 B-76. People suffering from dehydration require more than just water. Soldiers should consider the  
27 following information when providing oral rehydration (ORT):

- 28 • World Health Organization ORT formula:
  - 29 ▪ 1 quart water.
  - 30 ▪ 3.5 grams of sodium chloride (table salt).
  - 31 ▪ 2.5 grams of sodium bicarbonate (Arm & Hammer).
  - 32 ▪ 1.5 grams of potassium chloride (Lite Salt).
  - 33 ▪ 20 grams of sugar.
- 34 • U.S. military field expedients for ORT:
  - 35 ▪ MRE salt pack = 4 grams of table salt.
  - 36 ▪ MRE beverage base pack = 32 grams of sugar.
  - 37 ▪ MRE cocoa pack = 1.4 grams of potassium.
- 38 • Water is most important, next is salt, then potassium, then sugar.
  - 39 ▪ Water and salt alone are acceptable as an expedient.

- 1           ▪ In extreme cases, do not “load up” the patient with fluids, especially if the water is cold; the
- 2           patient could vomit and lose even more fluid. Small amounts of room temperature water
- 3           should be given frequently.
- 4           ▪ Babies will want to suck (not drink) the formula. Ice chips or a wet, porous rag should be
- 5           used.
- 6           ▪ Dehydration causes the blood pressure to be low. The patient should get in the shade with
- 7           feet up, if possible.
- 8           ▪ Pedia-Lite™ is a brand name ready-mix ORT formula for infants.

## 9           **Resolution or Disposition of Each DC**

10          B-77. Once a DC collection point is operational, there are four possible outcomes for the collection point  
11          operators:

- 12           • Retain control of the collection point, recognizing that moral obligations to DCs at the
- 13           collection point increase with time.
- 14           • Close down the collection point by releasing the DCs from it, if warranted by the tactical
- 15           situation and other factors.
- 16           • Arrange for movement of the DCs to another holding area, such as a civilian assembly area.
- 17           • Hand off collection point operations to other operators (such as a support unit or the HN),
- 18           which is the most likely outcome for combat units on the move.

## 19          **DC Collection Point Handoff**

20          B-78. As a unit moves out of an area, it must be prepared to hand off (transition) any active DC collection  
21          point to follow-on forces. Ideally, these forces will include trained CA operators; however, they may not.  
22          In either case, the outgoing unit must be prepared to fully brief the follow-on forces on the operation of the  
23          collection point.

## 24          **Briefing**

25          B-79. The DC collection point OIC/NCOIC should personally brief the OIC/NCOIC of follow-on forces.  
26          He should note the date-time group of the handoff; the name, rank, and position of the person to whom the  
27          handoff was made; and a summary of the information provided. The transition briefing should cover—

- 28           • EPWs.
- 29           • U.S., allied, and coalition Soldiers.
- 30           • Civilian internees and detainees.
- 31           • Civilians who are U.S. citizens or contractors.
- 32           • Civilians who may be useful as centers of influence.
- 33           • The tactical situation and intelligence (or unprocessed information) as they concern threats to
- 34           the DC collection point.
- 35           • Medical emergencies.
- 36           • Controlled property.
- 37           • Any special, additional information peculiar to the DC collection point.

## 38          **Controlled Property**

39          B-80. Units have several disposition options for controlled property. Depending on the property category,  
40          units may retain control of it, return it to the persons from which it was taken, or hand it over to other  
41          forces or agencies (such as local law enforcement or follow-on forces taking control of the DC collection  
42          point), or a combination of all three. Unit commanders act according to their moral and legal obligations,  
43          weighing the advantages and disadvantages of each option.

44          B-81. **Transferring Control.** To transfer control of this property, units must fill out a property control  
45          register listing all the items controlled and have an official of the follow-on forces sign for the items and a  
46          copy of the register itself by using DA Form 3161, *Request for Issue or Turn-In*.

1 B-82. **Retaining Control.** If units take the property with them (it must be taken if no one will sign for it  
2 and return is not an option), they should give the owner an official receipt (such as DA Form 3161),  
3 explain the unit's intention for the property, and explain the owner's rights and procedure requirements for  
4 compensation. This reiteration of rights is intended to reassure the owners and may be needed to ensure a  
5 smooth handoff.

## 6 **Evacuation Planning**

7 B-83. Evacuation creates serious problems and should only be considered as a last resort. U.S. doctrine  
8 states that only a division or higher commander can order an evacuation. When the decision is made to  
9 evacuate a community, CA planners must make detailed plans to prevent uncontrolled groups from  
10 disrupting the movement of military units and supplies. Considerations in mass evacuation planning  
11 include—

- 12 • *Transportation.* CA planners plan for the maximum use of civilian transportation.
- 13 • *Security.* CA Soldiers assist the G-2 in security screening and documentation of evacuees. Since  
14 the civilians are being removed from the area where they can best take care of themselves, the  
15 military provides security for them after evacuation. The military also provides for the security  
16 of all civilian property left behind, including farm animals, pets, and other possessions.
- 17 • *Documentation.* In some circumstances, evacuees may need identification documents showing,  
18 as a minimum, the name and locality from which they were evacuated. As a control technique,  
19 CA Soldiers may prepare a manifest that lists evacuees for movement.
- 20 • *Briefing.* Before movement, the movement control officer briefs evacuees. The briefer uses  
21 leaflets, loudspeakers, posters, or other means available. This briefing explains the details of the  
22 move, such as restrictions on personal belongings, organization for movement, and movement  
23 schedules.
- 24 • *Rations.* For a movement lasting no more than 2 days, supply personnel issue rations to each  
25 evacuee at the time of departure or at designated points en route.
- 26 • *Health care.* The public health team makes maximum use of civilian medical personnel,  
27 equipment, and supplies to care for the health and physical well-being of the evacuees. Military  
28 medical personnel, equipment, and supplies can be used as supplements, if necessary. The  
29 public health team or surgeon's staff takes proper steps before the movement to prevent the  
30 spread of infectious diseases.
- 31 • *Return.* Evacuation plans also provide for the evacuees' eventual return and criteria for  
32 determining the duration of their absence.

## 33 **DC Camp Considerations**

34 B-84. Successful camp operations depend upon many considerations that CA Soldiers must take into  
35 account. These considerations are discussed in the following paragraphs.

### 36 **Facilities**

37 B-85. When large groups of civilians must be quartered for a temporary period (less than 6 months) or on  
38 a semi permanent basis (more than 6 months), CA units may assist establishing camps. HN personnel or  
39 mandated NGOs or IGOs usually direct the administration and operation of a camp. CA units provide  
40 technical advice, support, and assistance, depending on the requirements. They may also furnish additional  
41 detachments and functional teams or specialists to resolve public health, public welfare, or public safety  
42 problems at any particular camp. Minimum considerations include—

- 43 • Camp control, construction, administration, screening, medical care, and sanitation.
- 44 • Security.
- 45 • Supply.
- 46 • Transportation.
- 47 • Information dissemination.
- 48 • Liaison with other agencies.

## 1        **Camp Control**

2        B-86. Control of the DC population is the key to successful camp operations. To meet U.S. obligations  
3        under international law, CA Soldiers ensure the efficient and effective administration of camps. Camp  
4        control also includes measures to reduce waste and to avoid duplication of effort. CA Soldiers must  
5        quickly and fairly establish and maintain discipline when administering DC camps. They must publish and  
6        enforce rules of conduct for the camp as necessary. Camp administrators serve as the single point of  
7        contact, coordinating all camp matters within the camp and with outside organizations or agencies. Camp  
8        rules should be brief and kept to a minimum.

## 9        **DC Camp Location and Construction**

10       B-87. The most manageable number of people in a camp is 5,000. This number helps enforce control  
11       measures. It also allows for the efficient administration of the camp and its population. The location of the  
12       camp is extremely important. Engineer support and military construction materials are necessary when  
13       camps are in areas where local facilities are unavailable—for example, hotels, schools, halls, theaters,  
14       vacant warehouses, unused factories, or workers' camps. CA Soldiers must avoid those sites near vital  
15       communication centers, large military installations, or other potential military targets. The location of the  
16       camp also depends on the availability of food, water, power, and waste disposal. Additional considerations  
17       include the susceptibility of the area to natural or man-made disasters (for example, flooding, pollution,  
18       and fire) and the use of camp personnel as a source of local labor support.

19       B-88. The physical layout of the camp is important. The main principle is to subdivide the camp into  
20       sections or separate compounds to ease administration and camp tension. Each section can serve as an  
21       administrative subunit for transacting camp business. The major sections normally include camp HQ,  
22       hospital, mess, and sleeping areas. The sleeping areas must be further subdivided into separate areas for  
23       unaccompanied children, unattached females, families, and unattached males. CA Soldiers must also  
24       consider cultural and religious practices and make every effort to keep families together.

25       B-89. CA Soldiers must also consider the type of construction. Specific types of construction necessary to  
26       satisfy the needs of the particular DC operation vary according to the—

- 27       • Local climate.
- 28       • Anticipated permanency of the camp.
- 29       • Number of camps to be constructed.
- 30       • Availability of local materials.
- 31       • Extent of available military resources and assistance.

32       B-90. Whenever possible, the DCs themselves or local agencies or government employees should  
33       construct the camp. Local sources provide materials whenever possible according to legal limitations. The  
34       supporting command's logistics and transportation assets are used to acquire and transport required  
35       resources to build or modify existing facilities for DC operations. The supporting command also furnishes  
36       medical, dining, and other supporting assets to establish DC camps.

## 37       **Administration of DC Camps**

38       B-91. Because of the large numbers of DCs for whom control and care must be provided, using HN  
39       civilians as cadre for the camp administration is preferred. DCs should become involved in the  
40       administration of the camp. Past military experience in DC operations shows that about 6 percent of the  
41       total number of DCs should be employed on a full-time basis. If possible, CA Soldiers organize and train  
42       the cadre before the camp opens. Whenever possible, civilians should come from public and private  
43       welfare organizations and be under military supervision. Other concerns are problems that might stem from  
44       the state of mind of the DCs. The difficulties they have experienced may affect their acceptance of  
45       authority. They may have little initiative or may be uncooperative because of an uncertain future. They  
46       may be angry because of their losses, or they may resort to looting and general lawlessness because of their  
47       destitution. The camp administrator can minimize difficulties through careful administration and by—

- 48       • Maintaining different national and cultural groups in separate camps or sections of a camp.

- 1 • Keeping families together while separating unaccompanied males, females, and children under
- 2 the age of 18 (or abiding by the laws of the HN as to when a child becomes an adult).
- 3 • Furnishing necessary information on the status and future of DCs.
- 4 • Allowing DCs to speak freely to camp officials.
- 5 • Involving the DCs in camp administration, work, and recreation.
- 6 • Quickly establishing contact with civilian agencies for aid and family reunification.

## 7 **Screening**

8 B-92. Screening is necessary to prevent infiltration of camps by insurgents, enemy agents, or escaping  
9 members of the hostile armed forces. Although intelligence or other types of units may screen DCs at first,  
10 friendly and reliable local civilians under the supervision of CA Soldiers can perform this function. They  
11 must carefully apply administrative controls to prevent infiltration and preclude alienation of people who  
12 are sympathetic to U.S. objectives. The screening process also identifies skilled technicians and  
13 professional specialists to help in camp administration—for example, policemen, schoolteachers, doctors,  
14 dentists, nurses, lawyers, mechanics, carpenters, and cooks.

## 15 **Medical Care and Sanitation**

16 B-93. The need for medical care and sanitation intensifies in camp environments because of the temporary  
17 nature of the facilities and the lack of sanitation by the people. Enforcement and education measures are  
18 necessary to ensure that the camp population complies with basic sanitation measures.

## 19 **Supply**

20 B-94. The camp supply officer or CA civilian supply specialist must coordinate in advance for food, water,  
21 clothing, fuel, portable shelter, and medical supplies. CA supply personnel must make sure U.S. medical  
22 personnel inspect all food and water, particularly civilian and captured stocks. USAID and security  
23 assistance officers (SAOs) can be helpful in U.S. efforts to provide aid to the country. IGOs and NGOs  
24 may also be useful. Support from U.S. military stocks should only be considered as a last resort, however,  
25 and CA supply Soldiers should not rely upon that support.

## 26 **Security**

27 B-95. The camp security officer provides camp security and enforces law, order, and discipline. Sources  
28 for security officers include local police forces, HN paramilitary or military forces, and U.S. military  
29 forces. Another potential source may be the camp population itself. Police personnel within the population  
30 could supplement security teams or constitute a special camp police force, if necessary. Internal and  
31 external patrols are necessary; however, security for a DC facility should not give the impression that the  
32 facility is a detention facility.

## 33 **Transportation**

34 B-96. The efficient administration of a DC camp requires adequate transportation assets. The camp  
35 movement officer or CA transportation specialist determines the types and numbers of vehicles required  
36 and makes provisions to have them on hand. He uses civilian or captured enemy vehicles whenever  
37 possible.

## 38 **Information Dissemination**

39 B-97. In the administration of any type of camp, dissemination of instructions and information to the camp  
40 population is vital. Communications may be in the form of notices on bulletin boards, posters, public  
41 address systems, loudspeakers, camp meetings and assemblies, or a camp radio station. An example of  
42 barracks rules is shown in Figure B-7, page B-25. CA public information teams and area PSYOP units may  
43 be able to assist.

### Barracks Rules

1. **Do not move from assigned barracks without permission.** *NOTE: Area teams assign individuals to the designated barracks. Only the U.S. center's administrative staff can change barracks assignments. Occupants desiring to change barracks must request permission from the area office.*
2. **Maintain the sanitary and physical condition of the barracks.** *NOTE: Barracks chiefs organize occupants to perform these tasks.*
3. **Empty and wash trash cans daily.** *NOTE: Put the trash into the trash receptacles (dumpsters) in the barracks area.*
4. **Do not bring food or cooking utensils into the barracks. Do not take food from the mess halls (other than baby food and fruit).**
5. **Do not have weapons of any kind in the barracks and in the surrounding camp.**
6. **Do not have pets in the camp.**
7. **Observe barracks lights-out time of 2300. Barracks indoor lights will be turned out at 2300 each night. Do not play radios, record players, or tape recorders after 2300.**
8. **Do not allow children to play on the fire escape.** *NOTE: This practice is very dangerous.*
9. **Watch children carefully and do not allow them to wander out of the residence areas.**
10. **Do not throw diapers and sanitary napkins into the toilets. Place these items into trash cans.**
11. **Do not allow children to chase or play with wild animals, as these animals may bite and carry diseases.**
12. **Obtain necessary barracks supplies from the barracks chief.**
13. **Do not smoke, use electrical appliances for heating or cooking, or have open fires in the barracks.**

*NOTE: These barracks rules are similar to the ones used in August 1975 at Indiantown Gap, Pennsylvania, in support of Operation NEW ARRIVALS. They also parallel the rules posted in support of Panama's Operations JUST CAUSE and PROMOTE LIBERTY.*

**Figure B-7. Example of Barracks Rules**

## Liaison

B-98. Liaison involves coordination with all interested agencies. USG and military authorities, allied liaison officers, and representatives of local governments and charitable organizations may help in relief and assistance operations.

## Disposition

B-99. The final step in DC operations involves the ultimate disposition of the DCs, although this consideration must occur early in the planning phase. The most desired disposition is to return them to their homes. Allowing DCs to return to their homes as quickly as tactical considerations permit lessens the burden for support on the military and the civilian economy. It also lessens the danger of diseases common among people in confined areas. When DCs return to their homes, they can help restore their towns and can better contribute to their own support. If DCs cannot return to their homes, they may resettle elsewhere in their country or in a country that accepts them. Guidance on the disposition of DCs must come from higher authority coordinated with HN authorities, NGO and IGO partners having mandated authority.

1 **Appendix C**

2 **Noncombatant Evacuation Operations Techniques**

3 The Department of Defense shall advise and assist the Secretary of State and the heads of  
4 other Federal departments and agencies, as appropriate, in planning for the protection,  
5 evacuation, and repatriation of United States citizens in threatened areas overseas.

6 *Presidential Executive Order 12656*

7 **Introduction**

8 C-1. Executive Order 12656 delegates responsibility for the protection and evacuation of U.S. citizens to  
9 the DOS and also directs the SecDef to advise and assist the Secretary of State in preparing and  
10 implementing plans. The Chief of Mission (COM), normally the U.S. Ambassador or other principal DOS  
11 officer-in-charge, has primary responsibility for conducting evacuation operations. Every American  
12 Embassy must maintain an emergency action plan (EAP), of which one section covers the U.S. military  
13 NEO plan.

14 C-2. DOS evacuates staff, dependents, private American citizens, and designated other persons or  
15 categories of persons in response to various crises, including civil strife, terrorist incidents, natural  
16 disasters, conventional war threats, and disease outbreaks. Evacuations differ considerably in scope, size,  
17 and complexity and can involve—

- 18 • Authorized departure of embassy staff and dependents.
- 19 • Ordered departure of embassy staff and dependents.
- 20 • Assisted departure of American citizens.
- 21 • Assisted departure of authorized other persons (HN nationals or third country nationals).

22 C-3. When authorizing departure, DOS grants permission to nonemergency embassy staff and all  
23 dependents to voluntarily depart the country at U.S. government expense. In contrast, when DOS orders  
24 departure, DOS directs nonemergency embassy staff and all dependents to leave the country. The number  
25 and type of embassy staff and dependents actually departing a country can vary greatly depending on the  
26 size of the embassy, the nature of the crisis, and the type of departure. For example, evacuations can range  
27 from massive, complex events like the safe extraction of almost 15,000 Americans and family members  
28 from Lebanon in the summer of 2006, to the relatively small-scale evacuation from Conakry, Guinea, in  
29 February 2007 during a period of civil strife. The latter involved flying a few dozen people (dependents of  
30 embassy staff, DOS employees temporarily deployed to the embassy and private American citizens) to a  
31 nearby city in another West African country.

32 **Planning Considerations**

33 C-4. The GCCs are tasked to maintain contingency plans for the support of DOS should such assistance  
34 be ordered by the SecDef. These plans include support for the evacuation of noncombatants. CA planners  
35 assigned to the geographic combatant command staff, CAPTs augmenting these staffs, and CMSEs  
36 deployed to various embassies throughout the GCC's AOR contribute to the planning process. NEO  
37 planning at the GCC level may be a consideration within a directed contingency plan, a directed separate  
38 NEO contingency plan for a specific country, or conducted during crisis action.

39 C-5. Coordination and integration with the American Embassy EAP is critical in the development of an  
40 executable NEO plan. CAO planning considerations include the analysis of several key aspects of the NEO,  
41 specifically—

- 42 • The assessment of the operational environment (permissive, uncertain, hostile).
- 43 • The country or area designated as an intermediate staging base (ISB) for the operation (if used).
- 44 • The country or area designated as a temporary safe haven (if required).

45 C-6. The development of the CAO running estimate and its maintenance throughout the operation is a  
 46 critical task. The CAO staff’s mission analysis of the various NEO designated areas concentrates on the  
 47 civil domain and with those aspects of the indigenous population the joint force will interact. Determination  
 48 of the type of operational environment and the root causes (manmade or natural) driving the NEO shape the  
 49 analysis. The following CAO planning considerations provide a common framework for evacuation  
 50 planning and operations–

- 51 • What is the attitude of the indigenous population (supportive, neutral, hostile)
- 52 • Who are the key HN personnel and what are their attitudes toward the evacuation?
- 53 • What is the availability of indigenous material and labor to support military operations?
- 54 • What are the numbers, ethnicities, demographics, point of origin, direction of movement, and  
 55 modes of transportation of prospective evacuees?
- 56 • What amount and type of physical damage is affecting the HN, particularly in transportation,  
 57 public utilities, and communications infrastructure?
- 58 • What is the status and character of the HN civil government?
- 59 • What is the assessment of key indigenous organizations influencing the population (political,  
 60 religious, economic, and private sector)?
- 61 • What is the assessment of key IGOs and NGOs operating in the AO?
- 62 • Do the ROE require development of a “no-strike list” and “restricted fire area” that includes  
 63 cultural and traditionally protected sites and high-density civilian population centers?
- 64 • What cultural nuances and customs should be known by the evacuation force to avoid  
 65 confrontation with the indigenous population?
- 66 • What is the ability of HN public safety authorities to maintain public order?
- 67 • Has information regarding helicopter landing zones, concentration of US citizens, air terminals,  
 68 port facilities, and landing beaches been verified?
- 69 • Have the screening and processing areas been identified?
- 70 • What HN religious events, holy days, festivals, celebrations, or other significant cultural activities  
 71 occur during the evacuation that could adversely impact the operation?
- 72 • What HN religious or cultural sites, shrines, buildings, facilities, or other locations does the  
 73 evacuation force need to be aware of to avoid desecrating them and antagonizing the populace?
- 74 • What civil liaison requirements exist?
- 75 • What is the role of assigned or attached CA forces?

## 76 **Predeployment**

77 C-7. The GCC may decide to create a joint task force (JTF) to conduct a NEO or may task a subordinate  
 78 Service component commander. As early as possible in the planning, the joint force commander (JFC)  
 79 forms the advance party and requests permission to send it to the site of the operation. The advance party  
 80 may consist of two elements; the forward command element (FCE) and the evacuation site party. In a  
 81 permissive or uncertain environment, the FCE is normally inserted before any evacuation site parties. The  
 82 FCE coordinates with in-country DOS personnel and HN authorities (when authorized by the DOS) and  
 83 establishes a communication link among the JFC, supported GCC, and DOS. Additionally, the supported  
 84 GCC may want direct representation with the ambassador during a NEO.

85 C-8. The size and composition of the advance party is mission dependent. The number of advance party  
 86 members allowed and the insertion method is coordinated with, and subject to the approval of the COM. JP  
 87 3-68, *Noncombatant Evacuation Operations* details specific tasks the FCE and evacuation site party  
 88 accomplish prior to the deployment of the evacuation force. Critical to the mission success of the advance  
 89 party are–

- 90 • Establishing liaison with the American diplomatic mission.
- 91 • Establishing a forward command post that can be expanded to the JTF headquarters staff.

- 92 • Providing a collaborative planning capability with the country team and reachback capability to
- 93 the JFC.
- 94 • Categorizing the operational environment (permissive, uncertain, or hostile).

95 C-9. CA staff members of the advance party whether supporting the FCE or evacuation site party

96 normally execute the following tasks–

- 97 • Conduct an initial assessment of the operational area to validate information and assumptions of
- 98 the CAO running estimate and advise the officer-in-charge (OIC) of CMO related issues affecting
- 99 the NEO.
- 100 • Identify to the OIC measures to minimize indigenous population interference with evacuation
- 101 operations.
- 102 • Maintain close liaison with embassy officials to ensure effective interagency coordination and
- 103 delineation of CA responsibilities and essential tasks.
- 104 • Identify and establish contact with IGOs and NGOs present in the operational area.
- 105 • Identify sources of indigenous material and labor to support military operations.
- 106 • Assist in ground reconnaissance of proposed assembly areas, evacuation sites, beaches, helicopter
- 107 landing zones, airports, and ports.
- 108 • Assist in the initial preparation of assembly areas and evacuation sites.
- 109 • Conduct civil reconnaissance to collect essential CAO planning information.
- 110 • Identify the JTF requirements for supporting evacuee screening and processing.

111 C-10. The evacuation site party identifies and, where possible, establishes the assembly areas, evacuation

112 sites, and the evacuation control center (ECC). Site preparations are completed in coordination with the

113 embassy's country team and EAP. In the event that reconnaissance of proposed assembly areas and

114 evacuation sites determines they are unsuitable, recommendations to move preplanned sites are coordinated

115 for approval by the ambassador.

## 116 Deployment

117 C-11. The composition of the evacuation force is mission dependent. The size of the main body depends

118 on the number of evacuees, evacuation sites, assembly areas, and the tactical situation. Upon arrival of the

119 main body, the advance party rejoins the headquarters. Deployment of the evacuation force may be

120 executed directly to the HN or to an ISB prior to insertion to the HN. The ISB may be located in another

121 country close to where the evacuation is taking place or may be any ship under U.S. control. Ideally, the

122 ISB will also function as a temporary safe haven, if one is required. When an ISB is located in a country

123 other than the United States, the DOS is responsible for coordinating with the government of that country.

124 C-12. The evacuation force may consist of a HQ, marshalling element, security element, logistic element,

125 joint communications support element, and SOF. The command group normally executes direct supervision

126 over a liaison team and the ECC. See Figure C-1, page C-4.

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
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**Figure C-1. Evacuation Joint Task Force**

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C-13. CA forces assigned or attached to the evacuation force may be employed in a number of supporting roles. Based on CA’s core capabilities, the force is best utilized when tasked in support of the marshalling force, liaison team, or the ECC.

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C-14. When assigned to the marshalling team, CA tasks in support of an assembly area may include–

- Recording the name, sex, age, potential medical problems, and citizenship of each evacuee.
- Identifying evacuees not on the list of potential evacuees provided by the embassy.
- Briefing each evacuee on the baggage limitations set by the embassy, positive identification requirements at the ECC, and restricted items that may not be transported according to embassy instructions to evacuees.
- Completing a “Waiver of Evacuation Opportunity” for evacuees who refuse to leave.
- Escorting evacuees to the ECC.
- Providing liaison to HN security forces and government officials.

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C-15. When supporting the liaison team, CA forces continue liaison activities with the embassy, HN, IGOs, NGOs, multinational forces, third country officials or other private sector organizations as required.


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156 **Evacuation Control Center Operations**

157 C-16. The ECC supports the DOS, which executes processing, screening, and selected logistic functions  
 158 associated with emergency evacuation of noncombatants. The JTF should, however, be prepared to perform  
 159 functions that are DOS responsibilities, if required. Evacuee processing may take place at an in-country  
 160 fixed facility, an air terminal, onboard ship, or at a temporary safe haven site. Regardless of location, a  
 161 comprehensive plan for reception and care of evacuees is implemented. The evacuation force commander's  
 162 primary responsibilities include providing overall security, maintaining order at the evacuation site, and  
 163 supporting the ambassador's efforts to care for noncombatant evacuees.

164 C-17. The ECC's purpose is to prepare the evacuees for eventual overseas movement to a temporary safe  
 165 haven or the United States. The ECC screens all evacuees to certify identification, ensures that  
 166 documentation is accurate, and verifies all information provided is current. Representatives from the  
 167 embassy's consular affairs section are present in the ECC to help determine the eligibility of questionable  
 168 evacuees. Evacuees may arrive directly at the ECC or be escorted to the site by the marshalling force from  
 169 assembly areas. If evacuees arrive without escort, processing personnel verify their identity and eligibility  
 170 for evacuation prior to allowing the evacuees to enter the ECC. Figure C-2 provides a recommended ECC  
 171 flow chart.



172  
 173 **Figure C-2. Evacuation Control Center Flow Chart**

174 C-18. Control of evacuees is paramount for the ECC to operate efficiently. The processing center performs  
175 the necessary screening, registration, medical, and transportation functions to ensure an orderly evacuation.  
176 Very important persons (VIPs) (designated by the Ambassador or on-scene commander) and emergency  
177 medical cases are provided individual escorts when available.

178 C-19. When assigned to the ECC, CA tasks in support of evacuee processing may include–

- 179 • Within the reception station:
    - 180 ▪ In conjunction with DOS representatives, receive, search, segregate, and brief incoming
181 evacuees.
  - 182 ▪ Maintain a roster of each evacuee, with nationality, date of birth, evacuation classification,
183 profession, destination, and name, address, and/or phone number of a point of contact (POC)184 in the United States for notification.  - 185 ▪ Escort evacuees as required.
- 186 • At the registration station:
  - 187 ▪ Assist in the positive identification of U.S. citizens and the nationalities of other evacuees
188 according to DOS guidance.
- 189 ▪ Refer evacuees with questionable identification to the DOS representative for final
- 190 determination of evacuation eligibility. NOTE: Foreign nationals must either be on the list of191 potential evacuees provided by the embassy or post or secure approval from the DOS staff192 before they can continue processing. The Ambassador or designated representative will be the193 final authority on acceptability of evacuee identification.
- 194 ▪ Supervise foreign nationals until they are cleared for evacuation or escorted outside the ECC.
- 195 ▪ Assist evacuees in completing administrative paperwork required to evacuate.
- 196 ▪ Provide each evacuee or family group a copy of DD Form 2585, Repatriation Processing
- 197 Center Processing Sheet, which should be completed before arrival at the repatriation center.198 (Refer to Appendix G, JP 3-68.)
- 199 • Other duties as assigned within the ECC.

200 C-20. During the course of an evacuation, nationals of the HN or third country nationals may request  
201 political asylum or temporary refuge. It is the policy of the U.S. to grant temporary refuge in a foreign  
202 country solely for humanitarian reasons when extreme or exceptional circumstances put in imminent  
203 danger the life or safety of a person. Until determination is made by DOS, U.S. forces safeguard those  
204 requesting political asylum or temporary refuge. The on-the-scene commander decides which measures can  
205 prudently be taken to provide temporary refuge. Requests for political asylum are handled by the DOS on  
206 an individual basis through appropriate channels.

## 207 Temporary Safe Haven Operations

208 C-21. A temporary safe haven, designated by DOS, is a location in an area or country to which evacuees  
209 may be moved quickly and easily. Ideally, the safe haven will be in the United States; however,  
210 circumstances may exist that require a temporary safe haven. Adequate transportation may not be available  
211 to move all evacuees directly from the evacuation sites to the United States. If a temporary safe haven is  
212 required, the DOS coordinates with the government where it will be located. Coordination for the use of  
213 facilities, customs requirements, security, transportation, and billeting is required.

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**The July 2006 Evacuation of American Citizens from Lebanon**

The evacuation of nearly 15,000 American citizens from Lebanon during July and August 2006 was one of the largest overseas evacuations of American citizens in recent history. The Department of State (State) has the lead responsibility for evacuating American citizens from overseas locations in times of crisis. However, the size and unforeseen nature of the Lebanon evacuation required the assistance of the Defense Department (DOD). Specifically, State needed DOD’s ability to secure safe passage for American citizens in a war zone, as well as DOD’s expertise and resources in providing sea and air transportation for large numbers of people.

The evacuation was unusually large, complex, and actually consisted of two distinct evacuation phases: first, removing nearly 15,000 people from the war zone in Lebanon to temporary safe havens—DOD transported about 90 percent of the U.S. evacuees to Cyprus, and took the rest to Incirlik Airbase in Turkey; and, second, flying them from these safe havens to the United States. Normally, DOD limits its assistance to removing evacuees from danger, and then turns them over to State at a safe haven, where State assists them in making travel arrangements to return home. In the Lebanon evacuation, however, State asked DOD to assist in the transportation of evacuees to the United States.

**Government Accounting Office (GAO) Report to Congress  
 GAO-07-893R  
 U.S. Evacuation from Lebanon**

C-22. The temporary safe haven force operates under the control of the JFC in coordination with the appropriate DOS representative. The force is organized like the ECC’s processing section. The force should deploy no later than the evacuation force; however, logistic requirements to support a large number of evacuees may require that it deploy earlier.

C-23. CA forces assigned or attached to the temporary safe haven force may be employed in a number of supporting roles. The CA force is best utilized when tasked in support of the reception and processing teams.

C-24. When assigned to the reception team, CA tasks include—

- Maintaining liaison with local DOS representatives and other agencies that may be involved with the operation.
- Briefing the evacuees on their arrival regarding—
  - Current political situation in the HN.
  - Description and operation of the temporary safe haven.
  - Further traveling options and arrangements.
  - Customs requirements in the temporary safe haven.
  - Projected departure times for flights to the United States.
  - Restrictions applicable to evacuees while at the temporary safe haven.

260 C-25. The processing team does not duplicate processing completed at the ECC, but should verify that all  
261 information obtained from the evacuees is complete and correct. CA forces normally are assigned  
262 supporting tasks within the administration section of the processing team. These tasks may include—

- 263 • Receiving and registering incoming evacuees in conjunction with DOS representatives.
- 264 • Maintaining a roster of each evacuee who passes through the temporary safe haven. It should list  
265 the nationality, date of birth, evacuation classification, profession, destination, and name, address,  
266 and/or phone number of a POC in the United States for notification.
- 267 • Providing escorts for groups of personnel, VIPs, and emergency medical cases.
- 268 • Providing assistance as needed in locating separated family members.

269 C-26. Movement of evacuees from temporary safe havens normally concludes at repatriation centers  
270 within the U.S. Under emergency conditions, the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) is the  
271 lead Federal Agency for the reception of all evacuees in the United States and their onward movement.  
272 Ultimately, each Federal Agency is accountable for assistance to its own noncombatant personnel.

273 C-27. DODD 3025.14, *Noncombatant Evacuation Operations*, designates the Secretary of the Army as the  
274 DOD executive agent for repatriation planning and operations of DOD personnel. The Army is responsible  
275 for repatriation of DOD noncombatants. When requested, the Army also provides repatriation services to  
276 non-DOD personnel.